

WEEKEND XVIII, NOVEMBER 2, 1957

1. THE EARLY MARX	P. 1
2. COMMENTS ON MY "NOTES ON MARX" (Nov. 1, 1957)	P. 10
3. ROBERT OWEN	P. 11
4. FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGY - General Comments	P. 17
5. MANNHEIM	P. 20

NOTES

"THE ORGANIZATION MAN"	P. 22
INTERDISCIPLINARY PROJECT	P. 22

THE EARLY MARX

P. had lunch with Merton and told him about the early Marx. He knew nothing about the new publications. I should read the Adams book which has one important chapter. P. doesn't see why one needs urgently the rest of the book. This chapter is a precis and is a rare thing for anyone to produce in terms of Marxian philosophy in English.

He doesn't mention the Marx 1844 manuscript by any title and doesn't refer to it as a piece at all. All Adams says is that this was what Marx was thinking or writing in 1844. That reference is quite inadequate to identify this posthumous piece.

The Russians had republished this piece after the Landshut and Meyer edition in 1939. By that time Adams had already written the book. However, he says in his preface that he was following the Marx-Engels Institute edition. It means that the reader should assume that he had been following the Moscow edition.

To anybody who is knowledgeable the thing means something else. The German Ideology, insofar as it had not all been published, was published in 1932 but that volume also contained another publication which was a first publication and there was a voluminous introduction to it. Adams would have known the Landshut and Meyer and it was a convenient edition. But when Adams gave as his source the Moscow edition, he gave one edition which is common and therefore no communist can complain, i.e., that this is the German edition and inauthentic etc.

In the Russian edition, this manuscript has no title because it had none in the original. It had some kind of heading such as "the outline of

an introduction to the connection between economics and philosophy and law". The other point is that the sequence of the pages is doubtful because it is an unfinished manuscript. Also it is practically illegible and the end is unfinished, i.e. it takes on the form of a synopsis. But most of it is finished and the pagination which Marx gave is a preliminary pagination and if he had finished it it might have been different. P. thinks he has a different sequence of pages.

The Russians were extremely meticulous in their edition giving commas, dots, brackets, different versions etc. and it looked like a careful edition. Actually it was the opposite and it was not given in Marx' pagination. Also there were no comments attached and therefore was utterly useless, which was what they wanted in the first place. They had ignored Marx' philosophical works and they didn't think that this manuscript should upset this. Therefore Adams, not wanting to be accused of falsifying by the Communists, didn't show a different text and didn't mention the fact that it was not edited by Marx. That was up to a point controversial.

Adams studied it closely and tried to give a precis. This is very difficult and is possible only if you understand it 'au fond'. That is why he wrote the work and when he published it 8 years later he gave the Moscow source and didn't even mention the L. and M.

Macmurray wrote his book after discussing Marx in Vienna with K.P.

P. wrote The Great Transformation in 1940-42 and already knew the Adams. He came to America in August 1940 and started writing in '41. Ilona was already in America and he wrote the book through 1941 and '42 and had already read Adams.

Russians
unaware
of
Early Man.

It is a mystification to say that Marx ceased to be Hegelian or Feuerbachian. Marx says that Feuerbach is the start of modern economy. The Communist line is that Marx had forgotten and repudiated all that he had ever done, and that everything before 1845 didn't exist. They can quote a sentence in Capital where Marx and Engels say that they only coquetted with Hegel and ceased to be Hegelian. How is this possible when their philosophy was dialectical? No one was interested until Lenin said that dialectical materialism is the story of Marx.

One or two matters are obscure. One would have to look up the 1939 edition of Riazanov and Adoratsky and one must be careful to distinguish the 1938 edition which didn't contain it and the 1939 which did.

The Marx-Lenin library in England is the first English publication in 1940 which has the foot-note reference to the 1844 book. This is the only reference to it that K.P. knows in the Communist literature. Lenin didn't know this manuscript. It was in the social-democratic archives in Germany. Neither did Bukharin who was shot by 1939. These are all post-Lenin discoveries. The Russians bought the archive and took it to Moscow where it is treasured. In 1919 the Russians couldn't have had these manuscripts. The Russians got or stole other manuscripts from which they inferred that Marx had never seen the Antiführing except the last three chapters. P. read this in the Red paper in Hungary.

Max Weber took his leading and daring ideas from Marx' notes on Economic History.

In 1857-58, Marx published in Neue Zeit an outline of the sociology that he would like to write. It was the first attempt to carry out the

program conceived in 1844.

Bottomore and Rubel have a discussion of duality in Marx - the inter-action of man and nature. If you take freedom and technology you have a similar thing. Landshut said that Marx wanted to relate the world of thought and idea to society i.e., to the material tools and economy which made society ^vmore and have a history.

This is not as clear as the Hegelian antinomy of philosophy and society, but it is not entirely different. Marx was moving between two poles, but at the beginning he was trying to contrast Hegel's world with the actual world.

In the society of the time the moving element was already in 1844 the economy. Our society is primarily an economic one. But whether one stresses the machine (K.P.) or the market (Marx) is an important difference.

In Hegel it wasn't the machine but the market - and he took it from Ricardo.

Culture trays are stamped by technical factors, but there are reactions to these. For example, even though England is the home of the industrial revolution one sees how strongly ruralism is entrenched.

P. does not want to make the idea of alienation basic to Marx' thinking but one would have to know what role it plays, basic or not.

There is also in Marx a confusion of the term exchange which is implied in the division of labour and in the market. The market implies exchange but also the division of labour implies exchange irrespective of its form. There is therefore a confusion about the term alienation and to what it is due.

Landshut says that Hegel's "reason" is the rational element in society. This is also Owen but why does he think that rationalism would be the answer to humanism and technology. It is because he thought that reason was a sufficient guide to the transformation of society. Marx had the same conception. It also underlines Hegel's 'Iamunft' ('ratio').

Underlying Marx' socialist conception is the idea that the rational use of machinery is the full use of machinery. That society which uses it to the full is a socialist society because it somehow corresponds to the rational use of machinery. That is how the common people understand the socialist proposition. With the machine, reason becomes a principle of self-motion in society, (in the sense in which dialectic is self-motion).

In Hegel the mind evolves because it has its dialectical mechanism.

Myself: What would be an example of this mechanism?

A good example would be the change in the leading ideas of periods. Man moves from negation to negation, from conservatism to liberalism to socialism and the double negation is the synthesis. (It doesn't move back to the original). The change from one idea to another always has an element of negation and synthesis. It is the logical character of the mind which leads to the dialectic of history. The mind realizes itself in history and this is called the "spirit".

We should work backwards because we have at least one element of truth where we conclude. At article 258, the subject-predicate - (in Hegel's critique of the State) Marx goes on for 30 pages on these three paragraphs.

X He said that speculative philosophy makes out predicates that are the subjects ^{out of}

and this is the best way of putting it. It is a pun: it means something in grammar and logic but also a human being, (Subject). To say that the mind has as its predicates the family and the state is to reverse the thing as it is.

Hegel's dialectic is regarded as a stupendous achievement which he thought up altogether himself. Then he developed a logic, history, ethics, law. But then the mind which reveals itself in history is very sly. It does so only with the help of ruses. If you don't like this kind of thing you can get thoroughly annoyed.

My question: does this philosophy have a distinctively German feature?

The Germans achieved such a heightened power and therefore it became distinctively German. But Platonism etc. wasn't very different from Hegel. With Plotinus you have an emanational idea: the Godhead fills the world with its essence. This is not so different from what the Capital idea does.

My question: Is Hegel's philosophy compatible with Christianity?

The church didn't think so. They thought he made no effort for God in a sufficiently ceremonious way. God was only squeezed in. Others on the other hand, said that its meaningless unless it amounts to a theological concept. Whether the Idea creates the world or God does, is a meaningless difference. But Hegel didn't create his philosophy as a theological system. It spread to England only much later.

It is quite true that Marx does use the dialectic and doesn't make the Idea or Spirit a subject of history at all ever. This is foreign to Marxism.

His first writings were theological - the most important subjects were theological. The atmosphere he grew up in was that of the Enlightenment. But the Enlightenment was deist and not theologically-minded at all.

The point that we should have is the humanness of Marx and its representation in Feuerbach.

Man is the result of his history. He produces the irrigation works and the pyramids. Therefore man is a result of history through his works. These are the content of the civilization he makes up.

Man becomes what he is through history. In Hegel this happened through man's intellectual achievements. But Marx said that a normal man has also manual achievements which are physical. Then you don't get the pure process of thought. Man's economy is part of the achievement. Marx said that a university professor would have the view that man's achievements are only products of the mind. It's different if you dig a ditch or build a house.

In 1857 when he was 40, he reaffirmed his argument on the philosophic premises.

In 1859 he had the same idea and it isn't the young Marx but Marx the philosopher. The unity of Marx and Engels was unjustly assumed.

In 1844, Marx was still anti-communist but in 1847 he was a communist. The word communist was used only with the Manifesto. The view is that from 1844 to 1847 Marx changed his view on the basic questions.

P. suggests that the logical sequence of the manuscripts is one, three, two.

His Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsphilosophie - 130 pages, is enormously interesting for the expert (written 1841 or 42) and is all on freedom. It contains among other things a complete theory of Fascism. Hegel is anti-democratic in his whole corporation position. It is surprising X that no one ever found it. It is corporatism in 1841 or 42.

X We would have to assume that the 1857-58 links up with Marx' work plans.

Owen is the only utopian of whom Marx spoke with high respect.

Marx, in his critique of the Gotha program was anti-revolutionary. The Manifesto was written 30 years after Owen who came out publicly in 1813. The Manifesto is utterly and completely political and was on the eve of the revolution.

There is a term in Owen that he wanted the remoralization of society and we will have to have that. Marx was against dehumanization. Owen wanted to remoralize society by making it rational. Owen did discover capitalism and socialism insofar as society is transformed.

See Marx "Selected Works" volume 2, p. 550.

Owen discovered an economic system and a different society and had the whole idea of the transition. The transition is the realization of the reality of society. The Erfurt program was divided into two programs: the X final aim and the transition. The latter was the program for the present

society. Lenin developed the whole thing in the State and Revolution. Marx had it on pages 515 to 572. He developed it first (cf., 554 onward and 566).

Marx took part of it from Hegel who developed his 'burgerliche gesellschaft' from Ricardo. (See also Freedom and Technology - General Comments).

COMMENTS ON MY "NOTES ON MARX" (Nov. 1, 1957)

The material is generally correct but my notes have the wrong style. e.g., the second paragraph was never put that way before.

X Marx did think that nature is the creation of man - a human creation. It is just a meaningless fact without man. The sentence beginning "Marx interest was ..." is non Marxist. It is Utopia - e.g., Shelley.

A misplaced style is one which makes it impossible to get through to the subject on account of the perfection with which it presents the material and conclusions.

Landshut said that Marx found a world of philosophy which was perfect itself. What did Marx find wrong? In terms of method he said that it should be turned around to bring in the real world. He was after a philosophy, not an ideal state of society.

The matter of tone is my difficulty. I have a soup where the fish is like the steak. But if I get hold of a thing I can bring out its unique character.

Marx was faced with the market problem. He didn't have the whole problem, only the market problem.

In the end I make the right distinction between a technological civilization and its market form. I have the right beginning of the end.

ROBERT OWEN

In The Great Transformation in the chapter on pauperism, there is developed at great length the idea that the poor must be an asset to the nation. There was for example, a Bristol society - a national association for exploiting the poor, existing in 1695 or 1697. The idea that the poor ~~are~~ ^{are} as an asset to the nation led to the thought that the paupers must be an asset. Owen also wanted to make the paupers an asset to the capitalist. This was not the idea of the Quaker Bellers of 1696 but it was the idea of the businessmen of 1697. Owen ran on the line of a business-like treatment of the poor.

P. also developed the idea in The Great Transformation that it was an anti-depression move to stabilize employment. We completely forgot this.

Originally the idea was that a wealthy country must have many poor - that they are an asset. To the Mercantilist this was obvious (a low-wage economy).

But for Owen a high-wage economy was linked to a low-wage one. The workers would exist on the land. New Lanark was a high-wage one. Therefore Owen combined here two things. This goes to show that one can't present this matter without considering it in its entirety. Owen was continuing something which, from the logic of the position, was already there.

It is important that we reconstruct what the Village of Union is about. We should credit the Village of Union with originality on basic social organization - the Bellers idea.

At the same time there was another idea, that a chartered company would have operated on the profit principle. It was Bentham, one of Owen's

silent partners, who had been one of the biggest engineers of renting out the paupers.

No one knew that trade would increase (The Great Transformation p. 103 Pauperism and Utopia). Nobody knew a thing and the reason why political economy mattered little was because the situation couldn't be understood at all. There were two incompatible systems - capitalism without a labour market. A labour exchange was already suggested in 1650 (p. 105). The Quakers had the idea to establish Colleges of Industry and exchange products directly (p. 105). The Bristol Corporation for the poor was a capitalist undertaking in proportion to which the latter were contributing to the rates. The idea of profit was a novel idea.

Then comes Jeremy Bentham. Samuel Bentham thought that one could use steam and metals in this program. Labour notes were not an original idea.

What difference does this make on our Owen argument? Either for his person or for the projects? The Bristol plan was a long time ago and Defoe (1707?) made an end of it. And then there was the Act of Settlement and a hundred years went by. The original thing is that Owen took the idea from Bentham i.e., the concept of unemployment - that they should keep the people (sustenance) and as an anti-depression measure. He defined the unemployed.

In the Villages of Union paragraph on precedents - it wasn't new at all and people said it was the old story and never worked. P. had said that the first real depression was in 1815, but this is not so, it was in 1782 (The Great Transformation). In 1792 Bentham came out with something for the unemployed. So we can't say that there was no distinction between the unemployed and the paupers. Therefore we should qualify p. 16 of the draft with Bentham - cf., in the Great Transformation what Bentham called unemployment.

The public meeting (p. 17) sounds very naive, as if nobody heard of this before.

In Bentham and Bellers there was no intention of criticizing the system. Owen had the ethical premises of socialism underlying his work, while he didn't come out for a socialist scheme.

When we mentioned "artificial" (p. 18) then we should give another sentence. Did Owen say it was artificial? P. is very surprised at the term "artificial" and doesn't think that anybody before or after him called it artificial. It is artificial from an institutionalist point of view. Unless it is instituted in a market it doesn't exist at all.

* Owen had ~~parallel~~ parallelograms as against Bentham's pentagon. With Bentham one man sitting in the middle saw it all. It was a jail. Sing-Sing is built like that (check in the Encyclopedia Britannica whether the Bentham idea was ever built).

P. 19 - Owen went from the Poor Law to unemployment and would have stabilized unemployment and had an anti-depression measure.

What is interesting here is that Owen was pushed on by the situation. There wasn't only an increase in pauperism but mass unemployment and that would sweep away the Village of Union and also there was the danger that the depression would continue or even increase. The parish might collapse. If Owen wanted to deal with pauperism and also to relieve the parish then the better the paupers were looked after, the more paupers there would be. (This is not so well known in America or Canada).

What could he do. He had to stabilize employment and get the employers

Owen's
system.

not to dismiss their people. He could do this by getting rid of wage commitments and getting cheap labour and arrange that the employer could have the labourer again. For the labourer he could secure some kind of income because of subsistence on the land. Through subsistence on the land the wages were reduced, but there was no mass unemployment and the depression needn't increase. In America in 1931 there were 13 million (?) unemployed and this was one of the reasons that business stopped (I should refer to all this).

I didn't develop how he discovered capitalism but it is implied here. Also the currency question is involved but that is to keep the exchange safe.

[What Owen suggested goes far beyond what anybody suggested before, either with Bellers - helping to carry the poor, or with the Bristol Corporation - to earn profit. The Capitalists would have labour without wages and capital would be distributed as promised to the workers (100 pounds and 200 pounds). This would be distributed out of profits and therefore it couldn't have been a non-profit economy. There was no nationalization of industry involved at all. He wanted to nationalize the paupers and that's an old idea that the state would make itself responsible.]

Since there is no mention of the labour exchange it must have been the employed which he referred to. P. suggests that he really only tried the possible, the depression was so long and everything wasted away.

For the employer the first point was not wages but markets. The Mundt plan for unemployment insurance was to subsidize the employer to keep his workers who were thrown out under capitalism.

[One hundred years later this was done. The great factories started

villages for their workers. New Lanark was such a village. This couldn't have been a great exception since the factories were rural and power wasn't yet urbanized. I should make the suggestion that there were more rural-sited factories than later on. }

P. read Bentham with great excitement. He was convinced we shouldn't help the poor. Ricardo saw that the only solution for the poor was for them to get used to higher standards. Also Malthus thought so.

My question: How viable would Owen's village of artisans be?

They could employ one another. The women would work for 5 hours. The profit would go to the community- but that would be catastrophic.

My question: Can we say then that Owen's second scheme was one to back up or insure the success of the first?

Pauperism in the village was an urgent problem. He thought that if his principle was extended to the labour classes then the Village of Union for paupers would be safer and the rates would be lower. The rates did fall but only after the Poor Law Reform Act. But things weren't solved in a day. 1815 to 1845 were thirty horrible years. This is the period that Harriet Martineau wrote about - the thirty years' peace.

Don't include too much on sect and party. There is no proof that this comes up in a serious way. Or that his working people would have political party affiliations. What an idea! You can't say that the second plan is to help the first. You can't say that it would work and help and that it doesn't hinge on bigger uncertainties.

If his scheme for paupers wasn't directly practical it became an absurdity. He thought that he would have a much bigger fight to check unemployment which is coming on.

There are grave objections to subsidizing unemployment. Efficient employers would protest. You are going to subsidize the inefficient competitors. These are all economists' objections. P. doesn't like them but they are all to the point.

(See also last part of The Early Marx Section).

FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGY - General Comments

The machine does certainly do something to the person who works under its command. But it is not something which we cannot adjust to. This may involve many things, but most of them have already happened. If one lists the physical and hygiene conditons of a factory - the actual hours, the fragmentation of labour, the action of the machine on crafts; and the intimate and incisive influence on the home, on domestic life, and the meaning of the family, and one adds the disintegration of man and his environment and urbanism in every regard, including his relationship to nature, each is almost a chapter in itself. This is a question of forms of life subject to accomodation with the help of the very machine development which caused the illle in the first place.

The question of adapting to the machine's effects on life is different from the ability to maintain one's inner life in this adjustment. The deeper level of whether the life of man can continue remains open and this is our main question. It is the freedom story.

Going back to Marx, these effects of the machine include the division of labour and it is doubtful therefore, whether the whole self-estrangement - which is a good description of what happens in the exteriorization and is partly divorced from it, what we call the effects of machinery on society - transcends this whole level. We must be careful to keep the structure within the total argument.

P. doesn't know whether Marx has any direct contact with our problem. His problem is undoubtedly the place of the economy in society - the economic process being instituted with private property and social classes - owning and non-owning.

The social conditions are such that the life of the propertyless classes is dehumanized and for the owning classes less obviously so.

This complaint leads to the acceptance of the reality of society. Society is real but it may be an illusion on his part to think that all his complaints would cease with a different instituting of the economic process. He was all for the machine and was just for a different instituting of the economic process.

His solution that man is to accept the reality of society implies that it is not the individual who is the ultimate reality. It is society. The individual can't be understood and can't fulfill himself. But that which changes on its own is society and the changes over time is history. History is the absolute and that is where man fulfills himself.

What he did with Hegelianism is what Landshut says - that Hegelianism is deprived of its mystification. How the Idea moves to fulfill itself in history is not clear. It is much clearer that a society does produce those thoughts and institutions which amounts to law, morality, the state and political economy.

This could be made clearer if you turned Hegel upside-down and then it is right-sideup. Then the actual society consists of human individuals and groups and they produce in their heads these mind-phenomena. These don't exclude each other for they don't exclude a dialectical law (Zeitgeist). There may be some dialectical law in evidence but it is absurd to think that there are two laws: one which people think and the other in which it thinks people. Marx argued that what he presented was not Hegelian but the opposite, although he used Hegelian forms of thought. But if Marx said that he ceased

to be Hegelian, the dialectic is Hegelian method (e.g., thinking). Dialectic is evidently valid in certain fields: revolution and counter-revolution are two processes. People get fed-up with one side, difficulties emerge and this stress is the reaction. Marx goes all the way in acceptance of this but here a Hegelian thought comes in, freedom is the fulfillment of necessity. There is a jump from necessity to freedom.

Here you see how basic is the acceptance of the reality of society to Marx and socialism. The Bolsheviks developed the thesis that freedom cannot be recognized as a massive postulate.

Sartre is the opposite. This is the absolutism of the postulate of freedom and leads to a rejection of the reality of society. (The absolutism of the postulate of freedom leads to a rejection of the reality of society.) The socialists reject the reality of society but insist on the social viewpoint being the only adequate one for a progressive world (technological civilization).

Rousseau drew the conclusion that the individual would have to be forced to be free, but it means that the individual wishes what the community needs for its own survival. He would be free in following the laws which are set up as the law of society. He would be free in following the laws he approved of and that is the autonomy of the personality in Kant. From Kant on, freedom is the central value in morality. There is no freedom outside social morality. Our [1] idealism fathered freedom. That is why freedom is immanent in the meaning of the universe.

MANNHEIM

P. got hold of the 'Mannheim' in New York. It shows very imposing mental power and is a very impressive effort. It is however too complicated and not a simple basic idea and the whole thing is wrong and you can't solve ~~X~~ the problem. He assumes a world without faith and belief - that's the given situation similar to the existentialists. With faith and belief out, he wants to show how a society can be constructed and how it can be master of social change. It assumes man is only partly rational and is partly irrational. The task is to make the rational faculties effective. He says that this is possible only if man is reconstructed. It is extremely improbable that this can be done.

The lack of clarity comes from the lack of faith and belief. One would have to build on faith and belief and he claims he has none. This is ~~X~~ insoluble. The one element in which he sees a trouble of our time in a "fundamental-democratic". In English this is in some sense the democratization inherent in an industrial society. That consists in more and more people (a greater percent) being activated and called to participate mainly in looking to their interests. He thinks that there are a greater percent looking to their interests and they participate and have a say. He doesn't mean the constitution, but e.g., the trade unions.

He says that this is an obvious contradiction with the increase of so much emotionalism (irrationality), with which he credits the masses. Culture is a possession of the few (the elite idea is strongly inherent in the work). This is the Pareto idea that only a small group is capable of leadership and rule, and since the masses of the people are activated to look after their interests the conditions under which elites form are undermined.

Many ideas come together here. His great thought is that we need a sociology as a practical guide to a reconstruction of society.

With this "fundamental-democratic", P. thought that the reality of society is increased by many more people who wish to be free (who are insisting on the fulfillment of their interests). This is a direct result of industrialization of society. Instead of being sweet, daft shepherds they are members of, for example, a socialist labour party.

His point is not proven and he might have a stronger case with the opposite. P. doesn't know if this comes into our argument. When Mannheim thinks of the trade union he links it with the fact that people have more education. P. doesn't see what education has to do with it. Also what Pareto's elite has to do with it. If you have a march some will be in front - but where will they go? That is the question. But in traditional societies there was no circulation elite e.g., clan societies. P. doesn't say that there is much truth in this.

It is doubtful whether "fundamental-democratic" is on a level of political democracy or basic freedom. P. is not sure that the people are fearing for basic freedom in terms of salvation. P. only assumes that man is unchanged in this regard for him to be master of his inner destiny. He assumes that for all of us, except for very few, life would be unliveable if it lost its meaning. It would if we were not always in a state of fear and hope. As regards the meaning of the fullness of life, it is where we are alone and exist as persons and nobody can quite get rid of that haunting knowledge unless he has sunk to a level where life can't be carried on. That isn't the problem - humans sinking to an inhuman level.

NOTES

"THE ORGANIZATION MAN"

The organization man is the victory of the organization over the live mind - over nihilism.

INTERDISCIPLINARY PROJECT

The session which was held in New York last week went through the work on Money but the work on the symposium got off to a very slow start. The session itself, however, was excellent.