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# THE PRICE OF DEVELOPMENT

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# THE PRICE OF DEVELOPMENT:

# CHANGING INSTITUTIONS IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

## XV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Economic development is so much in the minds of people today that a description of the social life of South Asia such as the preceding is bound to be judged as contributing or failing to contribute to the solution of the "problem" of the underdeveloped countries. This preoccupation with development is itself a matter worthy of the attention of the student of society. The underdeveloped countries --let us call them those in which average income per head is less than $300--contain over two thousand million of the three thousand million people who inhabit the earth. Suddenly all of the three thousand million who have given any attention to the matter have accepted the view that poverty is not inevitable, that it is both morally repugnant and remediable. It is hard for most of us to think back to the attitude of "the poor ye have always with you," and other such assertions, commonplace from immemorial times. Poverty, with its defenselessness against hunger, the short and insecure life it imposed on individuals, has become intolerable. This attitude began as the view of a small minority in the 18th century; it made some headway through the 19th and in the first third of the 20th; during the few years since World War II it has suddenly spread around the globe. It is a part of the complex of sentiment on which supra-national institutions are being erected. It corresponds with the objective possibility of eliminating poverty through modern technology. How ironical that the curve of the number of people in the world accepting the new notion that life must be preserved and made comfortable for all parallels so closely the curve of the scientific discoveries which burgeoned with equal suddenness during and after World War II into nuclear weapons capable of destroying all life on earth, - but this is not my subject here.

From the viewpoint of the underdeveloped world itself the right to comfort and personal security which is the explicit objective of development is not the only reason for its urgency. There is also an uncomfortable awareness that most of the developed one third of world population are of European ancestry, while the underdeveloped two thirds are of Asian and African ancestry. Development is today expressed in per capita income, a scoring system which marks progress in the attainment of material equality, equality in the mastery of nature, and this is valued as an index of equality in some deeper sense. Asian pride suffered tragically during the western industrial revolution and the colonial period. It cannot be restored by any reassertion of the formal equality of nations, of the statement that one culture is as good as another, that each people is rich in its own way and seeks its own kind of happiness, that the West has machines but the East has wisdom. The bitterness with which such broadminded statements are repudiated by Asian intellectuals is not wholly explained by the material advantages of development; in today's thinking material achievement is not least the validation of moral worth.

Even if an attempt at description could avoid being assessed as solving or failing to solve the problem of development, it will certainly be read as showing or failing to show in what measure development is going on in Southeast Asia. It is a nice literary problem so to weigh the items selected for exposition and the words in which they expressed that the objective degree of difficulty in the process of development is matched in the impression given to the reader, who thereby emerges with an exact feeling for the prospects. A successful exposition would come between the public relations material put out by governments and technical assistance agencies, which present evidence of the rapid, inevitable, and effortless advance of development, and the occasional antagonistic western visitor's assertion that "these people are hopeless." It would describe the social, political, technical, economic, educational, geographic, and other conditions in such fashion as to exhibit both the difficulty and the inevitable of the process of development.

Asia south of the Himalayas contains over seven hundred million people, about one third of the underdeveloped world. (Another third is in China, and the remainder in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America). South and Southeast Asia contains eleven new countries and one old one--Thailand--but by and large the unit of analysis in this book has not been either whole nations or separate individuals, but rather groups of intermediate size. Some of these are ancient: villages, castes, religious communities, speakers of a given language; others are modern: political parties, economic enterprises, governing elites. It takes no close observation to see that the former do

not have the character they had in ancient times, nor the latter exactly the form of their Western counterparts. It is worth examining these groups because on their nature depends the dynamics of their interaction which is a main determinant of current changes. I am heavily obligated to the writers of the few hundred books and articles which have tried to provide accurate accounts of one phase or another of Asian social life. On the other hand there are many vital points where the detailed information on which a secondary statement such as this must depend is lacking.

Perhaps the main theme of Asian thought which emerges out of the past and continues to influence both the writings of intellectual and the motivation of peasants today is that of duty. In the Hindu village it was the duty of the Barber to cut his clients' hair; of the Potter to make their clay jars and cups; of the Watchman to stand guard at night. The clients were typically Farmers; it was their duty to divide their harvest and provide some of it to each of the family's servants, not in payment for services rendered but so that all might live. What a modern interpretation might see as exchange of economic services must have had rather the character of ceremony, and in some places this is its most durable aspect. In Ceylon, where the system began to disintegrate long before it did in India, most of what remains of caste duty today is in the attendance at weddings of Drummers, and other performances which both the observer and the people involved would agree are ceremonial. In India caste remains at its strongest in temples, the use of wells, dining and marriage; in railways, schools, factories, trade unions it either never established itself or is more readily attacked.

The distinctive character of Hindu duty was that it was special to the person according to his birth. The vague sort of duty which is universal-- as the notion enters Christian and Muslim thought, for instance--could hardly support a complex society in which individuals had varied work to perform. Hindu duty was richly differentiated. It flowed from the creativity of Brahma, the Principle by which the concrete world is constantly being fashioned and refashioned. (Kramrisch, p. 221). The Architect, the Goldsmith, the Wheelwright, even the Potter had no lesser task than the imposition of the Principle on the inert material with which they worked. They made the Principle manifest and concrete in their several ways. No one could ask that such participation in the world process be compensated by payment. The performance of duty by all the participants would ensure that each had the necessary ceremonial and material support. If the preceding text goes into detail on such matters it is in the effort to convince the reader that an economy that actually existed over thousands of years is theoretically possible.

The person was thought either to be born a Potter, or else to be plastic enough that by watching his father and his uncles he would become a Potter. Certainly there was nothing else he could become. It was absurd that one born a Potter should aspire to be an Architect; in the first place he would be a failure, and in the second, even if he succeeded, the result of such impiety on any large scale would be disorder and consequent ruin for the whole of society. The young man was told that it was better to do his own duty badly than to do someone else's duty well; his neighbours not only knew their duty but also enough of his to see that he stayed within its bounds. Any apparent injustice in the system arose out of the circumstances of the previous existences of the individuals concerned, the present life being no more than an episode in the transmundane migration that takes each of us through countless existences. Just as in a modern Burmese motion picture the felicity of the lovers is the reward for their patience in the face of unjust separation in an earlier life, so the fortune of the Raja or the misery of the Sweeper were at once the evidence of good or bad conduct in another existence and its compensation or expiation.

The transmundane can make existence in this world either more or less important than it appears to a materialistic, matter-of-fact acceptance of the world. Buddhism appears on the whole to devalue earthly existence; the actions which accumulate merit in the fateful reckoning are those that separate one from the material world. Achievement in a social or material sense is useful towards the attainment of Nirvana only in the degree in which it is consistent with the loosening of one's own ties to the world, or, as in the building of a pagoda for others to contemplate, in encouraging others to cut their ties. Technique has its place; the Tibetan prayer-wheel whose revolutions are equivalent to the repetition of the prayer by the owner; the construction of iron gongs whose striking announces one's piety; the electric lighting that illuminates the pagoda and so provides a nightly view of its splendour; all of these constitute the sort of material activity which would seem to have an affinity with development. But the preoccupation of ancient Budhism, and to a considerable extent of that of Burma and Cambodia today, is less with the mechanical aids to separation from the world than

with that seperation itself.

Buddism
Hinduism (creates structures)

Although its basic religious concepts are identical with those of Buddhism, the emphasis of Hinduism is very different. In all fields it differentiates, and so creates structures. The life of the individual is in four parts: he is successively student, householder, the pious one in retirement, and the homeless and nameless one who wanders like the wild goose. As a householder he is not encouraged to abandon his family as did the Buddha, but rather to use every energy to support them until his sons carry on in his place. His fate to all eternity depends on the diligence with which he does his work here, whether it be a humble service to his fellow villagers or prime minister to the king. One cannot watch the diligence of even a minor clerk in an Indian government office today without sensing that no mere earthly incentive could motivate such devotion; the attention both to the material requisites of the job as he understands it and adhesion to the rules laid down by authority are part of the illumination thrown on his task by the eternal Principle.

In a remarkable way British administrators from the latter half of the eighteenth century onwards were able to combine a society based on such ideas with their own very different world. Duty to a raj became duty to the British raj. The tasks were somewhat modified, by the new rulers who showed profound intuitive understanding of the mechanics of social change and how it could be controlled in the interest of colonial production. Not all peoples can be colonised; the Indians of America were in the same epoch being destroyed and replaced by Africans because they could not be put to the purposes of Europeans. Not only did the British in India use Hindus--Islamic culture was different enough that Muslims fared less well--but during the 19th century Hindus moved or were moved into Burma, Ceylon and Malaya. Their assiduity, devotion, and ability brought them to the fore as tea-pickers and rubber-tappers; they were the harbour workers of Rangoon, the money-lenders of Kuala Lumpur, the landlords of lower Burma.

However, the same British acumen that perceived the features of Indian character which could be put to profitable use recognized that an epoch had ended, and in the face of moral rather than physical resistance released territories which now contain some 600 million Asians. It was Gandhi who devised the technique of non-violent resistance-- satyagraha, literally the seizing of truth. Those who threw bombs at British officials, he declared, had no confidence in their cause or they would not resort to desperate methods which, if they brought independance at all, would bring a rule as intolerable as the one they terminated. By avoiding violence he could mobilize in his support not only India but most of Britain; he was able to avoid promises to his Indian constituents of immediate material benefits on the attainment of independence. Such promises given in Indonesia returned to dominate subsequent politics, to confuse economic issues and paralyze governments.

Gandhi created symbols. The self-discipline which alone made non-violence effective became the core of a system that raised the eyes of peasants beyond their village boundaries and focussed the attention of a substantial proportion of India's three hundred millions on matters which would hitherto have been incomprehensible to them. India had absolutely no precedent in ancient or modern times for national, as against local, politics. Gandhi devised the language, complete with symbols and a syntax, in which this national politics could be expressed. Every day's walk in the three weeks that it took him to proceed from his ashram to the sea, accompanied by his 79 volunteers and hundreds of newspapermen, cameramen, and new adherents of the movement; the scooping up of sea water and making of a few grains of salt when he arrived, to express defiance of the rulers who had seized on the salt tax as an ingenious hold on the financially elusive peasant; the four-anna membership in the Congress Party that made millions of peasants participants in resistance; the establishment of schools in which Western magic and ancient Indian lore could be learned; all these were news items that reached across the country. To realize the tenuousness of the physical communication system that was available-- newspapers which reached only a tiny fraction of the population, and knowledge proceeding outwards from them by word of mouth in markets and village gatherings--fills one with admiration of the genius that could fashion symbols capable of transmission down this chain without fatal distortion. The substance of the communication was always demands on people, never promises to them: your Western clothes are inferior to our dhotis, so burn them; violence leads only to more violence; truth is all-important, so you must keep your word. No better religious base could have been provided to furnish the qualities of devotion and present sacrifice on which development depends. The element of egotism

Devotion, present sacrifice

on which it equally depends is a more readily available ingredient.

In the present age of nationalism the shameful indignity of foreign rule is the main recollection of colonial times. Yet underlying the emotional resentment are three substantive items, each of which was both positively and negatively related to present aspirations for development. The first was the disruptive effect of textiles and other machine made commodities. Factory goods destroyed the cottage industry of Asia as surely as they did that of Europe, with the difference that the displaced rural workers of Asia were not themselves eligible for factory work; the social confusion resulting from the devaluation of the work of certain castes by machine goods was proportional to the tightness of the village social structure; it was hard to shift to another product for people whose integration in society had depended from time immemorial on performing a specific duty.

Since the colonial powers wanted to create no unnecessary antagonism to themselves they governed Asia as far as was consistent with their purposes through Asian rulers and by Asian customs, direct and indirect rule being a matter of degree. Much present-day criticism by Europeans of American aid to Asia takes the form of saying that the Americans do not understand Asia. European administrators took pride in their understanding and sympathy for Asia. And yet colonial rule was resented too bitterly for us not to see as one of the reasons that the understanding was sometimes a mask for policies that froze many elements of society that would otherwise have changed. Princes whose subjects were ready to expel them were strengthened by colonial arms and became puppets, insolent and oppressive to those below them and subservient to the foreigners to whom they now owed power. In present Indonesia there is resentment of the conscious effort of the Dutch colonial administrators to keep the "native" in his village until he was clearly needed on the plantation, a policy which impressed on Indonesian life the stamp of a dualism which has been all too lasting. Indeed the native himself, whether bearer or the Ali Kahn, was created by colonial rule, a construct of the meeting of east and west.

The third substantive reason for resentment is in some respects the opposite of the second, but it is equally conspicuous. This was the regime of contract and of law and order, imposed without allowance for the unequal advantage of legal equality to different peoples. Before this new regime it was true that the creditor was usually able to read and write and his debtor not, but debtors are many and creditors few, and exactions were kept within bounds by some intuitive sense of justice, by the obligation of the superior to his subordinates, felt at the point where there was a danger of the debtor or tenant fleeing or starving, if not before. The extortion of landlords and usurers had always been tempered by the threat of justifiable and approved assassination. A system of law and order is acceptable and can dispense with such informal controls if there is substantive equality through the spread of education. The formal equality that was suddenly introduced as law and order gave objectionable advantages to foreign Asians: the Chinese in Indonesia, Malaya, Cambodia, VietNam, and Thailand; the Indians in Burma; the Marwaris in Calcutta; even down to the Rotinese (from the neighbouring island of Roti) who became the merchants and traders of Timor. Everywhere the use of rationality within a legal system was first put to use by marginal men of one kind or another. This overturning of social rankings is bound to be resented in the degree in which the sense of social ordering, of who belongs above whom, is strong.

Every society has some knowledge of such things; in all prestige is matched to economic success only after a waiting period during which the success is legitimized. But Asian societies were particularly effective in subordinating their economies to their "knowledge" of what was socially right. Caste arrangements did this directly; they allocated income--nearly always in kind--according to caste position. Markets dealt only in a limited range of commodities. Sumptuary regulations and customs made it difficult to use any exceptional profits that might come into a person's hands to gain standing. A man who exhibited wealth above that of his station would offer a temptation to some hungry prince to seize it; the upstart would lack military defenses as he lacked, social, moral and legal ones. But such means for maintaining the social ordering have given way to more subtle measures. Within a more or less impersonal legal system, among the casteless Muslims of Java, one can see the feeling for who is a worthy person operating within a market. My field work included interviewing a Javanese villager, a pious Muslim, who had a small coconut oil pressing plant

in a shed in his compound. He told me--and this was confirmed by his neighbours--that the villagers would sell him coconuts for 28 rupiah cents when other people would have to pay 28 and a half, just because of their respect for him. Since he was already well-off, they did not resent his using prestige to drive a hard bargain as they would the similar behaviour of a greedy upstart. And those who bought the oil--unless they were Chinese--would be willing to pay a little more out of the same respect. I was not able to ascertain whether the men who grated and trampled the coconut pulp in his oil-pressing shed felt it enough of an honour to be close to such a pious man that they would take lower than standard wages, but it seems entirely possible. In such ways attitudes of respect maintain themselves even in the free market of a casteless village into which law and order have been introduced.

Weber describes how the commercial cities of medieval Europe secured concession from barons and kings in the form of permanent legal rights, based on surviving traditions of Roman law, and their armed burgers were able to sustain these rights against the whims of the prince. The struggle between princes and their subjects in Asia did not ordinarily revolve around general "rights"; princes were indeed displaced from time to time, but by other princes, who were equally insistent on retaining unqualified freedom of action. When their Asian subjects became restless the European powers responded in their own fashion - with concessions in the form of advisory councils, limited electorates, minimal elements of civil rights, some relatively abstract division of powers between the governor and local elective or princely authority. These were as little able to save colonialism as ~~third~~ their opposites of jail and censorship; the system was dead. But it did have its effects.

In some of the ex-colonies this framework of law has come to have deep institutional roots. Much of the post-independence Asian history has consisted in the assimilation of law to the conditions of nationalism and democracy. The Agents of this process, in most instances still including many of the men who sought and gained independence, are an elite which has some similarities among the several countries. They are drawn from the most urbanized 10 per cent of the population, the educated of the Western rather than the Asian educational tradition. They may be pious, and piety has increased greatly since independence, but they are not at all inclined to turn over power to those who would rule by piety alone--the mullahs of Pakistan, the Buddhist monks of Burma and Ceylon. Usually they come of families that had some relation to the Western sector in colonial times, not as servants of the Colonial government but rather as professionals, especially in law, who could support a degree of independence. Aware of the potential conflict of interest that impends between city and countryside in the course of any industrial revolution, and the cultural gap to whose widening all earlier history has contributed, the elite approaches the countryman gingerly both in personal relations and in official policy.

Yet the effort of the elite to rule for the whole country, pious and secular, rural and urban, is checked by a variety of difficulties. The unity of the elite which would permit it to be statesmanlike is broken by the personal ambitions of its members, and in no country except India does it bring the peasantry into effective partnership. The result is in most countries a concentration of development expenditures in the cities, which increase in size out of all proportion to their increase in production of tangible goods. Individual ambition yet undisciplined to impersonal norms reveals itself in corruption at ministerial and lower levels. Accounts of such corruption along with lack of salable output from city factories despite much investment stir the countryside, and this combined with splits within the elite itself has resulted in the widespread disorder which has plagued Burma and Indonesia. [illegible] accentuate differences of material interest, cannot be resolved by force; no more can the cultural and economic differences between speakers of different laguages. Sometimes a precarious unity can be attained within the majority by expulsion of a minority group like the Chinese in Indonesia, or persecution as of the Tamils in Ceylon but even where such persecution is successful the temporary unity attained has not been applied to tackling the real problems facing the new nations.

In some instances the geographical split within a country is less rural versus urban than one region against another. The state is concerned with the use of national resources for national development--this development will alone validate the revolution, redeem the promises made by the elite and so legitimate it. That the resources of an area belong to the people of that area and not to strangers is a principle that seems to have been established by the successful struggle for independence.

But do the resources of Sumatra belong to the people of Sumatra, of East Bengal to the people of East Bengal? Insofar as these consist of readily marketable rubber and jute they translate readily into foreign exchange, the most valued because the most convertible of all resources. Once the alternatives seen for its use are the purchase of industrial equipment for Sumatra or of food for Java, the starkest conflict of interest emerges between the regions. Such issues are not intrinsic but arise out of the way problems are formulated; it is the work of statesmen to discover imaginative directions of compromise and get them incorporated in popular thought while they pursue energetic policies favouring growth. Rapid industrial development of Java, for instance, would constitute a durable solution, whereas strengthening the central government's armed forces will only delay the settlement and make it more difficult.

Geographical or ecological problems in the formation of national states are complicated by contradictions within their system of values. If development--increase in per capita income--is an objective very much in people's minds, so is equality. It appears that equality follows development; a rise in average income seems to be accompanied by a narrowing in the curve of its distribution among individuals. But equality is too immediately valued in Asia for people to trust that it will come incidentally and automatically; they insist on deliberate measures to introduce it. And whether in Asia or in Europe, whether the equality in question is among individuals, regions or culture groups, development and equality are in short-run opposition; the policies that advance the one in most instances delay the other. The strength of the desire for equality is in part at least a residue of the colonial period, when groups in opposition to European rule were undisciplined by the fact which alone can make opposition realistic and constructive--its sense that it constitutes an imminent alternative government. Thinking of the attainment of power rather than of the responsibilities that they would inherit with that power, they stressed without restraint or qualification the evils of unequal distribution of income. These evils are underlined for Asians today by reflection on ancient princely rule as on more recent colonial; there is a selection from the past of equilitarian elements, and the merger of these with European radicalism.

Along with this attitude fostered in opposition and following naturally from it was the inability to perceive the role of management, decision-making, and enterprise in economic growth. A factor of production which is not perceived will hardly be rewarded, and one to which rewards are precluded will tend not to be perceived. Partly under the influence of Marxist stress on labour as the exclusive source of value--a view which is as little to be met with in communist practice as in free-enterprise theory--the first years of independence showed a certain degree of enmity to those, whether local or European, who would claim skills thought really not to exist as the basis for exceptional rewards. But 15 years of independence have been highly instructive; in nothing does a statesman like U Nu show his greatness so much as in his recognition of decision-making and management during the past five years.

Development, as has been stated, is the mastery of nature. But the condition for it seems to be certain forms of social organization, and these cannot come into existence without a radical change in people. It need not surprise anyone that through a longer or shorter chain of argument we arrive at the conclusion that mastery of nature is attained by way of a change in men. ? mentalities

x I have tried to show that the life of the underdeveloped peasant is a unity in which there is no specifically economic segment; the economic is interwoven with the religious, the social, the familistic, and the political. Not only are these inseparable in the thinking of the peasant, but any attempt by the observer to separate them has a degree of artificiality. The grain of Java must be cut stalk by stalk with a small knife so as not to frighten the rice-spirit; when a man is building a house his neighbours join in the work less in anticipation of future help from him than to enjoy the social occasion; a woman weaves cloth for the market at the same time as she tends the baby that sits on the floor watching her. When production is so embedded, the concept of efficiency hardly applies, and suggested changes of technique make no sense. And if people "know" how to proceed, as they do, nothing has alternative uses and there is no such thing as cost. Even if the society cannot be said to "determine" the economy, then at least both are bound together

x How did you "show" "that"? How was "economic" defined? motivationally? through associations of "quantity"? or what else?

rightly enough that change does not appeal to any one. What development requires is a degree of separation of economy from society (Polanyi). The production process must be visualized in sufficient abstraction that one can compare on their merits, which is to say without religious or other preconceptions, alternative use of resources, alternative processes of manufacture, and alternative products. Karl Polanyi has described the disembedding process in English history; in using his concept I am stressing one aspect; disembedding makes economic rationality possible. Through this "great transformation" people become labour, resources become land, and tools become capital. By virtue of a fundamental change of institutions the economy begins to follow an expansion path. Residual immobilities are removed as powerful equilibrium forces begin to operate. With the very slightest guidance even in the most complex division of labour the available combination of the factors of production produces more of the same factors. Luckily there is no need for total disembedding, which would correspond to perfect rationality, but only for enough to release the economic forces in the desired degree. But for an individual the separation must go to the point where he will put his father off the bus of which he is ticket collector if no fare is deposited; he will sell his land to buy a factory if that will give him a larger return; and once he owns the factory he will maintain it intact by depreciation allowances, however tough a policy this requires towards customers and staff. The impact of accounting procedures on decision-making in Renaissance Europe has been noted by Weber; instances both of their use and their neglect are plentiful in contemporary Asia.

To declare that such a disembedding of the economy from the society is both the necessary and the sufficient condition for the application of rationality may seem to be unduly demanding. But in fact nothing less will serve, and the two other principal ways of focussing the problem really demand much more. The first is the notion that there are barriers to development in Asia which must be destroyed before material progress is possible (Marion Levy, Thompson). Outsiders point to specific institutions--family and religion are favoured for this purpose--and declare that development is impossible unless those barriers are knocked down, unless Asian institutions are changed into specifically western forms. This is ethnocentrism carried too far. The cows of the Indian countryside are perfectly consistent with development, but separating the economy means that they are to be counted as a cost at all points at which they impinge on it. Once the economy is set free from the society the two will interact in a historical process determined in the value system of the Asian people concerned, whose direction it is not necessary to forecast in a discussion of the initiation of development.

If the removal of barriers--in practice virtually all characteristically Asian institutions--is the unnecessary condition that Westerners are inclined to impose, the devaluation of all non-material elements is the condition implied in totalitarian schemes of development. This solves the "problem" of people having family, religious etc. lives, not by making these private and so separated and protected, but rather by making them public and strictly secondary. As much as possible of the whole person is brought into the economy. One can say that the communist scheme has the merit of paying due respect to the difficulties of development, and of attending fully to its organizational component and the transformation of people that make new organization possible. While the "barriers" notion makes development seem easy, indeed inevitable, because it assumes that other people are essentially like Westerners once some harmful institutions are changed, the totalitarian method is highly demanding; it proclaims its intent to discipline all human characteristics in the interest of the one important aim of material progress.

The deterioration in South Asia--as elsewhere in the world--of institutions which limit individual choice is a conspicuous feature of modern history. Debt slavery, of which we have accounts in Thailand up to the beginning of the century and in upper Burma in the 1920's, is now increasingly thought to be wrong as well as illegal. People ought not to sell themselves into bondage, even though they may be well looked after by their wealthy owner even though in joining the retinue of a rich man they may be better fed, better protected, and do less work than when they were on their own. In the rather humane Asian procedure the debt-slave always had the right to ask another rich man to buy him if his master did not treat him well; since the possession of bondsmen added to one's social standing, an alternative master was always to be found. None the less the sense is strong that people ought to dispose of themselves and their labour freely, day by day, and each day ought to be fairly paid for.  What applies to

Communism highly "demanding"; liberalism — "easy" ("barriers" done away with)

slavery applies in a measure to indenture, to caste determination of occupation, to sharecropping in the village, and these institutions are weakened where they have not disappeared. The burning desire to rise in the world which is beginning to be found everywhere in Asia, but nowhere so much as in its large cities, comes only when individuals have mentally detached themselves in some degree from the institutions which once determined their fate according to birth. This recognition of the individual as such, by himself and others, a recognition closely bound with the possibility of personal choice in widening areas of life, is the result of the weakening of earlier social bonds; it in turn acts back on those bonds and makes them seem more and more improper. The change goes far beyond the economic field; we find that multiple wives and organized prostitution begin to meet resistance in principle which would not have been understandable a generation or two back; some sentiment is felt even against arranged marriages. Without the possibility of choice and mobility there is no individual; once the individual has come into existence he wants choice. More data are needed to see whether this set of attitudes is strong enough to be a safeguard against Communism.

By re-embedding? How?

If disembedding is the method, how is it to be carried out? The answer is customarily expressed in terms of incentives. Provide rewards for any manifestation of pure labour, pure enterprise, willingness to treat land as a commodity; once the earliest hesitating manifestations appear and are rewarded, they will be strengthened and multiply. Within the individual mind an interpretation is generated within which labour and enterprise separate themselves out with the necessary clarity. On the objective side profits to enterprise become social power as they are converted to capital (Parsons); their reinvestment depends on the men, the social class, the organizations which have demonstrated their judgment and skill by conducting profitable enterprise in the first place. It may be possible to avoid profit-making and still have development, but only by the use of some more painful selection of the new men and their coming to power; the thing that is not possible is to retain any given group of men in power, with given techniques and ways of working, and still have development.

NB. Further, re-embedding is required.

Incentives contain an interpretive component which is often overlooked. Money, houses, clothing, even food above a very low level are useful and valued and sought after, and can therefore cause people to do things, in the degree in which they enter the life of the particular society. Luckily there is no difficulty in interpreting material incentives in South Asia. People there are more than capable of visualizing the superior sort of life in which they can participate, the advantages in prestige which they can secure through the ownership of automobiles, of brick houses, and through foreign travel. Once these advantages are understood there is no difficulty in transferring their desirability to money, for which the need thereby becomes unlimited, and so all the advantages of the price system as a signalling mechanism are brought in. Peasant reactions which have serious inconveniences for the price system, such as people living by tradition and so having limited wants (resulting in the famous backward bending supply curve of labour) seem as a matter of fact to be disappearing in South Asia, though more detailed information on the rate in different areas and cultures is seriously lacking.

The ready understanding, especially by urban Asia, of the prestige which comes from automobiles and other consumer goods, has involved however two sorts of difficulties. The first is that the furnishing in quantity of this incentive to disembedding itself competes with capital accumulation. The resource that brings an automobile into the country - foreign exchange - could equally well bring in cement to be used in constructing a factory, or else equipment for a plant to make cement domestically. One should therefore cast about among material consumer goods to be used as incentives for the ones which can be secured most cheaply in terms of the capital whose forgoing is their cost.

But such a viewing of material goods in terms of their prestige or symbolic value at given cost suggests that we make use of the fact that prestige (whose Latin cognate signifies "illusion") is after all put into them by society; why should not society put that value into items which do not compete at all with capital? If a man

as is often thought

2/ The remedy of modern development is the fostering of the peasant's economy. The ... is ... by disestablishing the ... peasant's economy.

will work hard for an automobile because this gives him standing among his friends--the transport it provides could be furnished much more cheaply by buses-- then why not give him a medal instead, and make his friends admire that just as much? The medal would indicate that the man has done something for development, and since development is what people want so badly, knowing that through it they can all have automobiles in the end, and explanation of the facts to the public should endow the bearer of the medal with more prestige than the driver of the automobile. If the logic of this simple argument could be put over, against the tradition of cooperation which has such deep roots in Asia, the problem of development would be solved.

Any absurdity which attaches to such a proposal throws light on conditions in South Asia to day, particularly on its numerous contending groups. The government says that people ought to do things for their fellow men and for their country, but such official statements, although initially not without influence as interpretation-forming agents which could strengthen the will to development, are more than counteracted by other and more potent "explanations" of what constitutes merit in the new national state. Though the minister may ask people to work hard at low pay and assert that his effort is joined to theirs for the benefit of the country as a whole, he also exhibits a narrower loyalty, to his friends and relatives, in giving jobs within his ministry. It is said that the peasant is the man on whom all depends and his faithful work in agriculture is supremely meritorious, but then prizes in the form of automobiles are distributed in cities. People ought to give all and take little in their work for the country, and their salaries are set low and their income taxes high, but then some in conspicuous places, whose conduct sets an example to many, are perceived to add to their salaries by corruption and avoid payment of tax. A few of the corrupt ones are lightly punished; most of them advertise, by consumption, the gains they have secured and, in effect, the means they used to secure them. The country is going to be strong; we have only to wait; but the minister protects himself with a deposit abroad which says more clearly than words that in his sincere judgment the future of the country is in doubt. No one knows in what degree the people of South Asia could be brought to have a given value system, because the attempts to impose a system have been mutually contradictory. These are not to be blamed on individuals, but arise out of the many ways in which social structures are composed of groups whose relative positions are shifting.

One can go further than this and assert that interpretation creates (as it can destroy) authority, and this is substitutable for both capital and land--the latter a vital resource in the face of population growth. Suppose industrial labour organizes itself into unions, and insists on the application of rules which reduce output, and its pressures can be made to appear forward-looking and generally desirable. This under rather general conditions would have the effect of increasing the incomes of the industrial labour force at the expense of the peasants--and to a lesser extent of the owners of capital. But the peasants, without planning any strategy for the purpose, fight back effectively. They also reduce the amount of their work and divide it, and the crop, among an increasing number of villagers. Technology regresses as plots diminish in size. Since the peasants are poor and their government is democratic, they pay little in taxes. It is far better to help out one's widowed sister than to sell grain to be eaten in the city. The combined effect of the interpretations here referred to on the part of urban labour and the peasantry may be that they work an average of six hours a day rather than nine which would be feasible under the sway of a different set of interpretations. The three hours could be applied, at a negligible cost in extra food consumed, in building dams and in other structures that would constitute agricultural capital. These improvements might be sufficient to change a situation where the last person was producing much less than he consumed to one where he was producing considerably more. Insofar as authority or leadership can do this, they are the equivalent of land.

The role of such interpretations in social affairs is thoroughly understood by Marxists, who refer to them as "theory". Originally the antagonism that would lead to the rule of the proletariat was between it and the bourgeoisie. Asia had little bourgeoisie and proletariat insofar as it had little industry and hence, according to Marx, no contradictions but only unrelieved oriental despotism. Lenin, and then Mao, rescued Asia from this situation and gave it the dignity of a great number of contradictions: the quarrels between rival Western imperialisms, each needing colonies to prolong its own existence; between the imperial powers and their Asian subjects; between landlords and incipient bourgeoisie; between landlords and peasants. With the new abundance of antagonisms it was possible to select, and Mao proposed the grouping of all "progressive" forces against the imperialists. In place of the struggle on the urban barricades at the central points of the enemy's power, he established

"liberated areas" at the periphery, taking advantage of the inefficiency of government and the existence of nearly inaccessible jungle (Pye). By armed struggle the leaders expand and join together the initially liberated areas. This was the strategy in China, Malaya, and today in South VietNam. Communists know that an interpretation is all-powerful as long as it has no effective contradiction from other theory. This condition they are of course able to impose more easily than a representative government in a plural nation.

All three approaches to the economy--removal of barriers, totalitarian, and disembedding--require some political changes, both in the form of the institutions by which government is carried on and in the specific individuals who hold power. As things now stand in South Asia, the emphasis is on national unity--cultural, political, economic. The nationalism of the late 18th century in Europe is recalled by the governing elite, but in its unifying and conserving aspects rather than its revolutionary and democratic ones: The nation is thought of as a concrete entity, an atom, which will go forward by "its" determination. The problem is to avoid fission, to get everyone working together; one sees this most conspicuously in the domestic as well as the foreign policies of Indonesia, and much more in the expression of leaders than in their legislation.

It is in the need to delineate boundaries, to secure unity within the nation and to sharpen differences from those without, that cultural nationalism has its use. The phenomena which result have the superficial appearance of revival of ancient culture, but examination shows that there is purposeful selection of earlier items for wholly modern objectives. Those characteristics are selected which give maximum service as symbols, and have the minimum implication of reversion to the ancient forms of society. Thus Ceylon since 1956 has had a national dress, the white shirt and cloth well known throughout South India. Cabinet ministers might wear trousers at home but would not be found addressing a meeting except in national, which is to say political, dress. This initially distinguished members of the present government from the trousered English-speaking members of the UNP; a Bandaranaike who had learned Sinhalese after he had learned English could thus, with the adoption of the Buddhist religion, distinguish himself from his opponents. Thailand, on the other hand, never having had to distinguish itself from colonial rulers, nor to attack any indigenous class whose privileges were inherited from colonialism, is perfectly satisfied with coats and trousers for its men and is positively proud of the bobbed hair of its women. It has its own people of mixed descent, Anglo-Thais, for instance, but since these never had any expectation of preferential treatment they are subject to none of the attacks which Indo-Europeans suffer in every country which has become independent.

It would be interesting to ascertain which culture elements out of the past qualify to perform the unifying function in a modern nation. They appear to revolve around clothing and language rather than food. Rarely do they include type of house, and never such social forms as caste, dance, and princely power. There are some instances of revival of ancient industrial processes destroyed by European factory goods, usually with modern devices for efficiency--spinning is an instance. Some of the national symbols--flags and passports--are entirely new to Asia. On the other hand, India's lion-capital of Sarnath, adopted as a crest, is purely Asian. In all instances there is the usual disposition to rewrite the events of history to make them more useful as symbols.

It would even be worthwhile to analyse one such symbol, language, to see what elements are extracted from the past, what from Europe. In Indonesia an effective decision was made to base the national language on Malay which incorporated ancient Javanese, Sanskrit, Arabic, Portuguese, Dutch and English vocabulary in that order. The view is taken that all the accretions of vocabulary up to Arabic are indigenous and all subsequent ones are foreign. However, in contrast to this sharp cut-off in respect of vocabulary, the grammatical forms which are being used are frankly European, and, far from avoiding words for modern artifacts, a huge national effort is going into constructing a dictionary that will include Javanese and Sanskrit terms for automobiles and censuses. The search for Javanese words in particular contrasts with the modern concepts to which these will be applied and which are needed in political discourse.

The incorporation from the past of substantial social elements as against symbolic or differentiating ones is urged only by communal groups who are unanimously regarded as obscurantist by the urban elite. However, the distinction is sometimes difficult to make; ayurvedic medicine is on the borderline; its practitioners are an important social group in Ceylon and even in India, and it is in effective rivalry with Western medicine.

Much of this ransacking of the past helps the nation in its task of providing a frame of unified understandings within which development will take place. These include laws, regulations, standards of personal and political conduct. Through a wide territory they inspire the peasant to lift his eyes beyond the village in which he was brought up. He learns a national language--for most of Asia this is different from his own--and can then move where economic opportunity beckons. This along with the physical apparatus of communication, especially radio, should enable him to vote in terms of an objective understanding of his country's problems. All the countries we are considering have placed upon themselves the burden of political as well as economic development. The peasant comes to enter new sorts of organizations with specific and modern as against diffuse and traditional objectives.

But at this point the theme of national unity as an objective gives place to the even more important theme of national diversity. I have discussed how regional and cultural diversity impose difficulties; to them must be added organizational forms which are new, equally inevitable, and of great potential value as well as danger to the process of development. The formation of voluntary and other associations has been especially conspicuous in Indonesia; football clubs, credit and production cooperatives, trade unions even among the peasantry, local military units with political interests, even chambers of commerce. Each village notable gathers a faction about him, useful for supplying witnesses in court cases and deliverable as a voting bloc. (clienthood)

The new structuring is from the point of view of the individual an incentive as well as a means to mobility. Where rising in the caste hierarchy looked impossible, rising in the trade union is merely a question of learning to be a good speaker, finding out how to mobilize local support, studying how to conduct a meeting. Ambition is rewarded with promotion and prestige; the young man who has been successful in his village finds himself advanced from secretary of the local to council member in the provincial capital; from there he can go to Djakarta itself and have a voice in the union's national affairs. Among the countries of Asia there is no conspicuous correlation between this process and income per head--Indonesia has more such organizations than Malaya or India, while its per capita income is both lower and rising more slowly than either. But whether serviceable or not, such organizations are formed as family, caste, and village lines weaken. The new structures, which serve specific purposes and interests, along with the old ones which survive in different degrees, are the grass roots of political power. The much greater skill in the incorporation of these by the Congress Party than by the Muslim League in prepartition India has had important consequences for political stability in India and Pakistan. The formation of new voluntary bodies often utilizes old antagonisms. The peasant of Kerala has been made to see the opposition between Congress and Communist parties as that between Christian and lower-caste Hindu.

Thus among its other useful purposes the unity of the nation provides a frame in which diverse entities can form and compete with one another. Alongside the competition of freely producing business enterprise is that among seaports, among cooperatives, among government departments, among regions of the country. In India the process brings larger and larger portions of the population into a modern style of thinking, characterized above all by competition and by flexibility in the formation of organization. [In Ceylon, on the contrary, the dominant party, standing for the majority culture-group, the Singhalese, has tended to stamp out competition; Galle may not compete with Colombo as a seaport, for this would disturb the power position of the trade unions which control the labour supply of Colombo; Tamils may not compete with Singhalese in government service, because the latter would not then be masters in their own house.]

It is hardly to be expected that the elite in any of the rapidly changing countries of South Asia can entirely prevent the formation and competition of self-conscious groups. They form and compete everywhere, and the effect of the attempts to suppress them is the driving of competition into those modes that are least useful. The Chinese of Indonesia is deprived of legal equality; he loses the sense of the security of his property; his natural reaction is to put his capital where it will be least conspicuous--loans on usury, bribes to secure import privileges, hoards of consumer goods--rather than into those which are productive for the country but more visible--cement plants, sugar estates, mining ventures. The Sumatrans are given less autonomy than they feel entitled to and profits on their sales of plantation products are not available for investment in their own territory; they ship out their production illegally in small sailing craft and use the resources to build up military strength

against Java, which is thereby forced to use more of the resources it controls for internal security. The Burmese peasant is, in effect, heavily taxed (through the difference between the internal and external price of rice) by Rangoon, conflict takes the form of military repression on the one side and, on the other, the even more costly destruction of pipe lines, railway bridges, and every other physical manifestation of Rangoon that comes within reach.

Such remarks as these may imply a criticism of countries, individuals, and policies. Their purpose is quite different: neither to praise nor to blame, but to study the constitution of nations so as to find in what degree new structures are forming within them and how the interaction of these is related to development. The political activity now to be found within Indonesia, Ceylon, and Burma in such sharp contrast with their inertia over centuries so far from showing that development cannot take place, shows rather that in certain repects it is occurring. It is the protests against bribery and arbitrary imprisonment that give the appearance of turmoil rather than the corruption and lack of civil liberty themselves.

The countries of South Asia and of the underdeveloped world generally are not unanalysable entities but contain important internal structures. If a country is an entity like a person, then it may often be useful to exhibit your affection towards it and try to persuade it to reciprocate. You may or may not succeed, but it can do no harm to try. This was often the way European alliances were formed by Britain in the 19th century, in an age when a country consisted of an aristocratic ruler and subjects whose loyalty to him was rarely in question. Flattery and gifts were effective instruments of policy. If however the country is a congeries of units of all kinds, overlapping one another, often in bitter opposition, with effective power distributed among them in a fashion which is imperfectly known, and the government consists of people who are able for the moment to balance these units in an unsteady equilibrium, an equilibrium maintained by avoiding unnecessary issues and saving all energies for confronting those which the problems of development make unavoidable, then the requirement of an outsider - say the United States - that the government declare its affection may have a disastrous effect. Such a declaration may take on enough symbolic importance in internal politics to upset the equilibrium and put the opposition of the declaring government into power. The United States will then have secured a temporary symbolic victory and longer term substantial defeat. The substitution of one government by another may be delayed if the outsider reciprocates the declaration of affection with gifts of arms, ostensibly for use against a third country but more than adequate to threaten internal enemies; insofar as this is successful it causes the government to depend on its arms rather than on its success in raising the incomes of its citizens. We recall that a similar freezing of internal social conditions was one of the principal complaints against colonial indirect rule. It is awareness of internal structuring in their electorates that makes serious Asian governments insist on a full measure of independence in their foreign dealings.

Foreign aid is no new instrument of policy for advanced countries (Liske). During 200 years at least it was applied within Europe—France influenced Russia, Britain Austria, Germany Italy, by supply of arms, by construction of railways that would today be called either social overhead or defense support, by gifts in cash. What is new is the universality with which the instrument is used, and sometimes a degree of detachment from the specific and immediate political aims of the donor country.

It is remarkable how little is known about the effect of this instrument. A donor country is first inclined to help its friends; then it reflects that the money might be better spent on those countries that are wavering between it and its enemy--even including some close to its enemy. But in the next round its close friends have seen that the way to get more help is to waver, and do so, at which point the donor begins to lose confidence in the rationality of his "policy" in international politics. He may then go on to convince himself that the gift will benefit him; this plainly cannot mean that his nation will ever get back full value in trade or other economic benefits but only that the collective donation of all developed countries will be successful, and he and his allies together will benefit from living with developed rather than with underdeveloped countries. But even considering all donors together as a kind of club from which all will draw collective economic returns for their "investment" of foreign aid, and assuming both that the aid is necessary and that development actually occurs--these are not mild assumptions--it is still doubtful, economists tell me, that the donors will benefit in an amount equal to their aid. There is no proof that a country which is itself developed is better off economically to live in a developed than in an underdeveloped world. Charges are made that the

developed countries now exploit underdeveloped ones through the market for raw materials and so have a vested interest in the underdevelopment of Asia; it is also asserted that the developed countries will benefit from the foreign aid they give if it has the effect of generating development. As little evidence is available for the one assertion as for the other. It seems fair to summarize available ignorance on the subject by saying that aid is as likely in practice to make enemies, or at least neutrals, as to make friends and allies; that even if it secures development in the receiving country one cannot be sure that this will benefit the donor economically in the amount of his donation. The possibility of the donor doing actual harm to the cause of development even by technical assistance is not to be neglected: any government to government transaction strengthens the public sector; it is in the very nature of the way aid is distributed that it encourages official planning, which, according to the circumstances, may speed progress or check it, may encourage or prevent the indispensable new men from coming forward.

Though points such as the above are not ordinarily made officially and in public, yet they are well enough known to governments and more than suspected by electorates. Why then is foreign aid so firmly established, supported by all forward-looking citizens of the donor countries, and likely to increase in magnitude regardless of the ups and downs of the cold war? It is elementary sociology that when intelligent people give inadequate and self-contradictory explanations of what they are doing they have some deeper unexpressed and inexpressible reasons. In this instance the inexpressible must surely be an inchoate supra-national sentiment. This sentiment has brought into existence organizations ranging from the International Postal Union to the United Nations General Assembly. So far only the minor experiments of this kind are entirely successful, but the sense persists that something is needed. If world government is premature, we can try customs union and foreign aid for the time being. A restless condition and ineffectual strivings, rationalized by incoherent official reasons, are what one expects to find when wholly new institutions are struggling to be born. For the present no one who wants to support foreign aid can decently call on altruism, even of the practical sort that quite respectably sponsors welfare measures to aid the poor by redistributing income within a given country. Just as the poor within a Western country have become human so that they must be helped, so the people of South Asia have come into the view of the taxpayers of North America who feel the beginning of responsibility to share with them. Since this cannot be publicly said those who have an intuition of the supra-national world of the future use specious arguments of a suitably self-interested kind.

I have argued that recognition of the pluralism within the underdeveloped nations would improve the diplomatic policies of the developed ones towards them. Such recognition would also improve foreign aid. Development looked at as a problem is different from the viewpoint of the outsider, who we assume is anxious to assist, and from the viewpoint of the country itself. The contrast is not simply that only the actor can set his own goals, and that the outsider who would give aid must be subservient to these. It is rather that the goals themselves cannot, any more than the goals of an individual, be fully stated in advance of the action that will implement them. It is just as proper to assume that the goals of a person are what he is moving towards as that his goals are what he says they are, and that if he is moving in some other direction or not moving at all this is due to error or inertia on his part. The chain of reasoning that starts here will end with the conclusion that foreign aid can only be usefully applied to a country that has not only declared its aim to be development but has actually initiated that development with its own resources.

All other foreign aid is futile. Aid can be furnished only in capital, technical competence, or some other visible ingredient of a complex process. Unless the process is under way and the furnishable ingredient is lacking foreign aid will not work. In the static underdeveloped situation investment opportunities often appear to be fixed; where this is so and some capital is provided from the outside, then indigenous saving will be reduced, and what was intended as capital aid turns out to be a gift of a consumption good. If the community is satisfied with its investment, it takes the benefit in the form of leisure. Far from stimulating development this reduces economic activity as well as creating dependence on the source of aid. Even where capital is put to use so that it adds to income, it may do so in smaller amount than the use of the same capital in the donor country; in this case direct gifts of consumer goods would be preferable (Triantis). Whatever the economic effect of the aid its spending creates new social groups of administrators and other beneficiaries. These may be military or civilian. If military they may come into a position to overturn the government through which the aid was funnelled to them. If an urban civilian

class, its numbers will expand under the life-giving powers of foreign funds. This is clearest where the gifts are in food for city populations which thereby can grow without concern for the political support of peasants or need of economic integration with them.

It might be said that if the initiation of development is disembedding of the factors of production, which makes possible rational behavior, then a gift of capital in the form of a factory operating effectively in the urban setting will set an example of rational behavior that can spread. But whatever laws may govern such spread or imitation are complex indeed. Consider the European estates of the colonial period. No contract was sharper than that between the estate manager with his accounting, his freedom from all domestic and personal ties to his work, and the peasant who had nothing but personal ties. The former did not convert the latter to his methods by the demonstration of their effectiveness (Boeke). On the contrary, the peasant insofar as he has taken political power has used it to bring the estates to the peasant way of doing things; a way described in the estate context as nepotism, squatting, and financial ruin. If rational management did not spread from the estates, it need not spread from a modern sector established by foreign aid.

*Pop. growth*

Even if all difficulties could be overcome in some magical way and aid made useful to a country which was not otherwise oriented to development, it could still be futile because of the growth of population. The low-level Malthusian equilibrium trap (Liebenstein) consists in the simple fact that any increase of income which does not take place more quickly than population grows will be offset by that growth. If per capita income does not rise change in the structure of the economy is unlikely. One escapes from the trap by having income grow more quickly than population; the rise of per capita income brings structural change, and this acts back on the rate of population increase to check it, preferably before the shortage of land seriously lowers marginal returns. In the classical instances of development, the democratic application of the medical benefits of development either could not or was not allowed to lower death rates much in advance of the increase of income which would lower births. Now, when medical benefits cannot be withheld, the only way is to raise the per capita incomes of entire nations as rapidly as possible. This by itself is an argument for concentrating large amounts of aid in a few ~~places~~ (Bladen).

*Food aid*

Population considerations become more and more relevant with the increasing proportion of foreign aid constituted by food. Food which goes to a country doing nothing about its own development permits population to increase, and therewith the magnitude of the problem that will ultimately have to be faced. At the rates of increase of 3 per cent per year already attained in some parts of South Asia, and soon to be reached in all, population doubles in 23 years, and multiplies by eight in 70 years. The way in which an increase of scale changes the character of a problem can be seen by some comparisons. Ireland, with six million people a century ago, could in great measure solve its population problem by emigration. If a kindly foreign government had presented gifts of food for 70 years until it had grown to 50 million there would have been no such easy solution, as there is none for Java today. The fact that migration as a solution has become impossible because of administrative difficulties and not through any shortage of nearby land is seen in the failure of the official attempts to settle South Sumatran jungle from Java. At the peak of the effort 60,000 people were moved; it would take a million movers a year to prevent increase today. On the other hand gifts of food which keep people nourished while they build roads and irrigation works, and so generate new sources of food supply that will make future gifts superfluous, are the greatest help that can be offered by one country to another.

*Crucial issue*

This provides a criterion for policy on perhaps the most crucial issue of the day. Suppose that the recipients of the foreign food are city dwellers who are able to live in the cities because of the gifts, and work at producing fertilizer that will grow more food, trucks that will replace oxen in its transport, or consumer goods that will constitute an incentive to the peasantry to produce more. The gifts in such a case are likely to be a genuine benefit to the receiving country. The actual economic effect of a gift is complicated by substitution (Wolf), but to see that the population problem was not worsening one can watch per capita income or, preferably, the prospects for the future as indicated by changes in the capital position and projected population. This is made somewhat difficult by the fact that one must apply to the receiving country the national accounting system that ordinarily comes into existence later than development itself; greater factual and statistical knowledge of such elusive matters as the accumulation of capital in agriculture and maintenance of the soil is urgently required.

To what extent must the new technological culture be hung on the traditional one? This is a question easier to ask than to answer (Blumer). One can cite any number of particular instances in which the new is grafted on to or interpreted in terms of the old; Martin Orans tells us how a tribal people, the Santals, who come to take jobs in the steel mill at Jamshedpur consider their jobs like land—an assured status and revenue, transmissible to their heirs. It is even easier to give instances of worthy technical assistance effort which was wasted because it was not introduced to people in their terms. Yet generalizations are difficult. Much of the old is outworn and discredited; the merit of the new is its newness, and only those who want to depreciate it and argue against its adoption relate it to the old. Once newness for its own sake has become important, people will exult in the change of their old customs, and a cumulative process of destruction will take place. Should change be economized, on the assumption that ability to accept it is a scarce asset? If such a scarce asset as willingness to maintain equipment might be fostered by calling for a maximum, not a minimum, amount of it (Hirschman), then why not so for acceptance of change?

No study of change can be useful that does not rest on facts. One must confess ignorance of what is happening over large areas of South Asia in such fields as education, family, caste, and religion. In respect of education neither quantitative expansion of education nor effectiveness in implanting national symbols is in doubt. The young person's drive for upward movement in the social scale takes him to the school which the government has built to secure trained workers and responsible citizens. With one or two exceptions (Shils) we have no objective material on the content of higher education in Asia or its effect on those who submit to it. With similar worthy exceptions (Geertz, Ross, Carstairs) we have nothing on how the family is changing. On forms of caste in present-day village life there is somewhat more(Lewis, Mayer, Srinivas, Dube, Roy), and one can even suggest a hypothesis. The Barber, the Potter, the Drummer are no longer forced to shave, make pots for, and assist at the weddings of the senior agricultural caste. But now that population density has increased, and the land has been badly subdivided, the agricultural families are glad to have the food which they formerly divided with their caste servants, even at the cost of shaving themselves, shaping their own pots, dung cakes, etc. The liberation of the village servants will make them free indeed - to seek their food elsewhere in a crowded country or starve to death. The usefulness of liberation from caste depends on the pace of development and the jobs it provides. The effect of religion on economic life is seen richly in Java (Geertz) where different attitudes towards Islam on the part of villagers give different shapes to their economic activities; the need to make a pilgrimage to Mecca, felt by some, is a spur to profit-making and saving. On the other hand there is insufficient material to test as closely as one would like the hypothesis proposed above in which Hinduism is related to the diligence of the craftsman.

Study of the societies of South and Southeast Asia is more hampered by shortage of good data than it is by any lack of speculative imagination on the part of social scientists.

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