Review List for TRADE AND MARKET IN THE EARLY EMPIRES - pub. date May 20, 1957

American Anthropologist
American Economic Review
Amer. Geographical Society
Amer. Historical Review
Amer. Rev. of Sociology
Amer. Political Science Rev.
American Scholar
Amer. Sociological Review
The Annals
Annals, Amer. Cong. Arcn.
Anthropologie - Paris
Antiquity - England
Archaeology
Atlantic Monthly
The Booklist
British J. of Sociology
Bibliothèques D'Histoire Mondiale - Paris
Canadian J. of Econ. & Pol. Sci.
Card Div. Lib. of Congress
Chicago Tribune
Christian Science Monitor
Clarendon Quarterly - London
Cumulative Book Index

Economic History Review - London
Economic Journal - England
Economic Record - Australia
Economica - London
Encounter - London
English Hist. Rev. - London
Harpers Magazine
Hesperia
Historia - Germany
Homo - Germany
Int'l Rev. of Soc. History - Amsterdam
J. of Amer. Oriental Society
J. of Economic History
J. of the History of Ideas
J. of Political Economy
Library Journal
Man - London
Meridian Books
Felix Merrow
The Nation
J. of Near Eastern Studies
New Republic
N. Y. Herald Tribune
N. Y. Times, Book Rev.
N. Y. Times, Branson Crane
Summary of the Economy + Society Discussion.

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Economy + Society

Tale at Parsons 1957 (Neil Smelser 1957)

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Outline of Answer to Smelser (Type 118)

by H. W. Pearson

Review: Foundations 1979 T J. Spengler

of Polit. Ex. due 68, 7
(8) L'Anthropologie, Paris t. 61 No. 3-4, 1957 Movement Scientifique - M. Bonteiller (Editor) No copies

(9) The Annual of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (v. 313 p 195-6) (Lewis H. Haney - Fort Washington, N.Y.)


(11) Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science (pp. 91-2) Paul Schmitz (Sir George Williams Coll.)


15) The American Anthropologist (The Economy has no Surplus) 1959 No copies
1. The American Economic Review - Simon Rottenberg - U. of Chicago (3 copies)
2. The American Historical Review - Donald Dewey (5 copies)
3. The American Journal of Sociology - Manning Nash - U of Chicago (7 copies)
5. Final paragraph of above review (No. 4) (6 copies)
7. L'Anthropologie - Mouvement Scientifique - M. Bouville (2 copies)
8. Archaeology - Tom R. Jones - U of Minnesota (3 copies)
9. Boston University Graduate Journal - George Dalton (6 copies)
10. Canadian Journal of Economics & Political Science - Paul Schweitzer - Sir George Williams College (6 copies)
12. The Economic Journal (6 copies)
13. UNESCO International Social Science Bulletin (5 copies)
14. The Indian Economic Journal - Murray C. Polakoff - Austin (Original only)
(A) Karl Polanyi: Economic theory and anthropology (Ed: Morton H. Fried)
(B) Karl Polanyi: Conception, treatment of economic mobilization in Industrial society (Ind. Soc.)
"The economy has no angles?"
The Anonymity of Antiquity

The sphere of culture and art in ancient times is one of the most fascinating and enigmatic aspects of human history. The works of art and literature produced during this period have left behind a legacy of beauty and wisdom that continues to inspire and awe us to this day. However, the true identity of the creators of these masterpieces remains a mystery, as many of the works were produced anonymously. The reasons for this anonymity are multifaceted and include cultural, religious, and political factors.

In ancient Greece, for example, the concept of the author was not as developed as it is today. The idea of the artist as a self-promoting figure was not prevalent, and the works of art were often regarded as the product of a collective effort. The concept of the artist as a unique individual who created a piece of art in his own name was foreign to the Greek mindset.

Similarly, in ancient Rome, the idea of the artist as a private individual was not as prominent. The works of art were often commissioned by wealthy patrons, who would hire the artists to create works that would glorify their status and wealth. The artists themselves were often anonymous, and their works were seen as the product of the patron, rather than the artist.

In many cases, the anonymity of the artists is due to the way in which the works were distributed and preserved. Many of the works of art were destroyed or damaged over time, and only a few survive to this day. The works that have survived are often the result of chance, and the identity of the artists who created them is often lost.

Despite the anonymity of the artists, their works continue to inspire and awe us. The beauty and creativity of these works are a testament to the human spirit, and a reminder of our shared humanity.

The Anonymity of Antiquity is a fascinating topic, and one that continues to fascinate scholars and art lovers alike. The mystery of the anonymous artist is a mystery that continues to captivate us, and a reminder of our shared humanity.
C. Wright Mills and the Pragmatists

Sociology and Pragmatism: The Higher Learning in America
by C. Wright Mills

Harvey J. Black

The greater part of this book, which mainly concerns other things, contains some facts about C. Wright Mills' views on American society and education. In making these comments, I would like to say that it is my belief that the book will prove to be of great value to all who are interested in these subjects.

The book is divided into two parts: the first part deals with the sociological aspects of education, and the second part is devoted to the educational system as a whole. In the first part, Mills discusses the role of education in American society, and he argues that education is not merely a preparation for life, but is also a means of social control. He points out that the educational system is systematically biased against certain groups of people, and that this bias is reinforced by the social and economic structure of American society.

In the second part, Mills discusses the role of education in the political and economic life of the country. He argues that education is a powerful force in shaping the character of the individual, and that it is also a powerful instrument in the hands of those who control the educational system. Mills believes that education can be used to create a society that is more just and equitable, but he also argues that the educational system is currently biased against certain groups of people, and that this bias is reinforced by the social and economic structure of American society.

In conclusion, I would like to say that this book is a valuable contribution to the study of education and society. It is written in a clear and concise style, and it is easy to read. I would recommend it to anyone who is interested in these subjects.


Some years ago Professor Karl Polanyi in The Great Transformation - a brilliant socialist polemic and no mean work of scholarship - traced the major ills of the modern world, notably war, fascism, and unemployment (communism was not then thought to be a major ill) to the rise of the free market in the nineteenth century. When this earlier work appeared in 1944, it struck a novel note in the socialist camp, for Polanyi was too good a historian to believe that historical development is "inescrutable" and, hence, did not refrain from venturing moral judgments with a refreshing Victorian flavor. Unfortunately, historians, like most people, have difficulty in leaving well enough alone. In this new work, Polanyi and a formidable body of associates undertake to document and defend at length the major assumptions of the Great Transformation. The result is a very dubious Book Indeed. Its avowed objects are to show that the "self-regulating market" was unknown to certain earlier civilizations; that there is nothing "natural" about such a market; and, hence, that economic historians should rid themselves of that illusion that, throughout most of history, most human beings have sought to buy cheap and sell dear. The book can fairly be described as a sales talk for a particular approach to history with demonstrations and occasional exhortation to accept substitutes. Among the subjects treated in the eighteen chapters are "marketless trading in human times," "primitive discovers the economy," "anthropology as history," "trade enterprises in Asien and Norden civilizations," and "Parsons and Selter on the economy."

Will this book cause economic historians to change their ways? I doubt it. The authors' hardest blows are directed against straw men of their own making, and their relevant criticism of economic history are not convincing. To economists, the "self-regulating market" - the villain of the piece - is one in which a rise in the price of wheat relative to the price of oats will induce people to raise more wheat and fewer oats - nothing more. The response to this price change may be fast or slow, accurate or inaccurate, good or bad. Since the stone age, no market society has managed to stay alive without making some use of a self-regulating market to organize its activities, and no society has ever refrained from intervention designed to speed up, slow down, or suppress certain market-induced adjustments. By the terminology of this book, a market ceases to be self-regulating when the restraints imposed by custom and politics pass a certain point. The implication is that economic historians by thinking too much in terms of market adjustments, underestimate the role of custom and politics in their discipline.

That economic historians tend to discount the importance of custom in determining prices (also wages, rents, choice of occupation, etc.) is true enough. But is this not because experience has taught them that, on close examination, customary prices turn out to be either of very recent origin or not the prices at which goods and services change hands? The fragmentary evidence on the influence of custom in economic life brought forward in this book affords no basis for concluding that the skepticism of economic historians is unreasonable. Likewise, the authors do not cite chapter and verse to show how economic historians have been led into error by a neglect of political considerations.

The truth would seem to be that this book, like The Great Transformation, is dedicated to the proposition that bourgeois economists who still take Adam Smith seriously have certainly a warped, and probably a false, view of human nature. We doubt bourgeois economists, as a class, are temperamentally suited to their dry calling and so have difficulty in understanding why their fellow men so readily respond
to appeals to the heart. But does this matter? Appeals to the heart are relatively rare in the everyday business of life; most of the bread baked for sale throughout the ages has gone to the highest bidder. Admittedly economists have only a modest contribution to make to the writing of history; but in common with archivists, translators, ethnologists, and other such folk, they have certain skills that occasionally prove useful to historians.

As a contribution to methodology this book is too diffuse and jargon-laden to have much effect for good or ill. Yet it contains a number of good things for specialists, notably Polanyi's demonstration that some serious errors have been made in translating Aristotle's work on economics and Rosemary Arnold's chapters on aspects of the African slave trade. In conclusion, it is not out of place to suggest that the cause of "interdisciplinary" research in the social sciences would be advanced by the use of better English.

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This is a book which is easy to review in a superficial manner, but rather difficult as soon as one tries to check in fact what the authors intended to say. Economic theory and reports about anthropological materials form the main part of this monograph. Cuneiform, Biblical, Greek, and Roman problems are considered more briefly with the intention of finding common denominations for an immense mass of at first look, unconnected facts. Economic theories about market and about non-market economies only belong into a review for this periodical, whenever the authors try to explain facts of Oriental social and Economic History with their help.

In principle I must confess that I was unable to discover a completely integrated and interconnected theoretical system behind these analyses. In addition, Professor Pearson has made the preposterous assumption that the formulations of Professors Reuther, Baederker, and Eduard Meyer are in agreement with the Greek-Roman source evidence, and that Professors Eduard Meyer, Daniel, and Rossier-Castel had aspirations to analyze and propound economic theory. I am, under these circumstances, quite certain that systematic economic theoretics will either have to reject or to remodel the ideas about economic theory which are expressed in this book.

Of the attempted anthropological analytical studies about Aztec and Maya civilisations by Anne C. Chapman is not pertinent to this periodical, those about Whydah on the Guinea Coast by Rosemary Arnold, about the Berber Highlands by Francisco Barea, about Coptic and Redbatim in the Indian Village by Walter C. Nade will be of interest to a number of readers. However, they will discover that much material and much recent discussion are missing and that the African early reports are not sufficiently confronted with contemporary observations on peasant economic survivals. The weakest pages of this book are those where attempts are made to use Cuneiform, Biblical, and Graeco-Roman evidence. To give a first example, that the 50 deben or, perhaps, Tyrian drachms which Judah Ishmael received, should be compared with pertinence with the equivalency of a slave as set out in Hamburgr's Code (p. 34), is an obvious economic howler. Neither the silver content nor the buying power of the sums in question have anything in common.

It is methodologically quite right that interpretations from Graeco-Roman, Medieval and modern patterns are excluded, as far as possible, whereas Cuneiform evidence is used. But it sholud be obvious that the pertinent Cuneiform sources have to be perused in full, as obtain convincing conclusions. Unfortunately Professor Polanyi who is responsible for the crucial chapter II of this book ("Market Trading in Hamburgr's Time") is at most superficial, and a comparison with Professor A. L. Oppenheim's more modern chapter III ("A Bird's Eye View of Mesopotamian Economic History") will show conclusively. For Professor Oppenheim Cuneiform economy is characterized by "the interaction between two independent variables,
palace and city". As a rule, this led, in his correct opinion, to fairly strict, albeit still primitive state planning with rather restricted individual trading.

But Professor Polanyi seems to believe honestly that the fact that "market places" do not seem to appear in our archaeological Cuneiform evidence according to Professor Oppenheim must mean that market trade in the ancient "fertile crescent" of the Bronze Age was reduced to zero. Did Professor Polanyi, in fact, never hear of the "market" price, established at the quays, which had the same natural function of market places in southern Mesopotamia, traffic making use of the rivers a great deal, and of the gates functioning in a similar way as market places at the entrances of Mesopotamian cities? Did he not receive information that both foreigners and natives could buy and sell there legally what the general state planning did not require? That money, usually in the form of weighed or measured units, was not used as a means of exchange in all pertinent Cuneiform documents is quite true. Here an all too modernizing earlier interpretation has to be and usually has already been abandoned. But when Professor Polanyi comes to the rather surprising generalizing conclusion that "money is not used as a means of exchange" in Sumerian, Akadian, and even Assyrian, Neo-Babylonian, or Persian Mesopotamia, he does more harm to truth than the all too conservative, but more cautious representative of an earlier generation.

Professor Polanyi uses Graeco-Roman sources more than once in trying to prove a point in his analysis of Cuneiform economic conditions. This will make a proper appreciation of his views by Cuneiform specialists rather difficult. But it must be said by me as an Ancient Historian and Classic scholar that unfortunately he does not interpret Greek passages well. To give a striking example. On page 16 f. this author uses Herodotus I, 153 to prove that the city of Babylon had no market place for trade as late as during the earlier 5th century B.C. In fact, the passage in question only speaks of Persian Iran, i.e., the Susana, and is of dubious value even for outlining conditions in this region, because we probably do not have here a Herodotean statement before us, but an interpolation by some post-Classical compiler who was under the influence of more anthropological theory. Cf. here J. E. Powell, Herodotus (1940), pp. IV, 73.

Similarly serious slips are found where facts of the Graeco-Roman period, including the Phocisian, Carthaginian, and Lydian social and economic patterns of life are analyzed (pp. XI, 1 f., 13, 14, 15, 48, 52 f., 53 f., 57 f., 61 f., 65-69, 219 f., 675). Whatever has perished in the long and informative monograph by W. K. Pritchett—A. D. Pigott—D. A. Amoros, The Ancient World, (Historia 25 (1950), 223-251, 263 (1956), 178-185, 27 (1958), 195-210—will find as much unprofitable contemporaneous and primary evidence as may be desired to show that Professor Polanyi's thesis is prepositional according to which a proper and intensive market economy began in Athens and elsewhere in Greece is late as in the course of the 4th century B.C. (cf. especially pp. 64 f. of the reviewed book).

A different matter is that Professors Bollackst, Friesly, Hassebroek, Oestel, resile, and a number of other colleagues have eliminated many all too modernizing interpretations of ancient evidence from the economic picture of the period from Pindar to Demosthenes and Aristotle. Furthermore, the Ancient Historians of to day, with very few exceptions, now refuse completely to believe in an intensive Hellenic market economy before the small silver denominations of Aegina, Corinth, and
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Athens were coined near 660 B.C. Thereafter, until 470 B.C., or so, a limited market economy developed in the territories of a few Greek states only. Professor Polanyi, however, does not consider these well established facts of Greek economic development as worthy of his consideration.

I only mention here a few of the numerous serious misinterpretations of the Greek-Roman sources which are found in large numbers throughout this book. On p. 15 and 16 Poseidon banking and the legal position of Poseidonicus Alexandria are misunderstood by Professor Polanyi and Revere. On p. 13 Al Mina, the famous site, which was excavated by Sir Leonard Woolley is dated in too early a millennium. Professor Revere is so fascinated by his wish to find ancient examples for what he calls "actual para" that he includes (pp. 15 f., 60) Phoenician empire building cities like Tyre, Sidon, and Carthage and an otherwise at least arguable argument, and permits Smyrna to survive after the Lydian destruction of 575 B.C., or so (pp. 56 f.). Professor Polanyi's chapter V ("Articled Discoveries the Economy") is mainly a sociological treatment about matters which do not have anything to do with interpreting Aristotle. That the Lydian electrum coinage is not as early as king Croesus, but was not issued before 520 B.C. or so has been proved irrefutably. Cp. F. M. Helschaim, Near Eastern Economic History I (1938), p. 581, E.G. Robinson, The Date of the Earliest Coinage, Num. Chron. 6, 1912 (1916), 7 f.

The interpretation of the term katechismos in Aristotle, Pol. 1247 a 18 by Professor Polanyi is impossible, because the related term katechismos is not considered. In addition, the author tries to make his readers believe that Aristotle is confusing in this passage. His interpretation of ostraka sounds, in contradiction to this, that Aristotle was not used to deviate from the average meaning of Greek terms at all. On the whole, this is a most regrettable book, with the exception of Professor Oppenheim's chapter III.

F. M. HESCHAIM


Le présent ouvrage, qui avec un certain sobriété vient clairement en aide III édherent pour, mérite d'être spécialisé signalé en mètre de sa publication, quel qu'en soit l'intérieur, que de son esprit et de sa méthode, qu'il semblerait voir se reproduire dans des domaines scientifiques utiles sous certains exceptionnels. J. Sauvageot a agit sans effort salutaire l'opposition de conception qui existe entre l'historien de l'art, qui se l'intéresse aux monuments ayant une valeur esthétique et dans une certaine mesure pour eux-mêmes, et l'archéologue, pour qui tous les vestiges de l'activité humaine sont un retour en dehors de l'archéologue, et il remarquait que, dans le domaine mathématique ou l'étude de divinité, il a conçu dans l'esprit de l'histoire de l'art. Il l'a des civilisations pour la reconstruction desquelles l'archéologue a été de son esprit fondamental, soit que la nature des vestiges découverts conduise d'elle-même vers des conclusions liées largement à l'ensemble de la vie sociale, soit que l'absence relative de sources littéraires ai
This book is of outstanding interest. Any anthropologist, and any economist, whose field of interest lies mainly outside the highly developed societies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, will find it challenging and profitable reading.

The book has a central thesis, which inspires in varying degrees the essays of all the eleven contributors. It was developed first by Professor Karl Polanyi, and elaborated under his inspiration by a group of economists, anthropologists and sociologists, working under the auspices of a Columbia University Interdisciplinary Project for research on economic institutions during the years following 1948. This central thesis is that economics, in the usual modern sense of the word, is no more than a study of market phenomena' (p. 241), and that modern economic analysis is properly applicable only to economies based on a complete self-regulating market mechanism, excluding the supply-demand-price mechanism. "In the absence of markets and market prices, the economist cannot be of help to the student of primitive economics; indeed, he may hinder him." (Ibid.) It is difficult even to identify the economic process where it is embedded in non-economic institutions" (p. 71), as in tribal societies, based on kinship.

Economics (the thesis continues) can be 'integrated' in any one or more of three different ways. There is not only the system of present growth to which alone modern economic analysis is applicable, namely 'Exchange', operating through a whole system of price-fixing markets; there are also 'Reciprocity' and 'Redistribution'. In a 'reciprocative' system, the society is divided into groups, the members of any one of which act towards another group as the members of that group (or of some other group) act towards them (see pp. 222, 252-3). Familiar examples are the Trobriand economy and the Kula exchanges of certain Melanesian islanders, described by Malinowski and Ruth Benedict. In a "distribution system", the produce of the society flows into a centre, either physically or notionally, and is then shared among the members according to fixed rules (see pp. 223, 233-4). Groups within a society, such as a patriarchal household or a medieval manor, may be organized on a 'distribution' system, irrespective of the way in which the economy as a whole is integrated. Reciprocity and Redistribution are often combined, with or without some of those features which in their developed form are the hallmark of Exchange. In one of the most successful chapters in the book, Dr Walter C. Neale shows (pp. 293-8) how the Incan village economy which so puzzled early British administrators was an intricate blend of Reciprocity (through the case system) and Redistribution (through the sharing of the common grain heap), devoid of market features.

There are enough valid conclusions in the book to make it, in the phrase used by more than one contributor, a "paradise再也没有啊工作", but good to some of the individual elements are in marked disharmony. Dr. Neale and Professor Daniel R. Fusfeld, there are very serious weaknesses which can only exasperate the reader who does not share Professor Polanyi's obsession with the market. Exaggeration of the main thesis by several of the contributors is important. It is a great pity that of the first five chapters, dealing with various aspects of ancient economic history and thought, only one has been written by a scholar who knows the original sources at first hand: this is chapter III, in which Professor A. L. Oppenheim gives a particularly stimulating "Bird's-Eye View of Mesopotamian Economic History". Above all, Professor Polanyi comes to grief in his chapter V, dealing with ancient Greece. No scholar more than he realizes the Greek commercial practices contained in the private speeches of the Attic orators and in the comic poets, he draws an entirely unwarranted distinction between sixth and fifth century Greece, which he describes as "economically more naive than even the extreme 'primitive' would have it", and Greece of the fourth century, to which he attributes the origin of the "gainful business practices that in much later days developed into the dynamo of market competition" (p. 64). Greek economic life, he declares, was "still in the very first beginnings of market trade in Aristotle's time", and in his writings "we possess an eyewitness account of some of the praiseworthy features of infant commerce at its very first appearance in the history of civilization" (p. 65). To cite the major developments took place not later than the fifth century, during the last years of which, for instance, we already meet with the earliest surviving reference to the bottomly bond (Libras, XXXII, 6-7, 14), that remarkable invention (the prototype of marine insurance) which contributed so much to the development of trade by spreading its risks, which were then considerable, for outside the comparatively poor commercial section of the population. Professor Polanyi's views about the importance of local food markets in the Peloponnesian War period and in early fourth century Athens, but the only evidence he cites is badly misinterpreted. Cities might sometimes set up special markets outside their walls for foreign armies, or generals might create them, but this
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outside their walls for foreign armies, or generals might meet there, but this
was simply because the cities did not wish to admit the foreign armies within
their gates; there is never any implication that regular markets did not exist
inside the cities concerned. Professor Polanyi forgets an important piece of fifth
century evidence of which he himself elsewhere makes good use: Herodotus I,
152, where a striking contrast is drawn between the Greeks, who do have
markets, and the Persians, who do not.

Professor Polanyi will not, then, allow the economy of ancient Greece, at any
time before the Hellenistic period, to count as a system of 'Exchange'. Unfortunatley he has failed to ask himself whether it can be said to fall under either
of his other classifications. In fact, three features of the economy which Professor Polanyi
identifies as Reciprocal and Redistribution are conspicuously
absent from Greek society of at any rate the fifth century onwards, as from
the Hellenistic cities and the fully developed Roman world down to at least
the third century A.D. The Greeks certainly made more significant use of the
slave system than their predecessors. Their development of marketing institutions,
transmitted to the Roman world, was perhaps an even more remarkable

New College, Oxford G. R. M. de Ste. Croix
This book is of outstanding interest. Any anthropologist, and any economic historian whose field of interest lies mainly outside the highly developed societies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, will find it challenging and profitable reading.

The book has a central thesis, which inspires in varying degrees the essays of all the eleven contributors. It was developed first by Professor Karl Polanyi, and elaborated under his inspiration by a group of economists, anthropologists and sociologists working under the auspices of a Columbia University 'Interdisciplinary Project' for research on economic institutions during the years following 1948. This central thesis is that economics, in the usual modern sense of the word, 'is no more than a study of market phenomena' (p.241), and that modern economic analysis is properly applicable only to economics based on a complete 'self-regulating' market system embodying the supply-demand-price mechanism. 'In the absence of markets and market prices, the economist cannot be of help to the student of primitive economies; indeed, he may hinder him.' (Ibid.) It is difficult even to identify the economic process 'where it is embedded in non-economic institutions' (p.71), as in tribal societies based on kinship.

Economics [the thesis continues] can be 'integrated' in any one or more of three different ways. There is not only the system of recent growth to which alone modern economic analysis is appropriate, namely 'Exchange', operating through a whole system of price-fixing markets; there are also 'Reciprocity' and 'Redistribution'. In a 'reciprocal' system, the society is divided into groups, the members of any one of which act towards another group as the members of that group (or of some other group) act towards them (see pp.222, 252-3). Familiar examples are the Trobriand economy and the Kula exchanges of certain Melanesian islanders, described by Malinowski and Ruth Benedict. In a 'redistributive' system, the produce of the society flows into a centre, either physically or notionally, and is then shared out among the members according to fixed rules (see pp.223, 253-4). Groups within a society, such as a patriarchal household or a medieval manor, may be organized on a 'distributive' system, irrespective of the way in which the economy as a whole is integrated. Reciprocity and Redistribution are often combined, with or without some of those features which in their developed form are the hallmark of Exchange. In one of the most successful chapters in the book, Dr Walter C. Neale shows (pp.223-6) how the Indian village economy which so puzzled early British administrators
was an intricate blend of Reciprocity (through the caste system) and Redistribution (through the sharing of the common grain heap), devoid of market features.

There are enough valid conclusions in the book to make it, in the phrase used by more than one contributor, a 'pathbreaking work'. But good as some of the individual chapters are (in particular those of Dr Neale and Professor Daniel B. Fusfeld), there are very serious weaknesses which can only exasperate the reader who does not share Professor Polanyi's obsession with the market. Exaggeration of the main thesis by several of the contributors is constant. And it is a great pity that of the first five chapters, dealing with various aspects of ancient economic history and thought, only one has been written by a scholar who knows the original sources at first hand: this is chapter III, in which Professor A.L. Oppenheim gives a particularly stimulating 'Bird's-Eye View of Mesoopotamian Economic History'.

Above all, Professor Polanyi comes to grief in his chapter (V) dealing with ancient Greece: 'Aristotle Discovers the Economy', 'Hag-ridden by his general theory, and showing no knowledge of the great body of evidence for Greek commercial practices contained in the private speeches of the Attic orators and in the comic poets, he draws an entirely unwarranted distinction between sixth and fifth century Greece, which he describes as 'economically more naive than even the extreme "primitivist" would have it', and Greece of the fourth century, to which he attributes the origin of 'the gainful business practices that in much later days developed into the dynamo of market competition' (p.64). Greek economic life, he declares, was 'still in the very first beginnings of market trade in Aristotle's time', and in his writings 'we possess an eye-witness account of some of the pristine features of incipient market trading at its very first appearance in the history of civilization' (p.67). In fact the major developments took place not later than the fifth century, during the last years of which, for instance, we already meet with the earliest surviving reference to the bottomry bond (Lysias, XXIII, 6-7, 14), that remarkable invention (the precursor of marine insurance) which contributed so much to the development of trade by spreading its risks, which were then considerable, far outside the comparatively poor commercial section of the population. Professor Polanyi even denies the existence of local food markets in the Peloponnesian War period and in early fourth century Ionia; but the only evidence he cites is sadly misinterpreted. Cities might sometimes set up special markets outside their walls for foreign armies, or generals might create them, but this was simply because the cities did not wish to admit the foreign armies within their gates; there is never any implication that regular markets did not exist inside the cities concerned. Professor Polanyi forgets an important piece of fifth century evidence of which he himself elsewhere makes good use: Herodotus I, 153, where a striking contrast is drawn between the Greeks, who do have markets, and the Persians, who
Professor Polanyi will not, then, allow the economy of ancient Greece, at any rate before the Hellenistic period, to count as a system of 'Exchange'. Unfortunately he has failed to ask himself whether it can be said to fall under either of his other two heads. In fact those features of the economy which Professor Polanyi identifies as Reciprocative and Redistributive are conspicuously absent from Greek society of at any rate the fifth century onwards, as from the Hellenistic cities and the fully developed Roman world down to at least the third century A.D. The Greeks certainly made more significant use of the slave system than their predecessors. Their development of marketing institutions, transmitted to the Roman world, was perhaps an even more remarkable phenomenon. Slavery in a highly developed form, and the free market: a case might be made for putting these two features of Greek society, with the political development culminating in democracy, among the basic reasons why Greek civilization advanced so far beyond anything that had gone before it.

New College, Oxford                              G.E.M. de Ste. Croix

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No. 3. April 1960, p. 510
In a striking book entitled "Trade and Market in the Early Empires," published in America in 1957 under the editorship of F. Polanyi, C. M. Arensberg, and H. W. Pearson, who worked together in a team at Columbia University in New York, a position was taken, among other things, with respect to trade in the Ancient Near East. The most prominent position of Polanyi is that markets and market trade, characteristic of our Western trade, first appeared roughly sometime since the time of Aristotle. In the Ancient Near East, in particular in Mesopotamia, markets and market trade should (on this view) have been unknown. Economic intercourse, and also what we call trade, should have depended there on reciprocity and redistribution.

"Reciprocity may be attained through a sharing ... ad hoc central decision" (quotation from p. 253)

Yet the exchange of goods was necessary between the various countries and this was so from the earliest times. This should happen (on this view) in so-called "ports of trade," neutral places, originally under the protection of a sanctuary, later also of a weak political authority. In particular, such "ports of trade" would have been Ugarit, Byblos, later Tyre and Sidon, and finally also Alexandria. "Trade" in these places "did not depend primarily upon markets but had a history and logic of its own, stemming from the principle of a politically neutral meeting place" (p. 51). Here it is only to be noted that the theory of Polanyi and his co-workers runs up against strong objections; his propositions depend on a very one-sided study of the text-material and on a generalization of its results. Other texts contradict his theory. So, for example, the conclusion concerning Mesopotamia depends exclusively on a study of the Assyrian trading colonies in Anatolia with Assur—which trade is itself, moreover, still known only from the side of the colonies--ce. 20th century B.C.--and not on that which is known from Babylonian, while it is also apparent from the texts that the situation was not the same at all periods of Babylonian and Assyrian history. Moreover, although large market places were not present in the Babylonian cities, this does not mean that the institution of market trade, together with the formation of market prices, was unknown. There are strong indications that these were well known in the Old Babylonian period and that the natural place in a country, where a great deal of the traffic and trade took place by water, the quay along the river or canal, the kārum, functioned as market together with all its appurtenances. It is noteworthy that Egypt, where the situation was completely different and where, following the position of J. Picard, markets were not known (La Foire, Requils de la Société Jean Bodin V, 1953, pp. 11-24), is not taken up in the considerations of Polanyi.

la façon très dispersée. Dans le cadre d'une explication de la société contemporaine, selon la méthode dialectique, les références aux phénomènes économiques primitifs, en pré-capitalistes ne se font pas en effet dans une perspective historique mais hiérarchique [f].

Le rassemblement des matériaux contenus dans l'œuvre de ces auteurs fournit les grandes lignes de ce qui pourrait être une esquisse théorique de l'économie traditionnelle, esquisse que les découvertes de l'anthropologie contemporaine tendraient à confirmer. L'analyse de Marx et d'Engels repose sur quelques observations fondamentales dont les principales sont les suivantes : importance des liens de parenté et situation de dépendance de l'individu producteur au sein de la communauté familiale ou clanique ; absence d'échanges, au sens économique du terme, entre les membres de la communauté, donc non-transformation du produit en valeur ; propriété commune de la terre.

Richard Thurnwald [g], malgré le discrédit où l'a jeté son vocabulaire convenu de manière désuet, a exprimé sur ces problèmes des vues pénétrantes bien qu'inégales, dont certaines et non les meilleures rejoignent souvent celles de F. Engels dans L'origine de la famille, de la propriété privée et de l'État dont il ne fait d'ailleurs pas mention. Thurnwald se démarque clairement des économistes et rejette les postulats théoriques de l'économie libérale. Cette liberté dans la méthode lui permet de restituer aux phénomènes sociaux — famille, statut social — une importance qu'observait la conception individualiste de l'économie, et de découvrir quelques aspects fondamentaux de l'économie traditionnelle. Toutefois il persiste à utiliser certains concepts dans leur acceptation économique formelle, indépendamment du contexte social (par exemple, le capital : « objets de première nécessité... susceptibles de s'acquitter par eux-mêmes ») et, bien qu'il s'en défende, son travail est encombré d'un évolutionnisme diffus qui étouffe l'analyse dès que les phénomènes se compliquent, et l'arrête.

À côté des économistes ou des anthropologues économisant certains ethnologues ont apporté une importante contribution au problème des économies traditionnelles par la livraison de matériaux de haute valeur. B. Malinowski, Margaret Mead, Lucy Mair, E. E. Evans-Pritchard, S. F. Nadel, Max Gluckman, Audrey Richards, Mary Douglas, Paul Bohannan [h], etc. (la liste s'enrichit chaque jour), débarrassés du souci de faire adhérer à tout prix les faits à une théorie, se sont le plus souvent contentés de remarquer que ce qu'ils observaient ne coïncidait pas avec les schémas des économistes libéraux et de fournir parfois des éléments d'explication très pénétrants.

D'après [i] occupe parmi les ethnologues qui ont traité des problèmes économiques une place particulière.
En considérant le don comme un phénomène total, mettant en cause les structures sociales, politiques et religieuses, Mauss situait correctement l'étude des problèmes économiques dans ces sociétés. C'est avec raison qu'il observe que la circulation des biens se fait selon un système de prestations et de contre-prestations. Il découvre le lien qui existe entre le transfert matériel des objets et la hiérarchie sociale : « Donner c'est manifester sa supériorité, accepter sans rendre c'est se subordonner. » Toutefois, Mauss assimile les divers types de transfert à un seul : le don. Il n'exploite pas les conséquences de son observation sur les rapports entre prestations et situation sociale, négligeant de différencier la qualité des protagonistes et de définir l'orientation des transferts. Cette lacune l'entraîne à accepter l'explication irrationnelle du pâtirach (don aux divinités) selon la thèse d'une reciprocité quasi absolue. À cela s'ajoute le défaut d'utiliser dans un tel contexte un jargon juridique moderne. Le terme de « droit » (circulation des droits, règles de droit, etc.) revient souvent dans son texte. Il parle de « liens juridiques entre les parties », de « contrats » ; il assimile les collectivités à des « personnes morales ». Ces analogies conduisent à une interprétation historique discutable : le don serait un chaînon intermédiaire vers les formes juridiques modernes du commerce ; le pâtirach, un marché rituel, pré-monnaïtair, sans marchands. Enfin Mauss suggère à plusieurs reprises que l'échange de dons se fait dans une intention de profit et cite même des taux d'intérêts de « 30 à 100 % ».

C'est Polanyi et son équipe interdisciplinaire de chercheurs qui ont apporté la contribution contemporaine la plus positive à l'étude de ces problèmes en démontrant que les mécanismes des échanges sont d'une nature différente dans les économies traditionnelles et que les lois de l'économie de marché ne s'y appliquent pas. Les auteurs distinguent trois modèles d'échange : reciprocité, redistribution et commerce, chacun correspondant à une structure sociale et politique. Ils insistent pour que soient pris en considération, en ce qui concerne la circulation des biens : l'identité des protagonistes, l'ordre de succession des prestations, la comparaison des fréquences. Ce travail, qui contient beaucoup de matériaux et d'idées, ne représente encore que la phase critique d'une recherche inachevée mais prometteuse [K].

Malgré ces derniers apports, aucun schéma général d'explication du phénomène économique dans la société traditionnelle d'auto-substinance n'a été tracé. C'est ce que nous avons essayé de faire dans cet essai en reprenant certains concepts et analyses des auteurs ci-dessus, de ceux qui ont envisagé ce problème hors du cadre théorique de l'économie libérale.
retour. Les anciens ont un intérêt solidaire à respecter l’ordre établi.
Cette restriction morale s’appuie d’ailleurs sur un fait matériel. Les biens transmis lors d’un mariage seront de nature diverse et s’accompagneront souvent de prestations en travail accompli par plusieurs membres de la famille du jeune homme. Le caractère composite de la dot témoigne de la condition de celui qui est capable de la rassembler. Elle interdit également l’exploitation éventuelle d’une spécialisation dans la fabrication d’un unique objet matrimonial.

OBJETS MATRIMONIAUX,
BIENS DE PRESTIGE, BIENS D’ALLIANCE

Ainsi c’est à l’occasion de l’institutionnalisation des rapports matrimoniaux entre groupes homologues que l’on voit apparaître des objets d’un caractère particulier dont la manipulation est associée au statut de celui qui les manipule. Dès lors nous avons le schéma de circulation des biens suivant (fig. 2):

- La circulation des biens matrimoniaux ne se situe qu’au niveau des anciens. Les cadets en sont exclus, par contre les femmes sont indirectement incluses dans le circuit.

* Un homme adulte peut verser lui-même la dot de sa propre épouse. Ce ne sera pas généralement pour la première mais pour la seconde ou la troisième. En tant qu’il est directement avec le père de sa seconde femme, il se situe socialement sur le même plan d’âge que son beau-père. Sa seconde femme dotée par lui-même sera par contre dans une condition de cadette à son égard et à l’égard de sa première femme issue d’une génération sociale supérieure (fig. 3).
ÉCONOMIES TRADITIONNELLES D'AUTO-SUBSISTANCE

Sur le plan économique ceci amène deux observations :
— Les biens matrimoniaux ne s'échangent pas ici entre eux. Ils sanctionnent en circulant dans un sens ou dans l'autre le contrôle d'une des deux parties sur la progéniture d'une femme émanant de l'autre partie. Les femmes elles-mêmes ne sont pas «échangées» contre les objets de la dot. Ce qui entre en considération dans ce processus de circulation c'est la progéniture attendue de celle-ci. Il paraît donc plus exact de dire que les dotes circulent, non pas en sens inverse des femmes, mais de leurs enfants. On observe en effet qu'en cas de divorce, la dote souvent n'est pas retournée lorsque la progéniture reste du côté du père. Cette observation prend toute sa signification pour apprécier plus justement, comme nous le verrons plus loin, la notion de valeur dans un tel système.

La rétention des biens matrimoniaux au niveau des anîs représente une ponction sur la production du groupe : une partie des biens ne sera pas redistribuée. Il s'agirait donc là d'un surplus. Ce surplus toutefois ne procède pas d'une productivité plus élevée mais de la mise en place d'une institution qui l'exige. Ici, nous rejoignons et Marx et Pearson [1] lorsqu'ils soutiennent que le surplus a un caractère institutionnel, et qu'il ne trouve pas à l'origine d'une nouvelle structuration sociale. La productivité peut être identique dans un autre système social, c'est la nature des produits et leur répartition sociale qui seront différentes. Si cette ponction ne s'accompagne pas d'un accroissement de la productivité, le surplus redistribué sera moindre et la tension sociale risque de s'aggraver.

— Puisque ces biens témoignent de la condition de celui qui les possède et que leur circulation a pour objet le renforcement de l'autorité des anîs et de leur groupe respectif, leur transfert ne peut se faire indépendamment du statut des parties en cause.

— Lorsque l'un de ces biens est isolément, est transféré entre un cadet — qui l'a fabriqué, par exemple — et un anî selon le mode de prestation que nous avons vu, le statut des deux parties ne change pas ; la hiérarchie sociale est au contraire consacrée par ce transfert. Par contre si l'anî remet un de ces objets à un cadet, le statut de celui-ci se trouve renversé. Pris isolément les objets matrimoniaux peuvent ainsi devenir des objets de prestige et ces objets auront pour caractéristique de consolider l'ordre social lorsqu'ils circulent de bas en haut, des cadets vers les anîs, et de l'alérer quand ils circulent de haut en bas, des anîs vers les cadets.

1 A l'instabilité souvent déplorée du mariage dans ces sociétés il faudrait comparer la stabilité des rapports de filiation établis à cette occasion.
2 Celui-ci faisant dans le cadre de l'économie coloniale qui ne s'est accompagne d'aucun progrès technique dans l'agriculture, mais qui a fait apparaître un surplus agricole exportable grâce à la mise en place d'institutions nouvelles telles que l'impôt ou le travail forcé.

Historians, economists, anthropologists, and sociologists are gathered here to deal with Karl Polanyi's theme: that the reference of all economic behavior to the model of the self-regulating, price-forming market has obscured crucial problems in economic history and in the interpretation of non-market economies. The last-motiv is woven through Part I, in which the historical problem of non-market organization is raised; Part II takes Aztec-Maya, Berber, Dehoney, and India for case materials of economic organization that is not of the market kind; Part III develops a set of concepts as a prologue to a theory of economy and society.

The essays vary in quality from the insightful use of functional theory to the misapprehension of trends and goals in economic anthropology, but they do clearly underline the proposition that economics in the market image does not account for the diversity of economies in time and space. The substantive papers bring together material on societies usually beyond the purview of the non-specialists, and they do it well.

The major puzzle of the book is the editors' conception of it as a unity. The problem of the historical and areal identification of the economic type is a coherent section in the hands of the senior editor. The section describing actual economies is by nature diverse.
But the third section -- the theoretical and interpretative -- bears small relation to the problem stated and draws almost nothing from the empirical material.

However, some new and provocative ideas are developed and some old ones restated in modern garb. Polanyi's trilogy of reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange mechanisms for integrating economic activity are given expanded meaning. The overtones come from two new ideas: the substantive economy and instituted process. Substantive economy is "empirical economy," the "livelihood" aspect of economics, or what an ethnographer usually collects and reports as the economic life of a people. "Instituted process" refers to the self-evident proposition that economic activities are part of a normative social structure. Together, these concepts enable one to talk about the "embeddedness" or "unembeddedness" of economic activity in a social system. They provide a new idiom about the relations of "economy and society" (as against talking about economics and sociology).

Despite their attractiveness, these concepts give me pause. Since the editors did not refer them to empirical material, and since they do not stem from the effort to order and interpret observation (of course, this is not a necessity), I cannot imagine how they are to be fruitfully employed. As I know the anthropological process of gathering economic fact (the substantive economy par excellence, often to the annoyance of economists), these concepts would not redirect or improve field work. In seeking generalization from fact, I tremble at the leap into a level of discussion equivalent to the third section of this book,
All this is to say that we have been presented with some challenging problems, some stimulating ideas, and some conceptual tools whose utility is yet to be assessed. Those interested in the attempts to make of economic life (though perhaps not of "economics") one of the subject matters of the "behavioral" sciences will profit from this book.

University of Chicago
social scientists thought that research on African societies would "bear fruit in enlightened policies" and when anthropologists were expected to supply the data, and sometimes the advice, to make indirect, rule work smoothly. She is keenly conscious today of "how much less easy it is to reshape society by deliberate action than has sometimes been supposed." Dr. Mair, however, is not in favor of a retreat into the study or the museum. She is still an active field anthropologist and a reader in applied anthropology at the University of London. She pleads for more applied anthropology, not less—and of her brand. She recommends it to the brush, how native cities are replacing governors and district commissioners, and to the new specialists on the development of "under-developed" areas. The task of all social anthropologists is the analysis of social systems, but Dr. Mair believes that "an anthropologist can apply" his special knowledge by making intelligible to the layman the forces at work in the society that he is seeking to change.

The "studies" in this book—of economic incentives, land tenure, education, and chieftainship—are based upon Dr. Mair's field work among the Gaada in East Africa and are models of how to write for the layman without "writing down." They, also, make some basic contributions in the field of general social anthropology, which the author defines as the sociology of tribal- and peasant-type societies. Sociologists as well as laymen will find them well worth reading, especially her penetrating analyses of economic values in African societies.

ST. CLAIRE DRAKE
Roosevelt University


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BOOK REVIEWS


The author, a historian, has written a highly competent treatment of the migration of the Russian peasantry to Siberia during the period from the emancipation of the main body of serfs in 1861 to the start of World War I. There is a thesis: the examination of the Siberian frontier in the light of Frederick Jackson Turner's view of the American frontier. Treadgold contrasts and compares Siberia and the American West.

He has not undertaken a social history; there is little of peasant institutions and life presented here. He is not a demographer or economist; thus, while he has reason to suspect that the size of the peasant migration was underestimated, he goes no further than to indicate his suspicions. Nevertheless, good use of realistic fiction is made to give some social perspective to the peasant movement. There is a wealth of demographic and economic detail regarding the migration and the growth of the area in people and product. Detailed treatments in these directions fall outside the scope of the book. It is hoped that the published treatment will call forth further studies which will enter more intensively into these aspects.

The book is divided into five parts: The origins of the migration and the peasant economy; migration policy after emancipation of the serfs, and the beginnings of the movement; “The Trans-Siberian Railway, 1892-1906”; “Stolypin and the Duma,” a description of the policies of Stolypin, the attitude of the Duma, and the final course of migration; and, finally, “The Fate of Migration,” the end results, the causes and effects of the migration, and the fate of the Russian peasantry are outlined.

The burden of the book is developed, then, in terms of a succession of governmental policies, and detailed treatment is given to the consequences of these policies. The more general aspects of the book are to be found in the opening and closing chapters. In the concluding part it is suggested that the basic motive to the migration was the quest for land and freedom.

A few errors mar otherwise careful study. The Russian conquest of Siberia had its bloody passages, no less than did the American conquest of its frontier. In central Asia the Russians encountered more massive resistance over a long period than did the Americans. Yet, too, much can be made of this point in both directions. Again, while the Russian settlement of Siberia was by families, yet individual settlers—trappers, miners—left their mark on Siberian folklore and belles-lettres, including little touches of “wildness,” as in the American West, although not on such folkloristic scale. Finally, the review of the causes of the migration proposes that the peasant’s quest for freedom was "in part a consequence of his having already been relieved of the bondage of serfdom." This is highly disputable. The Russian peasant’s search for freedom long antedated the emancipation of the 1860’s and in part brought it about. The emancipation, rather than initiating his quest, made it more easily attainable.

The impact of these few objections should not detract from a general appreciation of a sound work on an important and interesting subject.

WASHINGTON, D.C.


For the most part the remarks of the participants in this symposium on Indians held during the Draper Centennial Year of 1954 were directed more to the public at large than to a scientific audience. The contents, ably edited by Dr. David A. Bares, include papers on the legal and minority-group status of the Indian (Hoebel and Barnett and Baereds, re-

Professor Komarovsky is to be commended for tackling a much-neglected topic: the relations of sociology with economics and history. The affinities of sociology with anthropology and social psychology have been hampered to the point of brouhaha, but his ties to the other disciplines have disintegrated. (The reviewer mapped these interconnections "somewhere", see Social Forces, October, 1950.) Komarovsky has chosen to present the case by means of actual studies (as in the old Stuart Rice volume) rather than in terms of principles (as in the Ogilby and Golderweiser volume).

In his editorial discussion, by no means the least valuable section, he has grouped the main convergence among these disciplines under four heads. One might add a fifth category: the use of data from one field as indexes to processes in another area. One thinks particularly of the utility of economic data on levels of living and income distribution for sociological work on stratification.

1. Empirical data accumulated by one discipline are illuminated by concepts from another field. Illustrative of this situation is the very informative paper by Lipset and Trow, who use the concept of reference groups to analyze the diverse tales of unions regarding wage policies.

2. Concepts and hypotheses from one field suggest new problems for another. Lipset and Trow (in the longest paper of the volume) show that the contemporary debates over the effects of mass audiences upon literary quality were in full vigor in the 18th century. They certainly provide much of us with new appreciation of continuities in western social life. It is doubtful, however, that they have gone much beyond the previous work of literary historians.

3. Two disciplines employ their respective frameworks on a common problem. Kerr and Fisher subject the "Mayo school" of industrial sociology to stringent analysis. They emphasize also the need to search further for economic bases of divergent patterns of industrial relations before attempting the anti-economic interpretations. Akerberg and Torstell (who seem to have had the other paper in hand when they wrote) plead for a more receptive attitude toward the positive contributions of the Mayo group and their allies. Apart from petty ideological sniping at Kerr and Fisher, Akerberg and Torstell fail to meet the issues raised by the preceding paper.

4. One discipline adopts a new method originated in another field. This fabric covers the remaining papers in the volume. Benson, with the simplest analysis of voting, challenges historians' conclusions about the crisis and the shifts in public opinion during key elections in our history. Benson raises fundamental doubts about the capacity of historians to deal with mass phenomena. Plans for the French polls of 1944-49 and shows that public attitudes were more diverse, less clearly defined, and less consistent than commentators assume. The utility of poll data for historical interpretation is taken up also by Lasorsa who sketches the ways contemporary polls might be designed to yield data for future historians. David concludes that polls supply a more full-bodied picture of social relations but he points out that future historians must discuss the questions that then appear relevant about the past rather than discuss what seemed relevant to the politics of an earlier generation. Schrader's criticism is more fundametnd: he argues that the historian must rely upon tangible causal chains and that events are determined more by objective circumstances than by fluctuations and shifting opinions.

Valuable adoption of new methods originated in other disciplines is exemplified also in a group of papers dealing with Keynesian processes in economics. Lieberman lays bare the non-economic assumptions of Keynes, while Vickers and Khan face up to the problems of using micro data for attacking macro or aggregative processes. Kalman presents his new technique argument for the peculiar advantages of survey data in establishing the parameters called for by the Keynesian system. (Unfortunately, the merits of aggregating as against survey data for this purpose did not receive attention in the volume.)

These studies should interest some of the scholars in the several disciplines to reconsider the possibilities of collaboration and to re-examine their neighbors' methods. Most of the papers are additional to knowledge, though (except for the study of Lipset and Trow) the economics once have appeared elsewhere in various forms. Unfortunately, only a few of the interrelationships among the three disciplines could find space in the volume; it is not certain that the included papers are representative of the types of problems encountered. From this standpoint the volume is perhaps excessively priced. The volume is likely to have more utility for economists or historians than for sociologists. True to the condescending attitude of sociologists will be re-created, what is needed is to break down sociologists' provincialism toward economics and history.

C. ARNOLD ANDERSON

University of Kentucky

This collection of essays is committed to the proposition that the identification of 19th and 20th century capitalist economy with the self-regulating market complex is as erroneous and distorted by the study of economy of early and primitive societies. Price-fixing markets are the exception in history, its authors hold, while earlier economic systems ordain redistributive or ritualistic institutions and fixed-price exchanges not amenable to treatment in terms of orthodox economic theory. They reject the "normal" economics of price, production and allocation principles and stress instead an approach that is both "substantive" and "functional"—dealing empirically with the distribution of material goods and services in this process as embedded within the whole social structure.

The book is the first published product of a long-term Columbia University seminar on the economic aspects of institutional growth. Its eleven contributing authors divide their efforts among equally between substantive studies of particular trading systems and theoretical or methodological papers. Unfortunately, the conceptual and terminological connections between these groupings are poorly developed, while certain papers are largely disjointed from the main thread of the argument. Those of A. L. Oppenheimer, on "Anthropology and History," and "A Three-Five View of Metropolitan Economic History," respectively, for example, are perhaps the most materialist, concise, and lucid in the whole collection, but no more than a small portion of either is directly pertinent to the central task set by the editors of eliminating the "market bias." The relevance of much of R. H. Textor's detailed discussion of "Prospects of the Eastern Mediterranean" also is not all clear. To this reviewer it was the weakest of the generally admirable group of substantive chapters. Oddly enough, the hitherto the heavy repetition which one's major inferences are aimed at inability in such a clear determination of the actual evidence for the case of strengthening an argument. Polanyi's treatment of "Marketless Trading in Humphries," for example, is effective in delineating all markets (not merely price-marking ones) primarily on the basis of one alternative reconstruction of trading practices in Assyrian merchant colonies in Arabia, and secondarily on the basis of an associted lack of archeological evidence for open-markets in Western Asia as a whole. These findings seem to be interpreted as "case" and of specific goods in private hands for whose disposal through a redistributive system there is no archeological evidence. As for using the merchant colonies as a model for the general economy, this practice is supposedly disposed of by another contributor (O. P. Fauth) in a different context. This is strange economics indeed—practically to ignore institutions that channelize distribution within the economic system and center attention on interregional, economic relationships.

This one-sentence finds fullest expression in the chapters devoted to theory. In a discussion of "The Economy as an Instituting Process," for example, Polanyi concludes that "true social processes must be redistri- buted, and heroic efforts must be made to recognize the survival of these institutions." Such a dictum is not only supported by the kind of data presently available, as a glance at the substantive studies shows. Moreover, while it may well reflect a degree of sociological reality, our confidence is shaken by the author's failure to qualify this and similar observations. Particularly how true are they, and are they, and under what circumstances? A better lead, for the present, is furnished by A. M. Chapman in her excellent chapter on Aztec-Mayo trade; she differentiates between state-administered long-distance trade and common market institutions without trying to assess their relative importance. It is interesting to note that both were present in this presumably "archaic" society.

Again, Fauth's criticism sharply the application of market-oriented terminology to some primitive communities by Melville Herskovits and Sol Tax in an apparent priori denial of their independent empirical findings that for some non-Western groups this terminology is inappropriate. Although they would carry greater conviction if he had examined their evidence more closely. Still another example is provided by Pearson's structures against adducing absolute economic surpluses as unilateral generative forces in social change. The initial point is valid and useful, but the discussion becomes mis-

Some important thinkers are appreciated immediately; others wait years for the recognition that is their due. Arthur Fither Bentley is one who has had to be patient. His epoch-making study The Process of Government published in 1900 did not have its full impact until the 30's and 40's. Some of us believe that his more recent work with John Dewey on the "transactional approach," Knowing and the Known, 1948, and his Inquiry into Inquiries, 1934, ultimately will have a revolutionary effect on modern logic, and subsequently on the methodology of the social sciences. It is only to say, most present day logicians do not feel the force of Bentley's and Dewey's criticisms nor see the relevance of their positive suggestions.

The editor of this volume, a political scientist, is to be commended for his initiative in assembling a collection of essays in honor of Bentley. It consists of eleven papers and a delightful epilogue by Bentley. The epilogue was included without the knowledge he had prepared the manuscript for a dinner meeting held in his honor by the American Political Science Association.

The editor explains that the contributors to this volume were not selected because of their common approach, but for their interests in fields of inquiry which Bentley has contributed; and that the common theme which binds all the contributions is scientific curiosity in our world. Unfortunately, because Bentley contributed in many disciplines and scientific curiosity is a somewhat nebulous criterion, the resulting collection of essays lacks cohesion. These are stimulating essays but they do not constitute a stimulating collection of essays.

Four of the papers have appeared elsewhere and will not be commented upon here. They are: "Some Characteristics of Visual Perception" by Adelson Ames Jr., "General System Theory" by Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "Human Rights: An Appeal to Philosophers" by Felix S. Cohen, and "The Quest for Being" by Sidney Hook.

Two essays, one by the editor and the other by Sidney Barter, are devoted to an analysis of Bentley's life and work. These are compendious pieces which should prove helpful to anyone who seeks to understand Bentley's point of view. The other essays are by P. W. Bridgman, Tom Colman, R. G. Cross, Charles P. Hagen, and George Lambeth. Of these, only Bridgman begins fresh ground with a suggestive analysis of the relation between the "conventional observer" of physics and the "human observer" of the conventionalized observer. The editor states that the essays of Ames, Cross, Hagen and Lambeth provide demonstrations of the transactional approach for the fields of psychology, economics, political science, and policy formation, respectively. It seems to me, although admittedly this is a difficult judgment, that Lambeth falls short of the exciting demands of this approach. His effort distinction between science and policy arts based upon science seems to be out of keeping with a full transactional viewpoint.

There is a bibliography of Bentley's writings for the benefit of those who would like to study his original works.

Omar Khayyam Moore

Yale University

It is difficult indeed, within the limits of a short notice, to outline, let alone appraise, the varied contents of this ambitious undertaking in psychology, metapsychology, sociology and social philosophy. In this book the author, Lecturer in Psychology and Education in University College of North Staffordshire, seeks to build upon the basic contention of his earlier Sociability and Privacy, that "social need is a central quality of life and a principal determinant of human life." The central aim of the present work is to establish whether the "normal" or "abnormal" in human behavior and personality can be defined and thereby an absolute measure of man elicited. In this task Halmos feels that greater digression into "metapsychology" is both necessary and justified.

The first chapter, "The Evolutionary Background of the Human Mind," purports to trace both the phylogenetic and ontogenetic basis of social need. Such foundation he discovers in the "principle of cohesion" (later, "socialization") which, with its correlative "principle of growth" ("individualization"), is "universally pertinent to life." He finds cohesion manifested in, for example, atomic behavior, fossilization and sublimated communism. Growth is witnessed in, for example, protuberant proliferation through division and the proliferation in mass societies. The fluctuation between these two basic principles of life is the very process of the species' evolutionary development and, it turns out, the optimum conditions of man's survival is not balance but an optimum disbalance.

In seeking the measure of this optimum disbalance, Halmos (in Chapter III) examines the concept of adjustment. Here he settles for a definition of the minimum area of abnormal "primary adjustment conditions." The concept of the "abnormal" presumably yields a measure of the unsatisfactory disbalance of cohesion and growth, in the form of a general principle to the effect that "nature is in the smooth transition of cohesion into love is unsatisfactory." (p. 31). Chapter III, "The Necessary and Mechanic Disbalance," considers artistic creativity, political leadership and scientific achievement, each in connection with the "abnormal." Halmos concludes that "it is not the logical overspill of abnormality which is responsible for creativity, but the universal and basic disbalance from which both creativity and abnormality may issue." (p. 145). He urges revision of the image of the misfits, not of the conception of abnormality.

In Chapter IV the author turns to a consideration of "insight" to lend further substance and plausibility to his concept of the "human abnormal." Insight is necessary because "psychology is a science of subjective experiences or it is not psychology at all." (p. 155). The chapter concludes with a stimulating discussion entitled "The Ethics of Insight Giving."

In the final and most controversial chapter, "Norm and Sociological Theory," Halmos insists that the role of the social scientist is coercive with the role of the social philosopher. Ethical neutrality is an untenable position largely because the linguistic duality between the indicative and imperative modes in questions. It is argued that "all propositions are communicative propositions" syntheses of what have been thought: positive and normative propositions (p. 208). To the question, "What sort of values are most appropriate to the bio-psychological nature of man?" Halmos answers that "it is certain that we should explore those nature and nothing else to obtain the first principles of this appropriateness." (p. 232). More generally, Halmos agrees with Syrkin that "the nature not only is what really exists...but also, at the same time, it is what ought to be, the ideal with whose growing realization all men must be contented." (p. 228).

VERNE HUNSHAW, JR.
The Ohio State University


This study of Lope de Vega, Calderón, Cervantes, Shakespeare, Corneille, Racine, Molière, Goethe, Dostoevsky and Hamsun tries and does more than its title announces. For the "man" whose "image" characterizes the plays and novels analyzed in it we; and our history contributes to our knowledge of how we have come to be what we are. Unfortunately, the story begins before establishing its consequences for our nature. The reader will in fact, on Hamsun, written in 1937, lacks the maturity of the preceding analyses, although its illumination would make the merit of a lesser book.

The portrayed span of our history reaches from the breakdown of the feudal order to the foreshadowing of totalitarianism. Pedagogical orientation still characterizes Calderon, while Vega glorifies the absolute monarchy, which Cervantes...
This collection of essays is committed to the proposition that the identification of 19th and 20th century capitalist economy with the self-regulating market complex has obscured and distorted the study of economy of early and primitive societies. Price-making markets are the exception in history, its authors hold, while earlier economic systems ordinarily involved redistributive or reciprocal institutions and fixed-price exchanges not amenable to treatment in terms of orthodox economic theory. They reject the "formal" economics of the maximization and allocation principles and stress instead an approach that is both "substantive" and "functional"—dealing empirically with the distribution of material goods and services as this process is embedded within the whole social structure.

The book is the first published product of a long-term Columbia University seminar on the economic aspects of institutional growth. The eleven contributing authors divide their efforts about equally between substantive studies of particular trading systems and theoretical or methodological papers. Unfortunately, the conceptual and terminological connections between these groupings are poorly developed, while certain papers are largely disjointed from the main thread of the argument. Those of Arensberg and A.L. Oppenheimer, on "Anthropology and History" and "A Bird's-Eye View of Mesopotamian Economic History" respectively, for example, are perhaps the most masterful, concise, and lucid in the whole collection, but no more than a small portion of either is directly pertinent to the central task set by the editors of eliminating the "market bias." The relevance of much of R.P. Reeves's detailed discussion of "Ports of Trade in the Eastern Mediterranean" also is not at all clear. To this reviewer it was the weakest of the generally admirable group of substantive chapters. Oddly complementing these hiatuses is the heavy repetitiveness with which the seminar's major tenets are hammered in. In short, as the editors
candidly admit, it is not a finished account but a report of work-in-progress.

A far more serious defect is the atmosphere of special pleading that pervades a number of the contributions, the defense of an a priori position in spite of the reiterated commitment to empiricism, the neglect of contrary fact and limitations of evidence for the sake of strengthening an argument. Polanyi's treatment of "Marketless Trading in Hammurabi's," for example, in effect denies all markets (not merely price-making ones) primarily on the basis of one alternative reconstruction of trading practices in Assyrian merchant colonies in Assur, and secondarily on the basis of an asserted lack of archeological evidence for open market-places in Western Asia as a whole. Thinking of buildings reasonable to be interpreted as "shops" and of specific goods in private hands for whose disposal through a redistributive system there is not the slightest evidence, the reviewer would flatly contradict the archaeological assertion. As for using the merchant colonies as a model for the general economy, this practice is adequately disposed of by another contributor (D.S.enna) in a different context: "This is strange economics indeed - practically to ignore institutions that channelize distribution within the economic system and center attention on (interregional) economic relationships."

This one-sidedness finds fullest expression in the chapters devoted to theory. In a discussion of "The Economy as Instituted Process," for example, Polanyi concludes that "Tribal societies practice reciprocity and redistribution, while archaic societies are predominantly redistributive, though to some extent they may allow room for exchange." Such a dictum is simply not supported by the kind of data presently available, as a glance at the substantive studies shows. Moreover, while it may well reflect a degree of sociological reality, our confidence is shaken by the author's failure to qualify this and similar observations. Precisely how true are they, and when, and under what circumstances? A better lead, for the present, is furnished by A.M. Chapman in her excellent chapter on Aztec-Maya trade; she differentiates between state-administered long-distance trade and common market institutions without trying to assess their relative importance. It is interesting to note that
both were present in this presumably "archaic" society.

Again, Pusfeld criticizes sharply the application of market-oriented terminology to some primitive communities by Melville J. Herskovits and Sol Tax in an apparent a priori denial of their independent empirical findings that for some non-Western groups this terminology is inappropriate. His arguments would carry greater conviction if he had examined more closely their evidence more closely. Still another example is provided by Pearson's structures against adducing absolute economic surpluses as unilateral generative forces in social change. The initial point is valid and useful, but the discussion becomes misleading when it fails to recognize any necessary relationship between socially defined relative surpluses and the material aspects of existence. While changing technology and productivity are obviously not independent of social forces controlling the economic process, it is hard to see the justification for dismissing the former as essentially secondary variables on the grounds that "there are always and everywhere potential surpluses available."

Still, this is an important book in spite of its blunders. Elsewhere there is mainly pious talk about interdisciplinary studies; here we see the fruit of close and active cooperation by sociologists, anthropologists, economists, and historians over a long period. Moreover, they have raised a profoundly meaningful question, both theoretically and with concrete examples, about the general role of markets in primitive economies and economic history. If the historical and institutional limitations they seek to place on "economizing" activities are seemingly overdrawn, they have nonetheless effectively high-lighted and described a number of alternative patterns of organization whose evolutionary and comparative significance merits close study. Ranging far beyond the competence of any single reviewer, these papers collectively offer a challenge to specialists in many disciplines to see their work in the context of a wider problem. For all of the manifesto-like quality of some of the papers, it is to be hoped that the collaboration of the authors continues.

The editors, Karl Polanyi, the institutionalist; Conrad W. Arensberg, the sociologist; and their disciples (Professor R.W. Pearson of Adelphi College and others) devote about 175 pages to descriptive studies in anthropology and ethnology and 187 pages to theorizing about the nature and place of "the economy" and economics.

They favor empiricism and the "empirical economy"; they believe that in material things, at least, scarcity and problems of choice or value are unnecessary. They also believe that the institutional setup should not require us to economize. This suggests the scrapping of formal economics as distinct discipline and the need to substitute "social planning," as in primitive economies, or in advanced planned economies. Russia is mentioned in this connection. (p. 256)

They suggest that by getting rid of the market system, and the economic theory based on it, we can eliminate the problems of scarcity and choice of means.

Incidentally, Aristotle is brought in as a witness, without disclosing his emphasis of the importance of individual wants as a standard of value and the basis for judging self-sufficiency.

... Most of their "early empire" material concerns slave and caste systems. Here they find the "reciprocity," "redistribution," and status which they favor — an equal sharing in a common pool of resources.

Their position rests on sweeping assumptions of (1) the existence of "adequate" production processes and supplies of goods, without either scarcity or surplus, and of (2) institutions and exchange processes that are independent variables.

Beck of all lies authority — central planning and control — and government determination of "ends." The authority is required to force the economy into an institutional mold devoid of economic motivation or economic rationality. Apparently, this would build up a "substantive" society to replace "the fading image of individualistic atomism." (p. 374)
Mouvement scientifique.


M. B.

Jontau (P., Asseu). Mariage, past and present. A debate between Robert Briffault and Bronislaw Malinowski. (Une discussion directe entre ces deux auteurs en forme d'ailleurs le chapitre central). Les deux adversaires tombent d'accord sur un point : la maternité a toujours été l'élément central du mariage. Mais, pour Briffault, le mariage est, à l'origine, relation de groupe, fondée « sur le droit primitif de la mère », le clan maternel, répondant à des besoins économiques. L'amour n'y intervient qu'à postériori. Du type matriarchal, l'institution a évolué vers le type patriarcal. Selon Malinowski, au contraire, le mariage est un contrat individuel (une sorte de contrat de ce type en cas de polygamie), et le « sentiment » religieux vient, même dans les sociétés les plus primitives, sanctionner la légitimité de l'amour.


M. B.


Extrêmement intéressant et substantiel, cet ouvrage nous donne un éclatant témoignage de ce que peut apporter un travail
d'équipe, si les Directeurs de la publication, laissant à chacun sa propre originalité, veillent néanmoins avec soin à la cohésion de l'ensemble. Chaque des chapitres initiaux de chaque partie pose le problème que développeront les chapitres suivants sous des angles particuliers. Chaque chapitre est accompagné de ses propres notes et de sa bibliographie, mais le double index final (auteurs, sujets) permet aisément la synthèse des références.

M. Pearson situe d'abord le débat « séculaire » sur la Primitivité de l'Économie Antique. Rodbertus, vers 1860, à propos des « Oikos », avait bien vu que le passage d'une économie « naturelle » à celle de la mondialisation implique une complète transformation des structures. Après lui, Bâcher, Mayers, Weber avaient repris la question. En fait, des types structuraux, où les transactions commerciales se réalisaient sans intervention du Marché, se rencontrent à Babylone, dans l'Antiquité Mésopotamique, dans les ports de la Méditerranée orientale (ch. 2 à 4, Oppenheim, Revere). Les marchands assyriens de Kanigah ne parvenaient qu'à une commission, en tant qu'intermédiaires ; agents indépendants quelque semi-officiels, ils étaient contrôlés par le Tankum, sorte de « Public-Traders ». Dans les ports de commerce méditerranéens, pas de marché non plus, et les Empires n'assistaient d'exercer un rôle de contrôle politique, la neutralité de ces fleuves de commerce facilitait les transactions et les échanges à marché, même à des distances considérables. Pas de marché à l'origine de la civilisation grecque, mais le marché apparaît lorsque la Grèce antique développe ses propres structures. Le Prof. Polanyi (ch. 5) se livre à une pénétrante analyse de la pensée d'Aristote qui, sociologue avant le temps, s'efforce de normaliser les lois de l'économie à partir des concepts de justice et de minimum vital nécessaire à la communauté.

Tout cela est de l'Histoire, mais, pour l'Histoire des Institutions, l'Anthropologie sociale a son mot à dire (ch. 6, Arensberg). Ici, l'on nous présente comme données de base quatre études monographiques : Mexique ancien, régime de Wydah, port guinéen, à la fin du xvième siècle, marché Berbéres, économie d'un village de l'Inde. Dans une très remarquable analyse (ch. 7), fondée sur Sahgour et sur de nombreux travaux modernes, A. M. Chapman caractérise les institutions économiques des Azteques et des Maya. Chez les premiers, les Fidjiens, riches marchands liés à l'archéologie, achetaient certaines denrées sur les marchés de Tenochtitlan et de Tlatelolco. Pourtant, ils procédaient le plus souvent directement, et leurs caravanes transportaient esclaves, vêtements royaux, plumes, jusqu'à des grands « ports ». De même agissaient les Pohon mayas, d'où l'importance de centres comme Xicalango. Asiatiques, liés à un tout autre type de structure, est au xvième siècle l'activité commerciale de Wydah, dont la conquête débrière (1727) respecte relativement la neutralité. Les grandes transactions avec l'intérieur (esclaves, or, fourrure) sont l'apanage des hommes, en fait des gens du Rénin. Le marché, lieu par les femmes, et apparemment les Blancs en deniers de première utilité, se situe sur un plan secondaire. La ségrégation entre les deux activités montre leur indépendance (ch. 8 et 9, F. M. Arnold). Excellente traitée par F. Benet, l'analyse des marchés où se rencontrent les Berbéres des
montagnes, prouve que ces tribus ne se bornent pas à y échanger des marchandises, mais y concluent des alliances, et s'opposent aussi, maintes fois. On peut parler, en ce sens, de « marchés explosifs ». Bonnet s'appuie sur les travaux de Doulet, Maulier, Montagne, et où ne saurait certainement le rendre responsable des regrettables erreurs typographiques qui déforment mainte citation. Dans le village de l'Inde (ch. 1 à 14, Neale), il y a, par l'intermédiaire des castes, réciprocité de services ; il y a aussi, aux niveaux de la famille étendue, du village ou de la caste, redistribution directe des produits agricoles. « Le réseau de la terre fait partie d'un système sans marché ». Pour l'avoir méconnu, la colonisation britannique « commet des graves erreurs. Neale s'appuie uniquement, semble-t-il, sur Summer Maine ; peut-être aurait-il pu faire d'autres monographies plus récentes (V. Elwin, notamment). 

Une troisième partie, consacrée à l'« analyse institutionnelle » (ch. 12 à 18, Polanyi, Aresnberg, Pearson, Hikins, Fustell et Neale), définis par là même un certain nombre de concepts, et d'abord celui d'économie. Pris dans le sens substantiel, et non formel, il implique la relation entre l'Homme et le Milieu environnant. A l'origine, les transactions commerciales sont affaires de groupes, et les échanges, et les fins ne sont proprement économiques. Avec le temps, toutefois, le concept d'économie va se cristalliser, et il aboutira à la notion (et à l'institution) du marché. Critiquant les théories économistes classiques, les travaux récents de Parsons et Smelser, et la théorie des surplus, donnant un aperçu de l'économie primitive, étudiant le Marché, selon les théories et à travers l'Histoire, les auteurs soulignent le caractère inadéquat des études des économistes en matière d'Anthropologie sociale. Pour comprendre les phénomènes, il faut séparer les concepts de transactions commerciales et de marché ; on ne saurait voir là une artifice convenue, mais une tentative véritablement scientifique, dictée par l'observation d'une réalité de fait.

M. B. 


Formant une trilogie avec les deux ouvrages précédents de l'auteur, la Hütte blau et les Conceptions du monde chez les Indiens Kwakiutl (cf. L. A., 15, pp. 439 et 5148), ce présent volume en est en quelque sorte une synthèse. Ayant acquis une connaissance approfondie des Indiens de l'Amérique du Nord, dans les Universités allemandes, anglaises et dans celles des Etats-Unis, le Dr. Müller fut admis à Philadelphie à consulter la masse incomparable des notes et documents rassemblés par le Prof. F. G. Speck. Ce savant, disparu en 1950, avait consacré une vie
The stories behind the Grecian myths—

Theseus and the Minotaur in King Minos' Palace,
The Troy of Helen and Homer—and the stories of two great archaeologists:
Sir Arthur Evans and Heinrich Schliemann

A highly entertaining introduction to the archaeology of ancient cities. Part IV

THE BULL OF MINOS

By LEONARD COTTRELL

author of Lost Cities $1.50
Mountains of Pharaoh $1.50
Illustrated $1.50
Available at all bookstores.

The product of research in an interdisciplinary project in the economic aspects of prehistoric growth at Columbia University (1948-58), the book contains eighteen chapters by sixteen authors. A separate division of cases, with two parts devoted to description of certain early and primitive economies, and the third to an analysis of the results and the conclusions of a series of theories for the interpretation of economic life.

In Part One the "empirical" data for the economies described are drawn from historical evidence in Part Two from anthropological and technological materials. Part Three contains the theoretical discussion.

Without going into detail, it may be said that this book is stimulating and important. As in most collaborative works, the chapters are uneven in quality. The best are V. Aristide: Discover the Economy—Polanyi, XIV (The Economy as Instructed Process—Polanyi), XVI (The Economy Has No Surplus Product), and XVIII (The Market in Theory and History—Neale). In the chapters based on "empirical" data one sometimes questions the competence of the authors. In the statistical chapters one finds that frequently it might have been preferable to arrive at a simpler, more direct mode of expression. One or two (page 170) should read:

"Empirically, we find the same patterns to be respectively, redistribution and exchange. Reciprocity denotes movements between groups in terms of goods, while redistribu-


Everyone is familiar with the Roman conquest and occupation of Britain. Beyond the frontier of the Roman province, defined in this day by Hadrians Wall, crossing northern England from Newcastle-on-Tyne to Solway and the Antonine Wall, between the Clyde and the Forth, lay the territory of barbarian peoples whose warfare
This is a difficult, challenging book which merits the attention of those who wish to understand the past. Its principal concern is with so-called marketless economies. In these economies the supply-demand-price mechanism familiar to the modern economist did not exist; in some, even the market-place as an institution was lacking. Since a marketless economy cannot be understood in terms of the economic structure of our own age, a twofold problem is presented: first, the identification of a marketless economy; and second, the development of a new and decidedly different approach to its analysis.

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data one sometimes questions the competence of the authors. In the analytical chapters one feels that frequently it might have been possible to arrive at a simpler, more direct mode of expression. An example (page 350) should suffice.

"Empirically, we find the main patterns to be reciprocity, redistribution and exchange. Reciprocity denotes movements between correlative points of symmetrical groupings; redistribution, designates appropriational movements toward a center and out of it again; exchange refers here to vice-versa movements taking place as between 'hands' under a market system. Two sentences later we find, "At this point some clarification may be welcome." Unfortunately, it is not immediately provided.

University of Minnesota

Tom E. Jones
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the one myth (in Judaism the I-Thou relationship, or covenant, between the chosen people and God, in Christianity, the incarnation and transformation of the Jewish myth) and, on the other, from the natural humanism of Rousseau and even Godwin: Shelley the man, Mr. Bloom acknowledges, may have embraced natural humanism; Shelley the poet he finds to be, in his own unorthodox way, profoundly religious.

Finding Shelley's poetry to be the product of a universal perceptual impulse—mythic or religious—Mr. Bloom, quite properly from his point of view, makes considerable use of analogies in his specific critical approach. He seems to regard Shelley's poems as products of a universe of discourse, and therefore meaningfully brings to bear parallel prophetic poets by Eckiel, Dante, Spenser, Blake, and Yeats to shed light on both. In this procedure, as in so much of the conceptual framework of his book, Mr. Bloom is guided by the work of Northrop Frye, whose name only appears casually but whose influence Mr. Bloom would be the first to acknowledge. In an important article in Kenyon Review, Spring, 1950, elaborated in his recent book Anatomy of Criticism, Frye, making use of the medieval scheme of four levels of meaning (literal, allegorical, tropological, analogical), pointed out that most criticism nowadays takes place on the literal (semantic) and allegorical (glossing a text with reference to history and biography) level, and stressed the need for more criticism on the tropological (making use of analogous poetic structures in expounding a given text) and analogical level.

Frye's critical approach, fully applied in his well-known study of Blake (Nursery Symmetry), constitutes, by implication, a challenge to the New Criticism, and Mr. Bloom, following Frye's approach, makes this implication quite explicit in polemical digressions which are not really digressions at all. Shelley's imagery has been criticized for being too shifting and abstract, but Mr. Bloom asserts in rebuttal that we perhaps overvalue today firmly held and fully developed imagery and accurate naturalistic description in poetry; that Shelley, like Blake, was attempting to present "vision" in terms of "minute particulars" which may not correspond to natural but to visionary reality, and which do not contradict but support each other, for contraries in this dialectical poetry are not negations. Shelley has also been criticized for imposing his will upon experience, but, says Mr. Bloom, this is the
fundamental mode of mythopoeic perception—"we can enter into the relational event," according to Huber, "only if we have both will and grace" (my italics). That Shelley's poetry is void of irony Mr. Bloom will not allow. It acknowledges the gulf between expectation and fulfillment in the world of "relationship" as fully as another kind of poetry acknowledges it in the world of "experience."

Our prejudice against Shelley, Mr. Bloom feels, is basically a prejudice against visionary or prophetic poetry. By placing a number of great poets in this tradition (including a few dear to the New Critics themselves), and by pointing out that our commitment to one philosophical position should not make us unable to read or even enjoy poetry written from another (a principle which the New Critics themselves have emphasized), Mr. Bloom has done much to rescue Shelley from his enemies and, at the same time, to enlarge our poetic tastes. If, as this Look implies, New Critics cannot deal successfully with poets of this kind, poets who do not write "little human dramas," in John Crowe Ransom's prescriptive phrase, then what we clearly need is at least another general critical approach. New Critical method would seem to be more effective in dealing with poets like Donne, Hardy, Housman, and Ransom himself, as perhaps the author should have allowed. His method would seem to be more effective in dealing with poets like Spenser, Milton, Blake, Shelley, Hart Crane, and Wallace Stevens.

In view of the inherent complexity of the subject and the thoroughness and rigor of the scholarship, I find the lucidity of Shelley's Myth-making astonishing. With only that amount of patience which any truly original work requires, the reader may find, as I did, that this book rehabilitates areas of poetry which he had almost considered waste, and that it broadens and deepens his entire response to poetry.


Modern economic theory, by its extraordinary achievements in analyzing the market-organized economy of post-Industrial Revolution Europe and America, inadvertently has been a deterrent to fruitful
investigation of economic organization in non-market societies studied by anthropologists and historians. Micro-economic theory, derived largely from Ricardo to Marshall, is concerned exclusively with the functioning of a very special type of organizational system whose integrating institution is a network of self-regulating price-making markets for labor and resource factors of production (distribution theory), and commodity outputs (price theory). The anthropologist or historian who studies price and distribution theory in the hope of applying what he learns to his own field, reacts to market-oriented economic analysis in one of three ways. If he accepts the basic postulates of price and distribution theory as universally applicable, then primitive and historical economies are made to appear as simpler images of our own, with the same pervasive features of economizing calculation and material self-interest. (Thus the Kwakiutl potlatch gets described in market terms as a forced loan bearing one hundred percent interest.) The more critical investigator appreciates the non-transferrability of market economics to the spheres of primitive and early economy. He either ignores economic organization entirely—in which case economics is identified with technology, and there follow descriptions of canoe-making, gardening, etc., but not of the integrating socio-economic institutions which make for unity, stability, and repetition in economic processes—or else modern economic theory is ignored and replaced by institutional description. Starting from anthropological field observations and not from the assumptions of formal economic theory, such outstanding anthropologists as B. Malinowski, R. Thurnwald, and R. Benedict have described patterns of primitive economic organization fundamentally different from the modern market pattern. The authors of Trade and Market in the Early Empires, building upon such earlier work, have derived a system of analysis relevant to non-market organized economies.

This unusual book contains eighteen essays by eleven authors. The essays are of two types. Eight are concerned with various aspects of empirical economics of anthropology and history (Aztecs, Maya, Dahomey, India, Mesopotamia, Northwest Africa), and ten with theoretical and institutional analysis of socio-economic structure. The book

1 Including five economists, three anthropologists, one sociologist, one historian, and one Assyriologist.
grew out of an interdisciplinary research project at Columbia University on the origins of economic institutions.

The unifying theme of the book is that economics organized in ways other than through self-regulating markets, require for an understanding of their functioning and social cohesiveness an entirely different set of concepts and analytical tools from those provided by market-oriented economic theory. The new concepts and tools have been derived largely by one of the senior editors, the economic historian Karl Polanyi, in whose earlier works one can discern the distinctive approach which is central to this book.

The analytical chapters are concerned with two sets of themes:
1. That three different patterns of socio-economic integration which provide unity and stability to economic organization can be identified empirically. They are labeled reciprocity, redistribution, and market exchange. The patterns are not mutually exclusive, but typically one dominates in each empirical society. Each pattern is instituted through a distinct set of underlying social practices which serves to relate the economy to its contextual society. Historically and anthropologically, the patterns of reciprocity and redistribution are found far more frequently than is market exchange. The social control of economic organization exists pervasively in primitive and archaic societies: the economic is “embedded” in social institutions in the sense of having no separate existence apart from its controlling social integument. Transactional dispositions of material goods and services are expressions of socially defined obligation, i.e., deriving from political, religious, kinship ties. 2. Secondly, that operational devices such as money, external trade, market places, accounting, prices, appear in all three types of economy but are instituted and function differently in each integrative pattern.

The chapters on specific primitive and archaic economics demonstrate the fruitfulness of the conceptual framework for empirical investigation. They show how extensive economic activity has been car-

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Footnotes:

3 Just as it is present in the Soviet Union, pricing and foreign trade exist, but are organized differently and perform different functions than do the same devices in the market economy of the United States.
ried on through organizational systems distinctly different from our own market pattern.  

*Trade and Market in the Early Empires* deserves careful reading by social scientists. Its conceptual schema, empirical studies, and conclusions are highly relevant to several areas of concern to social science. Anthropologists, sociologists, and economic historians should find the book particularly useful for the light it throws on the relation of economic to social organization. Those concerned with special problems of African and Asian industrialization and social transformation will find useful the book's delineation of the contrasting socio-economic structures of reciprocity, redistribution, and market exchange. Lastly, the book has relevance to recent experiences in the West. Changes in socio-economic organization, especially since 1950, entail either the social control of market organization, as occurs in American New Dealism, the British Welfare State, and German Fascism, or its replacement with central planning mechanisms of redistribution, as with the system of Soviet Russia.


There are few professions as addicted to morbid self-examination as college teaching. Undoubtedly the constant probing for tender spots and discussed areas is a result of the physical proximity of professor to professor. Doctors and dentists are locked in their separate offices in face-to-face contact with their patients; college professors are locked in face-to-face contact with each other in their tiny departmental promises. The consequence is that they spend more time discussing their common life together as a department than they do their common subject matter.

No secrets will be revealed if it is said that their discussions usually

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4 For an example of internal organization entailing reciprocity and redistribution, see the essay by W. G. Neale, "Reciprocity and Redistribution in the Indian Village: Sequent to Some Notable Tribes." For an example of external trade organized through non-market institutions, see R. Arnold, "A Port of Trade: Whydah on the Guinea Coast."  
5 In addition to the aforementioned essay by K. Polanyi, see by D. E. Bushfield, "Livelihood in Primitive Society."  
take the form of complaint. But, on the surface at least, it is rather peculiar that they should complain so much. Probably never before has such a large group of intellectuals been paid so well, both relatively and absolutely, or been given such positions of power and authority in the community. Indeed, they are even given what they claim they never get from the community — prestige. It is all very odd. But it seems less odd after reading *The Academic Marketplace,* For the source of the professors' highly developed sense of grievance turns out to be the professors themselves. Or to be more precise, the state of the profession as it is "organized" under their hands and for which they are at least in part — in large part — responsible.

As one reads *The Academic Marketplace* a sense of despair and frustration settles over one. Also, the word "incompetent" is not too strong as a description of how the profession handles its own affairs. Professors are not incompetent in their subject matter, by any means; but they are incompetent to organize their professional life. The conclusion must be: not only have the professors allowed themselves to be bullied; not only have they invited bullying; they bully each other. They bully each other by their intense and even neurotic desire to reach, to acquire, to grasp, to pour over themselves, prestige!

*The Academic Marketplace* is ostensibly only another dull sociological survey (based on a sample of ten "major" universities) of the hiring and firing of college professors. In fact it is an exposé of some of the most sensitive areas of academic life, those areas which center around money. The book has many faults; it is poorly organized (like the profession it studies); and it lacks sufficient depth of research to drive its points home. But its charges ring true. Only academic people would have dared to say what this book says; an outsider would have been pierced and torn to shreds by the pencils of angry professors.

Consider first the subject of recruitment. How are professors hired? How indeed. The authors say nothing new; but they do say it. "A distinction must be made between the two kinds of recruitment in general use — open, or competitive, hiring and 'closed,' or preferential, hiring. In theory, academic recruitment is mostly open. In practice, it is mostly closed." That is a nice way to put it.

The authors go on to say that hiring is done not on the basis of

1 Americans rank college teaching higher in status than any other profession or business except medicine. Lipset and Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society.* p. 111, and p. 50.
Kedziora, Harry S., Theory of Simultaneous Developing and Fixing of Photographic Emulsions, vii, 63
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—, Quantity and Quality, vii, 183
—, review of The Modern Researcher by Jacques Barzun and Henry F. Graft, vii, 190

The Methodist Idea and the Relatively Independent University, Edward K. Graham, vii, 103

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A New A.M. Program for Teachers of French, Herbert W. Godden, vi, 3
A New Experimental Site for the Extraterrestrial Study of Mars, Amanu Smith, Jr., vii, 93
The New Look in Human Biology at Boston University, George P. Fullon and Wesley K. Tiffany, vii, 77

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—, The Humanities, Science, and the Man in the Broadcloth Suit, vii, 135
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Nogee, Philip, Jr., author, College Affiliation and Political Attitudes, vi, 69
Norman Douglass' Lesser-Known Novels: They West and In the Beginning, John P. Shepherd, vii, 29
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Notes on the Report of the Committee on Policies in Graduate Education, John L. Fletcher, vii, 137

Oglesby, Moore, Jr., review of Guidance and Counseling in the Classroom by Douglas S. Arbuckle, vii, 27
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Owens, William A., Religion and Scholarship in the University, vii, 33

Patrick, Harry W., see Dalton, George
Polanyi, Karl, see Dalton, George
Political Education at Boston University, George D. Blackwood, vii, 4
Orthodoxy will outlive the present atheist regime, especially among the rank and file of the Orthodox believers in the U.S.S.R.

The author does not conceal his value judgments in appraising the ecclesiastical policies of the Moscow Patriarchate and at times his values tend to narrow the scope of his analysis; yet his fundamental assumptions are nowhere explicitly stated. Obviously one may differ with Professor Spinka in certain of his evaluations and point out certain aspects which deserve more emphasis. For example, one may wonder how much conjecture there is in the author's evaluation of the motives of the Russian Church leaders. Furthermore, the author fails to convey the significance of the nationality problem within the Russian Orthodox Church, a problem parallel in many ways to that of the Soviet State. Consequently, such questions as the centrifugal tendencies of the Georgian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian Orthodox, and the interplay between the Soviet ecclesiastical and nationality policies are hardly touched upon. The author's terminology further confuses this problem by applying the terms "Russia" and "Russian" to the multi-national structure of the U.S.S.R. A clarification of the officially ascribed status of the Russian Orthodox Church vis-à-vis other religious bodies in the U.S.S.R., as well as a more complete investigation of the motivations and rationalizations of the Soviet ecclesiastical policies, would have made, in the reviewer's opinion, for a more complete presentation of the problem.

In essentials, however, Professor Spinka's thesis is well argued and convincing. An able although not wholly dispassionate work, it will be indispensable to students of the Russian Church and its relation to the Soviet State. It deserves the attention of all those interested in Soviet affairs and East-West relations.

Bohdan R. Bokshyriw

University of Alberta

Trade and Market in the Early Empires: Economies in History and Theory.
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This book, which resulted from an interdisciplinary research project at Columbia University, consists of eighteen essays, eight of which are empirical studies of various early economies while the remaining ten deal with new theoretical concepts for the study of the general economy.

The unifying theme of the volume is the recognition that a conceptual framework which will transcend that of the self-regulating market system is needed for the study of the historical role of the economy. The authors do not wish to question the relevance of formal economic theory to the market economy, but they would like to apply it to that economy only. They find that our Western market society of the past hundred and fifty years has been an exceptional development which has bequeathed to us a "market bias" in examining and evaluating economic phenomena in general.
Even the meaning of the term "economic" needs careful scrutiny. A distinction is made between the so-called formal meaning which refers to the economizing process (a branch of logic) and the substantive meaning which refers to the process of satisfying material wants, that is, livelihood, whatever the institutional framework or economic system. Both meanings of "economic" are merged in practice since one of the distinctive features of a market system is that it compels economizing action in daily life; hence the relevance of economic analysis. The formal meaning of "economic" may, however, be irrelevant for understanding other economies where, in fact, the institutional system does not make for economizing behaviour. Alternatively, an assumption of the universal relevance of this meaning of "economic" may lead us into an a priori inference of the presence of market institutions, or colour existing evidence in that direction.

Any economy may be organized along the lines of a limited number of patterns or forms of integration, namely, reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange or price-making markets. These patterns may coexist in an economy while one of them may be the dominant pattern. Such a general system of classification of the human economy was first presented in Polanyi's "The Great Transformation" and here it is restated in a somewhat more rigorous form accompanied by further empirical studies.

In his article, "The Economy as Instituted Process," Polanyi presents one of the more fruitful results of his work by removing the traditional restrictions on our definition of trade. By defining trade in a substantive way (a relatively peaceful method of acquiring goods which are not available on the spot), he distinguishes two forms of trade other than market trade, gift trade and administered or treaty trade. Walter C. Neale in his essay, "The Market in Theory and History," discusses such questions as various kinds of exchange, price-making markets, and (by distinction) market-places; fluctuating prices which conform to the definition of economic theory, and traditional fixed prices (equivalencies) which are not determined by market forces, thereby constituting an entirely different phenomenon. Both essays contain a well-reasoned exposition of the central concepts and might perhaps have been welcome earlier in the volume. It may prove useful for the reader to begin with them.

In addition to the two theoretical essays already mentioned, Polanyi's re-evaluation of Aristotle as a social scientist and Harry Pearson's essay on the concept of the surplus, criticizing current theories of economic accumulation, are definitely of more than routine interest. Pearson brings out certain implicit assumptions in the "surplus theorem" which illuminate its dependence on market theory. He argues that to have any general meaning such a surplus has to be institutionally defined, in which case the concept takes on a generality which may destroy its usefulness.

Daniel B. Fusfield's essay on the methodological problems facing economic anthropology is a valuable contribution to the place of modern economic theory in the social sciences.

The descriptive studies of different societies are well documented and definitive and include essays on Mesopotamia, the Mediterranean ports of trade, Babylonia in Hammurabi's time, the Aztec empire, Dahomey in the eighteenth
century, the village economy of India, and a very interesting study on the present-day markets of the Berber highlands. Their appeal lies partly in the new evidence presented and partly in the new interpretation of previously known evidence. For example, the Babylonian empire emerges as a highly complex and sophisticated state with a correspondingly complex economy, yet with no evidence of markets. The singular position of trade, particularly long distance trade, is well substantiated in the essays dealing with the Mediterranean ports of trade and trading activities on the Guinea coast ("A Port of Trade: Whydah on the Guinea Coast," and "Separation of Trade and Market: Great Market of Whydah," both by Rosemary Arnold). A very different market institution is described by Francisco Benet in his essay "Explosive Markets: The Berber Highlands." He describes a market where instability is the rule rather than the exception and where even elaborate precautions instituted by the tribe are not sufficient to ensure the peaceful character of trading and the market place.

The new conceptual tools proposed by the authors help to interpret and classify all these divergent economic systems and it is significant that they yield new and interesting insights and even resolve some old contradictions when applied to already familiar evidence.

This reviewer wonders whether these concepts of the economy which transcend the market might shed some light on some of our unorthodox contemporary problems such as the process of economic development in tradition-oriented societies and the novel conceptual difficulties posed by trade with the state monopolies of the Soviet bloc.

In any event, this collection of essays provides a highly stimulating and original contribution to the institutional analysis of the general economy. The volume may well prove to be a highway for further work on the general economy by all the social sciences.

Sir George Williams College

Paul Schweitzer


This book, based on six lectures given at the University of Chicago under the Walgreen Foundation in 1956, presents a conceptual scheme for the study of comparative government. The author feels that the realities of politics are to be found in the use and control of power, and that the legal and constitutional framework provides only the setting. Accordingly, he presents his analysis of government in terms of entology, the study of power. The study is divided into three parts: the first deals with patterns of government; the second discusses the control of power through devices of power-sharing or checking between the people and the three branches of government; and the third is devoted to what are called vertical controls—federalism, guarantees of individual liberties, and pluralism.

The author feels that we have moved far from the eighteenth-century

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... What are the spheres of economic calculation which justify the postulate of economic rationality? No matter what our final answer, we must conclude in advance that contemporary economic theory cannot generate specific solutions for all the flows of goods and services, even in societies amenable to economic analysis.

In societies where the self-regulating price market is inconspicuous or absent, the categories of economic analysis grow even paler. What can we say about fluctuations of production and prices in the Soviet Union? Certainly, the accelerator-multiplier solutions for free-market economies have their limitations. Even more, what can we say about the traditional and reciprocal gift-giving among island peoples which does not hint at economic calculation, prices or gain? What can we say about the post-harvest distribution in Indian villages in which the guiding principles is caste organization? What can traditional international trade theory say about the isolated port of trade with fixed equivalencies which rule out price-determination by supply and demand? Can formal economic theory be of help in these matters? If not, what sort of theory can?

The answers, the authors of a recent volume address themselves. Roaming through the records of Babylon, Mesopotamia, Greece, Mexico, Yucatan, the Guinea Coast, and village India, they sketch a fascinating picture of the separation of trading practices from the familiar practices of free-market exchange. In addition, the authors prepare a critique of the analytical power of traditional economic theory and suggest some alternative categories for a better comparative economics. Leaving historical and archaeological judgment to experts, I should like to assess the authors' conclusions in terms of their own empirical material and in terms of the desiderata for a science of comparative economics.

...Self-consciously, the authors affiliate themselves with the institutional economists and the anthropologists, and equally explicitly they reject several other types of analysis: (a) economic history—whether steeped in "historical materialism" or "traditional liberalism"—persists in the "traditional coordinates of money, market, price, etc." (p. 28) in the study of civilizations to which they do not apply; and (b) those "eminently conceptualizing disciplines" (p. 98) of the economists, political scientists, and sociologist also come under attack. The chapter-headings alone—"Marketless Trading in Hausurabi's Time", "Separation of Trade and Market", "The Economy Has No Surplus", etc.—show their disaffection with economic analysis. In addition, Arensberg feels that sociologists malstrat particular social arrangements as "a matter of logical premise in the world-view of their discipline" (p. 102), and that they rely too much on their "formal and often timeless logic" (p. 108). In contrast, anthropologists are likely to ask general questions only after the details of observation about man's behavior have been taken up, compared, ordered, synthesized, classified, and recognized" (pp. 108-109). (c) Even though the authors' approach is "functional" (p. 308), it is not to be confused with "functionalism and system-building relyings on putative needs of individual or society" (p. 112).
The authors' self-conscious methodological preferences are therefore institutionalist, inductive, anti-systematic, and hesitatingly functionalist.

To hold such preferences and reject others is certainly legitimate in the present state of the social sciences. Further, the authors are not merely flogging dead horses, since they criticize approaches which have both their advocates and their vulnerability.

All the authors' methodological preferences are apparent in their parallel distinctions (a) between the disembedded and the embedded economy, and (b) between the formal and substantive meanings of "economic". The disembedded economy—most characteristic of the market economy of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—is a system in which "man's livelihood is secured by way of institutions that are activated by economic motives and governed by laws which are specifically economic" (p. 63). Its counterpart, the embedded economy, is an institutated system in which the strictly economic elements of price, production, economic motivation, etc., are conjoined to and dependent on other, non-economic institutions (p. 71). Similarly, the formal meaning of "economic" refers to the system of rational action. The alternative meaning, the substantive (which has "nothing in common" with the formal), refers to "an instituted process of interaction between man and his environment, which results in a continuous supply of want-satisfying material means" (p. 214). Substantively defined, the economy implies neither insufficiency of means nor rational choice (p. 213); above all, it is "instituted", or embedded in institutions. In terms of the authors' methodological preferences, the disembedded or formal economy implies a market orientation; a deductive approach, formalistic concepts, and a universal functionalism (i.e., economizing based on scarcity). Correspondingly, the substantive economy implies an institutionalist orientation, an inductive approach, empirically-generated concepts, and a minimum of functionalism (for, indeed, "it is doubtful...whether beyond subsistence man has had any universal economic problems"—p. 110).

Such distinctions, while valuable for certain purposes, come perilously close to throwing out the baby of general economic analysis with the bath of the culture-bound market orientation of traditional economics. This danger may be illustrated in the authors' discussion of the concepts of scarcity and economizing.

To the authors, the postulate of scarcity as the basis for economic activity implies a whole set of premises: (a) an "insufficiency of means"; (b) "more than one use to the means", as well as... at least two ends ordered in a sequence of preference" (p. 246); (c) this gives rise to "economizing" or a choice of means (p. 231); and (d) a retention of formal economic assumptions which "make all economies variations on the market theme" (p. 292). If we remove all but the first—as many modern functional sociologists presumably do—we are either "stripping the concept of its meaning and substituting instead naturalistic assumptions" (p. 292) or opening the door for "devices to introduce a market economy" (p. 303). Hence it seems that we must accept either the whole economistic set of premises or an empty "fact of scarcity" from which "nothing at all follows" (p. 269).

To summarize, the concepts of "scarcity", "institutionalized", and "economic" are corollaries, not alternatives, and all must be included in the formulation of economic activity which will stand the test of comparative analysis. Our whole judgement of the volume, however, should not rest on the authors' theoretical dilemmas. They did try their hands at locating the actual "manner in which the economic process is instituted at different times and places" (p. 250). Let us attempt to assess their positive results.
Polanyi suggests three patterns of integration of economic activity: (a) reciprocity, or "movements between correlative points of symmetrical groupings"; (b) redistribution, or "appropriational movements toward a center and out of it again"; (c) exchange, or "vice-versa movements taking place as between 'hands' under a market system" (p. 250). These types are "by no means mutually exclusive, nor do they claim to be exhaustive" (p. 99), but presumably they are selected from what are "very few patterns" of integration (p. 250), and attempt to "transcend the limitations of economic analysis" in a general theory of economic organization (xviii).

Even though the concepts of reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange are meant to be neither exclusive nor exhaustive, better terminology might have been chosen. Actually, all three involve exchange, in the sense that rights to economic goods and services change hands. Perhaps the concept "self-regulating market" should replace their concept "exchange." Certainly, if the authors consider reciprocity and redistribution not to be exchange systems, they carry their anti-economic bias even further implicitly than they do explicitly.

The authors relate these systems of exchange to forms of trade, money uses, market elements, and—in casual way—to types of social structure. We might abstract the following paradigm, with examples, from their analysis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Reciprocity</th>
<th>Redistribution</th>
<th>Exchange</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Forms of trade</strong></td>
<td>Gift trade</td>
<td>Administered trade (fixed prices, equivalencies)</td>
<td>Market trade (high-gaging-haggling, self-regulating prices)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(guest friends, Kula partners, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Uses of money</strong></td>
<td>Payment use (discharge of obligations, not transactions; blood money, bride price)</td>
<td>Standard use of money (equiv- alencies in staples)</td>
<td>Exchange use of money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Market elements</strong></td>
<td>Exchange at set rates</td>
<td>Exchange at set rates</td>
<td>Market with bargained rates—supply-demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Types of social structure</strong></td>
<td>Kinship, neighborhood, community (savage society; Kula; Indian village)</td>
<td>Government-controlled (Indian village, floodwater, empires, Soviet Union)</td>
<td>Market mechanism (19th and early 20th century Western Europe and America)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This scheme classifies not economies, but types of exchange. Production and consumption systems, for instance, are not considered. Nonetheless, the classification represents a genuine contribution to comparative economics. I should like to carry this analysis a little further, utilizing partly the authors' own examples, and to suggest correlates of social structure which may form the basis for further research.

In the light of these examples, I would like to add a dimension to the authors' classification—namely, the "mobilitative," which subordinates economic...
arrangements to an interest in pursuing collective goals, particularly in maintaining the political status of the society in question. Mobilization differs from redistribution insofar as it does not solidify and maintain a system of stratification (as the redistributive system does), but collects goods and services into the hands of those responsible for pursuing the broad political aims of the society. Of course, redistributive and mobilizational aspects of the economy may and do appear in the same society. It seems to me, however, that "administered trade" is more a characteristic of mobilizational institutions (usually government) and is seldom connected with redistributive systems. This is true not only for the authors' historical examples of administered trade, but also in modern states with bulk exchange, arranged trade agreements, trade "policies", etc., and in looser groupings such as the Sterling Area.

Therefore, we are presented with four, not three, types of exchange systems: (a) reciprocative; (b) redistributive; (c) mobilizational; (d) self-regulating market. Each is embedded in a particular kind of social structure. One way to identify these respective social structures, as well as to elucidate the principles governing each type of exchange, is to ask what kind of social structure typically appears as the bearer of potential instability for each type of exchange. Naturally, instability of the flow of economic goods and services occurs in natural disasters such as lack of rain, flood, storms, etc., no matter what the institutional embeddedness of an economy...

To summarize, we may agree with the authors' belabored dictum that formal economic analysis has little value outside the market context. We may also accept their assertion that economic processes are institutional or embedded. Yet the authors seem to hesitate to go further than demonstrating these basic points. Perhaps they preferred not to generalize because they were so aware of the shortcomings of formal economic theory. Perhaps, on the other hand, their position as institutionalists and anthropologists led to this hesitation. In any case, they did not go far enough in exploiting the general implications of their own interesting case material. It seems to me that to identify typical kinds of exchange (as they did), to trace these exchanges to typical kinds of social structure (as they only casually, and in one case erroneously), and finally to investigate the economic results stemming from the principles governing these several kinds of social structure (as they did not do), we may move a step closer to the development of a genuine comparative economics which meets the requirements of a comparative science more adequately than either traditional economics or radical institutionalism.
The book, the result of an interdisciplinary research project, consists of eighteen essays by eleven authors, all bearing on the theme that economic theory does not provide an adequate conceptual framework for the study of primitive economies because it is based on irrelevant institutional assumptions. It argued that the price-making market, which provides the rationale for economic analysis, became an important feature of economic life only in the relatively recent past and in Western-type economies. For all other societies and periods the economic process is too deeply imbedded in the moral process to be independently analyzed, and those who study primitive economies in terms of the market model are trying to fill empty sociological holes. Empirical evidence for the hypothesis that price-making markets are a recent and relatively exceptional phenomenon is provided by the few extant studies of trade and market institutions for communities as distant in time and place as ancient Mesoamerica, the Aztec Empire, eighteenth-century Labrador, nineteenth-century India and the twentieth-century Peruvian Highlands. The book is directed towards economic sociologists and economic historians. Revolutionaries will find this reconceptualization of economy and society stimulating and suggestive, but they are unlikely to find much practical or theoretical use for the new conceptual tools suggested by the authors.
Polanyi (K), Arnsberg (C.H.), Pearson (H.W.) (Eds.)

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The book asks an important question, assembles interesting data relevant to answering it, and then—because perhaps of multiple authorship—fails to clarify the relationship between data and question, to arrive at a convincing answer.

In 1944 Karl Polanyi published The Great Transformation, describing the unique turn taken in Europe in the nineteenth century with the development of a self-regulating market system based on supply-demand-price mechanisms. He evidently understood others to argue that this was not unique in human history; trade and markets were present also at different times and in different civilizations. To show that the modern self-regulating market is not unique, he joined with an anthropologist (Arensberg) and obtained money from the Ford Foundation for an ongoing seminar in which data from different societies could be compared. Harry W. Pearson became executive secretary and the results of the seminar bear these names as editors.

The book is divided into three parts. The first part is a review of traditional economic history—an introduction by Pearson; descriptions by Polanyi of the economies of humankind's and Aristotle's times; one by A. R. Bevan of the ports of trade in the ancient eastern Mediterranean; and "A Bird's-Eye View of Mesopotamian Economic History" by A. L. Oppenheim, the only real "outsider" in the seminar and book. The second part is a review of comparative data from anthropology—an introduction by Arensberg and descriptions of trade and markets in Aztec and Maya civilizations (A.C. Chapman) and Peruvian Highlands (P. Renfrew) in Africa, and in village India (E.C. Neale). The third part contains an argument and conclusions presumably drawing upon the empirical data—an introduction by the editors and a chapter by Polanyi on the meaning of economic terms; chapters discussing sociological views of economies—a general one by T.R. Hopkins, and an analysis by Pearson of Parsons and Smelser's new book; an essay by Pearson arguing against the "surplus" notion of economic development; a chapter by D.B. Fussel on economic anthropology; and a conclusion by Neale.

The "self-regulating market" is elaborately described in terms of our own system as developed in modern times. It is not surprising that none of the other cases fulfills all the criteria as well. So of course the case is made. But, if the problem is important, it is worth more care. There is at least one challenging case, which the authors should include and if possible explain away: the market among Indians of Guatemala. It appears to me to be every bit as self-regulating as our own, in terms even of the definitions of this book: in some respects less so, but in others more so. If this is a lone exception, it is a critical one; but are others? Perhaps a greater flexibility of definition, and a more widespread search, would alter greatly the interpretations and conclusions of this book.
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Dear dear fellow named as editors.

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Sol Tax

University of Chicago.
to the conclusion that, in order to avoid confusion, it is better to identify pressure groups as entirely separate from those bodies which are of a different nature and have different functions in the political process.

Although it is never taken up again systematically, this preliminary reflection is supplemented and amplified by a great many short analyses, based on particular aspects of French life, but often general in scope. There is, for example, the interesting passage (pp. 183-185) on the influence of the party system (dualistic or multiparty) on the relations between parties and pressure groups. Owing to the number and diversity of these analyses, it is impossible to mention them all. Although, taken together, they do not constitute a complete pressure group theory (the author modestly states that the efforts of several generations of research workers will be needed to evolve one), they nevertheless provide an indispensable basis for all future students of this important factor in the political process.


This book consists of a collection of studies by eleven professors (economists, sociologists, and anthropologists) in various American universities on the economic systems of certain primitive societies. Unlike the usual analyses, bearing on market economies (at the present time or in the past), these studies concern groups of human beings who built up their economy on very different foundations. Although accustomed to the use of coinage and carrying on a considerable amount of trade, they had no idea of curr...
This is not a complete transcription as the document is not fully visible. However, it appears to be an academic or scholarly text discussing economic theory, market economies, and their development. The text mentions the importance of market economies and the role of self-regulating mechanisms. It also refers to historical examples and economic concepts such as prices, production, and institutional factors. The text seems to be discussing the evolution of economic thought and the impact of market economies on society.

Polanyi (K.), Arensberg (C.W.), Pearson (E.W.) (Eds.)

This book consists of a collection of studies by eleven professors (economists, sociologists and anthropologists) in various American universities on the economic systems of certain primitive societies. Unlike the usual analyses, bearing on market economies (at the present time or in the past), these studies concern groups of human beings who built up their economy on very different foundations. Although accustomed to the use of coinage and carrying on a considerable amount of trade, they had no idea of competition, profit, savings or any of the other means of laying out money to advantage.

This is important from the theoretical point of view. Market economy, which has perhaps been considered as the only form of advanced economic organization (although the principles on which it was originally based have undergone radical changes in modern times), is in fact only one alternative, other systems, which were not at all trivial or embryonic versions of our own but completely different from it, have existed.

What has ancient history to show? Theories on the subject — whether the 'primitivist' theories of Hobsbawm or the 'modernist' theories of E. Bucher and K. Meyer — contain a common error in that they do not allow for the possibility of an economy with coinage and trade other than a market economy. This error is particularly understandable in that most of the typical features of a market economy are to be found in the societies concerned, but they play an entirely different part. In his study on Assyria at the time of Hammurabi, K. Polanyi shows that there were then no exchange centres; prices were equivalences established by authority, by custom, or by a statute or proclamation — in other words, they were not the result of the law.
of supply and demand and were not subject to fluctuation; transactions were guaranteed by the public authority and there was no risk of debtors being insolvent or of loss.

In a study on the trading ports of the Eastern Mediterranean countries (Mesopotamia, Egypt and the Hittite Empire) during the second millennium B.C., R.H. Revett shows that these ports were simply exchange centres, without the slightest feeling of competition. This is evident from the fact that very little importance was attached to the coastal area (the population remaining concentrated inland) and that there was no conflict at all between the empires bordering on the Mediterranean, mutual agreements guaranteeing the neutrality of the ports between which there was no rivalry.

In this connexion, Aristotle's views on economics (discussed by K. Polanyi) are of singular importance. For while it is true that the pre-Hellenistic civilizations knew nothing of a market economy, this type was just coming into being in the philosopher's day. Aristotle's theories are dominated by the two concepts of justice and conformity to nature, an economic society conforming to nature is a self-sufficient one, capable of living in a state of anarchy. There, exchange means sharing, prices are equivalences and do not vary. Any trade (in the sense of competition and profit-seeking) is contrary to nature; the fixed (and fair) price is by definition different from the negotiated (and unfair) price. To us, who are accustomed to reasoning in terms of markets, all these assertions seem like so many paradoxes and are comprehensible only if considered in their historical context. Until Aristotle's day, economy had been conditioned by institutional factors and not by individual competition; the philosopher defends this older conception, deprecating the invasion of new principles, such as competition, prices dependent upon the market, and profit, the machinery of which he cannot yet fully understand, but which he sees gaining ground not only in local markets but also on an increasingly wide international scale.

Similar findings emerge from the anthropological studies, which make up the second part of the book. These are a study by A.H. Chapman of trade problems in
Aztec and Maya civilizations; an article by R. Arnold on a trading port on the Guinea Coast; Khudah, an analysis by W.C. Neale of the barber markets of the high inland plateau; and, finally, a treatise on the phenomena of redistribution and reciprocity in an Indian village, by W.C. Neale. In this last mentioned study, the author tries how the economy of an Indian village is not based on competition or governed by the market; it has generally been described as 'pre-capitalist', community economy, or economy based on the barter system. Such terms are, however, inaccurate and inadequate and the author shows that this economy is mainly based on the two functions of redistribution and reciprocity — redistribution in the case of goods for consumption (every year, after the harvest, these are divided among the inhabitants according to their social function), and reciprocity in the case of services (such being economically dependent upon the other castes for the accomplishment of their respective tasks).

Placed in a specific historical or geographical context, the primary aim of all these studies is to contribute to economic theory; consequently, as is shown in the third part of the book, they are of undoubted value to contemporary economy.

The studies have compared two different forms of economic systems: first, market economy, in which prices and the production level are the result of self-regulating mechanisms (competitive) and, second, economies in which prices, production and exchanges are determined by institutional factors. This comparison leads to a dissociation of economic concepts which, hitherto, may have appeared to be linked — for instance those of trade and market economy.
Dear Professor Kraeling:

I do not wish to conceal that the concern which prompts me to write to you this time is as much personal as it is scholarly.

I would not be human if it did not pain me deeply that a work which contains the little that might survive me has been contemptuously dismissed by the reviewer in a journal of oriental history as "a most regrettable book." (JSSHO, April, 1960).

The enclosed will tell how, 10 years ago, in a signed note (JEH, ...) - not without the Editor's previous knowledge - intervened in an attack that had been surreptitiously made against the standing of a very great historian of the economy of antiquity. The attacker was no other than the writer of the review referred to above. No clarification to my knowledge has been forthcoming. Yet my taking action at the time, it would seem, now had a sequel.

The Oriental Institute has been most kind to my efforts. I feel it would not be right for me to keep from you and your colleagues some of the circumstances in this matter.

Sincerely yours

Enclosure
Answers by editors and authors to unfavourable reviews are rightly limited by strict rule of custom to very exceptional cases. Indeed, no public defence against criticism, however violent, should be undertaken unless the subject matter itself can claim an interest that transcends that of the specialist. X. Cmnd. p. 3.


The focus of the economic history of antiquity is the study of trade and commerce. Such a shift in historical perspective involves among other things a sharp distinction between markets and trade, these matters hardly fall under the heading of economic theory proper, as the reviewer would have it. A new task for economic history is to classify institutional concepts, such as forms of trade, monetary units, and market elements, indispensable for the empirical work of a comparative character in economic history. Admittedly, such an approach to the traditional notions must raise new problems.
These matters hardly fall under the heading of economical theory, as the reviewer would have it, while they involve a sadly needed clarification of the traditional concepts of economic institutions. It is through such critical approaches that paradoxes may be resolved.

In the absence of a market system was trade carried on in the ancient Near East? On the other hand, if continental Greece was indeed the pioneer of commercial forms of trade, how could such a change stayed without effect on her whole world of thought?

Araw interpretation of Aristotle's economic thought, which seemed of so poor a quality, may be found to be both realistic and of a depth worthy of close attention. In the argument of the book, his name. The reviewer emphasizes the importance of the rational economic institutions, such as the market, gift-exchange, and administered trade. It explains the seeming inadequacy of Aristotle's economic thought as reflecting transitional conditions, the transitional state of an incipient market-trade. Refusing to distinguish between trade and market, the reviewer deprives most of his statements of almost all relevance to the argument.
An issue is our proposition that the traditional view of the origins of our modern commercial civilization in Hammurabi's Babylonia is erroneous, and that the actual beginnings of trading and marketing should rather be sought in classical Greece at a much later time.

Such a proposition rests on our conceptual distinction between trade and commerce, and the historical (empirical) evidence we have adduced on the absence of market places.
Our proposition has a two-fold basis: the conceptual distinction between trade and market on the one hand, and the historical evidence we have adduced on the absence of market places on the other.

The tendency of this proposition is not to negate or dismiss the abundant evidence in Babylon for the existence of far-flung trading activities, except perhaps generally as a means of exchange. It is an overwhelmingly redistributive to point up the character of this trade as being essentially gift-in an almost exclusively state redistributive economy.
exchange) and (principal) trade.

The Heykom-Hutchinson hypothesis bypasses this main proposition on both as concept and fact. He dismisses the conceptual distinction between trade and market as falling under the scope of economic theory, and therefore beyond the domain of the historian, and so beyond his concern. Yet if the matter it does not fall within it is the shortcoming of the scope of economic theory, but economic theory precisely with the history of economic institutions throughout, which makes it appear mandatory for the historian
to include this distinction among his analytical concepts for the study.
The social and economic institutions of the Orient.

This indiscriminate identification of "kar" and "gates" with "market" in ancient Babylonia, beg the question, as the empirical evidence is concerned and is the consequence of dismissing our conceptual framework.

If our view about Babylonia is correct, then classical Greece becomes the center of attention for the origins of
commercial trading. Aristotle's economic thought, which in the traditional view is regarded as inadequate and pedestrian, must be reinterpreted if we consider the conditions of which examined were not those of a long-established but only of incipient market trade. In this light his work is often as both prophetic and morally penetrating.
In Herodotus offer any explanation of the exaggerated account offered by Herodotus, except that, if we suppose Herodotus to have been a Babylonian, and if we suppose that the Persian world power then stimulated Herodotus to avoid the risk of place in his master's dramatic production of the conflict of East and West.
The fundamental theorem of welfare economics is derived, equating free competition with Pareto welfare optimum—a new equilibrium and a new Pareto optimum for every change in the initial distribution of asset. The welfare objections to excise taxation are also restored here—without warning that similar objections apply to a great many other types of taxes, once reliance is recognized as a commodity.

M. Brandtman

Economic History; Economic Development: National Economies

Frederic W. M. Patrick (ed.)

This book is a collection of essays growing out of research at Columbia University on the origins of economic institutions and the economic aspects of institutional growth. Most of the contributors have been members of the faculty or graduate students at Columbia in one or another of the social sciences. Some of the essays discuss aspects of early or primitive economies (Babylonia, early Assyria, Mesopotamia, Andes and Mayan civilizations, the Guinea Coast, the Tibetan highlands, the Indian village). Others are of a more general quality (“The Place of Economics in Societies,” “The Economy as Institutional Process,” “Economic Theory and Islam: The Place of Economics in Societies,” “The Market in Theory and History”).

The burden of the book is summarized in an introductory note:

The conceptual problem arises in marketless economies where there is no “economicizing,” i.e., no institutional framework to compel the individual to rational and efficient economic activity, or “equilibrium” allocation of his resources. In that case the economy would not be subject to economic analysis since it presumes economists’ behavior with supporting institutional paraphernalia, e.g., price-making markets, all-purpose money and market trade. The aim of the book is to reject economic analysis, but to set its historical and institutional limitations, namely, to the economies where price-making markets have emerged.

If one examines economies empirically, it is said, three patterns of economic behavior are encountered. These are “reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange.”

Reciprocity denotes movements between correlation points of symmetrical groupings; redistribution designates appropriational movements toward a center and out of it; again, exchange refers to inverse movements taking place as between “hands” under a market system.

Formal economics, or economic theory, or economic analysis, says the authors, has relevance only to the final case in this trilogy. But only a brief period
in the whole history of human society, and only a few societies in the universe of all societies have been characterized by "market systems." Therefore, formal economics is not helpful in explaining or understanding aggregate behavior for most of history and for most societies. "The economist cannot be of help to the student of primitive economies. Indeed, he may hinder him." The anthropologists who have sought to study primitive economies "within the framework of orthodox economic theory" have fallen into methodological traps.

What are the qualities which, it is said, are possessed by the economies for the study of which conventional analysis is not helpful? They are inflexible or sluggish prices or exchange ratios; inelastic (sometimes absolutely inelastic) supply; inelastic (sometimes absolutely inelastic) demand.

The specific instances enumerated by the authors—e.g., set rates, customary or statutory equivalences, gift trade, administered trade, status trading, trading partnerships, the influence of kinship, magic and etiquette on economic behavior, noncompeting groups—seem to fall into one or more of these boxes.

It can be seen, for example, that the supply of imported goods at retail in Dubuque is less elastic than it would be if foreigners were not excluded from the trade; that the supply of watchman services would be more elastic in the Indian village if it were not necessary to be at the watchman came to qualify for providing the service; or that the demand for the goods of a Taibland Islander is less elastic than it would be if he were not bound to transact with specified "partners" and were free to exchange with all comers.

Now the conventional doctrine and techniques of formal economics have much to say about economies or markets in which inflexibilities and inelasticities occur. It is the task of philosophical analysis to explain why these characteristics do not seem to apply in this or that case, or to explain why the characteristics are not obliterated by conditions that would seem to make them irrelevant. But it is also the task of philosophical analysis to explain why these characteristics do apply, or to explain why the characteristics are so obliterated by conditions that would seem to make them irrelevant.

Here the contributors to this volume profess that people in the economies they have examined are not maximizers of economic quantities. People may seek to maximize in two distinct frameworks, one of which is free of constraints and the other subject to constraints. The first can be illustrated by the case of a hypothetical primitive who has pigs which he may exchange for yarns at any pig-yarn ratio and who may trade with anyone. The second is the case of the primitive who may trade at any pig-yarn ratio but for whom a single trading partner is specified. In both cases, the pig-owning primitive may maximize in deciding whether to trade at all, and, if so, how much pig he is willing to forego. The position taken in this book is that maximization behavior or the achievement of optimal solutions requires the prior existence of a "System of Self-Regulating Markets" free of rules which
constrain choice and (implicitly) in which supply and demand schedules are price-elastic. This is surely not true.

It would have been interesting to examine whether, with given constraints, primiters do in fact maximize. If the traditional share of the rice heap "paid" to the harver in the Indian village is much below the value of the goods he sells to the community, is there any way in which he can escape to some other trade or reduce the quantity or quality of the services he renders? The door to this area of inquiry was barred by prejudget.

It would also be interesting to see whether, in primitive societies, the constraints themselves do not change when they interfere with the achievement of optimum. If the technology of fishing progresses more rapidly than that of yam culture, does the fisherman exchange ratio change, however slowly, in favor of yams? Here and there, hints appear that at least some constraining rules do so change. For example, in Assyrian trade, "the necessaries of life were supposed to be subject to permanent equivalences (prices); actually they were subject to long-range changes." This question, however, was also not really subjected to close examination.

The meaning given by the authors to the distinction between formal and substantive economics may be the source of the whole difficulty. Formal economics derives from logic and refers to the rules for choosing among alternatives. Substantive economics derives from fact and is the "process of interaction between man and his environment, which results in [want satisfaction]." The two, they say, have nothing in common; they "could not be further apart." And they propose that only the substantive meaning of economics can yield the "concepts that are required by the social sciences for an investigation of all the empirical economics of the past and present."

In neither respect are they correct. First, formal economics and the empirical economy have everything in common. Theory is not an isolated exercise in pure logic; it is an instrument for making predictive statements about the real world. Experience and these predictions are tested by reference to the real world. Secondly, while economics can be described empirically by exclusive reference to them, fruitful predictive statements cannot be made by this procedure and it is precisely the task of the social sciences to make predictions about social phenomena. John Neville Keynes once said: "The prevalence of a low type of inductive reasoning in the treatment of economic questions is one of the most fertile sources of economic fallacy."

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Simon Ruttledge

University of Chicago

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New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. Pp. xx, 103. $5.00. (also ed. $2.95.)

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Formal economies, or economic theory, or economic analysis, say the authors, has relevance only to the final case in this trilogy. But only a brief period
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M. Bronfenbrenner

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AER Sept. 1958 Vol. XLIII Number 4

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*Rich Lands and Poor: The Road to World Prosperity, By Gunnar Myrdal.*


(Published in England as *Economic Theory and Under-developed Regions.*)

The very large and steadily increasing income differences between developed and under-developed countries constitute the focus of Gunnar Myrdal’s new book, a revised version of the Anniversary Commemoration Lectures of the National Bank of Egypt, delivered in Cairo in 1955 (published by the bank under the title *Development and Underdevelopment: A Note on the Mechanism of National and International Economic Inequality*, Cairo 1956). As the eminent Swedish scholar points out, “though these inequalities and their tendency to grow are flagrant realities, and though they form a basic cause of the international tension in our present world, they are usually not treated as a central problem in the literature on underdevelopment and development” (p. xvii). Part I of the book attempts to explain why and how these inequalities came to exist, why they persist, and why they tend to increase, and touches briefly on the question: How could these trends be reversed? Part II inquires into the reasons for the relative neglect of these questions in orthodox economic theory.

An examination of the sources of income inequality between regions within a country provides the model for interpretation of the international differences. While some attention is devoted to political factors (and there is much of interest in this discussion) the center of the analysis—and the part most challenging to standard economic theory—concerns the role played by free market forces. Economic growth is conceived as a cumulative process—in part because of a circular interaction of rising investment, incomes, demand, and investment; in part, and more importantly, because of “ever-increasing internal and external economies—interpreted in the widest sense of the word to include, for instance, a working population trained in various crafts, easy communications, the feeling of growth and elbow room, and the spirit of new enterprise . . .” (p. 27). Thus, an initial change for the better is conceived to produce a cumulative movement upward; conversely an initial change for the worse sets in motion a cumulative process downward. If a cumulative upward movement is initiated in one region, it is argued, this gives rise via movements of goods and resources to certain adverse changes (“‘washback effects’) in other regions, which initiate a downward movement. For example, an influx of products from the growing region tends to destroy handicrafts in the poorer region, or out-migration from the poorer region has adverse effects on the age composition of the population and thus on the productivity of that region. The resulting downward movement tends to cumulate because the provision of such
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(p. 675)

"Formal economics or economic theory, or economic analysis, say the authors, has relevance only to the final case in this trilogy."

"trilogy": reciprocity, redistribution and exchange.

"market systems" (were recent and few)

Therefore formal economics is not helpful in explaining or understanding aggregate behavior for most of history and for most of societies."

Polanyi

He overlooked the key term to which special attention is directed (p. 211?) Tr. & Mkt.

"economic postulate" (p. 2h0) Tr. & Mkt.

"the limited applicability of that common-sense compound" - that is the popular use of economic, which compounds economising with materiality - it is merely to urge the limited applicability of that common-sense compound."

"... economic theory, economic analysis or plain 'economics' is only one of several disciplines that busy themselves with the livelihood of man from the material angle." (p. 2h1) Tr. & Mkt.

"apart from mere generalities its minimal relevance to other than market systems, e.g., a planned economy, is negligible." (p. 2h1) Tr. & Mkt.

"shifting the emphasis from a type of rational action to the configuration of person goods and movements which actually make up the economy." (pp. 2h1-2) Tr. & Mkt.

"If we call the rules governing choice of means the logic of rational action, then we may denote this variant of logic, with an improvised term, as formal economics."

"The two root meanings of 'economic' the substantive and the formal have nothing in common." (Chapter XIII - p. 2h3) Tr. & Mkt.

See C. Menger: Grundsätze 2nd. edition - 1923 pp. 76-77)

"The letter derives from logic, the former from fact." (p. 2h3) Tr. & Mkt.
"It is our proposition that only the substantive meaning of "economic" is capable of yielding the concepts that are required by the social sciences for an investigation of all the empirical economics of the past and present." (p. 24) Tr. & Mkt.

"The general frame of reference that we endeavor to construct requires, therefore, treatment of the subject matter in substantive terms." (p. 244) Tr. & Mkt.

"The three institutions of trade, money and market will provide a test cast. They have previously been defined in formal terms only; thus any other than a marketing approach was barred. Their treatment in substantive terms should then bring us nearer to the desired universal frame of reference." (p. 245) Tr. & Mkt.

"...that variant of the theory of choice which we have called formal economics." (p. 246)

"...economic analysis loses most of its relevance as a method of inquiry into the working of the economy. (1. 3 from bottom p. 247) Tr. & Mkt.

"From this follow the limits within which economic analysis can prove effective as a method." (1. 16 from bottom p. 247) Tr. & Mkt.

"Outside of a system of price-taking markets economic analysis loses most of its relevance as a method of inquiry into the working of the economy." (1. 4 from bottom - p. 247) Tr. & Mkt.

p. 247 l. 10 below lists the conditions of relevant g and/or effective-ness. See George's reference to economics.
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(p. 675) Review by "The Myth in Early Imperial"

From "Formal economics or economic theory, or economic analysis, say the authors, has relevance only to the final case in this trilogy."

"trilogy": reciprocity, redistribution and exchange.

"market systems" (were recent and few)

Therefore formal economics is not helpful in explaining or understanding aggregate behavior for most of history and for most of societies."

Palmyr:

My References to Ch. VIII pp. 239 - 292. D. 243

"economic postulate" (p. 243) Tr. 1 Mkt.

"the limited applicability of that common-sense compound" - that is the popular use of economics, which compounds economizing with materiality - it is merely to urge the limited applicability of that common-sense compound."

"... economic theory, economic analysis or plain "economics" is only one of several disciplines that busy themselves with the livelihood of man from the material angle." (p. 241) Tr. 1 Mkt.

"apart from mere generalities its main relevance to other than market systems, e.g., a planned economy, is negligible." (p. 241) Tr. 1 Mkt.

"Shifting the emphasis from a type of rational action to the configuration of persons, goods and movements which actually make up the economy." (pp. 241-2) Tr. 1 Mkt.

"If we call the rules governing choice of means the logic of rational action, then we may denote this variant of logic, with an improvised term, as formal economics."

"The two root meanings of 'economics' the substantive and the formal have nothing in common." (Chapter XIII - p. 243) Tr. 1 Mkt.

See C. Menger: Grundsätze 2nd. edition - 1923 pp. 76-77)

"The latter derives from logic, the former from fact." (p. 243) Tr. 1 Mkt.
"It is our proposition that only the substantive meaning of "economic" is capable of yielding the concepts that are required by the social sciences for an investigation of all the empirical economies of the past and present." (p. 283) Tr. & Mkt.

"The general frame of reference that we endeavor to construct requires, therefore, treatment of the subject matter in substantive terms." (p. 284) Tr. & Mkt.

"The three institutions of trade, money and market will provide a test case. They have previously been defined in formal terms only. Any other than a marketing approach was barred. Their treatment in substantive terms should then bring us nearer to the desired universal frame of reference." (p. 285) Tr. & Mkt.

"...that variant of the theory of choice which we have called formal economics."

"...economic analysis loses most of its relevance as a method of inquiry into the working of the economy." (1. 3 from bottom p. 287) Tr. & Mkt.

"From this follow the limits within which economic analysis can prove effective as a method." (1. 16 from bottom p. 287) Tr. & Mkt.

"Outside of a system of price-taking markets economic analysis loses most of its relevance as a method of inquiry into the working of the economy." (1. 4 from bottom p. 287) Tr. & Mkt.

p. 287 1. 19 below lists the conditions of relevant quantitatively and/or effectiveness. See George's reference to Marshall's economies.

if also above 2. 4 p. volume 1. 16 above --
Trade and Market in the


Comments on Prof. F.F. Kerckhoffs's review in JESHO vol. III, Pt. 1, April 160.

The review is concerned with three chapters of Part I ("The birth of the economy"). There are three major debates on economic questions:

1. "Markets and Trading in European History" (Chapter I) by Nancy W. Lindberg.
2. "Aristotle discusses the economy" (Chapter II) by Karl Polanyi.
3. "Aristotle believes in chapter VIII it is set out that the term of "primitive" "moder" as often referred to the economy of" (Chapter IX).

The role of markets in the economy matters. Professor Smith in his absence of "the market" has been the subject of much discussion. A.V. reveals the conclusion that the significant innovation of price making was manufactured and directed trade was essentially a product of the first millennium.
Answers come from editors and authors to unfavorable reviews by specialists in the field, are limited by a strict code of conduct, to very exceptional cases. Even indeed there is no partial defence against (should be undertaken under a stupid attack however violent), matter of some substance and distinct in the world of scholarship is involved that may claim a wider interest than that of the specialist.

The proportion of work was devoted to be proportion that the traditional reading of the precolonial African economy to the emergence of market trading should be sought in classical Greece, toward the like path.

The significance of such a position is the importance of such a shift of perspective among others a conceptual distinction between markets and trade institutions.
between the different municipalities, as well as the operational distinctions, as well as a reconsideration of Aristotle's economics. It seems to be Aristotle's economics which should be treated as a system of a floor quality, not then be found to be both realising and of a type of depth worthy of his name & can be avoided as the economics should to mismatch with the underlying of a conceptional system. Moreover the historical tradition informing the argument is neither complete nor drawn at all, any reason for the preliminary treatment of the factual content. The paper
Dr. Malcolm's Notes

1. Retract four as an orthogonal. Let's consider the four points of the orthogonal. The four points are
   a. B
   b. C
   c. D
   d. E

2. We do not affect your equations. How can we

3. The equation of the orthogonal is

4. The form of the orthogonal is

5. The condition of the orthogonal is

6. Along the orthogonal, the equation is

7. The equation is
Comments on Professor Feichelman's review in *Journal of Economic History and Social of the Orient* vol. III, part 1, April 1960.

Three of the 21 chapters of the book are reviewed as falling within the scope of Oriental studies. These chapters are Chapter III "The secular debate on economic primitivism" by Harry W. Pearson and Chapters II and V, "Marketless trading in Hammurabi's time" and "Aristotle discovers the economy" by Karl Polanyi.

In Chapter I it is set out that the contrast of "primitive" vs. "modern" as often applied to views about the economies of antiquity should be better centered on the role played by the markets in the economy. "This perspective," as the author of the chapter says, "gives a much broader range to the issues of the entire debate. For now the elements of markets and commercial trade which appear in the Greek classical and Hellenistic period, are seen not as the heritage of over four thousand years of Mesopotamian development, but as portentous new inventions seeking a place in Greek culture."

Chapter II stresses the absence of a market system in the Mesopotamian economy. "So much already appears certain," this chapter concludes: "Contrary to traditional notions, Babylonian trade and business activities were not originally market activities."

Chapter V draws the conclusion that the significant innovation of price-making markets and of market-directed trade was owed not to the Orient but to the Greeks in the first millennium B.C. Thus the picture of the ancient Near East as it emerges from Chapter II is the factual and logical basis for the reconsideration of Aristotle's economics in Chapter V. These conclusions of the reviewer are not mentioned in the review. Rather, the improvements spelled out in these chapters contain nothing of relevance to the economic and social development of the Orient.
social history or either Babylon or classical Greece. Nor that they form part of a comprehensive historical theme intended to explain with their help the facts of Oriental economic and social history.

Yet the picture of the ancient Near East as it emerges from Chapter II serves as the factual and logical basis for the reconsideration of the classical economy in Aristotle's time as well as his economics which mirror it. Mere assumptions of classical antiquity was altogether wrongly placed by economic historians along the time scale which led up to market trade. In spite of intensive trading activities and fairly advanced money uses Greek business life as a whole was still in the very first beginnings of market trade in Aristotle's time. For we tend to discount the part played by price-making markets in favour of other methods of trading such as gift-exchange and administered trade to explain the supposed inadequacy of Aristotle's economics as traditionally viewed as reflecting a transitional condition of incipient market trade.
Prof. P. Marzi

Heichelheim

Comments on Prof. F. Heichelheim’s review of "Trade and Markets in the Early Empires. JESOT, 134 (2) April, 1980.

The dominant conclusion must be that:

was not, as we firmly believe, the

for commercial purposes that were

required to have developed in the East;

are, we think, have been a pioneer


For if Babylon and Tyre were not, as

it now appears, the ancient homes of the

rice making markets, then the elements

that seminal institution must

have come from the Hellenic sphere.

Some time in the first millennium B.C., sixth and fifth century Greece,

more, therefore, in essential respects, economically

more naive than even the extreme

primitives of the early centuries would have it. While in the

fourth century these very Greeks

initiated the gainful business practices

that in many later days developed into the "prima and market system."

These conclusions are not

mentioned in the review. Instead the

impression is created that Ch. 2 on

early forms of Babylonia trade and Ch. 3

contain nothing of relevance to the economic historians.

While Ch. 2 on market and trading in..."
three

of its doctrine, enshrined in falling under

the Scope of this Oriental Studies

the community since

back while we forecast the results of previous of the
Ancient Near East, as it emerges from

her, is the factual and logical

basis for the argument deployed

in regard to

Aristotle’s economics in

reconsideration of

Ch. 3.

Continued f.

The revenue refers to... the constant comprehensive attempts at clarifying

the known conceptual clarification, the

subject continues in Chs. 2 and

5, which are many concerned with

the factual questions the organization

of trade in the East Asia, Africa,

Europe, and the Oceania, and to

the end of the 18th century in the

Ottoman Empire. He made the question on

the role of markets in trade. In

California, it appears. The tendency of

our argument is to discount the data

part of price making markets and to

explain trade in its economic area

to in favor of other methods of

duced and to explain the well-traveled

marginal products of Aristotle’s economics

as traditionally viewed out of as a reflection

reflecting the period of their time from

Asia, Africa, and Europe.
The reversion concept of a market rule to clear a review

The reversion concept is market

market rule is a market system and
refers to distinguishing between price and
market. This in turn contradicts her
seemingly factual statements of

all relevance to her actual statements.

1. The market. He takes the identity of market rule, bar and the gates for granted. His conclusion that

whether market price has been often
been translated as a market rule price
as market price is a fact. This
amount to precluding the case of

issue, in spite of oppositions.

2. He emphasizes the issue under,

3. The traditional use of price, where

"equilibrium"

removes general cause) would become the

Since the word

that the word to carry the association
of market made price. Again the

neutral term 'equilibrium' is avoided.

in spite of opponent's reasoning.

3. Dr. Price the reviews agree that

up to the axiom was not popular.
As usual, the difficult question of market workings centred on the Greek economy. Studies of careful analysis of economic facts and the understanding of the market as not yet familiar with the workings of supply demand price mechanism i.e. Aka price mechanism instead. The evidence B"ohringer referred to was the real changing of the Stkhis as hardly ever being and the interpretation of demand being attributed more to exceptional circumstances directed by price differential. Price many markets.

3) Aka for equivalence noted as a culture something the popular concept of what we call to day price as a culture word. The equivalence noted as the literary survival of famous equivalences with "the price of a year in the tunics besides the review" adding the "thick pieces of silver" as the price of a year E i.e. the tunics besides the review. Thus this will an absurdly proof of ignorance about the price of slaves and their actual at the time. His misunderstanding was extremely hollow.
(4) The predominant misinterpretation of Meteors is as exchange or barter in the usual sense of the consumer. This movement is followed by the doctrine of the Aristotelian logic as a method of reasoning.

(5) An examination of Aristotle’s use of the concept of commercial trade is equally dismissed in the context of his philosophy of ethics.

(6) Even so, The Herodotean passage with its description of the market place, the symbol of the East & West trade, makes it a place of exchange and commerce. The ethics of trade, buying and selling, the notion of treatment and the system of the price and money before the Mediterranean trade.
Trade Market, antagonism nothing could be more plausible than the reference advanced against it. Nothing stronger existed.

The monumental inquiry into "Allied Force" now published in 1956-7-8. It dealt finally with the question to take us nearest to the date of a market situation that has since changed Greece than ever before.
Smelser's review of

Test

I. From the angle of "Ec st in (S rms"

2. The "diff" from want to exchange

3. The stuff from retreat to

the "si gee ril" to the cells (2)

4. Work on the "p. g. f. j." of our

5. What is the "p. g. f. j." of our

own protein.
Smedler's review.

I. Work out a formula of our own position.

(a) acceptance
(b) criticism of others
1. Darcy
2. Terry
3. Harry
4. Walter
5. Fusfeld
6. Fusfeld
7. Fusfeld
8. Fusfeld
9. Fusfeld
10. Fusfeld
11. Fusfeld

(b) on an empirical basis strongly
(c) to work out a formula of...
A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF EXCHANGE SYSTEMS

Neil J. Smelser
Harvard University

Our exposure to economic thought for two centuries has led us to assume that the exchange of economic goods and services occurs in a market. Even in our own market-dominated society, however, we must contend with several forms of exchange which defy analysis by traditional economic categories of supply and demand, price, interest, profit, rent, and rational calculation of economic gain:

1. The gift for a bride or baby, the services of a friend’s wife who prepares dinner, the “good turn”--all are exchanges of goods and services of potential market value. To offer to pay in such exchanges, however, is both inappropriate and insulting. Furthermore, any calculation which enters these exchanges is better attributed to the “rationality” of social reciprocation or status-seeking than to the calculation of economic gain.

2. The redistribution of wealth through charity or progressive taxation is again an exchange of potentially marketable commodities. While the economist may analyze the repercussions of these exchanges in the market, his categories of maximization, prices, and returns seem distant from the social rationale which initiates such redistribution.

3. The mobilization of economic resources for public goals--through eminent domain, taxation, direct appropriation, and selective service--involves the transfer of economic goods and services without the intrusion of an economic market. These exchanges affect the level of production, prices, and income in the market, but the concepts of the market do not explain the original exchange.

On the other hand, we still observe the market in varying degrees of perfection, and we know the value of the economists’ theoretical apparatus for explaining and perhaps predicting the course of market behavior. What, then, is the scope of economic analysis in the matter of exchange? What are the spheres of economic calculation which justify the postulate of economic rationality? No matter what our final answers, we must conclude in advance that contemporary economic theory cannot generate specific solutions for all the flows of goods and services, even in societies amenable to economic analysis.

In societies where the self-regulating price market is inconspicuous or absent, the categories of economic analysis grow even paler. What can we say about fluctuations of production and prices in the Soviet Union? Certainly, the accelerator-multiplier solutions for free-market economies have their limitations. Even more, what can we say about the traditionalized and reciprocal gift-giving among island peoples which does not hint at economic calculation,

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prices, or gain? What can we say about the post-harvest distribution in Indian villages in which the guiding principles is caste organization? What can traditional international trade theory say about the isolated port of trade with fixed equivalencies which rule out price-determination by supply and demand? Can formal economic theory be of help in these matters? If not, what sort of theory can?

To such questions, the authors of a recent volume address themselves. Roaming through the records of Babylon, Mesopotamia, Greece, Mexico, Yucatan, the Guinea Coast, and villages India, they sketch a fascinating picture of the separation of trading practices from the familiar practices of free-market exchange. In addition, the authors prepare a critique of the analytical power of traditional economic theory and suggest some alternative categories for a better comparative economics. Leaving historical and archaeological judgments to experts, I should like to assess the authors' conclusions in terms of their own empirical material and in terms of the desiderata for a science of comparative economics.

The volume is salted liberally with polemic. Self-consciously, the authors affiliate themselves with the institutional economists and the anthropologists, and equally explicitly they reject several other types of analysis: (a) economic history—whether steeped in "historical materialism" or "traditional liberalism"—persists in the "traditional coordinates of money, market, price, etc." (p. 28) in the study of civilizations in which they do not apply; and (b) those "eminently conceptualizing disciplines" (p. 93) of the economists, political scientists, and sociologists also come under attack. The chapter-headings above—"Marketless Trading in Hammurabi's Time", "Separation of Trade and Market", "The Economy Has No Surplus", etc.—show their dissatisfaction with economic analysis. In addition, Arensberg feels that sociologists maltreat particular social arrangements as "a matter of logical premise in the world-view of their discipline" (p. 102), and that they rely too much on their "formal and often timeless logic" (p. 108). In contrast, anthropologists are likely to ask general questions only after the details of observation about man's behavior have been taken up, compared, ordered, synthesized, classified, and recognized (pp. 108-109). (c) Even though the authors' approach is "functional" (p. 308), it is not to be confused with "functionalism and system-building relyings on putative needs of individual or society" (p. 112). There is not a search for "functional equivalents" in society after society, a search which becomes fruitless when "the sweep of cultural evolution and variation starts" (p. 112). To understand culture, traits one must know not only their function, but the relative order of their historical emergence, and the necessary precursors and preconditions they must have had" (p. 112). The authors' self-conscious methodological preferences are therefore institutionalist, inductive, anti-systematic, and hesitantly functionalist.

To hold such preferences and reject others is certainly legitimate in the present state of the social sciences. Further, the authors are not merely flogging dead horses, since they criticize approaches which have both their advocates and their vulnerabilities. On the other hand, when one's view of the world is too colored by the rejection of alternative "approaches", he is likely first to waste time on idle issues and second to arrive at curious analytical results.

An example of the first is Arensberg's revival of the deductive-inductive issue in his discussion of the relation between sociology, which deals with functional equivalence, and anthropology, which deals with culture traits. He recognizes the scientific requirement of general analytical statements and general comparative dimensions, as do most of us. At the same time, his discussion seems to oppose social scientific (deductive) and anthropological (inductive) methods as mutually exclusive. Surely, enough is known of the philosophy of science and the relations among disciplines to be aware of the necessary interplay between general concepts and empirical observations. One may err in moving from conceptual outlines to empirical investigations and in moving back again. Yet both operations are integral parts of the analytical thought process, and it seems idle to enter controversies over the relative value of each.

All the authors' methodological preferences are apparent in their parallel distinctions (a) between the disembodied and the embedded economy, and (b) between the formal and substantive meanings of "economic". The disembodied economy--most characteristic of the market economy of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries--is a system in which "men's livelihood is secured by way of institutions that are activated by economic motives and governed by laws which are specifically economic" (p. 68). Its counterpart, the embedded economy, is an institution in which the strictly economic elements of price, production, economic motivation, etc., are conjoined to and dependent on other, non-economic institutions (p. 71). Similarly, the formal meaning of "economic" refers to the system of rational choice ("economising") based on insufficiency of means and the logic of rational action. The alternative meaning, the substantive (which has "nothing in common" with the formal), refers to "an institutional process of interaction between man and his environment, which results in an economic activity of want-satisfying material means" (p. 248). Substantively defined, the economy implies neither insufficiency of means nor rational choice (p. 243); above all, it is "instituted", or embedded in institutions. In terms of the authors' methodological preferences, the disembodied or formal economy implies a market orientation, a deductive approach, formalistic concepts, and a universal functionalism (i.e., economising based on scarcity). Correspondingly, the substantive economy implies an institutionalist orientation, an inductive approach, empirically-generated concepts, and a minimum of functionalism (for, indeed, "it is doubtful... whether beyond subsistence man has had any universal economic problems"--p. 110).

Such distinctions, while valuable for certain purposes, come perilously close to throwing out the baby of general economic analysis with the bath of the culture-bound market orientation of traditional economics. This danger may be illustrated in the authors' discussion of the concepts of scarcity and economising.

To the authors, the postulate of scarcity as the basis for economic activity implies a whole set of premises: (a) an "insufficiency of means"; (b) "more than one use to the means, as well as... at least two ends ordered in a sequence of preference" (p. 246); (c) this gives rise to "economising" or a choice of means (p. 291); and (d) a retention of formal economic assumptions which "make all economies variations on the market theme" (p. 292). If we remove all but the first--as many modern functional sociologists presumably do--we are either "stripping the concept of its meaning and substituting instead naturalistic assumptions" (p. 292) or opening the door for "devices to
introduce a market economy" (p. 304). Hence it seems that we must accept either the whole "economistic" set of premises or an empty "fact of scarcity" from which "nothing at all follows" (p. 289).

Because the authors find shortcomings with the scarcity-economising formula, they discard scarcity as a general basis for economic activity. What then, is the alternative? And what is the nature of economic activity? One suggestion seems to be to consult the facts about specific "scarcity-situations". Scarcity is not a general feature of social action but may vary in individual cases. Scarcity-situations may be rare in some civilizations and very general in others (pp. 246-247). In any case, the investigator should look into the facts of scarcity-situations. A second suggestion seems to limit the definition of economic activity to that institutioned process which results in a "continuous supply of want-satisfying material means." Apparently, in this case, economic activity does rest in some sort of scarcity or functional basis, for subsistence is a universal economic problem. Yet, even under this process, scarcity is not a necessary condition, as the definition of a substantive economy shows. In still another suggestion, the authors seem to consider the fact of "institutedness" of behavior as an alternative to the scarcity assumption:

"...scarcity is present or absent in varying degrees as a result of the structure of society and social attitudes, and choice is often severely restricted by the social structure within which the individual functions" (p. 343).

It seems to me that the authors have created an extremely unstable methodological scaffolding in their attempt to replace the discarded postulate of scarcity. Their first error lies in the unhappy dichotomy of scarcity with all the trappings of market behavior vs. no scarcity at all. The straight "economistic" version of scarcity is, in fact, tightly culture-bound; the job of correction, however, is one of analytical repair, not rejection. We may assume, for instance, that a society possesses a value-system which defines certain goals as desirable for unit members of the society at various levels. By a process of institutionalisation, the appropriate channels for realising these goals are specified. It is apparent, however, that all societies exist in an environment which does not guarantee automatically the complete and instantaneous realisation of these goals. Hence an inherent part of the definition of the situation is that certain institutionalized attention be given to the supply of various facilities to permit flexibility in attaining the valued goals. The goals may vary considerably, of course, as may the institutionalized provision of facilities. Yet whether the goals concern perpetuation of kinship lines, attainment of a state of religious bliss, territorial expansion, or maximization of wealth, the society must come to grips with the problem of uncertainty in the environment because it is both completely and institutionally provisioned of facilities. This is the basis for both economic and noneconomic resources. The institutionalized attention to the supply of facilities---one aspect of which is the economy---all societies need not be embedded in one specific type of institution, such as the self-regulating market. Indeed, the structure of the economy will be in part a function of the institutionalized values themselves, in part a function of the general level of differentiation of the society, and in part a function of the availability (or scarcity) of human and non-human resources. Yet, if some sort of interest in realising resources for their use in directed behavior is never institutionalized (embedded or disembodied), this occasions a breakdown in the society in question. Scarcity itself does not determine the structure of the economy; yet, mastery over scarce means is one of the necessary ingredients
in defining the economy in a way which can be compared from society to society. This or a similar statement of the scarcity postulate seems to retain its comparability from civilization to civilization and avoids the embarrassing position that scarcity necessarily results in a market-dominated economy.

With this background statement, let us assess the authors' suggestions for an alternative to the postulate of scarcity. To say that the empirical variability of scarcity situations argues for rejecting the scarcity postulate displays a singular misconception about the nature of institutions. Scarcity is not a static matter of historical fact—evident at one time and not so evident at another. Scarcity involves a condition of uncertainty as to the availability of facilities. The institutionalization of economic behavior minimizes this uncertainty by the supply of appropriately-conditioned resources. Merely because there happens to be a surplus at one time and a dearth at another does not mean that the economic institution closes up shop during happy times and works overtime during hard times. The empirical variability in the availability of resources, far from being an argument against the scarcity postulate and economic institutions, seems to be strong evidence for stabilization through the institutionalization of economic activity.

Second, to limit economic institutions to those which work toward a supply of want-satisfying material means seems to enable the primitive and peasant societies at the expense of the market society. In the former, it appears (but is not necessarily so) that economic activity is devoted to a sort of material subsistence based on food, clothing, and shelter. Clearly, this definition defies the whole notion of cultural variability which the authors insist upon most strongly. Further, it has been long established that to limit the definition of economic activity to the material side is grossly inadequate for the analysis of economic behavior. It seems to have a certain reality about it for the analysis of subsistence economies. Yet in our own society, in which expressive behavior, ideas, and even personalities have economic value, the formula of the "supply of want-satisfying material means" cuts across as illegitimate to try to force a physical or material bias on all economic activity. It is to impose a fully-developed market analysis on all types of economy; both operations involve an ill-advised reductionism.

Third, it is commonplace that the definition of scarcity depends on "the structure of society and social attitudes", among other things. This institutionalization of attitudes and behavior, however, is not an alternative to scarcity, but one of the components in its determination. By looking upon "institutionalized" as an argument against "economizing based upon scarcity", the authors come dangerously close to rejecting the whole concept of "economic" altogether and are left simply with "institutionalized control" over material means, which, as we have seen, is insufficient as a conception of "economic".

To summarize, the concepts of "scarcity", "institutionalized", and "economic" are corollaries, not alternatives, and all must be included in the formulation of economic activity which will stand the test of comparative analysis. Our whole judgment of the volume, however, should not rest on the authors' theoretical dilemmas. They did try their hands at locating the actual manner in which the economic process is instituted at different times and places (p. 250). Let us attempt to assess their positive results.
Polanyi suggests three patterns of integration of economic activity: (a) reciprocity, or "movements between correlative points of symmetrical groupings"; (b) redistribution, or "appropriational movements toward a center and out of it again"; (c) exchange, or "vice versa movements taking place as between hands under a market system" (p. 259). These types are "by no means mutually exclusive, nor do they claim to be exhaustive" (p. 99), but presumably they are selected from what are "very few patterns" of integration (p. 250), and attempt to "transcend [the limitations of economic analysis] in a general theory of economic organization" (p. xiv).

Even though the concepts of reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange are meant to be neither exclusive nor exhaustive, better terminology might have been chosen. Actually, all three involve exchange, in the sense that rights to economic goods and services change hands. Perhaps the concept "self-regulating market" should replace their concept "exchange". Certainly, if the authors consider reciprocity and redistribution not to be exchange systems, they carry their anti-economic bias even further implicitly than they do explicitly.

The authors relate these systems of exchange to forms of trade, money uses, market elements, and--in a casual way--to types of social structure. We might abstract the following paradigm, with examples, from their analysis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Forms of Integration</th>
<th>Forms of Integration</th>
<th>Forms of Integration</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>Exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Forms of trade</strong></td>
<td>Gift trade (guest friends, Kula partners, etc.)</td>
<td>Administered trade (fixed prices, equivalencies)</td>
<td>Market trade (haggling-haggling, self-regulating prices)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Use of money</strong></td>
<td>Payment use (discharge of obligations, not transactions; blood money, bride price)</td>
<td>Standard use of money (equivalencies in staples)</td>
<td>Exchange use of money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Market elements</strong></td>
<td>Exchange at set rates</td>
<td>Exchange at set rates</td>
<td>Market with bargained rates--supply-demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Types of social structure</strong></td>
<td>Kinship, neighborhood, community (savage society, Kula, Indian village)</td>
<td>Government-controlled (Indian village, bloodwater empires, Soviet Union)</td>
<td>Market mechanism (19th and early 20th century Western Europe and America)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This schema classifies not economies, but types of exchange. Production and consumption systems, for instance, are not considered. Nonetheless, the classification represents a genuine contribution to comparative economic theory. I should like to carry this analysis a little further, utilizing partly the authors'
own examples, and to suggest correlates of social structure which may form the basis for further research.

A convenient point of departure is the authors' link between the categories "redistributive" and "administered trade". Polanyi mentions that several elements of administered trade--checking of quality, physical exchange of the goods, storage, safeguarding, etc.--are associated with the collection of exports and repartition of imports, both of which belong "to the redistributive sphere of the domestic economy" (p. 262). Administered trade is correlated, therefore, with the redistributive kind of economy. Yet the authors' own examples do not seem to justify this conclusion: (a) they describe the unmeaningum (a sort of public figure who directed investment) of the early Assyrian trading post conjecturally as fitting into "risk-free markless trading, organized in the public interest, primarily on behalf of governmental war material procurement" (p. 25). This seems less "redistributive" than "mobilization", i.e., subordinated to collective social goals, especially wars.

(b) The Mesopotamian economy, which seems genuinely "redistributive", is not discussed in terms of administered foreign trade; indeed, the only mention of external wealth concerns booty and plunder. The other goods and services were redistributed internally (p. 46). (c) The administered ports of trade in the Eastern Mediterranean seemed to guarantee political neutrality and protection for traders; there is no mention of a redistribution system by central authorities. In fact, the changing neutrality of the ports of trade was associated with a changing balance of power in the Middle East. (d) The Maya-Aztec trade--dealing primarily in luxuries for the upper classes--was administered trade but scarcely was concerned with the system of redistribution of economic goods and services internally. (e) The most convincing separation between redistribution and administered trade, however, occurs in the case of the port of Whydah and the kingdom of Dahomey. The system of administered trade had very little to do with the "redistributive economy" of Dahomey, but instead with maintaining the kingdom's ability to pursue its military policy: it was an arrangement to trade slaves for implements of war (p. 161). In fact, trade in the great port was to obtain "cloth and military stores" for the "palace, the army, and the houses of the great" (p. 182), whereas the market was for the necessities of the common folk. Administered trade was removed, in short, from much of the whole complex of redistribution.

In the light of these examples, I should like to add a dimension to the authors' classification--namely, the "mobilization", which subordinates economic arrangements to an interest in pursuing collective goals, particularly in maintaining the political status of the society in question. Mobilization differs from redistribution insofar as it does not solidify and maintain a system of stratification (as the redistributive system does), but collect all goods and services into the hands of those responsible for pursuing the broad political aims of the society. Of course, redistributive and mobilizational aspects of the economy may and do appear in the same society. It seems to me, however, that "administered trade" is more a characteristic of mobilizational institutions (usually government) and is seldom connected with redistributive systems.

This is true not only for the authors' historical examples of administered trade, but also in modern states with bulk exchange, arranged trade agreements, trade "policies", etc., and in looser groupings such as the Sterling Area.
Therefore, we are presented with four, not three, types of exchange systems: (a) reciprocal; (b) redistributive; (c) mobilitative; (d) self-regulating market. Each is embedded in a particular kind of social structure. One way to identify these respective social structures, as well as to elucidate the principles governing each type of exchange, is to ask what kind of social structure typically appears as the bearer of potential instability for each type of exchange. Naturally, instability of the flow of economic goods and services occurs in natural disasters such as lack of rain, flood, storms, etc., no matter what the institutional embeddedness of an economy. On the other hand, all economies institutionalize a focus for possible instability of economic flows in the following ways:

In the reciprocal system, the exchanging partners are segments units—usually families, neighborhoods, communities, clans, etc.—which base the exchange of goods and services on an implied reciprocal equivalence at appropriate times and places. In order for the resulting flow of commodities to display instability or break down, there must be an alteration in the structure of exchanging units themselves. Of course, this alteration has little or nothing to do with the economic conditions of supply and demand, but rather with the dynamics of kinship, clanship, tribalism, neighborhood, and demography. Because reciprocal exchanges normally follow from an ascribed base (frequently kinship), it is probable that a peculiar stability and inflexibility govern these types of exchanges. Since the sources of their change lie in the modification of ascribed roles, moreover, change is likely to be gradual.

In the redistributive system of exchange, the potential sources of instability are institutionalized in the systems of stratification, or the allocation of rewards in society—whether these rewards be power, wealth, or prestige. For example, in the distribution of fixed quantities of foodstuffs in the authors’ Indian village was a function of caste position. The redistributive system of the Assyrian city-palace organization was linked closely to the distribution of political power and prestige in the communities (pp. 36–37). To choose a modern example, the institutionalization of transfer payments (progressive taxation, welfare measures, etc.) in the British case rested on a changing ideology regarding the rights of various classes. Finally, the flow of charity in modern civilization rests on institutionalized values concerning the relations between the have and have-not in a society with unevenly distributed rewards. By investigating the nature and principles of these stratification systems in which redistributive systems of exchange are embedded, we may be able to read some regularity into this kind of economic exchange.

The stability or instability of the mobilitative type of exchange depends primarily on the fortunes of those pursuing the collective goals of society, such as wars, maintenance of the state, etc. The enclaves or ports of trade which the authors so ably analyze fed on a certain balance of power among empires which led all to prefer a politically neutral trading area (e.g., the Near East, pp. 54–55; Dahomey, pp. 174–175, 192). In modern times, the arranged trade and currency agreements of the Nazi and Soviet governments have stemmed from an interest in mobilizing resources for maximizing national power. Further, to analyze some of the arrangements for “bulk purchases” and “procurement of vital materials” would no doubt reveal the same interest in the politics and its perpetuation. Instabilities in this form of exchange, finally, are a function of the political status of the society in question. This exchange is not
governed by the principles of the market, in short, but there are definite
institutionalized structures—the political authority in its capacity to mobilize
resources—through which we may develop generalizations concerning the
short-term adjustments and long-term modifications of this type of exchange.

In connection with the market type of exchange, the burden of instability
rests on the market itself. Price and the usual economic mechanisms presum-
ably operate outside the concrete institutional nexus of stratification, political
authority, or kinship. On the other hand, the institutionalized values of eco-
nomic rationality govern the rules of behavior in such markets. Furthermore,
the fluctuations and changes in market trade are analyzable within the formal
apparatus of economic theory.

We might add that these four types of exchange correspond to the four
functional subsystems of society—as outlined by Parsons and his associates—in
the following ways:

(1) Latent pattern-maintenance and tension-management. Every social
system is governed by a value-system which specifies the nature of the system,
its goals, and the means of attaining these goals. A social system's first func-
tional exigency is to preserve the integrity of the value-system itself and to
assure that individual actors conform to it. This involves socializing and edu-
cating system-members, as well as providing tension-control mechanisms to
handle and resolve members' disturbances relative to the values. At the level
of society as a whole, the social units which specialize primarily in this "la-
tency" function are families, communities, religious and quasi-religious
groupings, etc. The type of exchange among such units—as illustrated by the
authors' and other examples—is reciprocative.

(2) Goal-attainment. Given the value-system and its relatively stable
institutionalization, the social system must establish certain relationships
with the situation external to the system; that is, the system's activities must
be directed toward a goal or set of goals. At the level of society as a whole,
the social units which specialize in goal-attainment are, broadly speaking,
political. The acquisition, control, and disposal of facilities in this political
sphere follow the principles of mobilulative exchange—taxation, eminent do-
main, forced contracts, selective service, etc.

(3) Integration. Harmony of purpose and lack of conflict are not neces-
sarily guaranteed in the specialized pursuit of goals. That function which deals
with maintaining the interaction among individual units is integration. At the
level of society as a whole, this involves the allocation of rewards and facili-
ties in accordance with the integrative requirements of society. One of the
kinds of social structure closely associated with this integrative function is the
stratification of the rewards of wealth, power, and prestige. The kind of ex-
change associated with the integrative subsystem of society is redistribution.

(4) Adaptation. This subsystem involves the supply of facilities by
which a variety of goals may be pursued at different times and in different situ-
aional contexts. Units specializing in these adaptive functions are economic
units—firms, boards of directors, managers, etc.—in the classical sense.
The kind of exchange associated with these specialized units is market exchange.
To these sweeping associations, we should add many qualifications. In some societies, all exchange seems to be concentrated in a single type--most notably in the island peoples' reciprocal gift-giving among clans and tribes. In others, such as our own, all four types of exchange are apparent, though a single type--the market--predominates. In still others, such as the Soviet Union, all four types make their appearance, though the mobilizational, redistributive, and market elements are controlled partially under a vast political rubric. The appearance and rank-order of the various types of exchange, in short, are dependent on the value-system of the society in question, the level of differentiation of its social structure, and the complexity of the demands of its internal and external situation. Despite these qualifications, to link types of exchange with types of social structure on the one hand, and to link the types of social structure with types of functional requirements on the other, lead toward a more general basis for the comparative analysis of exchange systems.

To summarize, we may agree with the authors' belabored dictum that formal economic analysis has little value outside the market context. We may also accept their assertion that economic processes are institutional or embedded. Yet the authors seem to hesitate to go further than demonstrating these basic points. Perhaps they preferred not to generalize because they were so aware of the shortcomings of formal economic theory. Perhaps, on the other hand, their position as institutionalists and anthropologists led to this hesitation. In any case, they did not go far enough in exploiting the general implications of their own interesting case material. It seems to me that to identify typical kinds of exchange (as they did), to trace these exchanges to typical kinds of social structure (as they did not do), and finally to investigate the economic results stemming from the principles governing these several kinds of social structure (as they did not do), we may move a step closer to the development of a genuine comparative economics which meets the requirements of a comparative science more adequately than either traditional economics or radical institutionalism.
My observations on limited markets alone.

K.P.: "The economy is defined as the total market without equilibrium.

241 Economic theory, economic analysis, or planned economy.

242 Practically it is no mere word. It is the task of modern economics to determine the relevance of its own theories to that of the modern planning economy, as well as to the plan economyadox.

243 Test of this analysis to provide us with both those conceptual tools required to penetrate the range of social relationships in which the economy was embedded.

244 Formal economics may be, succinctly put, 'spare audit' in self-directed industrial direction.
2.44 "For an investigation of all the empirical evidence of past and present, a formal expression is needed."

2.45 "Factual meaning, regulatory approach is identical with formal economy.

2.45 Formal meaning, systems analysis and application is a market system.

2.47 A centrally planned economy is a well-known instance. An economy system of economic units, economic actions, laws and its relations.
applicability is one distinction. An inadequate term. I mean economic effective application in the quantitatively relevant sense.

Why not leave him: how to be happy etc. to an unmarked economics.

Points: system of free, self, market:

1) Defined output and self-regulating factor market
   (system)

2) Trivial assumption
   When applied, agree in circle.
   i.e., a petitonic principle

3) Results: non-quantitative
   Non-quantitative

Ref.: Hayek's precook work. Not

1) Appeared to

2) For vagueness of terms nearly due to disregard of one, specialization

1) Results: on trade (advantages + problems)
   Trade.

2) Markets (prices)
   Markets (prices)

3) For absence of prof. on the market system i.e. price
   market system is price
   Markets (2) atom, market, a speculation

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