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There can be little doubt that the omission on the part of John XXIII to speak of Communism in either of the two greatest encyclicals of our time, *Mater et Magistra* and *Pacem in terris*, has caused grave consternation in various Catholic circles.

This consternation has gone as far as Vatican II. The Council from the beginning was born on a note of positive confrontation to the modern world in the open spirit of John XXIII. It was taken for granted that from the opening words of John to the Council Fathers, there would be no anathemas and condemnations. In spite of the clear intention of John XXIII to avoid sterile pronouncements, a certain number of the Fathers attempted to introduce a decree on anti-Communism. An expressly stated recommendation by two bishops of Brazil, Archbishop Proenca-Sigaud and Bishop de Castro-Mayer, consequently signed by two hundred bishops, was sent to Paul VI. "It is a question," said the statement, "of the greatest and most dangerous heresy of our times. The faithful will be deceived if the Council does not treat of it."

The origin of the statement was an article by Correa de Oliveira, professor at the Catholic University of Sao Paulo, originally published in the diocesan newspaper *Catolico*, and later distributed to the Fathers of the Council.

His central idea is that Communist governments have been "fairly clear and coherent not only with regard to the Church, but also with regard to all religions. . . . Today there are dangerous illusions among Catholics in this regard. We must therefore react energetically and swiftly, we must denounce strongly every Communist manoeuvre, and to realize the impossibility of any co-existence between the Church and a Communist regime."

Then he continues on the subject of nuclear war. "It may well happen that one or many nations of the West might be obliged to choose between two evils, that is, between a modern war, internal or external, conventional or thermo-nuclear, with all of its horrors or the acceptance of a Communist regime. In this case, we must choose the lesser evil. . . . The loss of faith is a greater evil than even possible extermination by atomic war." The author of that statement is willing, as a Christian, to permit a nation or nations to actively commit an evil (cessar) to prevent a greater evil. Christianity is to be preserved by perpetrating evil. This indeed is one of the most blatant forms of anti-Christian thinking that this author has seen in recent times under Catholic auspices. The good sisters long ago taught me very clearly that we may never commit any evil under any circumstances. As a theologian, my views are hardly different.

The article then enumerates what the Church would have to do in order to be tolerated by a Communist regime.

"1. The Church would have to teach its doctrine in a positive fashion but without the least refutation of materialism and of other errors inherent to the Marxist philosophy.

"2. The Church would have to be silent with regard to the thought of the Church on private property and of the family.

"3. Or, in the least, without directly criticizing the economico-social system of Marxism, the Church would have to affirm that legal existence of the family and private property would be an ideal in principle but incapable of being realized in practice and this would be the reason why—in the concrete situation—the Church would recommend to the faithful that they renounce every effort to reverse the Communist regime by re-establishing in legislation, according to natural law, the concepts of private property and the family."

The author then shows that this is impossible. He never distinguishes between doctrinal error, which would be against morals, and a particular political and economic attitude and opinion.

In a similar vein, the statement by the two hundred Bishops wants the Church to react against this tendency, for the error of co-existence is spreading "even among the ranks of the clergy and since it is propagated under colour of justice and charity, many of the faithful will be inclined to adopt these doctrines and principles."

It is no wonder that both these encyclicals have undergone a disturbing eclipse in Christian circles. What is particularly disturbing for the conservatives is the thought of the Pope along two lines: Socialization and its general application in *Mater et Magistra* and, while not explicitly mentioned, the implicit relation between Christianity and Communism in *Pacem in terris*. John saw very clearly that Communism grew up as an authentic protest against social injustice and inequality. He was able to make a clear distinction between authentic social injustice and false philosophical answers to those injustices. "It must be borne in mind, furthermore, that neither can false philosophical teachings regarding the nature, origin, and destiny of the universe and of man, be identified with historical movements that have social, cultural or political ends, not even when these movements have originated from those teachings and have drawn and still draw inspiration therefrom." The rest of the paragraph is even more "shocking" because in it the Pope seeks a lot of gray where professional anti-Communists wish to see black and white.

"For these teachings, once they are drawn up and defined, remain always the same, while the movements, working on historical situations in constant evolution, cannot but be influenced by these latter and cannot avoid, therefore, being subject to changes, even of a profound nature. Besides, who can deny that these movements, in so far as they conform to the dictates of right reason and are interpreters of the lawful aspirations of the human person, contain elements that are positive and deserving of approval?"

What is the Pope's attitude towards Communism in this encyclical? We will attempt to throw some light on this in the present article.

Among the many dramatic innovations of Pope John XXIII, his "opening to the left" held out the hope of dialogue between the Church and Communism. His willingness in *Pacem in terris* (the plural use of the word is not without meaning: peace to all nations, East and West) to recognize the impact of historical change on Communist ideology and practice; his studious avoidance of inflammatory language when alluding to Communism in all of his talks and encyclicals; his personal meeting with Khrushchev's son-in-law—all of these things represented a healthy departure from the earlier practice of the Church.

—FOOTNOTE No. 1—HERE—Set 8 pt.

<sup>1</sup>Paragraph 138, *Pacem in terris*.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

Many Catholics were not at all happy at this turn of events and a few even saw evidence that the "international left" had made its impact on the Vatican itself. The *National Review* through the voice of Will Herberg was very disturbed at finding nothing in *Pacem* or in *Mater et Magistra*, on Communism. Pope John's silence on this aspect of today's world is significant. In reality, the answer is to be found in the texts of both encyclicals themselves. In *Pacem*, the order of peace is not an absence of war, as many think; it is not "complete victory" over Communism; for the order of peace is founded on the basis which he exposes in the first two sections of the encyclical; an order of truth, social justice, love and liberty. You cannot suppress war or Communism—which are only names and not reality—unless you attack the causes of war and Communism, which alone are reality. In paragraph 139 of *Pacem* he explicitly recognizes that all is not black and white in either West or East. As a matter of fact, the origins of "false philosophical theories" may be just, while these same theories can change in the course of history.

In paragraph 159 of *Pacem* he says that it is not necessary to identify the flesh and bone men with whom we come in contact with the abstract logic of the ideologies that they profess. Every Christian knows that the Christianity that inspires him is worth more than the practical translation which he gives it, because of weakness or egotism in his daily life. He must realize that the opposite is also true: it happens that one may join and co-operate in social efforts emanating from those whose principles, for one reason or another, one cannot accept.

Pope John here invites us to go forward to the discovery of men beyond the ideologies which oppose them one to another. And what is true for men is also true for nations. The latter also cannot be identified with the political systems in which they exist. A limitless field of discovery opens before us. Today we know ourselves better than 30 years ago because of vastly improved communications of all kinds. Yet we are—as an international community—still far from the grouping together of people, further yet from a real communion and human friendship on an international plane. We are blinded by ideologies, by ideas which do not exist except in our heads. We do not seek to know what constitutes the profound soul of each people. We do not know the hidden treasures of culture and noble tradition which could become, in the exchange, the common patrimony for man and an enrichment for all. A real revolution will be made if men learn simply to speak to each other, East and West, Socialist, Capitalist and Communist. And not simply to co-exist side by side with a sword of Damocles over each of our heads.

Our century has discovered interplanetary space but has hardly begun to explore the space which separates men from each other because of ideology. We have thrown up massive bridges, but we do not yet know how to build bridges from people to people and to join the two sides. It is far qualified and wise statesmen to determine the stages, the means and the extent of this reconciliation among peoples, but it is for each one of us, starting now, to create an atmosphere for this mutual dialogue. It cannot be started or prolonged in an atmosphere of simple anti-Communism or anything else. The Chinese proverb of a thousand miles and the first step is very appropriate here. Mr. Kennedy and Senator Fulbright understood this well.

Pope John simply recognizes the old scholastic adage: take away the causes, you take away the effect. With the causes changed by social justice, Communism of necessity will have to change during the course of history. The professional anti-Communist would have us believe that this is impossible. These, the Pope says, are not true students of history, for history shows that men change, and that men are never as good or as evil as the doctrine they profess. If this is correct, then there is hope for a true dialogue between Christianity and Communism. If not, the only alternative is to "drop the bomb" which, in reality, solves nothing and, moreover, there is eminent danger of destroying all. It solves nothing because the destruction of Communism by thermonuclear war—besides being un-Christian—cannot kill the idea; it succeeds only in eliminating people while the essential vice—social injustice—remains the same. The eminent danger of the insane annihilation of the human race is too real to need any commentary. Thus, as the Pope put it, our only hope for peace is the program of *Mater et Magistra* an all out attack on the causes of inequality and social injustice which alone is the order of peace. Hence, the only way to open is a positive program of human betterment for all men and an opening and a possibility for dialogue on both sides. To shut this off by sterile anti-Communism is in reality, to give up hope in God's grace and human freedom. Such an attitude is basically inhuman and unchristian.

It is here that we meet total incomprehension. It seems that any honest attempt to view this problem of dialogue between Communism and Christianity is immediately tagged as "soft" on Communism, treason, "being duped," etc. As we have stated earlier, it is impossible to carry on a rational dialogue with members of the right wing just as it is impossible to discuss the Bible with the fundamentalists. Neither have any idea of the complexities involved when you get tangled up with real human beings. Communism and Christianity do not exist except in so far as they are believed and practiced by actual human beings; and these human beings are capable of change, as history proves. A real human being is never as good or as bad as the doctrine he preaches and there is always hope as long as the channels of communication are kept open.

This, of course, was the idea of Pope John XXIII in *Pacem in terris* and that is the principal reason why this particular encyclical came as a profound shock to many Catholics of the right. There can be little doubt that in paragraph 159 of *Pacem* the Pope is speaking about Communism. In it he makes a clear distinction between error and those who commit error. He attempts in this way to open the door directly to human beings, to real people instead of rejecting en bloc a whole sector of the human race by appeal to a cover-all ideology, and then proceeding to stigmatize it *in toto*, as do so many professional anti-Communists.

He begins his outline in paragraph 158 by an appeal to one of the main criteria of peace which is that of truth. Every man has a right to truth as outlined so clearly in the *Declaration of Human Rights* of the United Nations. In this paragraph the Pope shows how unjust it would be, by a total condemnation and impossibility of dialogue, to cut off any party from the benefit of truth. Thus, logically speaking, the right of a man in error creates the corresponding correlative obligation of "dialoguing" on those who possess the truth and to communicate it to them. Dialogue is a moral imperative.

Then, in paragraph 159 the Pope carefully distinguishes between theories and movements. *The Pope is emphatically against any spirit of crusade, for the essential postulate of any crusade is the identification of an adversary, man or nation, with his religion or his ideology.* Such an assimilation would be disastrous and has been at the origin of many schisms and wars in history. Therefore, to avoid such a facile and destructive identification, the Pope introduces all of paragraph 159.

Many Marxists emphatically deny distinction between theory and practice. The facts seem to point in an opposite direction, both with regard to nineteenth century Capitalism and Communism. History more than once proved that this is so since all movements, says the Pope, "cannot but be influenced by these historical situations and cannot avoid, therefore, being subject to changes, even of a profound nature" (par. 159).

In an interesting commentary in the Italian edition of *Pacem*, Father Toniolo makes the following observations:

"In paragraph 159, the encyclical gives an interpretation of history which as ought to THAROD ZHapyBunusobHl DatemTHaOILNUNNUNNU history itself confirms. The condemnation of erroneous doctrines remains firm as ought to remain firm every doctrine which condemns error. This does not rule out the possibility that the movements deriving from such a given doctrine cannot evolve in particular historical conditions; neither can it rule out that certain truths and demands can arise under the pressure of the rationality of man and from fundamental aspirations towards justice which reside in these movements."

This was also the view of the Pope in *Mater et Magistra* where he said that "socio-political groups and associations which endeavour to reconcile freedom with justice within society, and which until recently did not uphold the right of private property in productive goods, enlightened by the course of social events, have now modified their views and are disposed actually to approve this right" (paragraph 113). Later on in the same encyclical, the Pope mentions that "diverse ideologies have been developed and elaborated in our day; some of these have been already dissipated as mist by the sun; others have undergone and continue to undergo substantial changes. . . . The reason is that these ideologies consider in man only certain aspects and often the least profound" (par. 113).

Has this evolution taken place in fact? Is it this that the Pope means when he says that either now or in the future there will be advantages in "a drawing nearer together or a meeting for the attainment of some practical end, which was formerly deemed inopportune or unproductive, might now or in the future be considered opportune and useful?" (*Pacem*, par. 160)

Does this mean that the Church is becoming opportunistic especially in view of the precedence of Pius XII and the energetic condemnation of Communism by Pius XI in his *Divini Redemptoris*? Certainly not. In this regard, the words of John XXIII in his Christmas message of 1962 are significant: "The peace so desired by the Church can in no way be confused with a concession of relaxing of its firmness in the face of ideologies and systems of life which are in declared opposition with Catholic Doctrine—neither does it signify indifference with regard to the complaints which have come to us from those unfortunate regimes where the rights of men are misunderstood. . . Still less can we forget the sorrowful Calvary of the Church of silence."

Therefore, the Pope is speaking only on the plan of action and in the degree that these movements are in conformity with the rights and respect of the human person. Under these circumstances, collaboration is permissible and some dialogue is possible. The Pope clearly leaves a channel open, a hope between East and West. This positive view of the Pope is a far cry from blanket condemnation of all relations, of all dialogue. A triple condition is posed here and that is that the action must be "in accordance with the principles of the natural law, with the social teachings of the Church, and with the directives of ecclesiastical authority." (par. 160) This is not a new form of clericalism, for the Church has always claimed authority to judge and direct the faithful in social affairs for the simple reason that the underlying principles of the social order are moral in nature.

The Pope is saying what we have referred to above, "Besides who can deny that those movements, in so far as they conform to the dictates of right reason, and are interpreters of the lawful aspirations of the human person, contain elements that are positive and deserving of approval?" (par. 159). The great impetus of the social justice revolution of the nineteenth century was begun by the atheist, Karl Marx. No one who has studied *Das Kapital* and the poverty of the nineteenth century workers can fail to admire the prophetic voice of Marx that man's work, for instance, is not a commodity which you can buy and sell like other things. It is of infinite worth. Few if any were the Christian voices raised in similar protest. When Leo XIII published *Rerum Novarum* in 1891 many Christians were scandalized by his words, and some bishops even refused to publish Leo's teachings in their dioceses. Even Pope John XXIII, in his earlier days, was under suspicion for taking Leo's ideas too seriously.

The result has been that fear has paralyzed the Catholic community. Even today one of the great arguments against Civil Rights in the United States is that the field has been invaded by the Communists. Any type of socialization (even in the Johannine meaning of that word) is termed "creeping socialism" (a step before outright Communism); internationalism and the United Nations are treated simply as subversive and Communist "plots." Practically every great social issue today, according to these breeders of hate and suspicion, has been invaded by the Communists. An all pervading fear, then, overcomes even those Catholics who see what is morally right in civil rights, UN, etc. but who refuse to join the thick of the battle because of fear of any type of co-operation "with the enemy." "They will attempt to make use of us," they say. We should be willing to deny axiomatically and categorically that Communists can have no inclination to peace, human betterment and world peace. The alternative seems to me, is to end hope—to "drop the bomb", which, of course, will be the last insanity of the Christian community. Likewise we should deny to capitalism what it claims to be: the flower of human freedom. To our shame, we must admit that if it were not for the Communists, we would let the underdeveloped world starve to death at our affluent door steps and, it seems, the only way the President of the United States can get approval of his foreign aid programmes must be that it is "against the Communists." Too many Catholics are completely satisfied to denounce these affairs as "communistic" and to relieve their consciences in that way. In this way, the very easy way, they no longer have to look at the ugly facts and the ugly social condition of almost two billion human beings. We must condemn this manoeuvre unequivocally. We must face the real issues of world development, justice and peace, no matter who is involved with them; and, within prudent bounds, to co-operate with them in this endeavour, as President Kennedy so wonderfully put it in his inauguration address "not because the Communists are doing it, but because it is right." Take one case in point: One of the most basic teachings strongly emphasized by Pope John has been the principle of foreign aid to the underdeveloped countries of the world. In the case of the Pope and the President, we run up against a strong and growing type of selfishness in the United States. There is a growing proportion of the American people who wish no welfare, no foreign aid, no social security benefits for the aged and disabled. They are crass materialists who use anti-Communist campaigns for their own anti-social policies.

They are cruel and unchristian, whose bowels of mercy are in no way moved by the plight of millions and millions of human beings who cannot live in the dignity of men because they do not have the sustenance of animals. Their hearts are filled with the hardness which St. Paul saw in those merciless stoics of old and which the sacred scriptures reserve, as an ultimate curse of reprobation, for those who are not moved at the plight of their brothers.

This is not all.

Exaggerated individualism and conservatism (ironically called liberalism in the nineteenth century) has traditionally blasted all social reform with bromides and specious arguments about freedom from interference, private rights, private initiative, and the all-pervading "creeping socialism." This last charge is the most galling of all for, by a process of pure semantics, the popular mind glibly proceeds from Communism to Socialism to "Liberalism" almost in the same breath. The ironic truth of the matter is that it is precisely the abuses of the above laissez-faire policies (Conservatism) which both necessitated government intervention and cleared the way for Communism in the nineteenth century. Numerous social problems calling for government regulation were the direct result of these laissez-faire policies. Granted, for instance, that I can do as I please with my property, then naturally I can shift the location of my plant without regard to employee dislocation; I can fire and hire without regard to collective bargaining; I can engage in rackrenting, high real-estate speculation and in a host of other activities which result in social harm. Discrimination against Negroes around the world caps a long list of abuses resulting from the conservative view of the sanctity of private property.

In fact, even the various forms of collectivism which the conservatives so universally fear, have frequently, if not always, followed from this same false premise of the absolute nature of private property:

1. The individualism of the 19th century was the cause of Communism as a reaction of one class of human beings to the terrible injustices perpetrated against them by another class of human beings. So class injustice nineteenth century liberalism (or as it is known today, conservatism) on the one side provoked the acceptance of the revolutionary doctrine of class warfare on the other side, instead of the Christian doctrine of inter-class solidarity. As Cardinal Lercaro has pointed out, it was precisely this solidarity between men and between classes which was destroyed by the selfishness of economic conservatism.

2. Communism owes its origin and existence to the angry and blasphemous reaction of Christian working people to the blatant hypocrisy and cruelty of wealthy Christian employers who strictly attend church on Sundays and Holy days but heartlessly infringe the natural rights of their employees on work days, and all in the name of economic liberalism and the absolute inviolability of property rights and sanctity of free enterprise. Consequently, hypocrisy and abuse of authority and misuse of property rights provoked the acceptance of the revolutionary doctrines of state-terrorism, state-socialism and state-socialism, instead of the Christian doctrines of freedom of conscience and economic

freedom tempered by legal controls, and equitable exercise of property rights. Yet, as Pope Pius XI pointed out in 1937, elements of justice were to be found in some of the objectives of Communism and elements of truth were to be found in some of its doctrines though the means chosen to attain these objectives were wrong.

3. Communism traces its origin and existence to the avaricious reaction of angry employees to economic conservatism. The theories of the physiocrats in France and of such men as Adam Smith and Lobley and Bright in England were most acceptable to avaricious employers and industrialists; for one of the conclusions of *economic conservative theory* was that owners and masters had the right, exclusive of their employees, to be the sole beneficiaries of all economic growth which was due to the industrial revolution. This in fact was only a complicated rationalization of avarice by the political economists. But it provoked the acceptance by the employees of the equally wrong and even more complicated rationalization of avarice which had been thought up by Karl Marx in his *labour theory of value*: for one of the conclusions of this theory, which made it most acceptable to embittered and avaricious employees, was that employees had the right, exclusive of their masters (who would be liquidated in the coming revolution), to be the sole beneficiaries of all this same economic

We can take a good cue in this respect from the late and beloved President

growth.  
Kennedy and from Pope John. Both men did not shrink from these questions. They knew that the future of the world would rest, not just on a superiority of nuclear firepower, but on what we said to the majority of the world's peoples, and what we did after we said it. If we could use our wealth and resources with responsibility and compassion; if we could help develop the United Nations and its agencies in safeguarding and improving the human condition; if we could make it clear that the idea of freedom had to do not just with the way a nation ran its commercial enterprises, but also with the way a man grew and thought and raised a family—then we could face the true meaning of dialogue.

They never minimized the extent of the ideological challenge. They knew that the Communist world was itself in a condition of upheaval. They knew how important it was to make a correct assessment of these changes, for the wrong decisions would help create a conjunction of Communist forces—and this with a readiness likely to lead to nuclear war. The dialogue between East and West simply had to continue if the future was to be faced with any hope of peace on earth.

Wisdom begins with the ability to make distinctions, and they made distinctions not just between one part of the ideological camp and the other, but within each camp itself. This they both attempted to do in their own way; Kennedy and the Pope attempted to face new realities. They tried to cut through the insanity of mounting nuclear stockpiles and mounting antagonisms. They tried to apply a human perspective to grave international problems. They tried to speak directly to the Russian people, not lecturing or scolding, but giving full weight to their ordeals and difficulties and recognizing that common hopes can dissolve even the oldest enmities. History proves that men change when historical situations change, no matter what name we give these realities. Both men were great students of history and of human nature. These qualities are an absolute qualification for world leaders.

We can make no progress until we strip ourselves of Constantinian-ecclesiastical concepts and enter the Johannine era of openness and understanding. For a nuclear age, there really is no alternative to dialogue. The time of decision has come. It cannot be put off. Men must either work and love and strive together for some mutual understanding and accord, or they will die together in an inferno of accentuated hate and suspicion.

Source: See Table VI.  
*The Netherlands Economic Institute, Rotterdam, July 6, 1964.*

—CATCHLINE—POWER STRUCTURE AND CO-EXISTENCE —  
 B. LANDHEER

The three terms power, structure and co-existence, used in the title of this article, all deserve a closer scrutiny, though they are widely used.

Most simpler social groups are rooted in blood-relationships and a division of labour often based on the natural differentiation of age and sex groups. The structure of such groups is hierarchical and thus there exists an element of power which can be best described as "natural power". It is not so much the power of the physically strongest as the power of the most experienced, and may be based upon religious, magic, judicial or military functions.

As social groups grow in complexity they can "dominate" the less complex groups. Such domination can result from the presence of a given motivation, such as the desire for land, wealth, labour, soldiers, raw materials, or women.

Whether there exists a desire for dominance per se, is debatable, although many wars appear to have been fought out of sheer desire to demonstrate greater strength. Once the superior strength of the victor has been acknowledged by the vanquished, after defeat or retreat, no further use may be made of power potential except as a threat by which the stronger country can exert pressure on weaker countries to obtain favourable terms of trade in times of economic shortage.

In this sense it seems justified to say that the desire for dominance is rooted in man's basic drive-structure, when the desire for dominance becomes almost separated from those roots it appears as an *almost* independent drive: the power-drive. The term "almost" must be inserted here because the pure power-drive lies on the verge of the abnormal if the more direct motivation has become absent. It is, however, psychologically a complex problem to determine to what extent a certain social attitude can be related to one or several drives and to what extent the attitude is the result of frustration or excessive gratification, both manifesting themselves in a certain aggressiveness.

We are justified, however, in observing that the more complex a social group becomes, the more difficult it is to relate its attitudes directly to the basic need-structure of the individual. A complex social group creates a complex division of labour which may generate tensions and frustrations that are strong in spite of direct, and perhaps abundant, need-gratification.

The relation between the complexity of society and the psycho-physical structure of Man is not clear. It is neither a rational, nor an economic problem, and we are in no position to state that an affluent society does not generate strong tensions. On the contrary, there is ample evidence for the hypothesis that it is the degree of complexity of society which generates tensions while the goal-structure of the society may often remain a secondary factor.

It would undoubtedly be possible to test whether adaptation to a complex society uses up too much energy or too much of one type of energy. To our knowledge, no such studies have been made. Greater complexity is almost universally organized as a desirable goal, in spite of considerable emotional, though otherwise rather inarticulate, resistance.

On the other hand, it would be overly pessimistic to assert that the complexity of modern society is such that Man will never be able to cope with it, and that a breakdown is practically unavoidable. For such a view there is also no evidence. As yet there is no scientific answer to the degree of Man's adaptability, though there obviously must exist an upper limit.

Even the problem of this limit is not often raised, however, as it is an article of faith of modern society that there is no limit to Man's adaptability. Yet this belief has not found any scientific confirmation. We would expect that science would look for an answer in terms of Man's energy-structure. It seems highly unlikely that this energy-structure would not show limits in terms of human capability and adaptability. Man can only carry out his social functions within the limits of his basic capability. The limits of this capability could surely be more accurately determined.

If Man is seen as an input-output mechanism of energy, it should not be impossible to determine that ratio between input and output, beyond which excessive tensions result. It is a simplistic theory that this is purely a matter of physical need-fulfillment. Obviously interpersonal pressures must also enter the calculation.

It is this latter factor which gains weight with the degree of complexity of society, and which leads to the postulate of power as a desired social goal, apart from the factor of a direct motivation in the drive-structure. It might be justified to describe the power-goals which arise from the sheer complexity of society as a-functional power-goals.

These observations could be summed up in the hypothesis that a-functional power-goals arise out of the excessive complexity of modern societies.

If this line of reasoning is considered acceptable, the conclusion would be that the reverse could also be true—that a society without a-functional or even dys-functional power-goals would show less complexity and be more decentralized.

This may be one of the reasons why a more co-ordinated world-society is so hard to achieve. The leading groups of modern societies subscribe, almost universally—and often uncritically—to the belief that greater social complexity is an undisputed blessing. In reality it is a hindrance to better co-ordination, not organized from above, but growing out of the similarity of the normal social goals of the individual.

There is a fear that better international understanding would undermine the motion towards "progress", but this "progress" is defined in such a one-sided, rational and economic fashion that it does not correspond to the volition of the individual.

The tensions between "official goals" and private volition is one of the reasons why modern society generates excessive tensions from within.

The social control mechanism of modern society can only control upward motions, and as a result it cannot cope with the downswing of the pendulum which is part of the natural rhythm. This rhythm is frustrated by modern society with the result that the downswing of the pendulum might become uncontrollable.

The efforts to force the natural rhythm of social growth into a linear upward movement only aggravates this situation. Again the conclusion is that the one-sided complexity of this society-in-forced-upward-motion generates a functional power-goal, in relation to the economic as well as to the political realm.

This trend is aggravated by efforts at integration. We do not suggest that integration is not a desirable goal, but rather that the wrong kind of integration is being sought.

It does not take very deep thinking to understand that a functioning world-society must be a decentralized one.

World-society consists of co-existing territorial groups within which the majority of members identify themselves with their radius of social action. This radius for most people is local, regional or national. Only in a limited number of cases is it global. The percentage of people who are globally oriented will always be small as global functions will probably remain limited.

This fact is used by power-groups to present unrealistic goals as there is no direct global orientation of the majority of the world's population. Those who are globally oriented through their functions have the moral obligation to present global issues realistically, but this cannot be done if increased social complexity becomes the over-riding purpose.

It should be acknowledged that a world-society consists of territorial social groups whose capability is ultimately a function of their own resources. Such an avowal of the limits of legitimate expansion is the pre-condition for co-ordination in terms of co-existence. This could also be expressed by saying that a functioning world-society would be less complex than the most complex national societies of the present. While the latter are centralized, industrialized and urbanized, a world-society would have to stress decentralization, a strong development of agriculture and limited urbanization.

This means that there must be a very marked distance between the image which any powerful national society has of itself and the image of a functioning world-society. The current images of world-society are mostly replicas of the national images, instead of a concept *ad generis*. As a result, there is little in the global superstructure which can aid the growth towards a world-society, and this process will have to gain its major impetus from initiatives by the most powerful national societies.

This is the crucial importance of the concept of co-existence. This is the only starting-point towards the further growth of a world-society apart from the egalitarian image which derives from Western national societies of the 19th century.

This image has undoubtedly a corrective value, but not a massive one, as the processes of social growth operate in the direction of increasing rather than of diminishing differentiation. As power-differentiation grows, the egalitarian image becomes increasingly ineffective, and next to the cumbersome possibility of basic changes in the realm of international organization, there is a very urgent need for changes which start in the sphere of social reality.

As the efforts to reduce the power-differentiation, particularly in the economic field, have not hitherto yielded any conclusive results, the focal point of international growth begins to shift more and more towards direct arrangements between the two superpowers.

Only they can halt the further accumulation of a-functional and dysfunctional power, and they can do so provided only if they are prepared to adjust their images of world-society to functional ones.

Every human being has a certain radius of social action, and in the same way there exists a natural action-radius for each country. In as far as influence is exerted beyond the national borders, the influence-output, be it political, cultural or economic, should balance the influence-input. The focal point of the action-radius is always the country itself so that global society builds itself up from a number of focal points of varying intensity which should restrict their radius upon a basis of give and take.

Out of the power-differentiation of global society, no egalitarian society can result. This means that the only constructive possibility of social growth lies in the self-limitation of the most highly developed focal points and the growth to greater capability of the less developed ones. It is not possible to reach a functioning society by merely accelerating the existing growth-processes, as this does not diminish excessive social differentiation.

The concept of co-existence expresses this need for self-limitation, which is in the best interest of the population concerned as further power-growth would become increasingly a-functional and could easily cause a breakdown.

The difficulty does not lie in the need and drive-structure of the majority of the world population, but rather in the support which is still given to a-functional power-goals in numerous groups in the political, industrial, economic and scientific realm, penetrating into the sphere of national governments as well as international organization. Here the 19th century image of world-government in analogy to a national state continues to play a dominant role.

If one were to try and sum up this conflict in a few words one might say that the concept of co-existence takes power-differentiation as its starting point, whereas global thinking is expressed in terms of an egalitarian world-society. In reality, world-society can be neither a pure power-structure, as this would spell chaos and disaster, nor can it be an egalitarian society, controlled from a central point. It is, however, advantageous to find one's point of departure in social reality rather than in the formal global superstructure which is becoming less rather than more effective as formal equality is established among increasingly unequal groups.

In reality, the structure of world-society is hierarchical. This fact is acknowledged by the concept of co-existence. It is neither openly, nor adequately admitted in the formal structure of world society.

It is extremely difficult to bring about changes in social reality because that is a long-term and non-spectacular process, which is furthermore handicapped by the population explosion, by the wastage of natural resources and by outdated political forms of thinking, all three perhaps related to the a-functional forms of power and generating them in turn.

The changes in social reality must find their motivation in an adjustment between national images and that of a functional world-society, based on voluntary reduction of power of some nations and increases in power in many areas of the world, at all times in terms of a functionalization of power.

It is clearer if we think in terms of capability instead of power and if we say that a differentiated, but balanced, capability-structure is the key to a world-society. The difficult aspect of this process is that it implies capability-reduction in a number of cases. This we are loath to admit. The need for capability reduction, however, becomes evident at the moment when artificial linear capability-increases generate a functional power rather than meet the consumption-needs of populations.

In contrast to the concept of power, the concept of capability is reducible to the need-structure of the individual. To power there is no limit because it feeds on itself; the extension or contraction of group-capability, however, can be related to the normal life-goals of the individuals of which the group is composed. It is concrete and discussable while power-politics can never be fruitfully discussed because they lack a common denominator.

This is even more evident if we compare the concepts of power and of capability-structure. The power structure does not know a regulatory principle because it does not recognize any factor beyond "power" or "the maximization of self-interest." Co-operation between peoples and states is no more than an accidental and transitory condition which can change into war at any given moment. There is no possibility of control because the principle of the sovereign equality of states is the postulation of a fictitious situation which does not serve as a regulatory force in social reality.

As long as the reality-structure is formulated in terms of power, there exists no discernible regulatory force or principle as everything depends upon the self-interest of states. A superpower would only be possible in terms of a superstate, but not as the expression of the common interest of states which deny the need for self-limitation.

It is exactly this concept which is at the root of the "capability-structure" because in this case the capability has set itself a goal in terms of the inhabitants of the country in question. Capability is state-capacity aimed at the well-being of the citizens; power is state-capacity aimed at its own maximization.

The concept of self-limitation is the most essential attitude of a policy of co-existence. It is in conflict with the idea of power, but not with changing relationships of national strength as long as they do not lead to power-expansion. It is a great weakness of the theory of international relations and of international organizations that they view a static world, regulated from one central point by coercive means of social control, on the basis of majority-votes of states, postulated as equal units.

This image is too abstract to fit the reality of a world, organized in terms of territorial social groups of tremendously varying capability and subject to processes of growth as well as of decay. As soon as those groups will have occupied and utilized all available social space, the territorial group will become fully aware of its ecological determination. The more complex it is, the more it is incapable of expansion.

For the society of the future, expansion is a-functional. This is the great transition which we have to achieve: the transition from a society which considers expansion as normal to a society in which expansion is a-functional. At the moment we reject expansion by means of war, but we approve of political, economic or cultural expansion. We acknowledge, however, albeit half-heartedly, that economic expansion is aimed at the greater self-sufficiency of the developing countries.

We do vaguely visualize a world, made up of groups of industrialized countries, trading with each other, but ultimately determined in terms of their own capability. We still visualize an equalized world in terms of income, instead of a structured world, in which production is determined by capability adjusted to normal consumption-patterns.

This evolutionary development is not a movement that can be forced by governments or international agencies. It is fundamentally a process of growth, determined by the volition of peoples and their adaptation to a world which will no longer offer room for expansion if the inner possibilities of growth have been exhausted or are approaching their limits in terms of normal and balanced capability-development.

At present many still think that the future will show an increasing rate of international expansion. This idea is obviously wrong: it is entirely wrong if we think of the future in egalitarian terms; it is also wrong, although to a lesser degree, if we think in terms of structured differentiation.

Equal social units in terms of complete autarchy and self-sufficiency are not very probable. It is much more probable that the world will show structural differentiation and a number of levels of social control which will be sub-national, national, regional and global, depending upon the degree of centralization of the various activities of Man.

In a structurally differentiated world, based upon the co-existence of a number of industrial societies, the need for global centralization will be relatively small. The important level of social control must lie within the industrial societies themselves, which must strive for permanence, stability and self-regulation.

This development still seems far off in a world which lacks a realistic image of the future and which hovers between the artificial notion of continued expansion and the obvious need for permanence and stability. The development should be initiated by the U.S.A., as the country which is most advanced in the evolution of the industrial society. This industrial society, however, has not yet been able to create a functioning social system, aimed at stability, permanence, security and psycho-physical well-being. The country which succeeds in transforming the industrial society into this type of social system will form the vanguard of the future.

It is quite evident that this social system of the future cannot be identical with those prevailing at the present. It will have to show novel features which will mirror the "new reality" that comes out of a stable social system, based upon a lasting relationship between Man and Nature as well as between Man and Man. In many respects it will mean the "less" compared to the "too much" of the present. Above all it should mean more freedom of the individual to shape his life according to his psycho-physical structure.

In a stable society there will be automatically much greater privacy and much more individualism. Discipline without necessity is not needed by any society, and our present society continues to instill too much fear in the individual in order to exact his obedience. This fear is always related to fear of the "expansion" of other countries.

While we fear the expansion of others, we advocate our own, thus creating a dualism in the individual who can no longer formulate or understand his own interests.

We should be mindful of Hobbes who held that Man needs others, yet he also strives for freedom. We overlook that co-operation with others should be won on the basis of a clearly understood necessity, not as a compulsive mechanism that generates a negative rather than a positive emotional response.

In terms of the individual, "power" means his subjection to forces of social participation which are no longer emotionally meaningful. In this respect, modern society commits very grievous errors because it generates many forms of social participation which are neutral, if not indeed, negative in terms of the emotional response of the individual.

These processes cause latent resentment and frustrations. It is beside the point that the people who institute those processes, i.e., those of increasing prosperity—may be well-meaning. The decisive factor is the emotional response of the individual, and any society which ignores this, exposes itself to very grave dangers. We often act "as if" modern society is adjusted to the individual, while in reality it is based upon a highly artificial, indeed a false image of Man.

In this way, the entire concept of co-existence gains a deeper significance. We may interpret co-existence as "living-with-others" as they really are, not as we would like them to be. This matter of liking people to be this or that way can express itself in numerous forms: in improving people against their basic volition, in creating superfluous wants which do not create happiness, in fostering artificial forms of allegiance which are not genuine.

To like people as they are is much more difficult because it reduces our own volition to the minimal point. We do not exert influence, but restrain ourselves from using it, just as we advocate for nations.

If this is the right attitude between nations, it is also the right attitude between individuals. The minimization of society after many centuries of its maximization.

It requires a new philosophy, a new theory of the processes of our consciousness, because our consciousness has lost its natural proportions by too much interhuman influencing. The natural consciousness steers us by reflecting our emotions, but society may distort our consciousness to such an extent that our emotional responses no longer guide our life.

Once this stage is reached, we neither hate nor like life, we become indifferent. At this point Man can be manipulated, but this manipulation can operate only in a negative direction. We cannot manipulate Man in order to make him happy; we can manipulate him only towards unhappiness, and, by doing this, we bar the road to the future.

This perhaps explains why we no longer have an image of the future. Too many people have lost interest in a future which appears to be quite similar to the present.

We must recuscitate the interest in life in order to gain a meaningful image of the future. The acceptance of "co-existence", and of the equal right to life of others is perhaps a beginning because it means the right to create life according to our volition, as long as we respect the same right of others.

This is important because it may mean the beginning of a more creative period of human evolution: a denial of the mechanical, artificial and legal patterns of thought of the present time.

Life as a creative process is the necessary condition for our further development. The future is not a recipe, furnished by science, ideology, but the process of the volition of millions of human beings.

The will to live can be creative and positive, if it is not a desire for power of one human being over other human beings, but rather the emotional acceptance of life. "I live because I like to live" is perhaps the answer that would open a simple, constructive road to the future, based upon the recognition of the equal human value of the volition of other individuals, as well as of other social groups. This may be a philosophic, though controversial, interpretation of the concept of co-existence.

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LYNN TURGEON

In the past decade, the countries of the world seem to have been evolving towards a global economic system. In contrast to the postwar decade, when protectionism and "beggar-thy-neighbour" policies prevailed, trade barriers have been falling and the international exchange of goods and services has been expanding at a rate which exceeds the growth of the world's output of goods and services. At the height of the Cold War in 1952, it was still possible for Stalin to talk about the "disintegration of the single world market." Subsequent events, however, have made it abundantly clear that the Soviet Union wishes to be included in the expanding world economic club.

With the development of effective world markets for most commodities, market forces comparable to those operating domestically within the United States, especially during the 19th century, have produced an uneven impact on the fortunes of the different members of the world community. In the same manner that American farmers were operating on the lower blade of a domestic "price scissors" before the intervention of the farm subsidy program, the less developed countries, as producers of primary products, have been forced to operate in world markets on the lower blade of an international price scissors. In other words, there seems to be a universal tendency for market forces to produce terms of trade favouring those individuals or countries operating on the upper blade of the scissors, principally the manufacturers of industrial products.

The existence of a price scissors was undoubtedly an important precondition for both capitalist and non-capitalist accumulation in the early stages of growth. The extraction of an agricultural surplus—whether as a result of the spontaneous operation of our relatively free market forces or as a consequence of the planned imposition of a collective farm system and the collection of a "tribute" from Soviet peasants—has apparently been necessary in order to feed, clothe and equip a growing urban labour force engaged in the industrialization process. At some stage, however, both the United States and the USSR began to rectify this imbalance in the distribution of the fruits of development, either as a result of New Deal farm subsidies or higher Khrushchevian agricultural procurement prices.

In the world economy, some token attempts have already been made to rectify the growing imbalance in the benefits derived from global trade, as reflected in the increasing disparity between the growth rates of the "haves" and the "have-nots." United States agricultural surpluses distributed under Public Law 480 and other foreign assistance have tended to reduce what would have been an even greater disparity. Premium prices paid by the Soviet Union for raw materials produced in the developing countries, Soviet technical assistance, and inexpensive credit have likewise represented positive developments tending to mitigate the unbridled operation of world market forces.

What is still lacking and overdue on the world scene, however, is the power to tax and spend by some central authority. In the United States, it is an disproportionate rate and that the development of poorer states be subsidized by the federal government. In the USSR, likewise, planned investment has generally favoured the less developed Central Asian areas at the expense of the more advanced sectors of European Russia. The Conference on Trade and Development in June, 1964, would seem to represent a tentative first step in organizing some similar program to modify the present distribution of trade benefits among the members of the world economy.

Judging by the developments in Geneva, however, this is largely a long-run solution. In the meantime, we are living in the short-run in which both sides in the cool war are vying for the fidelity of the Third World. One aspect of this competition is illustrated by the contrasting paths of development prescribed by the United States and the USSR to guide the hopefully developing areas in their drives to escape abject poverty.

The Soviet prescription seemed deceptively simple in 1961 at the 22nd Party Congress. It read, in effect: put an end to your economic dependence on imperialism, come over to our socialist system, and become subject to new economic laws and thereby eligible for a new principle of distribution. As stated in the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:

"The socialist system makes possible the abolition of the economic and cultural gap between countries inherited from capitalism, the more rapid development of the countries whose economy lagged behind under capitalism, the steady promotion of their economy and culture with the purpose of evening up the general level of development of the Socialist countries."

In other words, instead of being subject to the capitalist law of uneven development, the developing countries within the socialist system would benefit from the principle whereby the advanced socialist economies to some degree would selflessly retard the pace of their internal development in order to assist the more rapid growth of the less developed members. Judging by the experience of the Eastern European nations, particularly in the immediate postwar years, there might be some loss of political sovereignty involved, as a cost of this Soviet-sponsored welfare program, and this undoubtedly represented a bitter pill for any of the extremely nationalistic underdeveloped countries to swallow.

Since the 22nd Party Congress, a sharp disagreement has developed within the erstwhile Soviet bloc over the necessary conditions of eligibility for assistance from the more developed countries. The Chinese would seem to demand the strictest adherence to Marxist dogma from the recipients of capital assistance, while the Russians appear to be willing to consider giving economic assistance to areas having merely the potentials for some loosely-defined socialist development. As a consequence of this internal disagreement—one of the causes underlying the Sino-Soviet dispute—the Chinese seem to have effectively cut themselves off from the mainstream of Soviet aid and thereby released more resources for internal Soviet development as well as for the as yet uncommitted countries.

As an example, it must be recognized that the USSR is certainly a brilliant demonstration of the ability of centrally planned investment programs to mobilize resources—the basic problem facing most of the developing areas. Whether the Soviets will also develop allocative efficiency has yet to be determined, but this is comparatively unimportant for the developing countries at this stage in their economic history. In practice, Soviet assistance in the developing areas to date has been comparatively successful, although political conversions have yet to follow in the wake of these successes. By bending over backwards in catering to the somewhat irrational whims of nationalist leaders, and by supplying technical advice and equipment on a business-like basis to a comparatively few countries, the Russians may have at least improved their image in some of the uncommitted countries.

United States prescriptions, which are somewhat more complex and less explicit, seem to be largely designed to create replicas of our mature capitalist-oriented economy. Our advisers insist that government outlays be minimized in the developing areas in order to create a favourable climate for private investment, hopefully our own. If rampant inflationary conditions prevail, the demand for cutbacks in their government expenditures and balanced budgets is even more insistent. United States proteges are frequently urged to devalue their currencies and eliminate exchange controls as a precondition for stepping up their exports and, if possible, for achieving a "favourable" balance of trade. Land and tax reforms, both in our own contemporary image, are implicitly, if not explicitly, advocated by our development experts.

The United States economy is a shining example of the successful outcome of capitalist development under extremely favourable conditions. Unfortun-

narity we have reached this blissful, near-affluent state as a result of policies and institutions which are pretty much the opposite from the ones which we currently have and which we are attempting to foist on the Third World. Partly as a result of our advice to date, some of our most coveted pupils are in danger of failing their courses in economic development. South Korea, South Viet Nam, Indonesia and Argentina are examples of countries where economic conditions seem to be going from bad to worse, partly as a consequence of our misguided prescriptions, administered either directly by our Agency for International Development or indirectly through the International Monetary Fund or World Bank.

To date, successful development in the poorer countries has been the exception. Several of the most successful examples of developing areas—Israel, Puerto Rico and North Korea—are to have more or less subordinated themselves to one of the major coexisting powers. Of the clearly non-aligned countries, the United Arab Republic may conceivably prove to be the most outstanding contemporary example of development. On the basis of the experience obtained thus far, what sort of advice might we objectively outline for the Third World? It would seem that the developing areas, if they are to succeed, might pursue an eclectic approach utilizing our own experience in the 19th century as well as the developmental path of the USSR since 1928 and Eastern Europe since 1945.

One of the most important, yet painful, facts of life with respect to development is the basic contradiction between present and future consumption. While the so-called "demonstration effect"—the creation of new needs as a result of exposure to United States soldiers and technical experts enjoying the "American way of life"—has produced strong demands for a rapid improvement in present-day living conditions in the developing areas, the rate of economic development depends to some extent on certain restrictions on current gains by consumers. The larger the share of resources diverted from increases in present consumption and into the construction of capital goods, the more rapid will be the pace of economic development taking place. While foreign aid and investment by the more advanced countries can help alleviate the severe belt-tightening required in the case of earlier capital accumulation, the fact remains that there probably will be a certain amount of continued hardship and inequity experienced by the present generation in these areas.

A great deal of the early investment underlying economic development is of such a scale and results in such large external economies that private investment, operating according to the dictates of the market, seems to be incapable of handling the job. Most of the social overhead capital comes under this classification, and government planned investment in transportation and power facilities, at the very least, seems inescapable.

Government planned investment in education and health is probably of equal or even greater importance. Western economists have become increasingly aware of the large role that investments in basic education and public health have played and are playing in our own economic growth. It is also interesting to note that, while consumers generally had a very low priority in the early stages of Soviet bloc planning, investment in medical and educational resources was relatively lavish from the outset of planning. When Western advisers advocate retrenchment in the government sectors of these developing countries, they are also overlooking the lessons of our own early history when governments played a significant role in financing the construction of social capital.

In advocating public policy in these areas, it might be best to assume the applicability of Say's Law—that there is no problem of sustaining sufficient effective demand since adequate purchasing power is generated in the investment and production process. By the same token, they might be well advised to ignore most of the Keynesian apparatus, designed as it is for mature capitalist-oriented economies and their problems. If government in the Third World assume their responsibilities for developing social capital, there should automatically be a seller's market with overabundant effective demand in relation to current production possibilities.

Although inflation will undoubtedly accompany early capital accumulation, the conventional "stabilizing" deflationary monetary and fiscal policies advocated by our experts will simply not work as Latin American experience has shown. In the words of the *Economic Bulletin for Latin America*, "the immediate cost of stabilization programs has generally been a lowering in the level of economic activity with declines in both investment and consumption . . .

there is therefore no assurance that growth will be resumed in the near future or that when it is resumed it will be free from further inflation." It should be recognized that inflation may play a useful role in somewhat less painfully forcing savings out of the system via the well-known "money illusion," the tendency of workers to pay more attention to the money in their pay envelopes in comparison with the actual goods and services to be bought thereby. In the history of most economies, inflation has been associated with early capital accumulation. Lack of inflation, on the other hand, may simply reflect economic stagnation, as illustrated by the recent experiences of Cuba before 1959 and Panama before 1963.

It might also be well to remember the positive roles that "unfavourable" balances of trade, tariff protection, indirect or regressive taxation, and "Robber Barons" played in our own 19th century capital accumulation. By attempting to graft on to the Third World's presently immature economies such mature policies and institutions as free trade, "favourable" balances of trade, progressive income taxation, social security, advanced labor legislation, and monopoly controls, we are insisting that our disciples put their carts before their horses. In general, a mature capitalist-oriented economy has such policies and institutions, not only because it can afford them, but especially because it cannot afford to be without them.

According to *New York Times* correspondent Richard Mooney, the Geneva Trade Conference bred the feeling that—although the rich countries have all the marbles—the "tide of history" is on the side of the poor countries. This improving power position of the Third World stems, in part, from the cold war and the intense political competition between the United States and the USSR. But the invisible bargaining power also arises out of a major weakness of the very mature capitalist-oriented economy—the inability to solve the problem of chronic unemployment. Under such circumstances, both foreign investment and foreign aid become important employment generators. As a result, mature capitalist-oriented economies need the developing countries as much as, if not more than, they need us. The Canadian government is already selling a stepped-up foreign aid program to its citizens on precisely the grounds that additional employment is thereby generated. Likewise, our Agency for International Development has been investigating the impact of foreign aid orders on different states and has found, in the first half of 1964, that \$138 million in orders connected with foreign aid could be traced back to some 45 states.

While a competitive policy is undoubtedly a drag on current development within the fully employed noncapitalist-oriented economies—as the recent experience of Czechoslovakia has made painfully evident—their political decision-makers are committed by their adoption of a policy of competitive coexistence to the pursuit of an internationalist foreign economic policy, one which would seem to be contrary to the greatest present welfare of their citizens. To be sure, there are positive offsets to counterbalance this contemporary drain of Soviet foreign aid such as a diminution of serious belief in the "Communist menace." Among these offsets are the long-term loans by Western Europe to enable the immediate importation of technically sophisticated complete plants and equipment with payment postponed to the future when repayment will be less burdensome. Nevertheless, there still must be some subsidy to the developing areas involved in the overall practice of borrowing from Western Europe at a 6 per cent interest and lending to the Third World at 2 per cent.

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## I. Introduction

The network of international trade has been an intriguing matter for many scientists during the last centuries. The reasons why a commodity can be traded internationally to the benefit of both the exporting and the importing country have attracted much attention. There can be no doubts that this problem is indeed of the greatest importance as international trade policy should draw heavily upon its implications. For this reason perhaps, the spotlights of economic science have so far not been focussed upon the volume of international trade flows, although this situation seems to change rapidly.

In a recent book by Prof. J. Tinbergen, *Shaping the World Economy*,<sup>1</sup> an attempt has been made to investigate the factors determining the volume of exports from one country to another. The problems tackled there revolved around two questions. The first question was: can one specify some general magnitudes which influence the amount of trade between pairs of countries? The second question was: taken for granted that these basic factors do exist, can they be presented in quantitative terms in order that their influence can be measured?

As regards the first question it will easily be seen that the size of a country will have an impact on the value of exports to another country. This is evident when one looks at a large country as an agglomeration of some smaller parts (read countries). So, the greater the size of a country, the more it will trade. Of course the same kind of reasoning holds for the importing country. But "size" is a very general term indeed. Which indicator shall we choose to represent it? Geographical size does not work since a large country in the geographical sense, will not trade much if it has only a small population. The number of inhabitants does not work either because we know that a given number of poor people buy and sell less than the same number of richer people. This argument already points out that the "size" of a country can, in this context, best be interpreted as the "economic size".

Another factor affecting international trade flows is distance. Trade between one country and another country on the other side of the globe will be smaller than the trade the same country has with a neighbouring country (of the same size as the remote country). The reasons are that in the first case costs of transportation play a larger role and knowledge of trade opportunities will be smaller. Both factors will limit the exchange of goods.

Three factors possibly determining exports from one country to another have been mentioned above: the "economic sizes" of both the exporting and the importing country and the distance separating the two, where the latter variable counteracts the former. But there are more. Perhaps, a country's price level and the quality of its products should be added to the list together with historical links between pairs of countries which have often resulted in mutual preferential treatment. A full specification, however, lies beyond the scope of this article as it will not be needed for the present analysis.

Let us go back for a while to what was called the second question: can the variables be presented in quantitative terms? The answer is for some variables: yes, for others: no, or only with great approximation. For "economic size" economists have a generally accepted indicator, namely, the national product which is the sum of the earnings by factors of production like labour, capital, land, etc., or, in other words, the sum of wages, interest and rent payments.

As the distance between countries cannot be measured exactly, it will be necessary to decide for each country, upon the geographical point, which will be representative for that country. This will often be the capital or, more generally, the centre of trade. For some countries, with more than one such centre the measurement of distance will definitely have an arbitrary character. The evaluation of the national price levels and the quality of a nation's products will still be some difficult task, but that will not bother us now.

## 2. The Model

The ultimate aim of the argument set out above was to arrive at an evaluation of the impact each basic factor has upon the value of a nation's export value. For that purpose 42 non-Communist countries—developed and underdeveloped—were selected of which the mutual trade pattern was supposed to be representative for the non-Communist world. This trade pattern consisted of (42×41) = 1722 trade flows which were used for several statistical testing procedures. The results of one of these tests can be given in the following form

$$(1a) \log E_{ij} = 1.0240 \log Y_i + 0.9395 \log Y_j - 0.8919 \log D_{ij} - 0.6627,$$

or, in the form of a power function:

$$(1b) E_{ij} = Y_i^{1.0240} \times Y_j^{0.9395} \times D_{ij}^{-0.8919} \times 0.2174,$$

where  $E_{ij}$  stands for the exports from country  $i$  to country  $j$  in \$100 million,

$Y_i$  for the gross national product of the exporting country in \$10 billion,

$Y_j$  for the gross national product of the importing country in \$10 billion,

$D_{ij}$  for the distance between countries  $i$  and  $j$  in 1,000 nautical miles.

(The figures relate to the year 1957.)

The interesting thing about these equations is that they describe in a quantitative way the relationship between, on the one hand, a country's exports and on the other hand the factors determining the value of these exports. And, supposing as we did, that our 42 countries represent the non-Communist world, equations (1a) and (1b) will approximately hold for each non-Communist country. They tell us that a one per cent increase in a country's national product ( $Y_i$ ) will result in a 1.0240 per cent increase in its exports and a 0.9395 per cent increase in its imports. They also show that distance has a negative influence, witness the minus sign before the coefficient in (1a) and before the exponent in (1b).

It will be clear that the formulae describe a kind of "average" situation from which each specific country may deviate. A negative difference for this average for instance may be due to a relatively high price level or a poor quality of export products. It may also be the result of a nation's own deliberate policy or the discrimination it has to face.

## 3. The East-West trade flows of 1957 examined

The use of equations (1a) and (1b) is based on a supposition which has already been mentioned above, namely that they give a fair indication of any non-Communist country's export relation. If that is correct we can calculate for any such nation the approximate value of its exports to any other such nation by substituting the relevant values for  $Y_i$ ,  $Y_j$  and  $D_{ij}$  into equation (1a) or (1b). We can do even more. We can also estimate the value of East-West trade which would occur if Communist countries would act in matters of international trade like non-Communist countries in order that we can see how this imaginary situation compares with reality. The results of this procedure for 1957 have been given below. Column 1 of Table I lists the calculated values of exports from seven Western countries to five Communist countries as they were derived from the equations above. Each figure represents the sum of five export flows. The latter have not been given explicitly because the figures would have suggested an illusory degree of precision whereas the table would have to be enlarged five fold. The five Communist countries referred to in Table I are Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The figures show that the actual exports (measured in billions of dollars) are consistently lower than the calculated exports which would have materialized if differences between East and West trade patterns would not have existed. Column 2 of Table I where the actual exports are given as a percentage of the calculated exports, shows striking differences in the export intensities. But still, the relatively greatest exporters, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy do not trade more than half of the calculated values. (It may be noted here that a neutral country like Sweden does not take an outstanding position). On the whole Table I suggests that the European nations taken together are trading somewhat more freely than the U.S.A. and Canada.

TABLE I

	calculated exports to five Communist countries	actual exports to five Communist countries	column (2) as a % of column (1)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Canada	156.4	28.1	18.0
France	635.7	106.0	17.1
Germany, Fed. Rep. of	688.4	262.3	45.7
Italy	305.0	136.8	45.2
Sweden	100.2	62.5	62.7
United Kingdom	1,377.7	216.3	20.9
United States	2,382.2	214.9	11.6
Total	5,106.3	1,106.2	21.7

Source: Direction of International Trade, Statistical Paper Series T, 1957 Issue, U.N. I.M.P., E.B.R.D.; S. Lorenz, *Exportimportstatistik: Die Exportierung ausserhalb des Handelsbereichs der Erde*; Stefan Kurawski, *Handelssysteme Polens Wobec Gospodarczego Rozwoju* (Warsaw, 1962).

Table II supplies information about the same seven countries as importers of products from Communist countries. Again we see that the realized imports fall short of the calculated imports. Comparing Column 3 of Tables I and II, it can be observed that the percentages figuring in the second table are slightly lower, whereas the order remains more or less the same.

TABLE II

	calculated imports from five Communist countries	actual imports from five Communist countries	column (2) as a % of column (1)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Canada	172.2	11.3	6.6
France	674.4	121.6	18.0
Germany, Fed. Rep. of	671.2	249.4	37.2
Italy	388.2	177.7	45.8
Sweden	103.4	66.1	64.0
United Kingdom	1,295.8	308.7	23.8
United States	1,865.2	85.4	4.6
Total	5,044.4	979.4	19.2

Source: See Table I.

Evidently, the import flows of Table II are export flows from the point of view of the Communist countries. Thus, knowing that the realized values of Table II are smaller than the calculated values it follows that the actual exports from Communist countries will be smaller than the calculated exports. It may however be interesting to examine the performance of each country individually. For that matter we may turn to Table III. There we see—as we expected already—that the totals of columns 1 and 2 equal those of Table II although, of course, each total is composed in a different way. Column 3 reveals—as it did in Tables I and II where we examined the Western countries—a wide variation in trade intensities. Here the U.S.S.R. is, relatively speaking, the smallest exporter whereas Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland may be compared with the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Sweden in Table I. But much more striking is that Yugoslavia not only ranks highest, as could be expected, its realized exports being of the same order of magnitude as the calculated exports. It suggests that Yugoslavia as an exporter of its products to Western countries behaves like an "average" non-Communist country! Table IV concentrates on the imports to the five Communist countries. Once again the order in column 3 is about the same as in the corresponding column of Table III. Yugoslavia's imports from our seven Western countries are even on the high side, as can be observed in column 3.

TABLE III

	exports to calculated seven Western countries	actual exports to these countries	column (2) as a % of column (1)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Czechoslovakia	220.1	118.8	54.0
Hungary	157.6	50.4	32.0
Poland	351.7	199.4	56.7
U.S.S.R.	1,992.2	433.8	21.8
Yugoslavia	176.4	175.0	102.7
Total	3,108.0	977.4	31.5

Source: See Table I.

TABLE IV

	calculated imports from seven Western countries	actual imports from seven Western countries	column (2) as a % of column (1)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Czechoslovakia	338.1	102.1	30.2
Hungary	162.3	73.1	45.1
Poland	612.6	245.3	40.0
U.S.S.R.	1,846.1	328.8	18.0
Yugoslavia	215.0	334.7	155.7
Total	3,174.1	1,184.0	37.3

Source: See Table I.

Discussing Table I, it has been remarked that the European countries seem to trade more freely with Communist countries than the two North American nations. This impression was reinforced by the results in Table II. In order to illustrate the statement once more in Table V actual trade figures with only five Western countries (excluding the U.S.A. and Canada) have been put next to the corresponding calculated trade figures. Comparison of column 3 of that table with column 1 of Table II and of column 6 with column 3 of Table IV indicates that trade of each of the five Communist countries is consistently more intensive with the five European countries as compared with the American countries.

TABLE V

	exports to five European countries		column (2) as a % of column (1)	imports from five European countries		column (3) as a % of column (4)
	calculated	actual		calculated	actual	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Czechoslovakia	95.0	105.7	111	225.1	85.9	44.8
Hungary	103.6	40.7	39.3	33.2	39.5	38.2
Poland	32.4	164.1	507	376.9	115.2	41.2
U.S.S.R.	1,333.1	413.2	30.9	1,116.1	333.3	29.8
Yugoslavia	91.3	141.0	154.4	106.3	70.6	66.4
Total	2,067.4	860.8	41.6	2,964.7	642.2	21.7

Sources: See Table I.

#### 4. The East-West trade development

In section 3, where an investigation of the East-West trade situation in 1957 has been presented, the observations suggested an extensive bias against East-West trade. The reader may object, however, that the circumstances have undergone a rapid change since 1947 and that current trade which might have led to a less pattern is perhaps less biased. In this section an attempt will be made to deal with this problem. Undoubtedly, during the four years period 1957-61, the latest year for which data are available, East-West trade has gone up sharply. Canadian exports to the five Communist countries increased by 297 per cent, the corresponding figures for France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Sweden, the U.K. and the U.S.A. being 83, 92, 95, 57, 51 and 20 per cent respectively. Communist exports to these countries followed the same path. But does it imply that the intensity of trade as we have called it, has attained a higher level? Not necessarily, since the calculated trade figures will be higher too as a result of the expansion of the "economic zones", i.e., the national products. A repetition of the calculations for the year 1961 can perhaps provide a solution, assuming that equations (1a) and (1b) based on observations for 1957, will equally hold for 1961.

Table VI gives for 1961 the same kind of information as Table I gives for 1957. Comparing the two, it becomes clear that, with Canada as the sole exception, hardly any indication can be found of an increased export intensity in the Western countries observed. This argument is reinforced if we include Tables VII, VIII and IX in our investigations and compare columns 3 with the same column in the corresponding tables of section 3. The statement may also be reversed so that it reads: if

TABLE VI

	exports to five Communist countries		column (2) as a % of column (1)
	calculated	actual	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Canada	228.3	39.3	17.2
France	99.4	250.4	252
Germany, Fed. Rep. of	1,316.4	543.2	41.2
Italy	225.7	396.7	175
Sweden	21.2	36.3	171
United Kingdom	1,686.7	602.2	35.7
United States	1,132.3	367.2	32.4
Total	6,031.1	1,860.9	30.8

Sources: Direction of International Trade, Statistical Papers Series 7, 1962 Issue, U.N. I.M.P., L.B.R.D. For other sources see Table I.

TABLE VII

	imports from five Communist countries		column (2) as a % of column (1)
	calculated	actual	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Canada	277.0	36.1	13.0
France	1,072.5	145.7	13.6
Germany, Fed. Rep. of	1,168.1	455.4	39.0
Italy	492.4	210.5	42.8
Sweden	116.4	114.2	98.1
United Kingdom	1,218.5	445.3	36.5
United States	2,793.1	116.2	4.2
Total	8,036.0	1,605.6	19.9

Sources: See Table VI.

conclusion can be derived from the observations, it will be that after the

TABLE VIII

	exports to seven Western countries		column (2) as a % of column (1)
	calculated	actual	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Czechoslovakia	428.2	375.2	87.6
Hungary	245.2	92.1	37.6
Poland	777.7	313.3	40.3
U.S.S.R.	6,340.0	772.8	12.2
Yugoslavia	365.4	396.7	107.2
Total	8,256.5	1,960.1	23.7

Sources: See Table VI.

four years following 1957 the "trade intensities" in East-West trade have remained remarkably stable. The reader who will have grown familiar with the set up of the tables can easily verify this statement without any further comment.

TABLE IX

	imports from some Western countries		column (2) as a % of column (1)
	calculated	actual	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Czechoslovakia	57.0	291.5	50.9
Hungary	29.7	138.6	38.8
Poland	46.3	334.1	36.6
U.S.S.R.	7,955.6	711.5	11.8
Yugoslavia	137.1	313.0	152.2
Total	8,651.2	1,868.3	23.3

Sources: See Table VI.

Finally, Table X gives like Table V, an elucidation of the trade pattern between the Communist and the European countries. It will be noted that apart from the Hungarian imports which now appear to be more in conformity with the export figure, no dramatic change has occurred. This further confirms the argument.

TABLE X

	exports to the European countries		column (3) as a % of column (1)	imports from the European countries		column (5) as a % of column (4)
	calculated	actual		calculated	actual	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Czechoslovakia	305.5	127.2	21.5	346.6	373.3	49.7
Hungary	167.1	90.0	53.9	193.6	116.9	33.8
Poland	378.4	228.6	52.8	345.2	237.8	36.1
U.S.S.R.	1,063.5	747.1	49.3	1,599.0	841.7	38.9
Yugoslavia	126.1	208.2	133.4	182.1	357.2	196.4
Total	5,007.9	1,471.3	29.4	4,670.5	1,674.4	32.1

Un exposé historique ne me semble pas susceptible de bien éclairer la question. En effet, le différend est apparu de manière publique en 1959, et même plus tard. Nous ne disposons donc de renseignements précis, officiels, que pour une période très courte. Tout au plus serions-nous amenés à faire allusion au progrès chronologique de la discorde, mais en remontant alors aux débuts de la révolution chinoise.

Puisqu'il s'agit d'un problème d'actualité brûlante, le mieux n'a semblé être de décrire d'emblée les positions adoptées par l'Union Soviétique et la Chine; peut nous amènera à n'envisager en ordre principal que les problèmes d'ordre idéologique. Après cet examen, je m'efforcerais de préciser quelles questions fondamentales expliquent l'apparition de ces conflits, essayant ainsi d'être fidèle, à mon tour, à la méthode marxiste qui nous demande de tenir compte de l'évolution de l'infrastructure pour comprendre celle des idéologies, des superstructures.

Ce faisant, je ne pourrais évidemment échapper à l'anathème d'une condamnation soit de révisionnisme, soit de dogmatisme. Ceci toutefois à d'autant moins d'importance que je n'appartiens pas à la famille. Ce qui compte pour moi, est de comprendre au-delà de la portée du conflit entre les membres de l'alliance communiste, quels sont les problèmes que ce conflit crée dans le monde et plus précisément pour chacun de nous.

—GET Small Cap—HEADING—10 pt.—1. DIVERGENCES, ETC.—

Des divergences d'ordre idéologique n'ont pu apparaître entre le guide du camp socialiste, l'Union Soviétique, et le membre chinois qu'au moment où celui-ci a pu se préoccuper vraiment de telles questions. Cela n'a été possible pour la Chine que vers les années 1954-1955 c'est-à-dire après avoir réussi à assurer sa sécurité, à réunifier son territoire, à enrôler sa population et à restaurer son économie.

On peut, en schématisant, résumer les divergences en les contrastant sur trois pôles: problèmes de la paix et de la co-existence; le rythme de développement économique; la question des mouvements de libération nationale.

Les Chinois insistent sur ce qu'il ne s'agit d'une discussion idéologique. Ils reprochent aux Soviétiques d'avoir déplacé le débat du plan des partis communistes sur le plan gouvernemental.

Pour l'Union Soviétique, le développement de la force du camp socialiste depuis la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale ainsi que l'affaiblissement du camp impérialiste permettent d'éviter de nouvelles guerres. Le capitalisme dans sa forme impérialiste est toujours agressif mais il n'ose plus déclencher un nouveau conflit à cause de la puissance de son adversaire et à cause des effets destructeurs des armes modernes. Le moyen le plus efficace d'aider au déclin inévitable du capitalisme est d'éviter l'ouverture d'hostilités destructrices pour les deux camps et de lutter sur le plan de l'efficacité économique, de l'élevation du niveau de vie.

Pour la Chine, tant que survit l'impérialisme, existent des risques de guerre. Le camp socialiste doit bien entendu essayer d'éviter l'ouverture d'hostilités mais il ne peut en aucun cas négliger l'impérieuse obligation qu'il a de continuer la lutte des classes et le développement du mouvement de libération nationale des anciennes colonies et d'émancipation des territoires sous-développés. Céder sur ces points ne peut, au mieux, que retarder l'éclatement d'une guerre et la rendre peut-être encore plus meurtrière. Ainsi la version chinoise de la co-existence est celle d'une politique qui tend à limiter les opérations à des guerres locales.

Si pour arriver au but commun qu'est le communisme dans le monde, l'Union Soviétique veut ne s'appuyer que sur la concurrence économique et la lutte pour la conquête de l'opinion publique, la Chine insiste davantage sur la permanence du risque de guerre, sur la fécondité de la violence et l'inutilité des concessions à l'ennemi.

Le rythme de l'édification du socialisme

L'expérience faite par la révolution soviétique, pour passer de l'étape démocratique au stade socialiste a démontré qu'il existe des lois objectives que l'on ne peut ignorer sans compromettre les résultats des efforts consentis, vouloir forcer la nature ne peut, en fait, que retarder le passage au communisme.

C'est ce qui explique ainsi que les faibles communes espées peu après la révolution d'octobre en Union Soviétique aient schuul, la circonspection témoignée par l'U.R.S.S. à l'égard des communes populaires et plus généralement à l'égard de l'accélération du rythme de développement adopté par la Chine depuis 1958. C'est aussi ce qui explique la franche hostilité des Soviétiques aux proclamations chinoises qui transforment leur pays arriéré en un pays développé et pour accéder rapidement au socialisme.

En 1958, les théoriciens chinois mettent l'accent sur la théorie de la révolution ininterrompue et l'utilisent pour justifier le grand tournant amorcé avec la ligne générale de l'édification du socialisme, avec les communes et avec les bonds en avant. La sourdine mise à cette campagne à la suite des difficultés rencontrées en 1959, 1960 et 1961 n'empêche que la mobilisation révolutionnaire a existé et qu'il peut reprendre. Cette théorie de la révolution ininterrompue intègre le principe de la révolution par étapes successives: démocratie — socialisme — communisme, au principe de la révolution permanente. Elle prétend que dans un pays arriéré au régime traditionnel affaibli, un parti révolutionnaire peut s'emparer du pouvoir, imposer un programme d'industrialisation et mobiliser les masses rurales en attendant de créer, à partir du haut, un prolétariat. Tout ceci peut se faire sans observer des barrières entre les diverses étapes d'évolution. La volonté des éléments révolutionnaires ne s'arrête pas, elle pousse toujours plus loin et crée, avant la consécration de la première étape, les germes du stade supérieur.

Ainsi apparaît la possibilité, au cours de l'édification du socialisme, de voir surgir des germes de communisme alors que subsistent encore des éléments qui datent de l'étape démocratique de la révolution. Les premières sont les communes, les deuxièmes comprennent les sociétés d'économie mixte, le statut économique particulier des investissements anciens et actuels de capitalistes patriotes et de Chinois émigrés outre-mer.

Dans la pratique cette théorie convient particulièrement au climat psychologique de la Chine; il impose de ne pas oublier l'excellence du travailleur chinois, souvent très ingénieux, presque toujours exceptionnellement courageux, endurant et consciencieux.

Enfin, cette théorie de la révolution ininterrompue s'adapte à la réalité sociale de la Chine actuelle et au-delà d'elle, à la situation sociologique des pays en voie de développement dont toutes les structures sont bouleversées. Les masses populaires chinoises avides de changements ont été mobilisées par le parti communiste pour accélérer le développement économique. Le rôle dirigeant du P.C. est ainsi renforcé pendant que l'exigence fondamentale de la population est en voie de satisfaction, et cette mobilisation permet la réforme des anciennes méthodes de pensée.

L'appui à fournir aux mouvements de libération nationale

Pour l'U.R.S.S., la situation internationale actuelle exige que la priorité des préoccupations du camp socialiste soit accordée à la lutte pour la paix. Le progrès du communisme dans le monde dépend du résultat d'une compétition économique et de la lutte menée par le prolétariat des pays capitalistes. Les pays sous-développés ne peuvent progresser qu'en respectant les lois objectives de l'évolution interne des sociétés. La révolution ne peut y être exportée ni accélérée de l'extérieur. Le devoir du camp socialiste est, d'une part, d'empêcher que l'impérialisme puisse freiner l'évolution interne de ces pays, et, d'autre part, d'aider les régimes indigènes.

L'aide doit être accordée sans se demander si le pays bénéficiaire est ou non déjà aidé par les puissances capitalistes. En effet, toute aide au développement favorise l'industrialisation et contribue à la formation d'un prolétariat, conditions nécessaires à l'apparition du socialisme.

Signalons aussi que l'aide du monde capitaliste aux pays sous-développés présente l'avantage de fournir une issue, autre que la course aux armements et la guerre, aux crises économiques qui attendent infailliblement le capitalisme, aux termes de la théorie marxiste-léniniste.

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Cette ligne politique de l'Union Soviétique qui tend à ne pas accélérer artificiellement la révolution, est dictée par l'importance qu'elle accorde aux réactions internationales qui provoqueraient une intervention du camp socialiste dans les anciens fiefs de l'Occident. Nous revenons ainsi à la ligne de force majeure de l'attitude soviétique, tendant au maintien de la paix.

La Chine, par contre, se montre beaucoup plus soucieuse d'accélérer le déroulement de la révolution mondiale. Pour elle, le Tiers Monde constitue la première préoccupation car c'est lui qui forme le principal ferment révolutionnaire dans le monde actuel. La tâche qui incombe à l'alliance socialiste est d'aider et de précipiter le mouvement d'émancipation des peuples, en acceptant même de créer des risques de conflits avec le monde capitaliste. L'aide à fournir au Tiers Monde est urgente; elle doit prendre de vitesse les tentatives du néo-colonialisme qui se font jour et qui visent à rétablir un régime d'exploitation économique sous le couvert d'une indépendance politique appelée à rester purement fictive.

Pour garder leur tranchant révolutionnaire, les peuples en lutte pour conquérir une entière indépendance ne peuvent rester sous la conduite de la bourgeoisie nationale. Celle-ci en effet, dès qu'elle arrive au pouvoir, s'oriente nécessairement vers l'exploitation des masses laborieuses. C'est pourquoi les Chinois insistent pour que ce soit le peuple ouvriers et paysans représenté par le parti communiste qui dirige tout le processus révolutionnaire, dès ses débuts. Il en découle qu'à tout prix, le camp socialiste doit accorder son aide aux partis frères, tant sur le plan économique que dans les domaines de la politique et de l'armement.

La conclusion tirée de cette confrontation théorique par les deux adversaires et admise généralement en dehors d'eux est que l'on assiste ainsi à une division des communistes en deux clans: l'un, celui de l'Union Soviétique, est celui des révisionnistes, l'autre, celui des doctrinaires, des dogmatiques. Ce n'est que récemment, en gros depuis 1963, que d'autres arguments moins formels ont été avancés, étrangers à l'idéologie et que nous examinerons plus loin.

Sans entrer dans le détail, il faut remarquer que ce clivage est fort artificiel. Si la Chine était aussi strictement marxiste-léniniste qu'elle l'affirme, lorsqu'elle reproche à l'Union Soviétique de considérer que dans l'ère nucléaire que nous connaissons, l'essentiel est de rester vivants, ne devrait-elle pas comprendre l'inconséquence qu'il y a à s'accorder qu'une valeur secondaire à l'arme nucléaire dans les rapports de force, alors que la doctrine qu'elle prône et prétend appliquer est toute entière basée sur le déterminisme historique des modes de production et des progrès techniques? (En fait, la thèse chinoise est basée sur la croyance suivante, exprimée par MAO TSE-tung dès 1946: l'arme nucléaire ne sera jamais employée parce qu'elle remplirait d'horreur le monde entier).

D'autre part, on peut renvoyer la balle et souligner le manque de sens historique, de réalisme, qui se dégage de la croyance — n'est-ce pas simplement un espoir ou un nouvel optimisme? — à l'impossibilité des guerres qu'inaniment ces mêmes armes nucléaires. Il est vrai qu'une erreur semblable avait déjà été commise au profit du fusil à répétition, et au profit des explosifs comme la dynamite (Lafargue et Nobel). Plutôt qu'une croyance, qu'une affirmation, il s'agit ici, à mon avis, d'un simple espoir offert aux populations; mais qui peut par ailleurs prétendre n'avoir besoin d'aucun bâton pour étayer son optimisme?

— CATCHLINE — 10 pt. Small caps — II. OPPOSITION D'INTERETS —

Il est certain que derrière l'étendard de l'idéologie que brandissent les deux adversaires en présence, se cachent des réalités différentes et des ambitions inavouées. Généralement, on croit expliquer l'apparition de tout le conflit par les trois raisons suivantes: pression démographique; rivalités de prestige; oppositions d'intérêts nationaux.

Voilà les articles des rédacteurs du Jumin Jipou et du Hongji en réponse à l'éditorial du comité central du P.C. de l'U.R.S.S. et le rapport de M. A. Sokolov du 14 février 1964. Ces articles sont résumés dans "La documentation française", "Notes et études documentaires", No. 292 du 22 mai 1964 et "Chroniques étrangères", No. 44, U.R.S.S., 5 Mai 1964. Ces motifs de friction existent, leur incidence véritable varie, mais il y en a d'autres plus profonds auxquels le jeu permanent de l'attitude déstabilisée, non seulement parce qu'ils ne semblent même communs, mais encore parce que ces raisons me semblent bien plus éclairantes. Ce sont les particularités de la révolution chinoise même, ou les caractéristiques de son héritage culturel et les degrés divers d'évolution sociologique atteints par les deux protagonistes. Voyons d'abord les conflits matériels.

Pression de population  
En arrondissant les chiffres, on prétend qu'en 1980, il y aura quatre Chinois pour un Russe: 1.000 millions face à 265. Mais le déséquilibre est encore bien plus grand sur le plan régional des contacts.

Dans l'Extrême-Orient, les provinces soviétiques comptent un peu moins de 7 millions d'habitants, contre 45 millions en Mandchourie. Or, la colonisation chinoise de cette contrée, qui y est continue depuis le 16ème siècle, connaît actuellement un grand élan à cause de l'industrialisation intense qui y a été effectuée. L'autre point de contact immédiat se situe au Sinkiang, mais ici les problèmes sont très différents. La région est pratiquement non peuplée, les autochtones ne sont pas Chinois mais frères de la population du Kazakhstan, de l'Uzbekistan, du Tadjikistan: ce sont des populations appartenant à l'aire d'expansion turque ou plutôt ouralo-altaïque. Il faudra encore de très nombreuses années avant que le Tchéstan chinois soit peuplé de manière dense comparable à l'implantation connue par les 18 provinces de la Chine proprement dite, car cette densité de peuplement présuppose la mise en valeur industrielle de cette contrée, qui représente 1/6ème du territoire de la République Populaire de Chine.

N'oublions pas que tous les territoires qui bordent le nord de la Chine ne se prêtent pas au mode chinois traditionnel d'exploitation; la frontière nord de la Chine est une des frontières les plus stables du monde; elle correspond à la limite entre une colonisation d'agriculture intensive, spécialisée, coûteuse en main d'oeuvre et une exploitation par des nomades pasteurs. A présent, ces derniers sédentarisés deviennent ouvriers; le climat continue à rendre impossible une agriculture intensive à la chinoise.

De plus, rappelons-nous que la pression chinoise s'exerce d'autre part traditionnellement vers le sud (cela manifestement depuis le début de l'ère chrétienne).

L'étude sur la situation économique de l'Europe en 1960, publiée par les Nations Unies à Genève en 1961 donne un chiffre de 264 millions d'habitants pour l'U.R.S.S. en perspective pour 1974 (Chap. II, p. 31).

Enfin, attachons-nous au phénomène connu dans les régions sous le vocable de "péril jaune", projection en quelque sorte des sentiments qui animent ou ont animé bon nombre d'Occidentaux.

La surpopulation de la Chine n'est ni neuve ni absolue: tout l'ouest du pays ne connaît qu'une très faible densité de population. Si la Chine était aussi peuplée que la Belgique, au lieu des 700 millions de Chinois qui l'occupent, il y en aurait 3, 5 milliards soit plus que la population actuelle du monde. Ceci aurait pu se réaliser si le pays avait pu échapper à la sélection naturelle des catastrophes, aux épidémies, à l'optimum, à la sélection d'un niveau d'efficacité qu'opèrent les guerres et si la Chine avait disposé des techniques et de l'aspiration qui animent la mise en exploitation industrielle des ressources naturelles.

L'Europe et la Chine se valent sur le plan de leur territoire. La Chine comptait environ 200 millions d'habitants au moment où l'Europe a commencé les grandes migrations qui ont rempli trois nouveaux continents. Aujourd'hui, les émigrants chinois sont pratiquement exclus de ces terres de peuplement. Dans ces perspectives, il me semble assez ironique d'évoquer avec le Kaiser Guillaume II, le péril jaune, puisque les Chinois ont mis 5.000 ans à remplir, incomplètement, le territoire compris dans leurs frontières actuelles et à déborder sur le sud-sud-est asiatique, alors que les Européens en deux siècles se sont emparés de la majeure partie du monde.

Pour l'avenir, n'oublions pas que le taux de croissance de la Chine est loin d'être extraordinaire: 2 à 2,5 pour mille, et qu'une politique de contrôle des naissances y est introduite (au grand dommage de la doctrine orthodoxe du marxisme-léninisme d'ailleurs).

(d'usage)

(ouvriers paysans)

(d'usage)

(et)

la

(péril jaune)

(sélection)

(dans)

(frontières)



Que ce problème démographique n'ait plus l'importance que l'ignorance lui fait accorder souvent en Occident apparaît à la lumière de l'attitude soviétique elle-même. Entre 1949 et 1957 sont réalisés d'énormes travaux de construction de voies ferrées pour relier les deux grands centres de l'alliance: en plus du transsibérien, une voie est construite à travers la Mongolie extérieure et une autre non achevée à travers le Sinkiang. Ces voies peuvent servir à l'expansion de la population chinoise vers le nord, dans des régions qui depuis plus de 30 ans ne sont ouvertes qu'à la seule influence de l'Union Soviétique. Simultanément ont été réalisés des accords pour l'importation de milliers de travailleurs chinois en Mongolie et a été constituée une commission mixte sino-soviétique pour procéder à l'étude de la mise en exploitation du réseau hydrographique de la région de l'Amour: inventaire des ressources, études de localisation des barrages, centrales et réservoirs.

542 millions en 1941, 20 millions en 1962, 20 millions en 1992 selon les statistiques officielles reproduites dans Hu Ping-hi: "Studies on the Population of China, 1949-1957", Harvard East Asian Studies, 1959.

Question de prestige

La délimitation des frontières ne semble relever bien plus de considérations de grandeur nationale que de nécessités d'ordre démographique ou d'enrichissement matériel.

(Frontières)

(le monde)

Rapportons brièvement sur quel porte la contestation en matière de définition du territoire national. Dès le triomphe de sa révolution, le jeune Union Soviétique renonce unilatéralement à l'héritage impérial que lui confèrent en Chine les traités inégaux imposés par le régime tsariste. C'est la fameuse déclaration Tchtchérine du 14 juillet 1918.

Cependant la réalisation effective de cette déclaration ne viendra que très longtemps plus tard: en 1952 pour les chemins de fer mandchouriens et les concessions de Port Arthur et de Dairen; en 1955 pour le Sinkiang. De plus, la réalisation n'a jamais été qu'incomplète. A Yalta, en 1945, en contrepartie de son entrée en guerre contre le Japon, l'U.R.S.S. obtient la reconnaissance de l'indépendance de la Mongolie extérieure et elle reprend certains privilèges impérialistes en Mandchourie (ceux-là même qui seront abandonnés définitivement en 1952).

Enfin, les 7 provinces extrême-orientales de l'U.R.S.S., notamment les territoires des Bouriates de Khabarovsk, de Chita et de l'Amour, ont jusqu'au milieu du 19<sup>ème</sup> siècle au moins subi l'attrait du pôle chinois, et non celui de la Russie plus distante, plus jeune et surtout moins brillante que le céleste empire.

La Chine a lutté de 1919 à 1949 pour se dégager de l'exploitation coloniale blanche. Parmi ses exploités, la Chine compte également la Russie tsariste et l'Union Soviétique. Celle-ci a voulu la vassaliser, non seulement en reprenant des avantages sur le gouvernement nationaliste de Chiang Kai-shek, mais aussi en cherchant à imposer — sans succès d'ailleurs — sa ligne de conduite au P.C. chinois. En 1923, c'est l'alliance avec le K.M.T. qui lui est dictée; de 1927 à 1931, l'U.R.S.S., par l'intermédiaire du Comintern, prône et impose une orientation gauchiste au P.C.; ce sont les tentatives révolutionnaires urbaines qui mènent à la quasi disparition du P.C. chinois; en 1941, c'est la conclusion d'un pacte de non agression avec le Japon par l'U.R.S.S., dont l'effet est comparable pour la Chine à celui du traité de 1939 avec l'alliance nazie pour nos pays; de 1945 à 1949: aucune confiance n'est maniée par Staline aux communistes chinois; enfin de 1949 à 1952, une politique de subordination aux intérêts du bastion socialiste dans le monde a certainement été proposée, comme aux pays de démocratie populaire d'Europe; mais Mao Tse-tung a sans doute été le dirigeant le plus résistant à cette politique, d'autant plus facilement que la révolution triomphante en Chine y était véritablement autochtone et populaire.

A ces questions de prestige sont liées des caractéristiques de traditions culturelles de la Chine.

Celle-ci en effet ne formait pas une nation lorsque l'Occident s'est mise à établir avec elle ou mieux à lui imposer des contacts suivis. Au contraire, elle se considérait comme une très grande puissance définie par le rayonnement, jamais égalé par d'autres, de sa culture, comme une sorte d'empire universel parvenu qu'ordonne selon les lois naturelles, capables de faire régner l'harmonie dans le cosmos.

Il en découlait qu'il ne pouvait y avoir de rapports entre la Chine et d'autres Etats sur un pied d'égalité.

Au centre du monde, il y a la Chine. Elle se représente par la graphie: "pays du milieu". En fait partie les territoires et les populations qui ont adopté le mode de vie et de pensée des Hans, c'est-à-dire du peuple chinois. Il s'agit d'une aire culturelle à laquelle le concept de nation est étranger. Tout s'ordonne autour de ce céleste empire par cercles concentriques, de plus en plus barbares à mesure qu'ils s'éloignent du centre. Les limites entre Chinois, vassaux tributaires et barbares ne tiennent ni à des questions de race ni à des délimitations de territoire: seuls comptent les modes de vie et de pensée. En principe, chacun peut se siniser, c'est-à-dire peu à peu entrer dans l'orbite du rayonnement chinois et lorsque l'adaptation est complète, l'étranger devient chinois à part entière.

L'extension de la sphère d'influence ne se fait jamais dans les modes des empires occidentaux, ni colonisation, ni envois de missions ou de propagandistes. Au contraire, c'est par un entraînement centripète que le leadership culturel s'établit.

La Chine se fermait par contre aux barbares qui voulaient imposer une réforme dans son système politique, économique et philosophique.

Cette conception traditionnelle des relations avec l'étranger était calquée sur l'organisation intérieure de la société de l'Empire: au centre le monde confucéen, entouré de franges marginales exogènes tolérées pour autant qu'elles ne troublent pas l'ordre du confucianisme. Ces groupes distillent les éléments étrangers à la culture sinétique: comme cela a été le cas pour les religions étrangères, comme le bouddhisme, comme ce sera le cas également pour les sciences, la technique et les modes de pensée de l'Occident.

Actuellement, le schéma général semble encore rester le même: les éléments capteurs du monde sont les marxistes-léninistes proprement révolutionnaires (les orthodoxes) autour desquels s'agglutinent des pays qui se développent ou se développeront au contact de ce centre. Plus loin se trouvent les populations qui ont encore à se libérer, à se pénétrer de la vérité du marxisme, qui forment une zone ténébreuse sur laquelle il importe d'étendre son rayonnement. Tout aux confins se trouvent les purs barbares, ennemis de la Chine: c'est le camp capitaliste, contre lequel il importe bien plus de se défendre que de songer à l'attaque.

(Légende)

(Légende)

Au sein du camp socialiste, la Chine n'a pu se manifester qu'après avoir assis de manière définitive son gouvernement interne et ses bases. Aussi n'est-ce qu'en 1956, à l'occasion des sérieux troubles qui ont éclaté au sein de l'alliance qu'elle a été amenée à y jouer un rôle.

(Légende)

Celui-ci a consisté d'une part à soutenir l'attribution de la direction de l'ensemble de l'alliance socialiste à l'Union Soviétique (ce qui revenait à affermir la position particulière du parti communiste russe et de son secrétaire M. N. Khrouchtchev) ainsi qu'en a témoigné l'attitude chinoise à l'égard de la révolution hongroise.

D'autre part, cette direction forte du camp socialiste devait n'être qu'un leadership idéologique, chargé d'interpréter la doctrine de l'alliance et d'en répandre les données et les enrichissements. La Chine favorisait une décentralisation matérielle et la création d'un groupe d'alliés bien plus que la consolidation d'un empire. Aussi son rôle a-t-il visé dès 1956 à soutenir les revendications en rôles particulières d'accès au socialisme (ce que sa propre révolution avait illustré, comme l'avait fait la Yougoslavie d'ailleurs et comme l'exigeait la Pologne de Gomułka). Ainsi la Chine mettrait-elle en valeur sa propre expérience et montrerait-elle son droit à participer à la direction de l'alliance.

(Légende)

Les intérêts politiques proprement dits

De plus, certains intérêts nationaux de l'Union Soviétique et de la Chine divergent. Bien sûr nous à les citer tout en signalant leur importance pour des pays qui pratiquent une "Realpolitik".

La Chine est un pays agricole qui doit encore effectuer sa révolution industrielle. La population rurale est disciplinée mais dépourvue de techniques spécialisées qui doivent être reconstruites.

Une partie de son territoire national, les îles de Taiwan et les Pescadores, n'est pas encore libérée. Elle n'a pas pu récupérer les pertes de territoire subies antérieurement: Vietnam sous l'effet de l'invasion française, Corée en 1948, Mongolie extérieure, comme l'a réussi la Russie Soviétique en reprenant les pays baltes, une partie de la Pologne et de la Roumanie et, vers l'Est, les Kouriles et Sakhaline.

De plus, la Chine n'est pas reconnue par les Etats-Unis ni par ses clients, ni en conséquence par aucune des grandes organisations internationales.

Enfin, elle ne possède pas son propre bouclier atomique. L'U.R.S.S. lui exprime ce désir de posséder des armes nucléaires à tout prix et de ne pas se contenter de la protection qu'elle lui assure et ici, l'Union Soviétique fait allusion à des intérêts nationaux particuliers puisqu'elle impute cette envie de la Chine à "des buts et des intérêts spéciaux que la force du camp socialiste ne peut appuyer" (allusions à Tchang et au différend frontalier avec l'Inde, de toute évidence).

Sur le plan des relations internationales, les Chinois accusent l'U.R.S.S. de violer les principes socialistes qui doivent régir les rapports entre pays frères et de poursuivre une politique chauvine et d'égoïsme national. L'intégration du bloc socialiste et le développement moderne des pays socialistes industriellement développés sont opposés ici au besoin impérieux de construire la base du socialisme dans les pays arriérés de l'alliance (ces derniers ne sont pas sourds d'ailleurs à cet argument et l'attitude de certains d'entre eux, telle la Roumanie, l'illustre).

La Chine refuse le paternalisme de l'Union Soviétique, qui se pose à présent en tuteur des autres pays et des autres partis, alors qu'elle ne les a pas toujours soutenus pendant leur lutte nationale.

Nous nous trouvons en fait, bien plus que deux pays socialistes qui s'affrontent, devant deux nations. La nation russe qui a polarisé le développement des peuples de l'Union Soviétique et la nation chinoise d'autant plus virulente que jeune et encore toujours maltraitée. Le nationalisme chinois est en effet une création due à l'action de Sun Yat-sen, du courant radical de l'immédiat après-guerre de 1918 et du parti communiste, sous l'influence prépondérante de l'Occident.

L'Union Soviétique soutient la renouveau chinois mais n'appuyait pas une opération de force seule pour récupérer cette partie du territoire national.

Cet affrontement d'intérêts nationaux apparaît à présent comme un des facteurs déterminants de l'action des deux grands protagonistes et il me semble mettre en lumière un élément nouveau: le déclin de la doctrine comme guide d'action véritable. L'attitude de l'Union Soviétique l'atteste déjà clairement; la souplesse chinoise dans la pratique de l'actualité immédiate l'annonçait.

CATCHLINE for 10 pt. Small Cap Heading — II. EXPLICATIONS, ETC.

Passons à présent à des explications qui, à mon avis, sont plus profondes, même si elles sont moins précises.

A. Il y a d'abord celles qui tiennent aux particularités de la révolution et de la culture chinoises.

1. La révolution communiste chinoise a mûri dans un pays très peu industrialisé alors que la théorie socialiste prétend que la révolution ne peut triompher que lorsque sont réalisées certaines conditions nécessaires, parmi lesquelles une certaine base industrielle et l'existence d'un prolétariat.

L'affirmation de ce que le développement économique est une condition préalable au triomphe d'une révolution marxiste est toujours préférée par l'U.R.S.S. qui prétend en effet que le communisme n'est possible qu'après la réalisation de certaines bases qui établissent un état d'abondance — à cette condition, la Chine se trouve encore devant un bon bout de chemin à parcourir.

2. La révolution chinoise, bien qu'animée par un parti communiste, n'a pas été basée principalement sur le prolétariat ni même sur la lutte des classes.

En 1948, la Chine comptait 750.000 ouvriers environ contre 280 millions de population rurale active, dans un ensemble de 550 millions d'habitants. Le plan d'action qui a été appliqué par les communistes chinois a visé et a réussi à amener tous les groupes sociaux disponibles à s'unir dans un mouvement qu'ils ont inspiré. Ce sont les intellectuels chinois convertis au marxisme qui ont mené la lutte en cantonnant l'opposition suscitée aux seuls grands bourgeois inféodés au capitalisme impérialiste: disons les 200 familles, en Chine elles forment ce qui est appelé la "bourgeoisie bureaucratique".

Aussi, la Chine populaire est-elle un Etat de dictature du peuple: celui-ci comprend les quatre classes patriotes: ouvriers, paysans, intellectuels, et bourgeoisie nationale; et n'est-elle pas une dictature du prolétariat?

3. Dans nos pays, et en l'Union Soviétique également, la population rurale forme la couche la plus stable, la moins politisée, celle qui ne se dresse qu'en dernier lieu contre l'autorité établie.

En Chine, les révoltes de paysans ont été nombreuses, et cela en raison de la misère, de l'injure, de la précoce désacralisation du pouvoir et de la notion de légitimité qu'ont forgée les intellectuels chinois. Toute dynastie qui prétendait s'imposer, alors qu'elle ne faisait plus preuve de sa capacité d'administrer dans l'ordre et dans la prospérité, n'était qu'une autorité de fait que les gouvernés avaient le droit et le devoir de renverser.

C'est ainsi que Mao Tse-tung n'a pas été un innovateur en considérant les paysans chinois comme le principal levier de la révolution sociale. Au contraire, il a incarné, ce faisant, un des idéaux les plus traditionnels de la Chine éternelle. Il a animé un mouvement de révolte paysanne à l'aide d'une interprétation modernisée de l'histoire; à l'instar de rationalisations moralisantes et subversives qu'avaient formulées avant lui quelques grands intellectuels inspirateurs des soulèvements passés. Mais cette politique n'a pas été appréciée par les Russes qui engagèrent le communisme chinois dans des voies occidentales. Ce n'est qu'après les revers subis par cette politique que l'Union Soviétique a dû se rendre à l'évidence; et à partir de ce moment (1951), elle n'a fait que laisser survivre les bases rurales de guérilla dirigées par Mao et Chu Teh au Kiangsi.

Rappelons qu'après l'avènement définitif de Staline au pouvoir, l'U.R.S.S. proclame la nécessité d'étifier le socialisme dans un seul pays. Pendant que cette perspective se réalise, les pays capitalistes continuent leur développement, les crises vont s'y succéder et la révolution y mûrir. Pendant ce temps aussi, les pays en retard doivent tendre à réaliser la première étape de leur affranchissement, fût-ce sous la conduite de leur bourgeoisie nationale.

L'U.R.S.S. considère qu'il est bien moins urgent d'œuvrer à la révolution mondiale que de rechercher avec son adversaire, le chef de file du camp capitaliste, un modus vivendi, de manière à pouvoir prospérer en paix et édifier le communisme.

Pour la Chine au contraire en matière de révolution mondiale, il en va comme pour les révolutions nationales. Il faut tendre dès le départ à la réalisation du maximum. Le but prioritaire des pays socialistes est d'aider les révolutions nationales des autres peuples lorsqu'elles sont dirigées par un parti marxiste. Ceci tient à l'expérience vécue par la Chine, expérience qui l'a persuadée de la nécessité des combats pour faire triompher le socialisme, et qui l'a ainsi convaincue que le principal ferment révolutionnaire dans le monde ne réside pas dans le prolétariat des pays développés (donc déjà satisfaits) mais dans les couches misérables des populations du tiers-monde.

S (Sov)

(handwritten notes)

(différend)

(deux)

(la Chine)

(mission)

(population) (monnaie)

(contenu)

4. L'unité égalitaire entre les hommes, imposée aux dépens de la liberté individuelle est dans la logique de la philosophie chinoise. Tous les efforts individuels, les appels aux travaux volontaires, à la limitation des besoins s'inscrivent dans un cadre bureaucratique et autoritaire auquel le peuple chinois est habitué de longue date. Une agriculture pauvre a amélioré ses rendements et à étendre son champ d'action par des travaux d'irrigation et d'autre part est contrainte à se défendre contre les intempéries, la sécheresse et l'irrégularité des fleuves est obligée à défaut de mécanisation et de puissants investissements, d'instaurer des corvées. Cela a été le cas en Chine depuis plus de deux millénaires. Une discipline collective a ainsi été inculquée aux miliciens de paysans chinois. Le régime actuel s'est efforcé de dépasser le stade de ces corvées féodales afin que le bénéfice des efforts collectifs se reviennent plus pour la plus grande partie aux seuls propriétaires mais qu'en contraire il permette de surtir la misère traditionnelle.

(pauvreté)  
de  
(sortir de la)

Le contraste à ce propos, avec la paysannerie de la Russie est manifeste, paysannerie anarchique et dont la qualité comme travailleur est médiocre, peut être entre autre parce que les formes d'organisation ne l'avaient jamais intéressée au résultat de ses efforts.

II. Voyons enfin ce qui peut être déduit de l'évolution des deux sociétés en présence.

En Union Soviétique, jusqu'en 1928, 10% seulement de la population active étaient composés de salariés de l'industrie, des transports, des mines et de la construction. Cette minorité a joué un rôle actif dans la révolution soviétique, et cette participation n'a pas eu son équivalent dans la lutte du communisme chinois, basé sur les villages.

C'est entre 1928 et 1938 que 80% de la population active soviétique passe du statut de paysan-petit propriétaire à celui de paysan salarié ou d'ouvrier (sovkhozes, M.T.S., coopératives, usines). Mais la prolétarianisation (caractérisée aussi par la soumission à une discipline de travail, la perte de toute indépendance et le déracinement) n'a jamais été complète car:

1. Immédiatement s'est créée une strate privilégiée: celle de l'intelligentsia technique et administrative et des ouvriers émérites (les stakhanovistes).
2. L'Union Soviétique a adouci le sort de sa population en consacrant d'énormes efforts à instaurer un système de protection sociale et sanitaire et en développant l'enseignement.
3. Enfin, dans les campagnes (plus de 50% de la population) des éléments d'entreprise privée ont toujours survécu: depuis 1935 en tout cas, l'exploitation de lopins individuels, l'élevage de petit bétail, de volaille ont entretenu des éléments de mentalité petit bourgeois.

Si actuellement, on peut parler "d'embourgeoisement" de la population soviétique, ce n'est pas tellement par ce que les froids de propriété y ont été développés mais bien parce que les modes de consommation et le style de vie vers lesquels la société s'oriente sont ceux des "bourgeois". Chacun recherche les bénéfices que peut lui procurer le système existant; la base étant assurée, on tend vers la satisfaction de besoins secondaires et surtout l'on tend vers la stabilité. La politique soviétique est basée sur les stimulants matériels (la définition du socialisme implique la rémunération d'après le principe "de chacun selon ses capacités à chacun selon son travail"). Si cet embourgeoisement n'avait touché que l'élite, depuis quelques années il s'étend de plus en plus à la population entière dont les revenus réels ont crû de manière très sensible. Il n'est pas exagéré de dire que la population soviétique entre dans une période de consommation de masse. Il suffit de voir l'étendue de la politique de construction de logements avec un appartement complètement individualisé par famille.

(droits)  
implique  
embourgeoisement

En s'efforçant de dégrader ce socle de toute sa charge affective, il faut tenir compte de ce que cette évolution, résultat d'une maturité et d'une assimilation du niveau de vie, ne signifie pas nécessairement un éloignement du communisme. Les crises qui définissent la réalisation de ce dernier sont devenues différentes. Si le mode de vie s'approprie au niveau d'aisance qu'implique l'embourgeoisement, des traits nouveaux de son collectif s'élaborent, même s'ils restent encore théoriques.

L'esprit militant qui subsiste ne peut, dans ces conditions, que rechercher à renforcer la société stable, à la perfectionner: plus question de révolution.

En Chine, par contre, la prolétarianisation a été beaucoup plus loin et elle fut son plein actuellement.

Jusqu'en 1958, la collectivisation des paysans s'est faite par degrés et en douceur, l'expropriation des industriels et des commerçants s'est faite par étapes très progressives et n'est pas encore complètement réalisée.

La vague des communes et des bouds en avant a balayé cette modération. Malgré certains retours en arrière, l'économie paysanne privée semble jouer un rôle beaucoup plus réduit que celui occupé par elle en Russie; les incitants matériels sont employés et certaines catégories bénéficient de privilèges mais l'atmosphère générale de la Chine est hostile à l'accumulation privée et à la recherche du confort individuel et les exemples d'austérité sont donnés par les cadres. Enfin, les services gratuits institués diminuent le rôle de la famille.

Or, la Chine n'est pas capable d'appliquer un service de protection sociale comparable à celui qui a été aménagé par la prolétarianisation soviétique; en Chine, le mouvement crée des pressions explosives qui exigent des contrôles et qui expliquent la constitution de milices, l'enregistrement des paysans, les réunions d'études et de discussions en équipes.

Les conséquences de cette disparité sociologique sont, à mes yeux, très importantes.

1. Il en résulte une friction mutuelle grandissante et des difficultés croissantes de communication, par des différences de ton et d'atmosphère dans les deux sociétés. Il semble qu'un Russe établisse plus facilement un contact réel avec un Américain qu'avec un Chinois.

Depuis 1958, on essaie de remplacer le foyer, le ménage par des cantines, crèches, services divers en Chine. Pendant ce temps l'Union Soviétique s'efforce d'attribuer des logements avec cuisine privée aux millions de ses citadins habitués à partager le point d'eau et le fourneau avec les autres occupants de l'immeuble.

La préparation en grand du communisme semble se caractériser par une importance accrue accordée aux facteurs objectifs, à la réalité. C'est ce que trahit notamment l'élaboration des plans.

(la)  
(caractéristique)

En Chine, les facteurs objectifs sont considérés comme de l'opportunisme de droite. La politique au contraire doit prendre les commandes, bien plus que les "experts" comme en Union Soviétique.

Ceci tient à ce que les cadres de la Chine actuelle ont été formés pendant la révolution; l'improvisation, l'élan politique, l'appui sur la propagande sont considérés comme les caractéristiques de la lutte pour le communisme bien plus que les conditions objectives.

Les cadres russes sont, non des révolutionnaires mais bien des pionniers de l'embourgeoisement, membres de cette élite technique, administrative et intellectuelle qui ont luté pour augmenter l'efficacité de leur système et tout autant le niveau de leur propre consommation: ils trouvent naturel et désirable que cette amélioration s'étende à leurs concitoyens qui y aspiront depuis deux générations. Les énergies semblent basées bien plus vers la réussite de chacun dans le cadre de l'ordre établi que vers la transformation de celui-ci au moyen de l'action collective.

2. Pour la Chine, la menace de l'impérialisme représente actuellement le même danger qu'a été l'encerclement capitaliste pour l'Union Soviétique dirigée par Staline. Cette menace justifie l'autoritarisme, la dureté de l'idéologie, le renforcement de la lutte. Pour les Russes, la guerre par contre rendrait vains tous les sacrifices consentis et les efforts actuels.

3. L'analyse des mythes qui animent la société communiste de type soviétique et leur comparaison avec ceux de la société chinoise montrent que l'U.R.S.S. est animée par une idéologie produite par une société de plus en plus large, de plus en plus ouverte (la dictature du prolétariat cède le pas à l'Etat du peuple tout entier), alors que la Chine est tout entière galvanisée par l'idéologie d'une couche sociale horizontale, bien distincte, celle du prolétariat (Union des ouvriers et des paysans pauvres), qui dirige et anime la dictature exercée par les quatre classes patriotes.

Or l'idéologie est d'autant plus puissante, d'autant plus capable de changer l'ordre établi, qu'elle est propre à un groupe social horizontal: à une classe bien distincte. Si la représentation de la société idéale à atteindre tend à refléter l'ensemble des aspirations d'une communauté, ses concepts deviennent universels. Ils favorisent nécessairement la stabilité, l'intégration à un ordre global. C'est le cas lorsque cette représentation est formulée par un groupe vertical qui est au pouvoir et tend à assurer la pérennité de ce dernier.

Cette menace est réelle, mais est envisagée à son utilisation par le régime. La différence capitale entre les deux sociétés qui découle de ces considérations est que l'on passe avec la Chine d'un type de société fermée où s'imposent des règles contraignantes définies par une minorité et appliquées à la lettre, à une société ouverte en Union Soviétique, où l'idéologie est complexe, nuancée, plus difficile à résister, où s'établit un certain pluralisme parce que s'y opèrent de nouveaux clivages.

Une confirmation de ceci a été fournie par un des derniers arguments avancés par la Chine pour condamner le révisionnisme de l'U.R.S.S. Il date de février 1964, dans la septième partie de la réponse chinoise à la lettre ouverte du comité central du parti communiste de l'U.R.S.S.: il est dit: "Les révisionnistes et opportunistes soviétiques cherchent à remplacer la base matérialiste par la mythologie riodorée, avec ses déesses de justice, de liberté, d'égalité et de fraternité" ce qui signifie, ont-ils ajouté "qu'ils avilissent la théorie du marxisme-léninisme et son outil: le parti communiste."

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(Energies)

(basées)

(condamner)

CATCHLINE—THE WORLD TRADE CONFERENCE AND CO-EXISTENCE  
JOSEF BOGNAR

People are becoming increasingly aware that co-existence means, pre-supposes and requires much more than the mere warding off of a nuclear war. Only by eliminating the factors responsible for war or, at least, by substantially limiting their influence, can war or wars be avoided. Therefore peace needs vigilance, confidence and security. Confidence and security, in turn, lie with the productive co-operation and joint undertakings of the peoples. Hence, constructive economic and cultural co-operation and exchange between states constitute a positive contribution to peace. In our days, however when the international interdependence of peoples and states has assumed unprecedented proportions and when the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution result in the internationalization of widening spiritual and economic fields, bilateral or multilateral co-operation of nations is no longer sufficient. The functions, tasks and sphere of competence of the international organizations must be expanded.

The convocation, proceedings and resolutions of the international conference dealing with problems of trade and development demonstrate that the governments of the participating countries—and through them the overwhelming majority of mankind—are becoming increasingly aware of the significance, requirements and purposes of international economic co-operation.

Obviously, the governments of countries of different social systems differ in the interpretation of this recognition, in the sincerity of its assessment and in undertaking the consequences. The progress made is, nevertheless, extremely important!

The history of the convocation and the proceedings of international conferences can be written in many different ways. Since we do not intend to write a history of diplomacy, we shall not examine which countries suggested and which countries opposed the convocation of this conference for the past 10 years. The decisive question is why this Conference had to take place after many detours, difficulties and obstructions. We do not believe, of course, in any force of necessity or fatality acting independently of human will, conviction or endeavour or of some conditions created by ourselves. Yet we contend that the requirements deriving from socio-economic conditions, from the new phenomena of technical development and from new international circumstances must inevitably be recognized—sooner or later, possibly after grave errors—by the large majority of mankind. The depth and degree of consciousness of this recognition are, naturally, subject to wide variation. Some are only capable of recognizing the immediate consequences, whereas others have a deeper insight into the associated and tertiary consequences deriving from the new situation.

The convocation of this Conference can be traced back to a collective recognition that the contradiction between the conditions created by the technical and scientific revolution, on the one hand, and the commercial policy evolved in the period of the cold war, on the other, in the world economy of our days must be liquidated. We do not mean to say that this basic contradiction has been recognized by the majority of acting personalities, civil servants or economists, as the decisive factor responsible for the difficulties in the world economy and in the national economies of the various countries. Yet there is a general feeling that something is wrong and there is a trend to try to find the way out.

The preconditions and the necessity of a wider international division of labour have been created by the technical and scientific revolution, but the commercial policy developed in the time of the cold war prevents its implementation.

Let us examine trade policies developed during the cold war. They can be summed up as follows:

1. The advanced capitalist countries, the United States in particular, decided not to deliver to socialist countries any goods that would further their "preparations for war", i.e., would assist their economic development. Such an interpretation of trade essentially means trade war; peaceful trade has never been and can never be governed by any other principle but that of mutual benefit.

2. The advanced capitalist countries, and in particular the large corporations, have endeavoured to maintain unilateral commercial advantages over the developing countries, advantages acquired during the colonial period.

3. A trend towards autarchy developed in the economic management of the socialist countries owing to the import-saving character of their industrialization and to the trade war (embargoes, etc.) launched by the United States.

Let us briefly survey the effect of the cold war trade policies on the economic life, growth and development of the three major participants in world economy—the advanced capitalist countries, the socialist countries and the developing countries.

The embargo or trade war—we use the latter term because only war can simplify human mentality to such an extent as to consider advantageous everything that is disadvantageous to the opponent—was declared under specific economic conditions. (The explicitly political projection of the problem will not be examined in this paper.) Following World War II came the

reconstruction of the West European economies that had sustained great material losses: the share of the United States in world trade grew by leaps and bounds, and what is referred to as "pent-up consumption demand" promised a long-range boom in the U.S. domestic economy.

In those days the world economy was short of goods since the demand for goods arising from the reconstruction considerably exceeded the available supply. The essence of the Marshall Plan, disregarding now the political aspects of the matter, was the purposeful distribution of the available resources. The reconstruction, for obvious reasons, greatly increased the demand for the classical raw materials and resulted, especially in the days of growing international tension, in the rapid rise of raw material prices. This led to a temporary boom in the countries producing raw materials, although the basic contradictions and inequalities survived. The specific aspect and weakness of this boom was that it failed to start the process of growth and to transform the raw-material-producing economies from a static state into a dynamic one.

In the socialist countries, too, a period of reconstruction followed the end of the Second World War. Subsequently, industrialization of an import-saving character was undertaken which resulted in rapid economic growth.

Owing to the technical and scientific revolution, the industrial production of the advanced capitalist countries eventually began to increase and they experienced accelerated expansion and the transformation of their industrial structure. A surplus of goods developed and their marketing met with growing difficulties since the Western countries did not want to sell them to socialist countries and could not sell them to the developing countries. This was no wonder, since the production of finished goods and the demand for them grew much more rapidly than did the demand for raw materials, especially in that period, when the chemistry of synthetic materials began to develop at a rapid rate. On the other hand, the needs of the underdeveloped economies are unlimited only in theory—in practice they are severely limited by their purchasing power which grows less rapidly than that of an advanced economy.

The advanced capitalist countries reacted in different ways to the difficulties of realization and to the economic recessions in their wake. The government of the United States tried to give a new impetus to economic growth by intensifying armament, hoping to reduce unemployment thereby. The West European countries endeavoured to enliven the boom by fostering integration and by laying new foundations for the international division of labour.

It was soon discovered, however, that armament today is no remedy against unemployment and cannot ensure lasting prosperity. This statement is supported by several investigations and reports resulting from the joint efforts of both western and eastern experts in economics. (The scope of the present paper does not permit me to prove this statement in detail.)

It is incontestable that for the past 15 years or so since the beginning of the cold war, the share of the United States in world trade has substantially dropped. This fact is usually accounted for by two explanations: according to one, the material and natural resources of the United States are so large that there is hardly any need for foreign trade; according to the other, specific conditions arising from World War II—the economy of the United States developed during the war while particularly grave damages were inflicted on the West-European economies—resulted in the unnaturally large share of the United States in world trade in the immediate post-war period.

There is some truth in both statements, yet both are basically misleading. It is true that the United States is not very dependent on world trade for its imports, but who would say that the world trade relations of such a highly developed and many-sided economy should and could be examined and approached exclusively from the angle of imports, particularly at a time when the realization of finished goods has a growing importance in world trade and the sellin of raw materials shows a downward tendency?

It is true that the economy of the United States is not import-sensitive but, in spite of the highly developed internal market, it would be erroneous to say that it is not becoming an export-oriented economy.

Nor can it be contested that after World War II specific world trade conditions prevailed, yet it should be realized that the share of export in the national income of U.S.A. is small. This was bound to make itself felt in the slowing down of the rate of economic growth compared with that in the West-European countries. Measures limiting imports were first taken as a "time-honoured" method to counterbalance the slow growth of exports. This, however, is not a rational method: obviously, the reaction of a strong and advanced economy, when the balance of payments changes for the worse, cannot be the same as that of countries at the initial stage of industrialization. The latter are generally unable to increase exports and must therefore restrict imports. The healthy reaction of an advanced economy upon a deterioration of the balance of payments is the intensification of export activities.

It follows that in the industrial-technical development of our days, even the strongest economy must increase its exports, and this makes it gradually export-oriented.

The new position of the United States in world economy partly was recognized by the late President J. F. Kennedy who tried to evolve new principles in trade policy. Yet he failed to draw all the inevitable conclusions from his observations. History will reveal whether these inconsistencies reflected his own views or the prevailing power relations.

On the other hand, the West-European states, as has been mentioned before, tried to expand markets by developing integration. No doubt, they have achieved significant results in this field: their production has grown rapidly, their weight in world trade has substantially increased and their standard of living has materially risen. It is well known, however, that the development of trade even within the integrated region has met certain obstacles. It is probable that the super-position of import on the integrating countries reduces the possibilities of export to territories beyond the area of integration. Hence, if it is true that trade in finished goods plays a growing part in world trade, then the economic difficulties of the export-oriented economies within the integration area will probably increase.

This explains why these export-oriented countries realized the danger of embargo and similar prohibitive lists before the United States did. And this, again, explains why, e.g. the German Federal Republic—whose government displays an offensive and actively hostile attitude to the socialist countries—is economically more elastic than the United States or many other West-European countries.

Even more specific was the position of the United Kingdom which was left out of the West-European integration but—owing partly to the low purchasing power of its partners, partly to the slower rate of its economic development—was unable to achieve an adequate increase in its exports to the Commonwealth countries. Owing to these circumstances, the British contractors have done their best to break through the embargo and other prohibitive commercial measures.

Thus the cold war trade policies were revealed to be—at different times and in different degrees—progressively less tenable.

After the period of reconstruction—1945 to 1949—the other large sector of the world economy, the socialist countries, carried out a programme of intensive industrialization. Since the achievements are well known, there is no need to describe them in detail. Industrialization at its initial stage invariably has, in a certain sense, an import-saving character. This is obvious since, on the one hand, the increased import of the means of production cannot be balanced by export, and, on the other hand, the products of the

new industries need a certain measure of protection. The increase of export becomes possible and necessary only when further industrial development is hampered by the limitations of the internal market. At the time of the cold war, however, as a logical consequence of western embargo, all industrialization had an import-saving character. In this period the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance concentrated its efforts in the first place on meeting the shortage of raw materials and semi-finished goods caused by the prohibitive measures. Yet, in spite of the difficulties created by the embargo and of errors committed in internal economic policy, socialist industrialization advanced at a rapid rate, creating a new situation also in the socialist economies.

The economies of the minor socialist countries (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, etc.) are import-sensitive, i.e., imports grow more rapidly than the national income. In Hungary, for instance, imports increase by 1.5 per cent for every 1 per cent rise in national income. At the same time, by the advancement of industrialization these economies became export-oriented, i.e., the growth of export markets becomes the chief precondition of the quantitative and qualitative expansion of industrial output. The position of the Soviet Union is, in many respects, reminiscent of that of the United States; from the angle of import the Soviet Union is not very dependent on world trade yet it is obvious that even an economy as strong and powerful as the Soviet economy cannot dispense with the impulses coming from the world economy and becoming increasingly intensive on account of the technical development.

A growing responsibility devolves on the Soviet economy in solving the decisive problems of the world economy; among other things, in affording economic assistance to the developing countries by adequately influencing the prices of raw materials, etc.

These facts clearly show that the socialist countries, which have entered a new stage of economic development, cannot dispense with some disciplinary and beneficial impulses coming from world trade, and that the rate and efficiency of their future development depend, in more than one respect, upon their active participation in the world economy. Obviously, even the co-operation between the socialist countries has vast and unexploited possibilities in store.

The beneficial advancement of this co-operation, however, does not preclude but presupposes the rapid and intensive development of the economic relations with the other parts of the world.

It has been generally admitted that economic growth of the developing countries requires a wide international co-operation, trade and assistance. Obviously, international assistance can not replace, but can encourage only the total mobilization of internal spiritual and material resources.

It is clear that the politico-economic problems connected with the problem of growth in the developing countries cannot be understood and solved in the spirit of a "business mentality." That is why the advanced capitalist countries have to face new problems. The prices of raw materials and of tropical foodstuffs can be kept low by the influence of the monopolies established in the colonial period. This, however, implies decreased purchasing power in the developing countries, thus decreased sales of commodities produced in the western countries cannot be sold in these markets. This prevents exactly the dynamic branches of industry, most strongly influencing the rate of technical development, from adequately expanding their capacities. In other words: the higher profit of raw-material monopolies concentrated in the traditional branches of industry forestalls or hampers the expansion of the markets of the dynamic branches of industry.

Trade with the developing countries requires a new, broader and more complex approach on behalf of the advanced capitalist countries and, let us add, also from the socialist countries, although it is easier for these to view relations with developing countries from national-economic level and in the light of the long-range interests of the other party.

It should be remembered—indeed it was much stressed at this Conference—that the interests of trade and development are closely interlinked. A slowly developing stagnant country is always a worse trade partner than a rapidly developing one. It follows that the effect of trade upon the internal economic processes and through them upon the process of growth should always be taken into account.

Another point to be remembered is that credits and assistance connected with armament do not promote economic development since the weapons, munition and spare parts are almost invariably imported; furthermore, the exports themselves are mostly from abroad.

In the case of the developing countries, it must also be realized that 59 per cent of the population of the world, and 80 per cent of the children under the age of 10 live in these countries. (Provided the Chinese People's Republic is included among the developing countries.) If the remaining part of the world refuses to trade with them on economic terms which can help them in their economic growth, these countries lose all perspectives of development.

Rapid economic growth of these countries is required not only as a maker of humanistic and internationalist duty but also in our own best interest. The contradictions and the deepening gap between the so-called rich and poor peoples may lead to countless conflicts that might jeopardize world peace. Rapid economic growth may prevent such conflicts. This, however, requires a radical revision of earlier concepts of world trade and world economy. Everybody must understand that the world—speaking figuratively—has become smaller, the interdependence of peoples has grown, the world-economic impulses influencing the development of national economies have become more intensive. And this process has by far not come to an end!

Lasting well-being, prosperity and peaceful development cannot be secured for 40 per cent of the population of the world as long as the other 60 per cent live in misery, poverty and stagnation.

These are the considerations which substantiate our earlier statement: that the convocation of the World Conference on Trade and Development was not the result of incidental factors, or initiative taken by one or another state or group of states. It is the product of the recognition that the scientific and technical revolution requires a new mentality in world trade. The liquidation of the cold war and the victorious spreading of the idea of co-existence, in turn, promote the assertion of this new mentality.

This new mentality—which, naturally, has not yet been adopted by every state with all its consequences, since economic interests developed in the past decades still actively resist its acceptance—can be summed up in three principles:

1. We live in different social-economic systems and in three groups, each comprising large numbers of states—the advanced capitalist countries, the socialist states and the developing countries—but in our present world none of these groups is capable of developing, prospering and advancing without the intensive growth of trade and economic co-operation with states belonging to the other two groups. This means in other words that we emulate in the rapid development of our own social-economic system, but that the economic stagnation, relapse or collapse of our rivals is not in our interest.

2. The various social-economic systems represent different economic methods and mechanisms. Naturally, these economic mechanisms change from time to time and are improved to serve more effectively the given social-economic system.

From the existence of different economic mechanisms it follows that world economy and trade today require is not in the first place the adoption of universal and general principles. Certain general principles which demonstrate our intentions and goodwill without prescribing an order of actions can, naturally, be formulated. Most of these, incidentally, will be formulated in a negative form, i.e., stating what to refrain from. Universal rules, determining the order and mode of economic actions, however, cannot be adopted because the introduction of one and the same impulse into different economic mechanisms will lead to different results. The abolition of customs duty on the importation of foreign goods may be advantageous to an industrially advanced country but might turn out to be disastrous for a developing country.

It follows that world economy and trade must not be "left to themselves", but concrete objectives and tasks must be determined for each group of states, and the interested parties must be allowed to achieve them with the means and methods deriving from their own economic mechanism. *Common aims should be attained by different but co-ordinated methods.*

3. Compared with the past millennia, a basic change has taken place in world economy and trade. For many centuries, foreign trade was based on comparative advantage inherent in climatic and natural resources. Raw materials and foodstuffs were thus the principal commodities exchanged in world trade. History carries convincing proof that the comparative advantage inherent in climatic and natural resources can be acquired by war, conquest and other forms of military force. Hence, the countries having great natural riches but no adequate military forces to defend them have been many times conquered and re-conquered.

Economists with up-to-date minds, however, agree that today comparative advantage does not depend so much on the climatic and natural conditions of a country as on the technical standard achieved. This statement is borne out by structural shifts over the post-war years towards foreign trade in finished goods, by the increasing share of industrially advanced countries in total world trade and by the changes in the terms of trade. A similar shift can be detected also within the internal economy of the countries.

The change in the character of the comparative advantage will strongly affect international policy. Unlike the comparative advantage inherent in climatic and other natural conditions, advantages inherent in technical-scientific standards cannot be conquered, are liable to destruction in war, yet cannot be transferred to the conqueror.

On the strength of these considerations we venture to hope that economic interests, which were responsible for so many wars in the past, will in the future be a most effective means of co-operation, exchange of experience and knowledge. This general consideration holds true, although in respect of certain raw materials, such as oil, for instance, this is not yet the case. Situations, attitudes and power groups developed for many centuries will not change overnight.

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Some may argue that these questions were not raised, discussed or accentuated in the manner of this paper at the Conference. As we have said above, our purpose is not to describe in detail the proceedings of the Conference, the positions taken by participating delegations or the compromises made. Our aim was to discuss the tendencies arising from the present situation to explore perspectives for the future development of the world economy and world trade.

There is no doubt that the convocation, the proceedings and the recommendations of the Conference should be looked upon as a significant achievement. The Conference itself convincingly proves that the vast majority of mankind is beginning to learn how to co-exist. Successful international conferences, however, not only prove but also promote development. They shape the thinking of the exponents of international policies, and this is a very important factor. Further, they introduce the concrete actions by which the factors and phenomena recognized can be turned to the benefit of the future of mankind.

In conclusion I should like to quote some of the resolutions and decisions adopted by the Conference, in order to show how, despite considerable difficulties and some failures, the Conference has promoted the establishment of the atmosphere and the practice of co-existence in the economic field.

Significant resolutions and recommendations adopted declare:

(a) "There shall be no discrimination on the basis of differences in socio-economic systems."

(b) "Economic development and social progress should be the common concern of the whole international community and should by increasing economic prosperity and well-being help strengthen peaceful relations and co-operation among nations."

(c) "All countries should co-operate in creating conditions of international trade conducive to the export earnings of developing countries and in general to the promotion of an expansion and diversification of trade between all countries, whether at similar levels of development, at different levels of development, or having different economic and social systems."



(d) "The Conference has also adopted recommendations for active measures to promote market opportunities for primary commodity exports and for increase in consumption and imports in both developed and developing countries."

(e) "Each economically advanced country should endeavour to supply financial resources to the developing countries of a minimum amount approaching as nearly as possible to 1 per cent of its national income."

In the subsequent text the recommendations refer to the importance of middle and long-range bilateral agreements, stressing the significance of the countries having planned economies in the development and expansion of the trade relations of the developing countries.

An important recommendation of the Conference suggests the establishment of a universal and authoritative organization which would permanently deal with the problems of international trade. The Conference on Trade and Development elects a permanent Executive Committee the staff of which will truly reflect the present power relations in the world. The Executive Committee appoints permanent Sub-committees for the chief groups of commodities and trade functions. The task of the Executive Committee and of the Sub-committees is to plan concrete actions and take measures effectively promoting the development of international trade.

The principles, resolutions and recommendations adopted by the international conference show that, by dealing with the problems of development and trade, it has opened a new chapter in the history of international economic relations. Notwithstanding the many unproductive debates and other difficulties concomitant to such conferences, the achievements of this one have given convincing proof that the participant states wish to liquidate the heritage of the cold war in trade policy and that a wide economic co-operation can be achieved in the spirit of co-existence.

The new era of international economic co-operation must be based on new principles evolved from the political and economic potentialities of our age:

(a) Countries having different social systems develop more rapidly if they establish wide economic relations with countries having another social system;

(b) world trade needs few general principles and many concrete common aims which can be attained by means of co-ordinated actions;

(c) in the contemporary world economy the comparative advantages are inherent in the technical-scientific level of the individual countries, whence the advantages cannot be conquered;

(d) the stormy growth of industrial productivity and the change in the structure of world trade require that the economically advanced countries should promote the development of the economically weaker countries.

By embracing, and complying with, these principles the world economy can and will become the most effective means of co-operation and progress of the peoples.

MOHIT SEN

there will be more science and THRAODLINNUNODILNUIILNUNUNNN

The great debate in the international Communist movement has reached its peak now. Certain organizational steps may or may not follow the world conference which is now being prepared. Some further charges and counter-charges may be brought forward by the protagonists on both sides. One hopes that there will be more science and sophistication in the inevitable further polemics. Yet one can legitimately doubt whether any new basic themes will emerge, following the eight comments by the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) by M. A. Suslov.

Rather than take recourse to a footnote, I would like to state at the outset that, of the enormous amount of literature that has been generated by the great debate, not much is likely to stand the passage of time and count as a contribution to the corpus of Marxist thought. We have the 1957 and 1960 Moscow Documents and the CPSU Programme as well as the Suslov Report. Then there is the Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and Khrushchev's *Problems of War and Socialism*, Togliatti's interview to *Nuovi Argomenti* in 1956 and his reports to the congresses of the Communist Party of Italy after 1956 would also stand. So would Mao's writings and speeches in 1956-57. On the other side, years hence one might possibly like to refer to *Long Live Leninism, Once More on the Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Ourselves* and the *Eighth Comment: Proletarian Revolution and Khrushchev's Revisionism*. The rest, while signifying something, is too full of sound and fury.

Taking a certain standpoint in such a crucial and clearcut debate is inevitable, especially if one happens also to be a Communist. Nor need it be an unscientific attitude. After all, any advance of any science has almost always been the result of intense controversy and the adoption of partial attitudes. Neutrality, often enough, has been an euphemism for a failure of intellectual nerve.

It is proposed in this article to attempt to explain the genesis of the present debate, then to go on to examine the nature of the split. We then proceed to discuss the basis of the tactical issues involved and finally we wish to put forward certain rather more fundamental considerations.

1. The Communist Party of China is quite right when it says that the first stage of the present controversy was inaugurated by the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Not only was there the sharp denigration of Stalin at this Congress but certain new ideas were advanced on the possibility of averting a world war. There emerged the new dimensions of peaceful co-existence and a fresh look at the newly independent countries, and at the possibilities of a peaceful transition to Socialism.

All this may have been known earlier to certain of the topflight leaders of the international Communist movement but it certainly came as a great shock to the overwhelming majority of Communists and commentators on Communism. It seems also to be a fact that the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union did not fully consult other Communist Parties before coming forward with a startlingly new evaluation of a very important period of the international Communist movement and its most outstanding personality and leader.

Following the 20th Congress, there was a great convulsion in every Communist Party. The Polish and Hungarian disturbances both reflected the new tensions and aggravated them. Since then, there has been a steadily mounting conflict in the international Communist movement.

We can demarcate stages: The struggle against the revisionist offensive till a point of stability was reached with the November 1957 Moscow meeting; the carrying forward of this offensive with a fair degree of unanimity, with the Yugoslav Programme as the main target, till the end of 1959; the start of the big dogmatic push by the Communist Party of China from the beginning of 1960 and the gradual realignment of Communist Parties; the rebuff to dogmatism in the November 1960 Moscow Conference but without an open break on either side; a vigorous offensive by the forces of creative Marxism since the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October, 1961, and the dogmatic counterattack, especially following the October, 1962, Caribbean crisis; the present position of showdown and confrontation, revealing a very clear majority for the creative Marxists but a powerful and determined minority for the dogmatists.

An interesting point to note in this connection is that the Communist Party of China in the first stage of the creative push was almost *en abstraito*. Mao Tse-tung's two articles on the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat and his famous speech on the contradictions among the people went far beyond the cautious, and even pragmatic, formulations of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. His only rivals in creative daring were Togliatti and the Yugoslav Communists.

While one can agree with the Communist Party of China that the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union sparked off the present controversy yet it had to come at some time. Fundamentally the inevitability was grounded in the new social reality and the new balance of forces on a world scale after the consolidation of the socialist camp and its possession of atomic armaments. Tactical adjustment and even a new strategic line had to be worked out. In the process sharp polemics and a certain degree of disarray could scarcely be avoided. But there are other reasons for affirming this inevitability.

These can be traced back to an earlier great divide in the Socialist movement—Lenin's break from social democracy following the First World War, which culminated in the setting up of the Third (Communist) International in 1919. Since that break, the first essential task of the Communist movement has been that of establishing its identity. Simultaneously, of course, there was the problem of becoming an effective mass force in the different nations of the world.

In the course of carrying out this essential task, while also paying attention to the problem of mass influence, it was, above all, necessary to combat the ideology and outlook of social democratic reformism, or right opportunism, to use the Leninist terminology. Only secondary importance could attach, and was attached, to the problem of sectarianism—the sect, or the movement, had itself to be first established. Apart from the Soviet Union, China, Germany and France till the middle 1930's mass Communist Parties hardly existed.

By about 1935, however, following the Fascist offensive, the transition from an establishing of identity to mass actions and influence on a global scale commenced. The need for broad unity to contain and finish the Fascist menace required a sharp turn in the policies and outlook of the international Communist movement. At the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International in 1935 the international leadership signalled the turn. Dimitroff's report on the United Front Against Fascism and Wang Ming's report on the anti-colonial revolution at that juncture, gave a new orientation and concentrated the fire against sectarianism and "Leftism". It is significant that time and again these two main reports referred back not to Lenin's great historical break with Social Democracy but to his last great theoretical work "*Leftwing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder*". Time and again these two reports emphasized the dual duty of the Communists of building mass Communist Parties and of simultaneously building unity with other anti-fascist and anti-imperialist mass forces.

This new orientation was implemented in the course of the anti-fascist war and, above all, by the Communist Party of China through the theory and leadership of Mao Tse-tung. This led to a swift growth of Communist Parties in major regions of the world and to the emergence of the world Communist movement

as one of the major shaping influences of world politics. The further development and sophistication of this new orientation was an essential task of Marxist theoreticians and leaders in the post-war period. However, a deeply sectarian analysis and line of action was imposed on the movement by Stalin acting through the Communist Information Bureau established in 1947. His last major theoretical pronouncement—*Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* and the speech at the 19th Congress of the CPSU in 1952, clearly bear the impress of dogmatism and sectarianism.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU and the subsequent efforts signified, above all, the continuation, development and sophistication of the new orientation that was already a reality in 1952. It was a new initiative to carry on the tasks of transition from establishing Communist party identity to becoming a mass force, acting in unity with other mass forces, for the accomplishment of radical social changes on a world scale.

II. The nature of the present schism should be discussed against this background. Power considerations certainly do play a part, especially as far as China is concerned. There is an element in the attitude of the Communist Party of China which can only be called chauvinism. Even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that both India and China have an equal share of blame with regard to the border war between the two countries, the form and manner in which China presses her claims and the enormous importance she attaches to considerations of national prestige (one has only to recall her negative approach to the proposals of the Colombo Powers), are evidence enough of a deviation from the norms of socialist behaviour. To this one has to add the very odd state of affairs along the Sino-Soviet border. Surely as between two socialist countries the principle of maintaining the *status quo* with regard to borders is the only rational policy. Arguments from feudal maps and "graves of ancestors" are particularly out of place in this connection.

Yet it would not be adequate to depict the conflict as mainly provoked by Chinese chauvinism. Would regional position, perhaps, give us a clue? Some sort of Asian or Afro-Asian feeling might have prompted the Communist Party of China to behave as it does, as a reflection and an accentuation of its separate identity and role in the world Communist movement. But this again is not an adequate explanation because the height of China's impact on the Afro-Asian world was at the time of Bandung in 1955 and later when her economic achievements astounded this vast segment of humanity. The stress on regional exclusiveness came simultaneously with the conflict with India, the aggressive espousal of the cause of the overseas Chinese in Indonesia and the ill-concealed hostility towards Nasser's Arab nationalism. It came also at a time when economic achievement had turned into its opposite, when, as Edgar Snow has told us in *The Other Side of the River*—national income actually fell for three years following the "great leap" policies. China's impact on Afro-Asia is still considerable but it has not fulfilled the promise of the early 1950's.

Underdevelopment and isolation are more in the nature of necessary conditions than of sufficient causes. After all, China was more underdeveloped and no less isolated in 1956-57—when she was *avant-garde* in the matter of creative Marxism—than in 1960. And by her present policies and attitudes she is scarcely contributing to her development or to the breaking of her isolation, both factors which the leadership of the Communist Party of China has shown itself fully aware of in the recent period, as the African tours of Chou En-lai and the overtures to British, French and West German businessmen demonstrate. Nor is the appeal of the policies of the Communist Party of China only to the Communist parties in underdeveloped countries. The Japanese Communist Party is not operating in an underdeveloped country nor the Grippa group in Belgium or the "anti-revisionist" groups in Britain, France or Italy. Conversely, the Communist parties of India, Ceylon, Iraq, Chile, Mexico and so on are neither the product of, nor are they operating in, conditions of affluence.

We have to seek for objective factors. The petty-bourgeois environment in China, the newness of the industrial working class there, certainly help to build strong pressures in the direction of the frenzy of "left" adventurism and sectarianism. The industrialization of the Soviet Union and the maturity of its working class were undoubtedly indispensable to the kind of changes in policy and attitude that have been registered there in the recent decade.

Yet in any discussion of this nature one should remember Engels' remarks about the relative independence of ideological factors. After all, the laws of history operate through accidents in the broad perspective of history. The present debate in the Communist movement is an accident, though not without its causes. It is essential, therefore, to look for the ideological factors in an ideological dispute, to remember certain historical experiences through which the Chinese revolutions passed and which created the ideological atmosphere for the present approach.

In the late 1930's and nearly 1940's Mao Tse-tung initiated an ideological drive against dogmatism in the Communist Party of China. The essence of this campaign was to end the method of argument by analogy and by reference to the Soviet stereotype, which had bedevilled the leadership of the Communist Party of China from its foundation till the historic Tsunyi Conference of 1935. It was this drive which made possible the acceptance by the Communist Party of China, as a whole, of the creative development of Marxism that Mao was introducing. The very success of the drive and of the Communist Party of China subsequent to the acceptance of Mao's ideas, led to the opposite error. There developed an attitude of stressing the singularity of China and of the Communist Party of China, thus overlooking certain common features of socialist revolution and construction. Instead of looking at China's problems with the help of Marxism, a transition was made to looking at the problems of the development of Marxism from the Chinese standpoint.

On the other hand, a Chinese stereotype was developed which was sought to be universalized. The specific conditions of China and the particular historical moment of the Chinese Revolution were overlooked in the process. It is easy enough to become dogmatic about other people's dogmatism, especially when success comes with the first application of what was a new truth. The particular nature of Mao's struggle against dogmatism could lead to exaggerations of the significance of the experience of the Chinese revolution. This twist was clearly evident in the long summation article that Liu Shao-chi wrote on the tenth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China for the *World Marxist Review*.

The second ideological or experiential factor was the nature of the Chinese Revolution. Stalin was not sufficiently accurate and comprehensive when he said that its characteristic feature was that armed revolution was opposing counter-revolution—a formulation enthusiastically quoted by Mao Tse-tung and other leading Chinese theoreticians. The specific form of the Chinese revolution was a peasants' war led by Marxists which transformed itself into liberation of the whole country by an army from the base in the north. It was not the spontaneous upheaval of the people throughout China which culminated in October 3, 1949, but the victory of the liberation army. It was more *chieftung* (liberation) rather than *kunming* (revolution). This was important in giving a military impress on the thinking of the Chinese Marxists and of inculcating an attitude of War Communism, familiar enough to students of Soviet history prior to the NEP of Lenin.

A carry-over of this approach when tackling questions of socialist construction, strikingly evident in the Great Leap and the People's Communes experiments, was an instance of misplaced concreteness. It easily enough led to the overlooking of spontaneous, objective and internal factors of a popular revolution in countries where the building up and advance of an indigenous liberation army could not be the main form of revolutionary struggle. Voluntarist excesses, over-reliance on the ideological strength of a trained corps and the "padding on" of revolutions from without, could easily become the hallmark of the thinking of Chinese Marxists should they allow their own successful revolutionary experience to overwhelm them.

These ideological experiences fitted in with the more elemental pressures of the petty-proprietor and small-scale producer environment of China to give us the powerful current of distorted Marxist thinking, which is the root cause and character of the present split. In essence, it is a current against the development of spontaneous, autonomous revolutions in different countries of the world and of replacing certain fundamental regularities of social revolution by the specific regularities of the Chinese revolution at a certain time in history, which is irreversibly over.

III. The actual differences assume the shape of tactical issues, of matters of policy and, to an extent, of the evaluation of the past.

In the evaluation of Stalin, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has presented an impressive array of facts which go to show that for some 17 years or so there was arbitrary rule of the most extraordinary kind in the Soviet Union. Explanations are offered in terms of Stalin's erroneous theory that, as socialism advances the class struggle sharpens; of the intense provocation from the capitalist encirclement and the tensions of rapid socialist industrialization, together with the personality of the leader. The Soviet explanations are far from satisfactory.

The Communist Party of China, however, does not attempt to explain the phenomenon so much as to deny its existence or, at best, to admit that there were some "excesses" and a few theoretical mistakes. Stalin's merits outweigh his faults. This is an extraordinarily lighthearted approach to most serious practical and moral issues. The Chinese party does not face the issue whether or not thousands upon thousands of honest and true Communists were unjustly killed, defamed or otherwise ruined, and often their families as well. It further avoids facing the issue of whether this is the inevitable path of "voices raised in anger", to use Brecht's phrase, to push a backward country to the level of modern socialism. Must "history hustle its horses" in this way, inevitably?

It would appear that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union overlooks the successes of the policy of Stalin: the achievement of industrialization targets and the defeat of fascism. It was after all the success of the Soviet Union during the Stalin era which led Communists within and outside the Soviet Union to feel that Stalin of the party were infallible and all that they did must inevitably be right. To point only to Stalin's failures cannot explain the personality cult.

Further, the responsibility for the crimes of Stalin was that of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as a whole, especially of its Central Committee. It would not be correct to replace the cult of the personality by the cult of the party. The party as a whole can make the most serious mistakes—this is evident enough to those Communists who have the living experience of movements which have not only not succeeded but frequently failed utterly. Here, the requirements of a critical, scientific approach and of adequate scope for expression of dissent and ways of reaching the entire party with opinions at variance with the current policies, becomes of paramount importance. It would seem that this method of consultations on major economic and technical issues has become the usual practice now in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with frequent Central Committee meetings and regular party congresses. This has yet to extend to political issues and to themes of Marxist-Leninist theory, passionate debates over which were so marked a feature of the days of Lenin—days of far graver difficulty and instability than exists at present.

Thirdly, there is the problem of institutional guarantees. One wonders whether there can ever be institutional guarantees when the terribly swift, unsettled and unsettling movements take place. Historical experience has demonstrated the futility of institutions once wrong approaches and attitudes are adopted. Yet, there is value in institutions as the embodiment and guarantee of a long-term shift and social achievement. In the Soviet Union many such institutions did in fact exist—the Soviets, the mass organizations and the like, to which the Webbs drew our attention. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that there was a certain degeneration of these institutions. The task seems to have been taken in hand of reviving these specifically socialist and Soviet institutions of democratic expression and control—we come back again to the question of ideological attitude.

Fourthly, the social roots of the phenomenon of arbitrary rule are to be sought not only in the vast peasant environment of "rural idiosyncrasy" to use a phrase of Marx, but also in the incomplete evolution of the working class with its lack of democratic traditions and consciousness. The leap from Tsarist autocracy to socialist democracy without a period of struggle for civil rights within a liberal bourgeois democracy was a stupendous achievement and without it much of modern history would have been very dark indeed. It is impossible to over-estimate the impetus that socialism received from this great historical initiative. Yet the strain involved and the insufficient elements of a self-generating working class opened the possibility of revolutionary substitution, which is the essence of Stalin's methodology.

Far more important, however, than the assessment of Stalin is the evaluation of the present epoch. The difference in this assessment lies at root of the differences over peaceful co-existence, war and peace, peaceful transition to socialism and the new perspectives of development for the newly independent states. It is on the question of the epoch that the world Communist movement is sharply divided into a creative majority and a dogmatic minority.

All Communist Parties including the Communist Party of China, are agreed that, on a world scale, the struggle today hinges on the interaction and conflict between the imperialist and anti-imperialist forces. That is why Lenin called this epoch, in which he lived, the epoch of imperialism and the proletarian revolution. The Communist Party of China insists that since the two determining opposites remain in existence today the world tactical line mapped out by Lenin retains its full validity.

Hence, the opposition by the Communist Party of China to any "revision" of Lenin in the matter of the inevitability of world war as long as imperialism exists, and the depiction of peaceful co-existence as a "bloodless" war and armed truce, the inevitability of civil war as a form of transition to socialism, the impossibility of national advance for ex-colonial countries unless the working class is at the head of the nation and of the state. And so on.

The creative majority of the world Communist movement agrees that the conflict continues to be one between imperialist and anti-imperialist forces. In this sense—but in this sense only—nothing has changed since Lenin wrote in the period prior to his death in 1924. But it further believes that a radical change has taken place in the relative positions of imperialism and socialism and that this necessitates a re-examination of many aspects of the tactical line propounded by Lenin some 40 years ago. The very success of that tactical line has rendered it obsolete in many important particulars.

The inevitability of world war, of the civil war form of revolution, of the armed truce nature of peaceful co-existence, of the impossibility of independent national development of the ex-colonial countries except under working class leadership—all this hinges upon the assumption, correct till quite recently, that imperialism was more powerful than its opponents. Today, however, the balance of forces has shifted and it is now the world socialist system and the other anti-imperialist forces that determine the main trend of world developments. Hence, a new approach can and should be made to all these strategic and tactical problems.

Indeed, it is difficult to understand how the Communist Party of China can deny the qualitative transformation in the balance of world class forces since 1916. The socialist camp and the breakdown of the colonial system represent a decisive weakening of imperialism, which retains its predatory character but not its previous preponderant strength. It is not the change in the character of imperialism but in the restrictions of its operations that give our times the character of a new epoch. In this new epoch new developments of theory are essential to cope with new possibilities.

It has to be underlined that the fresh understanding and definition of the new epoch, given pride of place in the Moscow Statement of 1966, is nowhere quoted in the voluminous material put out by the Communist Party of China, which is replete with all manner of quotations from every conceivable document. In *Long Live Leninism* and in the article directed against Togliatti, however, quite a different definition of the present epoch is given which differs hardly at all from the one made by Lenin some 40 years ago. This then is the heart of the present Communist controversy.

One other fundamental point has to be made before closing this section. There is a sharp difference between the majority and the minority in the world Communist movement on the necessity of averting a thermo-nuclear war. Certainly, the Communist Party of China desires peace and works for it, albeit in strange and desperate ways, but its leadership is disinclined to give the maintenance of world peace the first priority (here again the relevant formulations of the Moscow documents of 1957 and 1960 are never cited) and fails correctly to grasp the magnitude of catastrophe and disaster should there be a thermo-nuclear war.

The Communist Party of China has never denied that Mao Tse-tung told Jawaharlal Nehru that in a thermo-nuclear war roughly half of humanity would be wiped out but that this need not particularly depress anybody, since imperialism would also be destroyed and the remaining half of humanity could go on to build a classless and glorious civilization. He added that he disagreed with Nehru's pessimism on this point! Since these remarks were repeated by Mao at the 1957 Moscow Conference and have not been repudiated since, they evidently represent a considered approach to the vital problem of human survival when confronted by the thermo-nuclear challenge.

The newness of the times in which we live are, therefore, not only a question of the change in the relative positions of the imperialist and the anti-imperialist forces but equally in the new dimensions of destruction that would be the inevitable consequence of a thermo-nuclear war. This only emphasizes the necessity of seeing the importance of the pursuit of the international class struggle through the form of peaceful co-existence and peaceful competition simultaneously with the spontaneous, self-generated emergence of indigenous revolutions. Any "pushing on" of revolutions, as also any export of counter-revolution from without becomes an exercise not only in futility but in cataclysm. One wonders what the fate of humanity would have been if not Khrushchev and Kennedy had confronted each other at the height of the Caribbean crisis in October, 1962, but Mao Tse-tung and Senator Barry Goldwater.

IV. In its scale and vigour the present Communist controversy is the biggest of its kind in history, dwarfing even the schisms in Christianity, Islam, Buddhism or in the socialist movement at the time of the rupture with Social Democracy. Unlike those previous splits, except the last, the present debate is not so much the reflection of the clash of conflicting material interests but rather more "purely" ideological. It is more akin to the kind of passions generated at the time of any significant breakdown or breakthrough in any coherent systematization of a series of errors or findings in one of the natural sciences. The passions here are greater and the stakes more immediately important and relevant to the fate of humanity, but its essential character is the same. The conflicting viewpoints, however much buttressed on both sides by quotations from the texts of the founders of the system, make their ultimate appeal to social practice and human reason. This at once qualitatively demarcates it from the purely ideological or semantic disputes of many of the great controversies of the past. We have before us a *modern* controversy, familiar enough to anybody who has reflected on the nature and manner of scientific advance in our times.

At the same time one has to note its specific character. It is true that the Communist Party of China denounces its ideological opponents as having not only deviated from Marxism but having abandoned it altogether. It goes further and claims that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the other ruling Communist Parties from which it differs, have set about destroying their socialist system and that, in the Soviet Union in particular, there has been a regular "deluge of capitalist restoration." The warning is given that the Soviet Union and the other "revisionist" socialist states would end up in the way Tito's Yugoslavia allegedly has, i.e., as a "fascist satellite of United States imperialism."

In Comment No. Three, devoted to presenting its analysis of the Yugoslav social system, the theoreticians of the Communist Party of China have come to the conclusion that while a peaceful transition to socialism is not feasible, the peaceful restoration of capitalism has been proved possible. But, as yet, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the other Communist Parties of the creative majority have not linked up the dogmatic errors of the Communist Party of China either with any change in the fundamental socialist nature of the Chinese system, or the basically Marxist character of the Communist Party of China. This is a sharp break from the previous practice and is of the utmost consequence.

In the previous ideological controversy with Trotsky and his followers and in the post-war conflict with Tito, the gravamen of the charges on both sides was that the opponent had betrayed the cause of socialism and abandoned Marxism. The opponent was not within the movement but an enemy outside it.

It is a strange quirk of history that it was Mao Tse-tung who, after Lenin, abandoned this attitude with the reformulation of what Lenin had called non-antagonistic contradictions, i.e., which do not require breakup or explosion even when the conflict is involved. For more than two decades this was the approach adopted in inner-Party conflicts in China, an approach which Mao sharply underlined, in his famous speech on contradictions among the people in February, 1957. It is significant that the large scale experiences and directives, including Central Committee and Polit Bureau members, during the anti-right campaign in late 1957-58 were the first in the history of the Communist Party of China since the Tsunyi Conference of 1935, where Mao established his leadership. At the same time, the CPSU leadership while downgrading Stalin—rather ineptly and unscientifically as we have seen—insisted that he had been a great Marxist, that he had defended Lenin's cause and had remained a staunch fighter for the proletarian cause till the very end. Evidently, the non-antagonistic contradiction concept had caught on.

#### CO-EXISTENCE

This attitude, one strongly feels, is the correct and appropriate one, not chiefly because of the undoubted tactical advantages inherent in it, but because it is in keeping with the ideological and scientific nature of the dispute. There are numerous instances of confusion and acrimony in the controversies of significance among natural scientists, and the result is not always a compromise and synthesis but the clear victory of one of the disputants. Yet, all are and remain scientists and even the errors go to make up the corpus of science. Toleration of error is intellectual immorality, yet if the limits of the error are within the limits of the universe of discourse, i.e., reason and experiment, the consequence should not be excommunication. It seems likely that this approach will be adhered to by the creative majority of Communist Parties, though it is also likely that the Communist Party of China might well lead itself and the dogmatic minority outside the common movement.

There are parallels in the entry of the Socialist movement. The present writer would be the last to underestimate the historic necessity and immense benefit of the break that Marx and Engels made from Utopian socialism or the rupture from social-democracy that Lenin accomplished. Both these steps were dictated by the inherent exigencies of socialist advance in thought and action. Yet the great Utopian socialists—Saint-Simon, Fourier and Owen—are part of the socialist heritage. So are social-democrats like Plekhanov, Bebel, the Leibknechts, Rosa Luxemburg and the earlier Kautsky. In this connection, the warm praise of Engels for the utopian socialists and Lenin's advice to the younger generation to read Plekhanov and the early Kautsky may be recalled. It was part of the sectarian attitude of Stalin that such an approach was abandoned.

At the same time, one has to remember that there is such a thing as ideological and scientific advance, that one cannot fail to have judgment that there can be no tradition without development. It would be stupid and anti-scientific to overlook the contribution to Marxist and socialist thought that the leadership of the Communist Party of China especially Mao Tse-tung have made. Specifically, it was a creative development of Lenin's special contribution—the working out of the strategy and tactics of the anti-colonial democratic revolution under Marxist leadership. This will always remain a part of the heritage and corpus of Marxist and socialist thought. Yet, if the present erroneous line is persisted in when the evidence against it steadily accumulates and becomes overwhelming, then certainly the followers of the present line of the leadership of the Communist Party of China will end up in a blind alley, away from the main road of scientific development. Non-antagonistic contradiction will transform itself into an antagonistic one at the level of Marxist thought and action.

The present co-existence of different types of Communism is unstable and temporary. It will give way to a higher level of scientific understanding of the world as well as of the way to change it. The change of science is the only absolute that lasts since it is never still and always transforming itself.

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GYULA EDRS1

Leaving aside the forerunners of comparative law, we may date the first significant period to coincide with the Napoleonic wars. When the law of the newly established bourgeois regimes stood opposed to the law of feudalism. The influence of French law could be discovered even in the Russian *Svod Zakonov*, though in other respects Tsarist Russia was sealed off from any of the new bourgeois conceptions. In Germany, however, the *Tribunal Savigny* polemic demonstrated the prohibitive effect of the efforts aiming at the consolidation of the feudal bases of state-structure and particularism. Historical Legal School gained a victory for conservatism through the glorification of old Germanic law, taking advantage of the nationalist wave following the Napoleonic wars. Both the Romanists and the Germanists agreed in looking into their past instead of their present. The broad interest in comparative law died down, its real time had not yet come.

The decisive change occurred in the last third of the nineteenth century when capitalism attained its modern stage of development. A world economy came into being and the exports of goods and of capital by the great powers attained massive proportions. This imparted a new impulse to the study of private international law, made the study of foreign laws indispensable and the "export" of internal law desirable. Moreover it created illusions as to the possibility of constructing a "world-law" which would extend internal law to a world scale. In Germany this change was manifested in an interesting way by the fact that *Thiering's* critical remark that by the enactment of the French Code Civil "universal European civil law narrowed down to a restricted provincial civil law" no longer reflected the spirit of *Savigny*, nor did it serve the purposes of retrospective German separatism; on the contrary, it was aimed at harmonization and at an approach to future developments. The Code Civil appeared no longer as a law tending to general validity and endangering the "purity" of the German way of development of law but as a manifestation of separation contrasted with universal legal development, universality meaning in the first place that of the *Pandectas*, that is, of "*Usus Modernus*", as produced by German jurisprudence. Having attained national unity Germany stepped out of economic isolation and used even the "export" of law as a weapon of economic power politics. Until, in fact, brute force and racial myth was made the only means of politics, German law had been regarded by significant tendencies in German jurisprudence as an important member of the family of European laws. Thereafter Germany departed again from the co-operation of international law and was lost in the exclusive admiration and tendentious interpretation of German feudal and pre-feudal law (which, in fact, has been very similar to feudal and pre-feudal laws of other countries) breaking into abuses against the legal systems of the "decadent liberalism". Following the the First World War—as a consequence of the development of world trade—even Great Britain found splendid isolation to be too restrictive: her lawyers appeared on the forum of comparative law.

The third great upswing of comparative law followed World War II. Essentially, there were three changes in the traditional domain of comparative law:

(a) The United States appeared on the scene of the Western world as a victor of the war and with overwhelming superiority as the financier of post-war reconstruction.

(b) The second great "victor" of the war, the German Federal Republic buried the hatchet and rejoined the family in order to achieve its economic and power political goals within the Western alliance. Thus, it turned again from the ancient German law towards contemporary Western laws.

(c) Powerful bourgeois international organizations were created for which comparative law became absolutely indispensable.

The main point of the changes occurring after World War II is, however, not to be found here. The decisive change consisted in the transformation of the structure of the world economy: while previously comparative law with its solidarity complex and heated debates had been an internal affair of the West, now the world widened out. By the side of the Western world emerged the Socialist world. A new theme and partner appeared in the field of comparative law: the socialist law and lawyer. At the same time the world of the former colonies became more estranged from the Western world. Thereby a number of new problems arose. The effects of the appearance of socialist law will be dealt with later. First, I shall treat the causes of the upswing of comparative law in general.

This very summary and necessarily incomplete outline of development shows fairly clearly that the causes of the upswing in comparative law are primarily socio-economic in nature. While the development of markets within the bourgeois nations brought about national laws, the evolution of the world economy necessarily led to the development of comparative law. Further, as an expanding world economy depends on the application of non-warlike methods, comparative law can exert a beneficial influence on the consolidation of peace.

In the circumstances it is self evident that comparative law in judicial practice centres on the area of international economic relations that is, of commercial law, law of exchange and certain fields of private law, such as taxation and—as a result of the achievements attained to various extent by the labour movement—also labour law. This is indirectly proved by *Limpert* who pointed out that the order of sequence both in the development of national laws and in efforts at international unification has been both in Europe and in America as follows: 1) law of exchange, 2) commercial law, 3) law of contracts, 4) other parts of private law. *Limpert* further pointed out that the number of endeavours at unification in commercial law was 150, in private law 84, and in labour law 71, whereas in criminal law a mere 37, and in administrative law only 10. As a result of the increase of the number of various international and "super-national" organizations largely attributable to economic factors, in particular to the development of the means of production often outgrowing the possibilities given in certain countries, comparative law made great headway even in the field of administrative law.

Good intention, enthusiasm and expertise have played an important part, but ultimately it has been the formidable development of productive forces which brought the world economy into life. It was put wisely by *Gravson* that "*un réalité ce n'est pas le droit que l'on unifie mais un certain nombre de fonctions, de buts et de politiques, et que le droit joue en tant que science secondaire et auxiliaire, un rôle essentiel et indispensable en donnant effet, aux politiques dont l'unification a été décidée*". To this it might be asked that law is secondary not only in this sense but also in that it is ultimately the product of socio-economic relations maintained by social efforts. It is product and, at the same time, also creator: while it has been brought about by the laws of socio-economic development it is partly through law that these tendencies of socio-economic development are realized.

II.

As long as comparative law was practised in the Western world only, the situation was relatively simple.

The possibility of comparison arises only where phenomena to be compared are variants which can be subsumed—from a certain point of view—under a common primary category. They have, at the same time, both common and different characteristics. In the Western world this common primary category is the law of private property showing, in the beginning, the same basic principles, that is, the principle of in substance unrestricted private property, freedom of contract and formal equality before the law. These laws represent the same type of law: this identity plays an important part in their primary problems.

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At the same time a great variety of legal solutions developed on the basis of this extensive identity of primary principles. Their historic causes are manifold; certain national characteristics and legal traditions have played their part. First of all, however, the role of those class relations which engendered the modern Western systems of law was decisive. The law followed in the wake of the bourgeois revolution yet preceded the full accomplishment of the development of the bourgeois class; the old feudal class was still able to work to a certain extent its way into the capitalist forms of production. This led to the development of a legal system conserving certain elements of content which had originated in pre-capitalist times; for example, the system of landed property, the conservation of certain exemptions and privileges and—as it has often been pointed out—the priority given to status over contracts. In some respects legal methods and techniques applied before the entry of capitalism on the scene were preserved, such as judge made law rooted in particularism, the avoidance of any comprehensive legal concept, such as the recognition in general of tort-liability as a consequence of the conservation of the writ system "governing as from the grave" (*Maitland*). Here I refer to common law. On the other hand, the total victory of the bourgeois revolution brought about the originally consistent, relatively simple and clear law of the bourgeois class having as its motto *enrichissez vous* and opposing the law of the old regime to such an extent that it saw even in the recognition of the notion of legal person a danger of restoration; I refer here to the *Code Civil*. In some countries the bourgeois transformation was slowed down by feudal forces which hindered the development of productive forces. This is reflected in *Austrian* and *German* law or in pre-revolutionary *Russian* law. These had been constituted by political regimes characterized by a feudal economic base which became obsolete, while the bourgeois class was not strong enough to overthrow them; on the other hand the fact that not only the bourgeois class but also the working class became a powerful political factor, made an agreement between the Junkers and capitalists imperative. Within these laws ideas of bourgeois inspiration—having their origin in natural law—are intermingled with rules conserving feudal remnants, such as landed property, entail or the *Einführungsgesetz* of the BGB termed by *Wissac* as "Privatfürstenrecht". It seems as if the regulation of land law, on the one hand, and that of the law of contracts on the other, had taken place in different periods. Finally, there is the case of law made in the time of the development of modern capitalism in a country that has never been burdened with considerable feudal remnants: the *Swiss* private law which by reflecting the common principles of all the bourgeois types of law complies also with the special requirements of the period of modern capitalism, such as the discretion of the Court, claims of general character, an important part played by modern equity.

If we take into account a number of other variants such as the solutions, in many respects original, adopted by Scandinavian laws—it can be proved that the great intensity of common characteristics is completed by a wide range of variants: this domain provides great possibilities for comparative law.

As has been mentioned, the development of a world economy and of modern productive forces led to some levelling off among Western laws. Great parts of the feudal remnants surviving in some of these countries have been slowly eliminated. The original great principles of bourgeois development have been more esteemed than applied since the development of productive forces have outgrown the framework of private property. The requirement of state intervention, state-economic activity and some degree of planning, to a considerable extent have modified the assertion of the unlimited character of private property and contractual freedom. An interesting process of levelling off has taken place in the method of the development of law, as well. Judge made law has been unable to keep abreast with the requirements of rapid development. There has been pressure for radical changes: thus statutory law has obtained an ever increasing importance. At the same time, the great codes have become obsolete in the countries of the great codes—by using the slogan "loyalty to the codes" or propagated by the *Freirechtsschule* and similar other theoretical conceptions, or, on the contrary—a new type of judge made law emerged timidly on the basis of the old codes, slowly transforming these codes, and adjusting them to the requirements of our age. This process has only been promoted by the fact that the law of the United States, as a power taking the lead of the Western world, is also to a great extent a judge made law. Yet there is fundamentally no question of an adaptation of the law of the stronger acting under pressure; partly the pace of development and partly the ever growing antagonism between the stage of development of productive forces on the one hand and the traditional system of private property on the other require a judicial watering down of the highly esteemed codes. Here we are facing a two-fold process.

Levelling off or "harmonization" takes place in legal practice, delivery conditions and even sometimes in legislative activity; this is being registered, commented and promoted or backed by comparative law. In the field of the impossibility of performance in Germany the theory of "Geschäftsgrundlage" and in England the concept of frustration have simultaneously developed. In the domain of faulty performance in Germany the theory of "Leistungsstörungen" and "Positive Vertragsverletzungen" led in its legal consequences to similar results as in France where judicial practice was based on "inexécution." The law of torts was invaded by the general concept of duty of care which lead to the almost general responsibility based upon negligence. This has in practice brought the law of torts near up to the general responsibility caused by injurious acts which has spread on the Continent and which made its way even in Germany in spite of the exhaustive enumeration in the B.G.B. of all the cases of unlawfully caused damages.

As for the comparatists, as mentioned above, the British and Americans have abandoned the splendid isolation of common law. According to *M. A. Milnes* for instance, English and Continental laws are approaching one another even independently of the developments of the Common Market simply in consequence of economic interdependence and cultural transfusion. The isolation of English law and lawyers is bound to decline. At the same time Germany has returned into the great family. Instead of the isolation of German law, the common Roman roots have been emphasized (*Koch*). There is talk of the possibility of getting rid of the conflicts and ambiguities by the creation of supranational legal concepts caused by legal concepts deemed to be necessary if seen solely from a national point of view (*Zweigert*). There is the idea that one must not see in the positive norms of national law the only possible solution (*Ferd*). From the sphere of common law *R. B. Schlesinger* speaks about the deprovincialization of minds whereas *Duyot*, a Frenchman, envisages the possibility created by comparative law to leave the somewhat narrow bounds of national laws. *Constantinesco* has written a book in French on breach of contract in the framework of the "Librairie Encycopédique" of Brussels, edited by the "Institute of European Law" of the University of the Saarland, detached from France and annexed to the German Federal Republic, which has been published in Stuttgart. The purpose of this book is, above all, to point out the similarities between the French, English and German solutions. The author comes to the conclusion that modern civil law is losing its historical elements step by step. *Tine*, while reviewing in a very ingenious and interesting way on the pages of the periodical "Revue trimestrielle de Droit civil" the French judicial practice on civil liability systematically draws a parallel between the French and American laws. One of the remarks of *Zweigert* is particularly characteristic of the above mentioned issue. This points to the necessity of softening the rigour of Continental codes by means of judge made law on the one hand, and of providing the judge made law with a new basis, namely that of comparative law, on the other: "Des lois aussi vieilles que celles du BGB peuvent être franchement



attendées dans leur teneur par une interprétation de droit comparé", writes the learned author in connection with a proposition to introduce into the German law, by judicial practice, "promissory estoppel" which in the practice of U.S. courts serves the purpose of escaping from some consequences of the consideration doctrine, although German law does not know that doctrine at all and consequently does not need to find a way out of it.

It may be unnecessary to continue this enumeration. It can be asserted that circumstances within the Western world are now very favourable to comparative law, because:

1. The commensurability of the legal systems serving as the bases of comparison is ensured by their belonging to the same type of law having common fundamental principles.

2. Comparison is made profitable in particular by the common operation of two factors, namely:

(a) the manners in which the above mentioned common principles are put into practice differ greatly from each other;

(b) the outgrowing of the framework of the given national economies by the productive forces together with some other phenomena of world economy call for a certain levelling off action and for "harmonization."

III.

What resemblances and differences would appear in this situation if comparative law compared laws of different types being in force in countries belonging to different socio-economic systems?

The demand on comparative law of this kind has conspicuously increased after World War II. Most of the Western international scientific organizations and educational institutes dealing with comparative law deal also with socialist laws. There are a number of such organizations in the boards of which also socialist lawyers are to be found, the raising and working out of the problems of comparative law has begun in the socialist countries as well.

The great part played by the socialist countries in the world economy requires the application of comparative law in the field of the law concerning economic life in the same way—if not to the same degree—as within the Western world, whereas the possibility of comparative law is assured by the fact that law concerning international relations—in particular in the field of contracts—in some respects necessitates equal or at least similar solutions. This is facilitated by the fact, that the civil laws in some of the socialist countries were, before the war, similar to the German, Austrian or French laws, the traces of which—in particular in minor details and some types of legal institutions—can even now be found. Moreover—as *Loeber* pointed out—a number of similar problems are raised by modern life in the countries having different social systems.

Thus there is a demand and common ground for a comparison between the laws of West and East. This common ground is corroborated by the objectives, policy and postulates of peaceful co-existence and peaceful economic competition—the recognition of the fact that an atomic war would be—understating the case—too radical a "solution" of the great problems of the world.

Nevertheless, it would not benefit the purposes of co-existence to leave difficulties unmentioned. Broadly speaking, these consist in the fact—to be dealt with in detail below—that the importance of differences concerning fundamental issues is greater than that of the similarities. Whereas the comparison of the laws of countries having similar social systems often shows important differences on common grounds, in comparing the laws of countries having different social systems, important similarities can be found on grounds of opposite character. The common ground of comparison is in the latter case more general and therefore less distinctive. No direct common ground—such as private property in the West and social property in the socialist countries—can be found here. Hence the *genus proximum* constituting the ground of an investigation into similarities and differences appears here only on the level of a generalized legal concept formulated in disregard of the differences of social structures which hardly has any non-formal elements. This leads—among others—to the confusion of identical denominations of essentially different notions. The colloquium on socialist property organized in Brussels by the Institut Solvay, Centre d'Etudes des Pays de l'Est may be mentioned as an instructive example of this.

These problems also engender the fact that different social systems, regardless of their own partial internal differences, have neatly diverse ideological concepts. It would be wrong to pretend that this fact did not exist. On the other hand, differences in ideological bases should not lead to a situation where "comparative law" would be merely some kind of monologue spoken by deaf persons, who do not hear one another in spite of raising their voices.

Difficulties arise from the fact that, as a result of the differences in the social systems and types of law, fundamental legal issues are dominated by differences instead of similarities, while ideological controversies raise further methodological problems. On the other hand, the possibility and necessity of a comparative activity concerning the laws of the two systems is ensured by the fairly identical level of productive forces, which brings about a situation to a certain extent similar in both systems—it creates special dangers of accidents, it leads to mass-production, etc.—and puts to a certain extent similar questions in both systems. Such a comparative activity is ensured by the world economy created by the development of productive forces, it is ensured by the great part played in world economy by socialist countries; by the interest aroused in the Western world by the successes of socialism; by similar legal solutions caused partly by historical legal traditions partly by the influence exerted on law by international relations and—last but not least—it is promoted by the postulate of peaceful co-existence. Consequently difficulties only encumber comparative law but do not make it impossible. Comparative law may promote:

- (a) Mutual knowledge and understanding of each other;
- (b) Merely the satisfaction of practical requirements of international trade.

IV.

One is often inclined to consider phenomena to which one is accustomed as being the natural and only possible way of the attainment of the purposes of the institutions in question, that is, to confuse specific and general phenomena. This is the case above all if this interpretation serves one's own interests which need not at all become conscious. It is well known, for instance, that bourgeois revolution took a stand for "man" whereas the demands of "man" were conceived as those of the bourgeoisie forging ahead through fighting against feudalism.

It is of primary importance from the cognitive point of view of comparative law that for many Western lawyers law is equalized with the bourgeois concept of law. Socialist lawyers, however, are free from this misconception, owing partly to the Marxist historical view recognizing as many types of law as social systems exist, partly to the fact that whereas socialism, for anybody living in a bourgeois society, appears as an abstraction never experienced, social systems preceding socialism are for those living in socialist countries either experienced realities or historical past.

Now, the deceptive identification which raises the special phenomenon to the level of the general phenomenon, according to which the law of bourgeois type is equal to law in general, leads to two conclusions which though they can also be found simultaneously by and large are characteristic of two historical eras. These two possible conclusions are:

- 1. Socialist "law" is not law.
- 2. Socialist law is essentially the same kind of law as bourgeois law.

The first conclusion is a product of blind anti-Communism, while the second one—at least as to some of its important varieties—is a well-intentioned error promoted by the striving for peaceful co-existence.

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1. According to *Loeber*, Western lawyers in general analyze socialist law in a descriptive and dogmatic way, while socialist lawyers deal with Western legal systems on an ideological basis. In my view, however, this statement is to be rendered more accurate: here the purpose and the level of comparison have got mixed up. The purely descriptive and dogmatic treatment has to satisfy the practical requirements of world economy and the positivist attitude of Western lawyers has, indeed, led to the fact that comparisons of such kind occur more often in the West than in the socialist countries; *Kuapp's* criticism concerning this method<sup>1</sup> has been accepted for the most part by socialist jurists. The other purpose and level of comparison goes to the roots of the different types of law by considering law as a product and a shaper of socio-economic relations and by examining it through its interaction with other socio-economic factors. *Loeber's* statement that this method is more applied by socialist jurists than by the Western ones could be interpreted as a praise of the followers of socialist legal theory.

But *Loeber* did not mean that. He spoke of "prejudices" and—citing from *Braun*—of the caricature of comparative law. In reality this is not what he called "ideological" comparison, but merely execration and name-calling. As to this "method", his reproach is unjustified. Not that in a past period the method of execration without any analysis had not been a fairly frequent practice in the socialist countries but—due to anti-Communism—this method played at best an equal part in the Western countries where its vigour at present—in consequence of cold-war propaganda—has even become more intensive than in most of the socialist countries.

At first, socialist law was suppressed, belittled or held in contempt by some lawyers in the West, while others even denied that the phenomenon could be at all considered as "law." This was followed by a false generalization which is even now current: one of the ideological *Litmotifs* of anti-Communism and cold war is the identification of socialist law with that of fascism through the introduction of the term "totalitarian." This propaganda disregards the fact that fascism is the most militant and ruthless product of the system of private property whereas socialism is based upon the social property of the means of production; that the political system of fascism has been everywhere organized by the forces of private property in the spirit of blind anti-Communism, that while fascism aimed at the subjugation of the world, socialism serves the cause of the progress of humanity. What is the point, for instance, of asserting in a scientific publication dealing with comparative law that by rendering the maintenance of children born out of wedlock to be a state-function, by releasing their mothers from the humiliation of ~~illegitimacy~~ cases and from financial difficulties, the Soviet Union has weakened the legal status of such children, abolished their equality of rights with those of legitimate children, introduced a policy similar to the demographic policy of fascism? It is well known that in the Soviet Union no traces of the fascist demographic policy can be found which took the field of the propagation of one race irrespective of any other aspect, and whose ultimate aim was the extermination or enslavement of all other races. Nor can any trace of encouraging the birth of illegitimate children be found in the Soviet Union. Moreover, it is well known that the legal rule in question concerns not only illegitimate children but also orphans brought up by single women.

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And what is the point of abandoning the style and logical structure applied in other parts of a paper otherwise of high standard of using in respect of the above mentioned issue expressions such as "satellites." The learned author himself mentions that the legal regulation in question has not been adopted by the other socialist countries. And what, one may ask, if they had adopted it? It is well known that great differences can be found between the different socialist laws whereas similarities originate in the social property of the means of production and the class structure in the same way as the similarities between Western laws derive from private property and class relations involved by it. Reference has been made to the harmonization now in progress between the American and other Western laws: prior to the above criticized remarks *Ferid* himself had used quite another style while dealing with the American observers at the Hague Conference proposing the adoption of the techniques of the American Uniform Laws. What would be his comment if someone used the term "satellitism" in this connection? No socialist country has hitherto adopted any Soviet code, but has Belgium become the satellite of France by the adoption of the Code Civil?

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No doubt, the remnants of such methods should be eliminated from the comparison between the laws of the two systems. Tunc is right in laying down that one has to try to "*corriger la caricature que nous nous faisons de l'autre*." That also constitutes a part of the liquidation of the remnants of cold war.

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2. The other error having common philosophical roots with the former one, but being seemingly of opposite character, consists essentially in denying the importance of the differences between the laws of the two social systems. The manifestations of this view have different political roots. Some say that socialism has created nothing new in the domain of law, but brought about some sort of cockney-bourgeois law—*Zivc* refers for instance, to a statement asserting that the legislation of recent years on criminal law in the Soviet Union is no more than the reception of the Dutch criminal law of the nineteenth century. Such views are fostered by a scorn of socialism based upon ignorance and prejudice: if these prejudices have not become inveterated they can be cleared up by means of information. According to another theory falling under this category, two originally different legal systems are converging. This view is engendered by good-will, by a sort of an abstract humanism and by a striving for co-existence, that is, by noble motives which, however, may result in illusions involving the danger of disappointment. That is why a discussion in the spirit of honest sincerity seems to be proper here.

Undoubtedly a number of similar problems arise in every social system. It is also beyond question that the solutions of these are to a degree similar. I believe, however, that beyond this degree no convergence is possible, the contradictions are too deep-seated.

I cannot agree, for instance, with *Loeber's* argumentations according to which there are "systembezogener" and "systemneutral" fields in the domain of comparative law. This view—in my opinion—can only be considered correct in the sense that some problems are more directly connected with the social systems serving as their bases than others. The field of civil liability where according to *Gutteridge*—particularly as a consequence of the steadily increasing motor traffic—problems arise everywhere in an identic way and being a relatively "systemneutral" field, is a good example of this. Here technical progress, traffic conditions and intense mass-cohabitation raise in both social systems the same problems of legal liability. Superficially also the trend of development is identical: the minimal conditions of the subsistence of the injured person are to be insured by means of general insurance and this is to be completed by civil liability for full damages. The Western solution is, however, characterized by the fact that the most frequent originators of damages, the enterprises, are relieved from any further risk by paying insurance premia, leaving thus all burden of sanctions—through a "turt fine" as proposed by *Ehrenzweig* or in another way—solely upon the individual if liability is not almost completely eliminated through liability insurance or by other means. According to the socialist solution, on the other hand, the overwhelming part of damages falls on the enterprises: the organs of social insurance and—as regards damages not covered by social insurance—the injured person may claim from the responsible enterprise reimbursement, ~~responsibility~~ damages. While the enterprise can shift only a small part of damages upon the employee, it has to bear the rest

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itself: it is not entitled to cover it by insurance. As a result of the state-ownership of enterprises, damages caused by enterprises burden for the most part the state; the rest discharges the profit-sharing of employees, that is they constitute a loss for the entire collective. This solution stimulates the state, the collectives of enterprises and the persons causing damages alike, to prevent the development of situations involving the danger of causing damages. Thus, beyond the common tendency of the two systems, in the case of the socialist solution, the enterprise—and through it the state and the collective of the enterprise—bears the best part of the burdens, whereas, according to typical Western solutions only the fixed amount of insurance premium burdens the enterprises. Can it be denied that this essential difference originates in the fact that socialist enterprises constitute state property while the Western ones—as a rule—are in private ownership, and thus thus the legal institution of responsibility for damages together with the distribution of the risk of damages involved thereby is "systembezogen"?

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Identities and differences are caused by the fact that productive forces being on fairly equal level are employed within different social relations. The problems raised by the present level of productive forces—such as the problem of atomic war or universal peace raised in a quite new way by the modern technical development—led as a result of the differences in social and property relations, to solutions being sometimes of quite opposite character and sometimes superficially similar but essentially different. As a result of rapid development of productive forces the problem of how extensive planning can be made consistent with individual initiative and personal interests arises in both systems. There is a well known comparative theory according to which the Western world, based upon individual initiative, has introduced more and more elements of extensive planning activity whereas in the socialist countries, based on planning, personal interests and initiative have played an ever increasing part so that the trend of development has converged: in this way in the future all differences will disappear, being eliminated by a third new system.\* It is to be feared, however, that the well justified anxiety for the future of humanity may result in a kind of wishful thinking which may lead to illusions having in store a danger of disillusionment. The above outlined arguments show beyond question that the development of productive forces brings about everywhere certain elements of planning which, however, inevitably come into conflict with the system based on private property. The answer to the question put in an identical way will essentially differ in the system of private property from the answer given by the system based on the social ownership of the means of production even if the universal character of this problem may lead to certain convergence. Though the institution of private property is elastic and has undergone a number of changes, its basis—the non-social character of ownership—has remained unchanged which, despite any possible correction, leads to an unjust distribution of income. The results not only in a hindering effect on the ever increasing demand on an extensive planning and in the fact that the preventive influence of liability for damages cannot duly assert itself on the principal originator of damages, the enterprise, but also in far-reaching effects on the moral opinion, scale of values and habits of the entirety of society, which under the conditions of private property has necessarily become dehumanized because business competition and struggle for life involve a daily routine of legally causing damages and at the same time on the scale of values a number of real values are pushed into the background by values of financial character. As to the possibility of a third system—though ways and means may be different—for the time being no other alternative to private property can be conceived than the social ownership of the means of production.

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Thus, convergence has its limits. In my view, Tunc is right in pressing for making the phenomenon of convergence conscious,\* but it would be a mistake to leave it unsaid that this process cannot be applied beyond the limits of the real existence of convergence. No doubt, our comparative law activity would be easier and nothing would prevent an attitude of "keep smiling" if comparison were restricted to phenomena without essential differences. This would be a great convenience but it is doubtful whether this would be a useful solution. Zivert was right in pointing out at the Paris Round-table Conference on comparative-law activities in the Soviet Union that peaceful co-existence does not mean synthesis but a competition by peaceful means between different social systems,\* and the case cannot be altered at all by leaving it unmentioned as if it were bad manners to speak about it. It is better to go on with this competition in the field of comparative law by means of peaceful arguments and analytical research work. The friendly peaceful co-existence mentioned by Tunc will be possible in the long run only if the optimism also mentioned by him will not originate in wishful thinking. Humanity which might lose much through war—either cold or hot—can draw only temporary comfort by leaving peaceful competition out of consideration, while in the long run it can only gain by continuing that competition under peaceful conditions.

A. A. C. S.

In my view, that is what the science of comparative law has to keep in mind. Eötvös László University, Budapest.

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\*Göppens: L'état du droit comparé envisagé comme moyen de rechercher les matières susceptibles d'unification sur le plan international, *Rev. de Droit Internat. et de Droit Comparé*, Bruxelles, 1958, 23, pp. 88-89.

\*Göppens: Relations entre l'unification au niveau régional et l'unification au niveau universel, *Rev. Int. de Droit Comparé*, Paris, 1964, 1, p. 21.

\*Göppens: L'étendue du domaine de l'unification du droit, *Rev. Int. de Droit Comparé*, Paris, 1964, 1, p. 8.

\*Möller: Contracts in Contract and Torts, *Current Legal Problems*, London, 1963, p. 66.

\*Constantinesco: Incertidinea et Puncte Contractuale in Droit Comparé, *Kolloidium*, Stuttgart, 1960, p. 511.

\*Zivert: Du sérieux de la promesse, *Rev. Int. de Droit Comparé*, 1964, p. 45.

\*Dyrek: Marsial comparatives les, *Pravnik*, Prague, 1962, No. 8 (In Czech) *Inre Studij Juridica*, 1964, pp. 91-114.

\*Lieber: Rechtsvergleichung zwischen Ländern mit verschiedener Wirtschaftsvorrichtung, *Rubolz*, 1961, 2, p. 24.

\*Lieber, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-117.

\*See the reports of Fouquet Marx, *Rev. Int. de Droit Comparé*, 1964, pp. 103-106; of Rudolf Schifferinger, *Soviet Studies*, Oxford, 1964, 4, pp. 474-485; of Jacques L. Ehrlich, *Journal des Tribunaux*, Brussels, Dec., 1962, No. 1, pp. 791-792.

\*Cf. also Inre Studij, *Relazioni sui alcuni problemi della tecnica scientifica del diritto*, *Democrazia e diritto*, 1961, 4, p. 4.

\*Lieber, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

\*Knapf: Verträge im Tschechoslowakischen Recht, *Rubolz*, 1963, 3, pp. 495-497.

\*Ferd: Methoden, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Privatrechtsvergleichung, *Zsch. f. Rechtsvergleichung*, Weiz., 1962, 4, p. 263.

\*Ferd: *ibid.*, p. 41.

\*Tunc: La contribution possible des études juridiques comparatives à une meilleure compréhension entre nations, *Rev. Int. de Droit Comparé*, 1964, p. 54.

\*Lieber, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

\*Göppens: Le droit comparé, Paris, 1953, pp. 54-55.

\*Göppens: *ibid.*, p. 57.

\*Lieber, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

\*Tunc arrives at such a conclusion: (La possibilité de comparer le contrat dans les systèmes juridiques à structures économiques différentes, *Rubolz*, 1963, 3, pp. 495-494.)

\*Tunc: La contribution possible des études comparatives à une meilleure compréhension entre nations, *Rev. Int. de Droit Comparé*, 1964, 1, p. 54.

\*Cf. the report on the Round-table Conference, *Rev. Int. de Droit Comparé*, 1964, pp. 64-72.

\*Cf. the report on the Round-table Conference *ibid.*, p. 73.

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Issues of international policies have hitherto played the predominant part in the Sino-Soviet conflict. At first, they concerned the possibility of peaceful co-existence of states embodying different social systems and the prospect—not a certainty—of avoiding nuclear war; subsequently, the Chinese elaborated the concept of the 'intermediate zone' including, apart from the Chinese themselves, countries such as Japan, France and West Germany, raised territorial claims against the USSR and encouraged others to do so. It is not the purpose of this comment to deal with issues of foreign policies or with the organizational implications of the dispute for the world Communist movement; we are here concerned with its relevance for the continuity of the socialist tradition. As Palmiro Togliatti has emphasized in his last observations (published in *Rinascita*, September 8, and in *Pravda*, September 10, 1954) the issue in dispute is much broader than that between socialist movements in control of state power.

Of course, we are not discussing the dispute from the point of view of Marxist orthodoxy: Marxist ideology, like any other, requires sociological analysis of its origins and formation. We are primarily concerned with the question of whether the roots of the dispute can be explained by differences in developmental stages or differences in national tradition, or should be regarded as a reformulation of different approaches which are as old as the modern socialist movement.

A serious approach to this problem is *a priori* excluded if, with G. Lichtheim<sup>1</sup> in his speech at Ordzhonikidze, on August 8, 1954, Khrushchev has again made clear that the differences do not affect the right and duty of socialist states, if attacked even with nuclear arms, and that reconstructions, after such a war, would proceed on such socialist lines as possible after the immense destruction involved in war.

<sup>1</sup> *Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study*, London, 1941, p. 165, note 4.  
Marxism is defined as being, in essence, opposition to 'the economic system of bourgeois society, the latter being the fully developed form of Western civilization'. This statement coincides with the position taken by the Russian right-wing Social Democrats—including the Mensheviks—at the beginning of the twentieth century in their dispute with the Bolsheviks. This position, in fact, denied the possibility of a socialist revolution in a comparatively 'underdeveloped' country, such as Tsarist Russia was. Such an interpretation of Marxism would make it *a fortiori* inapplicable to the second half of the twentieth century, where the major changes in social structure are taking place outside Europe.

This interpretation, however, contradicts not only the personal views of Marx, as expressed in 1879 in his famous letter to the editor of the *Otechestvennaya Zapiski*, but also the historical origin of the Marxist movement: Marxism originated, as an intellectual trend, in Germany, which of all the countries of Western Europe was the least developed bourgeois society in the mid-nineteenth century, and became dominant in the socialist parties of Germany of the 1880's and Russia of the 1890's, operating underground. The ascendancy of Marxism as the theory of the socialist movement in Russia and throughout Central Europe became general in the first two decades of the twentieth century. By this time bourgeois society had long passed the stage of early nineteenth century England which gave rise to Ricardian economics. Thus the twentieth century vulgarizers of Marxism, including the 'economists' not only misrepresented Marxist doctrine, but were indeed several decades behind the course of history. Their misrepresentation of Marx' early political writings as some kind of 'infantile disorder' of Young Hegelian origin, and their neglect of Engels' later writings stressing non-economic factors on the shaping and interaction of history, belongs to the realm of political mythology.

Marxism is, however, a certain conception of the objective conditions of human action and, in particular, of such actions as lead to the replacement of one form of social organization by another one. In particular it asserts the basic importance of the industrial working class in the replacement of a capitalist by a socialist order of society. In this sense it gained ascendancy at the conclusion of the 'Populist' period in Russia. During the 'Populist' period Russian socialism had been represented by a great variety of trends, all of them based upon the indisputable predominance of the peasantry, while the need for a democratic revolution was generally recognized amongst the young intellectuals predominant in the progressive movements. Most of these trends operated upon the supposed anarchist—or rather spontaneous—inclinations of the peasantry towards the overthrow of the Tsarist regime as well as the construction of the new society, but there were also minority trends. These included incidents such as the *Nechayevshchina*, which belonged to the realm of the pathological. In its day it had acquired fame, apart from Dostoyevski's writings, by its association with the dispute between Marx and Bakunin; in our days it became a pet-food for anti-Communist authors.

Much more significant, however, was P. N. Tkachev's attempt to transfer the French Blanquist tradition to the Russian soil and indeed to combine this with a Marxist interpretation of history. It is this trend of the Populist era which is at present experiencing a revival in Maoism and in various revolutionary trends in the developing countries. The combination between Blanquism and Marxism consisted in the assertion that the idealy inspiring voluntarist action of *élites* <sup>1</sup> *I am using the term here in the very broad sense as applied in Francis Y. Saïd's book 'The Populists in Russia' (Italian ed., 1952, English translation published in 1961 in London under the title 'Revolution in Russia') so as to denote that period in the development of the Russian socialist movement in which it was not yet split into what eventually became the Social Revolutionaries—the party which, based upon the peasantry, played a prominent part during the Kerensky period of 1917, and immediately after the Bolshevik conquest of power, as a main centre of opposition to it—and the Social Democrats. The latter themselves split into the Leninist Bolsheviks, which eventually assumed power, and the Mensheviks, who emphasized the industrial working class. were the product of historical processes. Tkachev was not so naive as to believe that armed insurrection and conspiracy, in conditions of a crisis within the ruling class could lay the foundations of a new society, which further would develop by its own spontaneity. This was stated, at their trial after the assassination of Alexander II by the leaders of the group *Narodnaya Volya*, whose own concepts presented a mixture with anarchism. In Tkachev's concept there would have been ample room for a centralized party, of the Chinese rather than the Soviet Communist type. Since he was far from recognizing a guiding role of the working class amongst the social forces supporting the revolution, Tkachev might well have supported the following statement of Mao's made at the height of the anti-Japanese war but included in 1954 in his *Selected Works* (Engl. ed., vol. II, p. 272):*

<sup>2</sup> 'Our principle is that the party commands the gun, and the gun will never be allowed to command the party. But it is also true that with guns at our disposal we can easily build up the party organization, and the Eighth Route Army has built up a powerful party organization in North China. We can also rear cadres and create schools, culture and mass movements. Everything in Yenan has been built up by means of the gun. Anything can grow out of the barrel of a gun. According to the Marxist theory of the state, the army is the chief component of the political power of a state. . . . Some people have ridiculed us as advocates of the 'omnipotence of war'; yes, we are, we are the advocates of the omnipotence of the revolutionary war, which is not bad at all, but is good and is Marxist.'

It is difficult to understand how an author who writes as a Marxist can elevate the army and the process by which it asserts itself—war—into an instrument to create the political *élite*: Marxists would rather deem that the role of the army is defined by the current class-struggles from which the political *élite* emerges. The confusion, in China as in the case of many modern revolutions in near Eastern countries, is caused by the absence or weakness of an industrial working class, whose struggles might produce the required guiding force: in its absence, the power structure of the new society becomes autonomous. In the Maoist case Dialectics, which plays a central part in Maoist theory, turns from an analysis of the objective, internal contradictions in society into a learned circumscription of the application of force: this is ruthless where 'major contradictions', i.e., relations to the enemy, as described by decision of the Politburo of the CPC are concerned, more lenient when the contradictions are judged to be 'minor ones', i.e., 'within the people'.

As is well known, the Russian revolutionary movement did not develop on lines of Tkachevism, far less of Maoism, in spite of the fact that it operated in a relatively underdeveloped country, and in spite of the Stalinist phase to which the Maoists, naturally enough, cling.

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Still, Stalin would never have dreamed of an alleged 'omnipotence of war', though he elaborated his system in the course of a 'revolution from above' and of the preparation for a major war, forced upon the Soviet peoples, <sup>had</sup> against also his volution. When the voluntarist conceptions of revolution had broken down in the catastrophe of *Narodnaya Volya*, the leading minds of a new generation of revolutionaries, with a Marxist conception of social development, adopted an orientation based upon the working class. This was so despite the relatively slow growth of the working class. Their conception of revolutionary activities centred on the organization of the working class, around which all the other forces repressed by the existing regime, in particular the peasants and the national minorities would rally. This broadness of approach was one of the debts which Leninism owed to its Populist pre-history. The other was the conception of the centralized and organized vanguard. Yet when Lenin, in his Siberian exile in 1898 argued for a broad alliance based on the working class, although paying tribute to 'scryphes of Russian revolution', the leaders of *Narodnaya Volya*, he still took issue with Lavrov who had misinterpreted Lenin's wide appeal to people of all social classes in the struggle against absolutism as a *de facto* acceptance of the Populist platform. Lenin's basic orientation upon the working class was elaborated in 1905, when he, now in opposition to the Mensheviks, declared that the workers' party must organize the impending bourgeois-democratic revolution. In 1914 he called upon revolutionary Social Democrats to live up to the decision of the Second International, in the drafting of which at the Stuttgart Congress of 1907 he himself, with Rosa Luxemburg, had played a prominent part.

Collected Works, 4th English edition, Vol. II, p. 325 ff.  
The Stuttgart resolutions, as repeated by the Bâle Congress of 1912, characterized the impending war—the political constellation of which was fairly precisely foretold—as a crime committed in the interest 'of capitalist profits, dynastic ambitions, and in honouring secret diplomatic conventions' and also as a political and economic crisis which should be used by the socialists in order 'to arouse the people and to remove capitalist class-rule'. Governments were warned of the revolutionary dangers which might result from a war. We should keep in mind that, at this time, the Second International had practically no non-European sections, and that only German Social Democracy had a strength comparable with the present one of the French and Italian Communist parties; Bolshevism was a trend struggling for ascendancy within the Russian party though, as one sees, fully recognized as a factor in the International.

The idea that any socialist could welcome war as the opportunity for socialist revolution' never arose: the difference during the First World War between those supporters of the anti-war decisions of the Second International who eventually formed the Communist movement and those who remained Social Democrats, concerned merely the question of what should be done once war had broken out. Even before the arrival of the atom bomb no socialist and no Communist ever desired war as the occasion for revolution: when, in 1928, Bukharin made statements which might have been interpreted as expressing an expectation that the next wave of socialist revolution might follow from a war, they were immediately denounced by the CPSU as revealing undue scepticism with regard to the prospects of socialist revolutions arising from conditions of economic depression.

The Comintern's influence upon the revolutionary movement in the colonial and semi-colonial countries operated in a dual, and partly contradictory way. On the one hand, it served as the lever through which the Russian-Bolshevik conception of the 'revolutionary dictatorship of the workers and peasants, elaborated in 1905, and that of 'Peasants' Soviets', adopted already in the theses of the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920, were pressed upon the West-European Communist parties, with their fully urban outlook, and upon the Eastern Communist parties, in particular that of China, which were founded by intellectuals with a purely bookish knowledge of Marxism. On the other hand, the Comintern's centralism soon operated as a limitation upon efforts to go further in the adaptation of Marxist concepts, for example, to Chinese conditions. Organizational and ideological centralism as a means of bringing about unity in the international socialist movement proved disastrous. *Pravda*, on June 16, 1964, implicitly rejected the 'Twenty-one conditions for Admission to the Comintern' and similar documents, when it published an interview given by an old-standing Japanese Communist under the heading 'I do not recognize my 'expulsion' from the CP Japan's'. Having recently visited the city of Nagasaki and realized the feelings of its population <sup>for</sup> had supported in Parliament the ratification of the Test Ban Treaty. This action was taken in defiance of a party decision, adopted by the Central Committee of the CPJ against <sup>his own</sup> and his friends' votes; he was duly expelled by the Maoist majority of the Japanese Central Committee. In compensation for such a state of things in the Japanese Communist Party, Mr. Tomomi Narita, the leader of the much stronger Socialist Party of Japan contributed an article to *Pravda* (July 13, 1964) in which Soviet peace policies, including of course the Test Ban Treaty, are fully supported, and hence, by implication the Maoist standpoint is rejected.

Readers, however, should not forget that the Trotsky-inspired criticism of the Comintern's China policies, current in the west, is directed, not as with Mao, against the transfer to China of the concept of the working-class-guided dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, but against failure to call, in 1927, for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest peasantry. Explicitly, China is mentioned only in protest against the failure of the U.S.A. and of the Japanese Government to recognize her lawful government—a point on which there can be no disagreement amongst sincere supporters of peace.

The timing of Mao's break with the majority trend in Communism is open to doubt. Such things happen, as a rule, by an accumulation of comparatively minor disagreements until, eventually and particularly where state interests are involved, all past disagreements are generalized and exaggerated. For example, Miss Engelborgh-Berriels' observations about the non-aggression pact concluded by the USSR with Japan in 1941 which, <sup>set</sup> the Siberian divisions free to save Moscow—and perhaps also the Chinese revolution—in the December battle, appear to me as retrospective reflections of what, mildly, may be described as romantic nationalism as opposed to ordinary common sense in which Mao, as a rule, is not lacking. On the other hand, I think that Mohit Sen is inconsistent: when quoting, with approval, both Wan Ming's report to the Seventh Congress of the Comintern (which was far more reserved in supporting the United National Front) than was Mao at that time) and the Tsunyi-meeting, held a few months before on a rest during the 'long march', at which the Politburo installed by the Comintern and so headed by Wan Ming was deposed. Eventual agreement to these changes by the CPSU was conditioned by its obvious interest in the anti-Japanese United National Front. As regards the interpretation of the driving forces of the Chinese revolution, O. W. Kuusinen, the last survivor of the Comintern leaders of those days, has never been convinced of the correctness of Mao's standpoint, even for China only: in a speech made on the February, 1964 plenary meeting of the CPSU (and published, after Kuusinen's death, in *Pravda*, May 19, 1964, as a kind of political testament) he asserted that the Comintern, however much it may have erred in its criticism of Mao's neglect of the urban workers, was fully right.

Kuusinen, and those who reprinted his speech have, however, failed to make clear what, in their opinion, the Chinese party should have done once the possibility of a revolution different from that originally intended had become evident. These new conditions were the result of the complete failure of all efforts at organizing the urban workers after the defeats of 1927, taken together with the success of the peasants' guerilla war which, eventually, broadened to an all-national basis in the defence against Japanese aggression. Chinese Communists could not refuse the possible, in the sense in which Trotsky once said that in certain circumstances the Russian Communists, abandoned by the Western working class, might have to say (paraphrasing Engels) 'we have come too early.' Such an attitude, even if conceivable after a long civil war which had

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required enormous sacrifices; would have contradicted the self-assertion of a nation with a great history and great potential strength as well as the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the present historical period in the world as a whole. Similarly in our days, the adoption of the conception of world-wide transition to socialism by, on the whole, peaceful competition in the economic and cultural fields would imply, for the Chinese, a recognition that their country for a still considerable period of time would play a fairly secondary part in that process. In the long run, of course, its potentialities are nearly unlimited. <sup>14c</sup> As opposed to this, the Maoist conception of world revolution as being, in substance, the emancipation of the hitherto depressed colonial peoples promises immediate gains in prestige precisely in those parts of the world in which China, as a great power, is particularly interested, yet which worry little about Marxist doctrine. Marxist doctrine had to be suitably reinterpreted.

This re-interpretation could proceed under a tactically useful claim to Marxist orthodoxy since the CPSU, hitherto regarded as the guardian of such orthodoxy, had itself arrived at the conclusion that its own country's further progress is promoted by the dropping of obsolete points of doctrine. Since the Marxist economic teaching is obviously unsuitable as a basis for a Chinese claim to hegemony, the most suitable procedure in the ideological field was a one-sided development of Stalin's political doctrine, which in itself had been a shifting of the delicate balance established in classical Leninism between regard for the mass-movements, in particular of the industrial workers, and the organizing rôle of the élite, in favour of the latter. We have already noticed that thereby Mao arrived very close to one of the pre-Marxist sources of Leninism.

As distinct from 'primitive' Blanquism, however, which operated as one of the trends from which the modern socialist movement originated, <sup>15</sup> the share in the Paris Commune of 1870, though rarely explicitly recognized, forms part of the generally accepted socialist tradition. Maoism has evolved within the framework of a centralized world Communist movement and aims at securing for itself its ideological estate; hence, while Engels took the initiative in <sup>16</sup> ~~defining~~ <sup>delimiting</sup> himself, and fairly <sup>17</sup> ~~freely~~ <sup>freely</sup> from Blanquism, and from P. N. Tkachev in particular, Maoism consciously opposes and denounces everything else which has grown within the Marxist framework. The working class of existing socialist countries is said to be exposed to *embourgeoisement*—evident in the USSR already when, at last, it is possible to offer every family a flat of its own. The labour movements of the industrially developed countries, including the French and Italian Communist parties, are written off as 'Revisionist'. The exception is formed only by small splinter groups which accept the Maoist platform and are prepared to accept even atomic destruction of their countries as price for a 'world revolution' of the former colonial nations. 'Communists', we read in the seventh editorial comment of 'Yenmin Ribao' and 'Hongqi' to the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU, of February 4, 1964, are people who make revolutions. Once they refuse to make revolutions, they cease to be Marxists-Leninists, and become Revisionists of some kind. Revisionism, evidently, includes the Italian Communist concept of *primavera*—essentially a concept developed in 1891 in Engels' 'Socialism in Germany' according to which the working class, by fighting its struggle for originally limited aims, yet putting them into much broader connections, acquires the capacity essentially to take over the estate of capitalist society. Since at present no revolutionary situations exist in the developed capitalist countries, the socialists of such countries, if they were to accept the Chinese position, would have to operate as mere auxiliary forces of the emancipation movement of the underdeveloped countries, about the progress of which we can read every day in the news. Probably it would be even improper for them to fight for the *embourgeoisement* of the workers of their own countries as long as the colonial peoples starve. Any party which would take such a position seriously—as a political line, <sup>18</sup> ~~distinct~~ <sup>distinct</sup> from a mere desire to document 'radicalism'—would commit political suicide. <sup>19</sup> The share in the Paris Commune of 1870, though rarely explicitly recognized, forms part of the generally accepted socialist tradition.

There is no danger whatever of a world Communist movement of Maoist colour coming into being. On the other hand, actions such as those of the United States in North Vietnam are nearly bound to strengthen the appeal of Maoism in the world of underdeveloped countries. Hence we should expect the division to continue for long, even if external aggression should bring about new military and diplomatic arrangements within what, before, was called the world Communist camp and even if, with such background of increased external threats, the excesses in polemical formulations should be damped down.

Mohit Sen's reference to the schisms within the great world religions has the merit that it warns us against interpreting the Sino-Soviet dispute as a mere episode, to be ended by the patching up of dogmatic differences, by international conferences or, in the extreme case, by the disappearance of the detested side from the stage as an unimportant sect as, for example, the Trotskyists have become. It should, however, be kept in mind that the dispute has a well-definable socio-economic background, and that we live in quickly moving times. It is true that four centuries were required to make Roman Catholics and Protestants consider the possibilities of reunion (and this only when faced with a crisis of the religious world outlook as a whole) but it is hardly conceivable that any major country, whatever its local conditions and lines of development, will be without an industrial working class of its own with a typical working class attitude by the end of, say, a 20-year period. Nor is it likely that, by then, the Chinese will still be enamoured with <sup>20</sup> ~~far~~ <sup>far</sup> Communism; much before then their people will have come to regard socialist planning as a means to improve their standard of life, even though, in our days, the Chinese leaders prefer to describe this as *'embourgeoisement'*. The Soviet theoreticians, on their part, now clearly emphasize that production drives do not serve production for production's sake, but have to lead to an improvement of the living standards of the people. On the other hand they emphasize, as against the Chinese, that only by economic progress can socialist countries introduce structural reforms which reduce the differences between town and countryside, between the state-socialist and the co-operative sectors, between manual and intellectual workers: this was heralded by the May, 1964 session of the Supreme Soviet.

Evidently, in the Sino-Soviet dispute we are meeting fundamentally different conceptions of socialism: until it will be healed in the natural way we shall have to live with it just as with the splits within what, on paper, is still the 'Western alliance'. We shall have to see to it that conflicts within either of the great 'camps', whatever specific interests of the competing parties are involved, should not degenerate into a competition in 'toughness' against the opposite 'cold war' party.

<sup>15</sup> Cf., for example, G. Kozlov, in 'Voprosy Ekonomiki', 1964, No. 1, p. 49.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. B. Foucault's report of the June, 1964 session of the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the CC of the CPSU, reprinted in 'Kommunist', 1964, No. 11, pp. 45 ff.

<sup>17</sup> University of Glasgow.

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A serious approach to this problem is a priori excluded if, with G. Lichtheim<sup>1</sup> in his speech at Bratislava on August 8, 1964, Khrushchev has again made clear that the differences do not affect the right and duty of socialist states, if attacked even with nuclear arms, and that reconstruction after such a war would proceed on such similar lines as possible after the immense destruction levelled in war.  
<sup>1</sup> *Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study*, London, 1961, p. 165, note 4.  
Marxism is defined as being, in essence, opposition to 'the economic system of bourgeois society, the latter being the fully developed form of Western civilization.' This statement coincides with the position taken by the Russian right-wing Social Democrats—including the Mensheviks—at the beginning of the twentieth century in their dispute with the Bolsheviks. This position, in fact, denied the possibility of a socialist revolution in a comparatively 'underdeveloped' country, such as Tsarist Russia was. Such an interpretation of Marxism would make it a priori inapplicable to the second half of the twentieth century, where the major changes in social structure are taking place outside Europe.

This interpretation, however, contradicts not only the personal views of Marx, as expressed in 1879 in his famous letter to the editor of the *Otechestvennye Zapiski*, but also the historical origin of the Marxist movement: Marxism originated, as an intellectual trend, in Germany, which of all the countries of Western Europe was the least developed bourgeois society in the mid-nineteenth century, and became dominant in the socialist parties of Germany of the 1880's and Russia of the 1890's, operating underground. The ascendancy of Marxism as the theory of the socialist movement in Russia and throughout Central Europe became general in the first two decades of the twentieth century. By this time bourgeois society had long passed the stage of early nineteenth century England which gave rise to Ricardian economics. Thus the twentieth century vulgarizers of Marxism, including the 'economists' not only misrepresented Marxist doctrine, but were indeed several decades behind the course of history. Their misrepresentation of Marx' early political writings as some kind of 'infantile disorder' of Young Hegelian origin, and their neglect of Engels' later writings stressing non-economic factors on the shaping and interaction of history, belongs to the realm of political mythology.

Marxism is, however, a certain conception of the objective conditions of human action and, in particular, of such actions as lead to the replacement of one form of social organization by another one. In particular it asserts the basic importance of the industrial working class in the replacement of a capitalist by a socialist order of society. In this sense it gained ascendancy at the conclusion of the 'Populist' period in Russia. During the 'Populist' period Russian socialism had been represented by a great variety of trends, all of them based upon the indisputable predominance of the peasantry, while the need for a democratic revolution was generally recognized amongst the young intellectuals predominant in the progressive movements. Most of these trends operated upon the supposed anarchist—or rather spontaneous—inclinations of the peasantry towards the overthrow of the Tsarist regime as well as the construction of the new society, but there were also minority trends. These included incidents such as the *Nechayevshchina*, which belonged to the realm of the pathological. In its day it had acquired fame, apart from Dostoyevski's writings, by its association with the dispute between Marx and Bakunin; in our days it became a pet-food for anti-Communist authors.

Much more significant, however, was P. N. Tkachev's attempt to transfer the French Blanquist tradition to the Russian soil and indeed to combine this with a Marxist interpretation of history. It is this trend of the Populist era which is at present experiencing a revival in Maoism and in various revolutionary trends in the developing countries. The combination between Blanquism and Marxism consisted in the assertion that the ideals inspiring voluntarist action of *élites*—I am using the term here in the very broad sense as applied in Franco Venturi's book *Il Populismo Russo* (Italian ed. 1952, English translation published in 1961 in London, under the title *Roots of Revolution*) so as to denote that period in the development of the Russian socialist movement in which it was not yet split into what eventually became the Social Revolutionaries—the party which, based upon the peasantry, played a prominent part during the Kerensky period of 1917, and immediately after the Bolshevik conquest of power, as a main centre of opposition to it—and the Social Democrats. The latter themselves split into the Leninist Bolsheviks, which eventually assumed power, and the Mensheviks, who emphasized a 'western' way of development, both factions, however operating upon the organization of the industrial working-class, were the product of historical processes. Tkachev was not so naive as to believe that armed insurrection and conspiracy, in conditions of a crisis within the ruling class could lay the foundations of a new society, which further would develop by its own spontaneity. This was stated, at their trial after the assassination of Alexander II by the leaders of the group *Narodnaya Volya*, whose own concepts presented a mixture with anarchism. In Tkachev's concept there would have been ample room for a centralized party, of the Chinese rather than the Soviet Communist type. Since he was far from recognizing a guiding rôle of the working class amongst the social forces supporting the revolution, Tkachev might well have supported the following statement of Mao's, made at the height of the anti-Japanese war but included in 1954 in his *Selected Works* (Engl. ed., vol. II, p. 272):

One principle is that the party commands the gun, and the gun will never be allowed to command the party. But it is also true that with guns at our disposal we can easily build up the Party organization, and the Eighth Route Army has built up a powerful party organization in North China. We can also set cadets and create schools, culture and mass movements. Everything in Yenan has been built up by means of the gun. Anything can grow out of the barrel of a gun. According to the Marxist theory of the state, the army is the chief component of the political power of a state. . . . Some people have ridiculed as an advocate of the 'omnipotence of war', yes, we say, we are the advocates of the omnipotence of the revolutionary war, which is not bad at all, but is good and is Marxist.

It is difficult to understand how an author who writes as a Marxist can elevate the army and the process by which it asserts itself—war—into an instrument to create the political *élite*: Marxists would rather deem that the rôle of the army is defined by the current class-struggles from which the political *élite* emerges. The confusion, in China as in the case of many modern revolutions in near-Eastern countries, is caused by the absence or weakness of an industrial working class, whose struggles might produce the required guiding force; in its absence, the power structure of the new society becomes autonomous. In the Maoist case Dialectics, which plays a central part in Maoist theory, turns from an analysis of the objective, internal contradictions in society into a learned circumscription of the application of force: this is ruthless where 'major contradictions', i.e., relations to the enemy, as described by decision of the Politburo of the CPC are concerned, more lenient when the contradictions are judged to be 'minor ones', i.e., 'within the people'.

As is well known, the Russian revolutionary movement did not develop on lines of Tkachevism, far less of Maoism, in spite of the fact that it operated in a relatively underdeveloped country, and in spite of the Stalinist phase to which the Maoists, naturally enough, cling.

required enormous sacrifices, would have contradicted the self-assertion of a nation with a great history and great potential strength as well as the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the present historical period in the world as a whole. Similarly in our days, the adoption of the conception of world-wide transition to socialism by, on the whole, peaceful competition in the economic and cultural fields would imply, for the Chinese, a recognition that their country for a still considerable period of time would play a fairly secondary part in that process. In the long run, of course, its potentialities are nearly unlimited as opposed to this, the Maoist conception of world revolution as being, in substance, the emancipation of the hitherto depressed colonial peoples promises immediate gains in prestige precisely in those parts of the world in which China, as a great power, is particularly interested, yet which worry little about Marxist doctrine. Marxist doctrine had to be suitably re-interpreted.

This re-interpretation could proceed under a tactically useful claim to Marxist orthodoxy since the CPSU, hitherto regarded as the guardian of such orthodoxy, had itself arrived at the conclusion that its own country's further progress is promoted by the dropping of obsolete points of doctrine. Since the Marxist economic teaching is obviously unsuitable as a basis for a Chinese claim to hegemony, the most suitable procedure in the ideological field was a one-sided development of Stalin's political doctrine, which in itself had been a shifting of the delicate balance established in classical Leninism between regard for the mass-movements, in particular of the industrial workers, and the organizing rôle of the élite, in favour of the latter. We have already noticed that thereby Mao arrived very close to one of the pre-Marxist sources of Leninism.

As distinct from 'primitive' Blanquism, however, which operated as one of the trends from which the modern socialist movement originated, its share in the Paris Commune of 1870, though rarely explicitly recognized, forms part of the generally accepted socialist tradition. Maoism has evolved within the framework of a centralized world Communist movement and aims at securing for itself its ideological estate: hence, while Engels took the initiative in defence of himself, and fairly forcefully from Blanquism, and from P. N. Tkachev in particular, Maoism consciously opposes and denounces everything else which has grown within the Marxist framework. The working class of existing socialist countries is said to be exposed to *embourgeoisement*—evident in the USSR already when, at last, it is possible to offer every family a flat of its own. The labour movements of the industrially developed countries, including the French and Italian Communist parties, are written off as 'Revisionist'. The exception is formed only by small splinter groups which accept the Maoist platform and are prepared to accept even atomic destruction of their countries as price for a 'world revolution' of the former colonial nations. 'Communists', we read in the seventh editorial comment of *Yenmin Ribun* and *Hongqi* in the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU, of February 4, 1964, 'are people who make revolutions. Once they refuse to make revolutions, they cease to be Marxists-Leninists, and become Revisionists of some kind'. Revisionism, evidently, includes the Italian Communist concept of *prasetza*—essentially a concept developed in 1891 in Engels' 'Socialism in Germany' according to which the working class, by fighting its struggle for originally limited aims yet putting them into much broader connections, acquires the capacity eventually to take over the estate of capitalist society. Since at present no revolutionary situations exist in the developed capitalist countries, the socialists of such countries, if they were to accept the Chinese position, would have to operate as mere auxiliary forces of the emancipation movement of the underdeveloped countries, about the progress of which we can read every day in the news. Probably it would be even improper for them to fight for the *embourgeoisement* of the workers of their own countries as long as the colonial peoples starve. Any party which would take such a position seriously—as a political line, as distinct from a mere desire to document 'radicalism'—would commit political suicide.

\*Its share in the Paris Commune of 1870, though rarely explicitly recognized, forms part of the generally accepted socialist tradition.

There is no danger whatever of a world Communist movement of Maoist colour coming into being. On the other hand, actions such as those of the United States in North Vietnam are nearly bound to strengthen the appeal of Maoists in the world of underdeveloped countries. Hence we should expect the division to continue for long, even if external aggression should bring about new military and diplomatic arrangements within what, before, was called the world Communist camp and even if, with such background of increased external threats, the excesses in polemical formulations should be damped down.

Mohit Sen's reference to the schisms within the great world religions has the merit that it warns us against interpreting the Sino-Soviet dispute as a mere episode, to be ended by the patching up of dogmatic differences, by international conferences or, in the extreme case, by the disappearance of the defeated side from the stage as an unimportant sect as, for example, the Trotskyists have become. It should, however, be kept in mind that the dispute has a well-definable socio-economic background, and that we live in quickly moving times. It is true that four centuries were required to make Roman Catholics and Protestants consider the possibilities of reunion (and this only when faced with a crisis of the religious world outlook as a whole) but it is hardly conceivable that any major country, whatever its local conditions and lines of development, will be without an industrial working-class of its own with a typical working-class attitude by the end of, say, a 50 year period. Nor is it likely that, by then, the Chinese will still be enamoured with 'war Communism': much before then their people will have come to regard socialist planning as a means to improve their standard of life, even though, in our days, the Chinese leaders prefer to describe this as *embourgeoisement*. The Soviet theoreticians, on their part, now clearly emphasize that production drives do not serve production for production's sake, but have to lead to an improvement of the living standards of the people. On the other hand they emphasize, as against the Chinese, that only by economic progress can socialist countries introduce structural reforms which reduce the differences between town and countryside, between the state-socialist and the co-operative sectors, between manual and intellectual workers: this was heralded by the May, 1964 session of the Supreme Soviet.\*

Evidently, in the Sino-Soviet dispute we are meeting fundamentally different conceptions of socialism: until it will be healed in the natural way we shall have to live with it just as with the splits within what, on paper, is still the 'Western alliance'. We shall have to see to it that conflicts within either of the great 'camps', whatever specific interests of the competing parties are involved, should not degenerate into a competition in 'toughness' against the opposite 'cold war' party.

\* Cf., for example, G. Kaslov, in *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, 1964, No. 1, p. 46.

\* Cf. B. Ponomarev's report at the June, 1964 session of the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the CU of the CPSU: reprinted in *Kommunist*, 1964, No. 11, pp. 45 ff.

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Still, Stalin would never have dreamed of an alleged 'omnipotence of war', though he elaborated his system in the course of a 'revolution from above' and of the preparation for a major war, forced upon the Soviet peoples, and against also his volition. When the voluntarist conceptions of revolution had broken down in the catastrophe of *Narodnaya Volya*, the leading minds of a new generation of revolutionaries, with a Marxist conception of social development, adopted an orientation based upon the working class. This was so despite the relatively slow growth of the working class. Their conception of revolutionary activities centred on the organization of the working class, around which all the other forces repressed by the existing regime, in particular the peasants and the national minorities would rally. This broadness of approach was one of the debts which Leninism owed to its Populist pre-history. The other was the conception of the centralized and organized vanguard. Yet when Lenin, in his Siberian exile in 1899 argued for a broad alliance based on the working class, although paying tribute to 'voryshees of Russian revolution', the leaders of *Narodnaya Volya*, he still took issue with Lavrov who had misinterpreted Lenin's wide appeal to people of all social classes in the struggle against absolutism as a *de facto* acceptance of the Populist platform.<sup>1</sup> Lenin's basic orientation upon the working class was elaborated in 1905, when he, now in opposition to the Mensheviks, declared that the workers' party must organize the impending bourgeois-democratic revolution. In 1914 he called upon revolutionary Social Democrats to live up to the decision of the Second International, in the drafting of which at the Stuttgart Congress of 1907 he himself, with Rosa Luxemburg, had played a prominent part.

<sup>1</sup>Collected Works, 4th English edition, Vol. II, p. 325 ff.

The Stuttgart resolutions, as repeated by the Bâle Congress of 1912, characterized the impending war—the political constellation of which was fairly precisely foretold—as a crime committed in the interest 'of capitalist profits, dynastic ambitions, and in honouring secret diplomatic conventions' and also as a political and economic crisis which should be used by the socialists in order 'to arouse the people and to remove capitalist class-rule'. Governments were warned of the revolutionary dangers which might result from a war. We should keep in mind that, at this time, the Second International had practically no non-European sections, and that only German Social Democracy had a strength comparable with the present one of the French and Italian Communist parties; Bolshevism was a trend struggling for ascendancy within the Russian party though, as one sees, fully recognized as a factor in the International.

The idea that any socialist could welcome war as the opportunity for socialist revolution<sup>2</sup> never arose: the difference during the First World War between those supporters of the anti-war decisions of the Second International who eventually formed the Communist movement and those who remained Social Democrats, concerned merely the question of what should be done once war had broken out. Even before the arrival of the atom bomb no socialist and no Communist ever desired war as the occasion for revolution: when, in 1928, Bukharin made statements which might have been interpreted as expressing an expectation that the next wave of socialist revolution might follow from a war, they were immediately denounced by the CPSU as revealing undue scepticism with regard to the prospects of socialist revolutions arising from conditions of economic depression.

The Comintern's influence upon the revolutionary movement in the colonial and semi-colonial countries operated in a dual, and partly contradictory way. On the one hand, it served as the lever through which the Russian-Bolshevik conception of the 'revolutionary dictatorship of the workers and peasants, elaborated in 1905, and that of 'Peasants' Soviets', adopted already in the theses of the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920, were pressed upon the west-European Communist parties, with their fully urban outlook, and upon the Eastern Communist parties, in particular that of China, which were founded by intellectuals with a purely bookish knowledge of Marxism. On the other hand, the Comintern's centralism soon operated as a limitation upon efforts to go further in the adaptation of Marxist concepts, for example, to Chinese conditions.<sup>3</sup> Organizational and ideological centralism as a means of bringing about unity in the international socialist movement proved disastrous. *Pravda*, on June 16, 1964, implicitly rejected the 'Twenty-one conditions for Admission to the Comintern' and similar documents, when it published an interview given by an old-standing Japanese Communist under the heading 'I do not recognize my "expulsion" from the CP Japan's'. Having recently visited the city of Nagasaki and realized the feelings of its population... had supported in Parliament the ratification of the Test Ban Treaty. This action was taken in defiance of a party decision, adopted by the Central Committee of the CPJ against... his own and his friends' votes; he was duly expelled by the Maoist majority of the Japanese Central Committee. In compensation for such a state of things in the Japanese Communist Party, Mr. Tomomi Narita, the leader of the much stronger Socialist Party of Japan contributed an article to *Pravda* (July 13, 1964) in which Soviet peace policies, including of course the Test Ban Treaty, are fully supported, and hence, by implication the Maoist standpoint is rejected.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup>Readers, however, should not forget that the Trotsky-inspired criticism of the Comintern's China policies, current in the west, is directed, not as with Mao, against the transfer to China of the concept of the working class guided dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, but against failure to call, in 1927, for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasant peasantry.

<sup>3</sup>Especially, China is mentioned only in protest against the failure of the U.S.A. and of the Japanese Government to recognize her lawful government—a point on which there can be no disagreement amongst sincere supporters of peace.

The timing of Mao's break with the majority trend in Communism is open to doubt. Such things happen, as a rule, by an accumulation of comparatively minor disagreements until, eventually and particularly where state interests are involved, all past disagreements are generalized and exaggerated. For example, Miss Engelborgh-Bertels' observations about the non-aggression pact concluded by the USSR with Japan in 1941 which, set the Siberian divisions free to save Moscow—and perhaps also the Chinese revolution—in the December battle, appear to me as retrospective reflections of what, mildly, may be described as romantic nationalism as opposed to ordinary common sense in which Mao, as a rule, is not lacking. On the other hand, I think that Mohit Sen is inconsistent when quoting, with approval, both Wan Ming's report to the Seventh Congress of the Comintern (which was far more reserved in supporting the United National Front than was Mao at that time) and the Tsunyi meeting, held a few months before on a rest during the 'long march', at which the Politburo installed by the Comintern and so headed by Wan Ming was deposed. Eventual agreement to these changes by the CPSU was conditioned by its obvious interest in the anti-Japanese United National Front. As regards the interpretation of the driving forces of the Chinese revolution, O. W. Kuusinen, the last survivor of the Comintern leaders of those days, has never been convinced of the correctness of Mao's standpoint, even for China only: in a speech made on the February, 1964 plenary meeting of the CPSU (and published, after Kuusinen's death, in *Pravda*, May 19, 1964, as a kind of political testament) he asserted that the Comintern, however much it may have erred in its criticism of Mao's neglect of the urban workers, was fully right.

Kuusinen, and those who reprinted his speech have, however, failed to make clear what, in their opinion, the Chinese party should have done once the possibility of a revolution different from that originally intended had become evident. These new conditions were the result of the complete failure of all efforts at organizing the urban workers after the defeats of 1927, taken together with the success of the peasants' guerilla war which, eventually, broadened to an all-national basis in the defence against Japanese aggression. Chinese Communists could not refine the possible, in the sense in which Trotsky once said that in certain circumstances the Russian Communists, abandoned by the Western working class, might have to say (paraphrasing Engels) 'we have come too early.' Such an attitude, even if conceivable after a long civil war which had

In the first number of this journal several authors sought the nature of coexistence. They found that minimally two persons or states must put up with one another with little communication, but that maximally there was a meaningful communication leading to interdependence.

To be effective, a state of coexistence must involve a search for an effective mode of communicating connotative as well as denotative meanings of activities and statements. Perhaps the greatest experience we have in cross-cultural communication is with colonialism.

Since World War II most of the colonies of the world have been turned into independent nations. The exceptions are some small island communities of the Pacific, a few outliers such as the Portuguese colonies in Africa and Indonesia, and the vast reaches of Soviet central Asia.

Colonialism is a political and economic form characterized by two major conditions; one can be called the principle of the working misunderstanding, the other the principle of the absentee sovereign. The interaction between these two principles leads always to basically the same form of social structure (even when its superficial decoration is very different) and, interestingly enough, to a single structure of events (even when the history in which they are played out seems totally diverse).

#### THE WORKING MISUNDERSTANDING

The essence of colonialism is that there are always two, often opposed, ways of looking at the power system and at the world in general; one is that of the colonizing power and the other represents the views of the colonized peoples. The two viewpoints grow naturally and silently out of different cultural viewpoints and goals. The colonizers and the colonized have many cultural disparities. Thus, one group reacts to any given situation in a way quite at odds with the reaction of the other group.

Such a situation—the colonial condition—must not be confused with two-party government or other forms of regulating opposed views in government matters. Such parties have different views and often different aims. They will usually disagree on means and often on ends and goals of the society. But, for all that, they usually understand one another—only too well. They share the major elements of their culture—particularly those unstated assumptions about the ultimate nature of God, society, the good life, and the value of the human being. All governments contain such opposed views, even if there is no recognized "opposition."

Colonialism presents a different picture from encapsulated opposition: in a colony the ruling group sees the local situation in terms of categories and problems—indeed, in terms of the very words—that they learned "at home" in quite a different polity and economy. Their schools, their families, their books and art galleries, plays and political associations all go towards shaping their opinions. And besides opinion, people absorb from these institutions basic axioms for viewing the world and thinking about life and about power that they do not even know they hold.

The members of the subject group, in the same way, look at the situation with eyes and ideas grown accustomed to the local scene. They do so in words, moral and ethical values, and expected responses that have been learned largely unconsciously and that have remained unconscious. The "ways" of nature and of the world are simply perceived and communicated differently by the two.

In an African colony, the political and economic situation was assessed by the European rulers in terms of European culture; the same situation was assessed by Africans in terms of their various African cultures. Their common heritage and their common humanity assured that for some matters the two evaluations were complementary. Just as surely, their separate histories led them to view other matters divergently. The result of their rubbing shoulders and ideas was not common understanding so much as it was a more or less fortuitous confluence of some aims and purposes, accompanied by a constant suspicion of tyranny, stupidity, or lack of good faith when things did not turn out as expected. Such is the nature of the "working misunderstanding."

In a situation such as African colonialism, the power system, as it would be seen by a social scientist, was not what it appeared to anybody on the ground. Communication was faulty—not merely incomplete, for communication is probably never total—but faulty. There were two sides and neither really knew the "codes"—the connotations of word and deed—in which the other group perceived the situation, valued it, communicated about it, and acted.

#### THE ABSENTEE SOVEREIGN

The second major characteristic of all colonial systems is that the most important decisions in the policy and economy of the colony are made by the ruling power (with more or less reference to the colonized peoples, and always subject to the working misunderstanding) primarily on the basis of factors operative in the metropolitan country rather than on the basis of factors operative in the colony itself.

The absentee sovereign leads inevitably to one of two possible outcomes: to tyranny on the one hand and to paternalism on the other. There is undoubtedly a continuum between tyranny and paternalism, and in some situations people find the one as distasteful as the other. If the rulers are "kind" (a very complex concept), or if they have "the interests of the people at heart" or consider their own "mission civilisatrice" as putting more "responsibility" on them than on the colonized peoples, one of the many forms of paternalism results. If, on the other hand, the rulers are selfish and exploitative the result can be labelled tyranny. Many a colonial official has been deeply hurt when, after thirty years of selfless service to a colony, he has been charged with tyranny by a subject people who do not distinguish tyranny from paternalism but see only the disjunction between their own cultural views and aims and those of the colonizing powers.

#### COLONIAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The result of these forces is a singularly static form of society in the midst of which great material and ideational changes can and do take place. The static quality emerges not from any inability on the part of the governed, or from any basic desire by the governors to "keep a country backward," as has often been charged. Rather it arises from a desire on the part of the rulers to keep the situation predictable.

The British in Africa—and they are my target only because I know their situation better than any other—made several revealing reversals in their own cultural attitudes in order to accommodate those greater "virtues" that they believed their culture had to offer Africans. One of the primary purposes of British administration was always to make the law "sure" or "certain"—this aim is based on the British idea that it is a virtue to maintain certain legal rights underlying democracy. Indeed, the "certainty of the law" was, in British eyes, one of the major virtues that they had to impart. They did not find the "law" to be "certain" in their African possessions, so they set about creating certainty; and in doing so, they of course used the tools and the institutions with which they were familiar and which they knew to "work." They established a hierarchy of responsible officials, and new systems of courts; they began to write down those aspects of "native law and custom" with which they did not want to interfere.

"Responsibility" is a word that turns up, in some form, in all European languages with a predominantly Latin vocabulary; it has been translated into the languages with predominantly Germanic vocabularies (*Verantwortlichkeit*). It is, nevertheless, a concept that is very difficult to express in most African languages. African cultures, of course, recognize obligations towards kinsmen and towards officials that Europeans would call "responsibilities." But in the African view the obligation is towards people, not towards principles or a "system." One does not have "responsibility" towards an idea or to a position in a system; most of all, the African idea does not extend to the proposition: "You are responsible, you take the rap!"

When the European governments sought and found the politically "responsible" Africans, they did not extract only that part of the total meaning of "responsibility" which was in fact shared. Understandably enough, they brought the entire field of their commutation with them. The result was, of course, that they never considered African officials totally "responsible" in the context of colonial government.

The European colonial powers found in many parts of Africa a highly organized means of settling disputes that had much in common with the courts with which they were familiar—judges, witnesses, rules of evidence, and jurat pomp and ceremony. Under the zeal of paternalism, and the philosophy of cultural evolution, they set about improving and "evolving" these courts into the more "efficient" mechanisms that they knew. In doing so, they credited Africans with understanding more of such intentions than was actually the case. The courts they established were not merely more "efficient," but in many cases they were different in kind—many disputes could no longer be heard, and the right of judicial compromise was denied.

Perhaps most important of all was the European fetish for writing down the law, which practice has still not run its course. Accompanying the writing down of the law was a constant worry that the administrators were "freezing" the system so as actually to imperil the changes they themselves wanted to make—certainly a well-founded fear. Yet, there was widespread belief that it is possible to write down a law or set of laws without changing it significantly. The point was missed: "it" may not be changed, if the "it" is the particular rule itself. But the whole "it" is bigger: it included the substantive law, the way it is enforced, the attitude towards law and ultimately the social philosophy of justice and of the relationship between a man and his government.

The British case is particularly interesting, because the British so passionately defend their "unwritten" constitution at home, and so tense Americans about the difficulty of amending theirs. Having an unwritten constitution provides suppleness. Yet, in Africa, the British wrote down constitutions in order to supply certainty (the very while they were stating that they feared loss of suppleness to changing conditions).

The point is obvious: throughout, the British administrations were providing (so they thought) the very "security" of the law that they found in Britain and missed in Africa. They did not realize that the sureness and security in Britain came from a sureness of culture, not merely a sureness of the law. Where there is cultural security and predictability, an unwritten constitution is handy and easily adaptable. The British did not find the African system predictable—they did not sufficiently know the culture involved. So they wrote down the law, appointed "responsible" officials, and established "better organized" courts.

It is just this very procedure that gives to all British colonies, at any one time, the same type of formal social and political structure. The result is a "freezing" of social change, development, and growth. It takes place not merely at a slower rate, but at a pace and in a direction dictated from outside.

As a result, colonies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries all have a fascinating similarity—and that similarity comes from the superficial (though sometimes powerful) institutions of the colonizers, implanted on peoples who do not fully comprehend the rules that have been assigned them. The British idea of "indirect rule" provides a ready example. This label applies to a method for trying to "maintain" the power system of an indigenous society, while looking it to a supererogatory alien system of power. The fiction could then be maintained that the authorities continued to operate just as they always had. The result was, of course, uniform throughout the British Empire (in spite of local variations in detail). The British in Nigeria (say) established a colonial system with a governor, a lieutenant-governor, a series of provincial commissioners, and under them a number of district commissioners. The names and titles changed from one country to another — the hierarchical structure did not. Then, at a certain point, the "chiefs" fitted in, with their graduated subordinates. The "native administration" always linked in, via courts and council meetings, with the alien administration.

Precisely the same type of organization was to be found in Fiji, and indeed everywhere else there was British administration. The difference is that in Nigeria, the titles of the various officials were given in local languages such as Hausa, Yoruba, or Ibo whereas in Fiji, they were given Fijian names. In both cases it could be said by the aliens, "This is a traditional system." Yet from a longer view, British colonies form a single "type" society—and they differ only in detail from French and Belgian colonies.

In Africa, there are several characteristics of colonial social structure to be examined. The societies within a colony are frozen not merely in time, but in space—in spite of the fact that mobility of *individuals* becomes vastly increased. Moreover, colonies are externally at peace—there may be "uprisings" but there are no wars, except insofar as the colony takes the side of the metropolitan power in her wars. Colonies must have monetary systems that are congruent, in one way or another, with the monetary systems of the metropolitan power so that trade can be carried on, exports delivered, and—in recent decades—aid given from the metropole to the colony. Monetary systems both presuppose and create vast networks of contract. There are literally hundreds of other requisites, but these three will provide sufficient examples for our present purpose.

Africa was, before colonial days, full of people on the move. Because of the ways Africans provided for their own subsistence, and because of social, political, and even religious pressures, Africans moved and kept moving. The creation of colonial administration concomitantly created a need to know where everybody was. Moreover, the European background of the administrators told them that people should own their own land, have rights in it against others and against the world, should be citizens of a stable, and indeed of a fixed, local community. And that meant boundaries.

Boundaries existed in Africa before the Europeans arrived there; but they are better thought of as "marches" than as "borders." They were cultural marches; the "adjoining places" of communities rather than legal dividing lines. Seldom were there, for any extended periods of time, marks on the land—although in a few areas of Africa they might be represented by streams or boulders, for short periods of time. One of the most important of all colonial activities was the splitting up of Africa, not just among nations, but among the Africans themselves, by means of legally enforceable boundaries. The whole basis of society was changed from what it had been—groups of people, held together by kingship, kinship, or religion, who occupied and exploited a more or less clearly defined area. It became vast numbers of areas, each occupied by people with citizenship rights in it. The difference may appear small, but the resultant misunderstanding was of staggering proportions.

Into what had been an extremely dynamic situation of migrations, wars, and movement, peace was thrust by fiat. Africa became the homeland of the Pax Britannica, the Pax Gallica, the Pax Belgica. Thus, not only was the law changed and the political territories frozen in space, but the political units were not allowed to fight one another. To peoples accustomed to the nineteenth century wars in Europe and South Africa and to World War I, such a situation appeared to be no more than the dawn of the new era. Whatever it may appear to Europeans in the second half of the twentieth century, it was considered by some Africans in the first half a serious deprivation—at the same time that they recognized its advantages. Certainly, however, it worked untold changes in the power and authority systems within African societies.

At the same time, the colonial peace created a situation in which individuals were safe far from home; colonial trade made available goods worth travelling to get. Therefore, as movement of social groups ceased, individuals began to travel far from home. Road and railroad networks began to appear—often excellent within a country, although the effects of colonialism are clearly visible on any railroad map of Africa, because the railroads of one colony do not connect with those of adjoining countries, but only link the "hinterland" with the seaports. The mode of movement within Africa thus changed fantastically: Africa is still a continent on the move, but the units of movement are now travelling individuals instead of migrating social groups.

Finally, the possibilities of travel and trade were given a fillip by the introduction of general purpose money. There were currencies of limited range in many parts of Africa before European impact. But with colonialism, the range of currency became total (that is, the same money could be used for any purpose that any money at all could be used for).

Trade, individual movement, currency, responsible officials, boundaries—it can all be summed up in another major, and all but useless, development: the growth of contract and public law. Economic growth and large-scale political organization functioning in the world as it is now organized, demand highly developed contract concepts and contract and public law. And the "sureness" of law comes to be even more an overt concern the greater the province of contract and public law in the social fabric. In Africa the growth of "civil law" set in—a growth that is continuing at an even greater pace in the free nations of post-colonial Africa.

To repeat the leitmotif: changes were made because the governors and the governed saw the problems differently, because the governors had the power to innovate regardless of the views of the governed, and because the misunderstanding could only grow. Nobody is to blame. There is no way in which guilt or innocence, good or bad, can be attached to these aspects of colonial activity. They exist and are part of it.

Yet, despite the misunderstandings, there has been a mesh of interpenetration of the cultures concerned, and in the attempt to "educate" clerks, book-keepers, catechists and technical assistants, many Africans were taught to read. Once that happens, the gates are open, and the Africans either come to understand—or misunderstand—a greater proportion of the European culture and to want it, or else their reading must be curtailed. At the same time, if the colonial situation is to be maintained, the absentee sovereign must exert itself. Therefore, if the "working misunderstanding" ceases to operate, the principle of the absentee sovereign is brought into play—not by wickedness or the desire to exploit, but by the exigencies of the situation. The moment that the principle of the working misunderstanding is over-riden, and cross-cultural translation, even of an inadequate sort, takes place, then the principle of the absentee sovereign is also over-riden, and the structural fault of basic instability of the colonial system appears.

#### COEXISTENCE AND CULTURAL TRANSLATION

What, from the colonial experience in Africa, can we learn about the nature of co-existence? First of all, that the problem of communication between different cultures must be recognized, and second that the power system between co-existing persons, groups, or nations is intricately interrelated to the communication process. However, the power system no longer is dominated by the absentee sovereign, which is replaced by what we can call the principle of the multicentric power system. It is also evident that in the absence of a single sovereign, the inadequacies of the working misunderstanding become immediately and aggressively apparent. A principle of transcultural translation must be devised that will work, or at least give some semblance of working. Therefore, the basic demands of a stable system of co-existing states are means of controlling multicentric power systems and means for achieving transcultural translation.

States are an example of a unicentric power system, no matter how pluralistic they may be. They are ultimately, if they are to work, reducible to a single structure of power relationships on crucial matters. Ultimately, the state can be analyzed as a single hierarchy of power, albeit many modern democratic states are pluralistic in their institutionalization. The easiest form of the multicentric power system for us to see is the group of two or more nations treating with one another. However, it must be recognized that in many parts of the preliterate or primitive world the bicentric system may permeate the entire political system right down to the very household. In short, we must not confuse the political system with one of its manifestations—the state. Attempts to override national entities have too often sought the creation of a unicentric power system.

It is obvious that the point at which multicentric systems may differ most markedly from unicentric systems is that in the former there is a possibility of having more than one legal culture and more than one valational culture, and that on the other hand, in an apparent contradiction, there is a need for the two power systems to act in some matters in accord—indeed, as an entity—in the absence of permissible power sanctions, each providing sanction for the other.

The representatives of two such power systems and their accompanying culture viewpoints always, or often, have the problems that diplomats of other sorts so often experience—there is a tendency for them to "talk past one another." They lack the common understandings, or what the French call *representations collectives*, even to know when they are misunderstanding one another. Even if the individuals themselves achieve suitable communication, the message is garbled in the process of being fed back into the larger system, and to some of the representatives of it in the lower echelons, or to the general public. Such communications are always faced with the danger of being colored by egocentric and ethnocentric considerations which turn any attempt at cross-cultural communication into mutual recriminations.

Another way of looking at a multicentric power system is to consider it as a form of contract. For years, political philosophers talked about the "social contract", and then immediately confused themselves by looking for origins, and assuming that the origins of political behaviour were to be found in contractual association. Of course, they are not. However, the origins of certain types of multicentric political organizations are to be found in contract-like behaviour. Now, one of the primary forces at work must be to create a shared culture within which the independent cultures of the two treating centres can be, if not immediately translatable into one another, at least established in such a way so that it is known when they are not being translated into one another. In short, one of the unsolved political problems of the world—and it is also a legal problem—is how to achieve the institutionalization of power within a multicentric system without creating an agency of authority.

It is interesting to note that just as we have been able to define some of the problems of co-existence by reference to the problems of colonialism, so we may, in a sense, be able to sketch in some of the requirements for meeting the problem. Such an answer is to be found in the training of multicultural individuals to assume positions of influence. This is not what has been called disparagingly in some circles "internationalism"; it is rather a plea that at least some of the members of all societies be able to discuss with one another, and with full awareness of the pitfalls of ambiguity, the problems which face all. During the late 1940's and the 1950's in Africa and South Asia there came to the fore a group of people who had developed the capacity to speak and to feel both the languages and the cultures of the formerly colonized world, and of the colonizing powers. Nehru was no less an Indian merely because he, or so his sister claimed, dreamed in English. He was educated in England, and yet remained an Indian to the finger tips. In the same way, many African leaders hold the capacity within themselves to translate from one culture to another, simply because of the fact that they have habit patterns that they have picked up by intercommunication in each culture, and in order to create and maintain entities within themselves and their own minds it is necessary for them to put into some kind of perspective the differences and contradictions in the many cultures.

Today, both the Russians and the Americans do precisely the opposite—they foster what anthropologists call "avoidance" relationships as a device to ensure that their differences cannot become a *casus belli*. The result is that there are astonishingly few individuals who are able to translate from one cultural idiom to another, and the bicentric power system is deprived of any full or useful basis for achieving transcultural communication. Avoidance relationships never solve problems, but only form an admission, never based on essayed fact, that the problems would appear to be insurmountable. In such a situation, it is difficult to create a cadre of multicultural people. Yet, a multicentric power system depends, if it is to work, on the existence of multicultural persons and recognized modes of transcultural translation and of knowing when communication is not being effected.

In colonialism, the working misunderstanding led to a rejection of the absence sovereign. In the Cold War, the lack of transcultural communication led to a denial of the bicentric power system.

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CENTRE EUROPÉEN DE CO-ORDINATION DE RECHERCHES ET  
DE DOCUMENTATION EN SCIENCES SOCIALES

Vienne I, Baumgartenstr. 1  
le 3 mai 1964

Monsieur le Docteur Rudolph Schlestinger,  
Editor, CO-EXISTENCE,  
Erveroch, Kilmun by Dunoon, Argyll, Scotland.  
Monsieur le Professeur.

Le Comité Directeur du Centre Européen des Sciences Sociales a pris connaissance avec un vif intérêt, au cours de sa séance extraordinaire du 20 avril 1964, de l'ensemble des informations communiquées par vos soins au sujet de la revue 'Co-existence'.

Le Comité Directeur salue l'initiative que vous avez prise de publier une revue d'études comparatives pour assurer une meilleure compréhension internationale dont les buts et l'esprit ont toute sa sympathie. Il est heureux qu'un groupe de personnalités aussi éminentes dirige cette publication; il vous prie de vous faire son interprète auprès de celui-ci pour l'assurer de son soutien moral.

Il vous autorise à publier cette lettre dans le numéro prochain de votre publication, auquel il souhaite un plein succès.

Veuillez croire, Monsieur le Professeur, à l'expression de mes sentiments de haute considération.

(Sign.) Prof. Adam Schaff,  
Président du Comité Directeur du Centre Européen  
de Coordination de Recherches et de Documentation  
en Sciences Sociales.

NOTE D'INFORMATION SUR LE  
CENTRE EUROPEEN DE COORDINATION DE RECHERCHES ET DE  
DOCUMENTATION EN SCIENCES SOCIALES  
Bayermarkt, 6, Vienne I, Autriche.

La création du Centre Européen de Coordination de Recherches et de Documentation en Sciences Sociales répond au besoin d'un organisme susceptible de promouvoir des recherches comparatives européennes en Sciences Sociales, groupant des pays de structures sociales et économiques différentes.

En 1962, lors de la 12ème session de la Conférence Générale de l'Unesco, une résolution adoptée par la Conférence Générale autorisait le Directeur Général de l'Unesco à faciliter l'établissement à Vienne du Centre Européen de Coordination de Recherches et de Documentation en Sciences Sociales avec la coopération du Conseil International des Sciences Sociales et l'assistance du gouvernement autrichien.

Le Centre Européen de Coordination de Recherches et de Documentation en Sciences Sociales est une dénomination du Conseil International des Sciences Sociales. C'est le Comité International des Sciences Sociales qui a désigné pour diriger le Centre un Comité Directeur composé des personnalités scientifiques suivantes:

*Président:* Prof. A. Schaff (Académie des Sciences de Pologne).  
*Vice-Président:* Prof. A. Robinson (International Economic Association, Cambridge, Grande Bretagne).

*Members:*  
Prof. A. A. Aronovitch (Institut de l'Economie Mondiale et des Affaires Internationales, U.R.S.S.).

Prof. S. Groenmann, Président du Conseil International des Sciences Sociales (Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht, Pays Bas).

Recteur R. Kerschagl (Hochschule für Welthandel, Autriche).

Prof. V. Knapp (Académie des Sciences, Tchécoslovaquie).

Prof. J. Stoetzl (Centre d'Etudes Sociologiques, France).

M. Szabcs-Likierics, actuel Secrétaire Général du Conseil International des Sciences Sociales, participe à toutes les réunions du Centre de Vienne et assure les liens entre le Centre de Vienne et l'UNESCO.

Le Secrétariat permanent du Centre, à Vienne, comprend notamment: un secrétaire scientifique responsable de la marche du Centre (M. H. Raymond) et un secrétaire administratif faisant fonction de secrétaire général (M. A. Grulich).

Dès sa première réunion, en septembre 1962, le Comité Directeur a décidé le lancement d'un certain nombre de projets de recherches.

*Le Directeur du Projet* groupe autour de lui des spécialistes représentant les Instituts scientifiques européens intéressés. Le projet de recherche est initié par ces dix Instituts qui désignent et peuvent prendre part à la recherche envisagée. Le Centre de Vienne est à la disposition des *Directeurs des projets* et des Instituts pour la coordination, la préparation et la documentation des recherches.

Les recherches sont exécutées dans chaque pays sous la responsabilité et l'autorité entière des Instituts qui prennent part au projet. De même, des Instituts conservent le contrôle des résultats qui font éventuellement l'objet de publications communes.

Le Centre de Vienne est donc un lieu de rendez-vous pour les spécialistes de divers pays européens et de diverses disciplines. Il s'efforce de faciliter la mise en route, sur le plan national, des projets de recherche comparative, en accord total avec les Instituts et les personnalités scientifiques responsables à l'échelle nationale.

Cette action, le Centre de Vienne l'accomplit par l'intermédiaire des personnalités scientifiques de son Comité Directeur. Il peut aussi solliciter le concours des institutions internationales qui son représentées aux réunions du Comité Directeur par des observateurs.

A sa seconde réunion, en février 1964 à Vienne, le Comité Directeur du Centre de Vienne a examiné les rapports des Directeurs de projets; nous donnerons ci-après un bref résumé concernant les projets qui ont été ou seront mis en route au cours de l'année 1964.

## 1. IMAGE DU MONDE DESARME.

Cette recherche psycho-sociologique sur les images que se font d'un monde désarmé des personnes de pays à structure sociale et économique différente est dirigée par le Prof. Stoetzl (Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris). Y participent le Peace Research Institute (Oslo), le Centre de Recherche pour l'Opinion Publique (Varsovie). Dans cette recherche d'opinion, il n'est pas question d'utiliser les réponses des personnes interrogées comme autant d'indicateurs de ce qui devrait se faire ou de ce qui se fera, mais plutôt de voir:

- comment les personnes interrogées structurent un monde qui n'existe pas encore,
- comment on peut expliquer le monde de structuration des images présentes.

La première réunion du groupe de travail chargé du projet a eu lieu à Vienne les 10 et 11 janvier 1964 avec la participation des représentants des Instituts de dix cites.

## 2. FORMES DE L'AIDE AUX PAYS EN VOIE DE DEVELOPPEMENT.

Le projet de cette recherche comparative sur les formes et les concepts de l'aide aux pays en voie de développement a été élaboré par le Prof. A. Aronovitch et A. Robinson. Il a été discuté à une réunion d'experts à Vienne du 16 au 18 avril 1964.

L'Observatoire de Développement (Londres), l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (Paris), le Centre de Recherches pour les pays en voie de développement (Varsovie), l'Institut d'Economie et de Politique (Prague), reçoivent pour les études prévues par ce projet une aide du Département des Sciences Sociales de l'UNESCO, La Hochschule für Welthandel (Vienne) participera également aux travaux.

Le but général du projet, tel qu'il a été élaboré sous sa forme définitive par la réunion d'experts est de répondre à la question: quelles sont les formes de l'aide les plus efficaces? Comment les formes actuelles de l'aide pourraient être améliorées?

## 3. BUDGET DE TEMPS ET INDUSTRIALISATION

Ce projet est dirigé par M. A. Szilaf (Académie des Sciences de Hongrie). Il se propose:

- de comparer les changements dans les budgets de temps et le degré d'industrialisation, c'est-à-dire le changement dans les occupations journalières au sein de populations plus ou moins urbaines.

b) d'examiner l'effet du travail en équipe sur les emplois du temps des travailleurs. Ce problème affecte des secteurs de plus en plus importants de l'activité industrielle.

Un certain nombre d'Instituts ont déjà donné leur accord pour la participation à ce projet de recherches:

- Académie des Sciences de Hongrie
- Centre d'Etudes Sociologiques, Paris
- Université de Cologne (Département de Sociologie)
- Ecole des Sciences Politiques et Sociales, Université Catholique de Louvain (Belgique)
- Institut pour l'Economie et l'Organisation de la Production Industrielle (Académie des Sciences de l'URSS, Moscou/Sibirie).

Une réunion de mise au point de projet a eu lieu à Budapest au mois de septembre 1964. Les premiers résultats pourraient être connus vers le milieu de l'année 1965.

## 4. DELINQUANCE DE LA JEUNESSE DANS L'EUROPE D'AUJOURD'HUI

Ce projet est dirigé par le Prof. St. Walczak (Université de Varsovie). Il s'agit d'étudier le rapport entre les processus consécutifs aux diverses industrialisations et le délinquance des jeunes. A l'occasion d'un colloque international organisé en automne 1964 à Varsovie par le Centre de Vienne et l'Académie des Sciences de Pologne les données existantes dans divers pays européens sur ce problème ont été discutées, le projet prévoit le lancement de recherches par les Instituts intéressés dans le cadre d'un plan concerté d'études comparatives.

## 5. REGIONS EN RETARD DES PAYS INDUSTRIALISES

Sous la direction du Prof. S. Groenmann ce projet se propose d'abord d'examiner les traverses existants dans divers Instituts d'Europe sur le développement des régions en retard. Définissant les critères de ce que l'on appelle le "retard" d'une région et les caractéristiques qui s'y attachent (et qui qualifient), le projet traitera sous une forme comparative des politiques de développement, en y incluant les techniques de planification régionale.

## 6. PLANIFICATION GLOBALE COMPAREE

Ce projet, dirigé par M. C. Groussin traite des rapports de la planification, de ses techniques, de ses méthodes avec:

- La prévision technologique.
- Cette étude méthodologique posera la question: dans quelle mesure et à avec quels moyens la prévision du développement technologique et scientifique peut-elle influer sur le plan?

b) Les Sciences Sociales appliquées à la planification.

Cette partie du projet propose d'examiner comment les techniques et méthodes de planification peuvent être améliorées et transformées par les connaissances sociologiques et psycho-sociologiques sur nos sociétés.

c) Connaissance de l'opinion.

La connaissance de l'opinion permet-elle de former une stratégie du plan? A quel niveau, dans les différents plans? Telle est la question à laquelle la troisième partie du projet se propose de répondre.

La première réunion d'un groupe de travail consacré à ce projet de recherches aura lieu en 1964 à Paris.

## 7. LES ASPECTS SOCIO-JURIDIQUES DE L'INDUSTRIALISATION

Ce projet, dirigé par le Prof. V. Knapp (Tchécoslovaquie) examinera les repercussions sur le droit des divers pays européens des phénomènes du développement économique et social. Il se propose notamment d'étudier la très importante question de la responsabilité, notion juridique que les transformations technologiques et socio-économiques ont fait considérablement évoluer dans les divers pays d'Europe.

D'autres projets sont en cours d'élaboration ayant trait à la sociologie urbaine aux attitudes psychologiques et sociales de la jeunesse dans l'Europe d'aujourd'hui, à la sociologie rurale, etc.

*War/Peace Report*, published monthly by War/Peace Report Inc., 4 East 14th Street, New York, N.Y. Editor, Richard Hudson. Subscription prices, \$3.00 per annum; educational rate (for schools, students, libraries, etc.), \$3.50 p.a. The following review refers to Nos. 4 (April) to 8 (June) 1964.

*Review of International Affairs*—Politics, economics, law, science (science), published as a fortnightly by The Federation of Yugoslav Journalists, Beograd, Nemanjina 24, P.O.B. 413. Chief Editor, Miodrag Miloricevic. Subscription, \$3.00 per annum. Reviewed are the issues from No. 339 (May 20th) to No. 343 (July 20th) 1964.

The two journals here reviewed differ in many points, notwithstanding the common concern of a sincere desire for peace and the occurrence of certain events during the period under review. One of them is a non-official American publication, issued with the support of a board of sponsors not all the members of which can be described as pacifists in the ordinary sense of the word. The other emerges from a Communist yet non-aligned country (with some contributions from other non-committed countries, in particular India). Its authors may be regarded as more or less representative, if not of the official views of the country of publication, then of those of other members of the non-aligned group of states.

The *Review of International Affairs* is not exclusively devoted to the problems described in its title. In this journal, however, we find not least with the much smaller section which is devoted to the problems of individual countries, including Yugoslavia, Israel, etc.

In two journals so different, certain contemporary events are bound to be seen in different perspectives, even if near-identical solutions are arrived at. The April issue of *War/Peace Report* starts with a discussion of experts on the possibility of a neutralization of Vietnam, leading to the prospect that a South-Vietnamese settlement, by direct negotiation or French mediation, might result in the transfer of power to a broad political combination, within which the weight of the (Communist) left-wing would be likely to increase, while a neutralist attitude would be preserved. Such an outcome, though unavoidable from the point of view of supposed U.S. interests, is regarded as a consequence of the American failure to come to terms with the National Liberation Front while the Communist influence within it was still weak. It is accepted by the *War/Peace Report* only as a minor evil compared to the unending continuation of a hopeless war, not to speak of its possible extension. It would enjoy the full sympathies of the *Review of International Affairs*. This sympathy extends—not just as some unavoidable result of bargaining—to the non-aligned as well as to the leftist aspect of the proposed solution. Non-alignment is conceived not only as an institution devised primarily by consideration, but also as a mode of co-operation between states with similar interests in peace, their temporary belonging to different blocs notwithstanding. No. 342-3 of the *Review*, apart from an article by N. Opacic on The New Non-Aligned Conference, of which more below, brings also articles on Italian Co-operation, touching on Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania (L. Moiser), and, at the occasion of the Khrushchev visit, on 'Scandinavia in East-West Relations' (R. Petkovic). In either case the positive aspects of inter-bloc co-operation are emphasized in countries particularly interested in forming bridges, without immediate demands for any country's leaving its bloc; though the authors obviously aim at an eventual 'withering away' of all the blocs. Petkovic's article appreciates the varied ways in which the individual Scandinavian countries serve the cause of peace—by contributing within NATO to the relaxation of international tensions, by the traditional neutrality of Sweden or the positively non-aligned neutrality of Finland—with a natural sympathy for the last-mentioned way, and in the hope that the relations of all Scandinavian countries to the USSR might become 'the most substantial example of co-existence in the sphere of East-West relations in general'.

No. 340 of the *Review of International Affairs* publishes an article by J. Djerrja, headed 'Different Contributions—Unequal Results'. From the viewpoints of the Great Powers concerned—the outcome of the U.S. policies towards Cuba, and of the Soviet policies towards the United Arab Republic are compared. Of the developments in the Caribbean area it is said that they:

... bear the stamp of the U.S. pre-election campaign, and thus the actual crisis may not be as acute as it appears on the surface. What is unfortunate is that too great a number of Americans have accepted the thesis on 'total victory' as the only means of dealing with the Cuban problem, and their readiness to protect the country's vital interests. But in fact the Cuban problem is nothing other than an opportunity for the Americans to show the world something they are willing to do even at the cost of their own national and continental interests, if any, with a small country which claims its independence right to live independently and to choose its own internal regime.

The May issue of *War/Peace Report* brings an extensive interview with Fidel Castro. He emphasizes the impossibility of exporting revolution from Cuba, just as it is impossible to import counter-revolution from the U.S.A. to Cuba. He suggests that, after three years of experience as president, Kennedy was on the way to correct the earlier mistakes of U.S. policies. We all know the tragic way in which this impending correction was executed in the course of events.

As to the Soviet policy towards the U.A.R., Mr. Ejerdtja, in the quoted article, concludes from the behaviour of Khrushchev and Nasser during the former's visit to Egypt 'the maturity and stability of the non-aligned and socialist orientation of the U.A.R., was fully manifested, while the Soviet policy of a new realistic and equal approach in the non-aligned and developing countries was markedly confirmed. But even where these attitudes were not quite identical, in all their aspects they were no obstacle to fruitful co-operation and understanding'. The italics in the above quotation are mine; the marked words show that the Yugoslavs, even after the recent rapprochement, do not conceive their non-alignment as identification with Soviet policies. *A fortiori*, descriptions—not in a toast, but in an article supposedly analytic—of Nasser's orientation as 'socialist' are likely to be a source of argument, not with the Chinese only.

The most American supporters of peace-policies, many contributors to the *War/Peace Report* suffer under a tendency to take for granted most of the assumptions of the predominant trends in U.S.A. and the 'images' of the 'prospective aggressor' and of the 'third world', artfully built up by the establishment. Thus, in fact, is the very setting within which the Goldwater candidate became possible. We have above noticed the fluidity with which 'neutralist' solutions to burning issues of foreign policies are defended as mere 'minor evils' instead of frankly stating that a policy of positive co-existence is the only one which can preserve the U.S.A.'s capacity to make further major contributions to the progress of mankind. If *War/Peace Report* says something about what the U.S.A. could positively do, it is in connection of relating the argument—certainly weighty with American politicians and the electorate—that disarmament means economic breakdown. In this connection W. D. Group, in the April issue, correctly states that disarmament does not mean... that every government would be set frantically to work with every other. It does not even mean that there would be no animosity or tension. It simply means that national power no longer could take a massive military form and that disagreements would no longer be settled by war (though possibly they would be settled by other violent means). What kind of violence.

These few... terms of settling power could be expressed. The great powers still desire to call attention to themselves by showcasing their arms, by showcasing their military and nuclear power, by showcasing their wealth, resources, buildings, parks by building hospitals as the world, by more events open to their own subjects... These things are not just matters. They are symbols.

Prof. Grunpp follows up this argument by enumerating a number of expenditure items—including increasing the conventional armaments of the U.S., both on its own, and on behalf of the UN—without even raising the question of what other UN members may have to say about a UN force financed and equipped by either of the 'Big Two'; space and atomic spendings, and most other forms of rivalry. With an implicit logic, to which we shall have later to return, rivalry is supposed to be a competition in non-economic expenditure; Grunpp does not even hint at the possibility that healthy rivalry—to speak with the leading article of the *Review of International Affairs*, No. 341, a policy of peaceful and active co-existence in the international economy—may, for its own sake, pursue 'the aim of promoting economic development throughout the world, and especially of stepping up economic growth in the "emerging countries"'. The June issue of *War/Peace Report* prominently features a statement by Walter Reuther where massive U.S. aid for the under-developed countries is suggested as a means to force the USSR (which evidently is supposed to interpret its own interests as being opposed to disarmament) to participate in it and thereby to set U.S. resources free for other more useful purposes. Yet (Reuther takes for granted) an image of the world within which, for example, the Republican platform for the 1964 Presidential election, can state that 'trade with Communist powers... could only be justified if it would serve to diminish their power' and—in relation to the development of the young nations—that 'America's tax revenues derived from free enterprise sources must never be employed in support of socialism'. Walter Reuther, and the editors of *War/Peace Report* assuredly dislike such concepts which contradict the old-standing liberal interpretation of trade as involving mutual benefits. Yet in their analysis of the 'war-industrial complex' I miss an address bluntly to counter the prejudices of a part of the electorate, fed as it is by the propagandist annexes of the 'complex', and to develop a positive image of an American dependent on real—not just propagandist—sources of strength, alternative to the 'cold war'.

For the Yugoslavs the positive character of their non-alignment policy is non-controversial: its very merits rest in its anti-colonial character and in the involved support for the emancipation of the ex-colonial countries. This is fully understandable but not yet an answer to the problems of progressive Americans who have to tackle the problems of their own country from its own, and not merely from a charity standpoint. The positive meaning of non-alignment is treated in the leading article (L. Ervez) of No. 339 of the *Review of International Affairs* and in a discussion article by Dinesh Singh (then Deputy Foreign Minister of India). Starting from the internal debates in India which followed the border conflict with China in 1962, Singh concludes that 'non-alignment as a basic concept remains unchanged; only new dimensions have to be added to it'. In this connection the argument concerns foreign policies only. Gavro Altman, however, arguing in the same issue against the Chinese dogmatists, of necessity argues the socio-economic implications of co-existence:

It goes without saying that co-existence has been and is still interpreted in various ways and it is inevitable that these interpretations also include such as are contrary to the essence of a socialist ideology of international relations. In the developed capitalist countries there have been and there still are attempts to use co-existence, even they cannot help anything, it is seen against progressive changes in society, to obstruct agreements on vital international problems or agreements for maintaining the status quo in social relations, and to guarantee spheres of interest in former and present colonies. There have been and there still are, on the other hand, attempts to use co-existence for certain socialist countries, Communist or socialist parties, with exaggerated emphasis on the priority of improved East-West relations, and with a lack of understanding for the needs and aspirations of some of the liberation movements and newly liberated countries. In practice this has meant insufficient support of these movements and has facilitated the Chinese, especially in its assumed role as the chief protector of interests of these movements and countries.

... Co-existence must be understood as the co-operation of independent, sovereign countries, regardless of the differences in their social systems, a co-operation in which they continue to violate and pressure in their mutual relations and which is (this should be particularly emphasized) a system of international relations based on the responsibility of the joint responsibility for eliminating the differences between the developed and the under-developed. There can be no talk of unequal victory for the principle of co-existence as long as there is a stable dependent territory, so long as every dominant and totalitarian has not been eliminated from international life.

In his above quoted article in No. 342-3, N. Opacic says that:

The non-aligned group has already been an obstacle to the struggle for peace and to the struggle for the elimination of all causes of international tension, since such instability... in numerous political activities this means an unprincipled struggle for the realization of all kinds of subordinate and subordinate interests... for the stability of all kinds of social, economic, political or economic conditions, for the preservation of important institutions in the life of newly-independent countries, for the elimination of colonial and imperialist relations in international economic life, for the amelioration of the economic and general conditions of the emergent nations, and for their inclusion in terms of equality in world trade and systems of labour.

It is natural that the Yugoslavs, starting from such an attitude, devoted quite a few articles to the World Trade Conference (one each in No. 339 and 340, two in 342-3) after its conclusion, with increasing optimism. On the other side, the direful outlook of the American peace-movement from international economic issues, and its tendency to deal with the under-developed countries only when in connection with one or the other of them a threat to peace—usually by threatened U.S. intervention—arises, have resulted in a practically complete neglect of that Conference in *War/Peace Report*. Yet the latter offers something which the Yugoslavs, living in a planned economy and insufficiently aware of the problems of western capitalism, fail to produce, namely a serious discussion of the economic problems of disarmament.

The comparatively optimistic attitude developed in the already quoted article by Prof. Grunpp did not for long satisfy its readers and editors. In the June issue they published a

From the context it is not clear when Mr. Altman has to raise when speaking of which countries and socialist parties not merely of industrial nations. He may have overlooked the difference in viewpoint between supporters of non-aligned co-existence according to whether they conceive it as stability associated with a bloc and, hence, essentially bound to emphasize the importance of understanding with the opposite bloc, whatever interpretation they ascribe to what I have called in the first issue of this journal, 'the broader concept of co-existence' or are mainly concerned with securing closer co-operation of the non-aligned countries, even which are under-mentioned.



highly critical letter, by John B. Gilmore from the Industrial Economics Division of the University of Denver Research Institute, and three positive attempts at approaching the problem—by Emily Hazzell (of Columbia), Charles M. Bliss, Chairman of the board of the Bank of New York, and Jan D. Segal, a leading officer of the I.U.E. of the AFL-CIO.

Gilmore joins issue with (a) Geisinger's taking for granted a very gradual process of disarmament—and hence a very modest amount of the resources to be diverted each year—and (b) his neglect of the specific character of the industries subject to disarmament (a point more specifically elaborated by Bliss) which implies very serious problems for the communities involved (a point particularly made by Segal) unless a positive answer, by national planning, is found. Bliss remarks that while, on the whole, a "mere" ten per cent of the U.S. labour force earn their livelihood as members of the armed forces or from defence employment in seven states (all in the west) more than twenty per cent of the manufacturing employment is in the defence industries. Not a mere quantitative but a qualitative problem is involved: 55 per cent of the engineers and scientists doing research work in American industries are engaged in defence and space programmes. As Gilmore notes, "the hard core of our defence production is becoming increasingly dissociated from the mainstream of our economy . . . largely segregated from the commercial market and its processes."

It appears the potentialities of the technologically most advanced parts of American industry already exceed the limitations of a capitalist market. Unless they are to be scrapped, they *have* to be absorbed and directed by public planning. All the contributors to the June issue of *War/Peace Report* draw, in diverse terminologies, this conclusion which is implied in the very nature of things: after all, the Republican platform also implies planning—though for destruction only. Why should it not be possible, to speak with Bennett, to develop "new, larger scale Research and Development programmes, organized and financed primarily by government, since the rewards will generally be too long range and indirect to be of interest to private investors unless the government guarantees a market?"

The answer lies, of course, in the political field—in what Senator Fulbright has called the American electorate's attachment to the Cold War. Prof. Bennett and the other contributors are very conscious of these difficulties, but they commit a mistake by taking for granted a certain politico-propagandist setting in a long-term discussion of life-and-death issues of the nation. In his argument against Prof. Cronin's expectation of a very slow disarmament process J. S. Gilmore quotes authors as different in their general views as Hertran Kaha and Arthur Waskow as authorities for the possibility that a disarmament agreement, to be carried out perhaps even in a few weeks' time, may be "triggerged off" by a nuclear confrontation, or perhaps a real nuclear accident. What, indeed, should happen if, for some reason or other, the present orientation of the American national economy towards "war production," to use P. Matlick's term, should break down?

\*Of his article in "Science or Society," *Dissident*, 1964.

Meanwhile they expect, and appreciate, a very gradual progress. The May issue of *War/Peace Report* gives a detailed survey of the individual disarmament issues under discussion, the June issue, a very pessimistic survey about the way in which the American Senate would vote in members of a Disarmament Treaty: the implication is that only small and implicit steps are likely. A not so different estimate of the short-term prospects (as distinct, of course, from the desirable developments) appears implied in the *Review of International Affairs*, No. 50 in Dr. Ivkovic's concentrated attack against such "big powers" as, within their military-political alliances derive, in fact, the value of certain initial agreements reached between East and West and . . . refute the possibility of the further process of the relaxation of international tensions. In her "military-political commentary," published in No. 53 of the *Review* under the heading "Moderate Optimism," M. Badyrina analyses various recent, and less well known measures of disarmament under the viewpoints that she reflected, in substance, technological obsolescence of those particular pieces of rocketry: a glance at the pages of *War/Peace Report* shows that, also in the opinion of its editors this is the kind of disarmament at present feasible or already in progress.

Yet such an appreciation of the present situation—probably correct—should induce supporters of a consistent peace policy to approach with extreme caution the various efforts, current since long, to certify the desirable characteristics of an international peace order from largely individualistic conceptions of the state and its growth, as evolved in Western Europe and particularly embodied in American constitutional ideology—less in American constitutional life, which protects the farmers' interest by the equal representation in the Senate of all states, large or small, just as the so-called "veto" protects the socialist third of mankind against being outvoted in UNO. The ideal type of an international peace order is not the sheriff's office of a "Western" who shoots down the law-breaker, the latter being classified as a foe by the supposed consensus of the community, but the conciliatory chamber in which the main three types of social organization co-existing at present meet; majority decisions being admissible only if they cross existing groupings instead of amounting to a misuse of the appearances of international organization for the lining up for the support of a certain alliance against one or more social formations. No institutional scheme eliminating the one or other aesthetic shortcoming say, in the voting procedure of UNO\* can contribute to the removal of the very serious political obstacles standing, at present, in the way of organizing peace.

\*Illustration in appearance rather than in substance. For example, the infusion of the votes from underdeveloped countries in Africa through the former colonial divisions are hardly compensatory for the fact that India and, after her withdrawal, China have only one vote for hundreds of millions of people.

In the February issue of *War/Peace Report* the editor, R. Hudson, entered that well-ploughed field by suggesting, in support of Disarmament Agreements, rules about a Peace-keeping Majority\* to be embodied in the UNO charter; suggesting the 'veto' in the Security Council should be replaced by the ruling, that UN intervention was admissible only by the concurrent votes of at least ten members of a Security Council enlarged to 25, and of a majority in the General Assembly representing the absolute majority of mankind. If these formal agreements are translated into practical policies, we see that the major capitalist powers, if in agreement say on South Africa, would enjoy a safety not less absolute than under the 'veto' system since with their closest friends they will hardly dispose of less than five votes even in a reformed Council; the under-developed countries would be fully safe if they proceeded with a minimum of homogeneity; the socialist countries, themselves representing a great third of mankind, would require the concurrent votes of non-communist countries with a total of about 400 million inhabitants, which is likely but not absolutely safe say, in the event of an aggression against Cuba, at a time when Sino-Indian disputes happen to be exaggerated. Yet in the April issue, L. B. Sohn (co-author with G. Clark of the book *World Peace through World Law*, described Hudson's suggestion as insufficient since already China and India, voting together—which they would probably do when the interests of all under-developed countries were involved—could block a majority. In his opinion "it is more important that nations which would have to pay for it should have a stronger voice in the decision". Pacifists who thought in such terms may reconsider their position after having read the Republican platform for the 1964 Presidential elections, which was adopted a few months after the quoted lines were written. For more correction of detail within the institutional approach is sufficient. Possible co-existence of states representing different social structures can emerge, not from generalizations from the process in which some Western constitutions came into being—or were, *ex post facto*, ideologically explained—but only from a prolonged effort at mutual understanding.

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