

WEEKEND NOTES III - ROYSTEIN

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KARL POLANYI, JULY 14/56

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## 1. RELIGION AND REVELATION

Christianity was not understood by the Apostles or since. It was carried along by the Christological element. <sup>exceptionally did</sup> Only ~~in the past~~ <sup>Communism</sup> 160 years are we getting Christian heresies such as Socialism. The Apostles met Jesus alive after the crucifixion and then preached that he was the son of God and this story spread. There is nothing of the meaning of Christianity in the Crusades which was a long sustained movement.

Among the Jews there was an intolerant eradication of their idolatrous <sup>id</sup> sects to the extent where no trace of them remains although they are referred to in the Old Testament. This seemed to go with a strong religious sense.

The Essenes didn't wish to continue. They didn't marry nor have children. There is a strong feeling in Christianity that the end of the world was imminent. The Acts was the only contemporary recounting of events.

<sup>had several years</sup> Polanyi spent a year reading in all of the world religions. Then Wells' Outline of History came out. Each religion talked about the 'Path', the 'Way', the 'Road'. This leads to the question of whether there was a common problem for the world at this time.

Confucius had no notion of theism or God. He was in the great Chinese liberal tradition - not to label. The English also have this aversion to labelling - it is limiting. This Chinese idea of



allowing and wanting all opinions is an expression of the reality of society.

The teachings of Christ were not understood - were called the interim ethics.

P. thinks my last draft (July 12/56) reveals that my grasp of the revelations is complete - I have it all internalized. What I wrote in my letter reveals that I see things the same way as P. does - things are in the same sequence and context in which they belong and everything else is incidental.

P. personally tends to keep to a minimum of assumptions and starts on the inner insights. He does not tend to link them, nor give it an <sup>shown</sup> etiology - a causal background. This is probably because any causal background brings in definite assumptions of a historical or literary kind.

For example, if you link something to the Old Testament, then the truth of what you say hinges on the criticism of the Old Testament, e.g. do Fundamentalism and the Synoptics agree, or what about John's view?

Old Testament criticism was created by Wellhausen and the Jews didn't take note of it, <sup>even less than had</sup> while the Christians didn't take note of the New Testament critics. <sup>German</sup> The Fundamentalists preferred obscurantism to New Testament criticism, but the English took up the New Testament criticism. The Jews decided for obscurantism all the way and took no note of Wellhausen, nor of Weber and Meyer's books on the <sup>Judaism</sup> history of Old Testament. The Jews said this was antisemitic and therefore anti-progressive and anti-liberal. The Deuteronomy story wasn't taken note of.

9th in m slurred over.  
The discovery of the temple dating from 621 was ~~not taken note of (?)~~.

The post-exilic and pre-exilic part of the O.T. was not noted. After  
the <sup>Cobert</sup> Hammurabi discovery - 1802, the fashion spread <sup>generally</sup> that all was Judaism was  
Babylonian. There is a Babylonian origin of the Story of Eden. Jewish  
scholarship stopped and retired into obscurantism.

The post-exilic period - 445 <sup>in time</sup>, corresponds to Periclean  
Athens. Egyptian literature takes us back 1000 years and Ugaritic  
literature <sup>sees an other</sup> takes us back 1000 years (It is a lovely literature <sup>in</sup> which much  
is entirely enchanting).

The point is, that if the structure of human consciousness  
is analyzed, the changes and sequence of revelations, in a sense, the  
historicity in terms of the race is irrelevant, because it may be the  
individual who goes through them. The phylogenetic holds - every child has  
the fear of death experience and it would be irrelevant whether the race  
went through it in the Paleolithic or Neolithic or when in history. We  
are much more sure that these elements exist than when and how they  
originated.

The certainty, validity and dignity of this knowledge is  
of a different order than the kind of knowledge about origins or causes  
and this inner knowledge is the only evidence we have for religion. It  
is called revelation because we can't deduce it from anything. Revelation  
implies that it wasn't there before, or that it doesn't exist in other  
cultures. It is knowledge which comes about, but when it's there it's  
certain. In religion it is natural, because these are the concepts that  
apply to the subject. There is nothing more certain than the knowledge  
of inner experiences, since outer experiences are only mediated. It is  
knowledge, not faith or belief. It doesn't differ from knowledge as



faith really differs. It is not that we only believe it - this is a misconception about religious knowledge. It is external knowledge that is mediated. It is just that the subject is different, not the certainty of the knowledge.

What about the validity of introspection, insofar as every individual has different experience? Psychology today is not introspective, it just studies behaviour. P. doesn't agree with behaviourism that only behaviour is an objective fact. There is thinking and feeling. In anthropology P. stands for operational definitions as much as possible, but we can't insist on them without stultifying them. We can't pretend not to understand what the other fellow says. P. is not anti-behaviourist provided it is taken reasonably.

Revelation is a different realm of experience. Some religions would be shattered if miracles proved true and others would be affirmed. Jesus refused to do miracles, although he could do them in the then-accepted sense. It meant rare powers of influence and these powers were not infrequent in the East - psychologically and physiologically rare phenomena. They couldn't understand then what e.g. the physiologist means by a miracle, since nature's laws were not formulated.

e. c. > With Revelation you now know something for certain. When a child suddenly fears death, it comes to him as a revelation, and the certainty is complete. It is revealed as if a curtain is drawn away. You see it. That for which it is a metaphor is simpler and clearer. It is irreversible and never ceases to operate.

There are no adequate theories of mind and consciousness. The mind is an English word and other words exist in other languages,

e.g. "Geist" and spirit or mind don't mean the same thing. Their real importance lies in their use and the situation in which they are used. This is an Instrumentalist idea which is near the Pragmatist or Dewey position. In the theory of knowledge there are many sound elements in the Nominalist rather than the Realist position. P. is not a Pragmatist nor an Instrumentalist, although there is some truth in both positions. P. only says this to excuse himself. The distinction of the basic terms consciousness and mind and the term "awareness" are important (what most people mean by consciousness).

P. thinks mind is the compulsive element in thought and communication. The simile is the river and the ice floating in it. The stream of consciousness is the river and that which is crystallized is the ice. They are the same material but operate under different laws. Logic is the crystallography of the mind and is there in all compulsive thinking <sup>flow of consciousness</sup> - law or morals or <sup>ethics</sup> or geometry or emotion. The logic of emotion is the same as the logic of the intellect. This comes from John MacMurray. The dialectic of emotion is a mind product. Don't confuse mind and intellect. The mind takes in intellect, emotion and value, e.g. ~~may~~ include law, ethics and aesthetics. With aesthetics there is something valuational yet it is essentially emotional material. This is a justified treatment but we have generally narrowed the world of "mind" to intellect and cut out emotion as subjectivism. (Kages would have said emotion was pre-mind man).

For MacMurray, the movement of the mind as pure dialectic was shown in the dream - moving according to its own inner law - that is dialectic.



The theological content of revelation doesn't mean anything and there is no point in it. If God was revealed to you, you think of God. Revelation is <sup>a</sup> personal <sup>event</sup>. <sup>It happens to you</sup> God ~~may be personal or impersonal(?)~~.  
God is the meaningful entity in the world, or the world is a meaningful entity. <sup>we</sup> Otherwise ~~the~~ could never have found meaning in it. <sup>Yet that is what we do.</sup> The one thing that is certain is that we can't originate meaning. <sup>in John signifies</sup> "Logos" <sup>is</sup> means meaning. Any other belief is <sup>either</sup> illogical or nonsensical.

The philosopher says that this is nonsense. In terms of his discipline he has excluded the assumption on which P. rests - the mind satisfied with the certainty that he participates in the meaning of the world. That we couldn't have invented meaning is obvious to P. It is obvious that the sphere of existence with "You" being "I" to yourself is different from a mechanical or organic event. Nor is there this meaning in growth e.g. the apple tree is the seed of last year. In the world of the organic, <sup>different</sup> the things <sup>are</sup> the same, and in the mechanical world, <sup>of effect</sup> measuring <sup>meaningful.</sup> is correct. Gravitation is a statement of causation in the mechanical world. There is also a statement of identity in the organic world e.g. my friend <sup>or the</sup> age 3, is now 68.

<sup>Personal</sup> Meaning is the third type of statement. What is more certain <sup>is</sup> <sup>the</sup> ~~that~~ (meaning? Otherwise you get into the crazy behaviouristic circles of George S. Mead - two people communicate like two dogs, <sup>illogically conceived, as in machines,</sup> <sup>ing</sup> Meaning doesn't bear explanation i.e. reducing it to something more familiar. One can't reduce meaning further. <sup>It is</sup> These are the basic elements <sup>in the</sup> of a theory of knowledge.

P.'s scientific training and inner life coincide. There is no contradiction here. That comes from formulating religious knowledge <sup>not</sup> as

making society all that it can be and we are free to resign ourselves to what it is and live in the light of our freedom. This is a different existence.

The growing point of <sup>this</sup> thought is that it is no use arguing <sup>that we</sup> are free in the abstract, <sup>as to using freedom to the full in society, recognizing that complete</sup> <sup>that such a</sup> freedom is illusory. <sup>Therefore of such a freedom,</sup> There is no such thing. There is nothing taken

away by society organizing one way or the other. (F) We must organize society to ensure definite freedoms, and ~~some distinctions must be made.~~ <sup>concrete</sup> <sup>then distinctions can be made.</sup>

We cannot <sup>have</sup> ensure freedom <sup>and we</sup> unless we institutionalize <sup>them as</sup> it ~~is~~ being a state of freedom. We can't resign ourselves to <sup>the reality of</sup> society as it is unless we <sup>the concrete actual</sup> change society to its limits. We can't resign ourselves to the reality

of society limiting Christian freedom, in the sense in which the responsibility to our conscience requires it, unless we do what we can to ensure the right, the just and the demands of love. If ~~certain limits cannot be transcended, e.g. we lose all our civic liberties, then the~~

~~time for resignation has not come.~~ <sup>There is no limit to this effort because</sup> We cannot know where it lies. <sup>One</sup> says we have to resign ourselves to these dangers. P.

agrees that in one sense we have to resign ourselves to this situation. Then we can leave to society the molding of man. However there is a lack of clarity here, and P. feels strongly that to reject a movement towards justice and humaneness because that would limit freedom is wrong. A complex society limits freedom anyway. Unlimited freedom does not exist and there are irremediable evils connected with a complex society which we can only see if we try to eliminate them, e.g. that production is a curse anyway, whether we eliminate machines or not.

Owen suggested that we put machines in a village to alleviate conditions. He only tried to answer the question that reforms are no good



anyway since you can't remove the curse of labor. His concern was the machine and he said that it shouldn't be used indiscriminately. Owen was told that there must be social classes and proletarians and his answer was to educate these people through the trade union movement (started in his name in 1828) and also co-operatives, (1844).

P. is led to the conclusion of resignation to power, <sup>the existence of</sup> economic value and institutions, <sup>of</sup> but what Owen meant is not so clear.

*(as inherent in society)*

The evidence of the reality of society lies in the fact that we cannot help in creating these events even though we do not wish to, and also in the inevitable alternatives <sup>and use it in one way or another</sup> we can only choose to have less power and not to have no power. Even our wish to have less or no power creates another power - those who disestablish existing power, e.g. anarchists <sup>gain their power from</sup> are based <sup>such</sup> on this opinion.

The complex society <sup>no one can</sup> wouldn't even know when <sup>he</sup> it hits. In America people feel if you don't buy <sup>what you need</sup> you ruin others. <sup>by depriving them of what they need</sup> Through the market you <sup>with reference to</sup> economic value, it ~~values~~ <sup>values</sup> some peoples gifts and abilities and devalues others. You cannot avoid destroying lives. You are not free not to do so.

The Huxian analysis is that power is nothing but opinion, e.g. that the King can order his soldiers to shoot someone is based on the power <sup>in the last resort</sup> of opinion. <sup>So called public opinion is suborganized power and can</sup> P. says that the organization of power by government parallels <sup>be as deadly as highly organized power, only one</sup> public opinion, and therefore it is deadly. The point is that a center of effective <sup>cannot</sup> ~~cannot~~ <sup>contract out of it.</sup> <sup>it is</sup> ~~power in society which is only~~ an objectification of the subjective state of affairs. Anybody can objectify it <sup>my secret opinion and use it</sup> by using ~~my opinion~~ as his power.

<sup>economic</sup> The classics thought the same way of value on the market, an objectified subjective condition. For the person, <sup>his appraisal of</sup> utility is subjective.

becomes <sup>neither or sell it</sup>  
 but on the market it costs e.g. \$2. and he can't get it cheaper. The  
 objectification of value in <sup>market</sup> price is the same transformation or objecti-  
 fication of the subjective state. as <sup>private opinion</sup> governmental power is of

Perhaps other things are like law - if something is objectified  
 for a third person it is a law. This Objectification is a Hegelian term.

He said that spiritual realities like law are the objectification of spirit  
 or 'geist'. P. doesn't share this <sup>form of the</sup> idea but it comes into the argument as  
 the reality of society and you can't contract out of it. Power, economic  
 value, law are paradigms of social reality.

It's not the expression of opinion that creates power, it's  
 the fact that you hold it. {e.g. "He's guilty whether you can prove it or  
 not". is a conviction in times, but others can  
 act upon it overtly.

Similarly in the economic value argument; <sup>ie.</sup> I can't help  
<sup>in the market</sup> influencing price just as long as I value things - as long as I want one  
 thing more than another in the market.

The point which must be made is that this power is an  
 objective fact. When we overlook this we forget that public opinion is  
 such a phenomenon and <sup>so is</sup> valuation. When not valuing something, we destroy  
 the value of those producing it(?) <sup>since they are made into</sup>  
 "non-valuers"

Likewise with institutions, <sup>some</sup> people imagine they don't create  
 institutions because they are anti-institutionalist. However, they <sup>only</sup> create  
 other institutions <sup>that have</sup> an anti-institutionalist effect.

<sup>imply a reference to</sup>  
 Institutions are ~~partly based on~~ the opinions we hold, e.g.  
 there are no hospitals in a society <sup>where opinion</sup> which makes absolutely no difference  
 between the sick and the healthy. On another level, <sup>the absence of such a difference</sup> this itself may be a  
 movement for the abolition of hospitals (?)



P. has these things on record 30 years ago. It is not possible to contract out of society. (cf. Tolstoy and "nicht tun" - not doing, i.e. doesn't need machines, power and police - doesn't work).

The Christian idea that every individual is unique may now be grounded on the permutations and combinations of genes.

My question: the reality of society as an effective answer to the problem of the Essence of Fascism.

P. wrote the Essence of Fascism in 1935. He left Vienna in '31 and '33 and had been working on the reality of society line. MacLurray wrote a book on Community and Society with the ideal of society which institutes the community of persons. The world importance of Fascism is its hostility to Christianity, wishing to go back to pagan or pre-Christian times.

There is a contradiction here. P. insisted on the idea of opinion forming power and no contracting out. We might have less power or use it differently but the idea of power as evil must be rejected. P.'s friends were then on the non-resistance line of Ghandi. His doctrine was directed against the Chandist utopia, which was the same as Tolstoy's.

On the question of freedom, the powerless society was the ideal but that is shown not to be identical with a society of no government. Public opinion may crush life out of people, yet it is a pure illusion that it depends on government. The thing must be built in such a way as to force the problem of freedom into the center and force the formidable revelation of the reality of society. It must be clear where the drama lies. One

should not think that by centering on freedoms he undermines the position of abstract freedom. (P. has never given in to unfreedom). If one means a society without power he is just mistaken. If the abstraction of freedoms is maintained it can only be identified with the absence of government.

J.S. Mill in his famous essay on Liberty pointed out that the way trade is organized is not a matter of freedom. He personally favors the free system of trading but this is not a question of liberty and it doesn't make society free or unfree. This is the only source we possess on what liberty is unless we fall back on Paul and Christian freedom. Few people realize where we got this idea from. It was regarded as a metaphor for manumission - to free the slave, "eletheros" - free, "eletheres" - liberty. However, Aristotle meant by "eletheres" liberality, the liberal gentleman - the all varieties of public-spirited enlightened gentleman. Paul uses "eletheres" as the state the slave is in after he is removed from slavery. Also if tyranny interferes with "eletheres" it also applies. The peoples' privileges were called liberty - with whom it could trade etc.

When do public liberties mean what they mean today? It was Locke in two treatises on Civic Government in 1690 who established this principle that civic government is limited etc. The American Constitution was instituted from Locke. These civic liberties are prior to the French Revolution. The freedoms came later in the Bill of Rights (the first nine amendments, including amendment No. 5) in 1791. These were first called freedoms. The English Bill of Rights of 1689 implemented the Declaration of Rights of the preceding year - the Glorious Revolution. The English had it 100 years earlier. Bills of Rights were feudal



institutions meaning privileges - akto nemos, you own land to yourself (?).  
Luther's "Christen menschen freiheit" is a theological concept.

In Dahomey once a year there was general criticism and self-criticism in which the Kings couldn't participate, although usually you could only approach the King in the dust. We have the minutes of these meetings. (Jews had similar idea in spring?)

Paul activates the life of the spirit.

Resignation is not a psychological process. You have changed to be something different from what you were. This can be misunderstood. Its meaning is not a process, but that your consciousness changes its form, not its content.

What is it in the mind that makes mathematics compelling? It is not a habit.

(My letter July 10/56):

The first industrial revolution was tillage. The second was the machine. Tillage with no irrigation is a horror. The inner link is between death and how the curse is formulated there. This really gave a content to life which is work. Human life as we know it springs from the finiteness of life.

Jesus said man may be washed out forever right away and this is a terrible message. He said to resign yourself but if you do it you are in a state of the life of the spirit, and this gives you abundance of life.

P. points to each of the terrible revelations because it is the beginning of life, and this is the real meaning of Christianity. It reveals something man is not conscious of and the very resignation is the fount of the life of the spirit.

Buddha is very similar to Jesus but Buddhism has nothing much else to say either. It hasn't much to do with historical events. In our part of the world, the prophets and Jesus made the biggest commotion. We also have the Essenes and they too were Jews. We know that Jesus was in some tradition that had been there for quite a time. We know more definitely that the Essene teachings were akin to those of Jesus. Jesus believed in the negation of self and that the body was sin, and he gave away his clothes. In the totality of a total understanding of life, nothing else has the cutting edge of the three revelations.



Two things are added in P.'s mind:

- 1) the new sociology as an attempt to express the reality of society.
- 2) to restore the place of the individual in society through accepting the antinomy of Rousseau - each apparently contradicting or suspending the former. The method is dialectical and that's how the mind works. The Rousseau antinomy is an expression of the reality of society, but it is underdeveloped. But it is a strong foundation for a non-atomistic sociology although dragging in a wrong philosophic position. It is not the recrudescence of Fascism and contains no kind of Socialist temptation.

We return to the "Essence of Fascism" on a higher level, but with the basic insight which is crucial, and this is the turning point.

Margaret Mead is very good on the economy of primitive society (see book quoted in G.T.) but she ended up with giving a general sociology. This contained the classical fallacy of the personality and culture position. Her personality investigations were very fruitful but philosophically it was childish nonsense. She wrote that the answer to the Rousseau dilemma was the congruence of the two. This was the same position as Rousseau, that the individual should be indoctrinated. (Rousseau's achievement was to have discovered the antinomy but he was not libertarian in the least). Mead really expressed the "Quiet American" idea without the idealism, only the adjustment side. She was thoroughly totalitarian without her intending it. It was a non-philosophical position. But it would make life impossible and moreover meaningless if it were possible. Nothing could ever happen and no

one could want to strive or achieve anything. There is no room for any event except the static. It explains how nothing ever happens, not how it can exist at all. It is an absurdity. Margaret Mead is a fail. She is really the "Quiet American" - the real "Quiet American".

You can't insist on the elimination of all the power in government. In a Socialist system the problem ceases, and there is no reason not to have a truly Christian position. Under Russian 'exploitation' there must be some kind of discipline and hierarchy. But we accept the minimum requirement of society freely in arranging a distributive system.

The basic Rousseau idea should be taken up with the idea that Parsons is an elaboration. With Rousseau, the constitution of personality should be a function of the 'volonte' generale'. Parsons said no - they should harmonize. Mead said this was the only answer to a human society, i.e. no society can exist where they don't harmonize. This is the American fiery cross of double adjustment. It is the death idea in its most glorified form. Once the individual personality structure is adjusted to the culture and the culture to the personality structure, those who pretend to be alive really walk in a cemetery.

Parsons' value is that it is not hopelessly harmonistic but capable of elaboration. Hegel's system was used to justify everything and then the left Young Hegelians used it to establish the Prussian state.

For Parsons, see the introduction to the book "Toward a General Theory of Action" (not Social Action) the introduction by Shils and Parsons and Terry's sum up.



It is the same as the whole personality work: Mead Linton, Kardiner, Corer. It is all nonsense trying to use the early education of the child. After the child has stopped being interested in daily functions he can speak and be told something. That's when the story begins. It may be both. With toilet habits only, you have to account for hundreds of personality structures. Otherwise you get a broad correlation and it is doubtful whether it is relevant.

The importance of the Parsonian theory is in the correlation of personality structure to culture, which can be taken up scientifically. What they call culture is the mutual role expectations of society. But the question of the individual doesn't come up here. This would show that the whole of psychology is related to this sociology. By personality structure he means how a Red Indian child of four differs from the French or Chinese. Some people would operate with core values around which it is developed.

Our revelations are events in the history of the race, but otherwise they would relate to what these mean. Core values refer to definite idiosyncrasies. e.g. magic, a fascinated relationship to nature, animals or plants. Then there is religion.

Core values are not subject to comparative treatment but we stress the same ineffable element.

P. has a scientific mind and doesn't live in the world of the indescribable, ineffable and incomparable, but he doesn't deny it.

We maintain the polarity between society and the individual although this is not atomistic:

1) the individual is the individual in community. It is not possible to isolate him.

2) Our effective access to society is through ourselves. We do not operate with society in terms of abstract notions but change ourselves to do what is strategic in regard to society.

Otherwise we are in a schizoid position from the individual point of view. You would get into nirvana where you have decreed you are nothing but a function of society. Stevenson said that there is a danger that now man is no longer himself but a robot. We have this polarity. The whole point is to find the simple outline.

Culture is the counterpressure to Nature. Without it, man would act under the natural pressures of hunger and sex, and the realm of freedom would not exist.

Perhaps, as a passing thought, there would be the realm of dealing with personal problems - not to give way and react to the pressure of circumstances.

Man is reached by Nature through the physiological sphere. Paul started with Nature being the master. If the spirit were stronger then we get the freedom from the pressure. This is the point where the depth and truth of Christianity becomes apparent. It is not the Christology. We don't have any special derivation from the Paulinian or Augustinian positions (?).

In reference to culture, man's capacity to react to Nature's pressure may be less today than among primitive peoples. This is nothing but



lack of imagination and ignorance (?) Then Margaret Mead is on the right track.

*Concomitant with the*  
If man is hungry, the first thing he would do is what others do. This is opposed to the idea that the physiological urge has a consequence which would relieve that urge. If he is hungry he does nothing. He wouldn't pull down a banana if it is ridiculous or forbidden. It may be accepted or approved, but he would never do a thing which causes a scandal. In this regard the discoveries of the anthropologists are decisive.

The 18th century behaviour doesn't exist. Hobbes' negative utopia was an entirely novel fantasy in which the element of truth is zero. The wolf behaves as a wolf and human beings are the same. Hobbes and Parsons are naive in assuming the natural state in which human beings behave.

Abundance means more than enough, e.g. if fruit rots. In "The Argonauts" you have Villa Kallia Trobriand Islanders who, as magic, ate berries and the demon took their appetites away. They enjoyed the idea of rotting food. From their gardens they feed their Sister's family, heaping it up in a display to prove that the wife has a goodbrother. They display it before carrying it over, and also afterwards.

Ecology and nature still exist and ecological limitations are really final. It is not true that man doesn't think of the future. Most of his effort is not in production but conservation. The pressure of nature is not as strong as we think and man is capable of suicide and starving himself to death. On the average free will doesn't exist. A whole society may decide to die but that is very exceptional.

The laws of human society are different from the laws of the individual. Man wouldn't have the conviction of free will if he could withstand any

pain or pressure. He could choose death. Some can stand pain indefinitely and have a stronger feeling of freedom. Man has the capacity of killing himself while sane. In Homer or the O.T. no one kills himself. Suicide is crucial. Some animals can kill themselves. They have the capacity of desisting from life.

This is relevant to what we imagine man to be like in his reaction to pressure and freedom. How is this related to suicide? Jesus committed suicide to prove his freedom. It means that he sacrificed himself. In Homer, Diomedes commits suicide but he is declared man<sup>d</sup>. Barbarian Kings all commit suicide if things go wrong, but pre-Christians don't seem to commit suicide.

However, we are talking about what the collectivity would do, and man acts as a member of the collectivity because he doesn't live alone. Culture anyway isn't what individuals produce individually.

All this needs judgment or insight and it takes some care to find it. The usual type of conversation is insufficient. One doesn't get far in the conversation with the half-stranger.

There are two realms of freedom, in the culture and in personal life. We don't want freedom for its own sake. Christian freedom is a very personal matter: what conscience would dictate for salvation. There is a tremendous concern and fear for inner life.

It is not freedom in general. Freedom from constraint and a specific kind of constraint is meant here. It means we don't want meaningless things instead of meaningful ones - e.g. never the wild ass in the desert.



Rousseau has clarified the meaning of freedom and Kant accepted it as freedom under law. Without law there is no moral freedom. You accept the law yourself and then you judge yourself by the law. Otherwise there is thoughtless anarchism. This follows from Rousseau and is the meaning of individual freedom from which Kant took the autonomy of personality.

For Rousseau democracy is not a resolution of freedom and equality. The new notion of democracy is that which is born by the people. This is generally accepted, except by T.S. Eliot. P.'s original Rousseau essay is theoretical and is of greater importance.

Rousseau or not - that human society has the will to survive makes its members behave accordingly. For the individual there is a principle of survival governing his behaviour (life instinct) and he may get himself killed for his own sake. Society also fights for its way of life, not for its survival. What identifies society is the pattern and way of life. In this way society resembles the individual. (Plato had this. Hobbes had this frontispiece in his book of a ghat with small muscles consisting of men- Leviathan editions).

The will to survive is not identical with the physical body. Roughly it may be, but it is not. If living is dying, most people take risks - even... One can forget about Rousseau.

The answer to this must be empirical; i.e. a society consisting of individuals behaves on one principle and society on another. It is an antinomy. This is actually happening and we don't know how. (See Rousseau section for discussion of "first approximation").

This must be one of the main problems of Parsons. The point is to be familiar with such a conception and to see how far one could rely

on it. The great advantage is using Parsons without his background.

The alternatives to atomistic safeguards are two:

1) Society should be a revolution which is a limit to freedom in a basic way.

2) This should not unhinge the postulate of freedom.

It puts the stress on the illusions of the libertarian position: freedom as an organizing principle is embodied in a market society with a market economy. The individual's freedom is safeguarded by regarding freedom as an organizing principle.

We are much more definite in what we mean than others are.

The emphasis lies where P. saw it twenty years ago. Maturity is resignation or acceptance of the reality of society but not as an excuse for not living up to the postulates of freedom. It is something in the light of which it can reasonably be accomplished.

P. disregards a number of basic humanistic ideas like some degree of stability, justice and nearness to nature. In a work of this kind one has to fix on some simple line.

Can we accept peace and freedom as the main concern of the future? The main concern now is with physical survival and avoidance of the totalitarian trend in society.

This doesn't eliminate the economic problem but subordinates it (i.e. relativizes it). We have been unable to relativize it and have



accepted it as the measure for justice, freedom, order and law. Freedom is behaviour in a perfect market and the opposite is called dictatorship because the market isn't free. Market behaviour is the application of reason, and justice is the kind of exchange or rate of the free market. Everything else is unjust. Justice is the price which the market produces and it is a just price as if a judge had decided it (commutative justice).

We have to get near the hard core, the reality of society, while maintaining the postulates of freedom. We must convince man of the need for maturity or he'll perish or be degraded against the abstract formulation of idealism which concretely doesn't apply. P. is like Shaw. The message is that freedom is possible in a complex society at a price and then a higher life will develop. Regarding freedom as choice, and the market as offering the most choice is childish. Freedom is limited by the involuntary consequences of willed actions. In a concrete society this is obvious and we'll have to create concrete institutions.

Now the Russians are beginning to realize that the road is free and not obstructed by false alternatives of freedom versus justice. The Russians recognize that their insistence on justice led to a loss of freedom far greater than was realized. Free society was leading to war and destruction and the injustice of keeping the peoples of the world down in a colonial fate. This was necessary if they wanted the freedom of market institutions without limiting them for the sake of justice. Americans say the spread of colonialism will be avoided.

Noetics deals with the question where do we know things from. We have a certain harmony inside. Plato said that justice must have a certain harmony which the individual has. Socrates argued that it is from the individual that you know things and that's enough. In the light of our knowledge of freedom we recognize this as satisfactory.

The countermove was the corporatists. Rousseau had messed the problem up with his *volonte de tous* of individual intentions, but he sees they haven't the last word. The Fascists go back to Plato, Aristotle and Rousseau because, (in spite of our earlier thought) they are collectivistic. It was the corporatists who reversed the position and said go back to the biological basis.

Christianity never accepted that and the Communists couldn't accept Socialism as a Christian derivation.

The thoughts of the mind are not enough to direct civilization. They may be true in some sense, but they must be true in the relevant sense. Truth is <sup>4</sup>an innumerable as falsehood. The relevant truth is the only one that counts. The important thing is to feel committed to express the most illuminating thoughts that give clarity, strength and meaning to actual life. This is now more possible than in P.'s whole life.

We know the absurdity of trying to find the formula of how to live - among what elements under the surface we see the utter illusions of the attempt (?).



On the surface today things are chaotic, but it doesn't mean a thing. The surface of the ocean is nondescript, but that doesn't alter the fact that there is no place of greater quiet and equilibrium.

As far as the Fromm position is concerned we must mobilize the essential Christian position as being a limited one. The Christians don't realize it and don't like it. They say that Jesus didn't mean it in the social sense. One centers here on nuclear phenomena like power or economic value. The inevitable alternative is that whether you do something or don't, you are affecting other peoples' lives. You are living in an illusionist nonexistent world if you deny it. This is a real development over the idea that the axis of the individual's existence is his own survival. This antinomy has never been put. (P. will get Rousseau article for me which develops it quite well). The individual is concerned with safety of life and limb (not in a physical sense) and must continue to live. When he says "I" he means the organization of the mind, soul, and personality and this is the way he exists and gives meaning to everything. The antinomy is that society consists of such individuals and society survives, although they may perish. How is this possible? Does society educate in such a way that what society wants they do? You compel them to internalize these things.

Re Riegan: To recognize the reality of society through other-directedness is wrong.

We should be uncompromising in relation to common-run things.

## 2. THE ROUSSEAU PROBLEM

Rousseau is the founder of political theory. (It is almost a theory of society). P. often held that in the duality of the 'volonté générale' and the 'volonté de tous' Rousseau established the basic problem and dynamic of political theory.

Rousseau's volonté générale isn't a volonté at all but the survival and behaviour of society as a society. There is <sup>here</sup> no volonté at all -- society in an emergency behaves so as to survive, while the individual behaves so he survives. Maybe it is the Parsonian society and the Parsonian personality structure.

This is a complete antinomy and requires a real answer -- how does a society constituted of individuals survive when individuals act to assure their own survival? Parsons says society's values and motives are internalized and institutionalized in mutual role expectations (the same values and motives).

The individual concerned with his own survival maintains his moral personality (Christian freedom). The second revelation is regarded as relevant and not suspended but limited and enriched by the reality of society. This is what the metaphysics answers. (What I said about losing the individual self in the emphasis on the reality of society is to the point).

In the Great Transformation, the requirements which refer to society are justice and freedom. Owen didn't see the problem of freedom.

Now there is a whole range of problems of this double axis of political theory. If the survival of society is rational, then man's life is irrational, and this irrationality is the postulate of his personality and



integrity. The second revelation is to maintain it.

P. thinks he knows one of the answers: in an emergency individuals act as members of society, while outside of it, they don't. This is in a time-limited sense. But in a structural sense there is no limit of time - a human being always acts as a member of society in maintaining the strategic moral centers of social existence. Society protects some strategic values by having the individual internalize these values and in an emergency they become the operative ones. Thus we can use the truth content of Parson's theorem - although the specific one is good, the general one is weak.

The Rousseau idea exercised P.'s mind for 20 years. The main works here were the *Contrat Social*, *Reasons of Equality*, and *On Progress*. Rousseau thought that the "Volonte generale" is the only conclusive norm and the *volonte de tous* must give way. Rousseau asked how it is that man is born free and we find him everywhere in chains? (feudalism etc.) His answer was that the 'volonte generale' was the only permanent principle and man should be forced to be free and equal through education and legislation. Therefore the *volonte de tous* must give way.

It never occurred to Rousseau that the individual should have a life of his own. If you were religious and patriotic you would always feel alike. He didn't even raise the question of the minority and majority. Individuals just have to conform through education, and the individuals will wish what the *volonte generale* requires. This is like Parsons only Parsons has the possibility of locating strains and stresses but Rousseau doesn't.

For Rousseau the 'volonte generale' is any kind of collectivity e.g. the people in the town of Geneva. It is an underdeveloped form of the reality of society. His view was that the common popular thought is the valid one. His great discovery was the people as a valid term. He thought civilization is bad because it destroys the inherited traditional and sentimental values in a lower middle-class sense. He thought the enemy was the Kings and intellectuals and these should be destroyed. It is true that the valid form of culture especially in modern society is the popular culture. Rousseau expressed this in a hundred different ways but he didn't quite see the idea of the intellectuals - he equated them with the Paris coffee-house clique.

He quarrelled with Hume who had more sense, and said that the right thing to do is to go hiking on Sundays and pick flowers. He discovered picnics, hiking and flowers although in his Confessions he admits he never could distinguish the flowers. This is the meaning of democracy which all the people share - folk songs, traditions etc. In this way he precedes Herter. He pointed out the Strasbourg dome to Goethe. He rediscovered the popular amusements and sentiments and established the thesis that civilization had ruined man. He discovered a meaning of democracy quite distinct from <sup>ci</sup>evil liberties although this would prevent the education of the individual.

P. doesn't agree. P. believes in mind and doesn't believe the petit-bourgeois are the last word. Rousseau has all the contradictions, and the most contrary movements took their inspiration from him.

The whole American mechanism moves through panic and uncontrolled emotionalism.



The answer to Pousseau must be empirical. Society behaves on one principle and individuals on another. It is an antinomy. It is actually happening and we don't know how.

P.'s answer is a first approximation. 1) In an emergency the individual acts as a member of society and pretends to act according to his individual needs i.e. he would have some rationalization. This is true in the crucial elections which are about the life and death of society. They won't be unanimous.

2) Internalized values are such as to safeguard strategic value systems, and in a non-emergency, they do not act to destroy these positions. If it does, he splits off and founds different societies. As long as he doesn't split he will suffer the tensions of this explanation. You could prove it now, that under crucial elections people vote, but the explanations they give are unreliable.

P. thinks that it is an empirical fact that the structure of the individual corresponds to this. All correspond to core values, and all stand together or else they form a different community containing new core values, but the same laws operate in the new community, e.g. the Communist coll-society.

Now we can come back to the relation of the individual to society. If there are few institutions that permit him to live in a niche, he will more strongly approve of the society that permits him to do so. e.g. English society. Strategic values may be enemy attack, abnormal sexual activity (touches on the family), telling the truth. Strategic values may be different in different societies, but none can disregard hostile attack, sexual organization, and character formation. Some deviance is

tolerated in what is strategic to every society, and what is strategic lies in many directions. E.g. every society has conformity and must set a limit.

This must be one of the main problems of Parsons.

P. feels that the Rousseau proposition is basic to modern democratic society. The Ancient Greeks didn't know it and therefore had absolute dictatorship in the government realm. Rousseau got his problem from Plato and wasn't concerned with the Periclean liberalism in Athens. The republican institutions here, worked in a dictatorial way and were formulated against feudalism. In the principles of a small democratic city-state Pericles did encompass the antinomy of democracy; equality and freedom. He got all the equality but none of the freedom.

Rousseau begins the Confessions with the freedom of personality and the uniqueness of his ego. If it is quite justifiable to use the academic scientific analysis Parsons gives to the problem of the correlation of the personality of the individual with the basic institutions of society, it would permit the use of Parsonian analysis for these problems. The interest lies in the antinomy: how is freedom possible in a complex society. It is the same problem as liberty and equality which are incompatible. It would maintain liberty and equality within the pressures of a complex society and we would have a framework in which life exists. The emphasis lies where P. saw it twenty years ago. Maturity is resignation or acceptance of the reality of society but not as an excuse for not living up to the postulates of freedom. It is something in the light of which it can reasonably be accomplished.



### 3. KLAGES AND HISTORY

Man's history is a brief history and we are only now filling in the wide spaces - like the old maps of Africa. History up to 20 - 30 years ago had vast blanks, not of historical time but of prehistory and the neolithic and paleolithic periods, elastic blanks with tremendous gaps. There is a big difference between ordinary ignorance and these gaps, since you don't know what is in them. Certain kinds of thinking is thus unjustified as long as these gaps exist, e.g. you can't generalize.

Today we have filled in much in time and space. The anthropologists have had a look at all the peoples of the world. Everything is listed and we can begin to generalize. Formerly we could imagine any number of types since we didn't know all. Now for the first time the possibility exists of describing man with empirical universality.

Also in time, there is a filling in of the wide spaces. Methods have been discovered (mutually checking methods) which fill in these long spaces. We now actually think we know time distances 25,000 years back with radiation, ice ages and other archaeological methods, so we can begin to speak of the early history of man with a sense of relating ourselves to the empirical and thus it is not speculative. Just because we don't know certain details it shouldn't be stopped. We can begin, for example, with the question under what circumstances man began to till the soil. Previously we had said e.g. "when man began to till the soil", and some of this acquired the character of certainty. Now knowledge gained by elaborate methods tends to confirm common sense beliefs.

We are then ready to go into a new anthropology in the theological sense. Many things have been done till now which are semi-

conjectural, but they are too little factual, e.g. Wyte (?) had a metaphysical theory of the mind 15 years ago. Also Ludwig Klages had similar ideas. With Spann there was a renaissance of the metaphysical. He took up from Hegel an element that is very much on the lines of modern science - holism. Sauts wrote a book on it and P. is definitely a Holist although he didn't read this book.

Aristotelian metaphysics contains the idea that the whole is before the part, a principle used now in biology and Gestalt psychology. This is not absurd metaphysically and there is no reason why this should not be valid empirically.

Taking Spann as a continuation of Hegel, Klages was the opposite (?) - a pupil of Nietzsche. The biological principle was his starting point but he went further. The mind has the same peculiar character as in Hegel i.e. mind is meaning, not a psychological function - 'geist', for which there is no translation. Klages is a vitalist with the idea that life is destroyed by the mind - consciousness destroys unconsciousness.

The great weakness of Klages' excellent theories is that he must historicize them, and says when and to whom it happened and then he gets into trouble. The Greek period is too short and this happens over ages. P. thinks there is truth in the approach and these are interesting and exciting speculations on human consciousness.

These exerted a big influence on the Nazis although both Spann and Klages were anti-Nazi - Spann was banned and Klages went to Switzerland. Rosenberg, the third man is not a thinker, but expressed more



deeply the essence of the movement to the world and the lasting importance of the Klages episode.

For Klages man as a vegetative soul is the natural form of consciousness. It is a kind of somnolence which is not inactive but whose activity is emanational - a kind of radiating excitement like the state in which poetry or eros existed. Sexuality was a heightened state of emotional experience. The early state of man was like this, then something happens - a transcendental event, something hostile to life - the mind. The mind is not part of the flow of life but destroys life by creating an ego, and this ego is a parasite which feeds on life. This is the effect of the breaking in of the mind.

These are all metaphysical ideas, not empirical and all this is told in symbolic form in Greek mythology. The mind must end in the destruction of life. Klages went further than Nietzsche who had said that rationality and selflessness were destructive elements but did include the Will to power. Klages disagreed with Nietzsche and held that the Will to Power in a somnolent nature was also mind. He did not accept it as life emanations. In Christianity a mind phenomenon is a compelling <sup>element</sup> of cause. In Klages there is no compelling element.

P. accepts the other alternative and sides with the mind against life. The very essence of Christianity is the life of the spirit - more life but with a peculiar addition. The world religions recognized that the eruption of the mind and spirit creates danger to man's happiness - but they answered don't allow the ego to develop, or self-consciousness to center on the ego. Raise <sup>the spirit</sup> to intensely life. It is peculiar that all world religions have the same subject.

Klages wrote a big book "Mind as the Enemy of the Soul". It is a peculiar collection of scraps of mythology which are well-used prehistory and archaeology. At the same time it is modernist, anti-progressive, and its greatness lies in its utter pessimism: You can't change or alter this process - mind will destroy man. All science and technology, war and imperialism is a craze of Western man. It is all seriously meant.

P. was much struck by this, but couldn't help seeing that the transition from history as a history of consciousness to history as political and social history can't be dated at all. The first is not empirical - the vegetative soul and the eruption of the mind is a speculation over very long periods of time and it is impermissible to use it due to the methodological difficulty.

Now with the filling in of history we have a new situation with a justified temptation. History is an area of time all of which is known and it is conceivable to generalize in a way not done formerly. What was impermissible for Klages might be fine for us. There are matters we ought to know and some very exciting questions, e.g. When did the neolithic happen?

P. was reading the "Historia Mundi" published in Switzerland which contains new information of archaeology and prehistory. Some of it is excellent but some is repetitious and empty - important periods and aspects are sketchy while others are crammed full.

Not much intelligent speculation has been done in a Klages way. However, Nietzsche belonged here with his discussion of the Apollonian



and Dionysian, followed up by Bernard Shaw in his Superman position - the life force. But still very little has been done. The scientific mind didn't encourage it, but now is the time to think about the material we have collected.

The strongest German influence since Klages is the Austrian prehistorian Hengden, who had an enormous influence on German historiography. He started writing on the paleolithic era, and already one sees how unsound some of it is, and that he should have waited. But it was the first effort to put together mankind's history from the new knowledge. However, Klages has not influenced German historiography - too much philosophy.

Some of this was behind Miss Harris' work (mythological school of English classicism that did a lot of speculation on Greek religion).

The Marxists come in in a peculiar way. They took up the tribal history of man and unfortunately some premature theories were made on unileal development. They have dropped this, although it had a real sway for a time. Greek, Roman and Israelite society had historical and anthropological evidence and no other society in the world resembled the Greek and Roman. It appeared that tribal societies that looked like the Roman and Greek were a starting point, but these theories were inapplicable to any existing tribes e.g. the Afghans or the Dahomans are not like the Romans or Greeks. A speculative history turned out to be inappropriate for contemporary tribes. There was no resemblance to the Israelite, Roman, Greek, or Germanic tribes. P. just read a Marxist manuscript - not contemporary - about society at a Roman, Greek, or Germanic stage. This is not different

from Klages' difficulty, starting in a speculative way. These difficulties may disappear.

Homer and Hesiod were contemporaneous - two Greek poets describing their own time but for a different audience. We shouldn't assume that the two pictures are incompatible. They referred, more or less, to real actual features. (Importance of Hesiod, first to discuss tillage).

It is quite possible to make more sense out of history than appears on the surface. The last 50 years will look puzzling and contradictory with too rapid changes in 5000 years (esp. between '30 and '60).

Spann is unreadable and academic but Klages is the opposite - a lovely book, "The Cosmogonic Eros".

My question: This seems never to have been taken up in America? In America there was a metaphysical school represented by Emerson. The greatest mind of the American was Henry Adams, extremely daring. Walt Whitman was a most interesting philosopher in the same way Shelley was a philosopher.



4. BEYOND THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION

A former pupil of P.'s (8 years ago) knows the Parsons system thoroughly and in discussions with Harry Pearson concluded that Parsons had much relevance to the Great Transformation position. The thesis that market society was anomalous and self-contradictory, he felt, was borne out in Parsonian sociology but that Parsons had a conservative mind and never went on to this idea. He never developed the idea that the strains of incomplete internalization of values and inadequate roles would amount to a system that permits inadequate internalization.

The Great Transformation is a simple presentation and in Parsons' terms a correct sociological analysis of affairs. The truth-content of Parsons position bears out the analysis of the Great Transformation. (P. originally thought Murray P. merely supported the old-fashioned Socialist position).

The idea is now to rewrite the Great Transformation, applying it to America and bringing forward the metaphysics underlying it.

The Russian shift within 5 years will lead to a rediscovery of the early Marx and the practice on which the future of Western civilization depends.

There is a great interest in "The Sane Society". Michael Polanyi wrote a review of Fromm in the "Listener" and criticizes it as going back to Utopian Socialism. P. thinks this is not so. The one

utopia of the past 150 years, the utopia of abundance has come true and that is behind us. This is the basis of man's crisis, that he is trying to live in these conditions and doesn't know how. It is not that he is chasing after utopia, he has got it.

Untrue is the liberal utopia denying the reality of society. The technological utopia is overfulfilled. The chart of the Utopians is thus beside the point. The one that is disproved is the liberal economy and not socialism. Socialism is an attempt to catch up with the technological utopia. Utopia is behind us not before us. The general position of technological civilization is thus given in a much more dramatic way. A technological civilization is related to man's wishes and ideals and even his illusions by fulfilling a utopia and that creates man's basic condition.

The fears, horrors and terror come from that source. What is in crisis is the liberal utopian, atomistic concept of society, in practice a market society. We are not the utopians, since it is the market that is hunting an illusion. That is our answer - to consciously create free institutions with the help of technological civilization, partly limiting it and retrenching it. We cannot accept efficiency as the market did. It sold the pass to technological civilization and internalized efficiency.

We were in danger in our conversations of getting a kind of panlogism (?) in our attitude threatening from the conception that if the economy is re-embedded we have solved all our problems. The real difficulty is that part of our institutionalization is a reaction to inadequate internalization, e.g. the trade union as a reaction to not accepting the market organization of labor institutes the rejection, and on a second level by instituting the reaction creates antagonistic roles. We were in danger of



a harmonistic position which is morally useless since it deprives life of any purpose and effort.

It would also be theoretically useless. The instituting of the values and motives consist of internalizing and externalizing them, the first being to make them the basis of personality structure and the second to create mutual role expectations which form the structure. If both are in perfect correspondence then nothing happens.

Parsons is conscious of this idea that imperfect internalization and inadequate roles lead to strains and stresses. In the Great Transformation, it is amazing to what extent this idea holds.

Parsons calls embedding "fusing", e.g. the circumstances created by a kinship situation, or the following circumstances:

Q. Why did the woman pay?

A. She's a widow and it's Wednesday.

i.e. her status is a widow and on Wednesday she gets her pension. The situation explains her behaviour, e.g. legislation, the calendar etc. However "fusion of motives" is nonsense.

The great experience of the past 30 years is that Fascism is possible and Socialism can go wrong.

The New Deal and what it implies is an independent valid American resolution of the problem of our civilization.

There is no slipping back to a naive Socialism. That the masses of the people might support an anti-liberty movement as if there had never been the Stalinist moral catastrophe proves our concern for

freedom is a justified one. The Stalinist episode is ineradicable for the race. If mankind lasts 50,000 years Stalin will be as well-known as e.g. Prometheus and the gods of Olympus - a part of human mythology. Trotsky will stand out as a moral victim (?) and a failure as a statesman, and it will be clear that Stalin was right. Socialism in one country is a break from marxism, and one of the greatest political conceptions.

Lenin imagined he was only a marxist, but he was mistaken. The most important ideas were his own: to use marxism as a basis for political theory and practice. Classes and class forces must be joined up and related so as to solve the political needs of a situation - this is Leninism. Stalin imagined he was a pupil of Lenin and Lenin agreed to Socialism in one country. They broke away from the idea that only in an advanced country is socialism scientifically justified and they should not try it in a backward agrarian country. Cf. Wolfe's "Three Who Made A Revolution" which will give the Russian picture was proved true on Stalin and was brilliantly written.

The English edition of the G.T. "The Origins of Our Time" discusses the focus on the Poor Law of the classical economists.

The Fascist part of the G.T. is out of date and gone. Fascism grew and declined exactly with the world crisis.

There is also another idea that has not been taken up: the problems of the 1920's and '30's were the same as the 1820's and '30's. We got a pseudo-solution for a century and here we were back with the same problems, democracy, money, agrarian questions and autarchy. A history of



the 19th century would have to write this up.

It would also contain a complete theory of the nationalist revolutions. These were to protect the countries against the sudden break-in of industrialization. Reactions were both national and social. All the nationalists want, is to proceed at their own rate employing their own ideas and morals in industrialization, not those of the Russians or Americans.

#### The Great Transformation and America:

This book should contain a discussion of the market-free areas and the role of the market.

The radical New Deal policy is the minimum to emerge out of the rejection of the market system. It is an outcome of the last 30 years and the question of freedom is raised completely. This would be the most radical New Deal type of book ever published, (i.e. following the outline we have been discussing). The approach comes from the New World as the topic of the day. It would bring in Russian economic and foreign policy and it is now a question of focusses. P. stresses the importance of the conceptual system.

The rewriting of the G.T. would have to contain fewer points more broadly presented and without the shocking technique. It should be as popular, clear, and simple as possible, and appreciative of the market in order to be stronger in attack, i.e. the market works very well in very many ways.

Also Socialism works well and thus the limits within which we can move have enormously broadened. Socialism in terms of the efficiency of the planned economy is not doubtful and the problem of freedom is an open question since Stalinism has been liquidated as a moral problem. Owen had said that the market system with the machine constituted a great danger unless precautions are taken.

We would refer in this book to the Riesman position in the new sociology. It is a strengthening of the anti-socialists in America for foreign policy reasons. It implies that we give capitalism a chance, which weakens our position from the foreign policy aspect. There is now a slight weakening of the impatience with criticism of things as they are. With the Russians the idea of having to adjust is becoming a more common idea. This is an implication of lessened tension.

Should P. and myself publish anything together it would be more optimistic for reasons of a general order. There is a reawakening especially for the philosophical issue.

P. doesn't regard social transformation or reform as an everlasting task. There is no reason not to think that men will return to personal relations and private life and the inner ability to respond to what life can give. The social question came up suddenly and may disappear. The Ancient Greeks raised the question of what constitutions to have but that didn't go on forever.

The only permanent thing is to keep society in repair, i.e. to adjust the balance of society's ideals with one another, to adjust institutions so as to permit the adjustment of mutually limiting ideals. Maybe there will



always be a flux toward order and peace.

These are not problems for us to solve. We are not committed to an everlasting concern about society. We want to get rid of that.

Technological civilization threatened the everlasting existence of mankind. We have made ourselves dependent on centralized power forces: utilities, power heating, etc. and man may not be able to evade the fatal impact by reducing his needs under a physical blow. England can go even to this day with less heating and has maintained its rural culture. But power greed may change that. We may revert to a peasant existence, but starve, without food (depending on ships and oil etc.)

P. is not much moved from the position of the G.T. As a radical New Dealer, he took the New Deal seriously while the Americans never did. The principles underlying it are those of a plastic society - the political can shape things without fear of breaking the economic. Most Americans didn't think it interferes with Capitalism. Others did - the mild socialists. Others feel that the reorganization of institutions can go on under a market system (not a market economy). Markets are linked up, while isolated markets do nothing. America today is a market system but not a market society. Isolated markets are very widely spread and not of wide importance. There may be self-regulation as far as one market is concerned but that's all.

Ultimately there emerges a synthesis of the reality of society and the requirements of a free society. The great reserve out of which

the cost of freedom can be met. It is the sacrifice of ultimate efficiency. The market principle can then be formulated as the efficiency principle. If there is technological efficiency in the means-ends relationship, then the market economy is an adequate organizing principle because the maximizing principle would ensure the efficiency of technology.

While the maximizing is recognized as essential, it is not popular, but it is really the efficiency principle. It seems you can't transgress it, but it is really not a requirement of production to be efficient.

Sometimes the critics of the market economy are critics of the utilitarian value scale. We agree but this does not affect the logic of the market, because with a non-utilitarian value scale you can be as rational as possible. You can get around efficiency by regarding it as a parallel to the utilitarian value scale. There can be action on means-ends not dominated entirely by efficiency.

Opponents say that we are not limited to the utilitarian value scale by maximizing on the market. They say that the opposite (to maximizing means to alternate ends) is impossible and unthinkable - it is a logical necessity. You may act on some other value scale. You simply define the means-ends relationship as implying efficiency and formulate it as maximization.

We do not accept the absolute primacy of the efficiency postulate. Other postulates may compete and this is logically possible and right. Our opponents are in contradiction when they say you cannot sacrifice efficiency - that it's impossible due to logic. Compromise



with other postulates is possible. It always depends on how you define a thing.

One must take a radical line rejecting maximization as inherent in logical behaviour. Otherwise one doesn't get through. (non-rational behaviour is regarded as primarily expressive, e.g. the shout, song, dance, but this is not irrational.)

## 5. INDUSTRIALISM

P. supports my views on industrialism and adds the idea of the exteriorization of man. There has been an enormous shift to the outside.

Leibniz had the conception of Monads. This is logical from the point of view of science, for where is a phenomenon in space and time? It would be everywhere where you see it or where it has effects, but it would be at certain places and times before it is put together. That the universe is filled by every object is the modern conception of an event. Thus the world consists of innumerable Monads unconnected, but each fills the whole universe.

The reason P. mentions this is that in this conception man always exteriorizes himself and does not exist only inside his skin, e.g. he exists in the house he built, the children he had, also in other external objects. It is not new that man has belongings like a house, pipe etc. but P. thinks that modern industrial civilization has shifted the balance to external objects. Man never depended as much on his own works for sheer physical existence as now. - e.g. transportation, police forces, libraries. Man did depend on his own works previously but the extent has greatly shifted. This is a quantitative change not a metaphysical novelty. If that is the problem of industrialism in a Leibnizian sense, you are thus discussing man. Whitehead used this. The stars are emissions of the light of the sun of 1000 years ago. Each star fills the universe of time and space. The scientific concept is to regard them as interdependent, but according to Leibniz they do not communicate.



Thus we are better equipped to talk about the exteriorization (or externalization) of man in a complex society because he has this fear of the unknown and annihilation.

The importance we attach to the industrial revolution and industrial civilization is absolute. Here, so much of man is outside of him and not controlled any more - just like the past is not in his control. Is it the element of fear to which power is related which stands out?

We are not even sure that it is the goods which industrialism creates which is the prime mover. It creates comfort, leisure and science but people must first be convinced that that's what they want. Today, the automatization of anything is considered progress.

When P. was a child, the "practical Englishman" ("practischer Englisher") was a funny culture tray. "Practical" was the first word used for efficiency. It referred to the absurd English gadgets out of which the practical American gadgets grew. The "practical Englishman" was funny because nobody was practical.

Efficiency is very recent and is today the prime mover. There is no exception - the slightest difference in efficiency becomes measurable and it becomes a justly taskmaster.

Industrialization provides the concreteness of the scene, but the structure of the person is provided in the home.

Tolstoy said that technological civilization should be all destroyed. He was perhaps the greatest and deepest thinker of the whole period as it strikes one now.

He died in 1910 at a small railway station, Astapovo, because he had gone away from home for a day or two, although he was a very aged, sick and debile man.

This date was very close to the curtain raising. In 1908 there was the annexation crisis, and in 1912 the first scare with the war between the Turks and the Serbians. In 1914 the Austrian archduke was murdered. World War I did away with empires - the Russian, Turkish and Chinese, and the Russian Revolution has run since.

The adoption of machinery: (from memory)

There is no mention of machinery in Adam Smith. The use of machinery started with the mule, then the jenny and then Arkwright put them in a factory and made a lot of money, producing woollens at first.

No class interests favored the use of machinery - the classes had first to be created. Then the question arises, why England, and why in particular the Midlands? There lived here just poor boorish Irishmen. There is no factor of science here either, as the inventors were all uneducated.



## 6. MODERN POLITICS

Dulles and Nixon are the "Quiet Americans".

Tito showed what Adenauer could have done with almost nothing in hand. The only hope is active armed neutralist states to fight for neutrality, actually preventing war by military means, and providing a 1000 - 2000 mile broad separation between Russia and the West.

If a small power gets a bomb, we may need universal slavery to police the world.

The greatness of Stalin is almost without parallel in World history, due to his not arming Russia after the last war but rebuilding her. He thought it possible to avert war. He saw that America was bent on war but she couldn't attack Russia and it would take years for her to attack. He would restore national production and kept the war danger idea from the people (even after he was wrong on Hitler). How could Russia disregard the war danger, even what seemed the inevitability of war? He did continue some solid armament such as tanks, submarines, cannons. However, Russia demobilized after the last war and went in for full scale reconstruction. Five years later her efforts were renewed. Stalin didn't permit himself to accept the danger of war and had done terrible things under this pressure, e.g. Yugoslavia. The satellites were prepared as a "glace" of Russian protection under the Russian threat. This couldn't be done with Yugoslavia. It meant that the Russians would decide which countries would be sacrificed. But for the American threat, the Russians would have wanted a liberal policy - democratic regimes on a working-class basis under the Russian armies and then their withdrawal, requiring just a friendly foreign policy to Russia.

But under the A-bomb threat there was a military necessity which led to the Czech and Yugoslav affairs. In Yugoslavia, the break came when it was insisted that the Russian secret police be in charge. (cf. the Kardelj book). In the Czech putsch, the Russians had demanded that the Skoda works be withdrawn 500 miles further back to the Carpathians. The Czech government then said to come in and take over, since it couldn't do this on account of the workers. It couldn't be done under Benes. The public under rates military decisions.

There was a recent book by an English writer (Borden Smith?) on the Czech situation. There is only one possible explanation for the purges - orders from Moscow to unify the parties at all cost. Therefore all the other elements had to be annihilated in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Germany. Stalin started then to have an effective military command. He didn't mind which faction was to take over, but they had to be able to act instantly in a military crisis. That was the reason for all these purges. The other were called Titoist or Zionist. The horror of this Russian system is beginning to be known.

The whole American mechanism moves through panic and uncontrolled emotionalism. Americans are afraid they would panic in an emergency but modern man's self-control is at least as great as the Red Indian's. Man hasn't changed.

However, we produce the habit of lying on a large scale, stark lies, e.g. Hitler.

Canadian foreign policy is less mendacious than most. In



the Beaudoin and pipe-lines dispute there was a deep force for liberty but the counterforces are afraid of liberal institutions breaking down. St. Laurent was definitely anti-liberal. People value the certainty of liberal institutions functioning in an emergency rather than their being liberal.

7. ANTHROPOLOGY HANDBOOK

P. is now beginning a new interdisciplinary project - an old idea which he had eight years ago, to formulate questions for field workers in anthropology with regard to economic institutions. This couldn't be done then because P. had only the concept of the two meanings of "economic" and the original semantics. (at that time he put together a few hundred questions?) Now he has taken up the idea with the anthropologists to publish a field book of economic anthropology.

There is at present a field book for social organization called "Notes and Queries" but there is hardly anything there for the economy. (P. is now working with another anthropologist - Arensberg is in the Near East). P. arranged to produce a sample - not a general work. The book was to be just on Trade, Money and Markets. (The subject for the past 8 years) but P.'s conclusion was that the only way to do it was to put in all the discoveries and say how to find out more about them. By the beginning of August P. wants to have the first fitting. P. will only do Trade, the introduction to the whole book and the problems and approaches to all three sections. The book will show how questions come up in regard to concrete matters and avoid a systematic presentation. (That would be deadly and boring; he will take up the live things).

In Anthropology P. stands for operational definitions as much as possible, but he can't insist on them without stultifying them. (?) (remark made in another context).



8. BACKGROUND OF POLANYI'S WORK

Background of P's article in Hungarian sociological journal, (1909 at the age of 23?):

The post-expressionist world was disappearing as a reaction to Gauguin, Cezanne etc. Impressionism was out altogether and something new appeared in art which is decorative and formalistic. Something normative appeared in poetry e.g. Claudel and the new plays and lyrics - something anti-democratic and anti-libertarian. There was the New Machiavelli of Wells and science rose to prominence instead of literature. Planning was coming up and the first signs of monopoly capitalism began to be noticed. It was the end of a competitive world and so the individualistic emphasis disappeared. It was a forecast of fascism: the working class will be led by capitalistic planning and will be a normative ethical corporativistic movement. This was the main point on which it hinged. It was the same thing as Christianity which started with the slave class and went to the ruling class. That the working class turned to Bolshevism instead of syndicalism(?) is closely related to it.

The article begins with a peculiar analysis that culture of superlative sensibility and analysis will disappear and culture of a single normativity remain. Science had made an end of normativity and had man as the end (?) Darwinism had entirely got rid of normative ideas. All Conservative religions are normative: only morals are important. This was really an important forecast that came true in Italy 7 years later.

Kipling had the poem: "Once there was a people and the people were no more" (?)

and this was a song of the Fascists although there were no Fascists at the time. There was no working class and two years later the International collapsed (in 1914 - 5 years?) as if it never existed.

The article remained utterly and completely uncomprehended as a case of forecasting. The changeover described is to Fascist ideology. In 1909 there had been no war for close to 100 years. The last war was 1840 (?) and we had no idea then of the movements of history. This was done on a Marxian assumption.

P. had been in the Socialist movement from 1903 - 1908. One year after the beginning of the Socialist youth movement which he founded, P. ceased to be a Socialist altogether. This was the declaration on a Marxist basis of his being anti-Socialist. P. turned vehemently against the Bolshevik movement in 1917 and remained entirely anti-Communist. P. changed since the Hitler attack on Russia in 1941. The article was the last thing of any importance before the G.T. in 1944. P. published nothing for 35 years. But now there is such material and then there wasn't. Main reason that P. was not productive was that he was waiting for a thorough confirmation for his interpretation of events. When it did come about, he found it very simple and he returned to Socialism independent of its scientific assertions which he rejected. He came on a religious basis and that never changed.

His most important insight was that Russian socialism was returning to a Western foundation.

P. wrote the outline of the G.T. within a week and it contained the same material as the Bennington lectures. It followed from a paragraph



in the Essence of Fascism on the separation of economics and politics. P. only stopped for study on Speenhamland, Malinowski, and Heckscher.

At that time the market theorem provided only a kind of insight and it wasn't substantiated that the method could be used for anything. Then at Columbia P. started to apply it to antiquity to see if it works. He spent nine years on antiquity and never changed the subject - trade, money markets. Now we have achieved twelve points of insights or discoveries which had not been seen or understood. P. had not gone much further and didn't have a conceptual system. In "The economy as instituted process", and trade, money and markets, one chapter ending says that the market is not important. He didn't see it then, but it was implied. The difference between the implicit and the explicit is the difference between the born and unborn. P. now has a historical development which he didn't possess.

When P. started on all this his health was impaired. Working from 1937 - 57, he could have produced a life work of a standard character. But P. worked on a low efficiency level especially at Columbia. P. worked on the project 8 years and he now is more effective in summing up and not as effective in collecting material.

In the selection of the directions of his work, P. was very fortunate - he hardly ever arrived at a dead end where he had spent lots of time. Not once in the ten years has he started out on a false track or made a statement that did not turn out to be sound. P. had so many brain-waves but was suspicious of all. Nothing had to be revised. P. is very suspicious of speculative methods. It was enough when Herodotus said to the Greeks: there is no market in the place altogether. P. put years

of work in on the assumption that Herodotus was right and so it proved. But in this regard one has to have good judgement. Almost every capacity(?) will take you off good judgement and will make it difficult to judge well.

The mind is frail and it is difficult to find something. The mind is like a trap and you are sure to be misled. That is why P. is such a strong believer in empirical research. If one fact counters you - stop. You can and should maintain a general theory until the fact is established that throws it out. If you thought it should fit and it doesn't, you must hold on anyway. What probability is there then, that anything that is true should be found without contradiction seemingly coming up?

P. had actually not done any consistent serious research work since 1920 -- 22, and then he wrote philosophical essays and religious ethics and found nothing to put his teeth into. The time hadn't come, and it wouldn't have been heard. The situation as referred to began to develop in the 30's and the whole world changed completely. P. was born for serious work at the time when the liberal epoch would lapse and new institutional work was required.

In 1922 P. worked on Socialist Accountancy and tried to solve the question of pricing in a Socialist society on a purely institutionalist basis. Ultimately things didn't develop along these lines. P. thought there would be bargaining between the trade union and the State. P. thought such a bargain would express something real on account of the institutional character of personalities and what they represent. P. has a knack for the institutional approach - likes to think of a functioning mechanism and has a strong aversion to psychological argument and doesn't believe in it even though he was very intimate with thinking of Freud and Adler.



P. is not political in his attitudes - he has no capacity to participate in politics but a great interest in the analysis of politics. P. was never in politics and has a strong aversion to being involved politically (on the personality level). Political people have an interest in making their weight felt and otherwise you are not a political person.

My Question: How did P. ever get into economic history?

Ans: P. hated history but took up English economic history for a living and got interested and loved to teach it. Only the theory of Fascism forced him to present it, and he used English economic history to give market history. This really was the story of economic institutions. Then P. thought it should be applied - partly economic history and partly anthropology. P. was not interested in history as dates, the ancient world etc. - just in the conceptual development and the capacity to master the situation we are in now. Being diverted to an interest in the past alone P. thought repulsive, but the recognitions of the past for the present are boundless.

P. is still holding the pulse of mankind and listening to its breathing and this is a conceptual and spiritual process. Otherwise P.'s work is a mystery. We should always put this at the head of his work and P. wants to do this. P.'s students always understood that.

P. never doubted that there would be relevance in work on antiquity especially when one feels the great resistance against his thoughts. The resistance is great and growing.

The new title of the '56 book is "Studies in Institutionalization" and touches the idea that the human side of the process is the relevant one.

Otherwise it may be called "Trade vs. Markets". P. has not the gift of writing and therefore is supplemented. Harry Pearson has a great gift for smooth writing.

The intention of the G.T. was to be as clear as possible - intense, ruthless and uncompromising. P. wanted a vehicle of clarity. However this requires that you be as nakedly and barely clear as you can in writing, but P. falls in love with a metaphor.

P. asks one of his helpers to write something and then the person goes further and adds something essential. This is suitable for moving a whole array of thought on. P. thinks his new book is better because it has passed through more minds. Compared to this, one's own work is poor. If six people write it, you have proven your case that this is a world of thought.

Avoid smoothness because the thing loses its jaggedness or ruggedness. Always watch for not being too smooth. You don't awaken the reader, you lull him.

With Rousseau you have an utter perfection of sentences producing startling effects but there is e.g. ruggedness.

Koestler's strength lies in the topicality of his subject. He is a high-grade journalist but no artist and doesn't have a gift.

Examples of ruggedness are Somerset Maugham - interrupts and puts in something that doesn't belong - and Strindberg. With Shaw his ruggedness in thinking stemmed from an utter mastery of his subject. The introduction to Pygmalion runs entirely on the subject.



The Commentary article has appeared in "Sociological Analysis" of Tulane University which is the only sociological reader in America, in Leonard Keynes' book at Penn State with Sombart and Keynes, and in the new Columbia Contemporary Civilization course. It was also mentioned by Moore who quoted Polanyi that there are no economic motives. Also at Michigan State a course on Modern Doctrines, given several times has P. in the title of the course.

P. is now writing reviews on books about medieval cities. The concept of the Port of Trade is important and should be used in new areas e.g. medieval times.

P. is thinking of issuing a little book (paper back) containing possibly the Aristotle paper, and others, e.g. Syrians - riskless trade and the Commentary article.

9. THE RUSSIANS AND CHINESE

People with P.'s background are getting very rare, for their experience covers the past three generations. P.'s mother was Russian and now he is increasingly reverting to the Russians. Mankind has a certain reserve in the Russians, which everybody knew at the end of the nineteenth century. Also now the Chinese constitute endless reserves for all mankind.

If you go back 1000 years we find many tribal people, e.g. Persians, Greeks and Germanic tribes, and they are the paradigm of civilization of the time. If we go back another 1000 years we have the tribal societies where simple democratic principles were in operation, which are different from modern societies. These provide reasons for being hopeful.

"Globe and Mail" reports in a scurrilous vein on the new China, calling on public opinion, meetings and discussions in a flood, psychology being endlessly argued.

A great advance in Russia would be a wide and representative Gallup poll frequently sounding out public opinion.

There is fear of Russian military power and even though the Russians are ready to reduce it, it is great.

American policy is illusionist insofar as they thought they were safe with money etc.

P. never thought that what the Russians were doing would be a matter of concern, but what we are doing is P.'s concern.



10. THE EARLY MARX

The early Marx was washed out by Engels and Dialectical Materialism: A non-philosophical 'tabula rasa' is the end of philosophy. This doesn't recognize philosophical problems. It is a kind of popular approach - "now we have enough of philosophy" - i.e. all the philosophy that's possible.

Marx never wrote a line of the Dialectical Materialist lines. Anti-Duhring was full of it and Marx never reflected on that. Engels wasn't philosophically minded. Traditions of Western philosophy were a closed domain. The Chinese avoid Western philosophy. In 1937 P. started teaching at the W. E. Alliance and put out the Marx pamphlet in 1937.

11. ART

Art is the effort to transcend man's existence. Goethe - "Danke das der gunst der Musen" - said there is nothing but change because we age, and he breaks out in a hymn of thanks. He promises you that which never passes - the content in your mind, the form in your spirit. The poem is "Dauer im veksel". Everything changes personality. Those who don't know death don't produce art, the attempt to transcend man's finiteness. We wouldn't do these things if man was everlasting, e.g. the pyramids. Art is eternal. Life is the gift of death.

12. PSYCHOLOGY

P. doesn't believe in psychology. It is interesting but not important. Psychological reactions are ambivalent and not compelling. This or the other may happen and which happens doesn't depend on psychological factors but objective ones - i.e. it depends on political factors and the power situation. (Although this may be a psychological factor, that doesn't alter it). In the political situation you never meet the psychological factor, you jump it.

REMARKS

Canada

Maclean's magazine is an important formative influence on the Canadian mind and life.

The French coming to Stratford looks like a different world.

Hesiod

Comment on my letter of July 10/56: Hesiod was the first to mention the curse of the soil - irrigation.

Greece

Under Hellenism, Greece was beginning to develop a market trade, not a market economy.



"The Quiet American"

See the reviews in "Commentary" of the "Quiet American".  
Rahv is nonsense tinged with brilliance, while Diana Trilling in an excellent piece says Rahv hasn't answered a thing.

Rahv says that all views have a chance and therefore you should have no view.

Surplus

Life is not a process which produces a surplus over itself.

Nuclear Discoveries

It may not be that the nuclear discoveries are irreversible.  
P. is afraid of the physical extinction of the race. Man is crazy enough to destroy himself.

Personal

P. thinks I have a sound gift for writing and am able to cope with new thoughts without being stuck. I move the thing somewhere and then go on. I don't get carried away and change the basic line. P. thought I wouldn't emerge from his world of metaphysics. I have the ability to shape and build and can rely on it, and so we should plan. P. believes his world of thought is of greater topical interest than 5 years ago.

P. thinks my first G.T. outline stands including the sequence of the Chapters and my first article on the reality of society. The meaning of the revelations is solid, sound and clear.