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Slavery. STANLEY M. ELKINS. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. viii, 248 pp. \$4.50.

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A good book dealing with slavery in the Americas is always welcome. The enduring passion in American historiography to treat the War Between the States almost exclusively as a military and political conflict has often obscured the slaves, their owners, and the ancient institution which joined them. Elkins' book on slavery is a good one, and in addition to all enlightenments, it may refresh the memories of some soldiering intellectuals badly in need of refreshment.

But the appropriateness of this book for students of culture goes beyond questions of historiography. Slavery is more than a matter of economics, more than solely a means of controlling the labor of others. It was one of man's most important inventions, and it has been part of the institutional system of myriad societies. Tylor wrote: "The greatest of all divisions, that between freeman and slave, appears as soon as the barbaric warrior spares the life of his enemy when he has him down, and brings him home to drudge for him and till the soil" (II:156, *Anthropology*, London, Watts and Co., 1946). That "greatest of all divisions" involves in every historical instance a way of life, a conception of the human condition, an ideology of society, and a set of economic arrangements, in short, a cultural apparatus, by which slaves and masters are related.

The economic arrangements which bound slave and master postulated that the master had the right to appropriate something which was the slave's—his time, or the products of his labor, his skill, often his children, perhaps his life. All definitions of the slave condition contain as a nucleus the idea of the property rights of one person in another. In certain circumstances, such rights take the form of capital. For the anthropologist, whether or not the slave is a capital good, a source of capital accumulation, a commodity, or something else and beyond these, is very relevant. Kroeber has written that "The fundamental thing about culture . . . [might be] the way in which men relate themselves to one another by relating themselves to their cultural material" (p. 68, *Anthropology*, New York, Harcourt Brace and Co., 1948). The relationships between slaves and masters in any particular historical instance are an illustration. As for capital, it may be viewed concretely, as some store used to undertake fresh production, or as a social aspect of the productive process. ". . . capital is not a thing," states Marx (I: 791, *Capital*, New York, International Publishers, 1939), "but a social relation between persons, established through the instrumentality of things." And he adds, in a peculiarly relevant footnote: "A negro is a negro. In certain circumstances he becomes a slave. A mule is a machine for spinning cotton. Only under certain circumstances does it become capital. Outside these circumstances it is no more capital than gold is intrinsically money, or sugar the price of sugar. . . . Capital is a social relation of production." The similarity between Kroeber's definition of culture and Marx's definition of capital springs from no common intent other than to describe something in human behavior. Both definitions indicate the relevance of the phenomenon of slavery

for anthropology. Especially important is the degree to which a particular mode of slavery is primarily economic, or embedded within a code of behavior such that the economic rationale is submerged or secondary. All slavery may be slavery, but not all slaveries are the same, economically or culturally.

Through slavery, human beings, their labor, their lives—that is, their production and reproduction—are transformed into things. In capitalistic societies these things are commodities; in part-capitalistic societies they are part-commodities. Where the kind of social and technical organization is such that it is not possible readily to appropriate a worthwhile portion of the product of others by enslavement, the goals of slavery, when it occurs, will not be directed to the maximization of profit. Where servitude is total, the kind and degree of appropriation will vary, according to what the level of technical development and the accompanying institutional apparatus, including the economic system, make possible.

In this hemisphere introduced Western slavery lasted nearly four centuries; it involved the enslavement, unremitting labor, and, often, violent death, of some ten to twenty million persons. Those numbers are merely the supposed minimum and maximum of creatures forcibly enslaved and do not include those others born into slavery. This was just possibly the greatest acculturation event in human history, beyond its spectacular significance demographically. It is still not enough noticed how mightily the labor of the slaves contributed to the growth of industrial capitalism; and even Elkins curiously neglects the work of Eric Williams (*Capitalism and Slavery*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1944) and others on this theme.

An institution moribund or dead in the mother countries was spread through the sub-tropical lowlands of the New World, particularly on the Atlantic periphery, with varying vigor and at different times. In the Danish, Dutch, English, French, Portuguese, Spanish, and Swedish colonies, and in the United States, the slave trade and slavery played a key role in the economic development of the capitalist metropolises. Edgar Thompson ("The Plantation," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Chicago, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, 1932) has shown how this Western industrial slavery, slavery within capitalism, was basic to a pioneer institution, the plantation. The developmental problem was one of bringing into production tracts of fertile land available for the asking, or little more, but in the absence of an adequate labor supply. The need and economic advisability of such development grew swiftly as plantation products were transformed from the luxuries of the rich into the daily necessities—sugar, coffee and the like—of the proletarian poor in the mother countries.

But from the point of view of the entrepreneur, free labor would not do for plantation development, since land was free. Freeman provide opportunities for the garnering of entrepreneurial profit when they have no access to the means of production (particularly land), at any price they can pay, and must instead sell their labor at the market price. In the absence of coercion from above, and of organization below, this price is determined by supply and demand; and, where supply far exceeds demand, the price is low. Such is the situation which that much-neglected encyclopedic ethnologist, H. J. Nieboer, called one of "close [sic] resources" (pp. 420–422, *Slavery as an Industrial System*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1900). But the pioneer situation prevailing in the New World lowlands was one of ample free land and scarce labor; the entrepreneur could appropriate neither profit from the employment of needful laborers, nor rent from scarce resources. And in contrast Nieboer called this situation one of "open resources." Or as Thompson put it (1932:21), in one instance two would-be employers chase one

laborer; in the other, two would-be laborers chase one employer. The baldness and simplicity of this formula ought not to rule out its usefulness for understanding the economic grounds for slavery in the New World.

Yet not all New World situations gave slaves the same status, used them in the same ways, treated them with equal cruelty or kindness. It is this variation which caught Elkins' eye. Following a critique of American writing on slavery, he is led to ask his central questions. What set slavery in the United States apart from slavery elsewhere in the New World? Was the impact of North American slavery on the slaves' lives and personalities different from that which it had on slaves in other New World countries and colonies, and if so, why? Having asked the questions, Elkins answers them, fully and eloquently. The core of his argument (pp. 37-80) makes fine reading. He contrasts the slavery systems, and the surrounding institutional apparatuses, in the ". . . liberal, Protestant, secularized, capitalist culture of America . . ." with the ". . . conservative, paternalistic, Catholic, quasi-medieval culture of Spain and Portugal and their New World colonies" (p. 37). Elkins' omission of the word "capitalist" from this second list of adjectives is crucial. Having stated his terms, he finds largely what Frank Tannenbaum (*Slave and Citizen*, New York, Knopf, 1947) found before him. In North America, slavery as an industrial system was able to develop unhampered by preexisting institutions and cultural usages affecting the definition of the slaves' place in society; in Latin America, this was not so. In the first case, slaves as commodities were at their fullest defined, while in the second, the complete commercialization (read "dehumanization") of man was prevented by the prior claims of Church, monarchy, and tradition—that is, by the culture.

In a subsequent portion of his book, Elkins contrasts the slaves' experience of slavery in North America with the concentration camp experience of Europeans under Nazism, concluding that, in their effects on personality, these two historical events share much. A final chapter compares the abolitionist movement in North America with that of Britain, and explains differences in the end of slavery in the British colonies and in North America in terms of the different positions of the abolitionists with relation to national institutional frameworks.

In comparing North American slavery with that of Latin America, Elkins adds to Tannenbaum's earlier (1947) treatment. Tannenbaum puts his emphasis heavily on whether a particular society ". . . accepted the doctrine of the moral personality of the slave and made possible the gradual achievement of freedom implicit in such a doctrine" (1947:viii), and on the role of a universalistic religion—in this case, Catholicism—in protecting the slaves from complete dehumanization. Tannenbaum avoids, however, the question of differing levels of capitalist development within those countries and colonies which had slavery. In a recent discussion on the same subject (pp. 60-66, "Race relations in Caribbean society," in *Caribbean Studies: A Symposium*, V. Rubin, ed., Mona, Jamaica, Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1957), he explicitly rejects "economic determinism" as an explanation of the difference in systems of slavery in Latin America and in North America. But while Elkins has put economics into the argument he also, like Tannenbaum, circumvents critical evidence on the interplay of economic and ideological forces. It is a historical mistake to treat slavery in Latin America as a single social phenomenon, even for purposes of broad comparison. One relevant example is that of Cuba, of which Elkins might have said more than he does. William Law Mathieson (p. 34, *British Slavery and its Abolition*, London, Longmans Green and Co., 1926) wrote:

Spanish slavery in the West Indies was a century older and lasted considerably longer than that of any other European Power. It began and it ended as probably the worst in the world; but there was an intermediate period, happily of great length, during which its reputation for mildness was fully deserved.

If the institutional framework of the society was what kept intact the slaves' moral personalities, what happened to it in the case of Cuba, at the beginning and at the end? A look at R. R. Madden (*The Island of Cuba*, London, Chas. Gilpin, 1849) will suffice to reveal what happened in Cuba to those rosy institutional arrangements which protected the slaves, once slavery became part of an industrial plantation system, as it had much earlier in the British and French West Indies, in North America, and elsewhere. Institutional restrictions may have hampered the maturation of slave-based agricultural capitalism in Cuba; but that they could not prevent it is painfully clear in the record. In the mid-19th century, Cuban slavery dehumanized the slaves as viciously as had Jamaican or North American slavery.

On the one hand, then, there was in the case of some Latin American societies an economic change which conditioned radical changes in the slaves' status. Yet again, on the other hand, the argument that there was no working tradition of a slave society in the non-Catholic New World countries is open to attack. The British West Indies are a good case in point. Tannenbaum and now Elkins argue that in North America there was absent any legal, institutional, or traditional background for slavery, though Elkins is willing to grant (pp. 41, 47) that the Barbadian (and later, Jamaican) slavery experience may have influenced the form slavery took in North America. In fact, there was an English legal, and to some extent even institutional, background for British West Indian and North American slavery. Madden (II:131, *A Twelvemonth's Residence in the West Indies*, London, Jas. Cochrane and Co., 1835) notes that "... a commission was appointed by Queen Elizabeth in 1574 to take steps for the manumission of English slaves, even while her Majesty's fleet was ravaging the coast of Africa for negro ones." In 1537, the House of Lords rejected a bill for the manumission of villeins (I:130, *The Economic History of England*, by E. Lipson, London, Adam and Chas. Black, 1945), and there is documentary evidence, according to the same author, in the form of surveys, court rolls, and manumissions, proving the existence of 16th-century villeinage. It is true that the villeins are estimated to have numbered but one percent of the population, but this meant thousands of persons.

The Rev. G. W. Bridges, a pro-slavery racist writer of 19th-century Jamaica, cannot be entirely discounted when he writes:

The negro slave-code, which, until lately, governed the labouring classes of Jamaica, was originally copied from that of Barbadoes; and the legislature of that colony resorted, for a precedent, to the ancient villeinage laws, then scarcely extinct on British ground. They copied thence the principles which ruled, and the severity which characterised, the feudal system under the Saxon government.

Not seventy years prior to the settlement of Barbadoes, a remarkable badge of servitude had been imposed on British subjects, by the statute against vagabonds, which adjudged them, expressly and absolutely, to positive slavery; inflicting violent punishments on the disobedient, stigmatising runaways by branding, and, for the second offence, decreeing death. The same law empowered the master to rivet an iron ring around the neck of his slave, affixing the penalty of ten pounds upon the person removing it; and it repeats the word "slave," so odious to British ears, no less than thirty-eight times.

Such remained the effective law of England in the year 1553; and it was only thirty years after that period that Barbadoes fell into the possession of the Lord High Treasurer. The enactments regarding negro slaves in the colonies were therefore, naturally enough, transcribed from these late precedents at home, where the name and character of slavery was thus familiar (I:507-508, *The Annals of Jamaica*, London, John Murray, 1827).

very good

In commenting on this quotation, no less an authority than L. C. Gray concludes: "It appears probable that colonial lawyers seeking precedent for their legislation found it in this statute, as well as in other vagrancy laws" (I:343, *History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860*, Washington, The Carnegie Institution, 1933).

Slaves had numbered 9 percent of the population in the Domesday Book, but slave status had been gradually assimilated to villeinage thereafter. Villeinage at its simplest involved an obligation to enforced labor, both regular and extraordinary (the *precariae*), as well as contributions in kind or in money to the lord; normally the villein had no legal security, but some protection in custom and tradition, and in manorial courts. By and large, Elkins does not deal with these data or provide ample evidence that there was no precedent in England for North American slavery. His argument peters out in a footnote (p. 38), where he mentions medieval villeinage in England, noting that "the legal suppression of personality was never present in villeinage." This latter statement comes as no surprise. Slavery of the particular British West Indian, North American, and 19th century Cuban sort probably had no precedent, legal or otherwise, anywhere in modern times.

The question, then, does not seem to hinge on the presence of a tradition in one case and its absence in another, but on the effective transfer of a tradition in one case and its nontransfer—or incomplete transfer—in another. The Spanish colonies in the New World were no more and no less pioneer settlements than were Barbados, Jamaica, and North America. Why did metropolitan institutions travel effectively with the south Europeans, only ineffectively with the north Europeans? It is hard not to suppose that the economic and political structures of the metropolises, and not only their religious and other ideological systems, were probably important. England's tradition of representative government meant that, like as not, slave laws would be made by slave owners, and so they were. In the Spanish colonies, such laws emanated from the mother country. But Elsa Goveia shows that when Cuba's slave owners became politically powerful, as plantation slavery there became capitalistic in a fuller sense, they handily defeated the intent of the 1789 laws designed to ameliorate the slaves' condition, and humanitarian tradition, universalistic religion, and past practice did not prevent them (p. 81, "The West Indian slave laws of the eighteenth century," *Revista de Ciencias Sociales* 4, 1960). This was the same year in which free commerce in slaves was decreed by the Spanish Crown for Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Caracas (Venezuela).

Puerto Rico provides a double example of the economic onslaught upon institution and tradition. The Crown invited Puerto Rico to name a representative to the central governing council of the Empire in 1808, a move expressly designed to reduce separatist pressures accompanying the growth of a plantocracy on the island. Don Ramón Power, first delegate to the council, carried 22 propositions with him, intended to give Puerto Rico's merchant and landed classes greater freedom of action. One such proposition lay at the basis of a whole series of forced labor laws, by which freemen squatters on Crown lands were driven by force onto the plantations (see "The role of forced labour in nineteenth century Puerto Rico," *Caribbean Historical Review* II, 1951 by Sidney W. Mintz). These laws were revoked in 1873, at the same time that the emancipation of the slaves was decreed. As for the slaves and their condition in this 65-year period, much the same occurred as in the case of Cuba. A series of repressive laws was passed, more and more limiting the slaves' legal, social, and economic status. These laws were paralleled by a rising tempo of slave revolts and outbreaks on the plantations. Neither physical type nor nonslave status protected the landless Puerto Rican

creole from the plantocrats in the period 1808-1873; and José C. Rosario and Justina Carrión reveal how the doctrine of the moral personality of the slave was conveniently forgotten as the plantations expanded (pp. 113-120, *El Negro*, Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico, University of Puerto Rico, 1940). When Herman Merivale compared Puerto Rico and Jamaica in 1839, he was fully justified in writing:

The tropical colonies of Spain were commonwealths in an epoch when those of most other nations were mere factories; they are now rapidly acquiring the degrading characteristics of factories, while ours, we hope, are advancing toward the dignity of commonwealths (p. 41, *Lectures on Colonization and Colonies*, London, Oxford University Press, 1928. See also, Sidney W. Mintz, "Labor and sugar in Puerto Rico and Jamaica, 1800-1850," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* I:273-280, 1959).

Yet another case worth examining is that of French Saint-Domingue; it is dealt with in a paper by Wallace Katz ("Slavery and caste," *King's Crown Essays* 6:13-34, 1959), which stresses the relationship between metropolitan authority and the local power of the planters. But the cases noted earlier should be sufficient to make the point.

The upshot of these arguments is that there was a legal precedent for slavery in the north European colonies, and that the institutional apparatus of the south European countries did *not* always protect the slaves—or for that matter, the freemen—in their slave-holding colonies. Notable differences between these two kinds of colonial situation were the varying effectiveness of metropolitan political control and the differing rates of emergence of capitalist plantations. Furthermore, the principal powers which had colonies in the New World differed in the degree to which representative or self-government was possible on the local level. Representative government and quasi-autonomous legislatures were apparently firmer in the British colonies than in the French, firmer in the French colonies than in the Spanish.

The slave plantation, producing some basic commodity for the mother country, was a special, emergent capitalist form of industrial organization, which appeared earlier, and with more intensity, in the colonies of the north European powers than in the colonies of Spain. (Omitted here are the earliest Spanish plantation experiments in Santo Domingo, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, which soon disappeared.) Industrial slavery of this sort effected a more complete dehumanization of the slaves than did other forms of slavery. (And, of course, even domestic slavery in Jamaica, Saint-Domingue, or the American South was less crushing in its impact on the individual than field slavery.)

The differentials in growth of the slave plantations in different colonies are to be understood as resulting from different ecologies, differential maturation of metropolitan markets and industries, and different relationships between creole governing bodies and the metropolitan authorities. The rate of growth of the slave plantation, then, did not hinge on matters of race, civil liberties, protection of the rights of individuals slave and free, or the presence or absence of one or several religious codes.

The rates at which existing norms of behavior with reference to "social inferiors" were changed or reversed depended to a considerable extent on the power of the planter class in the creole society, and on its capacity to influence or to immobilize political decisions made in the metropolis. The power of the planter class of course varied. But the capital for plantation development usually originated in the metropolis, and the moral force of capital's sacred right to reproduce itself was felt in turn in metropolitan legislatures.

It needs noticing at the same time that the south European countries and their colonies gave up slavery later than did those of northern Europe. Spain's Antillean

colonies (Cuba and Puerto Rico) for instance, declared emancipation respectively in 1880 and in 1873 (not in 1867, the date Tannenbaum gives for both, 1957:62). From this vantage point, it might appear as if the north European powers earlier recognized the moral failure of slavery and responded selflessly. By and large, this does not appear to have been the case; the difference seems to have been more economic and political than purely ideological. Once emancipation was accomplished, moreover, there is a striking similarity between the south European and the north European colonies and countries in their adjustments to freedom. Jamaica, British Guiana, and Trinidad imported Indian indentures and the record of their employment is not pretty. Cuba, having achieved emancipation at last in 1880 (followed by 6 years of "guardianship" for the ex-slaves!) imported Chinese—approximately 125,000—with few institutional protections of any sort, and judiciously kept the price of free labor low by massive importations of Haitians and Jamaicans thereafter. W. Kloosterboer (pp. 191–202, *Involuntary Labour since the Abolition of Slavery*, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1960) has demonstrated that, where slavery came to an end too soon—that is, before the labor pool had increased to a "closed resources" level—various sorts of forced labor arrangements, usually justified by "vagrancy" laws, were put in force.

These laws have lingered longest, not in countries of a particular institutional background, but in those of a particular level of economic and demographic development. A prime example—as south European as one would like—is provided by Harris (pp. 50–65, "Labor emigration among the Moçambique Thonga," *Africa* 29, 1959) for Moçambique; Kloosterboer (1960:67–78) deals with a similar theme for Angola. In much of contemporary Latin America, indigenous peoples are still driven into wage labor by an array of laws which permit no feasible economic alternatives. Would it be too cruel a jest to say that the south European ideology recognized the moral personality of the slaves but could not adjust to the idea of the moral personality of the freedmen? Be that as it may, it does appear true that capitalism matured more rapidly in the colonies of the north European powers. Emancipation appears to have been an aspect of this maturation. Without questioning the motives of the abolitionists, it needs to be asked again whether the growing awareness of the dignity of freedom may not have been accompanied by an equal awareness that free workers produce and consume dramatically more than slaves, other things being equal.

An investment in slaves, after all, means that capital is being held in a particularly inelastic form. Whether or not this will be brought home to the slave owner depends on the degree to which he considers his human chattels an investment. On the plantations, ecological conditions and the nature of the crops grown meant that the slaves were substantially nonproductive—in terms of maximizing a cash profit—for some part of the year. Unlike the wage earners of early capitalism, slaves represented a cost, diminishing capital when they were not working, to the entrepreneur. This helps to explain the truly desperate efforts of slave owners to increase their profit margins by compelling slaves to grow their own foodstuffs, by enabling them to become artisans, by renting them out in labor gangs, and so on. In the less capitalistic slavery situations in the New World, circumstance minimized the businessman's view, the deliberate purchase of slaves with the intention of expanding production and hence profit, the borrowing of capital at interest in order to buy slaves, and the other practices associated with the developed slave plantation. The very definitions of idleness, stupidity, and even humanity differed accordingly. On the capitalistic slave plantation, humanity was an obstacle to maximization. In other, less economically committed situations, this

was not necessarily the case. The degree of social commitment to a capitalistic mode of production based on slavery is an essential aspect of the analysis of slave status. It is for this reason that even in situations where slaves were used for gain, such use alone does not adequately permit predictions about slave status. M. G. Smith's careful and important institutional comparison of Jamaican and Zaria (Nigeria) slavery (pp. 239-290, "Slavery and emancipation in two societies," *Social and Economic Studies* 3, 1954) fails of its purpose—which was to obviate interpretations "... based on economic determinism . . ."—when he notes but does not fully examine such features of Zaria society as its lack of dependence on overseas markets, its stable economy, the religious motivation and military form of enslavement, and so on.

When Elkins turns to compare North American slavery and the concentration camp experience in recent western European history, his treatment is most of all provocative. It seemed effective to this reviewer, especially to the extent that it deals with the shock effects on human personality of certain cruelly repressive episodes, but much less effective as culture-historical analysis. The author is concerned with the stereotype of "Sambo": ". . . docile but irresponsible, loyal but lazy, humble but chronically given to lying and stealing; his behavior was full of infantile silliness and his talk inflated with childish exaggeration . . ." and so on (p. 82). Why, asks Elkins, is this stereotype of the Negro people so strong, and so exclusively North American? He finds his answer in the trauma of enslavement, and it is in this connection that the concentration camps, and the behavior of their inmates, are discussed.

But only for the shortest of time-spans, in cultural terms, was the concentration camp an institution. Its purpose very soon came to be the annihilation of its inmates. The intent of slavery, much to the contrary, was to perpetuate a population in a given status, and to some extent it succeeded. Slaves throughout the Americas, though they never reproduced their own numbers, were born by the millions into slavery. Newborn slaves were enculturated; it would be hard to apply that term to the inmates of the concentration camps. Furthermore, it is not proved that this particular stereotype was or is applied in the United States only to the Negro people. In a footnote (p. 83), Elkins refers in another connection to ". . . the stereotypes of eastern and southern European immigrants that were held by certain classes in this country early in the twentieth century." For an amplification of the stereotypes and more perspective historically, the reviewer suggests a visit (in A.D. 1961) to New York's upper West Side, where the opinions of yesterday's immigrants from Europe may be collected on today's immigrants from Puerto Rico. The obverse of the "Sambo" stereotype is equally ugly and rather more frightening; it held for the Negro slaves as well; it holds for other peoples here as well today. But in spite of these strictures, the sudden juxtaposition of two such superficially unlike bodies of data as those on slavery and on the concentration camps is startling and illuminating. Elkins' own reservations (p. 104) are wise, but his contrast is justifiably daring all the same.

In arguing finally that the North American abolitionists were intransigent and outside the institutional framework, unlike their British opposite numbers, Elkins provides an idea of why the struggle was more bitter and unyielding here than in the case of Britain and her colonies. Two criticisms may be made. The position of the British abolitionists was neither uniform nor wholly conciliatory. Elkins fails to use or to evaluate, for instance, Eric Williams' excellent discussion of this (1944:178-196). He omits as well what may be an important political consideration which is geographical at its roots. The United States alone, of all the great powers, had to fight for the aboli-

tion of slavery *within its own national territory*. That it did so—and that its people carry that fight forward to this day with bravery and honor—is admirable, but beside the point. The irreducible conflict, in the case of other nations, was fought by undermining mercantilism, pushing free trade, and shifting power to the industrial capitalists. As Williams indicates, this was accomplished within the metropolis, far from the colonies themselves. The American South, however, was integrated with United States institutions in a way that the British West Indies never were, and never could be, with the institutions of Great Britain. Surely the American struggle might have taken a different shape. But it is worth wondering what the tone of British abolitionism might have been like had Jamaica, as it was constituted in the 18th and 19th centuries, been Wales.

Slavery is gone now from this hemisphere. But the study of the "peculiar institution," as Kenneth Stampp calls it (*The Peculiar Institution*, New York, Knopf, 1956) goes on. For anthropologists, the task is nearly as fresh as it ever was. There are questions of Africanisms, and their perpetuation; of race relations; of the culture history of the plantation, and of the culture of the slaveholding countries and colonies. Meanwhile one central question can be asked again and again; how did these societies define man? Malinowski described slavery as

... the denial of all biological freedom except in the self-interest not of the organism but of its master. The slave is also deprived of all satisfactions which culture guarantees to a man as the price paid for the trammels it imposes. The slave does not enjoy the protection of the law. His economic behaviour is not determined by profits and advantages. He cannot mate according to his choice. He remains outside the law of parentage and kinship. Even his conscience is not his own" (p. 297, *Freedom and Civilization*, New York, Roy Publishers, 1947).

But Malinowski himself observes that, if this be slavery, in many instances the peculiar institution in question must have been something else indeed. This description comes closer, perhaps, to John V. Murra's personal correspondence definition of the real meaning of exploitation—the denial to certain individuals or groups of the conventionalized prerogatives of the human condition, as defined by the culture. It is worth noting that even recent attempts by European nations to define slavery for purposes of its elimination in African colonies and elsewhere have suffered from the difficulties of definition. Even the idea of "right of ownership" poses difficulties; Lord Lugard felt impelled to point out in 1933 that: "To an African the term 'right of ownership' might not convey the precise meaning intended, namely, that of a chattel without human rights" (p. 9, "Slavery in all its forms," *Africa* 6, 1933).

Glancing for the last time at the Latin American cases, one sees clearly that slavery meant different things to different societies, and at different times. The most important case, perhaps—carefully avoided by the reviewer up to here—is Brazil. In spite of Elkins' adjectival omission, the "... conservative, paternalistic, Catholic, quasi-medieval culture of ... Portugal" created a slave-and-sugar empire in Brazil which *appears* capitalistic from the first. Yet most writers hold that the complete dehumanization of the Brazilian slaves was not realized. If so, we need to know how Brazil followed her unique path, why slaves there were not culturally "erased," even while the economic structure apparently had as its goals those which had led the British, Dutch, French, Americans, and finally, Spaniards, to trample on human rights with their plantations. After the arguments about economics and ideology are fully set forth, the cultural question does remain. What—*from the point of view of the culture*—is man? We still must "ask" the slave-owners and the slaves. Elkins makes the question clearer, helps us understand better what we should be asking.

Warm regards,
Sidney Mintz

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Haciendas and Plantations in Middle America and the Antilles

By

ERIC R. WOLF AND SIDNEY W. MINTZ

Hacienda
This paper attempts to deal with two kinds of social organization in agriculture, the hacienda and the plantation. Since these terms are employed with various shades of meaning by various writers, it may be well to indicate at the outset how we propose to use them here. We shall make hacienda stand for an agricultural estate, operated by a dominant land-owner and a dependent labour force, organized to supply a small-scale market by means of scarce capital, in which the factors of production are employed not only for capital accumulation but also to support the status aspirations of the owner. We shall let plantation stand for an agricultural estate, operated by dominant owners (usually organized into a corporation) and a dependent labour force, organized to supply a large-scale market by means of abundant capital, in which the factors of production are employed primarily to further capital accumulation without reference to the status needs of the owners. In this paper, we shall discuss these two kinds of estates as social systems, as distinctive webs of social relationships. To this purpose, we have drawn on field data from Puerto Rico, Jamaica and Mexico, and on written sources of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.^a

We were first led to deal with the two kinds of estates discussed here in carrying out field work in two Puerto Rican communities. One of these communities, Cañamelar, was characterized by a large modern "factory in the field" which produced sugar for the world market. The other community, San José, contained several estates producing coffee, as well as many small farms. The cultural characteristics of the sugar workers of Cañamelar differed considerably from those of the coffee workers and small farmers of San José. We

^aThe Puerto Rican data were collected during 1948-49 when both writers carried on field research under the auspices of the Puerto Rico Project of Columbia University, directed by Julian Steward, and supported by the University of Puerto Rico and the Rockefeller Foundation. Sidney W. Mintz served as field director of Yale University's Inter-disciplinary Training Programme in Jamaica during the summers of 1952 and 1954. The Programme had the support of the Ford and Carnegie Foundations. Eric R. Wolf carried out research in Mexico during 1951-52 with the support of the Doherty Foundation, as well as during the summer of 1954. We are grateful to the organizations which have helped our efforts in the field. Special thanks are due to Julian Steward, for allowing E. R. Wolf to prepare parts of the present study while serving as Research Associate of the Project for Research on Cross-Cultural Regularities, University of Illinois. We are also indebted to Dr. Charles Erasmus of the University of Illinois Project for Research on Cross-Cultural Regularities, and to Dr. Raymond T. Smith of the Institute of Social and Economic Research, University College of the West Indies, who read and criticized the manuscript. Responsibility for the present paper, however, rests solely with its authors.

sought to explain some of the major differences between the two communities in terms of the differences between the two social systems which dominated the local sub-cultures, the plantation in Cañamelar and the haciendas in San José.^a In this paper, we shall generalize our findings in the hope that these may be applicable to other geographical areas.

Our main purpose, then, is to view the hacienda and the plantation as two kinds of social systems. In each case, we shall attempt to analyze and discuss the variables which we believe to be essential to the maintenance of the system. These variables combine in complexes which recur in similar combinations in different parts of the world. Since such systems occur in more than one instance, we shall refer to them as "types".

The type is thus created by abstraction from a number of concrete instances. If we are interested in particularizing, each instance may of course be viewed as a unique constellation of variables, and no two instances will be alike. If we are interested in generalizing from single instances, however, we can abstract the general features of two or more cases which seem to resemble each other.

At this point, we should like to caution against three possible misunderstandings of our position. First, we shall limit our discussion to two types of social systems in agriculture, but we do not wish to imply that the hacienda and plantation types constitute the only such types, nor that they are polar concepts. While we shall delineate the differences between these types in dichotomous terms, they are only two of a number of possible types (6, pp. 111-30; 45).

Second, it would be false to think of the hacienda and the plantation as necessary sequential stages in the development of modern agricultural organization. While plantations have supplanted haciendas in many parts of the world, as for instance in some of the great sugar-producing areas in Latin America, this process is not inevitable. In some areas, as in Peru, haciendas and plantations have existed side by side for substantial periods of time without change in one or the other type. Yet the two types do seem to represent responses to different levels of capital investment and market development, and the differences between them are — at least in large part — determined by differences in the kinds of market which they supply and the amounts of capital at their disposal.

Third, economists as well as other social scientists have been much given to analyses of markets and of capital supply without reference to the larger societies in which the markets and capital must function. Yet markets and capital formation are functionally related to other aspects of the society of which they form a part, and depend on these other aspects for their maintenance and growth. If we are to discover the cultural implications of the hacienda and the plantation, then, we must be aware of these relationships to

^aFor a detailed analysis of these two communities, see (23) and (48). Both studies, together with the other findings of the Puerto Rico Project of Columbia University, have been published (with amended titles) in (39).

the larger society. While we hope to give the two systems analyzed here the status of cross-culturally valid types, we cannot really do so until we know more about the variety of societal contexts in which they may occur. It is possible that the features by which we define the types on the basis of field experience in Latin America will not be found in the same distinctive combinations in other parts of the world. It is also possible that even if the combinations of features discussed here have wide cross-cultural distribution, the different features of the types could yet have different functional consequences for the lives of the people involved in their operation. Our analysis thus represents no more than a first step towards cross-cultural comparison.

Given this general intent of our paper, we may now say something about the mechanics of the comparison. We shall compare our types in terms of four categories of data. These are:

1. *General conditions*: the conditions which must be present in the larger society if the hacienda or plantation is to arise. These types cannot be expected to develop unless the larger society affords both the motives and the means for wealth accumulation based on mass production and sale of agricultural produce.

It must also be recognized that all social systems have histories. No social system is the "same" at birth as it will be in its "mature" phase. The conditions which initiate a system often differ markedly from those necessary to keep the system operating in its established form. We have therefore chosen to distinguish between initiating and operational conditions.

2. *Initiating conditions*: the conditions which must be met in the establishment of any single hacienda or plantation. The presence of the general conditions noted above may lead to a variety of alternative social types, of which the hacienda and plantation are only two. In discussing the initiating conditions of the hacienda and the plantation separately from the general conditions which underlie them, we hope to focus our attention on the motives and means found in the larger society which are involved specifically in the establishment of these two types to the exclusion of others. Each type represents a particular way of combining capital, land, labour, technology, and social and political sanctions. The motivation to effect such combinations, and to treat each factor as having a commodity character is cultural in the sense that it is a product of particular historical forces and of a particular cultural orientation (27). In this paper, we are not concerned with an analysis of these forces and orientations themselves. Rather, we take them as given, and initiate our discussion at the point where the entrepreneurial groups begin to deal with these factors of production as commodities, and to combine them in specific ways to establish haciendas or plantations.

3. *Operational conditions*: the conditions which are essential to the continued operation of the systems subsumed under each type. In each case, the particular combination of operational conditions chosen defines the type. As the combination is altered, the type is modified or destroyed. The maintenance

of the particular combination of operational conditions is therefore essential to the maintenance of the type.

To initiate haciendas or plantations, entrepreneurs most usually rearrange or transform the factors of production which characterize a pre-existing social order. Frequently, therefore, the initiating conditions of the hacienda or the plantation involve direct coercion. The operational conditions of the two types, however, appear once this process of reorganization is completed. They involve little use of direct coercion, but rely rather on the many indirect compulsions supplied by the cultural mechanisms which grow up in their wake. These mechanisms we shall call the derived cultural conditions.

4. *Derived cultural conditions*: the social relationships set up in terms of a specific cultural content which make the combination of operational conditions effective. Given the kind of motivations prevalent in the larger society, the operational conditions of the hacienda or plantation are combined without primary reference to human relationships. Such a combination cannot be realized, however, without the concomitant development of social relationships which translate it into practice. Any operation of a hacienda or plantation which is essential to the fulfilment of their goals requires cultural forms or mechanisms for its activation. The particular cultural forms or mechanisms selected may vary from time to time and from place to place. The limits to this variation are set by the requirements of the prevalent combination of operational conditions. While the combination of operational conditions is itself fairly rigid, the cultural conditions accompanying it may prove to be elastic. Thus, for instance, a labour force of a certain size is essential to the operation of a hacienda and may be viewed as an essential operational condition of the system. The cultural forms which serve to recruit and maintain this labour force, however, may vary from ceremonial kinship through attachment via debts to the grant of subsistence plots. All of these forms may co-exist within a single system; or their functional roles may be filled by other cultural techniques.

It will be noted that we have omitted, for purposes of this discussion, any major consideration of environmental conditions (conditions of climate, altitude, soils etc.), as well as of the intricate and important relationships between environment and technology. We shall be concerned here with an analysis of the general structural aspects of the hacienda and plantation. Any study of particular haciendas or plantations in a particular locality or region would of course have to take primary account of their ecology.

I

GENERAL CONDITIONS

The general conditions for the development of the hacienda or the plantation include:

1. A *technology* adequate for a production of a surplus. We are as yet un-

tribal
aristocracy
feud

able to present an absolute index of productivity as a measure of the technology needed to develop haciendas or plantations. For the purpose at hand, however, it is probably enough to say that the technology available in the larger society must be sufficiently productive to allow an individual worker to produce more than he needs to satisfy his own culturally prescribed standards of consumption. Furthermore, this surplus must be capable of increase either through the organization of individual producers into a compact labour force and/or by changing the technology employed to increase *per capita* productivity. Although there are specific technological differences which set them apart from each other, both hacienda and plantation achieve their productive ends by massing large numbers of workers on a large area of land.

2. *Class stratification*, or the possibilities of stratification by class groupings. Such stratification is needed to permit differential access to the factors of production and distribution. It allows individuals or groups of individuals, whose statuses are culturally defined as landowning entrepreneurs or corporations, to appropriate the surpluses produced on the hacienda and the plantation in culturally sanctioned ways. Both types restrict the right of the labour force to consume all of the financial rewards realized from the sale of the products produced. Money obtained through sales is reinvested in the particular systems by the entrepreneurs, appropriated as profits for investment elsewhere, or siphoned off for culturally sanctioned individual ends.

Haciendas and plantations are often located in areas where the labour force has a cultural background which is oriented towards different goals and rewards from those posed by the entrepreneur-investor of Western society. Greaves has said that:

v.g. { In its economic isolation primitive economy is self-sufficient, self-satisfied, and self-sanctioned. The purpose of foreign penetration is to break down this economic isolation and absorb its resources into the current of international trade, and for this purpose it is necessary that the natives either produce a saleable surplus over their customary needs or convert their self-contained economy to some degree of specialized exchange (10, p. 60).

Unfortunately, economists have paid little attention to the cultural aspects involved in the imposition of restrictions on consumption in such a new labour force. The consumption requirements of a given society tend to be standardized in terms of the value system of the culture carried by that society. Workers being drawn into a hacienda or plantation type of organization will, in the first instance, tend to judge their reward – in money or perquisites – on the basis of these antecedent cultural norms rather than in terms of cultural alternatives not yet known to them. Both types under discussion here, therefore, have an opportunity to establish a standard of reward consonant with antecedent consumption standards, though by no means necessarily consonant with newly developing cultural evaluations. This is especially important in situations where direct coercion is not feasible, not advisable, or culturally not sanctioned.

3. *Production for a market*, or the possibilities of such production. Haciendas and plantations are characteristically the products of the expansion of world

economy, particularly since the fifteenth century. Both are geared to the sale of surpluses produced into an outside market, a market which has grown in scale to permeate the larger society, or several societies (2, pp. 102-6; 13, pp. 8-9; 19, p. 149; 42).

In response to the growth of such markets, both types specialize in the production of single commodities. The desire to produce steadily for an outside market for maximum returns makes concentration on a single crop advisable since investment in processing equipment, training of unskilled labour, allocation of labour time, transportation and processing are all simplified in monocrop specialization. The two systems differ, however, in the types of markets which they supply, in their adjustment to such markets, and in the degree of subsidiary production they carry on, in addition to the main staple. These differences will be discussed below.

4. *Capital accumulation*, or the possibilities of such accumulation. Both types discussed here also require capital for their operation. They both depend on the level of capital accumulation prevalent in the larger society, and contribute to it in turn. The availability of such capital of course rests on the willingness of entrepreneurial groups to make investments in supplying already existing markets or to use their capital to encourage the growth of new markets.

5. A *political-legal system*, which can support the operations of haciendas or plantations. Such a system may function to support haciendas and plantations in three major ways. First, it may be used to furnish major factors in hacienda or plantation production, the large land areas and labour forces required by both types. In some cases, land is available which is not owned and occupied by native populations, and the political-legal sanctions of the society are simply invoked to ratify property titles established by hacienda or plantation entrepreneurs. In many cases, however, land must be forcibly appropriated through military occupation or through the exercise of some other form of violence. In still other cases, the entrepreneurs must establish friendly relations with the local government or otherwise appease the local population, before hacienda or plantation production can become effective (47, p. 33). Nor is control of land itself sufficient to constitute a hacienda or plantation. In eastern Bolivia and western Brazil, for instance, large tracts of land are held by private owners but no means are presently available to turn their population of migratory squatter farmers into a dependable labour supply (15, p. 132-5; 35, pp. 458-74). Political and legal techniques have therefore been invoked in Latin America to import labour forcibly, as in Antillean slavery and indenture, to marshal potential labourers through such arrangements as the *repartimiento*, or to limit the free access to land — thus immobilizing the potential labour force in a situation of "closed resources."^a

^aThe contrast between an area of "open" resources, where land may be had for the asking, and an area of "closed" resources, where land is appropriated up to a point where labourers can only gain access to it by entering some form of dependent relationship, has been discussed by many scholars. It seems to have some bearing on the subject matter of this paper, since the hacienda seems to occur in an "open-resource" context, the plantation in a situation characterized by "closed resources". As will be pointed out, the lack or availability of capital is a crucial additional factor in qualifying the open-closed resource polarity. For a discussion of these concepts see (18, I, pp. 790-800; 20, 25, 42).

In Latin America, forced settlement was most characteristic of the tropical lowlands and the circum-Caribbean areas, while already existing populations were marshalled forcibly to work in the several highland areas (33, pp. 411-25).

The second major function of the political-legal system of the larger society with reference to haciendas and plantations is to provide the political and legal setting in which these social systems may flourish. Thus the system of sanctions may serve to maintain or change existing arrangements of land tenure to expedite hacienda or plantation production. It may establish tariffs, raise or lower taxes, extend credit, set prices, and in other ways manipulate economic relationships. It may encourage tendencies towards one or another system of agricultural organization through education, agricultural extension, and mass media of communication.

Finally, its third major function is to provide means through which the transfer of surpluses from producers to owners may be reinforced. Should the social relationships which mediate this transfer break down, the owners must be able to call on agencies which can re-establish these relationships through force or allied social sanctions.

II

Given these general conditions in the society at large, they must be mobilized in specific ways to produce either haciendas or plantations. Furthermore, these initiating conditions must be combined in functioning complexes to provide for the maintenance and growth of the enterprises so established. To permit these combinations of initiating conditions to become effective, they must be mediated through social relationships. The intensity of the initiating conditions, their combinations, and the attendant human relationships are different in the two types. Our next task, then, is to understand the nature of these differences.

ANALYSIS OF THE HACIENDA TYPE

1. *Capital*

a. *As an initiating condition of the type.* While the plantation requires a large supply of capital, the hacienda operates within a situation of capital scarcity. Several factors are responsible for this. First, with limited markets, capital which can be borrowed for hacienda operations tends to be generated within a limited region, and is only rarely pooled with the capital resources of other regions. Such capital thus remains relatively scarce. Second, the money-lending institutions which furnish hacienda capital are often tradition-oriented groups, such as instrumentalities of the Church, local merchant groups, or small banks. Such organizations are interested in low but secure returns, rather than in rapid accumulation. In a context of limited markets, moreover, they tend to distribute the risks of lending money by spreading

credit in limited amounts among a large number of enterprises, rather than by concentrating all their resources in a single enterprise.

b. *As an operational condition of the type.* Just as the supply of capital for hacienda operations remains limited, so the needs of the hacienda for capital are geared to a low capital input. Capital must be obtained to cover the initial cost of land and equipment, to meet current costs of operation, and to replace worn elements of production. But haciendas usually pay little for land, and their labour-intensive technology requires only a small outlay for mechanical equipment. They need only enough capital to maintain them in a state of stability. The hacienda rarely expands its production; it is geared instead to a restricted but stable market. The systems subsumed under the type are thus attuned to low capital intake.

c. *Derived cultural conditions.* Given the low input of capital, the financial requirements of the hacienda are rarely beyond the financial means of a person with the appropriate social, political and economic connections to ensure repayment. The most typical form of ownership of such estates is family ownership, which permits the mobilization of wealth through kinship ties and ties of personal friendship, but retains control in the hands of a consanguine primary group, rather than delegating it to a secondary group formed expressly for the purpose of manipulating capital, such as a corporation.

Another cultural condition, accompanying the operational role of capital in the hacienda type, is the use of the hacienda system to furnish not only returns on capital invested, but also to furnish the funds needed to feed the owner and his family and to support his aspirations for power and prestige. In sharp contrast to the plantation type in which the factors of production are manipulated wholly for maximum profit without reference to the consumption or status needs of the owners, in the hacienda type the factors of production are thus burdened with demands which are economically irrelevant to the process of production. In the absence of "rational" cost accounting, these costs will remain hidden, though none the less real. These costs of power and prestige in turn may be necessary to support the capital structure. Only by maintaining the good name of his family, and by underlining its social status through conspicuous consumption, can the hacienda owner hope to convince the lenders of capital of his economic viability.

Furthermore, the hacienda owner cannot rely on an abundance of capital to articulate the needed factors of production. Lacking sufficient capital to pay labour wholly in the form of wages, he must find other means to spur his labour force to the required effort. Further, he is limited in his ability to introduce new technological equipment or new techniques of cultivation. In contrast to the plantation type, capital thus does not constitute the main axis around which hacienda life revolves. Some capital is needed to bring a hacienda into being, but in its maintenance it plays a minor part, when hacienda systems are compared with those characteristic of the plantation type.

2. Market

a. *As an initiating condition of the type.* Both haciendas and plantations require a market for their cash produce, as an initiating condition for their appearance and development. The scope of this market, however, is a specific condition which favours the rise of one or the other type. Plantations are geared to sales in markets of large scope; haciendas supply markets of small scope. The market of a hacienda may be limited to the inhabitants of a locality or a region, as in the case of the *pulque* haciendas of Mexico or the brandy haciendas of Peru^a. Or the market may consist of the members of a sub-culture, such as an upper class with tastes for a specific luxury product. Such consumers purchased most of the coffee grown on coffee haciendas in Puerto Rico before the 1928 hurricane.

b. *As an operational condition of the type.* The organization of the hacienda type is geared to the market it supplies. A hacienda owner keeps his investment secure by restricting the supply of the desired product somewhat below consumption expectations. Like his creditors, he shows a distinct preference for a low but safe rate of return (26, p. 98; 34, p. 490).

A hacienda owner may attempt to control his market further by moves in the social and political field. On the social plane, he may gain the consent of relatives or friends for specific marketing operations, or he may ask them for information which bears on the state of the market. On the political plane, he may press for legislation affecting markets through the erection of tariffs (11, p. 134), or use his political power to guard his marketing advantages from outside interference. In essence, he tries to create a semi-monopolistic situation to reduce his risks, and his investment will be secure only as long as he can maintain these semi-monopolistic advantages.

c. *Derived cultural conditions.* The plantation produces for a mass market. It subordinates all other considerations to the desire to meet the demands of this market. It devotes all its resources to the production of the desired cash crop. The hacienda is much less single-minded in its economic effort. Its emphasis on the production of one major cash crop rarely excludes the production of other goods, either to feed its resident labouring population or to satisfy its own demands for consumer goods.

The plantation accepts integration into a system of economic and political relationships operating on the national or supra-national level of integration.^b It thus tends to become a subordinate system within a larger system, at the mercy of forces over which it itself can exercise little control. In permitting alternative pursuits to cash crop production, although strictly within the frame-work of commercial operation, the hacienda also maintains a second line of defence on which it can fall back if its market grows unstable. Less committed to the demands of a national or supra-national market, it has few ties which bind it to units beyond the region or locality. Less geared to capital

^aOn the Peruvian brandy haciendas, see (3, pp. 313-14).

^bOn the concept of levels of integration, see (36, pp. 43-63).

accumulation and to technological innovation than the plantation, it retains a greater capacity than the plantation for self-regeneration after a slump. The hacienda maintains greater control over the conditions and requisites for its existence, and remains more autonomous and less subject to the play of outside forces.

3. *Land*

a. *As an initiating condition of the type.* Both hacienda and plantation require large land areas to come into being. Yet they differ significantly in their demand for land, and in their use of it once it is acquired.

b. *As an operational condition of the type.* The hacienda must control enough land both to grow its cash produce and to provide its workers with subsistence plots and other perquisites, such as wood or forest resources. Such perquisites take the place of wages which must remain limited due to the scarcity of capital which is a characteristic of the hacienda. In contrast to the plantation which acquires only land which it can put to use for maximum profits, either at the moment or in the future, the hacienda also needs land to furnish a non-wage incentive for its labour force.

The hacienda must also attempt to monopolize the supply of land in its immediate vicinity. It needs this land less for purposes of agricultural production than to deprive its labourers of economic alternatives to participation in hacienda operations (2, p. 201). It pre-empts the agricultural resources to prevent any independent agricultural activities from being carried out by its potential labour supply; and it attempts to bar its own labour force from seeking economic independence outside the limits of the hacienda by cultivating land not owned or controlled by the hacienda (11, pp. 133-4).

c. *Derived cultural conditions.* Once a hacienda has reached its goal of setting narrow limits to the economic alternatives open to its resident labouring population and to the potential labour supply in the communities surrounding it, it will cease to grow. Very often, therefore, a large hacienda or a group of haciendas will be surrounded by marginal land which they dominate indirectly rather than directly through control of the legal title. The inhabitants of these marginal zones will depend on the hacienda for cash wages and other perquisites, but often retain traditional cultural patterns in managing their own internal affairs. It has even been argued that periodic work on the haciendas provides such groups of people with some opportunity, however small, to maintain those aspects of their culture patterns which require some small outlay of surplus cash and goods, and thus tends to preserve traditional norms which might otherwise fall into disuse (2, p. 221; 17; 49).

4. *Labour*

a. *As an initiating condition of the type.* Like the plantation, the hacienda requires a large supply of labour at strategic periods during the cycle of production of its chief cash crop. Unlike the plantation, however, the hacienda

is limited by its lack of capital in its ability to offer purely economic rewards to its labour force. Some writers have argued that the emergence of haciendas or plantations respectively is primarily a function of the available supply of labour. But it is lack of capital rather than lack of labour which constitutes the specific initiating condition for the emergence of the hacienda. Plantations, equipped with sufficient capital, can import the required quantities of labour or put pressure on their government to arrange for its importation. Even where the hacienda may be able to increase in population by internal growth, it will not thereby turn into a plantation without further investment of capital. Similarly, a plantation — retaining all of its workers — may well turn into a hacienda if it loses its capital. Capital, rather than labour, would thus seem to be the strategic initiating condition in the emergence of one or the other type discussed here.

Nevertheless, it is probably true that the hacienda requires a minimum density of population as a necessary initiating condition for its emergence. Since it lacks capital, it must always rely on the labour supply of one locality or region, just as its market consists of the aggregate demand of one locality or region. If the region is but sparsely inhabited by agriculturists who have free access to available land resources, no effective control over labour can be established (see above).

b. *As an operational condition of the type.* The hacienda must thus bind labour by means other than money wages. Where some cash payment of wages is made, they are in no way a measure of labour performed. Its techniques of payment thus usually involve the direct or indirect use of compulsion. Some of the means by which the hacienda binds labour to land in the absence of monetary rewards may be noted here.

First, the hacienda tries to deprive its labour supply of economic alternatives. The chief expression of this is the desire of the hacienda to control all the land in its vicinity, discussed above.

Second, it makes use of part of its land to provide its workers with subsistence plots and other perquisites which take the place of money wages. As we have seen, the provision of a subsistence plot and other perquisites has an important function in maintaining the hacienda financially solvent and in keeping its system intact during periods when the market undergoes a severe decline. Since the labour force is able to fill a substantial part of its own consumption requirements within the framework of the hacienda, it can maintain itself in a state of "suspended animation" until market trends are reversed.

Third, the worker is tied to the hacienda through specific economic mechanisms, such as debts acquired at the hacienda store (II, pp. 137-8), or through loans obtained from the hacienda owner. According to Tannenbaum (4I, pp. 188-9) the Mexican peon

was born into debt because the children inherited the parents' obligations. He acquired a debt in his own right at baptism because the cost of the *fiesta* it occasioned was advanced by the *hacendado*, and money was borrowed for

the priest, for the *aguardiente*. His first clothes — made from the white *manta* — were purchased from the plantation [hacienda] store, the *tienda de raya*, against his future wage. When he was old enough to marry, money for the festivities was borrowed from the plantation [hacienda] owner; when children were born, the same process led to the same end — further debt. The religious holidays were celebrated with borrowed money, sickness was marked by dependence upon the *patrón* for the payment of such medication as was to be had; and when the peon died he was buried with such honor, drink, prayer and festivity as money borrowed from the same source made possible.

Fourth, hacienda worker and hacienda owner are tied together by the performance of mutual services. Exploitative as the debt relationship is from the economic point of view, it must be emphasized that in it the hacienda owner takes over many of the risks incurred by his worker.^a Such relations sometimes acquire the weight of tradition, and are reinforced through semi-sacred cultural mechanisms such as ritual kinship or other ceremonial ties (22, p. 363).

Fifth, all of these relationships may be reinforced through the use of force employed by the hacienda owner against his labourers. Ususally, the hacienda possesses its private system of law and order for this purpose (see below).

c. *Derived cultural conditions.* Due to the demands of the hacienda for a dependable labour supply, it not only tries to convert the population of nearby population clusters into a part of its labour force, but it tends to develop special settlements of dependent labourers (*acasillados* in Mexico; *agregados* in Puerto Rico) on its own terrain. The struggle of the Mexican hacienda owner to build up such settlements and to remove their inhabitants from the rival jurisdictions of Indian communities or the national state has been analyzed by Silvio Zavala (50, pp. 711-48). The growth of haciendas thus alters the settlement pattern of any given region through the creation of new population clusters. At the same time, once the hacienda reaches its limits of expansion, it will tend to relinquish direct control over the population living on its borders, integrating them only as migratory labourers during peak seasons of the productive cycle (see above). Under these circumstances, the hacienda sets up a cycle of migration from surrounding settlements to hacienda, or from highlands to lowlands, and back, as in Guatemala, Mexico or Puerto Rico (16, pp. xxv, 321; 23; 44, p. 30).

The binding mechanisms described above also tend to set up cultural conditions with important consequences for the people involved in them. By rendering aid, the hacienda often takes over functions which the indigenous social group once rendered for its members within the antecedent social structure. It may thus act to stabilize traditional ideal norms and behaviour patterns, often reinforcing the "tradition-oriented" character of the labour force (see above).

On the other hand, unlike the relationships which spring up among the hacienda workers themselves, these aid relationships are ties between social and economic unequals, and are hierarchical in character. They are thus reinforced by the development of appropriate symbols of dominance and

^aFor a European parallel, see (12, p. 386).

submission. It would appear that the nature of the hacienda type emphasizes the operation of certain psychological mechanisms within this hierarchical setting. First, there tends to develop a collective representation of the hacienda owner as a symbolic "father," with the hacienda workers functioning as his symbolic "children." As the locus of power, the hacienda owner emerges as the major source of special favours as well as an allocator of perquisites. He may be judge, employer, military leader, and possibly fictive or blood relative to his workers. Since the personal relationship between owner and worker takes shape within a hierarchical system based on an intrinsic division of labour between both, they produce feelings of reciprocal dependence which are yet charged emotionally in different ways for the participants. The hacienda owner must always act to maintain his dominance. Yet he must also use his personal attributes to bind his labour supply through affective ties. These affective ties may reflect father-child relationships, or other relationships characteristic of the family (24, pp. 228-9; 26, p. 98; 48, pp. 114-16). It follows that these affective ties will not only be ties of love and affection, but also of hostility. They are reinforced by the fact that they are characterized by the rendering of services which are usually tied to basic needs, such as health and subsistence, rather than by money. If the owner renders such a service, the worker will be expected to respond likewise. Thus, for instance, a worker may agree to perform additional labour in exchange for the right to collect more wood, or feel obliged to cast his vote in favour of the hacienda owner's political candidate in exchange for the right to graze animals on the hacienda pasture. No matter how exploitative these ties may seem to outsiders, they are often phrased in terms of mutual dependence of the owner and worker by the people themselves. The representation of the owner as a symbolic "father," the close bearing of the reciprocal services performed to fundamental subsistence needs, and the phrasing of mutual dependence, in turn, tend to give rise to cultural patterns which duplicate familial relationships in which oral techniques of mastery predominate. Examples of such patterns may be found in the daily distribution of *pulque*, rum or *coca* in Mexico, the Antilles, and Peru; or in the annual harvest festivities such as the Puerto Rican *fiesta del acabe* or, formerly, the Jamaican crop-over, in which the owner is obliged to feast the workers (1, p. 202; 8, p. 270; 46, p. 103; 48, p. 45).

In the minds of the labour force, the person of the hacienda owner — who mediates between them and the outside world — may also come to represent the hacienda itself; his well-being may seem a validation of their collective effort. At the same time, he will act as the funnel through which the yield of some part of their work effort is returned to them. This redistribution, narrow though it is, partakes of the centralized redistributive economics characteristic of primitive societies (27, pp. 47-53).

Once such a system becomes established, its functioning may become essential to the feeling of security of those who must live in terms of it. Dis-

turbances of the system, whether due to changes in the position of the worker or of the owner, tend to be felt as threats to a way of life^a.

In assessing the cultural conditions of the hacienda as derivatives of its use of labour, special mention must be made of the hacienda store. It represents one of the more obvious binding mechanisms through which the hacienda binds its workers. Work performance is credited in goods at the store, and goods received are often credited against work performance in the future. Yet such a store does more than supply a worker's consumption needs. Often it may force him to buy goods which he might not otherwise buy, thus accustoming him to new consumption behaviour which, in turn, he can only satisfy by working for the hacienda. The store also acts to limit the amount a worker can consume; it ensures that his demands will not threaten the surplus produced in the course of hacienda operation.

Because the hacienda accomplishes its ends in binding labour through the variety of economic, social, and psychological mechanisms just discussed, labour is often less scarce than available capital. As a result of this particular relationship between the conditions of production, the hacienda owner can express his status needs more easily by expending labour than by expending wealth. Lavish use of labour power thus tends to become the chief way in which the hacienda owner maintains his privileged position within the social group to which he belongs. In many individual cases, this derived cultural condition may indeed become the dominant *motif* in the life of the owner. Where emphasis is placed on the conspicuous consumption of labour, the ability of a hacienda to generate capital for reinvestment and growth may be affected in turn. One should not lose sight of the fact that the hacienda was organized to produce agricultural goods for a market. Yet one of the functional implications of the type does seem to involve the diversion of the factors of production to non-economic ends. This situation contrasts sharply with that of the plantation where decisions are not made in terms of the prestige or consumption requirements of one owner, but in the expectation of maximum returns on invested capital.

5. *Technology*

a. *As an initiating condition of the type.* Both haciendas and plantations tend to produce their major cash crops by massing large numbers of workers on a large area of land. Both employ some capital to purchase technical equipment, usually to further rapid and efficient processing of the cash crop produced.

b. *As an operational condition of the type.* The technology of the hacienda bears the imprint of the lack of capital which attends its birth and limits its

^aThese secondary psychological gratifications have often been used to defend the hacienda system, or have been denied validity by its opponents. At various points in history, every social system which provided personal gratification of this sort has been defended as productive of security by some, and attacked as destructive of personal liberties by others. The present discussion attempts to describe and analyse these characteristics as derivatives of a functioning social system.

operations. First, the hacienda rarely exploits all of the land under its control. Usually, it concentrates its massed man-power and equipment only on the best land (called the *casco* of the hacienda in Mexico), leaving the remainder of the land to its labour force as subsistence plots or unattended (*II*, p. 134; 40, pp. 121-2). Second, its technology remains labour-intensive; there is not enough capital to develop greater intensity of equipment (*II*, p. 134; 34, p. 490). It achieves its production by massing labour, not tools. Although there is a relatively low level of productivity per worker, by combining the efforts of many workers, the hacienda produces a surplus sufficient for its economic operations.

Third, lacking capital, the hacienda does not have the wherewithal to purchase new skills and equipment. It must thus rely on the culturally standardized technological behaviour available in the area under its control.

Fourth, little capital is available to improve means of transportation. Nor is such improvement necessary since the amount of cash produce to be transported hinges upon the demands of a limited and often easily accessible market. Simple animal transportation, such as can be provided by strings of mules, usually suffices to meet the needs of a hacienda.

c. *Derived cultural conditions.* The traditional technology and transportation of the hacienda react in turn to reinforce and maintain the characteristics of the type. Limited by capital and markets, it remains limited in productive capacity; limited in its capacity to produce, it remains limited in capitalization and market. Low productivity per worker and lack of advanced transportation may even help to maintain the stable price structure for which the hacienda strives. Lack of mobility may also act to limit the ability of hacienda workers to find social or economic alternatives to employment on the hacienda.

Since the technology remains tied to the traditional skills of the labouring population, the hacienda typically does not require the specialized group of technicians and technically-trained administrators so characteristic of plantation organization. The supervisor on the hacienda need not possess technical skills which differ significantly in kind from those of the workers under his command. His role is social and political, rather than technical, in that he exercises the delegated authority of the owner, an authority backed by the private system of law and order maintained by the hacienda.

6. *Sanctions*

a. *As an initiating condition of the type.* We have noted above that the hacienda often operates under conditions such that it must systematically limit or destroy social and economic alternatives to the employment it provides in order to obtain an adequate labour supply. We have also seen that, in the absence of monetary rewards, the hacienda tends to substitute social, psychological or economic binding mechanisms to tie the worker to his place of work. When such mechanisms break down or when the security of the

hacienda is challenged by the growth of economic alternatives outside its boundaries, it requires a system of force to deal with possible recalcitrants. Such a private system of law and order can exist only where the state is either too weak to exert control on the local level, or where it supports the delegation of judicial functions to local entrepreneurs. Mexican haciendas used to maintain their own police, judges and jails (1, p. 203).

b. *As an operational condition of the type.* The main purpose of such a private system of sanctions within the context of the hacienda is the maintenance of — primarily — work discipline to ensure that the workers put the requirements of production of the hacienda's bulk product above their own private activities. This pattern of exaction may vary from time to time and from place to place, but is usually standardized. Thus, for instance, on some Mexican and Peruvian haciendas, labourers render a fixed quantity of labour time in return for the use of land for their own consumption needs. On Puerto Rican coffee haciendas, workers drop whatever activities they are engaged in when the signal to begin the coffee harvest is sounded (17; 46, pp. 105-6; 48, p. 18).

The existence of such a private system of sanctions leaves the hacienda owner a free hand when he has to punish infractions of such work discipline. He needs this free hand because the relation between his worker and himself is phrased in personalistic terms. He may have to discipline his worker, but at the same time he must continue this personal relation between himself and the culprit. A plantation can discipline by firing a worker or by refusing to hire him — acts which involve no personal tie between it and the subject of the decision. Where the right to fire or refusal to hire may itself be sufficient sanction in itself to enforce discipline on a plantation, on a hacienda the owner may have to adapt his discipline to the character of each particular case.

c. *Derived cultural conditions.* In meting out punishment, the hacienda owner may have to consider the general situation on the hacienda, rather than a set of absolute rules governing standards of behaviour. His procedure will be "situational"; its main function will be to serve as an "example" to his workers. On occasion, he may have recourse to higher political officials who will administer such punishment, but usually he will tend to resist the imposition of any impersonal body of law which would tend to limit the exercise of his personalistic authority. Sanctions used on haciendas often take the form of physical punishment. The psychological function of such punishment may be twofold. On the one hand, it allows the offender to return to the ranks of the labour force after he has expiated his offence. It thus restores the affective tie between owner and workers through the elimination of the threat to the owner's authority. On the other hand, it may simply exercise a terror function calculated to paralyze resistance to authority on the part of the labour force. Under such conditions, needless to say, workers can often be subjected to physical punishment for reasons which under another system of law and order would not justify such severity.

III

Like the hacienda, the plantation demands capital, markets, land, labour, and equipment. In contrast to the hacienda, however, it combines these factors of production differently, and with different results for the human beings it employs.

ANALYSIS OF THE PLANTATION TYPE

1. *Capital*

a. *As an initiating condition of the type.* Like the organizers of haciendas, so the plantation entrepreneurs need capital to set up a productive organization capable of meeting the demands of an existing market, or to expand those markets by advertising and selling. The demands of the plantation for capital are very much greater than those of the hacienda since it is usually geared to large-scale markets, often supra-national in scope. Such capital rarely can be furnished by an individual entrepreneur operating within a local context. Capital generally is concentrated through a series of financial mechanisms in a corporate group which gauges its investment in a given enterprise or area on the basis of maximum returns on capital advanced. The initial investment must be very large to allow the plantation to acquire the needed factors of production under optimal conditions and to make optimum use of them in its operations.^a

b. *As an operational condition of the type.* Corporate ownership must not only furnish the large sums which are required to equip a plantation for its start in life, it is also a functional requirement for plantation operation. The plantation must be organized so as to be capable of absorbing large amounts of capital, as well as of repaying capital used with large profits. Corporations function on a scale of operations which makes it cumbersome for them to split their investment into small ventures. Use of land, labour and technology on the plantation thus must be geared to production in bulk with maximum efficiency and utilization. In all these respects, the plantation differs sharply from the hacienda, with its limited intake and output of capital.

c. *Derived cultural conditions.* Only rarely are the funds needed for the operation of a plantation found within the country where the plantation is established. Such countries usually are classed as "underdeveloped", and capital formation among the indigenous population is rarely advanced enough to allow natives to assume the burden of financing such large-scale agriculture. Capital for plantations therefore is usually supplied by foreigners (29, p. 247), while labour is either drawn from the inhabitants of the country or, much more commonly, is imported into it. Some of the interests associated with the statuses of workers and owners are potentially in conflict in any country. In plantation areas, such conflicts may become further charged with antagonisms arising from cultural differences between the protagonists.

^aFor a picture of the different scale of requirements for capital on the part of haciendas and plantations, see (24, pp. 227-9).

In large corporations, the functions of financial control and management usually have become differentiated, and are delegated to different groups of specialists. Ordinarily, the financiers set the goals of production, while the managers are concerned with implementing these goals through the judicious use of the factors of production under their control. The division between financiers and managers assumes even greater importance in cases where the financiers reside in the country which exports capital for the enterprise, while the managers exercise their delegated function in the country in which the plantation has been established. Since the corporation is organized to obtain maximum returns on invested capital, the managers are committed to impose these goals on a country and a people whose cultural orientation and interests may be at variance with those of the owners at home. And as the managers are often foreigners themselves, the exercise of their role is governed by the same ideal norms which animate the behaviour and thinking of their corporate employers.

The flow of capital, subject to the demands for maximum profits, becomes the motor force which underlies all other major relationships within the plantation type. The plantation enterprise evaluates all social arrangements in the light of pecuniary considerations, and tends to make the demand for maximum returns on such generous investment the major factor in deciding whether a pattern of relationships is to be continued or is to be replaced by another one. The result is a situation in which land, labour and equipment are judged wholly in their capacity as commodities, and the relationships which govern their use are evaluated wholly in the light of "rational" cost accounting. The role of land, labour, and equipment in the traditional culture of the area tends to remain as much a matter of indifference to the financiers and managers as do the cultural consequences of plantation organization for the lives of the native population.

The employment of rational cost accounting further differentiates the plantation from the hacienda. The subsistence and prestige needs of the corporation owners are divorced from the uses to which the capital is put. Such needs can be satisfied by intermittent payment of interest only after the completion of a cycle of production. Most capital is ploughed back into the operation of the enterprise and used for economic ends only. In the employment of capital to these ends we may again note a tendency to treat factors of production as commodities, regardless of the cultural implications of such treatment.

An important consequence of capital investment in a foreign country is the tendency of the investor to attempt to protect his stake by influencing the political machinery of the country in which he has invested. Because of this, "every plantation region is in politics from its inception" (47, p. 33). The connection between imperialism and plantation economy is too well documented to require further comment in this paper.

2. Market

a. *As an initiating condition of the type.* The plantation requires not only a very large and steady supply of capital to finance its operations, it also needs a market of large scale into which it can pour its product. Such markets are usually found in a "developed" country or countries, often in the country which supplies the capital to the area where the plantation is located. In such countries, the customers are either industries which need such products as jute, rubber, or sisal, or factories producing consumers' goods such as sugar, tea, cocoa, or coffee. Since the first World War, such markets have been increasingly secured against over-supply through international agreements which regulate production through manipulation of quotas, tariffs, or prices. Such attempts at stabilization seem to be necessary to reduce the high risks attendant on the investment of large amounts of capital (29, p. 254). We thus witness, on the international level on the part of the plantation, some of the semi-monopolistic techniques employed by the hacienda in its attempt to control its market on the local or regional level (see above). In contrast to the hacienda, however, production on the plantation must be capable of rapid expansion when there is a significant increase in effective demand through the growth of new industries, population, or popularity of a product.

b. *As an operational condition of the type.* In contrast to the hacienda, which attempts to reduce its risks by habitually undersupplying available demand, plantation production is closely geared to the capacity of its market. Since the plantation is essentially a system for the production of maximum returns on invested capital, the use of land, labour and technology is continuously re-evaluated to enable the system to produce more. Yet production is not speculative (9, pp. 107-10; 21, pp. 101-11). It always remains subject to international agreements, as well as to the national policies of both the producing country and the country which receives the final product.

c. *Derived cultural functions.* In contrast to hacienda production, plantation production tends to be more highly specialized. Each plantation grows only one crop. Unlike the hacienda, the plantation thus reduces its ability to resist sudden changes in the outside market. It ties its fate to the fate of its major cash crop and maintains no second line of defence in case of market failure.^a

The plantation is thus less autonomous in its operation than is the hacienda. Functioning, as it must, within a wider political and economic system, it is subject to economic forces of a different order. In this sense, the risks associated with capital investment in plantations are very high (29, p. 260). At this level of market organization, it is impossible for the owners to exercise

^aIn recent years, there has been a tendency for plantations in some parts of the world to develop secondary cash crops which could take the place of the major cash crop in case of unfavourable changes in the market. Also to be noted is a tendency of "underdeveloped" countries to force plantations to pay greater attention to the subsistence needs of their labourers. See, for instance, (5, pp. 112-19). Such tendencies may eventually lead to major changes in the plantation type.

personal influence over the market. Whatever the semi-monopolistic or monopolistic arrangements made to ensure the security of the investment, they must be accomplished through manipulation of national or supra-national agencies where personal influence is of limited effectiveness. Risk-taking thus seems to depend primarily on the changing relationships of strength between the dominant powers exercising control over the plantation areas, or between these powers and their agencies.

3. *Land*

a. *As an initiating condition of the type.* Like the hacienda, the plantation needs sufficient land to allow it to produce large quantities of cash produce. The plantation must make such possession of land consonant with its investment in machinery and transportation. For the plantation, land is thus a commodity like any other, acquired, used, and discarded for purely economic reasons.

b. *As an operational condition of the type.* The plantation not only needs enough land to carry on cash crop production in bulk consonant with its goals of increasing profit, it also must improve its land to maintain or to increase its productivity. Much capital therefore is expended on plantations to drain or irrigate the land, and to condition the soil through the use of commercial fertilizers. The plantation also must control enough productive land to allow it to expand production for expanding markets. Unlike the hacienda, however, it will own little unproductive land. Such land may be owned to facilitate transportation or to conduct agricultural experimentation; but it is not hoarded, as it is on the hacienda, to deprive the labour supply of effective alternatives to employment on the estate or to grant subsistence perquisites to its labourers. Generally speaking, the plantation strives to "streamline" production with as little paternalism towards its labourers as possible. In rare instances, a particular plantation may grant some subsistence plots to its labour force for other than paternalistic reasons. The granting of such perquisites may represent a politically expedient move to assuage local discontent, or may grow out of technical considerations related to the requirements of sound land use for the commercial crop. But the plantation does not use such perquisites to bind labour in the way that the hacienda does.

c. *Derived cultural conditions.* Through its massive occupation of land for purposes of cash production, a plantation soon comes to dominate the social and economic life of the immediate area in which it is located. Its demand for land usually brings it into immediate conflict with the pre-existing population, whether that consists of hunters and gatherers who make use of land as a hunting preserve, or agriculturists who carry on some form of subsistence or cash crop agriculture. In occupying land that other people have used for subsistence purposes, it usually undermines subsistence production, driving the indigenous population into wage-labour on its newly-won lands as an immediate result.

The concentration of plantations in certain regions of a country which are closely located to markets and major routes of transportation, moreover, has a tendency to dichotomize the structure of the host nation into a plantation sector, marked by intense economic activity and highly charged with capital, and a "marginal" sector, which remains tradition-oriented and under-capitalized. At the same time, the marginal sector is often greatly affected by the operations of the plantation sector through such mechanisms as wage-labour, commercial activity, tariffs, etc. The result frequently is a quite uneven development of the geographical regions and social structures associated with plantation activity and non-plantation activity respectively. The contrast between the "marginal" mountainous interior, and the belt of coastal flatland occupied by plantations in Puerto Rico would be an example; the contrast between the coastal plantation belt in Brazil, and the Brazilian hinterland would be another. At the same time, the very massiveness of the plantations themselves tends to discourage the development of alternative or additional economic enterprises of smaller scale in the plantation sector itself. McBride (19, p. 152) has said that

In such a social order there is little room for a middle class. The plantation largely markets its own crops; it procures supplies, directly or indirectly for its entire population; hence the trader class is small and usually dependent upon the estate. Economic groups outside of the plantations are also decidedly limited. The professional class is not numerous. Most of the population bears some relation to the plantation and falls into one or the other categories into which its people are divided.

Thus the social, political, and economic life of the host country may become dominated by agricultural enterprises producing one or two crops for export, while its own capacity to produce economic alternatives to the plantations remains severely limited.

4. *Labour*

a. *As an initiating condition of the type.* A labour force large enough to carry on production in bulk at rates low enough to guarantee returns on invested capital is an essential initiating condition of a plantation. Where it is not available in the vicinity of the plantation, or where the local population is unwilling to work in plantation operations, such labour must be imported.

b. *As an operational condition of the type.* The plantation operates on the assumption that labour is plentiful and cheap. As in any "industrial" establishment, low labour costs are one of the guarantees of its financial success. It functions at an optimum where many labourers are competing for the same job, since such competition automatically lowers the price of labour. For instance, in the post-emancipation period of the British West Indies, plantation owners — deprived of labour by the development of a Negro peasantry, and also short of capital funds — succeeded in securing cheap labour by sponsoring heavy immigration from India. This migration did not meet the need for labour fully, but it increased the total population of certain strategic areas sufficiently to lower labour costs. In Peru, coastal sugar plantations

count on the seasonal migration of hacienda dwellers and members of Indian communities in the highlands, much as the coastal sugar plantations in Jamaica and Puerto Rico depend in part on the seasonal labour of highland peasants. In Guatemala, a highland Indian population resists permanent wage labour because of its culturally conservative standards of consumption, but is forced by law to undertake wage labour on the coastal plantations (6, pp. 119-60; 14, pp. 163-5; 17; 23; 30, pp. 9, 72; 44; 48). Thus, the plantation thrives on conditions under which labour is in year-round or seasonal oversupply. Where such labour power is absent, or does not voluntarily put itself at the disposal of the plantation, the political apparatus of the larger society often functions to facilitate its provision through laws affecting tenure, taxation, immigration, and other means.

In a situation where many workers are competing for available jobs, the most advantageous method of payment for the plantation is in the form of a money wage. The plantation labourer is typically a "free" labourer in a free labour market. To the extent that work effort is rewarded with cash, labour power can be measured impersonally. Payment by the task, by piece work or by hourly rates plus bonuses are the prevalent manner of payment, due to the repetitive and "industrial" nature of the operation involved (29, p. 243). Free housing occasionally may be provided to a few workers to maintain a core of year-round operatives. Unlike the hacienda, however, the plantation does not rely on such capital-saving mechanisms for binding labour as the extension of perquisites, the granting of personal credit, or the institutionalization of personal relationships between employer and employee. Such perquisites run counter to the demands of rational management of extensive land areas for intensive production by decreasing "efficiency" and adding to the cost of administration. Ideally, the plantation would keep a small core of workers attached to it throughout the year to carry on necessary routine labour while relying on heavy in-migration of workers during the peak season of work.

Workers who receive wages for their work, in turn, begin to change their consumption patterns. Increasingly, their needs can only be met by purchases in stores rather than by subsistence production on plots owned or operated by themselves. When their ready cash is spent, they will tend to return to the plantation for additional employment rather than expend their efforts on growing or making things for themselves (see below).

c Derived cultural conditions. Plantation use of labour tends to have immediate effects on the prevailing pattern of settlement of a plantation area. Most striking is the development of entire communities of wage labourers directly dependent on work on the plantations. These are usually spatially as well as culturally separate from the traditional settlement of the inhabitants of the country. Some of them are located on the plantations themselves, but more generally they occupy surrounding marginal lands. Such changes in settlement pattern may ultimately affect entire regions and even countries.

Striking also is the pattern of seasonal migration set up as a result of seasonal demands for labour on the part of the plantation. Such migration may link the interior of a country with its plantation belt, as in Guatemala or Puerto Rico. It may also take form across national boundaries, as in the case of Haitian migrants to the Dominican Republic. Such seasonal migration may be expected to have strong effects on the unity, prevailing division of labour, and distribution of authority within the worker family, and on other aspects of worker culture.

Employment for wages also introduces new and decisive factors into a plantation area. Wage payment makes superfluous any personal relationship between the employed and the organizers of production. The labourer retains no relationship with the enterprise other than through the intermittent sale of his labour power. In contrast to the hacienda, and often in contrast also to the traditional cultural patterns of the group to which the worker belongs, personal relationships are not the means through which labour is organized and used.

Not only do the means of earning a livelihood differ sharply from those prevalent on haciendas, but wage-payment also alters the patterns of consumption of the labour force. The hacienda worker is paid in goods and perquisites of a non-monetary nature. The hacienda which provides these services in kind is thus able to impose an upper limit on the consumption of its labour force, a limit which is rarely subject to revision. The plantation worker receives money wages which must be spent at stores. He thus becomes to a much greater degree than the hacienda worker a consumer of goods which are not produced by him or others like him, and which are not produced within the confines of the locality where he lives. Money wages thus condition a continuous flow of store-bought goods into the plantation area, introduced either by company stores or by the stores of small merchants. The consumption habits of the plantation labour force may indeed be patterned on antecedent cultural norms, but the goods introduced set up a continuous flow of cultural alternatives into the worker community. The plantation worker, unlike the hacienda worker, is continuously confronted by consumption choices which he must resolve.

The new goods introduced from outside, in turn, are not isolated elements which diffuse without further cultural implications. A pair of store-bought, two-tone shoes, or sunglasses, or canned goods are not merely new culture traits. They also represent participation in a larger social and economic system in which invidious comparisons are drawn between individuals, in terms of their capacity to consume. The money wages of the plantation worker not only confront him with a choice of items of consumption but also with new social relationships symbolized by these items of consumption. This tends to modify the initial cultural values of the labour force, and to widen its social and cultural horizons. The increase in consumption choices is sometimes furthered by increases in money wages, as in Puerto Rico after 1940; such

increases are made possible by the enormous productivity per worker within the plantation system. Although such increases in *per capita* rewards are rarely proportionate to this productivity, they allow the plantation workers to participate far more completely than the hacienda workers in the expansion of the consumption frontiers of capitalist society.

In the case of the hacienda, the owner himself draws revenues for purposes of subsistence and prestige from the operation of his estate. In contrast, the owners of a plantation hardly look upon the enterprise as a source of livelihood for themselves. This is especially evident where the plantation is merely one of a number of enterprises owned by a corporation. In such a case the accumulation of capital is the primary purpose of the enterprise, and all means are geared to this end. There is thus little chance that the cultural patterns based on common understandings of the consumption process, such as are characteristic of the hacienda (see above), will tend to develop on the plantation.

Wage-payment of work performed on the plantation has additional consequences for the culture patterns which develop around it. The fact that each worker receives equal wages for similar standardized units of work allows each man to buy as much or as little with his wages as the next man. This equality of rewards operates as a strong levelling influence, placing each man on a roughly equal plane with his neighbour. The experience of similar rewards for similar work performed becomes a powerful factor in making plantation workers conscious of the similarity of their chances in life. Such "consciousness of kind" receives further reinforcement through the frequency with which men are laid off because of fluctuations in the market for the product of the plantation or increased mechanization of operations. The plantation worker lacks the ability of the hacienda worker to fall back on the produce of his subsistence plot and other non-monetary perquisites when faced with a crisis in the market. In his case, loss of job immediately poses a serious problem for him in terms of biological survival. Since, in the eyes of the organizers of production, on the plantation one man is as good as the next and one man can easily take the place of another, all men tend to be confronted by a similar fate.

Faced with the same life situation, plantation workers tend to develop social relationships to counteract the instability of their individual positions. These relationships may follow a variety of patterns. They may be relations of ritual kinship, patterned on the bonds within the familial grouping but extended to non-kin persons in order to include large numbers of men in quasi-familial ties (22). These ties may prove effective in lending greater solidarity to segments of the worker community but often are not flexible enough to unite a major part of the total labour force. This is frequently accomplished more effectively through unionization, which represents an attempt to create local scarcity of labour within a total societal situation of chronic labour abundance. Unionization, however, often founders on the very problem that

brings it into being: too many men competing for too few opportunities to work. It thus rarely remains purely on the economic plane but tends to develop political ends. If the labour union can gain enough strength to influence policies on the national level, it can work for an increase of institutionalized services provided by the government or forced on the plantations through government intervention. This political role of unions of plantation workers is especially important in societies which are politically and economically dependent on dominant powers. The union may have opportunities to ally itself with groups operating on the national level to restrict the power of the dominant country. Agitation against foreign-owned and foreign-operated plantations may form part of such a political effort, and political success of anti-colonial political groups may result in an extension of services to the plantation population.

Finally, the plantation also tends to effect the cultural and ethnic composition of the population under its control. As a result of labour immigration or imports, plantation areas are generally characterized by much cultural and physical heterogeneity (43, p. 323). The equality of life chances and the development of a common "consciousness of kind" among the plantation workers may be instrumental in breaking down such cultural and ethnic barriers, resulting in considerable acculturation and inter-breeding between different ethnic groups.

5. *Technology*

a. *As an initiating condition of the type.* In contrast to the hacienda, the plantation requires a substantial investment in machinery, in transportation, equipment and facilities, and in technological skills. Machinery is usually needed for processing but is also applied to field operations as new techniques for such application are worked out. Generally machinery is imported from the industrial country which also furnishes the capital and managerial skills for plantation enterprise. Its benefits to the plantation country are thus only indirect, and consist primarily of that part of wages which reflects increased productivity.

Improvements in transportation are a necessary accompaniment of the plantation system, both in external transport, to allow the product of the plantations to be shipped to overseas markets, and in internal transport, to permit rapid and efficient communication between the plantations and their marketing outlets. Such improvements may be made by the plantation entrepreneurs alone, or by the entrepreneurs in conjunction with local governments. Often, the establishment of a transportation network and the introduction or improvement of transportation facilities may benefit a number of parties to such construction programmes: the government, for instance, may improve thereby its ability to tax, to investigate local affairs, to draft personnel for the armed services, and so forth. From the point of view of the plantation, however, an improvement in transportation primarily represents an increase in the efficiency of its operations.

The plantation also requires a body of skilled personnel for the execution of administrative and technical functions. Such personnel is rarely available within the plantation area, and usually must be imported from outside or trained to fulfil the necessary requirements.

b. *As an operational condition of the type.* In sharp contrast to the hacienda, the plantation can afford to spend large amounts to improve its technology. Its mechanization of phases of both processing and cultivation; its systematic use of fertilizer, herbicides, and irrigation; its ability to experiment and to introduce new varieties of the staple crop; its ability to subsidize government research or to further the development of new technological skills in local schools; all these contrast sharply with the labour-intensive character of the hacienda. The introduction of such new devices and skills are, of course, subject to the same yardstick of "rational cost accounting" used in all phases of plantation operation. In any given situation, the form which plantation organization takes will depend on the amounts of available capital, the degree to which manual labour may prove to be cheaper or more efficient than machines, the degree of technological progress achieved in improving the quality of the product in the industry in general, and so forth. Similar considerations will also animate the introduction of new means of transportation or of new technical skills. Only expectable returns on capital investment will bring improvements in the flow of product from field to factory, or in the manner of concentrating, distributing, and interchanging labour or machinery.

Given the scale of plantation operations, a technical staff is necessary to supervise work in the field, processing, marketing, and other phases of production or distribution. The delegation of such functions to specialized personnel creates a gap between the *de facto* owners of the plantation and the technicians, on the one hand, and between the technicians and the local labour force, on the other. This gap is accentuated where the *de facto* owners of the plantation reside in a country other than the one in which the plantation is located.

Hacienda and plantation again contrast sharply in the ways in which labour is marshalled to perform its appointed tasks within the systems subsumed under each type. The hacienda, with its scarcity of capital and its need to bind labour, retains a labour-intensive technology often based on the tools and techniques traditional in the culture from which the labour force is drawn. In contrast, the plantation labourer is integrated into a system of production wherein his productivity is tapped *via* an increased efficiency of the organization of work, or a multiplication of his productivity *via* scientific agriculture, or both. In addition to the technical improvements provided on the plantation, the plantation labourer's productivity is heightened by the systematization of production. Work effort is customarily divided into a number of fixed operations, each of which may be performed by any worker without regard to his individual capacities. This reduction of work tasks into a number of

separate operations, each performable by any worker, seeks to utilize the worker purely in terms of his labour power without reference to other characteristics. It permits the quick training of unskilled labour and allows the ready substitution of one worker for another. This rationalization of the labour force contrasts with the customary rationale of production on the hacienda^a.

c. *Derived cultural conditions.* The presence of machinery on the plantation implies social as well as occupational distinctions between a relatively small technical staff and the large unskilled labour force. Since the technical staff tends to be drawn from the country which provides the investment capital for the plantation rather than from the country in which the plantation is located, it often views local problems in terms of outside interests rather than in terms of local considerations. Often, such a group identifies strongly with the dominant country, and tends to reinforce this identification through in-group cohesion and group self-consciousness. Such cultural aspects of the managerial role are not necessary attributes of the plantation type, but rather are expectable features of plantations which draw their skilled technicians from the home country. Since both technicians and workers tend to form their separate and often antagonistic in-groups, we may expect further that tensions between them may become the focus of nationalist or racialist sentiments. Often, therefore, we may find the technicians laying claim to distinct racial descent, superior intellectual power, and membership in a politically dominant nation, and the workers reinforcing their own solidarity through the use of contrasting symbols. The political tendencies of workers in plantation areas thus receive considerable added strength.

Such tendencies are also reinforced by other cultural conditions derived from the operation of the plantation. It may be noted, for instance, that with the introduction of a complex division of labour on the plantation, the individual worker can no longer span conceptually or technically the range of production operations. Work loses its "holistic" character, and becomes de-personalized. In areas in which the labour force possesses a culture which traditionally evaluates work in terms which integrate economics and other aspects of life into a closely woven fabric, such change in the character of work may produce "secularization" of traditional cultural norms. A machine-wrecker ideology may develop, and merge with developing nationalism and class solidarity.

Such trends are also effected by the growth of advanced transportation in plantation areas. Such an increase of transportation lays open community,

^aSome have defended the rationalization of production under the plantation system as an aspect of the liberation of the worker from ties of submission to a personal overlord, controlling his very life. Others have criticized the plantation system for its supposed destruction of a highly integrated way of life, be it that of the hacienda or of some traditional village group. It would seem to us that these forms of organization take shape in response to cultural forces which are not dependent primarily on the personalities or personal philosophies of the organizers of production. They rather represent answers to problems posed by differing kinds and sizes of markets, differing amounts of available investment capital, and differing political situations.

region, and nation to further penetration from the outside. It may increase geographical mobility and thus affect the worker subculture. It may permit increased contacts between groups of workers on different plantations and thus reinforce the class solidarity evoked by the operation of the plantation. It may render labour more interchangeable over wider areas and thus reinforce the tendency of the plantation to use each worker as an interchangeable and standardized unit. It may also operate in opposite ways: it enables dissatisfied elements in local communities to move out more easily into other areas or urban centres and it may decrease the solidarity of the local group by opening up new horizons and opportunities for change and social circulation. In the development of such alternatives, transportation must, of course, be seen only as one element among others, and its role can be understood only through an analysis of the total context surrounding its growth.

6. *Sanctions*

- a. *As an initiating condition of the type.* Like the hacienda, the plantation requires a system of sanctions to regulate the distribution of surpluses produced and to discipline labour in its operations.
- b. *As an operational condition of the type.* In contrast to the hacienda, where an infraction of labour discipline calls into question the authority of the owner and where punishment is used to restore threatened social relationships, the organizers of production on the plantation can enforce work discipline simply by firing the wrongdoer. This is possible first, because the plantation operates within the context of an oversupply of labour, and, second, because one unskilled worker can easily take the place of another in the performance of the simplified and standardized operations to which the work process has been reduced. Just as the wage payment involves no personal bond between the recipient of the payment and the employer, so the sanctions guarding the enforcement of law and order are wholly impersonal and do not involve the restoration of affective relationships between employer and worker.
- c. *Derived cultural conditions.* Such manner of punishment tends to reinforce the tendency towards self-help on the part of the plantation labour force. Unable to have recourse to personal relationships with plantation managers and technicians, the worker against whom sanctions have been used can rely only on the sympathy and aid of his fellow-workers whose interests are linked with his own in similar risks and chances of life. Ultimately, therefore, the worker against whom sanctions have been invoked will tend to rely on any economic or political organization which purports to represent the interests of the working group, in an effort to gain restoration of work or recompense for his lost livelihood. The enforcement of discipline is thus fraught with problems for plantations which find themselves confronted with strong labour organizations; the presence of such organizations may dictate considerable expediency in the imposition of such sanctions.

CONCLUSIONS

Our paper has dealt with two types of social systems in agriculture: the hacienda and the plantation. In each case, we have tried to indicate the conditions which must be present to channel development towards systems of one or the other type; the conditions for their maintenance; and the cultural conditions to which they give rise. We have also tried to indicate the conditions which must be present in the larger society to permit and to further the growth of both haciendas and plantations. Our aim throughout has been to define each type as an operational model which would account for differences in behaviour observed in the field, and yet would possess utility in making predictions about situations yet unstudied or unknown.

It may well be that the operational models suggested here are limited to Latin America and must be modified if they are to apply to other areas of the world. It is also possible that they must be redefined even to apply to Latin American situations with which the present writers are unfamiliar^a. Yet scientific procedure in cross-cultural comparison cannot do without some such typological constructs. Even a cursory reading of the available literature leaves little doubt that plantations of the kind subsumed under our plantation type exist in other parts of the world. Similarly, attention may be drawn to hacienda-like systems which appeared in thirteenth century England and in fifteenth century Eastern and East Central Europe (7, pp. 229-31; 4, p. 410; 28, pp. 171, 186, 192 *passim*; 32, pp. 139-41). Such systems may profitably be restudied in the light of the models offered here.

The use of such models in cross-cultural enquiry can be profitable, however, only if they are not endowed with a life of their own but are used simply as heuristic devices to analyze relationships between variables which are constantly in process of change. A type is not a "thing" found in nature, but a mental construct. Just as the concept of a social system involves a series of interrelated statements about recurrences of observed behaviour, so the concept of a type of social system represents a series of interrelated statements about the recurrent features of a number of social systems.

^aIn a careful and trenchant criticism of the present paper, Dr. Raymond Smith cites evidence for arguing that sugar plantations in British Guiana have many of the economic characteristics we ascribe to the hacienda type; at the same time, medium-sized banana properties in Jamaica, he writes, seem to have many of the economic characteristics we ascribe to the plantation type. He concludes that there is a "... question whether there is not a range of types of economic organization varying from the medium-sized farm to the plantation, and whether it is possible to define such organizations in quite the social terms ..." we have employed.

This criticism cannot be gainsaid if type construction of the present sort is to be ruled out until we have adequate data for all world areas, or even for all of Latin America. In the view of the writers, the utility of the present paper may lie in part in the stimulus it provides for the re-examination of data on a variety of agro-social systems in different settings. Hopefully, many more "exceptions" to the types will be reported upon by other critics in the future. We are aware that specific farming systems are "real", while our types are merely abstractions from a limited number of cases. If critical reporting of cases deviating from the abstract "norms" we have constructed leads to a better understanding of process, and of the inter-relationship of different characteristics of agro-social systems, our purpose in writing this paper will have been served.

Such recurrent features are never identical from system to system, but may be said to bear resemblances within certain specifiable limits. Thus, as we have seen, in both Puerto Rico and Mexico there existed at one time or another social systems in agriculture which were characterized both by possession of a company store and grants of subsistence plots to some part of the labour force. In Mexico, both company stores and subsistence plots were swept aside in the course of the agrarian redistribution which followed in the wake of the Revolution of 1910 (46, pp. 132-3, 571). A complete reorganization of the system of landholding and agricultural production involved the simultaneous regression of both features. In Puerto Rico, coffee haciendas dissolved their company stores but retained the practice of granting subsistence plots, while — in contrast — some sugar cane plantations retained their company stores and abolished subsistence plots (48, 23). Here a complex interplay of politics and economics produced different results in different regions. The manner in which any one feature of a social system is bound up with other features of the same system may thus vary even between similar systems. This variation is the result of the interplay of social, economic, and political forces in their differential impact. If we are interested in constructing types, then we must be aware that the particular diagnostic features of the systems subsumed under the type construct may vary from system to system.

These common features of systems subsumed under the same type may not only vary from system to system viewed synchronically, but within any given system over time. It may be necessary, for purposes of cross-cultural comparison, to regard the features of a system as stable characteristics in order to compare them with specified features in another system. Seen diachronically, however, such features appear as the result of processes which change over time. From this point of view, a system may be seen as a series of interdependent processes which may bear on each other in a number of ways. Thus, for instance, production for a market may be initiated along many different lines. It can vary in form and intensity; it may proceed slowly or rapidly. Concomitant processes leading to the establishment of a wage-earning labour force may take their origin in different conditions and proceed at different rates in their turn. Such variability in one set of processes may set off variability in others. Each of these processes may be examined as a continuum in time, in differential involvement with other processes. A social system may therefore be viewed as a set of process *continua* examined synchronically. The type under which the system is subsumed, in turn, represents an even more generalized statement about comparable sets of variable processes. It follows that the type construct is of limited usefulness if used to erect a series of "sociological species." We should like to emphasize its operational value, as a means of allowing us to see variables in interdependence rather than each variable isolated mechanically from its matrix.

Types or models for prediction may aim at a wide or narrow range of pre-

diction. The intent of this paper runs parallel to the work of other anthropologists, but differs perhaps in its attempt to widen, rather than to restrict, the range of prediction. Julian Steward, for instance, has interested himself primarily in cross-cultural regularities among sub-cultural groups found in different parts of the world, leaving the characterization of the larger systems in which these sub-cultural groups occur to analysis by other disciplines. Focusing his attention primarily on such subcultures, he has found it useful to direct initial attention in the construction of types primarily to an analysis of the relevant cultural ecological adaptations, the localized interplay of environment and technology. Such initial emphasis is qualified with the proviso that a given cultural ecological adaptation must be understood ultimately in terms of the level of socio-cultural integration of the group in question (36; 37, pp. 9-10; 38). Our present paper differs in emphasis, though not in intent, in placing primary stress on the conditions of the larger society, while regarding the ecological adaptation as only one of a series of limiting conditions which analysis must take into consideration. Our purpose has been not only to trace the cultural conditions which derive from the operation of the systems discussed here, but also the initiating and operational conditions of the systems themselves. These conditions are the conditions of a type of large society which delegates strategic decisions to individual entrepreneurs or groups of entrepreneurs. Such decisions have direct bearing on the way in which individual systems develop and operate, and should be included in a model which aims at a wide rather than a narrow range of prediction. Thus, for instance, the ways in which labour is used within each type of system analyzed above appears to have strategic relevance in conditioning the cultures of the social groups involved. Yet the use of labour in each type of system is dictated by decisions which view labour as a commodity. These are the results of specifically cultural, not "natural" conditions within the larger society.^a It seems to us that a type concept which does not include the orientation and purposes of the larger society explicitly in its initial formulation can be applied properly only to situations in which these orientations and purposes remain constant.

Since agricultural systems of the kind discussed in this paper are set up to produce profit on invested capital, they are subject to the same kind of decision-making process which governs the allocation of resources in the larger entrepreneurial society. Thus, their component features may be rearranged by entrepreneurial *fiat* to meet the same purpose in different ways. Haciendas and plantations are but two of the alternatives through which this purpose may be achieved. The present paper has not exhausted the possible range of alternatives, nor explored the variety of conditions which may make possible their emergence. The types discussed, however, may be viewed properly as

^aThis point of view, stressed in the present paper, seems to be gaining increasing currency among non-anthropologists. One of the earliest and at the same time most neglected related concepts is Marx's "commodity fetishism". See (18, pp. 43-58). Significant modern statements include Polanyi (27) and J. Schumpeter (31).

points of departure in an intensive study of other related or contrasting types. We feel that such studies are needed to reduce the operations of blind chance in attempts at induced change and to make possible a measure of systematic forecasting.

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To Professor Polanyi,
with warm best wishes,
Sidney W. Mintz

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THE JAMAICAN INTERNAL MARKETING PATTERN: SOME NOTES
AND HYPOTHESES^a

By

SIDNEY W. MINTZ

Even the most casual visitor to Jamaica cannot fail to take notice of the internal marketing system by which almost all perishable vegetable foods, and many other locally produced goods, are conveyed from the primary producer to the ultimate consumer. This system is very old in Jamaica; although the writer could find no reference to it during the Spanish period, descriptions of markets and of marketing appear frequently in works on Jamaica written in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. While present-day marketing probably differs somewhat from the marketing typical of pre-emancipation Jamaica, the pattern fundamentally seems to have remained unchanged. The particular character of Jamaican marketing is rooted in the island's past—a past shaped by a system of slavery under which the slaves had to produce their own foodstuffs. The sugar estates traditionally required their slaves to produce the greater part of their own food on land allotted from the upland slopes or from unused scrub portions of the property (10, pp. 289-90; 12, pp. 108, 158). Slaves were permitted to do as they pleased with any surplus they produced, and quite a few apparently were able to accumulate considerable sums of money through their independent production and marketing operations (6, pp. 181, 390; 12, pp. 73-4). Important conventions concerning the slave's rights to his own produce, and to the financial rewards of the sale of this produce, developed over time, and appear to have been respected as a matter of course by the planters.^b A slave, cultivating foodstuffs for himself and his family, could produce more than the family consumed, making an exchangeable surplus available to be funnelled into the marketing system. Some slaves, in turn, were thus freed from food production and could use their free time for craft specialization, producing goods to be sold at market, and using the proceeds to buy neces-

^aData for the present paper were collected during the summers of 1952 and 1954, while the writer was serving as field director of Yale University's Inter-disciplinary Training Programme. The writer is indebted to that Programme, and to the Ford and Carnegie Foundations, which financed it, for the opportunity to collect the data. Many persons in Jamaica made valuable suggestions regarding the materials presented here. Especially helpful were Mr. W. D. Burrowes, Mrs. Ella Campbell, Mr. David Edwards, and Dr. M. G. Smith.

^bCf., for instance, Edwards (5): "I do not believe that an instance can be produced of a master's interfering with his Negroes in their *peculium* thus acquired [from the sale of produce]. They are permitted also to dispose at their deaths of what little property they possess; and even to bequeath their grounds or gardens to such of their fellow-slaves as they think proper. These principles are so well-established that whenever it is found convenient for the owner to exchange the Negro grounds for other lands, the Negroes must be satisfied, in money or otherwise, before the exchange takes place. It is universally the practice."

sary foodstuffs. Basketmakers, pannier makers, leatherworkers, woodworkers, and other artisans, for instance, who worked at their crafts or at other jobs for their masters during the week, were enabled by the market system to exchange the products of their skills for foods and other necessary goods (6). The marketing system thus facilitated a wider division of labour within the slave group. Marketing also provided the slave with an opportunity to obtain foods or other products which came from different regions of the island and might not have been obtainable in his home region. Markets also enabled slaves to congregate with a certain amount of freedom in centres where news could be exchanged as well as goods, and where respite from the plantation regimen could be enjoyed. Although the missionaries objected vigorously to the fact that markets were held on Sunday (I, pp. 66, 204), it was there that many slaves received their first direct exposure to Christian teaching.^a

There is ample reason to suppose that the market system in Jamaica had important African antecedents. The vast majority of Jamaican slaves came from West Africa, where markets were highly developed,^b and where women were predominantly the marketers—as they are in Jamaica today. However, the Jamaican pattern could develop and persist only because the slave, and later the freeman, had access both to land and to a marketing institution so that he could produce and exchange foodstuffs and craft articles.^c

Perhaps the first significant point to be made about Jamaican internal marketing, in terms of its present character, is that it is carried on largely by women rather than men. Historical accounts lend some support to the idea that this has long been the case;^d at the same time, men appear to have

^aOf particular interest is the story of James Finlayson, a slave, said to have returned from his marketing at Falmouth one Sunday, deeply moved by the rebuke of a minister for breaking the Sabbath, who later became a leading figure in the spread of the Baptist faith in St. Ann parish. Cf. Henderson, G. E. (7).

^bThe bibliography on West African marketing is a rapidly growing one. For two brief but useful analyses, cf. Herskovits, M. J. (8) and Nadel, S. F. (11).

^cThe slaves were permitted to maintain or to re-work the African traditions of marketing and to derive significant advantages from doing this, although they were severely punished for attempting to perpetuate certain other practices of the ancestral cultures, such as those connected with personal magical power, funerary practices, the use of drums as part of religio-political activity, etc. It is quite clear why they were encouraged to keep subsistence plots, but further historical research is needed before the writer can attempt to explain why they were allowed to build up an elaborate and lucrative marketing system for themselves. Da Costa Eduardo's contention that "Negroes in parts of the New World have preserved religious survivals and orientations more carefully than economic, social or artistic aspects of African culture . . ." because these are . . . "more important life values, which are obviously culturally determined . . ." and accordingly, . . . "less subject to change than others having less moment" Da Costa Eduardo, O. (4) is not supported by the evidence from Jamaican history. Rather it would seem that the Negro slave preserved those parts of his ancestral culture which he was permitted to retain, and that this in turn depended primarily on the needs of the plantation system, and on the power of the planter to exact conformance.

^dCf., for instance, Bickell (1); Bigelow, J. (2); Sturge, J., and Harvey, T. (15); and especially, Livingstone, W. P. (9). Livingstone writes of the market women ". . . they appear unconscious of any hardship in the arrangement which transfers to them so large a part of the burden of life. It gives to them a certain power, apart from sex, over the men, which in the circumstances is perhaps essential". The implications of this comment are touched upon later in this paper.

sex

you are right

free port for
our women

*Separation of trade and market
in Africa, West Indies etc*

predominated, although not to the exclusion of women, in the agricultural work. The pattern of women as marketers and men as cultivators on the subsistence plots remained consistent both before and after slavery, and this division of labour has probably persisted because there has been no reason for it to change. To what degree marketing and small-scale agriculture were the two sides of the sexual division of labour within the slave family when the estate was not exacting the family's labour, is not clear. In this connection, it is interesting to note that 'divorce'—that is, the termination of common-law unions in the slavery period—was consummated by tearing in two the 'cotta', or head cloth, which supports the market woman's basket of produce (6, p. 182; 14, pp. 218-19). This may have signified the breaking in two of a symmetrical economic relationship between male cultivator and female marketer.

Marketing is conducted in Jamaica today almost exclusively through the use of money, rather than by barter. Barter, to the writer's knowledge, is very rare,^a and probably was infrequent even in the early periods once some currency had filtered down into the slave group through the selling of goods or the performance of special services for the free members of the society. The presence of a highly standardized medium of exchange, which serves in nearly all marketing transactions, is perhaps the second significant diagnostic feature of the Jamaican internal marketing system. This highly standardized medium of exchange—money—makes it possible for a marketer to exchange her goods completely a dozen times in the course of a pre-market night, and for a single item of produce to be passed from hand to hand perhaps a like number of times before reaching the ultimate consumer. Such a process increases the time spent in handling the goods involved, and may increase their cost, since every handler expects to receive some reward for her part in the exchange process. From the point of view of the ultimate consumer, who must pay the difference between the original price of the goods and their final selling price, this is an inefficient process. It possesses certain very important advantages, however. Prices for the consumer naturally respond to variations in supply. In this sense, the consumer benefits rather than loses when a large number of middlemen are involved in supplying him, since miscalculations may lead to a glut which is immediately followed by a sharp drop in consumer prices. Unevenness of supply of a given product may depend on seasonal variation and on available transport; but it is also dependent in good measure on the very nature of the whole productive and marketing system in which thousands of small-scale producers and middlemen are involved. The fact that the internal marketing operations in Jamaica are carried on by great numbers of individual entrepreneurs, in many thousands of individual and discrete steps, is the third extremely important point to note in interpreting the system.

^aMr. David Edwards informed the writer that in a highland market of the Upper Yallahs Valley, Portland higglers barter tree crops like coconuts and breadfruit for ground crops, such as escallion.

*X unknown in Jamaica,
money enforced!*

*maybe
of above
Barter*

most important! Plans + this forces of the "traders" market!!

To understand the connection between Jamaican internal marketing and other aspects of Jamaican culture, several other characteristics of the marketing system must now be enumerated. The fourth characteristic is the fact that goods for internal marketing are hardly ever trucked without carrying those who buy and sell them. The trucker of produce is almost always a trucker of marketers as well. This is important in considering the amount of human energy and time invested in the distributive process, and in evaluating the efficiency of distribution. The fifth characteristic is the tendency for sellers to operate on a very small scale, buying and selling small quantities of produce which represent a small capital investment. This capital is usually borrowed, at least initially, either from the market woman's husband or, more commonly perhaps, from a small business man who usually charges an exorbitant rate of interest. The sixth characteristic of Jamaican internal marketing follows from this: the profit margin for such marketing transactions is extremely small. These points, common knowledge to most Jamaicans, are among the essential characteristics of Jamaican internal marketing; inherent in them are important advantages and disadvantages for the primary producer, the ultimate consumer, and for all those who take part in the movement of goods or who hold property in those goods.

The individuals who act as middlemen in the marketing process—who sometimes produce a portion of what they sell and perhaps consume some of what they buy, but who serve mainly as transporters of produce, sharing the risks of buying and re-selling largely perishable goods in variable supply—are known as 'marketers,' 'vendors,' 'speculators,' or 'higglers' in Jamaica. 'Higgler' is probably the term most commonly used and tends to be applied indiscriminately to people filling roles at every step in the marketing process. In addition to those characteristics mentioned earlier, such as a small stock, transactions in cash, etc., which typify the higgler, there is one final feature to be mentioned—she usually (though by no means always) carries a diversified stock of produce, so as to avoid being caught in the glut of a single item. This is the seventh and last diagnostic characteristic of Jamaican internal marketing to be mentioned here.

The observations thus far are intended to describe some features of the marketing system without reference to other aspects of Jamaican culture. But there is agreement among students of human behaviour that apparently unrelated features of culture often are so interwoven into a web or network that they are dependent on one another, and that changes in one feature are likely to lead to completely unanticipated changes in the other. The remainder of the present paper purports to suggest that certain relationships exist between the internal marketing system and the system of agriculture, the pattern of land tenure, the structure of the rural family, and other aspects of Jamaican life, such that changes introduced into the marketing system without reference to these other aspects of the culture might result in unforeseen and far-reaching consequences.

Many! The whole picture adds up to an interlocking picture combinations and transitions of trade (ie carrying) + marketing proper

First of all, it is hypothesized here that the Jamaican marketing system, as described above, and the Jamaican pattern of small-farm cultivation are wedded not only historically, but functionally and psychologically as well, and that changes in either of these parts of Jamaican culture would almost certainly result in changes in the other. Had it not been for the pattern of subsistence-plot cultivation under slavery, and the perpetuation of subsistence cultivation by the growth of a ~~rural~~ peasantry after emancipation (10, 13), the Jamaican economy would have taken on a very different character. The production of a *per capita* agricultural surplus within the internal economy under slavery facilitated and made advantageous the development of a strong marketing pattern, which probably rested on the foundations of the African cultural heritage of the slaves. After emancipation, the market system proved to be of great value to the small-scale cultivator who, by means of it, was provided with access to the cash he needed to supply himself with those items that could not be produced locally. This situation still obtains. Like the higgler, the small-scale cultivator's capital fund is minimal, his production very small, and his margin of profit narrow. He depends heavily on the higgler, who helps him to transform at least part of the products of his labour into cash. This interdependence between higglers and small-scale cultivators, between marketing and small-scale agriculture, has never been broken, and may be even stronger today than it was a century ago. The owners of the tremendous number of small farms which are at present maintained in Jamaica must depend on the sale of at least part of their produce for obtaining cash. And while the owner-cultivator of half an acre may be unwilling to invest the time and energy necessary to go to market to sell his handful of yams and coconuts, he is quite happy to sell them to the market woman who scours the neighbourhood to buy just such odd handfuls of resaleable goods. The same small-scale farmer is unwilling to put his entire half-acre into corn or escallions or any other single crop for fear of a seasonal glut, when all he had produced might have to be sold at a loss, if sold at all; he prefers to diversify his tiny farm in order to reduce the risk involved in the production of any one item. It will be noted immediately that the small-scale farmer distributes risk in production by crop diversification, just as the higgler distributes risk in distribution by carrying a selection of items. The market woman who buys from the small-scale farmer is sensitive to the very same dangers her supplier faces. However, the same diversification which reduces risk in both production and distribution increases the complexity of both. Some have argued that if the Jamaican small-scale farmer were willing to put his entire half-acre into a single crop and then sell the harvest to a wholesaler, the agricultural and marketing processes would be made much more efficient. But to this argument both small-scale farmer and higgler are likely to respond: "Efficient—for whom?" On a number of occasions when small-scale farmers have put all their land into a single crop, they have lost everything. The small-scale farmer can-

yes

wsp.

problem of "risk-bearing" (capitalist only)

not afford to put all his resources into the production of a single item, the market for which is not guaranteed. Given the demand situation, and the marketing system by which all internally consumed crops are handled, the man who farms on a small scale in Jamaica must diversify; given the diversified farming on this minuscule scale, the marketing will tend to remain as it is.

The higgler provides the essential link between producer and consumer in the whole process of local distribution, because no one, at least in present-day Jamaica, is willing to take her place. So long as farmers sell their surplus in the form of several hands of bananas, a handful of ackees, a few breadfruit, half a dozen eggs, and so forth, truckers who, in some countries, serve the consumers' needs by buying wholesale in the countryside and selling wholesale to retail stores or jobbers cannot supplant the higgler in Jamaica. No trucker can profitably tour the Jamaican countryside buying on the scale of higgler operations. It would take him several days to acquire a load of often highly perishable goods, since he would have to purchase these goods in tiny quantities. Moreover, with no wholesale outlet for them, he would have to unload his stock through individual re-sale of similarly tiny quantities. The higgler, on the other hand, is able to carry on her business profitably on such a small scale because her capital outlay is very small and she is willing to work on an extremely low margin of profit. She is willing to do this because higgling is one of the very few ways in which she is able to convert her labour into a cash reward, however small. In the course of her transactions, the higgler makes a very significant contribution, not usually recognized, to the functioning of Jamaican society. While she is engaged in providing the consumer with needed produce and the small-scale producer with an access to market, she pays a very high rate for services. Thus, she contributes up to a third or more of her gross income to the trucker (the number of trucks engaged in carrying higglers and their goods to and from markets is considerable: twenty trucks is not an unusual number to see at one of the busy country markets, and there are 87 such markets in Jamaica); she frequently pays as much as 5 per cent or more interest for three days' use of capital borrowed from the butcher or shopkeeper who finances her business; and the market itself may collect 5 per cent of the estimated selling value of her load in addition to other fees, in return for letting her sell.

If it be true that small-scale farming and the particular kinds of marketing arrangements that exist in Jamaica are closely related, it may be useful to consider briefly the nature of consumer demand in the island, since Jamaican production and distribution are naturally linked to the kinds of demand situations which Jamaican consumers create. Certain sectors of consumer demand seem to be relatively stable, for instance that of the suburban buyers of Cross Roads, St. Andrew, or the staff of the University College at Mona, St. Andrew. But these are relatively circumscribed consumer

5%
one
three
days

who owns the
market?

groups, composed of buyers with assured incomes and fairly fixed buying habits. The broad base of the consumer group consists of individuals with irregular incomes who, because of this, the writer would hypothesize, manifest irregular demand for goods. In the sectors of the buying public where demand is regular and assured, it may be possible to eliminate the market woman (and to some extent, the markets as well), and to establish green-grocers on the American or British model, exactly because consumer demand in these sectors of the economy is sufficiently stable to encourage businessmen at every stage of the production and distribution process—cultivation, trucking, wholesaling and retailing—to risk investment.^a But the irregularity of demand among the majority of Jamaican consumers would appear to preclude any overall replacement of the present marketing system with a different one.^b Thus it would appear that small-scale agricultural production is functionally related to the prevalent marketing arrangements, and that in turn both are related to the demand situation. The writer has restricted himself mainly to the first two components of the total system—production and marketing—because the connection between them is fairly clear. In the Jamaican situation they are interdependent and reinforce each other. Yet it is conceivable that a market system like that found in Jamaica today might be maintained in another society where peasant farms are of a much larger average size; contrarywise, a small-scale farming pattern such as Jamaica's might be maintained in conjunction with a very different form of marketing system. The writer would not hold that the two adaptations are inseparable, nor that any change in one is certain to destroy the other; he would suggest, however, that before any serious changes be made in either pattern, serious thought be given to what the results might be for the other.

From the point of view of the small-scale cultivator, it is sensible to maintain an 'uneconomic' farm, because to own land in Jamaica has a very special meaning, and being independent on the land is a value of deep significance to the Jamaican peasant. One can reason that the very small farms are frequently wasteful from the agronomic, conservation, and economic points of view. Much the same may be said of the market woman and

^aIn confirmation of a statement made by Mr. W. D. Burrowes to the writer a modern green-grocer's (part of a general food store) has now been opened in the Cross Roads section of St. Andrew.

^bIt has been noted by Mr. E. Seaga (in an article in the *Daily Gleaner*, of February 18, 1954) that in one portion of the consumer market—the north coast hotel trade—the higgler and the small-scale farmer have been virtually cut out of the economic picture. In the present writer's view, this is the result of the development of a relatively fixed demand situation. It would seem that the emergence of fixed demand eliminates the higgler and the small-scale farmer, by encouraging larger-scale entrepreneurs to enter the production and distribution picture. When a market for substantial quantities of agricultural products is assured, the trucker-wholesaler and the large-scale farmer are willing to invest in supplying that market. The competitive advantage which accrues to the large-scale farmer and the trucker-wholesaler in the fixed demand situation, as opposed to the small-scale farmer and the higgler, rests in the fact that, for obvious reasons, a greengrocer or a hotel owner will prefer to buy twenty sacks of potatoes from one trucker-wholesaler or large-scale farmer, rather than one sack each from twenty higgles or twenty individual small-scale farmers.

*Capulos may mean
higgler?*

her scale of operations. She, too, operates an 'uneconomic' and wasteful business. But she, too, is maintaining her independence. Many market women have told the writer in describing their fellows that "one week she gains and the next she loses, but she'd rather be a higgler and make a shilling than work in someone's house." In a country where over 70,000 adults, most of them women, are employed as domestics (3), where labour is relatively plentiful, where average incomes are low, where there is no social barrier to lower-class women working, and where the only economic alternative to marketing is domestic labour, it is easy to see why many women choose to be higglers.

Mention has been made of the division of labour between men and women which historically and functionally seems to parallel that between cultivation and marketing, although by no means strictly so. This division of labour, which characterizes rural lower-class peasant society as a whole in Jamaica, is replicated in thousands of individual families. The higgler wife or 'partner' provides an outlet for some of her cultivator husband's foodstuffs. At the same time, higgling provides a woman with a largely separate economic activity in which the husband does not exert a great deal of control. The significance of the marketing pattern in affecting the husband-wife relationship in thousands of Jamaican families is likely to be considerable. How the wife's independent or quasi-independent role as marketer and contributor to the total family income may influence conceptions of authority, equality, dignity, and other basic value-concepts within the family seems to be virtually unexplored. The writer would hold that an intimate functional relationship obtains between the marketing system and the patterned sexual roles evaluated by the Jamaican peasant people themselves as permissible and desirable. That there are basic Jamaican peasant values involved in being a higgler and hence 'independent', in having a source of income largely separate from that of one's mate—these are hypotheses and require substantiation. The more basic hypothesis that small-scale farming and the present system of Jamaican internal marketing neatly sustain one another also requires substantiation, and can be proved or disproved only by careful field study. Studies on these problems could help to throw light on one of the most fundamental institutions of Jamaican culture.

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West Africa: Whydah? Loango, Benin
 or Sambia? why

no mention of fixed customary
prices (a) markets

(b) as fairness

(c) wholesale

standard rate of "profits"

market dues?

forming out of markets

prices in town markets?

distances to market?

weight of load?

measures } local baskets
 for large
produce

cooked food }

precooked " ? }

inns? drinks?


property arrangements & taxes
 seeds

*All best wishes.
Sidney*

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PEASANT MARKETS

In a primarily agricultural country such as Haiti the market is the central economic institution. Chaotic though they may seem, these gatherings possess an elaborate underlying order

by Sidney W. Mintz

On market days in Haiti the towns and the country market-places gather thousands of peasants for hours of busy and noisy activity. The people come for gossip, courtship and the playing-out of personal rivalries, to visit a clinic or to register a birth; but above all they come for business—to sell the tiny surpluses of their little farms and to buy necessities. They press together in the ragged lanes among the stalls and the heaps of produce spread on the ground, inspecting and handling the displays of textiles, hardware, spices, soap and cooking oils, buying, selling and chaffering. Children push by hawking trays of sweets; farmers pull produce-laden animals through the crowds, calling loudly for the right of way. Trucks back up and turn around, their drivers honking horns, apparently oblivious of the people and the great piles of goods. There are vigorous arguments, sometimes ending in blows and arrests. In the very intensity of color, sound and smell the outsider is overwhelmed with an impression of confusion and disorder.

But for all its apparent anarchy the market place is characterized by an elaborate underlying order. Wherever they exist, peasant markets reveal a great deal about the societies they serve. They are a central economic institution in many countries where large numbers of small-scale farmers work their own land. To follow the movement of market-ers and stock through the system is an ideal way to begin to study the economy and to trace the distribution of economic and political power in the society.

In the simpler economies, wherein producers merely exchange local commodities, the market place may do little more than facilitate barter. In societies that use money but have fixed or traditional prices, the market place reflects

that isolation from the world market; its transactions neither affect nor respond to economic events in the world at large. Where trade crosses national boundaries, links diverse regions and supports specialist traders, the market place takes on a new significance, joining local activities to the world outside.

As the underdeveloped areas of the world—for example, Jamaica, Haiti, Ghana, Nigeria, India, Burma, Indonesia—move more fully into the orbit of world trade, their market systems have been passing from the earliest of these stages to the next. The transition disrupts traditional relationships and creates new alignments and rivalries in the society, and these are nowhere more dramatically revealed than in the market place. It is here that the peasant trades his surplus for the necessities he cannot produce from his own holding, and it is the market place that determines, directly or indirectly, the prices at which the exporter will purchase the peasant's produce for delivery to the world market. In certain countries the connection that the market establishes between the peasant producer and the world market is the keystone of national development. Those who hold political power may use the peasant market-system to try to educate, persuade, coerce and manipulate the peasantry, particularly with the aim of maintaining or increasing export production. The market places are primarily loci of trade, but they are also the arena where the diverse interests of the peasantry, traders and officials are pitted and exposed.

The study of the tangle of interests that animates the peasant market thus brings into the open numerous connections between regions, classes and interest groups. Traditional anthropologi-

cal studies, which focus on small, local groups, cannot yield comparable insights into such large, differentiated societies as those of India and Nigeria or even Haiti. Courts and legislatures provide good settings for observation of the competing elements in a society. But the market place reveals far more because it allows these elements so much greater freedom to express themselves.

Though man has probably been a trader since the beginnings of society, his trading activities have not invariably produced market places. When the Spanish conquerors came to the New World, for example, they were stunned by the size and grandeur of such Aztec market places as Tlatelolco, where 50,000 traders assembled on market day. A wealthy merchant group, the *pochteca*, controlled trade and wielded considerable power, and also served as efficient spies for the military. But in the great contemporary Andean empire of the Incas the conquistadors found neither market places nor merchants. Instead of trade they found royal monopolies in gold, silver, coca and fine textiles. Thus while market places are not found everywhere, their very absence tells us something about a society. The presence of markets does not necessarily imply a particular course of social development. Yet there are striking similarities among the peasant markets of the world, especially those of the new nations of Africa, Asia and tropical America.

Haiti is an older nation, with a history of political independence. But at its present stage of economic evolution this Caribbean republic is representative of the new nations that are emerging in the colonial regions of the world. Before the revolution of 1791-1804, Haitian slaves grew their food on plantation wastelands, selling surpluses in supervised



BUSTLING ACTIVITY OF MARKET DAY animates a clearing in rural Haiti. Tradeswomen are grouped by commodity they sell.

In this photograph woman in left foreground inspects wares of grain seller. At left in middle distance is lean-to of tuber sellers.



HAITIAN FARMS CLING TO TERRACED HILLSIDES near rural village of Kenskoff. Characteristically cluttered, the Haitian farm grows small but widely diversified crops.



ROAD TO MARKET PLACE is crowded with peasants. Whole families often walk all night, carrying their crop surpluses, in order to arrive at the market in time for early trading.

market places. In the 1790's the French observer Moreau de Saint Méry described such a market place, where 15,000 slaves traded on market day. The revolution destroyed the plantations that had made the island of Saint-Domingue one of the richest colonies in history, and substantially eliminated the French planters. Gradually Haiti became a peasant country where small-scale landholders cultivated their subsistence crops for local sale and a few items for export. The cash they received paid for the soap, cloth, oil, metal tools and flour they needed and could not produce. The national government sustained itself almost entirely by taxes on imports and exports; the local government, by levies on dealings in the market place.

Today, 150 years later, nearly 90 per cent of the people live in the countryside, and 80 per cent of them work their own land. Haitian peasants still cultivate much of their own food and produce a small surplus destined for export or for consumption in the domestic economy through sale in the peasant market. By aiming at these three different production goals they try to minimize risk and to secure a reasonably stable subsistence. They further hedge their investment of time and capital by diversifying the cultivation of their land, and this accounts for the curiously cluttered look of their little plots. Like other Caribbean farmers, the Haitian peasant makes thorough use of his land: he grows root crops underground, vines and creepers on the surface, grains above ground and trees and climbing vines in the air. Though technologically backward, the method provides a constant trickle of varied produce for the household where storage is difficult or impractical, a supply of craft and medicinal materials as required and a small quantity of items for sale at various times. It is upon this foundation that the Haitian market-system rests.

The peasant's wife most often handles the market transactions of the family, selling what the land has produced for sale and using the cash received to buy household necessities. Many peasant women become professional traders in this way. This further distributes the family's economic risks, since the men do the farming and the women do the trading partly as separate ventures.

Most of the trade in Haiti goes on in the nearly 300 officially controlled market places. In each region one or more central market-places services other, smaller centers. The larger centers are established in the towns; the satellite country market-places spring up over-



WOMEN DOMINATE TRADE in perishables in Haiti. In photograph at left, purchaser holds a measuring can while bean seller



fills it. They may fill and empty the can again before agreeing that it is properly filled. At right is section of the tuber market.



SUCCESSFUL TRADESWOMAN operates between markets. Her annual volume of business may amount to thousands of dollars.



SALT VENDOR'S CHILD arranges stock of coarse, unrefined salt for sale. Salt is among the few commodities shipped in bulk.

night as little towns that last only through the day to gather in and to absorb the peasant buying-power. Market days are staggered, enabling itinerant buyers and sellers to move from one market to another. Most of the important market places are on well-traveled truck routes. Thus the markets form a network, and the produce bought in one is put up for resale—after bulking, processing and transport—in another. For example, pork purchased in one market is cut up, salted and shipped to the next, while rice, millet and maize are husked or ground between purchase and resale to increase their value. The whole system of market places constantly adjusts and readjusts to seasonal changes, to the success or failure of harvests, to the growth and contraction of production areas, to the expansion of roads and trucking.

Trade begins beyond the fringes of the market, where licensed tradesmen from the towns, called *spéculateurs*, maintain outposts at which they buy commodities for export. Peasant women on their way to market stop to sell their coffee, beeswax and sisal to the *spéculateurs*, and then proceed to market with the cash they have received. Because competition is heavy and supplies uncertain, *spéculateurs* do not always wait for the peasants to come to them. They often send illegal buyers called "zombies" or "submarines" to make purchases directly at the farms.

But it is in the tumult of the market place that most trading activity goes on. Only after many days of observing and classifying the actors and their activities does the underlying order become apparent. Sellers of the necessities that peasants come to buy are present each

day in a given market place. Perishable foods come and go seasonally, but grains are nearly always available. Prices for different products fluctuate differently, perishables showing the greatest eccentricity, cloth and hardware changing very little from week to week, though perceptibly from season to season. Watching the market place each market day, one sees women dealing in the same goods always clustered together; grain sellers, corn-meal retailers and sellers of spice and sundries arrange themselves in rows. For the seller this permits a quicker check on the day's trade, on one's favored customers, and of course on prices. When sellers of the same stocks are together, the speed with which price is established, and with which it changes during the trading, is increased. Buyers of particular goods come regularly where the sellers are clustered.



PEASANT MEN WORK AS ARTISANS in the market, rarely as tradesmen. At left is a cobbler who rebuilds discarded shoes and



sells them. At right a blacksmith hammers sheet metal into hoes. Artisans usually tend their farms on other than market days.

Behind the facade of apparently uniform and competitive prices, however, there exists a relationship called *pratique*, in which the retailer gives her favored customers certain concessions in price or quantity or in the terms of credit in return for assurances of the customer's patronage when the market is glutted and prices are low. The retailer also makes *pratique* with her suppliers, thus assuring herself of a stock when certain commodities are scarce. Since *pratique* is a clandestine relationship, it can only be understood by carefully noting the details of many transactions.

Even the casual observer soon notices that the important heavy trade in perishables and the small-scale retailing of imports are carried on entirely by women. Men rarely trade; both sexes believe women are commercially shrewd-

er than men. There are, to be sure, male traders, but with the exception of the peasant who has come to market to sell livestock or craft articles they are almost always townsmen. The peasant woman makes her entrance into the market as a trader on the most modest terms, first as her household's representative in the market, then perhaps with a small stake borrowed from relatives or other traders. In a country where a handful of grain makes a meal and a bit of land a farmer, a few pennies constitute operating capital for the middleman, and what one can carry in one's hands is enough stock to begin trading. If the woman is resourceful she may parlay her small stake in a series of small trading transactions to a sum sufficient to secure her status as a *revenduse* (literally reseller).

Thousands of these women move from market place to market place, each deal-

ing in small amounts, but together buying and selling vast quantities of stock. They live by connecting centers of supply and demand; their potential profit rests in the price differentials between regions and in their ability to contribute to the value of products by carrying, processing, storing, bulking and breaking bulk. They often render services at incredibly low cost. Thus salt retailers in one market place interpose themselves between truckers and consumers, breaking bulk and retailing salt for earnings that sometimes fall below five cents a day. If these services were not provided, consumers would have to buy in uneconomically large quantities, or truckers would have to sell in uneconomically small ones. The fact that consumers buy from them even though they sit only a few feet from the trucks that bring the salt is proof that the service they sell is



TRUCKING AND TINKERING are other male occupations. Trucks carry resellers and their stock between markets. They



serve a vital function because regular bulk shipments are unknown. Tinker (right) does brisk business because new pots are expensive.



MARKETING OF FISH is characteristic of way trade is conducted in Haiti. Resellers wade out to fishing boats to buy fish (photograph at top); return to shore to sell them to waiting consumers (photograph at bottom). Fishermen will not deal directly with consumers.

worth buying. In their intermediary activities, the *revendeuses* scour remote countrysides. They buy basic commodities at their sources, where they are cheap, because the economic integration of the back country with the national economy is incomplete. Thus, by servicing buyers and sellers both, they help unite the peasant plot and the local market place with national currents of exchange, stabilizing general price levels and contributing to economic growth. The path to success is uncertain, but some few reach the top. The volume of a *revendeuse's* business may approach that of the famous "market mammies" of Nigeria, whose transactions amount to thousands of dollars a year. Though all apparently aspire to become city retailers, women with rural family-attachments incline to remain in the countryside and usually identify themselves with the peasantry.

For transportation from market place to market place the *revendeuses* depend upon the truckers. Demand is not sufficiently firm and centralized to give the truckers bulk cargoes to haul. It is not surprising, therefore, to discover that they are essentially passenger carriers, whose business it is to transport the *revendeuses* and their modest stocks. Trucking is a risky enterprise in a country where roads are few, maintenance facilities are poor and high taxes are levied against fuel and passengers. The trucker is a relatively new figure in the economy. His economic interests are at present firmly identified with those of the *revendeuses* and opposed to the *rentiers*, merchants and officials of the towns and cities. With the *revendeuses* he is against any forces aimed at the restriction and centralization of trade in Haiti. On the other hand, if the growth and evolution of the economy should make it possible for the trucker to profit by bulk transport, this general accord might well vanish.

In such an eventuality the truckers might find themselves allied with the townsmen. The *spéculateurs*, coffee processors, wholesalers and merchants, separately and in combination, all aim to encompass as much of the peasants' economic activity as possible. For although each peasant may be poor, the wealth that changes hands when thousands of peasants shop in the market place is considerable. Successful market places outside the towns constantly tempt the town merchants, particularly cloth- and shoe-sellers, who carry large stocks from their town shops into the country on market day. The townsmen



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


would of course prefer that all peasant trading took place in towns, where markets could be centralized, and the small reseller subjected to more control. To that end they have inspired repeated attempts at restrictive legislation. In this they are joined by the *rentiers*, the value of whose property would appreciate with increase in town trade. The importers and exporters among the city merchants would prefer to see export production rise, even at the cost of subsistence crops.

Officials of the national government are often similarly disposed. Unlike the local governments, which are largely supported by taxes on market-place transactions, the national government derives its revenues chiefly from taxes on imports and exports. Hence the state officials want to see peasant agriculture producing more exportable goods. One could say that their aim is to maximize the peasantry's taxable income.

In the market place one sees the whole structure of official power: police, military, judicial, executive. All market places in Haiti are under some supervision by state officials, who carry on two major and familiar functions: maintaining order and collecting taxes and license fees. At the top this structure is tied to the ministries in the capital; at the bottom it embraces notaries, justices of the peace, soldiery and local political leaders. It is within the market place, in the regulation of concrete economic transactions, that the penetration of political control is seen at its most complete as well as its most trivial. State officials supervise the workers who clean and maintain the market place; they catch and imprison thieves; they stop fights. They are supported by the lowest ranks of political officials, the *chefs de section*, who come from the rural areas to the market place to oversee peasants from their neighborhoods. The peasantry's name for any official, no matter how lowly, is always *l'état*.

Traders are taxed or licensed for taking livestock to market, for butchering, for selling animals, for selling meat, for selling foods of any kind, for selling alcoholic beverages and tobacco, for dealing as intermediaries in all other agricultural products, for tethering beasts of burden and for the stands and sheds they use to display meat and other products for sale. This revenue goes largely to governments of the *arrondissements*, though part is drained off by the national government. Tax revenues are used for the operation of local governments, and to pay for tax collectors' sala-



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
ries and the administration of the tax system.

Just as the political and commercial elements of the towns seek to centralize and control the markets, so the rural tradesmen seek to maintain the status quo. Their interests dictate a diffuse and open market in which ingenuity and intelligence enable them to compensate for lack of capital, and where they may hope to make the transition from perishable-produce dealers to hard-goods wholesalers or credit merchants.

The contention of these various groups, however, is ultimately intelligible only in terms of the behavior and power of the peasant, whose best interests do not lie decisively in either camp. In determining how he may maximize his cash income by transactions in the market place, he weighs the demand and prices of the domestic market against the opportunities offered by the export market. In striking a balance between the two alternatives he may incline toward the production of export goods to supplement his cash, but he is wary of export-market fluctuations which can deeply affect him and which he cannot control. His choices are not entirely free, for the various factions of the nation, especially those that favor increased production for export, exert considerable pressure upon him. As the source of his cash income, the market places are the peasantry's first line of defense against greater dependence upon the world market and a greater involvement with the officialdom of the state.

Apparently the alignments of interest that may be discerned in the peasant markets today have characterized Haitian society for many years. During the 19th century Haiti's seacoast towns sought to maintain economic hegemony over the inland towns. In the struggles of town merchants against the peasantry, and of the seacoast against the interior, climaxed by the capital's economic dominion over the nation, there are startling parallels with conflicts waged during the growth of capitalism in the nations of Western Europe. In both cases groups with vested economic interests sought to restrict the spread of competitive trading activity.

Thus study of an internal market-system may provide a lively vision of relationships among key economic and political groups in a society. Eventually it may be possible to compare internal market-systems in different societies as total systems, thereby revealing similarities and differences among the societies themselves that might otherwise be difficult to discover.



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