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The conversations between Macdonald and Hoover have introduced a world-wide political development which will need years to its completion. The Naval Conference in London will be only a continuation of all that was begun in such a big way in 1929; it will not be able to complete it. The building up of Anglo-American cooperation (with which a beginning has clearly been made), is only possible provided that at the same time ^{new forms of} ~~general changes~~ in interstate relationships ^{are evolved} ~~take place~~. Such a change, if successful, would open a new epoch in history.

For it is impossible to make a simple arrangement between England and America. There can be no equality between, on the one hand an island state which is a great sea-power, with its demands for world-wide political power, and all that this involves in ideas of neutrality and sea-law, and, on the other hand a rising continent, aspiring to a position of equality with the island kingdom - a continent which necessarily has its own ideas as to the "freedom of the seas" and the rights of a neutral. Between two such powers a ~~collision~~ ^{collision} is inevitable, except on the basis of an alliance.

But this is precisely what appears in this case to be impossible. As far as the nature of the differences between their respective "high politics" ^{are} are concerned, it is not impossible; these might indeed even demand an alliance. The reasons which close this path are other, and are not to be found in the region of the old ^(Machtpolitik) ~~balance of power or superior strength politics~~. Rather the difficulty arises from the higher level of national organization achieved in the Anglo-Saxon countries. The whole idea of democracy is contrary

to the idea of an alliance, both in home and foreign politics: at home because it makes impossible full self-determination, and externally because actually it is incompatible with the idea of interstate law.

Is it possible to achieve, in terms of legal policy, that measure of security which, up to now, has been achieved in terms of power? Or, more concretely, how can England and America attempt to organize world-law and world-peace in such a way, that it will offer them all that in the old world of a balance of power ^{could be} ~~was~~ achieved through open or secret alliances? The answer is destiny-laden for the whole world. A simple arrangement not possible.

England is an island state. Without her command of the seas she is threatened in time of war by starvation within a few weeks, or at most months. The empire is a sea-power. If the Netherland loses this command, ^{is unable to protect} and her daughters, ~~the Empire must fall to pieces.~~ the Empire must fall to pieces. Such an organism is affected by everything that occurs anywhere on the globe. Her ships travel along lines which together are three times as long as the Equator. And there is almost always war going on somewhere.

The strongest weapon for such a state is the blockade, for her unequalled fleet can wear an enemy down. It is however also her greatest weakness - that is, the possibility of being blockaded. Her fleet, for which her enemies claim that its sole purpose is to keep a deathly stranglehold on others ~~is the one weapon of defence without which the inhabitants of Britain would live in a nightmare.~~ is the one weapon of defence without which the inhabitants of Britain would live in a nightmare.

An island position, a wide-flung Empire, command of the seas. ~~Sea-law~~, these are all interdependent. English sea-law is nothing but the legal form of that kind of sea-warfare which is suited to an overwhelming fleet. If ~~sea-law~~ is altered, the fleet is crippled. Weaken the fleet, and sea-law works out to England's disadvantage. How then is equality possible between such a power, and one ~~to~~ which not one of these sets of facts is ~~applicable~~; a power which, being self-supporting can withdraw from all conflicts in foreign waters, and which is only affected by the fact, that there is always a war in progress somewhere, as a neutral who carries on her commerce best during time of war? If the cause of strife between these two were world-power, influence among coloured races, the possession of raw materials, these could be shared between them. But they are really divided by the differing forms in which their life flows, and which affect the whole globe, and demand contrasting regulations on those high ways of mankind, the seas. But just as England can not cease to be an island so neither can the U.S.A. cease to be a continent.

Hence the fact that the idea of parity has lately become of first importance in the Anglo-American conversations. Parity - with regard to England the word implies willingness to forgo the command of the seas as far as America is concerned. And, with respect to America it means that she is satisfied with this expression of willingness; so that she only makes one claim - that she need not always forgo equality, though at the same time she has no intention of translating this parity into actuality. If ever there were a

- The English people prefer to call it a "naval policy" -

"gentlemen's agreement" it is certainly this one as to the particular meaning of the word "parity". ~~The slightest step towards actualising such equality between the two fleets would bring England into a hopeless strategic position (for she is compelled to scatter her ships over all the seas).~~ *This agreement is* because it ~~is a "gentlemen's agreement" which~~ acknowledges that though parity is the important point, it must not, whatever happens, be mathematically understood, ~~could it be understood (because it is mathematically certain) that the naval problem is impossible of solution, or of settlement.~~

But - neither is that a way out. A gentlemen's agreement about the strength of navies can have meaning only if one can with certainty exclude all possibility of war between the partners. The intention so to do is present on both sides. But can it be done?

So we return to sea-law. For it is not enough to remove all direct cause of conflict between England and America as long as England still exercises anywhere in the seven seas her right of hold up ^(visit) search, confiscation and prize courts. For chance must very soon bring some American merchant vessel across her path. In that moment a conflict would arise, naval agreement or not. That is why Senator Borah believes every attempt to reach a naval agreement to be useless as long as there is no understanding as to sea-law. Hoover on the other hand, is of the opinion that it would be wiser not to wait for that, but rather to attain the same end by a naval agreement. Once that were reached, the other "old historical problems" outstanding between England and America would, according to the famous Hoover-Macdonald declaration of Oct. 9, ~~be~~ approached from a new angle and

in a new atmosphere". "Old historical problems" simply means, of course, sea-law.

To reach a naval agreement it would be quite enough to achieve a "gentlemen's agreement" as to the meaning of "parity" though even for that it would be necessary to remove all direct causes of conflict between England and America. It would amount to an implicit entente in time of peace.

But this is not enough for an understanding as to sea-law. For with all the good-will in the world, there is here no formula for an "arrangement" as is the case with parity. Here, supposing England to agree ^{to} "the freedom of the seas" America would have to offer no less than a pledge for the security of England in case of a blockade against her.

To make this important point quite clear. England, let us say, agree fundamentally to the freedom of the seas. This means that no neutral merchant vessel, even in war time, can be held up and searched for contraband. On the basis of this new sea-law, England then scraps a part of her fleet as superfluous. For it can no longer be used as an offensive ^{weapon} of capture and blockade, nor need it be maintained as a defensive weapon in case of the danger of being blockaded. But who would guarantee to England that this new sea-law would be obeyed were her advantage in question? Other states would probably not feel this too great a risk; England an island, could not run even the slightest risk in the face of the danger of starvation. Nothing but a naval guarantee offered by America, a self-imposed duty to oppose on England's behalf, any transgressor of the new law, could possibly bring

the English people to the double sacrifice of their fleet and their sea-law.

Self-imposed duty, standing security or whatever phrase one may use, what would these be, as between England and America, but other names for an alliance?

neither is
But Ven alliances. ~~WAAAAAASVDBAN~~

A. E. Houghton, ambassador of the U.S.A., first in Berlin and then in London, made the point quite clear and precise, so there could be no doubt about it, when he said: "We must not hope or seek to develop these wholly natural and hopeful relations between the British and the American peoples into anything like an alliance." (Manchester, 22. April 1927). The warmer and closer relations have grown in recent months, the oftener and more emphatically has Macdonald repeated this. As a matter of fact such an alliance is unthinkable, neither England nor America can now carry out an alliance in the old sense. This early stage in inter-state development they have finally left behind. Yet from this higher stage itself there arise new and great difficulties. Hughes, who has for decades incorporated the American tradition in foreign affairs, ^{announced} ~~waged~~ with resignation in his political testament "The *Pathway of Peace*"

~~As far as the United States of Europe are concerned, even this statement appears to us too weak. American democracy is, both in its origins and its opinions, both in its constitution and in the practical application of it, quite incapable of a policy of alliance,~~

~~even in the pure interests of peace. This fact is bound up with~~
~~things of which the U.S.A. are justly proud. When Hughes, in the~~
~~same work, announced~~ that the U.S.A. as a result of differing racial
groups and the forced division between executive ^{and} legislative, can
only adopt a foreign policy in which she can rely on the "predominant
sentiment of the people". He implies that it is not treaties of al-
liance, nor the status belli which arise from them, but rather the
live conscience of a watchful public opinion which will in each case
make decisions about war and peace. The warning against "foreign
entanglements" originally spoken as something like a prophetic law,
has become for the U.S.A. more and more an expression of a high
destiny.

For these reasons perpetual peace between England and America
must be secured by means other than an alliance.

The search for a new World-formula.

So here we are, ~~back to the~~ Kellog-^{back to the} Pact, ~~the~~ League of Nations,
the World Court at the Hague, the codifying of international law — con-
fident generalities. Perhaps we can manage without them!

~~Commander Eric Lomax in his book "The Next War" describes~~
~~war courageously and realistically.~~

[There will doubtless be ~~many~~ attempts to build up Anglo-
American co-operation, not by burdening it with formulæ, but rather
by confining the question to ensuring peace. The important point will

be, not the method, but that big wars will be avoided, or at least, that in a war in which England but not America was implicated, no conflict should arise between these two on the question of sea-law. But the old methods of diplomacy - provided they do not break down altogether one fine day - are sufficient to steer clear of threatening conflicts, and to prevent those in the making. ^{And to} certainly, if necessary, fundamentals might be sacrificed, and a common-sense policy be carried through. ^{Now all} this is useless for a conception which has got to last us for years and decades. It might conceivably work if there were only England and America in the world, but there are dozens of other states, and among them great powers which have just formed inter-state organizations with their own fundamental principles, and in which, indeed, England even plays some part. ^{And further: For the U.S.A. the idea of service is so fundamental that they not only want to do the right thing but also to have it acknowledged by everybody that it was the right thing to do. Their foreign policy would lose very much of its driving power if it were to lack this assurance.}

It is the land to which, although in the competition between the Kellogg-Pact and the League of Nations we forget it too easily, we owe both. No, we are in for ^{some sort of international order, whatever its} ~~other off-spring of international law.~~ ^{name.} But the League of Nations as it at present is, does not meet the case. Americans will have no part in sanctions or in the use of force as a method of keeping the peace. And England would probably in any given case, refuse to use her forces to carry out a blockade at the instance of the L. of N.; for to please that body she would certainly not involve herself in a conflict with America over sea-law. England has therefore from the beginning prevented the L. of N. from becoming explicit on this

point of sanctions. And scarcely had Macdonald entered the naval negotiations with America then he made Henderson in Geneva propose that *the* the L. of N. ~~should~~ should be changed. No "private wars" were henceforth to be allowed - that is an adjustment of the ~~Convention~~ ^{Convention} to the Kellogg-Pact. There would remain only "public wars" - a war of sanctions, which is no longer an "instrument of national policy". In such a case there would be only two kinds of war - unjustified offensive wars, to be outlawed, in which the offender would be held in contempt and outlawed by all signatories of the Kellogg-Pact, and also the war of the ^{Right} against the outlaw. But would this not change completely the aspect of ^{sea-law} sea-law? Could America seriously claim the right to trade with the offender? Even if as a non-member of the L. of N., she questioned her duty to oppose him? But this which would eventually be the English argument would certainly, as is clear, prove too much. For it would subject America to the obligations of the Geneva convention to which she does not, and never will, belong.

But neither does the Kellogg-Pact work as it at present stands. It outlaws war as an instrument of national policy, and binds the signatories to settle their conflicts by peaceful means. But all existing and centuries old neutral rights, with everything they imply about the freedom of the seas, is built on the just as old, if not older idea of the rightness of war.

~~It was said that a state, only exercises its rights if it~~ ^(going to war was supposed merely to exercise its rights)
~~was to war.~~ ^{did something which was} Whoever traded with such a state, takes pains to appear ^{neither right nor wrong, but simply indifferent.} ~~morally neutral.~~ And so everything that America thinks and feels about the freedom of the seas, and everything she demands of England has

since the outlaw^{ing} of war in truth becomes a ~~provisional~~ ^{provisional} question. Yet the Kellogg-Pact recognises wars which are not an instrument of national policy. For example, wars in which, as has so often been the case, neither side has admitted ~~being the aggressor~~ ^{to be the aggressor}, or in which the war^{was} carried on without declaration of war on either side. All the same, under the Kellogg-Pact a conflict between England and America would be avoided as soon as it was clear that in a war which concerned England, and not she but her ~~country~~ ^{country} was the offender. But unfortunately ~~with~~ a conclusion ^{so desired} ~~so desired~~ ^{able} would have this premise (for England an unbearable one) that the case would be judged by the one-sided ruling of ~~the~~ ^{the} U.S.A.

The difficulty is still more obvious in the case of the World-Court. For the Court could only give judgments in cases of sea-law if there were already an agreed codification. The same is true of the possibility of arbitration. The vicious circle is obvious.

~~So~~ we should not be impatient if the progress is gradual, even after the Naval Conference, towards ~~an~~ ^{Anglo-American} understanding, which in the present world situation is, after all ~~most important~~ ^{favorable to} peace. ~~One could only think that~~ ^{One could only think that} one is ~~trapped~~ ^{netted} in a ~~string~~ ^{string} of questions, without ever getting nearer their solution. ^{But} This only means that the arising understanding between England and America must first find ^{its suitable} ~~its suitable~~ legal and moral form. We must remember that we should never have had these ~~difficulties~~ ^{difficulties} to face if the Anglo-Saxon lands, with their higher forms of self-determination, had not ~~excluded~~ ^{excluded} the primitive method of a powerful alliance. In America there is already in the making a new kind of international law, lying somewhere between law and morals. The ~~subject~~ ^{subject}

Somewhat dead