

16 Dec. 1961

NW

C Paul Madore

1. On the moral dilemma created by power in industrial societies, and the essence of fascism and socialism

The fact that the aspirations of morality, which are ultimately grounded on person-to-person relationships, or more broadly (in order to include animals) on life-oriented responses, and means-ends relationships lie in different spheres and are governed by different principles creates the possibility of conflict between the two. Such conflicts, differ, however, not only in the degree of their objective destructiveness, but also in the intensity with which this destructiveness is experienced, particularly in the higher civilization, in which the world religions have awakened the inner life of man, the painfulness of spiritually ~~destructive~~ destructive behaviour (which may have been made inevitable by certain other dilemmas) may be very great. But the resulting inner crisis is incomparably greater in situations in which a dilemma arises that suggests that it has become permanently necessary to abandon the hopes of spiritual life. Such a dilemma is posed, however, in all industrial civilizations in which the reality of the new network of means-ends relationships becomes apparent. More accurately it is posed whenever earlier illusions on this problem vanish (such as the belief in a spiritual life after death, or the belief that morally destructive power does not exist in an economy detached from the political sphere, and that one's conscience is then safe so long as one fulfills one's contractual commitments). It is posed, then, as soon as the full scope of the ramifications of the industrial economic process become visible, and particularly when it becomes clearly connected to the decisions of the political sphere. For in so far as it is unthinkable to sacrifice the industrial economy, and in so far as in its untamed state the industrial economic process inevitably conflicts at many points with norms that stem from the moral sphere, the need to make a wide range of decisions in the

light of non-moral and frequently of anti-moral criteria appears as an inescapable aspect of industrialism,* if not of "realism" in some more general sense. The first crisis, in a nation's life, in which this dilemma becomes a political issue, is likely to result in a commitment to either socialism or facism. The former expresses a determination, which must rest on some visible hope, to continue to uphold the spiritual values of one's civilization (although not the superstitions of the religions from which they are derived) in the face of the reality of the new source of power. Fascism, on the other hand, represents a final acceptance of the presumed need to abandon the spiritual criteria as an anachronistic and possibly illusory relic of a past age. Only the socialist inspiration, then, is capable of undertaking efforts directed at the morally destructive manifestations of the economic process. The capacity to control it at all points, and a readiness to sacrifice economic efficiency, when necessary, are prerequisites for such an attempt.

It is conceivable that the socialist attempt can never wholly succeed. Yet there is no reason to doubt that in any event important partial victories are possible. Beyond that it seems likely that the continued existence of a commitment to struggle for the maximum of spiritual freedom that is possible can itself become a source of a new and higher form of life, just as in the past a new creativity has sprung from the recognition of the inevitability of physical death.

*This position has been expressed explicitly in C. Kew et al. 1961, Industrialism and Industrial Man

ii. On the threat of fascism

If it is true that the essence of fascism lies in a particular type of response to the moral dilemma created by power, then it would seem that the German experience is only a foretaste of what may still be expected to come in the future industrialized societies of Africa and Asia as well as in those of the West. In the new world of the 1960's there is a wide range of dilemmas that can turn a particular manifestation of the moral dilemma of necessary power into a national crisis. The advent of automation may be one. The stated need to accept permanently the amoral ethics of the cold war is another. And the amoral methods that may become necessary to overcome a serious economic depression might be a third. Accordingly the need to prepare for such crises is urgent. In general success in this regard will be measured by the strength of the belief in the nation at large in the vulnerability of the iron logic of industrial means ends relationships to various forms of social control.

In this connection much may depend on the success of economists in the theory of central planning in finding methods for the analysis of the social (non-economic) costs of production, and of sociologists and other social scientists in the study of conflict-reducing institutions.

John D. ...

Paul J. McCloskey

20 Dec. 1961

New Test
NW
P. Medlow

On Nehru's attack on Goa

At the present time Western thought is still in a state of ambivalence with regard to the kind of norms that should be pursued in the sphere of politics, and particularly international political relations. The recognition of the reality of means-ends relationships, (first expressed by Machiavelli, but since made familiar to wide sections of the public both from the practical ^{modern} of international relations, and from the world ~~at~~ their knowledge of the industrial process) suggests that one type of norm - the ~~maxim~~ requirements of expediency is the natural one for a realist. The continued craving for a human world, on the other hand, ~~and~~ for a world of human ~~values~~ and spiritual values, has not yet vanished. In short, the fascist resignation to a permanent abandonment of the world of values ~~and~~ does not yet prevail, ~~and~~ ^{In fact,} ~~as~~ the ~~possibility~~ possibility of ~~political control~~ ~~over~~ ~~the~~ ~~direction~~ ~~of~~ ~~means~~ ~~ends~~ ~~processes~~ ^{both economic and other} through ~~the~~ the political sphere ^{and as disillusionment with affluence occurs} becomes more evident, the socialist hope that ~~it~~ ~~may~~ ~~soon~~ ~~be~~ ~~possible~~ ~~to~~ give directions to means ends ^{processes} that have a human rather than a purely functional significance is stirring more and more. The interest of the West in the East, ~~and~~ ^{in the home of} ~~of~~ spiritual teachings and of mysticism, ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~possibility~~ ~~of~~ ~~finding~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~East~~ is partly explained, accordingly, by the hope that the non-Western countries may be able to find a way to ~~continue~~ continue to assert their values in spite of industrialization and of the ^{exigencies} ~~demands~~ of the international sphere. ~~Of~~ ^{non-Western} ~~all~~ ~~the~~ ~~statesmen~~ ~~Nehru~~ far more than others became a symbol for this kind of uncertain hope. His resort to the use of violence to ~~liberate~~ liberate Goa, accordingly, inevitably ~~released~~ released strong emotions among the American public. It appeared to reaffirm ^{laws of the} ~~the~~ ~~conviction~~ ~~that~~ ~~the~~ ~~world~~ ~~of~~ ~~expediency~~ ^{really} ~~are~~ inescapable, even for angels, and his action ^{appeared} ~~appeared~~ to make him a ~~full~~ full-fledged member, of the Western fraternity of ~~the~~ ~~realists~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~East~~ ^{since he has violated them,} ~~that~~ ~~he~~ ~~has~~ stopped believing in spiritual values.

Such a conclusion is premature, even though it may well be true ^{that} ~~that~~ ~~Nehru~~ ~~has~~ ~~grown~~ ~~to~~ ~~appreciate~~ ~~more~~ ~~the~~ ~~various~~ ~~chains~~ ~~of~~ ~~means-ends~~ ~~relationships~~ ~~that~~ ~~exist~~ ~~in~~ ~~social~~ ~~relations~~ ~~just~~ ~~as~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~physical~~ ~~world~~ ^{the improbability of the} ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~various~~ ~~chains~~ ~~of~~ ~~means-ends~~ ~~relationships~~ ~~that~~ ~~exist~~ ~~in~~ ~~social~~ ~~relations~~ ~~just~~ ~~as~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~physical~~ ~~world~~.

In the international sphere it is particularly difficult to ~~avoid~~ avoid such ~~situations~~ inherently destructive situations of conflict. ~~Since~~ ^{Since} no international ~~arrangement~~ ~~body~~ body exists ^{on} ~~in~~ which an individual nation can rely in cases in which events in ~~another~~ ~~a~~ foreign country affect ^{adversely} ~~vital~~ processes at home, the concept of sovereignty, ^{which includes} ~~the~~ right to resort to armed action ~~to~~ defend one's vital interests, is a natural consequence of the occurrence of such destructive situations. This method is particularly dangerous, however, because it ~~can~~ does not provide for a ranking of the various national rights affected, so ~~that~~ that it is not possible to compare the harm created by a particular situation of conflict in one's own country with the harm that would exist in the other if the burden of the conflict is shifted to it. ~~It~~ It is the ultimate task of international organization to find non-destructive ^{resolutions} ~~for~~ situations of conflict that affect two ~~more~~ more nations. This requires, of course, that the country suffering the least harm from such a resolution would voluntarily accept that harm to its vital or perhaps not so vital rights, in the expectation that on another occasion, other countries would ~~agree~~ agree to refrain from actions that would create more harm to it than advantages to themselves.

Such an arrangement might serve to reduce the harm created by destructive situations of conflict, but could it make it possible for nations to avoid altogether ~~to~~ avoid situations of conflict that are nevertheless destructive of human norms? ~~The~~ The answer to this most vital of all questions depends ^{largely} ~~on~~ the institutions that exist, for similar purposes, within the nations themselves, although if the need to resort to force can be made unnecessary ^{such an} ~~by~~ ~~an~~ international institutionalization of ~~an~~ international conflicts, the most important achievement in this regard will have already taken place.

Internally, the ability of domestic institutions to safeguard individuals from situations in which he is forced to ~~choose~~ choose between his ^{conscience} ~~and~~ and vital needs (such as ~~his~~ his physiological needs) depends in the first place on the capacity of the political and social spheres ~~to~~ ~~impose~~ their norms, and ultimately of dissenting individuals, to ~~partly~~ impose their norms on the ~~final~~ decisions ~~that~~

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~~xxxxxxxx~~ that pertain to means-ends processes~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~
This must, of course, stop short of the point
at which disorganization results, but ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~
but it must succeed in removing or ~~xxx~~ limiting the use of
some of the means ~~xxxxxxx~~ that create harm to persons while contri-
buting to ~~xxx~~ functional process. Variety in technological processes
and abundance in material means contribute to ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~
such a humanization of life by providing more variety in means that
are capable to create a given end, and also by providing a greater
abundance and variety
~~xx~~ of conflict-reducing
material means.

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On the ideological conflict between Russia and China

This, too, centers on the possibility of a peasant movement capable, under centralized leadership by revolutionary intellectuals, not only to bring these leaders to political power but also to move forward to a socialist and beyond that to a communist society. The existence of different positions on this matter might have remained a domestic problem for each country were it not for two external factors: the desire, by both countries, to support similar revolutionary movements in the new nations; and also their desire to appraise, for policy purposes, the possibility of a change in the external policies of the capitalist countries that might make possible the avoidance of a war against the socialist countries and also a lessening of their resistance to the establishment of independent and socialist states in the formerly dependent areas. Beyond that, there is also an interest in the conditions under which one might expect socialist leaders to come to power in the countries of Western Europe and in the United States, and in the measures that they might take to transform their societies into socialist ones.

The presence of these external considerations create a situation in which the ideological position of Russian leaders with regard to the peasant question leads them to support foreign policy objectives that conflict with those that the Chinese leaders tend to support. Accordingly, one must begin by identifying exactly the nature of these differences in their respective ideological positions.

Briefly it is this: according to Lenin, whose initial task centered on persuading the peasant-oriented revolutionary intellectuals of the Russian populist movement to cease relying on terroristic methods in their attempts to overthrow the Czar's government, the successful carrying out of a revolution in a peasant country requires the following: the creation of a central organization of active revolutionary leaders committed to the art and methods of politics, rather than to moral principles alone, and their use of politics to achieve step by step, with the support of changing coalitions, a position from which they could assume direct political power. Once in power methods would then be found to reorganize the institutions of society from above in such a way as to render it socialist, not in the sense that every person would be free from social obligations, but in the sense that all would share equally in the social obligations and also in the rights that attach to them. The peasants do not, in this image, play an active role. They merely provide an important element of support in the coalitions that permit the revolutionary leaders to come to power. The active support, at that time, was expected to be given only by the small number of factory workers that the revolutionary leaders regarded as their only fully reliable supporters, capable of supporting their movement with armed action at the decisive time. The possibility of creating coalitions depended, of course, on the existence of a variety of deeply dissatisfied classes and groups in the existing society aside from the workers. Their presence was attributed to the imperialist policies of the Western capitalist countries and the many ways in which it creates dissatisfaction not only in the dependent countries, but also in their own, in

so far as it resulted in continuous wars with rivals. Since the actual events through which the revolutionary leaders did come to power in Russia conformed closely to the pattern that was expected, it appeared to the Russian leaders that this was universal in its applicability.

According to Mao, on the other hand, the political means by which the revolutionary leaders may come to power may differ considerably from this pattern, and so can the measures through which a socialist society is established. It is possible, in his view, for the political leaders to obtain the active support of the peasants organized first in guerilla bands and then in regular military units, that then conquer the principal cities from the outside, by military force. The active participation of the peasantry in the overthrow of the traditional institutions then also makes possible the reorganization of social institutions from below, through the initiative of the peasants. In the resulting pattern, then, the villages are first to be transformed through the establishment of communal arrangements, and in so far as socialism is associated with these reforms, industrialization is not regarded as a prerequisite for the establishment of a socialist society.

An orientation on the Chinese pattern naturally suggests, therefore, that for the peasant nations of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, the political path that is opened by peasant guerillas will not only permit the revolutionary leaders to come to power but prepare the peasant population for immediate socialist reforms as well. An orientation on the Russian pattern, on the other hand, suggests that the way to socialism lies through two distinct steps: first the coming to power, by relying on any coalition that is politically feasible, with peasants as only one element; and then the implementation of institutional reforms from above, among which rapid

and planned industrialization is regarded as a prerequisite for genuine socialism.

These fundamental differences also create an important distinction with regard to the objectives of the foreign policy of a socialist country with regard to the anti-colonial movements of the non-Western nations. The Chinese pattern suggests that this must be directed at removing from political power, not only foreign rulers but also all domestic elements who, while they may oppose foreign rule, would oppose a socialist transformation of the countryside. The Russian pattern, on the other hand, suggests, that so long as a centrally planned industrialization program is being carried out by the coalition in power, the institutional and economic basis for a socialist reorganization of society is being developed. It appears fitting, then, to support the new nations with regard to their achieving national independence, but once it is achieved, and once such coalitions do come into power, even if they are not led by communists, no further definite foreign policy objectives appear to be present, except to provide assistance in the economic process of industrial development.

In addition, however, the different perspectives on the role of the peasant in national liberation and socialist transformation are also related to a different appraisal of the external policies of the capitalist nations with regard to the decolonization process, to the use of military force in destroying the socialist nations. The Chinese position which emphasizes the close connection between the continued pressures of imperialism and the radical peasant movements, is opposed to the view that the capitalist countries might reconcile themselves to decolonization and adjust their trade to socialist new nations. The Russian view, on the other hand,

which believes in the capacity of the capitalist nations to adjust to the impossibility of war against the socialist nations, also tends to ascribe to them a capacity to adjust to the existence of planned socialist economies in a large part of the world.

Similarly with regard to the coming to power of socialist leaders in the capitalist nations the Chinese view, in so far as it is skeptical of the method of coalitions and particularly of the ability of revolutionary leaders to remain revolutionary within such coalitions, shunning revisionist compromises, tends to emphasize the importance of a popular revolution that would remove all non-working classes from a position of power instead. Although it would seem that logically, the establishment of planned economies would be a desirable event even if it is done by coalitions, in so far as this should remove the presumed need of capitalist economies to expand in colonial areas and create wars.

25 March 1962

FOR A NEW WEST

by Karl Polanyi*

- For a New West

In seeking to formulate the basis for a new relationship towards the non-Western nations, the intellectuals of the West should free themselves from the power of the West's idolâ - science, technology, and economic organization - over their minds. For not only have these hidden from them the real content of the West's civilization, but they have now revealed themselves in their true light - as a deadly danger to the physical survival of mankind. This has occurred at the very time when in the non-Western ~~xxxx~~ societies their ~~dis~~integrating effects on ~~the~~ traditional institutions have given a new life to different core values, that place fundamental reservations on the positive valuations of the elements of industrial development.

In this new situation the West no longer possesses a basis for world leadership. It only possesses, at best, a basis for a new world role, created by its abundant experience with the evils that untamed industrial processes tend to bring about. Only a genuine recognition of the existence of a common threat of a common extinction and a resulting ~~xxxxx~~ genuine concern for the survival of its own civilization can transform the West's present monologue into a meaningful with the intellectuals and ~~x~~ political leaders of the new nations. For after five hundred years of imperialism, and fifteen years of through mental degradation under the pressures of the Cold War between its capitalist and socialist halves, expres-

~~stems of concern in the West for the fate of mankind itself will not~~
~~be believed.~~

* Edited from notes on conversations by P.M.

25 March 1962

FOR A NEW WEST

- For a New West

1. The West as a Civilization and the Political West
2. The idols of the Old West: science, technology, and economic organization (*Capitalism + individualism*)
3. The dual character of the consequences:
 - a. The internal and external ~~achievements~~ of the Old West
 - b. The idols revealed as a threat to physical survival
4. The core values of the new non-Western nations and the industrial process
5. The failure of Western leadership after the Second World War
6. The limited basis for a New West
7. Some specific issues for the New West
 - modus vivendi
 - Grotius extended
 - foreign trade monopolies
 - (the use of priorities in settling international ~~xxxxx~~ disputes)
 - (protection of the intellectuals from contracts)
 - ...
8. On the rejuvenation of the West and personal freedom

/8 Oct. 1962/

Karl Polanyi's theses concerning the "New West" *

1. There exists a political "West"/ the external policies of the capitalist states/ and also the West as a specific civilization, whose sources lie in the heritage of ancient Greece/ logic/ and in the Christian teachings concerning the inner life of man/ "freedom", "conscience". Socialism is the historical movement for the vindication and realization of these ideas of the "West's" civilization in the specific conditions that are created in an industrial society. At the present time the West as a civilization is divided into two halves - a socialist and a capitalist one, each of which is engaged in an intensive struggle against the other.
2. In the tense situation created by the "cold war" the intellectuals of the capitalist countries of the West have betrayed their central heritage. They have capitulated before the political West and have come to serve it. By doing this they have destroyed the world-wide prestige of the West, which had risen high at the time of its struggle against fascism, at the very time when politically independent non-Western nations began to appear on the world scene.
3. As a result of this at the present time there is no genuine dialogue between the new nations and the "Old West"/ the capitalist states. There is only a monologue on the part of the countries of the Old West about the importance of free enterprise. This monologue does not interest the new nations partly because they are all proceeding to rely on central planning for bringing about their economic development. ^{of their societies the type of religious-moral significance that has been associated with it in the West.} In the non-Western nations moral conceptions and strivings have remained on a different plane.
- I and also they do not ascribe to the industrial development of the West.*
4. Even though the West has in fact already lost its leading role in world affairs, it is nevertheless very important to create once more a dialogue between it and the new nations, although on a new basis. The development of industrial economies and of science and technology has created a general threat of an immensely destructive world war, a poorly organized world wide economy, and an urgent need to subordinate the further development of industrial production, science, and technology, to social aims. The West possesses the greatest experience with such problems and with the type of measures that they require. This experience is derived from its mistakes.
5. The reestablishment of a dialogue with regard to these problems, however, is possible only if the representatives of the new nations will sense that the representatives of a New West are genuinely concerned with the real threats and problems of the contemporary world that have become common for all mankind, and that they have renounced the traditional thought that the West must disseminate its own civilization throughout the world.

* Written from memory by P.M.

(over)

6. The Soviet Union possesses particularly favourable possibilities for carrying out successfully this new task of the West. It is hindered, however, by some of the historically determined positions of Marxism/ for example an insufficient awareness of the possibilities of peasant movements and of political parties of the populist type; and an insufficient awareness of the significance not only of the distinctions of nationalities, but also of the far reaching specific features of the different civilizations/ Buddhist, Hindu, Moslem, Christian.

KARL POLANYI'S THESES CONCERNING THE "NEW WEST"*

1. There exists a political "West" (the external policies of the capitalist states) and also the West as a specific civilization, whose sources lie in the heritage of ancient Greece (logic) and in the Christian teachings concerning the inner life of man ("freedom", "conscience"). Socialism is the historical movement for the vindication and realization of these ideas of the "West's" civilization in the specific conditions that are created in an industrial society. At the present time the West as a civilization is divided into two halves - a socialist and a capitalist one, each of which is engaged in an intensive struggle against the other.
2. In the tense situation created by the "cold war" the intellectuals of the capitalist countries of the West have betrayed their central heritage. They have capitulated before the political West and have come to serve it. By doing this they have destroyed the world-wide prestige of the West, which had risen high at the time of its struggle against fascism, at the very time when politically independent non-Western nations began to appear on the world scene.
3. As a result of this at the present time there is no genuine dialogue between the new nations and the "Old West" (the capitalist states). There is only a monologue on the part of the countries of the Old West about the importance of free enterprise. This monologue does not interest the new nations partly because they are all proceeding to rely on central planning for bringing about their economic development, and also because they do not ascribe to the industrial development of their societies the type of religious-moral significance that has been associated with it in the West. In the non-Western nations moral conceptions and strivings have remained on a different plane.
4. Even though the West has in fact already lost its leading role in world affairs, it is nevertheless very important to create once more a dialogue between it and the new nations, although on a new basis. The development of industrial economies and of science and technology has created a general threat of an immensely destructive world war, a poorly organized world wide economy, and an urgent need to subordinate the further development of industrial production, science, and technology, to social aims. The West possesses the greatest experience with such problems and with the type of measures that they require. This experience is derived from its mistakes.
5. The re-establishment of a dialogue with regard to these problems, however, is possible only if the representatives of the new nations will sense that the representatives of a New West are genuinely concerned with the real threats and problems of the contemporary world, which have become common for all mankind, and that they have renounced the traditional thought that the West must disseminate its own civilization throughout the world.
6. The Soviet Union possesses particular favorable possibilities for carrying out successfully this new task of the West. It is hindered, at present, however, by some of the historically determined positions of Marxism (for example an insufficient awareness of the possibilities of peasant movements and of political parties of the populist type; and an insufficient awareness of the significance not only of the distinctions of nationalities, but also of the far reaching specific features of the different civilizations (Buddhist, Hindu, Moslem, Christian)).

* Written from memory by P. M.

NW

1. The West as a civilization and the Political West

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2. The idols of the Old West: science, technology, and economic organization

NW

3. The dual character of the consequences:

a. the internal and external ('achievements') of the Old West :

b. the idols revealed as a threat to physical survival:

NW

4. The core values of the new non-Western nations and the industrial process

NW

5. The failure of Western leadership after the Second World War

NW

6. The limited basis of a New West

NW

7. Some specific issues for the New West

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- modus vivendi
- Grotius extended
- foreign trade monopolies
- ((the ranking of international disputes)
- (protection of the integrity of intellectuals from contractual pressures)

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8. On the rejuvenation of the West and personal freedom