Reprinted from AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST, Vol. 63, No. 1
February, 1961

Economic Theory and Primitive Society[1]

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Economics is the study of that broad aspect of human activity which is concerned with resources, their limitations and uses, and the organization whereby they are brought into relation with human wants. In modern industrial societies economists have worked out an elaborate technique for the study of this organization, and have produced a body of generalizations upon it. It is still a matter of argument as to how far this technique and these generalizations can be applied in the study of primitive communities (Firth 1958:63).

SOME ambiguities in the literature of economic anthropology result from a lack of clarity concerning the relevance of Western economic theory to the economic organization of primitive communities (Knight 1941; Herskovits 1940; 1941). Anthropologists concerned with primitive economy sometimes seek preparation by studying the economics of their own society in the hope of acquiring analytical categories, techniques, and useful insights. Such procedure seems especially reasonable because of the success formal economic theory has had in analyzing Western economy. However, it is not well enough understood that much economic theory is inapplicable to primitive economy.

> The fact that the attention of economists has been focused so exclusively on just those aspects of our economy least likely to be found among non-literate folk has thus confused anthropologists who turned to economic treatises for clarification of problems and methods in the study of the economic systems of non-literate societies (Herskovits 1952:53).

This paper presents some reasons why economic theory cannot be fruitfully applied to the study of primitive communities and suggests an alternative approach to analytical treatment of primitive economy.

ECONOMIC THEORY AND MARKET ECONOMY

The purpose of this section is to describe those special organizational features of Western economy which formal economic theory was created to analyze. And then to show why formal economic theory, so derived, cannot be used to analyze the essentially different structures and processes of primitive economic organization.

Both the method and content of economic theory were shaped by two central features of 19th century Britain: factory industrialism and market organization. Market exchange, as the principle of economy-wide integration, compels its participants to conform to very special rules. *Everyone derives his livelihood from selling something to the market.* Laborers must sell their labor, landowners must sell the use of their land and natural resources, farm and factory owners must sell end products. The same market mechanism transacts the factor ingredients of production—labor, land, natural resources, finance, transportation—as well as finished goods and services of all varieties.

Market exchange refers not only to the existence of market places (sites

wherein buyers and sellers congregate), but more importantly, to the organizational process of purchase and sale at money price which is the mechanism of transacting material products, labor, and natural resources. In Western economy such transactions frequently take place outside of market places. For example, labor is not brought to a market place to sell, but its use is bought and sold through the same price-making process that transacts produced items at a market place. Land too becomes such a marketed commodity, whose ownership or use is something bought and sold for a money price determined by the same forces of market exchange which determine prices of labor and material items. Indeed, the market forces of cost and demand which transact material items such as wheat are functionally linked with those that transact the labor and land resources producing wheat. A change in wheat price "feeds back" on the rent price of wheat land and the wage price of farm labor. Land and labor use become rearranged in response to such price changes because the landowners and laborers depend for their livelihood on the money price of their land and labor which, in turn, depends upon the sales price of the material product land and labor produce. This is what is meant by the market mechanism or market principle integrating—bringing together in mutually dependent fashion—the components of economy.

The distinguishing feature of a market-organized economy, then, is the special nature of interdependence: all material livelihood is derived from selling something through the market mechanism; resource and labor ingredients of production are organized for purchase and sale as are produced material items; market prices rearrange labor and resource uses. Economists sum up the essential process in the shorthand expression that market-made prices allocate resources among alternative output uses, and wage, profit, rent, and interest incomes among the resource owners.

What should be emphasized is that it is market organization which compels its participants to seek material self-gain: each must sell something of market value to acquire the material means of existence. The "economic man" of 19th century economics was not a myth, but a succinct expression of this institutional fact: the necessity for each of the atomistic units in an impersonal, market exchange system to acquire his livelihood through market sale.

Throughout the 19th century—from Malthus and Ricardo to Alfred Marshall—a body of formal economic analysis was developed primarily concerned with a single set of questions: what are the forces which determine prices in a market-organized, industrial economy? Such theoretical concentration on price mechanics was simply a reflection of the crucial integrative role of prices in determining outputs and incomes.

Moreover, the market system functioned in a self-regulating way. The "economy" was a cohesive entity apart from other subsystems in society. It is true that government protected property and enforced contracts, but neither government, family, nor religion controlled market organization or price results. Where social institutions did impinge on market forces, they did so only in an indirect way by affecting supply or demand conditions (such as the de-

mand for fish in Catholic countries), and thereby prices. The market structure was self-regulating in the sense that it required the components of the system to move—land to change its use, labor to change its location or occupation—in response to price changes made in markets. Price changes induced buyers and sellers to "economize," that is, to seek monetary cost reduction, or monetary gain increase. Production methods as well as the choice of which items to produce were guided by market prices. A condition for undertaking production is that the producer must expect to make a profit, which is the money differential between two sets of prices: those that determine his costs of production, and those that determine his sales revenue.

When market organization is economy-wide it creates a "market society," in the sense that social organization has to adapt to market needs to allow the sustained provision of material goods, and of money incomes with which to acquire goods.

> A market economy can only exist in a market society . . . a market economy must comprise all the elements of industry, including labor, land, and money. . . . But labor and land are no other than the human beings themselves of which every society consists and the natural surroundings in which it exists. To include them in the market mechanism means to subordinate the substance of society itself to the laws of the market (Polanyi 1944:71.).

For example, that laborers are compelled to sell their labor for a market-determined wage, means that they must move to remunerative labor markets when their present employments and wages fall. The location of population thereby conforms to market-registered needs for labor.

Finally, a market economy is highly decentralized. It consists of a multitude of related but nonetheless individual purchase and sale transactions. The operational units are individual business firms buying resources and selling outputs, and individual families buying household goods and selling labor and other resources. Such decentralization reinforces the atomistic view of society as simply an aggregate of self-interested individuals.

The question arises, why is it believed that the body of economic theory derived from such a special institutional matrix has analytical relevance to all economies, including the primitive? The reasons are several.

The English originators of formal economic theory grounded their analyses on postulates which seemed structured in the *physical* universe, and therefore universally applicable (Polanyi 1944:chapter 10). In addition, the repeal of mercantilistic economic controls and the consequent formation of nationwide markets, allowed the classical economists to use an "economistic" approach—to focus on economy as separate from society, to regard economy as having such an inner consistency and autonomy as to allow the derivation of distinct economic laws which seemed to operate independently of social institutions.

Especially significant in the work of the classicists was the delineation of purely "economic" motivation (material self-gain), as both necessary and sufficient to induce laborers to conform to market needs. For example, in urging repeal of Poor Laws which guaranteed subsistence as a traditional social

right, William Townsend based his argument on the assertion that the "natural" force of fear of hunger was the most efficacious inducement to work.

> Hunger will tame the fiercest animals, it will teach decency and civility, obedience and subjection, to the most perverse. In general it is only hunger which can spur and goad them on to labour; yet our laws have said they shall never hunger. The laws, it must be confessed, have likewise said, they shall be compelled to work. But then legal constraint is attended with much troubles violence and noise; creates ill will, and never can be productive of good and acceptable service: whereas hunger is not only peaceable, silent, unremitting pressure, but as the most natural motive to industry and labour, it calls forth the most powerful exertions (Townsend 1786, quoted in Polanyi 1944:113–114).[2]

With Malthus, too, immutable biology was the starting point for deriving economic laws: that the natural fertility of humans made food scarce because of the pressure of population growth, led him to deduce his subsistence theory of wages. The conclusions of biology—that the populations of all plant and animal life are limited only by their food supplies—were projected to the social world.

Ricardo's postulate, the "law" of diminishing returns, was also a natural phenomenon from which he deduced his income distribution theory: if one or more ingredients of production, such as land, is fixed in quantity, then output growth will consist of diminishing increments. In a market economy, owners of the fixed ingredient (landlords) will gain at the expense of the others (laborers and entrepreneurs).

Utilitarianism provided the crowning sanction, again in the guise of universal law: self-interest as the well-spring of all human action. The quest for material self-gain need be the only regulator of an economic system based upon the physical nature of man and the universe.

> The general conception which Bentham had is one that is widely prevalent today. . . . I think we shall conclude before the course is over that the bulk of orthodox economic theory as we have it at the present time [1935] rests upon a conception of human nature which is not very different from that which Jeremy Bentham drew up in such formal shape (Mitchell 1949:92).

The parametric assumptions of early economic analysis appeared as physical facts. The derived laws of market economy were thereby given the authority of nature. It seemed that economic processes had separate physical laws of their own, divorced from social convention (Polanyi 1944:115).

The economistic approach which separated out economy from society and created a body of theoretical analysis of market industrialism received more refined expression later in the 19th century in the works of Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger, John B. Clark, and Alfred Marshall. What is important for our purposes is that the neo-classicists made theoretical refinements also derived, it seemed, from universal truths: that the condition of "natural scarcity" (insufficiency of resources relative to unlimited material wants), necessitated marginal choice if maximum fulfillment of material wants was to be attained.

It is important to note how the condition of "scarcity"—so relevant for market economy—became regarded as universal fact, and a further basis for assuming the universal relevance of economic theory.

The institutional necessity for individuals to pursue material self-gain in

market economy, had ideological reflections in the form of generalizations about the nature of "man" in society. One such is the textbook homily that man's material wants are insatiable, a dictum that often implies the immutability of genetic impulse. If man's material wants are insatiable, then scarcity of enabling means exists by definition: no matter the absolute quantity of resources, they are scarce, that is, insufficient relative to the unlimited desire for the end products they produce. If man places great emphasis on fulfilling his insatiable material wants, then economizing, rational calculation results in order to arrange some preferred ordering of resource uses. But if such is ever the case in an actual community, it is a *socially* determined result: a result which obtains only in a society which places great value on material acquisition relative to other goal attainments, and whose institutional structure impels its members to behave accordingly (Mead 1937; Fusfeld 1957:343).

To the extent that the syllogistic chain—man's material wants are infinite, his material means are finite, maximum material acquisition therefore requires economizing calculation—is regarded as having universal relevance, it is incorrect and misleading. It confuses the universally correct, *biologically* derived postulate—man's existence requires continuous material sustenance—with a special type of *social* orientation: man's social organization impels him always to want more material goods than he has at the moment, and makes him value such material acquisition more than the fulfillment of other social goals with which it might be in conflict. If it is once seen that the degree of importance attached to material acquisition is most definitely determined by social institutions and values, then it immediately follows that the presence, absence, or existing degree of "scarcity" of enabling material means (in any society) also depends upon social, not physical, circumstances.[2]

It is not so, as some literature of economic anthropology asserts, that the postulates of scarcity and economizing calculation are of universal relevance.

> The elements of scarcity and choice, which are the outstanding factors in human experience that give economic science its reason for being, rest psychologically on firm ground. . . . Our primary concern in these pages is to understand the cross-cultural implications of the process of economizing (Herskovits 1952:3, 4).

It is an erroneous linking together of two different meanings of the concept "economic" which is at the root of the misleading assumption of universal scarcity, and the misleading conclusion that formal economic theory has relevance to all economies. Clarification of two points is necessary: what it is that all economic systems—Western and primitive alike—have in common; and the nature of those structural differences between them which makes Western economic theory inapplicable in the analysis of primitive economy.

TWO MEANINGS OF ECONOMIC[3]

The word "economic" has two distinct and independent meanings, both in common use, but differing essentially in the extent to which each can be fruitfully applied to real-world structures. In the substantive sense, economic refers to the provision of material goods which satisfy biological and social wants. The

substantive meaning is perfectly general in applicability, because all communities, regardless of differences in natural environment, production techniques, or cultural traits, are composed of human beings whose bio-social existence depends upon the sustained provision of material items.

The basic problem is universal: not only to have enough to eat to keep alive, but also to satisfy the demands of personal tastes, religious rules and a multitude of social obligations, all as important to the life of the group as mere subsistence is to the life of the organism (Herskovits 1952:294).

The broad agencies of material-means provision are everywhere the same: natural endowment and the cooperation of inhabitants.

We may move first of all, to those human and ecological factors that provide the goods and services which satisfy the demands of living, both biological and psychological, and that are at the core of any economic system. In some form, these factors are present everywhere; without their interaction life as we know it could not exist (Herskovits 1952:8).

With unambiguous meaning, therefore, one can talk about the "economic" system of Imperial Rome, of the Kwakiutl Indians, of the Benedictine Order of Monks, of 19th century England, or of Soviet Russia—meaning nothing more than the organizational structures and processes through which material goods are provided; one need not assume anything beforehand about necessary techniques, motivations, or specific types of economic organization.

The existence of some type of *systematic* economic structure is implied for the following reasons: the exploitation of natural resources requires the use of technique for the acquisition or creation of material goods (horticulture, farming, hunting, manufacture). The use of technique and of natural resources, together with the need for distributing material goods among all the inhabitants, require definite institutional arrangements—structured rules of the game—to assure continuity of supply, that is, to assure repetition of performance. The participants are mutually dependent for other reasons as well: the use of technique, division of labor, natural environment, and the fact that economic processes take place within a social community, all make necessary the utilization of some pattern of recognized rights and obligations. It is the rules which integrate the use of natural resources and technique and assure continuous cooperation in the provision of material goods that we call an economic "system."

The substantive meaning of economic, however, is not analytically informative in the investigation of specific economies because of the diversity of technical and institutional structure which exists. But it does have the merit of pointing up and explaining the general existence of organizational requirements for the sustained provision of material goods which must be fulfilled in any society. It is, of course, what anthropologists usually mean when they refer to the "economic" aspects of primitive society.

The second meaning of economic is described by the terms "economical" and "economizing." It denotes a special set of rules designed to maximize the achievement of some end or to minimize the expenditure of some means. Four aspects of this formal meaning of economic deserve emphasis.

(1) It has no necessary connection with the substantive meaning of economic. It would be prejudicial to assume that the organizational provision of material goods must be universally achieved through economizing calculation; whether such is the case for any specific economy can only be established by empirical investigation.

(2) Economizing calculation by no means need be confined to the creation, distribution, or use of material goods. It derives rather from the general logic of rational action which is appropriate to a large number of theoretical and empirical situations; these have in common explicit ends, delimited means, and definite rules of alternative choice for the achievement of the ends with the stated means. For example, economizing calculation unrelated to substantive economic organization appears in games such as chess, in military problems, and in preparing for academic examinations: each entails allocating specific means to achieve goal maximization.

(3) A primary field of Western economic analysis, price and distribution theory, is an application of the formal meaning of economic—economizing calculation—to a special set of conditions and organizational practices for the provision of material goods: that the acquisition of material items is valued greatly relative to other goal attainments; that factor resources are therefore scarce (insufficient in quantity to achieve all ends), are multipurposed (capable of fulfilling more than one end); that the ends for which the material means shall be used are graded (of differential preferment); that the hierarchy of preferred ends is known; and that the rules for relating the scarce, multi-purposed resource means to the graded ends be that (a) any material end shall be fulfilled with no more than the minimum resource means necessary for its fulfillment; (b) no means shall be provided for lesser ends before provision for greater ends is made (Robbins 1932).

(4) The fruitful application of economic theory derived from the formal meaning of economic, depends on the existence of a substantive, real-world economy so organized that at least some of the special postulates of the analysis are institutionally fulfilled. If the members of some society do not show an economizing predisposition in their use of means (they use more than the minimum necessary to achieve the end), their rules of social organization dictate that some means may be used only for one purpose (such as religion proscribing all but one kind of crop grown on land), or there is no condition of "scarcity" because extensive material acquisition is not socially regarded as of primary importance, then formal economic analysis is not capable of yielding insights if applied to that economy (Knight 1941; Herskovits 1941; Fusfeld 1957; Neale 1957b).

WESTERN MARKET INDUSTRIALISM AND PRIMITIVE ECONOMY

A distinguishing characteristic of market-organized industrialism is that both meanings of economic are relevant. The substantive economic structure through which material want satisfaction is provided for consists of a special set of economizing practices applied to scarcity situations. The participants

need material goods to survive; the market structure compels economizing performance for their acquisition and provides integrating unity and stability to such performance. The institutional complex which integrates the system—which links together the efforts of each and assures the sustained provision of material goods—is the supply-demand-price mechanism. Conformity to the market rules is effected through competition and by structured motivation: the institutionalized pursuit of material self-gain through market participation. One has to abide by the market rules to acquire material livelihood in a market-organized economy.

It should be added that, as with competitive market organization, the use of machine technology imposes a similar need for economizing calculation. Regardless of who owns them, machines are expensive. In the context of private ownership and market organization, economizing is enforced by potential market penalties in the form of money losses. The competitive striving for profits—the source of material livelihood for owners—requires efficient machine use to minimize costs. In the context of state ownership and central planning, economical use is required for fulfillment of priority goals: output maximization, rapid growth, and the production of crucial output components such as military and capital goods. Both the United States and Soviet Russia use structured mechanisms of economizing such as cost accounting, contract obligation to assure continuous resource supply, hierarchical authority discipline within factory organization, and price and wage formation so as to economize on the use of most scarce factor resources.

That every society must have substantive economic organization to provide material means of existence does not mean that each must have that special set of market exchange institutions for the analysis of which formal economic theory was uniquely designed. Indeed, there is increasing evidence that the market integrated economy is historically and anthropologically rare.

A considerable body of evidence runs contrary to the notions that human wants are unlimited, that financial incentives will transfer labor from nonindustrial to industrial pursuits and thus that the potential worker may be viewed as welcoming release from traditional restraints. Some of this evidence can be interpreted in terms of "rational conduct," but not in terms of economic maximization. The potential worker in underdeveloped areas is typically required to give up traditional forms of organization and reciprocal obligations that have combined to afford him security—both material and affective. The kinship system in any nonindustrial society is likely to provide a major barrier to individual mobility, because it is a social security system, because it is the focus of positive values and advantages, and because extended kin obligations are likely to reduce the effective appeal of individual rewards (Moore 1955:158–159).

Karl Polanyi and his associates (Polanyi, Arensberg, Pearson 1957) have shown that there exist at least two nonmarket principles of integrative economic organization for the analysis of which conventional economic theory is inappropriate. But such is the tenacity of belief that market theory is universally relevant—even to nonmarket and nonindustrial structures—that one economist says the following:

What are the qualities which, it is said, are possessed by the [primitive and archaic] economies for the study of which conventional analysis is not helpful? They are: inflexible or sluggish prices or

exchange ratios; inelastic (sometimes absolutely inelastic) supply; inelastic (sometimes absolutely inelastic) demand.

The specific instances enumerated by the authors—e.g., set rates, customary or statutory equivalencies, gift trade, administered trade, status-trading, trading partnerships, the influence of kinship, magic and etiquette on economic behavior, noncompeting groups—seem to fall into one or more of these boxes.

. . . now, the conventional doctrine and techniques of formal economics have much to say about economies or markets in which inflexibilities and inelasticities occur. It is not true that economic analysis cannot perform useful predictive tasks in such economies (Rottenberg 1958:676).

The use of formal price theory concepts such as "inelastic demand" in reference to primitive economies indicates an implicit market orientation: the pre-judgment of economic organization by way of a priori assumption that market structure—or its functional equivalent—exists universally. A market orientation assumes that economic theory is universally relevant because it assumes that scarcity situations are universal and everywhere compel materially self-gainful economizing, such as maximization of consumer utility and production at least cost.

It is true that economic theory has much to say about inelastic supply and demand conditions. But it is also true that what is said concerns economic sectors so organized that resource ingredients and product outputs are bought and sold through the market mechanism. As Herskovits rightly points out, economic theory requires market-determined prices to be applicable.

The problem of how value flows from fluctuations in supply and demand, in its essentially mathematical character, needs the quantitative index of value contained in price as manifest in the market to permit its analysis (Herskovits 1952:49).

The import of the work of Polanyi and his associates is that the economy-wide market mechanism, its materially self-gainful economizing, and its monetized internal and external trade do not exist as integrative pattern in the primitive economies they consider. Rather, that the production and distribution of material goods are organized by transactional principles essentially different from market exchange.

For in these societies, production and distribution involve little of the profit motive, and labor is only in special instances for hire (Herskovits 1952:11).

The process of distribution, in many tribes, is thus set in a non-economic [non-economizing] matrix, which takes the form of gift and ceremonial exchange (Herskovits 1952:155).

The integrative patterns which do exist widely in primitive economy are (1) reciprocity, that is, material gift and counter gift-giving induced by social obligation derived, typically, from kinship, as is the case with the Trobriand Islanders; and (2) redistribution, the channeling upward of goods or services to socially determined allocative centers (usually king, chief, or priest), who then redistribute either to their subordinates at large by providing community services, or in specific allotments to individuals in accordance with their political, religious, or military status. Redistribution, often accompanied by reciprocity, was the dominant principle in ancient Egypt, ancient Mexico,

Dahomey, and in feudalistic societies generally (Malinowski 1922; Thurnwald 1932; Herskovits 1952: chapter 19; Mauss 1925; Firth 1958:65, 68–69).

> . . . *the whole tribal life is permeated by a constant give and take;* that every ceremony, every legal and customary act is done to the accompaniment of material gift and counter gift; that wealth, given and taken, is one of the main instruments of social organization, of the power of the chief, of the bonds of kinship, and of relationships in law (Malinowski 1922:167).

The importance to economic anthropology of the distinction between the substantive and formal meanings of economic should be further emphasized.

That all societies must have substantive economic organization means that there will be similarities (and therefore bases for comparison) even between two widely differing economies—say, the Trobriand Islands and present-day United States. Thus one could talk meaningfully about the creation, distribution, and use of material goods in each, as well as the roles of money and external trade, and the organization of land tenure. However—and this is the point to be underscored—the fact that the United States is pervasively market-organized and industrialized (and thereby amenable to analysis by formal economic theory), while the Trobriands is neither, *makes the differences in economic organization and processes between the two more important than the similarities*, especially so on matters of interest to the anthropologist.[5]

There are three ways to clarify the issue and reinforce the point: (1) To contrast the questions of economic interest to the anthropologist with those the economist asks in his own field. (2) To show that economic mechanisms, practices, and processes common to both primitive and Western economies are institutionalized differently and often function in different ways and for different purposes. (3) To cite examples which show how misleading results follow from the assumption that primitive economic organization is functionally equivalent to Western economy, and from the conclusion that primitive economy is amenable to analysis by formal economic theory.

The matters of interest to the anthropologist investigating the general aspects of primitive economy can be classified, perhaps, into some six overlapping categories.

(1) Technological processes. Are they horticulturalists, fishermen, gardeners, hunters, etc.? Which technical devices are used? How are canoes and houses built, land tilled, fish-traps made?

(2) What is the level of material subsistence and how secure is it?

(3) What are the ecological conditions? What is the natural endowment (climate, waterways, land acreage and fertility) from which livelihood is extracted?

(4) Which economic devices and processes are used and how do they work? Are there money uses? If so, for which types of transactions? Which goods are transacted without the use of money? Is there more than one kind of money used? Are there market places or external trade? If so, how are they organized and which items do they transact? Are there prices or equivalency ratios for goods which change hands? How are such determined?

(5) What is the place of the "economy" in the society? How are produc-

tion processes, material goods transactions, labor services, and land utilization organized? How are they related to kinship structure, religion, political authority, and other social institutions? On what principles do things and labor services change hands and location? What is the nature of economic interdependence which allows division of labor to be practiced? What are the socially sanctioned motives which induce conforming participation in substantive economic activity? How is continuity assured in the supply of material items? How are the inefficient, the unusually efficient, and the recalcitrant treated?

(6) Are there distinct economic spheres with different operational principles and value norms in each (DuBois 1936; Steiner 1954; Polanyi 1957a; Bohannan 1959)? Is it meaningful in terms of the specific goods transacted, the processes and mechanisms which transact them, and the value judgments attached to such transactions by the participants, to distinguish between subsistence and prestige spheres? Are there treasure items or items of elite circulation? Is external trade carried out on the same principles as internal transactions?

Economists are not concerned directly with technology, social institutions, or physical environment. Such matters are regarded as given, in the sense of existing as part of the total environment of market-organized industrialism, within which economic mechanism functions.

> It is *precisely* the separate class of variables which it employs which for the economist, at any rate, distinguishes economics from the other sciences. Economics studies prices; quantities of commodities exchanged, produced, consumed; interest rates, taxes, tariffs: its basic abstraction is that of the commodity. It seeks to find reasonably stable relationships among these variables, but it is the variables not the relationships, which delimit the subject matter of the science (Boulding 1957:318).

Technology, physical environment, and social institutions are of interest only in special instances: when they affect the economic variables in which the the economist is interested. Two examples will illustrate the point.

For problems of aggregate output determination and growth in a market-industrial economy, an important quantity is the money expenditure by business firms in purchasing new plant and equipment. By changing the complex of costs, proportions used of resource ingredients, and profit expectations, an innovation in technique of producing will affect yearly investment outlays and so is of interest to the economist. But the anthropologist's interest in technology is both more direct and somewhat different. The economist is not interested in how the machine is built and operated (or in the social organization of the factory) as is the anthropologist in how the fish-trap is built, operated, shared, and inherited.

More importantly, the same is true of social institutions. On the rare occasion when the economist considers kinship, religion, or government, he does so only for a special purpose: when they have significant impact on economic quantities; for example, the impact of governmental price-support programs on agricultural prices and incomes. Because the organization of market economy is a cohesive entity in itself, the economist can describe and analyze that

range of processes of interest to economics without reference to the social.[6] In contrast, the close integration of social and economic institutions in primitive society makes it impossible for the anthropologist to describe the economic, without at the same time showing its relation to the social.

> Basically, the anthropologist is not asking the same set of questions as the economist. The business of anthropology is not economics; it is rather something that we might call "ethno-economics" . . . a statement of the categories of thought and language, the ideas, the principle of action, in terms of which a people institutionalize the business of getting a living. . . . For the anthropologist's task is to explain how people get a living, then to classify those modes . . . and theorize about the way they are linked with other cultural or social attributes (Bohannan 1958).

> The exchanges of archaic societies which he [Mauss] examines are total social movements or activities. They are at the same time economic, juridical, moral, aesthetic, religious, mythological, and sociomorphological phenomena. Their meaning can therefore only be grasped if they are viewed as a complex concrete reality (Evans-Pritchard 1954:vii).

Neither the problems of interest nor the methods of analysis are the same for economics and economic anthropology.

ECONOMIC MECHANISMS

A point of some importance is that a number of economic mechanisms, practices, and processes—the use of money, external trade, division of labor, market places, debt, prices—occur both in Western economy and in the primitive. But to conclude that because both use them, their organization, functioning, or purpose in primitive economy must be essentially the same as in ours, is not warranted.[7] Yet such is sometimes implied in the literature of economic anthropology.

> . . . there can be no division of labor without a resulting economic exchange. The universality of the fact of division of labor, even if only on sex lines, underscores the essential soundness of the reasoning which has made of exchange and distribution basic factors in all economic theory (Herskovits 1952:13).

Surely one could not conclude that because division of labor is practiced in the United States, in Soviet Russia, and in the Trobriand Islands, the same principles of "exchange" are operative in each. All one can infer from the universality of division of labor is a tautology: wherever it is practiced there is structured interdependence, and there must be some institutional means for persons to acquire what they do not themselves produce.[8] The basic form of institutional means for such exchange in any economy can only be established by empirical investigation.

> And as with the mechanisms of production, the distribution system, though a universal in human social life, takes on a vast number of forms (Herskovits 1952:12).

Similarly, when we compare other Western economic mechanisms with what seem to be their counterparts in primitive economy, it becomes clear that the differences in their organization and functioning are more important than their similarities. Clarification of the point is especially necessary for understanding the nature of money uses, external trade, and market places in primitive economy (Polanyi 1957a).

In Western market economy, money is all-purpose money, the same

money serving all transactional sectors as medium of exchange, standard of value, store of value, and as means of payment (for example, of debts). Few economic transactions take place without the use of money; and only one kind of money—conveniently interchangeable as check deposit, paper currency, and coin—is in general use. It is no accident that such is the case: the use of all-purpose money is a requisite for a market-organized economy because all labor and resource ingredients as well as finished outputs must bear price tags expressed in the same money in order for buyers and sellers to transact them through the market exchange mechanism. The use of the same money instrument makes physically different items both commensurable and "commodities," that is, things to be bought and sold whose value can be compared. (Indeed, money itself becomes a marketed commodity, the price of which is an interest rate.)

Where money is used in primitive economy, it is not all-purpose money; each kind can be used only for a special range of transactions, such as the use of cattle as a money object for acquiring a bride or paying bloodwealth, but not for acquiring food or craft products. In primitive economy a given money object often serves one use only, as when debts are calculated in terms of brass rods but actually paid in strips of cloth (Bohannan 1959). What should be emphasized is that the differences in money usage between primitive economy and the Western market system are indicators of underlying differences in transactional principles of economic integration (such as reciprocity, redistribution, and market exchange). The disposition of natural resources, material outputs, and labor are often compartmentalized separately in primitive economy. Frequently they are transacted without the use of money, and neither enter market places nor are transacted by the market mechanism of purchase and sale. Rather, they change hands and location in different economic spheres—in accordance with different sets of social rules, such as kinship obligation inducing gift exchange; political obligation inducing payment to central authority.

So, too, with other economic devices common to both primitive and Western economies. The uncritical application to primitive economy of such familiar Western categories as external trade and markets obscures essential differences. Usually they are not functional equivalents, but rather superficially similar practices not only organized differently, but often with different sociological as well as economic purposes (Firth 1958:63).

For example, in Western economy exports and imports are transacted through the same market principle which transacts internal exchanges, both economy-wide and local. In primitive economy, transactional mechanisms used in external trade are sometimes distinctly different from those used internally; moreover, external trade transactions of a nonmarket kind are frequently found. Some examples are the fish-yam and Kula gift trade of the Trobriands (Malinowski 1922) and politically administered trade in elite items so typical of West Africa (Arnold 1957). A further point of difference is that external trade in primitive economy is induced by the nonavailability of the im-

port items at home. Indeed, such seems invariably to be the rationale for primitive external trade (Herskovits 1952:36–37, 181; Polanyi 1957a, 1957b). In contrast, external trade among Western market economies takes place on the least-cost principle: things *are* imported which can be produced at home if such imports are cheaper than the domestic equivalents. The market principle of least-cost economizing, which pervades internal production and sale, characterizes external trade as well.

Of special importance is the fact that where markets do exist in primitive economy, they almost invariably are restricted to produced material items: *rarely, if ever, do land or labor get transacted through the price-making mechanism of market exchange.* Prices made in local markets do not reallocate labor and other resource ingredients of production, as in Western market economy. Neither land usage nor labor location and occupation respond to market price changes, because subsistence livelihood does not depend on market sale. In primitive economy the market is local, specific, and contained; its price results do not "feed-back" into nonmarket spheres of economy. A primitive community often has a market place, but not a market system; that is, an economy-wide complex of resource and output market integration through which most people acquire their subsistence livelihood.[9]

It is indicative that in economic anthropology the term "market" always is used to mean "market-place": an actual site wherein goods change hands by purchase and sale (Neale 1957b). In Western economy, the term market is applied not only to specific market place sites such as a cluster of retail stores, and to sites where ownership changes hands but not the goods themselves (the New York Stock Exchange, the Chicago Wheat Pit), but also to the diffusive economic forces of market exchange: the pervasive supply-demand-price mechanism which systematically transacts resources, labor, and products regardless of what specific site—market bazaar, retail store, hiring firm—is the location of such transactions. Indeed, that where an economy-wide market mechanism exists the market place site is of little importance, is indicated by such concepts as the "market" for automobiles or for engineers' labor, meaning the mass of potential buyers or sellers of something, wherever they are located. A further indicator of the importance, complexity, and special role of the market mechanism in Western economy is that market forces are classified many ways: controlled and uncontrolled markets; factor ingredient and output markets: local, economy-wide, and international markets; competitive and oligopolistic markets.

In summary, Western industrial economy is organized through the market principle and the use of all-purpose money: they are pervasive, interrelated, and tend to homogenize most sectors of production and distribution. Market economy has been appropriately termed "uni-centric" because of the wide variety of material items and labor transacted in the sphere of market exchange (Bohannan 1959). In contrast, primitive economy is "multi-centric," and the dominant centers are organized through nonmarket patterns of inte-

gration, such as reciprocity and redistribution; special-purpose monies are in use, and market-place exchange (where it exists at all) is subordinate and contained (Polanyi 1957a).

A MONEY ECONOMY IS A MARKET ECONOMY

A point mentioned above which deserves separate elaboration concerns the anthropologist's use of the term "money economy" as a shorthand expression for the type of economic organization prevalent in the West. Thus Watson (*Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy*, 1958) uses the term in describing how the Mambwe absent themselves temporarily from their villages to work for money wages in European industrial enterprises in Rhodesia; and Firth contrasts uni-centric Western "money economy" with primitive spheres of non-exchangeable goods:

> Another feature of such primitive transactions is the existence of what may be termed "spheres of exchange." There are various groups of goods and services, and exchange of one item can only take place with another item in the same group. In southeastern New Guinea, for instance, a very important series of exchanges takes place between the possessors of shell arm-rings and of necklaces of shell discs, while other important exchanges are of fish for vegetables. But the food items can only be exchanged against each other, and so also the shell valuables. It would be unthinkable for a man who wished a shell valuable to offer in return yams or fish or other property not of a shell kind. There is no free market, no final measure of the value of individual things, and no common medium whereby every type of goods and services can be translated into terms of every other. A primitive economy thus presents a strong contrast to our money economy (Firth 1958:69).

The term money economy emphasizes a derivative rather than the dominant feature of Western economic structure. The use of all-purpose money is not an independent trait, but rather a requirement for the functioning of a market exchange economy. Continuity in supply of material goods in market economy is assured through several practices, one of which is the use of all-purpose money. It is only when land and labor as well as fabricated goods are organized as available commodities to be bought and sold through the market mechanism that a money economy exists. From the anthropologist's viewpoint, they enter the same transactional sphere of market exchange. Where all-purpose money is absent in primitive economy, it is because market exchange as the economy-wide principle of integration is absent.

> . . . one cardinal feature of a primitive economic system is clearly the absence of money, of a price mechanism, and in many cases of a formal market (Firth 1958:70).

What is a "money economy" to an anthropologist appears as a "market economy" to an economist.

ECONOMIC THEORY, MARKET CATEGORIES, AND PRIMITIVE ECONOMY

Those who attempt to analyze primitive economy with the economic theory and categories derived from Western market industrialism seem uniformly selective in their choice of specific theories to apply. Almost invariably, it is from one field of economic analysis, price theory, that they choose (Goodfellow 1939; Rottenberg 1958).

The question arises, if it is thought that Western price theory is relevant to primitive economy, why not other branches of Western theory—say, Keynesian income and employment theory—as well? The answer, perhaps, is that in the attempt to apply Keynesian theory to primitive economy it would become evident that the assumption of functional similarity of economic organization between the primitive and the West is empirically indefensible. In a word, it cannot be done.

The contribution of Keynes was to show why, *in a decentralized market economy* such as those of England and America in the early 1930's, the full employment rate of production is not automatically sustained. But rather that we experience sharp and deep output fluctuations. The basic reason is institutional: in a market economy, all incomes are derived from the sale of end-products to private households (consumption goods—C), business firms (investment goods—I), government (governmental purchases—G), and foreigners (export goods—E); but there exists no automatic mechanism to assure that the total amount of such market purchases (effective demand) by C, I, G, and E will be sufficient to keep the labor and machine force fully employed. Moreover, the interdependence of the segments of market economy is such—each person acquires his livelihood by selling something to someone else—that a sharp reduction in one category of expenditure (say, business firm outlay on new machinery—I), inevitably induces spending cutbacks in other effective demand sectors (household consumption good purchases—C): those who earn their wage and profit incomes in producing machinery will be forced by income cuts to spend less on household goods.

One cannot apply such analysis to primitive economy because the basic institutional precondition is absent: the bulk of material income is not derived from, and therefore does not depend upon, market sales of output. In primitive economy, mutual dependence is not structured through the market mechanism: the primitive does not depend for his material livelihood on sale of his labor for a money wage which he then uses to buy material items; "effective demand" for goods cannot shrink, as it does in market economy, because the aggregate amount of money incomes received for market sale of labor and other resources shrinks.

FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE

One type of ambiguity in economic anthropology is the result of the assumption that primitive economic processes and devices are functionally equivalent to their Western counterparts. The temptation to make such assumption is great: primitive and Western communities alike must have substantive economic organization to provide continuous material sustenance; and, as we know, both use superficially similar devices and processes, such as tools, money, external trade, and market places. But if such functional equivalence implies a more precise identity—either organizational equivalence or identical purpose—it is a highly misleading concept.

Two examples showing how the use of Western market categories transforms primitive economic practices into overly precise functional equivalents of market processes, and in so doing obscures the essential differences between market economy and the primitive, are given below. (Italics are added to point up the use of market exchange terms.)

> The economic system of the Indians of British Columbia is largely based on *credit*, just as much as that of civilized communities. In all his undertakings, the Indian relies on the help of his friends. He promises to pay them for this help at a later date. If the help furnished consists in valuables, which are measured by the Indians by blankets as we measure them by *money*, he promises to pay the amount so loaned with *interest*. The Indian has no system of writing, and therefore, in order to give security to the transaction, it is performed publicly. The *contracting* of *debts*, on the one hand, and the paying of debts, on the other, is the potlatch. This economic system has developed to such an extent that the *capital* possessed by all the individuals of the tribe combined exceeds many times the actual amount of *cash* that exists; that is to say, the conditions are quite analogous to those prevailing in our community: if we want to call in all our outstanding debts, it is found that there is not by any means money enough in existence to pay them, and the results of an attempt of all the *creditors* to call in their *loans* results in disastrous panic, from which it takes the community a long time to recover.
>
> It must be clearly understood that an Indian who invites all his friends and neighbours to a great potlatch, and apparently squanders all the accumulated results of long years of labour, has two things in his mind which we cannot but acknowledge as wise and worthy of praise. His first object is to pay his debts. This is done publicly and with much ceremony, as a matter of record. His second object is to *invest* the fruits of his labours so that the greatest benefit will accrue from them for himself as well as for his children. The recipients of gifts at this festival receive these as loans, which they utilize in their present undertakings, but after the lapse of several years they must repay them with interest to the giver or to his heirs. Thus the potlatch comes to be considered by the Indians as a means of insuring the well-being of their children if they should be left orphans while still young (Boas 1898:681–682, quoted in Mauss 1925:100).

Some differences between the Kwakiutl and the Western transactions are these: in Western market economy credit has a variety of functions, the most important of which is the financing of business enterprise through both short- and long-term loans. The recipients employ the amounts of all-purpose money borrowed in such materially productive ways (ways which enlarge output and sales revenue) as to be able to repay the loan, plus the interest charge, and still retain some profit from the use of the loan. Such is not the case with the Kwakiutl.

The debt-credit creation apparatus in Western economy is part of market institution. The rate of interest paid on loans is a variable rate, depending on supply and demand forces in the money markets.

There is no status constraint on borrowing in Western economy: one does not borrow solely from one's lineage group.

In the above quote, Kwakiutl blankets are special-purpose money used only for a limited range of transactions, and not used at all in some spheres of Kwakiutl economy; blankets are not all-purpose money used in all sectors of economy, as is money in market economy.

It is true that, both in market economy and in the Kwakiutl, the volume of outstanding "debt" may exceed the volume of existing "money"; however, the mechanisms through which both debt and money are created, as well as the conditions under which debt is called in for repayment, are entirely different;

also different are the penalties for nonrepayment of "loans contracted," as well as the specificity of the loan obligation (Goldman 1937:188; Herskovits 1952:238).

The imputation of *material* self-gain as dominant motive in giving gifts which must be returned with larger gifts is an injection of Western values. In Kwakiutl values, the chief motive is seeking honorific prestige, not material profit, as is demonstrated by the ultimate in the potlatch code of honor: the outright destruction of wealth to show one's aristocratic worth, and to crush a rival.

In Western market economy, the debtor always initiates a loan transaction; in the potlatch, it is the "creditor," who takes the initial step by forcing a rival to accept gifts.

The potlatch sphere transacts some goods which are unique to it, uses some special-purpose monies (coppers) not used in other spheres, and transacts goods and monies in accordance with principles which are distinct from those of the subsistence spheres of everyday livelihood: the major portion of a Kwakiutl's daily consumed material goods is not acquired through the potlatch (or with money used in the potlatch), but through other mechanisms and relationships, that is, in other economic spheres (Goldman 1937:181–182). In Western economy, the bulk of one's livelihood is acquired through market sale and purchase; almost all material goods and services enter the same market exchange sphere—subsistence goods, prestige goods, as well as the debt-credit services to which Boas compares the potlatch (Mauss 1925:33, 36, 39, 102; Goldman 1937:180).

In what surely must be the most vigorous attempt to apply economic theory to primitive economy, it is asserted:

> The aim of this book is to show that the concepts of economic theory must be taken as having universal validity, and that, were this not so, the result would be not only scientific confusion but practical chaos (Goodfellow 1939:3).

Repeated assertion of the credo—faith means salvation, doubt means chaos—is preliminary to exegesis.

> Actually, once it is baldly stated, the proposition that there should be more than one body of economic theory is absurd. If modern economic analysis with its instrumental concepts cannot cope equally with the Aborigine and with the Londoner, not only economic theory but the whole of the social sciences may be considerably discredited. For the phenomena of the social sciences are nothing if not universal. . . . When it is asked, indeed, whether modern economic theory can be taken as applying to primitive life, we can only answer that if it does not apply to the whole of humanity then it is meaningless. For there is no gulf between the civilized and the primitive; one cultural level shades imperceptibly into another, and more than one level is frequently found within a single community. If economic theory does not apply to all levels, then it must be so difficult to say where its usefulness ends that we might be driven to assert that it has no usefulness at all (Goodfellow 1939:4, 5).

But there is a gulf between the Western and the primitive; types of *economic organization* do not shade imperceptibly one into another; and it is not impossible to say where the usefulness of economic theory ends.

Economic theory was created to analyze the special structures, processes,

and problems of market-organized industrialism, with its special features of all-purpose money, impersonal contract obligation, atomistic individualism, and the institutional necessity for individuals to acquire livelihood through market sale of labor, natural resources, and outputs. It is these which create the gulf between the primitive and the West. It would indeed be remarkable if economic theory *were* relevant to primitive economies which differed from the Western at essential points.

Confusion is compounded by reiterating the credo while, at the same time, offering evidence for disbelief: the economizing concepts of economic theory are applicable to Bantu economy despite the absence of machines, market exchange, all-purpose money, rent, interest, wages, profit, and the private business firm.

> . . . the functions are always actively carried out, but often by organizations, of which the family or household is the most important. . . . The difficulty of discovering the *forms* of modern economic life may well lead to a mistaken belief that the *functions* of that life are not to be discoverable among our less advanced people. . . . Modern economic theory has supplied us with a technique which transcends those forms and has the great merit of being applicable to the economic aspect of life, simply as an aspect, and independently of the forms prevalent in any given culture (Goodfellow 1939:7, 8).

It is illustrative that here again the root of ambiguity lies in the erroneous identification of the two meanings of economic: because Bantu society must provide for a sustained flow of material goods (the substantive meaning of economic, universally relevant), it is erroneously concluded that Bantu economy must consist of *economizing structures functionally equivalent* to those of market industrialism; and, therefore, that Bantu structures must also be amenable to analysis by market theory.

ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY: DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS

The literature of economic anthropology displays a frequent dichotomy: excellent description of economic organization, processes, values, and technology, combined with inadequate theoretical analysis and generalization. Perhaps the dichotomy reflects the institutionalized preparation of anthropologists. Precise description of data in which the anthropologist immerses himself is a distinguishing feature of the profession (Evans-Pritchard 1954: viii). Theoretical analysis, however, is one step away from the data; and, as we have seen, the obfuscating preconceptions of the economics and the economy of the anthropologist's own culture make theoretical analysis of primitive economy yet more difficult and less successful.

> Admittedly, there is as yet no body of generalizations that treats "economic" behavior from the specifically anthropological point of view. . . . "Economic anthropology," to date, is not yet a reality. It is still freeing itself from the belief . . . that economic theory itself already has something to offer for an easy explanation of other economic systems than the market system of the recent West (Arensberg 1957:99, 100).

In conclusion, several points of emphasis will be summarized in order to delineate those important differences between primitive economy and Western

market industrialism which makes formal economic theory incapable of yielding analytical insights when applied to primitive structures.

For economic anthropology, only the substantive meaning of economic is relevant. For any primitive community, one can only assume the existence of some kind of institutional apparatus through which material goods are acquired and distributed. One cannot assume as a universal the presence of any special economizing institutions such as those which distinguish market economies. It is not economizing calculation induced by "scarcity" which is universal, but rather the need for structured provision of material goods (Arensberg 1957:110).

It should be emphasized that no economic "system" is of one piece. Rather, that in any society—including our own, and most certainly the primitive—there exist spheres of economy with different principles of organization, different sanctions to induce conformity, different institutionalization of economic mechanisms, indeed, different moral values for judging worth and performance (Bohannan 1959:492). Even in our own economy, which is unusual for the variety of resources, outputs, and services transacted in the sphere of market exchange, there exist sectors such as family, government, and military organization, within which nonmarket patterns operate (Smelser 1959:173).

Primitive economy is different from market industrialism not in degree but in kind. The absence of machine technology, pervasive market organization, and all-purpose money, plus the fact that economic transactions cannot be understood apart from social obligation, create, as it were, a non-Euclidean universe to which Western economic theory cannot be fruitfully applied. The attempt to translate primitive economic processes into functional equivalents of our own inevitably obscures just those features of primitive economy which distinguish it from our own.

It is true that many economic mechanisms and practices either are universal or very frequently found in primitive, historical, and modern economies. But their presence is not prima facie evidence of organizational, operational, or functional similarity. Division of labor, money uses, external trade, and market places are best regarded as adaptable devices (like language and mathematics), capable of varied use for different purposes in a variety of organizational contexts. Here, the poverty of our terminology is a source of built-in ambiguity. Although categories such as land tenure and division of labor may be universals, their meanings are so colored by their special organization in our own economy that when used in reference to primitive economy they inadvertently impart the familiar, specialized meaning of our own. Conceptual categories are useful analytically only when they fit real-world structures; when diverse real-world structure is made to fit our specialized categories, distortion results.

The mistake of judging the men of other periods by the morality of our own day has its parallel in the mistake of supposing that every wheel and bolt in the modern social machine had its counterpart in more rudimentary societies (Maine, quoted in Bohannan 1957:iii).

A related point is that the reification of economic categories tends to create another type of ambiguity, as occurs when the Western investigator of primitive economy seeks answers to questions whose importance is derived from his own: how are governmental services financed? Who owns the means of production (Herskovits 1952:496)? It is neither possible nor desirable for the anthropologist to shed his cultural skin; but surely he can and should differentiate between primitive values and our own (Dalton 1960).

A matter of general theoretical significance to economic anthropology concerns the dominance and frequency of reciprocative and redistributive forms of economic integration. A distinguishing characteristic of primitive life is the fusion of social and economic institutions. Indeed, even the word "fusion" is distorting because it implies the bringing together of separate elements. It would be better to say that there is no awareness of the "economy" as a distinct set of practices apart from social institutions. Transactions of material goods in primitive society are expressions of social obligation which have neither mechanism nor meaning of their own apart from the social ties and social situations they express. In the Western meaning of the word, there is no "economy" in primitive society, only socio-economic institutions and processes.

Finally, it should be added that these matters are no longer of interest to anthropologists alone. Understanding primitive economy has become a necessity for those economists concerned with underdeveloped area transformation (Moore 1955; Myrdal 1957; Keyfitz 1959; Shea 1959; Neale 1959). The phrase "economic growth" joins together two different kinds of change which go on simultaneously in underdeveloped areas: institutional transformation from indigenous socio-economic forms such as reciprocity and redistribution, to market-organized industrialism; and additions to real material output generated by the new economic and technical apparatus. Economists are concerned with inducing real output increases, anthropologists with reducing the social decimation inherent in rapid institutional departure from indigenous forms. Both must understand the nature of the primitive economies which are being dismantled as well as the economic and social characteristics of market industrialism. For the economist to assume that the problem is primarily quantitative—more machinery, more roads, more food—would be to blind himself to the social realities of economy as well as to the social miseries of culture disintegration.

> In primitive communities, the individual as an economic factor is personalized, not anonymous. He tends to hold his economic position in virtue of his social position. Hence to displace him economically means a social disturbance (Firth 1951:137).

Western economic theory has proved a powerful tool for making industrialized market systems grow. But primitive economies are neither industrialized nor market systems. One must start from ethno-economic analysis—with Malinowski, not Ricardo—in order to choose those transformation paths to industrialization which entail only the unavoidable social costs.

NOTES

[1] I am very grateful to Karl Polanyi of Columbia University and Paul Bohannan of Northwestern University for their helpful suggestions and criticisms. Much of this paper consists of an application of Professor Polanyi's work (1944; 1947; 1957) to the special problems considered. Part of the paper is drawn from my doctoral dissertation (Dalton 1959a).

[2] As Polanyi points out, hunger is natural in the sense of biological, but it is not synonymous with an incentive to produce. It becomes such an incentive if society makes eating specifically dependent upon that individual's producing, which early market economy in fact did. For views similar to those of Townsend, that only poverty and the fear of hunger could make the lower classes industrious, see Bendix (1956: 63–82); on the origins of laissez-faire market economy in England, see also Keynes (1926).

[3] In the economist's sense, "scarcity" does not mean physical shortage, but a condition of insufficiency relative to desire. Any item in market economy which has a money price is regarded as scarce. Scarcity is, so to speak, a fraction: the numerator is resource ingredients available, and the denominator is desire for material outputs. The social emphasis on material acquisition in the United States, ironically, makes factor resources very "scarce" in the most affluent society in the world.

[4] I am indebted to Karl Polanyi for his illuminating distinction between the two meanings of economic (Polanyi 1957a, 1959; Hopkins 1957).

[5] Compare the following two statements: "Whether we consider the motivations underlying the economic activities of peoples without writing or a machine industry, or the institutions that are the framework of the economic systems of nonliterate, non-industrialized societies, it is clear that these are directed toward the same ends and utilize substantially the same means to attain those ends, as do people who are equipped with writing, and with the superior technologies of the historic societies" (Herskovits 1952: 487). "Whether one looks at undeveloped areas or the most highly industrialized ones, a fundamental theoretical point is evident. That point is the great complexity of human motivation. Men will work for as many reasons as there are values to be served by such activity and will refuse to work where that serves his values. The fact that industrial systems emphasize values that are commanded in a market and incentives that provide monetary claims on a market should not blind us to the diversity of ends or the diversity of means for their satisfaction" (Moore 1955:162).

[6] The degree of autonomy of market processes has been drastically reduced in Anglo-American systems, especially in the last thirty years. The experiences of depression and war have induced extensive structural reforms, increasing the number and variety of social controls over market processes. Some examples are minimum wage legislation and agricultural price supports; also, increased governmental spending and taxing for war, welfare, full employment, and growth purposes. From the viewpoint of this paper, two results of increased market control in the West are that formal price theory is less usefully applicable to present-day Western economy, and the areas of similarity between economic organization in the West and in primitive society have been enlarged (Dalton 1959a: chapter 6; 1959b).

[7] One need only point out that both the Soviet and American systems employ money, division of labor, foreign trade, market places, etc., to indicate that similar economic mechanisms can be adapted to dissimilar organizational structures, and used for different purposes. The point was not obvious in the 19th century because all Western industrialized economies were integrated through the same pattern of market exchange (Neale 1957b; Pearson 1957).

[8] Adam Smith's famous dictum—that division of labor is limited by the extent of the market—is, of course, true for market economy. It does *not* mean that the prior existence of market organization is a necessary condition for division of labor to be practiced. Division of labor based on sex seems to be universal.

[9] Max Weber contrasted primitive and archaic economies with the modern by singling out two features of market-organized industrial capitalism as historically unique: that the provision for a wide range of daily material needs is organized through market purchase and sale, and that,

"Persons must be present who are not only legally in the position, but are also economically compelled, to sell their labor on the market without restriction" (Weber 1923:276–277).

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Kari

Best regards -

George.

Frimitive Money[1]

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> In a subject where there is no agreed procedure for knocking out errors, doctrines have a long life.
>
> Joan Robinson

PRIMITIVE money is a complicated subject for several reasons. There is not in common use a set of analytical categories designed to reveal distinguishing characteristics of markedly different systems: economies without markets and machines still tend to be viewed through the theoretical spectacles designed for Western economy (Arensberg 1957:99). Second, francs, sterling, and dollars are only the most recent of a long series of foreign monies introduced into primitive economies. Earlier, Arabs, Portuguese, Dutch, English, and others introduced cowrie, manillas, beads, etc., with varying permeation and varying disruption of indigenous monetary systems. Only rarely do anthropologists succeed in disentangling the foreign from the indigenous in a way which reveals the nature of the old money and the consequences of the new.

Moreover, if one asks what is "primitive" about a particular money, one may come away with two answers: the money-*stuff*—woodpecker scalps, sea shells, goats, dog teeth—is primitive (i.e., different from our own); and the *uses* to which the money-stuff is sometimes put—mortuary payments, bloodwealth, bridewealth—are primitive (i.e., different from our own).

Primitive money performs some of the functions of our own money, but rarely all; the conditions under which supplies are forthcoming are usually different; primitive money is used in some ways ours is not; our money is impersonal and commercial, while primitive money frequently has pedigree and personality, sacred uses, or moral and emotional connotations. Our governmental authorities control the quantity of money, but rarely is this so in primitive economies.

Failure to understand the reasons for such differences leads to disputes about bridewealth versus brideprice, to arguments about whether cows, pig tusks, and potlatch coppers are "really" money, to the assumption that modern coinage merely "replaces" indigenous forms of money, and to disagreement of authorities over minimal definitions of money. In these disputes the characteristics of American or European money are too often used as a model.

Some of the most respected comparisons between primitive and Western money fail to go deeply enough into comparative economic and social structure. Even Malinowski and Firth do not explain that it is nationally-integrated market organization which accounts for those Western monetary traits they use as a model of "real" money: "The tokens of wealth [*vaygua:* ceremonial axe blades, necklaces of red shell discs, and arm bracelets of shells] have often been

called 'money.' It is at first sight evident that 'money' in our sense cannot exist among the Trobrianders. . . . Any article which can be classed as 'money' or 'currency' must fulfill certain essential conditions; it must function as a medium of exchange and as a common measure of value, it must be the instrument of condensing wealth, the means by which value can be accumulated. Money also, as a rule, serves as the standard of deferred payments. . . . we cannot think of *vaygua* in terms of 'money' " (Malinowski 1921:13–14).

Firth registers his agreement: "But according to precise terminology, such objects [strings of shell discs] can hardly be correctly described as currency or money. In any economic system, however primitive, an article can only be regarded as true money when it acts as a definite and common medium of exchange, as a convenient stepping stone in obtaining one type of goods for another. Moreover in so doing it serves as a measure of values. . . . Again, it is a standard of value . . . " (Firth 1929:881).

Malinowski and Firth use the bundle of attributes money has in Western market economy to comprise a model of *true* money. They then judge whether or not money-like stuff in primitive economies is really money by how closely the uses of the primitive stuff resemble our own—a strange procedure for anthropologists who would never use the bundle of attributes of the Western family, religion, or political organization in such a way. Quoting from Lienhardt—" . . . most anthropologists have ceased to take their bearings in the study of religion from any religion practiced in their own society" (1956:310). And Gluckman and Cunnison write, concerning political organizations: "One important discovery made in . . . [*African Political Systems*] was that the institutions through which a society organized politically need not necessarily look like the kinds of political institutions with which we have long been familiar in the Western world, and in the great nations of Asia" (1962:vi).

Dollars have that set of uses called medium of exchange, means of payment, standard of value, etc., precisely because our economy is commercially organized. Where economies are organized differently, non-commercial uses of monetary objects become important, and "money" takes on different characteristics. The question is not—as it is conventionally put—are shells, woodpecker scalps, cattle, goats, dog teeth, or *kula* valuables "really" "money?" It is, rather, how are the similarities and the differences between such items and dollars related to similarities and differences in socio-economic structure?

We shall show below the connections between Western money and economy, then go on to make some points about primitive money and economy, and finally will examine the case of Rossel Island money in detail.

CAPITALISM: MARKET INTEGRATION DETERMINES ALL MONEY USES

In the economies for which the English monetary vocabulary was created, there is one dominant transactional mode, market exchange, to which *all* money uses relate. By contrast, in many primitive economies before Western incursion, market exchange transactions are either absent (as with Nuer) or peripheral (as in the Trobriands), but non-commercial uses of money do exist.

Seeing non-commercial uses of money through the blinders of commercial money causes difficulty in understanding primitive monies. We must first be made aware of the blinders.

U. S. dollars may be called general purpose money (Polanyi 1957a; 1957b). They are a single monetary instrument to perform all the money uses. Moreover, the same dollars enter modes of transaction to be called redistribution and reciprocity, as enter into market exchange. These features of U. S. money are consequences of economy-wide market integration and require explanation in an anthropological context.

That U. S. economy is integrated by market exchange is explained by the wide range of natural resources, labor, goods, and services transacted by purchase and sale at market-determined prices, and by the extent to which people in our national economy depend for livelihood on wage, profit, interest, and rental income got from market sale. Natural resources and capital goods (land, labor, machines and buildings of all varieties), consumption goods (food, automobiles), personal and impersonal services (dentistry, electricity), are all purchasable "on the market." Goods and services which are ceremonial and religious, or which serve as prestige indicators, are purchasable in the same way and with the same money as subsistence goods. In market-integrated economy very different items and services are directly comparable, because all are available at prices stated in the same money. The subject of price determination of products and resources under varying conditions of supply and demand (price and distribution theory) is an important field of economics because market exchange is our dominant transactional mode.[2]

Commercial Uses of Money in a Market-Integrated National Economy

Except for economic historians, most economists and all economic theory were (until recently) concerned exclusively with European and American types of economy. Economists do not find it necessary to distinguish among the transactional modes of market exchange, reciprocity, and redistribution, because market exchange is so overwhelmingly important. For the same reason economists do not find it necessary to describe at length the different uses of money in our own economy: with only a few exceptions they all express market exchange transactions.

To make this point clear I will attach to each of the money uses an adjective describing the transactional mode, thereby pointing up how they all serve commercial transactions: medium of (commercial) exchange; means of (commercial) payment; unit of (commercial) account; standard for deferred (commercial) payment.

The medium of (commercial) exchange function of money in our economy is its dominant function, and all other commercial uses of money are dependently linked—derived from—the use of dollars as media of (commercial) exchange. For example, dollars are also used as a means of (commercial) payment of debt *arising from* market transactions. It is purchase and sale of resources, goods, and services which *create* the money functions of means of (commercial) pay-

ment and standard for deferred (commercial) payment.[3] All the commercial uses of money are consequences of market integration, simply reflecting the highly organized credit and accounting arrangements that facilitate market purchases. This is why economists in writing about our economy need not attach the qualifier "commercial" to the money uses. Indeed, we in our market-integrated national economy sometimes regard the terms "money" and "medium of exchange" as interchangeable. But for primitive communities where market transactions are absent or infrequent, it would be distorting to identify money with medium of (commercial) exchange, as Einzig warns us: "Since, however, money has also other functions and since in many instances [of money used in primitive economies] those functions are more important than that of the medium of exchange, it seems to be unjustified to use the term as a mere synonym for 'medium of exchange' " (1948:321).

Non-Commercial Uses of Money

Dollars are also used as a means of non-commercial payment: traffic fines paid to local government and taxes to all levels of government. A structural characteristic of Western economy is that redistributive transactions—obligatory payments to political authority which uses the receipts to provide community services—are made with the same money used as medium of (commercial) exchange in private transactions. The consequences are important and far-reaching.

In all societies having specialized political authority, there must be some institutionalized arrangement for the governing authorities to acquire goods and services for their own maintenance and to provide social services (defense, justice) to the community. In this sense, we may regard the redistributive function (acquiring and disbursing such goods and services) as an "economic" component of political organization. Exactly how the arrangements vary for political authority to acquire and disburse goods and services is one way of differentiating between the organization of Soviet, American, and (say) Bantu economies.

In U. S. economy the government makes use of the market in the process of redistribution: medium of (commercial) exchange money earned as private income is used by households and firms as means of (redistributive) payment of politically incurred obligation (taxes). The government then buys on the market the services and products it requires—civil servants, guns, roads—to provide community services.

In our system, the same can be said for another mode of transaction, reciprocity, or gift-giving between kin and friends. The same money serves the different transactional modes: in purchasing a gift, the money paid is used as medium of (commercial) exchange; giving the gift is part of a reciprocal transaction (a material or service transfer induced by social obligation between the gift partners). If cash is given as a gift, it is means of (reciprocal) payment of the social obligation discharged by the gift-giving.

Here is yet another reason why economists in dealing with our own econ-

omy need not distinguish among transactional modes: redistribution and reciprocity make use of market exchange and make use of the same money used in market exchange. In Western economy, therefore, tax and gift transactions appear as simple variations from the private market norm—special types of expenditure or outlay—which present no theoretical difficulties.

American reliance upon market sale for livelihood and upon the price mechanism for allocating resources to production lines does the following: it makes the medium of (commercial) exchange use of money its dominant attribute, it makes other money uses serve market transactions, and it confers that peculiar *bundle* of traits on our general purpose money which mark off dollars from non-monetary objects. It is our market integration which makes it necessary to institutionalize all uses of money in the same money instrument. As with Malinowski and Firth, we thereby come to think of "money-ness" as this *set* of uses conferred on the single monetary object. And because ours is a market economy, we come to think of medium of (commercial) exchange as the single most important attribute of "money-ness."

Limited-Purpose Monies

In primitive economies—i.e., small-scale economies not integrated by market exchange—different uses of money may be institutionalized separately in different monetary objects to carry out reciprocal and redistributive transactions. These money objects used in non-commercial ways are usually distinct from any that enter market place transactions. And the items which perform non-commercial money uses need not be full-time money, so to speak; they have uses and characteristics apart from their ability to serve as a special kind of money.

In U. S. economy, objects such as jewelry, stocks, and bonds are not thought of as money because (like cattle among the Bantu) these come into existence for reasons other than their "money-ness." Each is capable of one or two money uses, but not the full range which distinguishes dollars, and particularly not the medium of (commercial) exchange use of dollars. It is worth examining these because, we shall argue, primitive monies used in reciprocal and redistributive transactions are the counterparts of these limited or special purpose monies, and not of dollars as media of (commercial) exchange; they resemble dollars only in non-commercial uses (paying taxes and fines, and gift-giving).

Dollars serve as a store of (commercial and non-commercial) value because dollars can be held idle for future use. But this is true also for jewelry, stocks and bonds, and other marketable assets. However, in U. S. economy jewelry is not a medium of (commercial) exchange because one cannot spend it directly, and it is not a means of (commercial or non-commercial) payment because it is not acceptable in payment of debt or taxes.[4]

As a measuring device (rather than as tangible objects) dollars are used as unit of account and standard for deferred payment of debts. Now consider the

accounting and payment procedures used by a baby-sitting cooperative in which a number of households club together to draw on each other for hours of baby-sitting time. Family A uses four hours of sitting time supplied by family B. Family A thereby incurs a debt of four hours it owes the co-op; family B acquires a credit of four hours that it may draw upon in future from some member of the co-op. Here, baby-sitting labor time is a unit of (reciprocal) account and a standard for deferred (reciprocal) payments—a limited purpose money in the sense that it performs two of the subsidiary uses of dollars. Other examples (trading stamps, blood banks) could be given. The point is that even where dollars perform all the money uses for all modes of transaction, there are situations in which a limited range of money uses are performed by objects not thought of as money. These limited purpose monies become important in small-scale communities without market integration and, therefore, without a general purpose money.

Control over the Quantity of Money; Absence of Status Requisites

In national market economies, governments deliberately control the quantity of general purpose money because dollars (francs, sterling) carry out market sales which the populace depends on for livelihood. Roughly speaking, if the authorities allow too much money to come into use as medium of (market) purchase, the result is inflation. If the authorities allow too little money to come into use, the result is deflation and unemployment (a contraction in the rate of market purchasing below the full employment capacity rate of production). The need to deliberately vary the quantity of money is a direct result of economy-wide market integration.

It has often been noted (e.g., Herskovits 1952:238) that in primitive societies there is seldom any conscious control by political authority over money objects. Such is not merely a difference between primitive *monetary* systems and our own, but one that reflects differences between their *economic* systems and ours. In economies not integrated by market exchange, non-commercial monetary transactions are only occasional events (e.g., bloodwealth, bridewealth), and non-commercial money is not usually connected with production and daily livelihood. That the non-commercial money-stuff may be fixed in quantity for all time (Yap stones), or increase in quantity only through natural growth (cows, pig tusks) does not affect production and daily livelihood (as would be the case with us if dollars were fixed in quantity).

What is also true of our market economy based on contract rather than status, is that having the money price is a sufficient condition for buying most goods. Not only is Western money anonymous, so to speak, but money users are also anonymous: the market sells to whoever has the purchase price and only rarely imposes status prerequisites on the use of money as medium of (commercial) exchange.[5] In contrast, there usually are status prerequisites in non-commercial uses of primitive money. For example, in the use of cattle as means of (reciprocal) payment of bridewealth, status requisites such as lineage,

age, rank of the persons, must be complied with. The money users are not anonymous, and a special kind of limited purpose money is necessary to the transaction.

PRIMITIVE MONEY AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

Einzig (1948:323) points out that: "The overwhelming importance of unilateral non-commercial payments in primitive life as compared with payments arising from [commercial] trade is altogether overlooked by practically all definitions [of primitive money]. It is assumed that money must be essentially commercial in character and that any object which serves the purposes of non-commercial payments may safely be disregarded even if its use is of first-rate importance in the economic, political, and social life of primitive communities."

When anthropologists employ Western monetary terms to describe uses of money-stuff in non-commercial transactions, a crucial misunderstanding may result: when cattle or seashells perform some money uses in ways unrelated to market purchase and sale, they are not media of (commercial) exchange, or means of (commercial) payment.

The uncritical use of our general purpose money as the model of true money obscures the point that special purpose monies used for non-commercial transactions express salient features of underlying socio-economic structure. When we consider money in communities not integrated by market exchange—the Nuer, the Trobriands, the Tiv—it becomes essential to distinguish among the several transactional modes and among the several money uses: *primitive money-stuff does not have that bundle of related uses which in our economy is conferred on dollars by market integration and by the use of dollars in both commercial and non-commercial transactions.* The differences between cattle-money or shell-money and dollars are traceable to the differences in the transactional modes which call forth money uses. When Malinowski says that *kula* valuables are different from Western currency, he is really pointing out that reciprocal gift-giving is different from market purchase and sale (1922). Indeed, anthropologists use Western monetary terms ambiguously whenever they fail to distinguish between the market and the non-commercial modes of transaction. Reining, for example, states: "There seems to have been little exchange among households although iron tools and spears made from locally smelted ore had a limited application as a medium of exchange, being used primarily for marriage payments" (1959:39).

If Western monetary terms are to be used by anthropologists in the meanings they convey for our own economy, the unqualified phrase "medium of exchange" must mean medium of market (or commercial) exchange. Since brides are not acquired through impersonal market transactions by random buyers and sellers, the iron tools are not used as media of (market) exchange, but as media of (reciprocal) exchange: as part of a non-commercial transaction in which a man acquires a bundle of rights in a woman and her children in return for iron tools and other indemnification payments to her kin.

It seems useful to regard the bridewealth items as special purpose "money" because the iron tools and spears—or in other societies, cows or goats—are the *required* items, and because they carry out money uses which do have counterparts in our own society. Whether one calls them special purpose monies or highly ranked treasure items necessary to the transaction for which one may not substitute other items only matters when the subject of money uses in primitive compared to Western economies is raised. Then we can show that cows and armbands of shells do perform some of the uses of dollars but in non-commercial situations. The goal is always to state the role of bridewealth or kula items, or other limited purpose money, from the viewpoint of the analyst concerned with comparative economy, but without distorting the folk-meaning of the items and the transactions they enter.

Money Uses in Primitive and Peasant Economies

Because money and money uses in market-dominated economies differ sharply from money in other economies it is useful to classify economies in accordance with the importance of market exchange transactions (Bohannan and Dalton 1962).

Underdeveloped Communities		
Primitive (or Subsistence) Economies		Peasant Economies
Type I	Type II	Type III
Marketless	*Peripheral Markets Only*	*Market-Dominated*
Sonjo	Trobriand Islanders	Malay Fishermen
Nuer	Tiv	Jamaica
Lele	Rossel Islanders	Haiti
Arnhemlanders		Kipsigis
Bemba		Cantel }
Kwakiutl (1840)		Panajachel } Guatemala
		Kwakiutl (1890)

Type I: Marketless

In marketless communities, land and labor are not transacted by purchase and sale but are allocated as expressions of kinship right or tribal affiliation. There are no formal market-place sites where indigenously produced items are bought and sold. These are "subsistence" economies in the sense that livelihood does not depend on production for sale. The transactional modes to allocate resources and labor as well as produced items and services are reciprocity and redistribution (Polanyi 1944: Chapter 4; 1957 b; Dalton 1962). In marketless economies, then, transactions of labor, resources, material goods, and services are of non-commercial sorts—obligatory gifts to kin and friends, obligatory payments to chiefs and priests, bridewealth, bloodwealth, fees for entering secret societies, corvée labor, mortuary payments, etc.—which imme-

diately marks off as different from our own any money-stuff used. Items such as cattle, goats, spears, Yap stones, and pig tusks, take on roles as special purpose money in non-commercial transactions: they become means of (reciprocal or redistributive) payment, as is the case with bloodwealth and mortuary payments; or media of (reciprocal) exchange, as is the case with bridewealth.

Type II: Peripheral Markets Only

Everything said above about marketless economies holds true for those with only peripheral markets, with one exception: market-place sites exist in which a narrow range of produce is bought and sold, either with some money-stuff used as medium of (commercial) exchange, or via barter in the economist's sense (moneyless market exchange). We call these market exchanges "peripheral" because land and labor are not bought and sold and because most people do not get the bulk of their income from market sales. In such small-scale subsistence economies market-place prices do not function—as they do in our national economy—as an integrative mechanism to allocate resources to production lines: labor and land use do not respond to changes in the prices of products transacted in peripheral market places. Malinowski's *gimwali* are peripheral market transactions of an occasional sort without the formal trappings found in African market places.

Type III: Market-Dominated (Peasant) Economies

Small-scale market-dominated communities share with our own nationally integrated market economy the following features: (i) a large proportion of land and labor as well as goods and services are transacted by market purchase and sale; (ii) most people depend upon market sale of labor or products for livelihood; (iii) market prices integrate production. Labor and land move into and out of different production lines in response to profit (and other income) alternatives, as indicated by market prices. In such economies, the medium of (commercial) exchange function of money is the most important; the other commercial uses of money facilitate market transactions, and the same money is used for non-commercial transactions.

Peasant economies (Firth 1946), differ from primitive (subsistence) economies in that peasant producers depend upon production for sale. However, both peasant and primitive communities differ from large-scale, developed, nationally integrated Western economies on two counts: modern machine technology is largely absent, and traditional social organization and cultural practices are largely retained (Dalton 1964).[6]

ROSSEL ISLAND MONEY

Rossel Island money is famous in anthropological literature because it has for so long been a puzzler. Although it was reported at an early date, and by an economist (Armstrong 1924; 1928) who was in the field for only two months, re-analysis in the light of points made earlier in this paper allows a different interpretation of Rossel Island money and economy.

Armstrong's Theoretical Presentation

Armstrong asserts that Rossel Island money is a rough equivalent of our own (1924:429): that it is a medium of exchange used to purchase a wide range of goods and services, and that it is a standard of value for stating prices. He uses Western monetary and economic terms throughout to describe the Rossel system—medium of exchange, standard of value, buy, sell, price (1928:59).

The Rossel Islanders use two types of shell money, *ndap* and *nko*.[7] Ndap money consists of individual shells (Armstrong calls them coins), each of which belongs to one of 22 named classes or denominations, which Armstrong ranks from 1–22, a higher numbered class indicating a higher valued shell.

Armstrong's numbering system for classes of nadp shell money (1928:62)	Number of individual ndap shells in each class
22	7
21	10
20	10
19	10
18	20
17	7
16	7
15	10
14	30
13	30–40
	Total in classes 13–22 ≅146

Armstrong could not determine the number of ndap shells in each class below 13, but he guesses there are fewer than 1,000 in all (1928:63), which would mean 800 or so in classes 1–12.

Armstrong's theoretical concern is with the value relationships among the ranked shells. He tells us that (as in Western economy) all goods and services on Rossel bear a money price stated as a piece (coin) of a specific class (1–22) of ndap, so that a big house costs a No. 20 ndap shell, and a pig a No. 18 (1928:88). But the shells are not quite like dollar bills numbered 1–22 with a No. 20 (say), bearing twice the value of a No. 10, or an item priced at No. 20 purchasable with two shells of No. 10 variety. In Armstrong's view it is merely an aberration due to custom, and, perhaps, to unsystematic thinking (1924:426) that the Rossel Islanders insist that something priced at No. 20 must be paid for with a No. 20 shell, rather than with lower denomination pieces adding up to 20. He sees this as an inefficiency in their system as compared to ours—in which all bills and coins are directly convertible into each other. He therefore shows that the Rossel system requires elaborate borrowing to allow a person who does not happen to own a piece of No. 20 money to acquire an item "priced" at 20, and argues that it is the borrowing system that reveals the value relationships among the ranked coins (1924:425 and 423). This is a

cumbersome equivalent of our own system—a model T, so to speak—which does the same job as our own media of exchange, but with more work and fuss because one cannot substitute two $10 bills for something priced at $20. Armstrong writes: " . . . the necessity for continual loans is largely the result of the peculiar nature of the system. The same 'amount' of money, where the values are simply related and 'change' can always be given, could perform the same amount of real service (i.e., effect the same number of purchases) with perhaps a tenth or less of the amount of lending necessitated by the Rossel system" (1928:65).

If one borrows a No. 12 for a short time, he will have to repay a No. 13; but for a longer time he will have to repay a No. 14, 15, etc. Therefore, he says, the value relationships among the denominations 1–22 conform roughly to compound interest, which shows the relationship of an initial sum lent to its repayment equivalent, depending upon the rate of interest and the time the initial sum is outstanding. Theoretically, a No. 1 shell is related to any other number, 2–22, by the length of time a No. 1 loan is outstanding before repayment must be made in any higher number (Armstrong 1928:63, 64).

Armstrong's analytical interpretation may be summarized: nadp shell money functions like dollars in that it is a medium of exchange, standard of value, standard for deferred payments, etc. Debts are calculated and goods and services priced in shells of stated denomination. The peculiar (different from our own) feature of the system is that the shell denominations are not freely convertible into one another, which makes necessary frequent borrowing at interest to acquire the exact denomination shell needed for a given purchase.

Contradictory Evidence

There are two faults in Armstrong's analysis from which stem the subsidiary difficulties in his interpretation of the Rossel monetary system.

(1) He assumes all ndap shells function as media of (commercial) exchange. He does not distinguish among modes of transaction (reciprocity, redistribution, market exchange), but regards all transactions as commercial purchases (1924:427); brides cost a No. 18 shell, just as baskets costs a No. 4 shell. He writes: " . . . any commodity or service may be more or less directly priced in terms of them [*ndap* shells]" [1928:59]. Armstrong never doubts that Rossel Island money is essentially like our own media of (commercial) exchange. One could sum up his ethnocentric theorizing in a syllogism: ndap shells are "money"; money is a commercial instrument; therefore Rossel Island is a market economy.

(2) This market preconception leads him to do what the Rossel Islanders do *not* do: to number the ndap classes 1–22. By so doing he can assume that convertibility via borrowing and repayment is practiced throughout the *entire* range, so that one could start by lending a No. 1 shell, and by continual loans at interest, wind up eventually with a No. 22 shell. For example, "Any [*ndap* shell] value can thus be regarded as any lower value plus compound interest for the number of time units equal to the number of values by which the two are

separated, so that No. 22, for example, is No. 1 plus compound interest for 21 units of time" (Armstrong 1928:64).

By ranking them 1–22 Armstrong implies that the differences between ndap shell classes are cardinal differences: that a No. 22 is 22 times more *valuable* than a No. 1, in the sense that a $20 bill is 20 times more valuable than a $1 bill. There are no such cardinal differences among ndap shells. To number them 1–22 is to give a false impression of similarity between ndap shell classes and Western money denominations and a false impression about the commensurability or the "purchasing power" relationship between lower and higher numbered ndap shells.

The characteristics of monetary transactions on Rossel that lead us to doubt Armstrong's interpretation may be set out with the following provisos kept in mind: Rossel Island economy is not integrated by market exchange; ndap shells (except for the lowest few classes) are not media of (commercial) exchange; and convertibility throughout the entire range could not be practiced.

There are (on the basis of Armstrong's own data) at least three groups of ndap shells, the shells in each group being necessary for a different range of transactions, and convertibility via borrowing and repayment being possible *within* the lowest two groups, but not *within* the highest group, and not between groups.

The shells Armstrong classes 1–8 or 9 are the only ones capable of increase in quantity (1924:424; 1928:60). The individual shells in each of these classes do not bear separate names, and some of them, at least, enter low echelon transactions, casual market exchange between individuals. In one of the rare descriptions of how shells below class No. 18 are actually used, Armstrong tells us that one may buy a basket, a lime stick, or a lime pot with a No. 4 shell (1928:85).[8] However, the question, "what goods and services will *each* shell class 1, 2, 3, . . . 22 'buy,' or what transactions does each enter?" is not answered except for ndap shells Nos. 4, 18, 20, and 21. What is clear, however, is that shell classes 18–22 are used for a very special range of important transactions which mark them off sharply from lower echelon shells, and that shells below No. 18 are not convertible into shells 18–22 by borrowing and repayment. One cannot start with a No. 1 or 17, and by lending, work it up to a No. 18–22.

Armstrong writes: "Nos. 18–22 seem to be in a somewhat different position from the lower values and one would imagine that they are not related to each other and the lower values in the precise manner set out in generalized form above [i.e., according to the compound interest formula linking the entire series, 1–22]" (1928:68). Convertibility via borrowing and repaying a higher class shell most certainly breaks down between Nos. 17 and 18. I suspect but cannot so readily document from the data that it does so, between Nos. 10 and 11 as well. If such is the case, convertibility is possible among Nos. 1–10, and among Nos. 11–17, but not between the two sets, and not among Nos. 18–22. It is very clear that the entire series is not linked because the uses to which

shells 18–22 are put are of an entirely different order from the uses of lower shells. "As a matter of fact, a peculiarity enters as soon as we reach No. 18, which is not, as a rule [when borrowed] repaid by a coin of higher value" (Armstrong 1928:66).

Nos. 18–22 (of which there are fewer than 60 shells in all), are obviously treasure items like especially venerated kula bracelets and potlatch coppers, items with individual names and histories, which must be used to validate important social events and transactions in the same sense that bridewealth items validate a marriage. The folk-view toward these shells helps to explain their role as limited purpose money in reciprocal and redistributive transactions. "Nos. 18–22 are peculiar in one other respect. They have a certain sacred character. No. 18, as it passes from person to person, is handled with great apparent reverence, and a crouching attitude is maintained. Nos. 19 to 22 are proportionately more sacred, are almost always kept enclosed, and are not supposed to see the light of day, and particularly the sun . . . I am inclined to think that there may be a real gap [in sacredness and prestige] . . . between Nos. 17 and 18 . . . [No. 22 shells] are said to be inherited in the male line and to be owned by the most powerful chiefs on the island" (Armstrong 1928:68).

To have regarded Nos. 18–22 as especially valuable media of (commercial) exchange—high denomination bills—with which to buy especially high-priced merchandise, is the most telling error Armstrong makes. Nos. 18–22 cannot be acquired by any amount of lower class shells, and there is no way of gauging how many times more valuable a No. 18 is compared to a No. 6 because they enter entirely different transactions.

Without exception, Nos. 18–22 enter non-commercial transactions exclusively: they are used as means of (reciprocal or redistributive) payment or exchange in transactions induced by social obligation. Payments of a No. 18 are a necessary part of ordinary bridewealth, as well as necessary payment for shared wives, and for sponsoring a pig or dog feast, or a feast initiating the use of a special kind of canoe. No. 20 is a necessary indemnity payment to the relatives of a man ritually murdered and eaten, a transaction which is part of mortuary rites for the death of a chief (Armstrong 1928:67, 1924:428). Moreover, there is a connection between shells 18–22 and lineage affiliation which Armstrong notes but makes nothing of. ". . . Nos. 18 to 22 are regarded as property peculiar to chiefs, though continually lent by the latter to their subjects" (1928:66).

The implication throughout is that there exists (as with us) an impersonal money market in which anyone may borrow from anyone else at the going interest rate (1924:426). This is doubtful. Unfortunately, Armstrong is silent on the question, "who may borrow from whom, and with what penalties for failure to repay?"

As with special purpose money for non-commercial transactions elsewhere, there are status requisites involved in the acquisition and use of the high echelon shells on Rossel. Just as marriage is not a market purchase of a wife by anyone who acquires a No. 18 ndap, but rather a reciprocal transaction between

two lineage groups (the ndap payment being one of the several necessary conditions within the social situation), so too with pig feasts on Rossel. Only persons of correct status may sponsor the feast and pay the ndap shell. In this case Armstrong notes that social requisites determine who may use upper ndap shells; but he does not see this as a symptomatic difference between Rossel and Western money, i.e., between non-commercial means of (redistributive) payment, and our Western media of impersonal (commercial) exchange. What Armstrong says of pig feasts is equally true of marriage, and all the other *social events* which require payment of high echelon ndap shells:

> There are . . . complex social factors determining who shall have a pig to sell, [sic] and who shall be in a position to buy, [sic] and the buying and selling is not a simple economic occurrence, but a much more significant and complex social occurrence. We must suppose a complexity of social facts, which I am not in a position to define, that determine most of the general relations of a particular pig feast. . . . A particular individual provides a particular *ndap*. . . . A certain readjustment of social relations thus results from the holding of the feast . . . though we abandon the view that the monetary operations at a feast of this nature are to be regarded merely as a collective buying from a collective seller, it still remains that this is a useful way of describing these operations (1928: 82, 83).

It is about as useful to describe a pig feast on Rossel as buying a pig with a No. 18 ndap as it is to describe marriage in America as buying a wife with a wedding ring. To describe the pig feast as a market purchase one must ignore the social requirements of the transaction and the folk-view of the event, both of which differentiate this redistributive transaction from market exchange. Armstrong is forced to use market terms, purchase and sale, to describe pig feasts and bridewealth, because he regards ndap shells as media of (commercial) exchange in a market system.

One bizarre feature of the Rossel system, that a transaction requires a single shell of a specifically named class, and neither a shell from a higher class nor several from lower classes would do, may be examined in the light of what has been said above. "A man may have to borrow, even though he has money of a higher value in his possession than he requires at the moment. He may have Nos. 11 and 13, but not No. 12 which he requires at the moment. He cannot get change as a rule, for No. 13 is not a simple product of any lower value" (Armstrong 1928:64–65).

The higher values have nothing to do with commercial purchase and sale. One could not use five petty shells, like No. 4 (which buys a pot), to perform a transaction such as bloodwealth (which requires that special treasure Armstrong numbers 20), for much the same reasons that in the Trobriands, one cannot "buy" a renowned kula valuable with the pots bought from hawkers in a gimwali.

One final point. In comparing primitive money with our own, it is important that the writer describe the frequency of different kinds of monetary transactions. Only so can one gauge what role, if any, the money item(s) play in the production system. Armstrong concerns himself with social and ritual events—marriage, death, redistributive feasts, fines—and says almost nothing about production, subsistence goods, natural resource and labor transactions,

and all the other ordinary concerns of money and pricing in our own economy. That he nevertheless asserts that Rossel money is much like our own, should make one wary. Einzig is properly suspicious: "It is a pity that there is not enough evidence to show to what extent, if at all, *ndap* and *nko* are used as a medium of exchange in everyday transactions, apart from the purchase [sic] of pigs" (Einzig 1948:75).

If all the ndap shell transactions which Armstrong describes were abolished, subsistence livelihood of Rossel Islanders would remain unimpaired. It is a pity he did not hit upon that distinction which is useful to analyze economies not integrated by market exchange. DuBois (1936:50) writes concerning this: " . . . I should like to make a distinction between subsistence and prestige economy. By subsistence economy is meant the exploitation of the . . . natural resources available to any industrious individual. By prestige economy on the other hand, is meant a series of social prerogatives and status values. They include a large range of phenomena from wives to formulae for supernatural compulsion."

The upper values of ndap shells (and probably the middle values as well—Armstrong is silent here) enter prestige spheres in non-commercial uses. From the Westerner's viewpoint these transactions are outside the production system and subsistence livelihood. Despite Armstrong's assertion to the contrary, there is no evidence that one could opt out of the social and ritual games (through which upper ndap shells are paid and received) by converting upper shells into land, labor, or products, except perhaps as occasional events in emergency situations (Bohannan and Dalton 1962).

Rossel Island Money: A Case of Red Herrings[9]

"The study of economics in simple communities should properly speaking be a job for economists. But so far few economists have tackled it, and most of the investigation has perforce been done by anthropologists" (Royal Anthropological Institute 1949:158).

All social scientists are either Sherlock or Mycroft Holmes. Anthropologists are Sherlock: they go to the scene, observe minutely, gather their threads of evidence from what they observe, and—like Sherlock—sometimes reach Paddington before reaching conclusions. Economic theorists are Mycroft: they do not go to the scene to observe minutely. They have no equivalent to field work because economists are not concerned with social organization or human behavior, but rather with the behavior of prices, income determinants, capital-output ratios, and other impersonal matters relating to the performance of nationally-integrated, industrialized, market economies (for which fieldwork is unnecessary). Institutional matters, personal roles, and the social implications of economic organization have long since been consigned to the limbo of sociology. Neither the problems of interest nor the methods of analysis are the same in economics and economic anthropology.

Armstrong is an economist who played at anthropology. His mistake was to bring Mycroft's tools to Sherlock's subject (and without realizing he was doing

so). The result—to mix my metaphors—was to create a sort of Piltdown Economic Man, Melanesians with monetary denominations which fit the formula for compound interest. Armstrong's pioneer work is not a hoax, but a red herring; and the lesson to be learned is not analytical—what primitive money is all about—but methodological: how not to do anthropology.

CONCLUSIONS

The distinctions spelled out in this paper may be used to answer questions of interest to economic anthropology, comparative economy, and economic development.

(1) Anthropologists do not hesitate to contrive special terms for special actions and institutions when to use terms from their own society would be misleading. They do not talk about *the* family, but about nuclear, extended, and matrilineal families. The same should be done with economic matters.

Those aspects of primitive economy which are unrelated to market exchange can only be understood by employing socio-economic terms: ceremonial-prestige and subsistence goods; reciprocity and redistribution; spheres and conversions; limited purpose money. Such terms contain a social dimension and so allow us to relate economic matters to social organization, and to express the folk-view toward the items, services, persons, and situations involved. The economist dealing with monetary transactions in Western economy need not concern himself with personal roles and social situations because of the peculiarly impersonal nature of market exchange. The anthropologist dealing with marketless transactions cannot ignore personal roles and social situations and still make sense of what transpires.

Kula armbands, potlatch coppers, cows, pig tusks, Yap stones, etc., are variously described as money of renown, treasure items, wealth, valuables, and heirlooms. Malinowski says kula valuables are regarded like crown jewels or sports trophies in Western societies. Writers on East Africa say that cows are regarded like revered pets. Such treasures can take on special roles as non-commercial money: their acquisition and disposition are carefully structured and regarded as extremely important events; they change hands in specified ways, in transactions which have strong moral implications. Often they are used to create social relationships (marriage; entrance into secret societies), prevent a break in social relationships (bloodwealth, mortuary payments), or to keep or elevate one's social position (potlatch). Their "money-ness" consists in their being required means of (reciprocal or redistributive) payment.

(2) Subsidiary characteristics of Western money-stuff, such as portability and divisibility, are actually requirements for media of (commercial) exchange. In peasant and national economies integrated by market exchange, purchases of goods and services are a daily occurrence, and so money must be portable; market purchases are carried out at widely varying price, so the medium of (commercial) exchange must be finely divisible.

Yap stones, cows, kula armbands, and Rossel Island shells are not divisible, and some are not conveniently portable. But neither are they media of (com-

mercial) exchange; they are not used for daily purchases of varying amount. Their use as non-commercial money makes their lack of divisibility and portability unimportant. Here we see one way primitive money-*stuff* is related to primitive money *usage*. As means of (reciprocal or redistributive) payment used infrequently to discharge social obligations, it does not matter that the money-stuff lacks those characteristics required of a medium of (commercial) exchange.

(3) Economics textbooks (e.g., Samuelson 1961:54; Reynolds 1963:475) err in citing primitive monies *indiscriminately* as equivalents of Western media of (commercial) exchange, for the same reason that Armstrong errs in treating Rossel Island monies as a single type and as a crude equivalent of our own. By giving the impression that *all* primitive monies perform the same primary function as dollars, they quite wrongly imply that all primitive economies may be regarded as crude market systems.

Economists are correct in saying that some unusual money-stuffs have functioned as media of (commercial) exchange. They have in mind situations such as Colonial America (Quiggin 1949:316ff.) where "primitive money-stuffs" (commodity money such as tobacco and cotton) functioned just as dollars do today, or Prisoner of War camps where cigarettes (primitive money-stuff) became used as media of (market) exchange.

But to conclude that because some primitive money-*stuffs* do perform the primary function of dollars, *all* primitive monies may be regarded as crude media of (commercial) exchange, is an important error. As we have seen in the case of Rossel Island, this market preconception impedes our understanding of marketless economies and those with peripheral markets only. It implies that market exchange is the only transactional mode ever to exist, and so—as economists do in our own economy—one may ignore the social situations in which monetary transactions occur and the folk-view toward the persons, events, and items involved. It is precisely this sort of ethnocentrism that regards all "exchanges" as commercial transactions, and equates all money payments with market purchases, with the result that brides and murder are said to have a price, just as pots and yams in the market place have a price.

(4) A situation of special interest is one where cowrie (in times past), or sterling or francs (in recent times), acquired initially in external market exchange, became used internally for commercial and non-commercial transactions.[10] Such cases of monetary incursion deserve examination for reasons which are of interest to students of community economic development as well as economic anthropology.

Cowrie inflation, wampum inflation, and bridewealth inflation are related cases. Cowrie and wampum became used as media of (commercial) exchange through external trade with Europeans in situations where the quantity of money-stuff was uncontrolled and increased rapidly in supply. Similarly, where bridewealth comes to be paid in sterling or francs, the sum increases when earnings of Western money through market sale of labor or produce increase faster than the number of marriageable females (Bohannan 1959; Mayer

1951:22). What might be called "potlatch copper inflation" is a similar case: when the Kwakiutl became increasingly enmeshed in Canadian market economy, they used their market earnings to increase the stakes in the potlatch. The limited number of coppers (like the limited number of brides, elsewhere) fetched a larger bundle of market-purchased goods. All such cases may be described as "upward conversions": newly expanded market earnings are used to acquire treasure items and brides which indigenously were not transacted through market exchange.[11]

Western money does much more than merely displace primitive monies where the latter were not media of (commercial) exchange indigenously. It allows non-commercial payments and obligations of traditional sorts (such as bridewealth) to be discharged with general purpose money earned in market transactions—instead of with traditional items of special-purpose money. In economies which formerly were marketless or had peripheral markets only, a structural link—Western cash—now exists between spheres of exchange which formerly were separate. Western money therefore has inevitable repercussions on traditional social organization and cultural practices (Schapera 1928; Bohannan 1959; Gulliver 1962; Dalton 1964). In brief, market earnings can now be used for reciprocal and redistributive payments (just as in Western economy goods purchased on the market enter gift-giving, and money earnings are used to pay taxes and tithes).

(5) One source of ambiguity in the literature is the quest for a single, all-purpose definition of money that would include our own kind (and presumably Soviet money), as well as the welter of types in use in primitive and peasant economies widely differing in organization. Einzig writes: "It must be the ultimate goal of the study of primitive money to try to find the common denominator—in so far as it exists—in terms of which both the well-established rules of modern money and the apparently conflicting conclusions on primitive money can be explained" (1948:19).

To concentrate attention on what all monies have in common is to discard those clues—how monies differ—which are surface expressions of different social and economic organization. Money is not an isolated case. Much the same can be said for external trade and market places, which (like money) also are made use of in economies differing markedly in organization (say, the U. S., the Soviet, and the Tiv economies). Money traits differ where socio-economic organization differs. To concentrate attention on money traits independently of underlying organization leads writers to use the traits of Western money as a model of the real thing (while ignoring the structure of Western economy which accounts for the money traits). Then any primitive money which does not have all the traits of the Western model money is simply ruled out by definition—it is not money. This does not get us very far towards understanding primitive and peasant economies.

Two distinctions which allow us to contrast primitive and Western money are the distinctions between commercial and non-commercial uses of money, and between marketless economies, those with peripheral markets only, and

market-integrated economies. In sum, money has no definable essence apart from the uses money objects serve, and these depend upon the transactional modes that characterize each economy: as tangible item as well as abstract measure, "money is what money does" (Reynolds 1963:474).

NOTES

[1] M. L. Burstein, Robert Clower, Ronald Cohen, George Delehanty, Mitchell Harwitz, Sidney Mintz, and A. A. Walters made critical comments on an earlier draft. I am grateful to these anthropologists and economists, and to Heyward Ehrlich who suggested changes in style and presentation. I must acknowledge separately the kindness of Paul Bohannan and Karl Polanyi, both of whom read several drafts and insisted on improvement. Much of the paper is an elaboration of ideas contained in Polanyi's lectures and writings.

[2] For purposes of this paper we simply characterize the dominant transactional mode of Western economy as "market exchange." Price and distribution theory distinguish among many kinds of market exchange, pure competition, monopolistic competition, pure and differentiated oligopoly, etc. These distinctions do not concern us. Similarly, for our purposes we regard U. S. dollars as a single kind of money. For monetary problems in our own economy it is necessary to distinguish among currency, check deposits, and savings deposits, and sometimes between legal tender and money which is not legal tender; but for the matters of contrast that concern us, it is not necessary to make these distinctions. For a discussion of the fine points of money variations within Western economy, see Burstein (1963: Chapter 1).

[3] We can generalize the point by showing how all the commercial uses of money are brought into play as the result of a single purchase: I buy a house for $20,000 paying $5,000 down and borrowing $15,000 from a bank to be repaid in future installments:

(1) I acquire rights to a house; the former owner acquires $20,000. The money is used as a medium of (commercial) exchange.

(2) Dollars here are used also as a measure or standard of (commercial) value, i.e., as a measuring device to compare the house with any other commodity priced in dollars.

(3) The bank uses dollars as a unit of (commercial) account in recording my indebtedness to it.

(4) My debt to the bank also means that dollars are used as a standard for deferred (commercial) payments, i.e., as a device to measure commercial debt.

(5) If I save money currently in anticipation of repaying debt, dollars are used as a store of (commercial) value or wealth.

(6) When I begin to repay the bank, dollars are then used as a means of (commercial) payment of indebtedness incurred by the past market purchase.

[4] Common stocks may be used as a medium of (commercial) exchange or payment, as when a company is purchased for stock, but it is nevertheless dollars that are used as the (commercial) standard of value.

[5] The qualifications necessary are not due to the structure of market economy, but to cultural practices which differ among market societies: in U. S. society (but not, say, in French) Negroes cannot buy housing at will (but they can buy automobiles); people under 18 cannot legally buy liquor; sale of some firearms is controlled by license. But for most people and for most goods and services, there are no status requisites imposed.

[6] Marketless economies and those with peripheral markets only, refer to descriptions in the literature of situations before serious European incursion. The term "primitive economy" is downright misleading when it is used to include all three types. I prefer to use it to mean only types I and II (Dalton 1964). In type III, where market exchange dominates, economic structure differs markedly, and so too do the uses of money. Firth (1946) is right to call the market-dominated Malayan economies "peasant" rather than "primitive" to indicate that a distinction should be made. A useful distinction between peasant and primitive economies is the following: by a peasant economy we mean one in which, (i) most people depend upon market sale of resources or products for livelihood; (ii) modern machine technology is largely absent; (iii) traditional social organiza-

tion and cultural practices are retained in significant degree. A primitive economy differs primarily on the first point: most people to not depend on market sale of resources or products for livelihood. One might also say that the organizational component of community economic development consists in transforming economies of types I and II into type III.

Failure to distinguish among the three types is responsible for needless dispute in the literature, as when writers generalize from what is true in market-integrated economy, to all economies. Jones (1960) and Miracle (1962) argue the case for "economic man" in Africa: that Africans respond to material incentives and choose among economic alternatives just as we do. But note that *all* their examples come from type III economies, where Africans—like us—have come to depend for livelihood on market sale (of labor or cash crops). What is true for a Rhodesian copper miner is one thing; what is true for a Nuer or a Lele, is another.

[7] Following Armstrong, our treatment will concern ndap shells only. He said too little about strings of nko shells to allow anything more than guesses about how they functioned.

[8] Armstrong says that No. 4 ndap is the commonest on the island, there being at least 200 of them (1928:63). Note also that each ndap shell in classes 12–22, some 150 shells in all, had individual names, as did some at least, in classes 8–11 (1928:62).

[9] Armstrong's short stay on Rossel, his inability to speak the language, his dependence upon informants rather than direct observation, together with his preconception that Rossel money must be essentially like our own media of (commercial) exchange, prevented him from relating those aspects of Rossel money which differed from our own to their different socio-economic structure. Armstrong does not give enough information to make complete sense of the system.

The unresolved problems are many. To understand the system fully we should have to know about the following: what transactions does each kind of ndap shell enter? What is the nko system all about: Why do certain transactions require a sorting of both ndap and nko? Armstrong tells us that there are really more than 22 classes of ndap shells because some of them are subdivided and given separate names, making about 40 distinctions in all; what are the shells in these subdivided classes used for? Who may borrow from whom, and with what penalties for failure to repay? How do rank and lineage affect borrowing and repayment? Are the high echelon ndap shells related to kinship or political organization, in some such fashion as potlatch coppers are? Who are the "brokers" who act as intermediaries between borrowers and lenders, and for what kinds of transactions and between whom do they intermediate? Specific ndap values are identified with specific parts of pigs and men (Armstrong 1928:79), a matter the people regard as important, but which remains unexplained. So too with the number ten, which appears repeatedly: several transactions require payment of a linked series of ten shells, e.g., one each of the ten ndap classes 20-11 is paid as compensation for ritual murder.

[10] In Africa, at least, the impact of cowrie on indigenous economies and indigenous money, varied widely. In some instances, as with sterling and francs, cowrie came to be general purpose money which linked spheres of goods and services formerly kept separate, and which serviced several transactional modes within one society (see Vansina 1962:198); such was the case where cowrie came to be used in market-place exchanges as well as bridewealth. In other cases cowrie were incorporated as just another special purpose money with limited usage within the indigenous system (see Quiggin 1949: Chapter IV).

[11] The very early date at which Canadian market exchange permeated Kwakiutl life is important to understand how and why potlatches changed over time: before serious Canadian market incursion, potlatches were given infrequently, were the prerogative of nobles, and were necessary to affirm one's rank (Codere 1951). Having the traditional potlatch goods was not a sufficient condition for giving a potlatch because one had to have the rank as well. (As in many primitive societies, only those of high rank could accumulate the necessary goods.)

The nature of the potlatch changed radically with (i) the population decimation around 1840—the population fell from an estimated 23,000 in 1840 to fewer than 3,000 in 1880, and under 2,000 in 1890 (Codere 1951:52). Note that the 600 rank positions remained fixed. (ii) The second important change was the increasing use in the potlatch of items purchased on the Canadian market. Now the opportunity for upward conversions—the use of Canadian goods bought with cash to acquire internal rank and prestige positions—became unlimited. With a shrunken popula-

tion, practically everyone had one of the 600 rank positions, which was not the case earlier, and everyone had access to Canadian goods (by simply earning cash), which certainly was not the case earlier. Potlatches then came to be given frequently, by anyone (even women and children), and for all kinds of reasons; and, no doubt, even a commercial element entered.

The trouble with the literature is that even the early anthropologists (Boas first wrote in 1887) were describing Western market incursion well underway, without fully appreciating the radical difference it made to the potlatch when everyone had rank positions and access to purchased goods. Any generalization made about the nature of the potlatch should bear a date. See Drucker (1939:56, footnote 3, 63 footnote 22).

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Reprinted from AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST, Vol. 67, No. 1
February, 1965

Reprinted from AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST, Vol. 62, No. 3
June, 1960

A Note of Clarification on Economic Surplus[1]

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IN A recent controversy (Harris 1959; Pearson 1957, pp. 320–341), it is made clear that the term "surplus" is used by anthropologists in several meanings and for several purposes. Because of the important roles which have been assigned to material surpluses, especially in analyzing problems of institutional change and development, clarity concerning such a "treacherous" (see Knight 1941) term seems particularly necessary.

This paper will argue three points. (1) Even when the term surplus is used in an unambiguous sense having direct reference to empirical fact, the role of a material surplus as inducer of socio-economic organizational change is not at all certain. (2) When the term is used in ex post ~~facto~~ analysis of some unobserved change, or to explain some complex social structure, surplus becomes a definitional identity and its role as inducer of socio-economic organizational change is incapable of empirical proof or refutation: it is a logical construct which need not have any connection with actual events. (3) Lastly, as it is used in a market-organized economy, the term surplus has special meaning wholely unlike that in non market economies. The first two sections will refer to those types of nonmarket-organized economies studied by anthropologists. The third section will refer to a market-organized economy such as that of the present-day United States.

I. SURPLUS AS EMPIRICAL FACT

If it is explicitly recognized in any society that "this season" there is an unusually large amount of one or more material goods compared to the experienced norm of the past, we will call the extra output a factual surplus. As empirical fact, a surplus simply means that more of something is currently available than previously, and the society recognizes that such is the case.

It is the purpose of this section to show that the importance of such a surplus can vary greatly, depending on the society's socio-economic institutions and values, and the specific conditions under which the surplus arose.

(1) The amount of such surplus must be specified as well as the form it takes. If this season's larger output is only slightly larger than usual (indeed, even if it is much larger), the society may not recognize the existence of a surplus, in which case nothing may be changed by its appearance and conventional distribution. Actually, it would be meaningful to say that despite the increase in output no surplus has arisen, because none is recognized. Further, it will make a difference if the surplus represents a net increase in total output, or whether it consists of an expansion of one *component* of output while others are contracting (as usually occurs in war situations). A third possibility is that while there has been no change in the amounts and varieties of goods compared

to last season, there has been a change in their appropriation (distribution), so that some groups of people have acquired *what is to them* "surplus," but what is not surplus to the society at large.

(2) Was the experienced surplus accidental (an unexpected windfall)? If so, was it unprecedented? If accidental surpluses have appeared occasionally in the past, it is likely that the society already possesses some mechanism(s) for dealing with them. Further, if the accidental surplus is regarded as a highly irregular occurrence—a gift of the gods—there need not be any socio-economic change induced by its sporadic appearance.

(3) Was the surplus deliberately contrived? If so, the "surplus" probably was regarded as both necessary and important because it had been created for a specific purpose, such as war or an unusual trading expedition. But here again should be underscored the possibility that the extra output for some special use was derived not from a growth in the total—a factual surplus—but rather via a diversion from its normal use.

(4) Was the purposefully contrived surplus the result of an unusual intensity of conventionally applied effort, or did it result from some technological or organizational innovation, or from a military venture (war booty)?

(5) Did the extra output consist of a new type of foodstuff or other material item? If so, our concept of surplus—an experienced increase in material output—becomes ambiguous unless it is further refined. If a new type of good was produced in place of some of the old, there can be no clearcut surplus because new and old types of goods are not *directly* comparable in quantity. Whatever the quantity of the new good, it cannot (without redefining surplus) be measured against last season's quantity of old types of output. In general, when goods are measured in their natural units (hundreds of yams) rather than by money prices or by some measure of effectiveness in specific use, there is no way of comparing two aggregates of differently composed items and saying that one is definitely larger than the other.[2] Of course, in the special case where this season the normal output of the usual goods is produced, plus some amount of the new good, the latter represents extra output and unambiguously can be called surplus.

(6) Was the purposefully contrived surplus acquired this season the recognized beginning of a permanently higher level of available material goods; or was it regarded as temporary, the surplus disappearing with the fulfillment of the purpose for which it was originally contrived?

In summary, even in its simplest meaning—as experienced fact—surplus can be of widely varying importance, depending on the society's specific institutions and on the special conditions which created the surplus: whether there was a growth in the total or a different allocation from an unchanged total; whether the extra output was recognized or not; whether it consisted of one type of good or several; whether it was temporary or permanent, accidental or deliberately created, induced by conventional means or by an innovation.

It should be pointed out that when the term surplus is meant as it is above, to denote an experienced growth of output, it would be better to avoid using

the term altogether. "Surplus" bears the (market derived) connotation of redundancy, an amount over and above what is really useful or necessary, an excess of something. A deliberately contrived surplus (excess) would not make sense. It would be a contradiction in terms because the extra output would be deliberately sought only if it were, so to speak, earmarked prenatally. Whether or not an accidental increase in output would be in fact regarded as redundant (unnecessary), would depend wholly upon the social apparatus of the community, i.e., its structured mechanism for dealing with windfall increases in output and the conventional attitude toward the specific good(s) which had increased in quantity.

II. SURPLUS AS AN ANALYTICAL CONSTRUCT

It becomes clear from the Pearson-Harris controversy and the literature cited therein (Pearson 1957:339–341; Harris 1959:198, 199) that the importance attributed to material surplus stems from uncritical use of the concept as an analytical device, rather than as a term to describe a recognized growth in actual output. As an analytical device, surplus is derived as a definitional identity—a logical construct—and is used as a *deus ex machina* which allegedly explains complex social structure or some unobserved socio-economic development.

Surplus is a definitional identity when it is related to the existence of nonfood producers; and it is an ex post facto rational construct when it is asserted as a necessary and/or sufficient pre-condition for social stratification or division of labor. In the extreme case it is further asserted that the very appearance of a material surplus induces (causes) social stratification.

It should be emphasized that a syllogistic chain of deduction underlies the usage of surplus as a rational construct: every man must eat; if a man does not produce food for himself he must acquire food from other men; let us call this acquired food surplus; therefore, by definition, every society which has nonfood producers must have a food surplus. An example is the following by Gordon Childe:

> The stone axe, the tool distinctive of part at least of the Stone Age, is the home-made product that could be fashioned and used by anybody in a self-contained group of hunters or peasants. It implies neither specialization of labour nor trade beyond the group. The bronze axe which replaces it is not only a superior implement, it also presupposes a more complex economic and social structure. The casting of bronze is too difficult a process to be carried out by anyone in the intervals of growing or catching his food or minding her babies. It is a specialist's job, and these specialists must rely for such primary necessities as food upon a surplus produced by other specialists. Again, the copper and tin of which the bronze axe is composed are comparatively rare, and very seldom occur together. One or both constituents will almost certainly have to be imported. Such importation is possible only if some sort of communications and trade have been established and if there is a surplus of some local product to barter for the metals (Quoted by Kluckhohn 1949:52).

Some ambiguities inherent in the meaning of surplus as a definitional identity, and difficulties in its use as an ex post facto rational construct, can be stated as follows.

(1) In the above quotation from Childe, two different bundles of goods are defined as surplus: the food acquired by nonfood producers and the locally

produced stuff which is (by assumption) traded off. Such usage is wholly nonempirical. If the natives themselves do not regard the two kinds of produce as "surplus"—as things apart from other material goods—an artificial dichotomy is read into the data. Such distinction between surplus and nonsurplus goods is only justifiable *if it serves some analytical purpose capable of empirical proof or refutation*. As a definition, surplus cannot by itself be assigned a causal role without empirical proof. For example, a key passage in the above quote is the following: "The bronze axe which replaces it [the stone axe] . . . presupposes a more complex economic and social structure . . . these [bronze-axe making] specialists must rely for such primary necessities as food upon a surplus produced by other specialists." What are the theoretical implications of such deduction? That societies using the bronze axe must be more complex than those using the stone axe? That technological change is the most frequent (or most probable) inducer of socio-economic organizational change? That a prior increase in foodstuffs is a necessary condition for making use of bronze implements? None by any means is necessary. Division of labor based upon sex is found at relatively low as well as high levels of material subsistence. Bronze is an amalgam the proportions of whose components may vary considerably. Therefore, some bronze implements may require little more work than do stone implements. In a word, one cannot prove a theory of social change with definitions.

(2) An unproved social primacy is attached to food compared to other goods and services. In one *deus ex machina* use of surplus, an initial situation is assumed in which all are food producers (food being a biological necessity). Then a food surplus arises which allows the support of nonfood producers, e.g., priests. The implication is, that because religion is not necessary for biological survival, it is a second-class sort of service, a luxury, which must have come later in time than did food production: " . . . mankind must first of all eat and drink, have shelter and clothing, before it can pursue politics, science, religion, art, etc." (Engels 1883:16). Such usage assumes that because food is necessary for biological survival, it must be socially valued more than goods not necessary for biological survival. But such is frequently not the case. The social importance attached to a good or service (e.g., kula armbands) may have little to do with its need for physical survival. Indeed, an outstanding characteristic of primitive prestige economy is the all-abiding concern for goods necessary, so to speak, for *social* survival.

Surplus, when analytically so used, serves as the basis for an empirically unwarranted exploitation theory: if only the material goods necessary for biological survival are important, then the services of priests and political heads are, by definition, of lesser importance. The question then is raised, how does the rank and file become seduced into accepting this scheme of things in which they surrender material goods (by definition) of primary importance, to receive back (by definition) only less important services?

". . . the almost universal inequities which seem to mark the distribution of surplus economic goods is striking. This surplus wealth, it is apparent, goes to two groups, those who govern, and those who command techniques for placating and manipulating the supernatural forces of the

universe. The members of these groups are, therefore, to be regarded as belonging to a leisure class in that they, like their families and their retainers, profit from the social leisure which this economic surplus represents. They are . . . members of a leisure class . . . only in the sense that the goods they deal in consist of intangibles whose production does not require the exercise of the manual labor their less privileged fellows give to the production of the essentials to life they produce. . . . Having attempted to sketch the conditions which make for the production of an economic surplus and the social leisure it represents, two further points must be considered. The first concerns the manner in which non-producers of subsistence goods obtain the support of their fellows and entails a description and analysis of the devices employed to ensure them command of the surplus they must have in order to live and function. The second point bears on the measures taken by those who benefit from the economic surplus to ensure that those who do not so benefit remain content with their lot" (Herskovits 1952: 414).[3]

Surely it is the definitions and values of the analyst, not those of the society being analyzed, which make the posed questions seem important.[4]

(3) Not only is it true that surplus as a definitional identity is incapable of empirical proof or refutation, but when surplus is identified with the presence of nonfood producers, the term loses empirical selectivity because it is a rare society which does not have nonfood producers. What may be an empirically unimportant uniformity among societies (the presence of nonfood producers) is elevated to a position of theoretical primacy.

(4) In its analytical use as an ex post facto rational construct to explain social change, surplus implies a one-way causational sequence: material surpluses somehow arise which then induce (or make possible) more complex social organization. But the reverse could also be the case: a change in social organization inducing an increase in output, or a rearrangement of its uses so that (even without any growth in output total) one group gets more, or more of one particular good gets produced.

III. SURPLUS IN A MARKET-ORGANIZED ECONOMY

In an economy in which the participants derive most of their livelihood from market sales—both the sale of "factor inputs" such as labor or the use of land, and commodity outputs (finished goods and services) as do profit-receiving entrepreneurs—the term surplus commonly has been used in three different meanings.

In Marx's formal analysis of industrialized market capitalism, surplus value was a definitional identity expressed in terms of money price: the difference between the money labor cost of producing a commodity and its final sales price. In the aggregate, it was the sum of all market derived nonlabor incomes, i.e., rent, profit, and interest. The material output equivalent of aggregate surplus value consisted of all the consumer goods purchased by nonlaboring classes, plus additions to capital equipment purchased by entrepreneurs. For our purposes it is sufficient to point out that Marx's definition, like that implicitly used by Childe and Herskovits, is not empirically derived. It proves or disproves nothing; it merely defines from the point of view of the definer, not from the point of view of the social participants. The same chain of deduction underlies Marxian surplus: only labor can produce value; if the laborer receives less value (market determined wage) than he produces (product price on the market), we will call the money differential "surplus value."

Another analytical use of a surplus concept in market economy appears in formal economic theory derived from Ricardo. Here the concept relies on the important distinction between factors of production which are variable in marketable supply and those which are inelastic—temporarily or permanently fixed in quantity and therefore unresponsive in supply to price changes. In the case of a fixed factor supply, a Ricardian "rent" arises which is regarded by economists as "surplus" in a special sense: it is a payment made for the use of something (say, land), which if not made, would not reduce the quantity forthcoming. Pure economic rent is different from other factor payments in that it is not a necessary "supply price." The same quantity would be supplied even at a lower market price. That there is a price at all is due to competitive demand for something relatively scarce. In the same sense, the price of a Rembrandt painting is a "surplus" or economic rent, the exact amount of which is determined by competitive demand. The supply of Rembrandt paintings is fixed; if the price fell, the supply would remain unchanged. Ricardo first developed the concept in regard to land, but later market theorists have shown that land is just one of a family of such cases of fixed factor supply. As a contrast with the previously discussed concepts of surplus as an analytical device, the Ricardian rent concept is illustrative. Because it is grounded in empirical fact—the actual and recognized conditions of factor supply in a market-organized economy—it is an analytical device with direct application to empirical processes, problems, and policies.[5]

A third meaning of surplus in a market-organized economy is that associated with the farm commodities bought by the United States Government in its price-support program. Here the meaning of surplus is both empirical and unambiguous, but significantly different from our previously considered meanings. Surplus consists of that amount of any commodity which, during a given period of time, cannot be sold on the market at some specified (parity support) price. The characteristics of such surpluses are worth describing in detail.

(1) The surplus exists because of very special institutional rules. If the rules were changed so as to remove parity support prices, the surpluses would disappear as uncontrolled market price fell to that level at which the entire quantities forthcoming could be sold. Alternatively, if the rules were changed so that much less was produced, the surpluses would disappear because the uncontrolled market price would rise to that level at which the quantities forthcoming could be sold at parity price on the private market (i.e., without the government buying any).

(2) The surplus is socially recognized as being in excess—an amount over and above what is regarded as desirable.

(3) A unique aspect of market-determined surplus stems from the fact that whether or not a surplus exists depends entirely on institutional criteria (market prices), rather than on a physical increase in absolute quantities of produce. The special result follows that in market economy it is possible to have surpluses even if the total quantity produced this season is less than it

was last season. If market price falls below parity price for any reason (e.g., a shrinkage in demand), there is a recognized surplus no matter how the total quantity this season compares to last season.

IV. SUMMARY

In general, there are two basic meanings that can be attached to economic surplus. In an empirical sense it can refer to some specified portion of material output which is recognized as being in some way different from the socially defined norm. The importance of such experienced surpluses can be highly variable. What difference, if any, the surplus makes, depends on how it came into being and the special institutional apparatus and values of the society experiencing it. With regard to the meaning and usage of surplus as empirical fact, three points especially should be underscored if ambiguity is to be avoided: in each context it should be made clear whether the term is meant to describe an experienced increase in total output of usual material goods, an increase in one component of usual goods while the total has declined, an increase acquired by one social group out of an unchanged total, or the production of a new type of good qualitatively different from the old. Secondly, if it is believed that for some specific society experienced surpluses have been important, it is necessary to establish how the surpluses arose. Deliberately contrived surpluses can be created by social policy (such as taxation) as well as by technological innovation. Finally, only in a market-organized economy is it clear that empirical surpluses are recognized as being functionless and superfluous, surpluses being institutionally defined in market terms as those quantities of commodities which cannot be sold at some specified price.

The second general meaning of surplus derives from nonempirical definitions and is employed analytically. In two of the cases cited, surplus was defined as material goods acquired by nonfood producers (Childe and Herskovits) and as the money differential between labor cost and product price, or, what is the same thing, the incomes and outputs acquired by nonwage receivers in a market economy (Marx). Such usage is nonempirical in the sense that the social participants do not recognize the defined surpluses as being apart from nonsurplus outputs (or incomes). It is important to realize that surpluses so defined are rational constructs, which—in themselves—do not prove or disprove anything concerning the role or importance of the defined surplus in the process of institutional change or in accounting for social stratification. To build an elaborate superstructure on definitional foundations, as is sometimes done in evolution theory, entails oversimplification and unwarranted surety about complex processes. Indeed, such theorizing contains a methodological act of faith in the relevance of definitional categories to real-world structures, which is unseemly in the social sciences, and, at the least, should not remain implicit.

NOTES

[1] I am most grateful to Karl Polanyi of Columbia and to Paul Bohannan of Northwestern for their very helpful suggestions and comments.

[2] If material goods were measured by their effectiveness in fulfilling a specific purpose, we could then indicate which of two qualitatively different bundles of goods was larger. For example, if a bushel of rice contained three times the calories of a bushel of wheat, we could say that for food subsistence the bushel of rice was greater than the bushel of wheat.

[3] A similar orientation is reflected in Harris (1959:198), "The decisive question now becomes: what force or incentive makes the food producers surrender a portion of their necessary food supply in order to support a class of nonfood-producers."

[4] Herskovits himself points out that the attitudes of those who contribute to the material support of rulers and priests is far from that of hostility due to any feeling of exploitation: "It cannot be maintained on the basis of our existing knowledge that from either a psychological or an ethnological point of view, attitudes of blame are held by those who contribute to the support of their superiors. Rather we find far more frequently a lively pride in display, a drive toward emulation, a joy in following sanctioned leadership, and pleasure derived from the fact that adequate direction is being given political or religious matters by those whose competence is based on the divine order, or inherited position, or special training" (1952:482, 483).

[5] It was the theoretical basis for Henry George's policy of the single tax. The "surplus" (economic rent) could be taxed without reducing the quantity of land. Another application was in rent control policy during and after World War II. Housing already in existence is in fixed supply. Rental rates on such housing can be reduced (or prevented from rising) by law, without the quantity diminishing.

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REPRINTED FROM
THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
VOL. LXXVI, AUGUST, 1962
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TRADITIONAL PRODUCTION IN PRIMITIVE AFRICAN ECONOMIES*

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The absence of market dependence, 361. — Production and social organization, 364. — Allocation of factors of production, 365. — Work arrangement, 367. — Disposition of products, 369. — Reciprocity, 370. — Redistribution, 371. — Market exchange, 373. — Colonial impact and the new national economies, 374. —

Economic historians often stress the role played by the traditional institutions of pre-industrial European countries in shaping their sequential patterns of development: that the costs, speed, and specific lines of development were influenced by what existed before industrialization.[1] However, we seem not to apply the lesson to exotic areas such as Africa. Economists rarely show interest in the voluminous anthropological literature concerned with the economic organization of primitive societies before Western impact. Yet it is these same primitive societies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America which are now so much the concern of the economics of development.

Although Western impact in the form of wage employment and dependence upon cash cropping have become widespread in Africa, it is probably still true (as it was in the early 1950's), that most Africans get the bulk of their livelihood from traditional modes of production within the framework of tribal societies.[2] It is with such relatively unchanged, primitive economies in Africa that this paper is concerned.

There are at least two kinds of development problems for the solution of which knowledge of primitive economic structure is useful: (1) What accounts for the marked difference in receptivity to

* This study was supported in part by the National Academy of Sciences — National Research Council, under Contract No. DA–19–129–AM 1309, with the Quartermaster Research and Engineering Command, U.S. Army. I am grateful to Karl Polanyi and Paul Bohannan for their comments on an earlier draft. An unusually long bibliography is included to call attention to writings which may not be familiar.

1. Alexander Gerschenkron, "Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective," in B. F. Hoselitz (ed.), *The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas* (Chicago University Press, 1952); W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge University Press, 1960).

2. ". . . between 65 per cent and 75 per cent of the total cultivated land area of tropical Africa is devoted to subsistence production." United Nations, *Enlargement of the Exchange Economy in Tropical Africa* (New York, 1954), p. 13.

economic and technological change among primitive societies? Why do some adopt Western institutions and techniques with ease and alacrity while others resist the changes necessary to generate growth? (2) Why is economic development often accompanied by traumatic social change? Is it possible to reduce the social costs and dislocations by building compensators into the new economic forms?[3]

The point of this paper is to show how primitive economies in Africa differ structurally from developed economies in the West. Our concern is not so much with technological differences as with differences in the organization of production. And for either the West or primitive Africa it is convenient to regard production of any kind as consisting of three component sub-processes: the allocation of labor and other factors; the work process of arranging and transforming resources into products; the disposition of what is produced.

The Absence of Market Dependence

At the outset, we may summarize our main theme as follows. The absence of market exchange as the *dominant*[4] economic organization allows indigenous African production to take forms different from those in Western economy. These forms invariably entail social control of production by kinship, religion, and political organization. Therefore, change in primitive economic processes means inevitable change in social organization.

In primitive communities, the individual as an economic factor is personalized,

3. On social aspects of economic development, see Paul Bohannan, "The Impact of Money on an African Subsistence Economy," *Journal of Economic History,* XIX (Dec. 1959), 491–503; N. Keyfitz, "The Interlocking of Social and Economic Factors in Asian Development," *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science,* XXV (Feb. 1959), 34–46; Mary Douglas, "Lele Economy Compared with the Bushong: A Study of Economic Backwardness," in Paul Bohannan and George Dalton (eds.), *Markets in Africa* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1962); W. E. Moore, "Labor Attitudes toward Industrialization in Underdeveloped Countries," *American Economic Review,* XLV (May 1955), 156–65.

4. By dominant is meant that source which provides the bulk of material livelihood. Market-place exchange occurs frequently in indigenous Africa, but typically provides sellers with only a minor portion of their income. The point is considered at length later in the paper. It should be emphasized that market-place exchange does *not* refer to long-distance trade, usually in prestige goods (gold, cattle, ivory), sometimes carried on by professional traders, sometimes under government commission. On such trade, see the writings of Karl Polanyi referred to throughout the paper.

not anonymous. He tends to hold his economic position in virtue of his social position. Hence to displace him economically means a social disturbance.[5]

It is necessary to emphasize the economic importance of indigenous social organization because production in tribal Africa is most frequently a community activity in MacIver's sense, and only rarely associational:

Association is a group specifically organized for the purpose of an interest or group of interests which its members have in common . . . . Community is a circle of people who live together, who belong together, so that they share not this or that particular interest, but a whole set of interests wide enough and comprehensive enough to include their lives.[6]

We are used to thinking in terms of "production units" because the Western firm is an association, not importantly affected by kinship, religious, or political affiliation of participants. In Africa, however, production is often undertaken by intimate communities of persons sharing a multitude of social ties and functions, one of which happens to be the production of material goods. If we are not to prejudge the nature of production organization in African economy, it must be understood that none of those special characteristics of Western production due to the use of machines and reliance upon factor and output markets, need be found. The component processes exist: the allocation of factors; the arrangement of work; and the disposition of produce. How they are organized in the absence of market integration must be a matter for investigation. In a word, every society has production processes, but not necessarily production "units."

Indigenously, the most important production lines in Africa are agricultural, carried on without machine technology, and for subsistence purposes rather than primarily for market sale.[7] Un-

5. Raymond W. Firth, *The Elements of Social Organization* (London: Watts, 1951), p. 137.

6. R. M. MacIver, *Society, Its Structure and Changes* (New York: R. Long and R. R. Smith, 1933), pp. 9, 10, 12, quoted in S. F. Nadel, *A Black Byzantium, the Kingdom of Nupe in Nigeria* (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. xi. The distinction goes back to Tonnies' *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, and to Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1947), pp. 136–37. Association and community are not to be regarded as mutually exclusive, but as opposite ends of a range describing degrees of emphasis. What is here meant by community is characterized in a recent work, as diffuse, ascription-centered, and socially recruited. See Stanley H. Udy, *Organization of Work* (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1959), pp. 39, 53.

7. United Nations, *op. cit.* The literature on indigenous nonagricultural production in Africa, is fragmentary. A good study of handicraft production is contained in Nadel, *op. cit.*

like his counterpart in the American Midwest, the African farmer typically is not enmeshed in that kind of larger economy from which he extracts his livelihood as a specialist producer of cash crops, the money proceeds of which are used to recoup his costs of production, and the residual (his income proper), used to buy daily-used material items and services.

The absence of machines and of market dependence are related: as with hired labor or any other *purchased* factor, a machine represents a money cost which can be incurred only if the purchaser uses the machine to enlarge his money sales revenue from which he recovers its cost. The analytical point to be stressed is that without purchased ingredients of production, and without reliance upon market disposition of output, the input and output decisions of producers cannot be based on factor and output prices as guiding parameters. That neither factor nor product prices exist to constrain the indigenous African agriculturalist (as they do the Western) is crucial to understanding why it is that Africans can organize production in such seemingly bizarre "social" ways.

The absence of Western technological and market constraints means also the absence of the Western kind of material insecurity. It is not technological unemployment and depression which are the threats to the continuity of production and income, but rather physical environment — weather, plant disease. That there is no counterpart to depression-born unemployment is simply a reflection of the absence of dependence on market sale.

A related point of contrast is that unlike the Western worker, the African is rarely a full-time specialist in one occupation or in one production group.[8] Not only is it typical for him to produce for himself a wide range of the items he uses — his own house and tools as well as his food — but during the course of a year he is frequently a part-time participant in several production activities: he may join sporadic work-parties to do specific tasks such as clearing fields for friends, kin, and chief; he may be of an age set which is obliged to perform community services such as repairing roads;[9] he may go on seasonal expeditions to extract ore for metals.[1] In sum, it

8. I. Schapera and A. J. H. Goodwin, "Work and Wealth," in Schapera (ed.), *The Bantu-Speaking Tribes of South Africa* (London: G. Routledge, 1937), p. 153; also, M. J. Herskovits, "The Problem of Adapting Societies to New Tasks," in Hoselitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 94, 106.

9. Nadel, *op. cit.*, p. 248; M. J. Herskovits, *Economic Anthropology* (New York: Knopf, 1952), p. 113; Richard Kluckhohn, "The Konso Economy of Southern Ethiopia," in Bohannan and Dalton, *op. cit.*

1. Walter Cline, *Mining and Metallurgy in Negro Africa* (Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta, 1937), p. 56.

is frequently the case that during the year an African will work in several production groups, no one of which is crucial to his own livelihood. It is also common for an African to receive substantial amounts of factors, goods, and services as gifts, or in forms other than remuneration for work performed.

Production and Social Organization

The negative point stressed above, that the absence of machines and market dependence means the absence of those kinds of constraints on production organization in the West, clears the way to examine two positive points stressed repeatedly in the literature of primitive Africa: (1) That neighboring societies sharing the same physical environment often produce markedly different ranges of output,[2] with different technologies[3] used within differently organized production groups.[4] (2) That such economic and technological differences are largely attributable to differences in social organization: that kinship, political, and religious institutions constrain and direct all phases of production, in the same sense that market structure and machine technology constrain and direct production in Western economy.

The connections between indigenous African production and social organization may be described in three ways: (1) In terms of the MacIver-Nadel distinction, production groups typically are not separate associations but rather are integral parts of a community:

> . . . obligations to participate tend to be obligations to associate with the group involved rather than specifically engage in production.[5]

> The ties between producers tend to reach out beyond this common interest in the act of production and its rewards alone. A production relationship is often only one facet of a social relationship. . . . economic relations can be understood only as a part of a scheme of social relations. . . . Economic anthropology deals primarily with the economic aspects of the social relations of persons.[6]

> . . . special organizations to carry out cultivation or manufacture need not be expected among the Bantu; the functions are always actively carried out, but often by organizations of which the family or household is the most important, which exist to carry out almost all necessary functions, including the religious,

2. E. H. Winter, "Livestock Markets among the Iraqw of Northern Tanganyika," in Bohannan and Dalton, *op. cit.*

3. Mary Douglas, *op. cit.*

4. Margaret Mead, "Interpretive Statement," in Mead (ed.), *Cooperation and Competition among Primitive Peoples* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937); Udy, *op. cit.*

5. Udy, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

6. Firth, *op. cit.*, pp. 136–38.

the legal, the political, and the educational, and which conduct manufacture and agriculture alongside of these other activities.[7]

(2) The same point is generalized by Karl Polanyi in saying that primitive economy is "embedded" in society, in the sense that the economic system functions as a by-product of noneconomic institutions: that economy as a cohesive entity, a separate set of practices and relationships apart from social organization, does not exist in primitive life.[8]

(3) If the organization of production in African economies is indeed an inextricable part of social community, it should be possible to show how *each* component subprocess of production — the allocation of factor resources, the arrangement of work, and the disposition of produce — is related to social structure.

Allocation of Factors of Production

Production in all economies requires organizational devices and rules to direct labor, land, and other resources to specific uses. Resource allocation is never unstructured because continuity in the production of basic goods is never unimportant. One may gain insight into the special rules which mark off types of economy — say, the United States compared with the Soviet Union compared with the Bantu of South Africa — by asking which transactional procedures channel resources to production lines: how are land, labor, and other resources allocated; how do they change hands or usage?

In our own economy, factors as well as products are marketable commodities. In tribal Africa, products are frequently marketed, but factors almost never. A distinguishing characteristic of such economies is that labor and natural resources have no separate "economic" organization: factor movements and appropriations are expressions of social obligation, social affiliation, and social right. A second characteristic is that typically, land utilization is organized differently from labor utilization. Unlike Western market economy *each* of the factor ingredients may enter production lines through *different* institutional channels, the channels being structured social relationships. Both points are illustrated by the following examples.

In much of agricultural Africa, land for homesteads and farms

7. D. M. Goodfellow, *Principles of Economic Sociology* (London: G. Routledge, 1939), pp. 7–8.

8. Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1944), Chap. 4, "Societies and Economic Systems"; "Our Obsolete Market Mentality," *Commentary* (Feb. 1947); "The Economy as Instituted Process," in K. Polanyi, C. M. Arensberg, H. W. Pearson (eds.), *Trade and Market in the Early Empires* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957).

is acquired through tribal affiliation or kinship right. One receives land as a matter of status prerogative; only rarely is land acquired or disposed of through purchase and sale.[9] The Bantu are typical in this regard:

> Every household-head has an exclusive right to land for building his home and for cultivation. Generally he can take up such land for himself within the area controlled by his sub-chief or headman, provided that he does not encroach upon land already occupied or cultivated by others. Failing this, it is the duty of his headman to provide him gratuitously with as much land as he needs. . . He also has the right, subject to the approval of his headman, to give away part of it to a relative or friend, or to lend it to someone else. But he can never sell it or dispose of it in any other way in return for material considerations. Should he finally abandon the spot, his land reverts to the tribe as a whole and can subsequently be assigned to someone else. The only other way in which he can lose his right to the land is by confiscation, if he is found guilty of some serious crime.[1]

So, too, with the Tiv,[2] the Dahomeans,[3] the Nupe,[4] and the Kikuyu.[5]

What makes the African social integument so important for factor allocation (and therefore production) is that land may be acquired through one set of social relationships, while labor to work the land is acquired through others. In the same Bantu societies in which land is acquired from chiefs by all family heads as a matter of tribal affiliation, labor to work the land is acquired by marriage rights (wives do the sustained cultivation), and by kinship and friendship reciprocity (work parties to do specific tasks such as clearing fields and harvesting). Put another way, the "labor" to perform different tasks in growing the same crop — clearing the field, planting, harvesting — may be acquired through different social relationships.[6]

The extent to which various community relationships allocate factors to production lines is even greater than indicated above. Each separate production line — farming, cattle-raising, house con-

9. Paul Bohannan, "Africa's Land," *The Centennial Review*, IV (Fall, 1960); Herskovits, *op. cit.*, pp. 364–65.

1. Schapera and Goodwin, *op. cit.*, p. 157; see also, J. L. Sadie, "The Social Anthropology of Economic Development," *Economic Journal*, LXX (June 1960), 297.

2. Paul Bohannan, *Tiv Farm and Settlement*, Colonial Office, Colonial Research Studies 15 (London: H. M. S. O., 1954).

3. M. J. Herskovits, *Dahomey, An Ancient West African Kingdom* (New York: J. J. Augustin, 1938).

4. Nadel, *op. cit.*

5. The Kikuyu came closest to Western concepts of land tenure, and land was sold on rare occasions. See, Jomo Kenyatta, *Facing Mount Kenya* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1938); Bohannan, "Africa's Land," *op. cit.*

6. Schapera and Goodwin, *op. cit.*, pp. 149, 151–52.

struction, road construction — may use somewhat differently institutionalized procedures for recruiting the labor and acquiring the land and material resources used in each; that is to say, labor for agriculture may be acquired in several ways, each different from labor used in producing other goods.

As will be pointed out below, such factor diversity born of multiple social obligations is also the case with the disposition of the goods produced. African economies are "multicentric"[7] in the allocation of both factors and produce. This multicentricity is expressed in two ways, both extremely common in primitive economy: (1) Resources and products are arranged in groups, the items in one group exchangeable with each other, but not with items in other groups;[8] indeed, there may be items which are not exchangeable at all. Typically, "subsistence" items form one or more exchangeable groups, and "prestige" items, others. (2) Each commensurable group of factors and products may be transacted by an essentially different socio-economic device or procedure (reciprocity or redistribution); each socio-economic procedure expressing the special social obligation which induces the material transaction and, where relevant, dictating the permissible ratios at which commensurable goods may change hands.[9]

Market exchange is also a common transactional procedure in tribal Africa, but differs sharply from reciprocity and redistribution in the permissible range of goods transacted in markets, the forces which determine exchange ratios, and in the absence of a social imperative connected with market transactions.

In summary, an African's role in each production process is usually defined by some aspect of his social status — tribal member, husband, cousin, friend, elder. The question, what forces, institutions, or rules direct labor, land, and other resources to specific lines of production, can be answered only with reference to community social organization.

Work Arrangement

The specific arrangement of work in any production line is the combined result of physical environment, technology, economic structure, and social organization. But the relative importance of

7. "Introduction," in Bohannan and Dalton, *op. cit.*

8. Raymond W. Firth, *Human Types* (New York: T. Nelson and Sons, 1958), p. 69.

9. Polanyi, "The Economy as Instituted Process," *op. cit.*; George Dalton, "Economic Theory and Primitive Society," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 63 (Feb. 1961).

each may differ between different production lines and between different types of economy. Here we will be concerned with one primary point of difference between Western and primitive economies: in our own system, the constraints imposed by economy-wide market integration and by machine technology are far more important in determining work organization than those imposed by physical environment and social structure. In tribal Africa just the opposite is the case: physical environment and social structure are all-important because of the absence of machine technology and of a larger market economy to enforce economizing decisions on local producers.

That physical environment imposes sharp constraints on African work organization is due to the great reliance by the Africans on production lines entailing little fabrication, such as agriculture and herding. Compared with their Western counterparts, the African agriculturalist and herder lack those devices of applied science (irrigation equipment, disease-resistant seeds, scientific stock breeding) which reduce ecological risks in the West.[1] Indeed, technology and science have allowed some Western farmers to organize farm work on something like a factory basis. However, the economic as distinct from the technological differences between Western and primitive production, deserve emphasis. Dependence on market sale for income together with reliance on purchased factors, force Western farmers into the same economizing choices of weighing costs against sales revenues that typify manufacturing processes. With us, farm production too is sensitive to market prices, which of necessity serve as guiding parameters for production decisions including efficient work organization as measured by least cost.

Where African producers do not use purchased factors and do not depend on market sale, economizing least-cost choices in work arrangement are not enforced by technological or economic necessity, as in the West. We are told frequently that in primitive economy social relationships and values are important determinants of work organization:[2] that sexual division of labor is maintained, that magic and religion impinge on work schedules, that there is often a festive aspect to work parties, and that it is not uncommon for more labor to be lavished on a task than is strictly necessary. It is because of the absence of Western market and technological constraints that

1. Daryll Forde and Mary Douglas, "Primitive Economics," in Harry L. Shapiro (ed.), *Man, Culture, and Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 337.

2. Peter Lloyd, "Craft Organization in Yoruba Towns," *Africa*, XXIII (Jan. 1953), p. 31; also, Mead, *op. cit.*; and Udy, *op. cit.*

work *can be* arranged to express social relationships. The tribal producer does not have a payroll to meet. It is *not* that he is indifferent to material abundance or efficiency; rather, unlike the West, the larger economy neither compels producers to seek cost minimization, nor provides them with economic directives (factor and output prices) to make economizing decisions in work arrangement. It is important to understand this point in order to understand why economic development or Western "impact" induces such deep and wide social dislocation. When Western market economy comes to dominate some area of Africa — typically, through a land shortage forcing changeover to production of cash crops — there are socio-economic repercussions because of the need to reorganize factor allocation, work arrangement, and the range of items to be produced, in accordance with market criteria.[3]

Disposition of Products

The apportionment of outputs is a concept familiar to Westerners. We are used to tracing through the yearly flow of goods to their final recipients as is done in national income accounting and input-output analysis. But as one economist who tried to measure product and income flows in primitive African economy points out, our Western categories of analysis are derived from our own very special market-integrated structure.

> An attempt to examine the structure and problems of a primitive community in the light of the existing body of economic thought raises fundamental conceptual issues. Economic analysis and its framework of generalizations are characteristically described in terms appropriate to the modern exchange economy. It is by no means certain that the existing tools of analysis can usefully be applied to material other than that for which they have been developed. In particular it is not clear what light, if any, is thrown on subsistence economies by a science which seems to regard the use of money and specialization of labor as axiomatic. The jargon of the market place seems remote, on the face of it, from the problems of an African village where most individuals spend the greater part of their lives in satisfying their own or their families' needs and desires, where money and trade play a subordinate role in motivating productive activity.[4]

The absence of purchased factors (including machinery) and the lack of dependence on market sale for livelihood, together with

3. P. H. Gulliver, "The Evolution of Arusha Trade," in Bohannan and Dalton, *op. cit.*

4. Phyllis Deane, *Colonial Social Accounting* (Cambridge University Press, 1953), pp. 115–16; the same point is made by Firth, *The Elements of Social Organization, op. cit.*, p. 121.

the pervasive influence of the social integument, are reflected in the disposition of produce as well as in the allocation of factors and the organization of work:

> The income-creating process is itself part and parcel of the income it yields, and the results of the process cannot be abstracted from the process itself.[5]

If the categories we use to describe output disposition are to be analytically revealing they must be derived from the special structural characteristics of indigenous African economies. We follow therefore the African emphasis on the social obligations to pay and to give, and the rights to receive goods and services, built into social situations. In the succinct statement of Firth, "From each according to his status obligations in the social system, to each according to his rights in that system."[6]

In primitive economy, transactions of products are like those of factors in four ways: (1) Factors and products both may be transacted by different rules or mechanisms within the same economy. (2) Both may enter different transactional spheres, in the sense that the items in each sphere are commensurable and exchangeable only with other items in the same sphere, and not with items in different spheres. (3) The dispositions of factors and products cannot be understood outside the social situations which provide the impetus for their movement, i.e., transactions of both express underlying social relationships. (4) What might be called "socially guaranteed subsistence" is arranged both through factor resource and product disposition. Illustration of each point is given below.

Reciprocity

Factors and products are transacted by any of three socio-economic rules or principles: reciprocity, redistribution, and market exchange.[7] Reciprocity is obligatory gift- and counter gift-giving between persons who stand in some socially defined relationship to one another. Indigenously, gifts of produced items and factors are regarded simply as one form — material, or economic — of expressing such social relationships. (In our own society, a birthday gift from father to son is just one among many ways of expressing their kinship relation.)

Reciprocity plays a much more important part in primitive

5. S. H. Frankel, *The Economic Impact on Under-Developed Societies* (Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 41.
6. Firth, *The Elements of Social Organization, op. cit.*, p. 142.
7. Polanyi, "The Economy as Instituted Process," *op. cit.*

African economies than in our own: the frequency and amount of such gifts are greater; the number of different people with whom one person may engage in gift exchange is larger; the social obligations (and sanctions) to do so are stronger; and, above all, such gift reciprocity may play an important part in production (especially in labor allocation), which is rarely the case in our own economy outside the family farm.

After describing the network of obligatory gift transfers of labor and material products among kin and friends, at ordinary times as well as during festive occasions, Schapera and Goodwin explain the importance of reciprocal flows in Bantu societies:

> The main incentive to conformity with these obligations is reciprocity. In the relative absence of industrial specialization and consequent economic interdependence, kinship serves to establish greater social cohesion within the community, and to integrate its activities into a wider co-operation than obtains within the restricted limits of the household. The so-called "communal system" of the Bantu is largely a manifestation of this close bond of solidarity and reciprocity arising out of kinship and affecting well-nigh every aspect of daily life.[8]

The great variety of items and services transacted reciprocally helps to explain why "production" is invisible, so to speak, in primitive economies: from the viewpoint of the participants, the movement of resources and products is not regarded as an activity distinct from other social activities. A gift of labor to help a kinsman clear his land (part of production) may not be distinguished from a gift of cattle to help him acquire a bride; or, indeed, a gift of a song or a name. The pivotal matter is the social relationship between the persons which induces gifts of labor, cattle, songs, and names. When the source of the gift obligation is the same, there is no reason for the participants to mark off the labor gift as part of production. *It is only when production activities become divorced from activities expressing social obligation* that production becomes marked off as a peculiarly *economic* activity, apart from other activities (as, of course, occurs in market economy).

Redistribution

Redistribution entails obligatory payments of material items, money objects, or labor services to some socially recognized center, usually king, chief, or priest, who reallocates portions of what he receives to provide community services (such as defense or feasts), and to reward specific persons. Typically, but not invariably, the

8. Schapera and Goodwin, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

central figure is also endowed with the right to distribute unused land or hunting sites; these allocation rights are vested in him in the name of the community by virtue of his high political, juridical, military, or religious authority. As with reciprocity between friends or kin, the obligation to give over factors, such as labor for the chief's garden or new house, may not be distinguished from the obligation to pay over items such as food. Indeed, what appear to us as economic transactions of resources and products need not be distinguished indigenously from such as express the obligation to perform military service.

Among the Bantu the chief receives payments of specific goods and services from all his people, and payments of fines and blood-wealth. Such tribute payments are partly in recognition of his position as the steward of tribal landholdings, and of his juridical authority. The word "tribute" is important here in both its economic and social meanings: the goods and labor paid over are tribute, and the social recognition of authority is a tribute:

> By virtue of his official status as head of the tribe he also played an important part in the economic organization. . . . He received tribute from his people, both in kind and in labor. He was given a portion of every animal slaughtered or killed in the chase; the *lobola* [bridewealth] for his chief wife was paid by the members of his tribe; he had the right to call upon his subjects to perform certain tasks for him, such as building his huts or clearing the land for his wives' gardens; above all, he received fees for hearing cases and fines for misdemeanors, and, in cases of homicide the culprit paid compensation not to the relatives of the deceased but to him.[9]

His material receipts cannot be regarded apart from the chief's material obligations to his people. He uses the payments and fines for his own maintenance, but also to provide community services and to reward special service of his subjects:

> . . . all this accumulation of wealth by the chief was really made on behalf of the tribe. One quality which was always required of the chief was that he should be generous. He had to provide for the members of his tribe in times of necessity. If a man's crops failed he would look to the chief for assistance; the chief gave out his cattle to the poorer members of his tribe to herd for him, and allowed them to use the milk; he rewarded the services of his warriors by gifts of cattle; his subjects frequently visited him in his kraal and during their stay he fed and entertained them.[1]

Just as an individual receives land from his chief and labor from his wives, kin, and friends as a matter of right, so too does he receive

9. I. Schapera, "Economic Changes in South African Native Life," *Africa*, I (1928), p. 175; see also, Herskovits, *Dahomey, op. cit.*, pp. 78–80.

1. Schapera, *op. cit.*, p. 175; see also, M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *African Political Systems* (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), pp. 8–9.

material aid in time of need as a matter of social right. Rarely in African societies are there special institutions to care for the disabled or the destitute.[2] Subsistence is guaranteed among the Bantu — as is the case widely in primitive Africa — in two ways: through socially structured rights to receive factors of production, and through emergency allotments of food from the chief and gifts from kin. It is these socially assured rights to labor and land, and to emergency subsistence, which has sometimes been mistaken for "primitive communism."[3]

Market Exchange

As with reciprocity and redistribution, market exchange is a common transactional procedure, especially in West Africa. However, indigenous market transactions differ sharply from those labeled reciprocity and redistribution, and differ also in important respects from market transactions in developed economies.[4]

Purchase and sale seem to us peculiarly *economic* — permeated by utility and material gain — precisely because market transactions are neither induced by nor express social obligations or relationships. Unlike the partners to reciprocal and redistributive transactions, buyers and sellers in the market share no social tie which *obliges* them to engage in the market transactions. Therefore terms of trade may be haggled out without social disruption, both parties to the exchange being socially free to seek their own maximum material advantage.

Indigenous market exchange in Africa might better be called market-place exchange to point up the absence of labor and land markets. In primitive Africa, market exchange is usually confined to a limited range of produced items transacted by face-to-face buyers and sellers in market places. Moreover, the market exchanges are usually peripheral, in the sense that most sellers do not acquire the bulk of their livelihood, and buyers the bulk of their daily-used goods and services, via the market-place sales and purchases. Although the market prices are determined by familiar sup-

2. Sadie, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

3. See, Polanyi, "Our Obsolete Market Mentality," *op. cit.*, p. 112; also Firth, *The Elements of Social Organization, op. cit.*, pp. 145–46. It should be added that the material insecurity which results from dependence on favorable weather and other aspects of physical environment, together with low productivity techniques and the lack of storage and processing facilities, also work in the direction of mutual aid and sharing. See Forde and Douglas, *op. cit.*, p. 337.

4. For an extended treatment of markets in primitive compared with developed economies, see "Introduction" in Bohannan and Dalton, *op. cit.*

ply and demand forces, there is absent that crucial feedback effect which links change in market price to production decisions. Unlike the price mechanism in a market-integrated economy like the United States, prices formed in African market places do not serve to reallocate factors among production lines, because labor and land do not enter the market and basic livelihood is acquired in non-market spheres. Market-place exchange is found widely in Africa as a peripheral pattern in the same societies in which all important output and factor flows are carried on via reciprocity and redistribution.[5]

Colonial Impact and the New National Economies

It is necessary to consider the socio-economic impact of colonialism to understand the present situation in much of Africa. Two points especially must be made clear.

The destructive aspect of colonialism was not *economic* exploitation of Africans in the conventional Marxist sense; it could hardly be so considering that material poverty was already the common lot before the Europeans arrived. It is, perhaps, our own cultural emphasis which makes us focus on the real-income component of welfare and regard it as the sole component. Typically, colonialism did not make Africans worse off *materially*; it destroyed culture and society of which the indigenous economy was an inextricable part.[6] It destroyed materially poor but unusually integrated ways of life, wherein economic and social processes were mutually dependent and reinforcing. This is something on a different plane from simple material betterment or worsening. The destructive colonial impact consisted in forcing socio-economic change which was not meaningful to Africans in terms of their traditional societies:

> For the sting of change lies not in change itself but in change which is devoid of social meaning.[7]

5. Soviet economy provides an analogy: peasant market-place exchange of a few food and craft items which are bartered at freely fluctuating prices, is a peripheral pattern compared with the dominant central planning complex through which most goods are produced and almost all factors allocated.

6. There is a familiar parallel situation worth mentioning. Some literature of the British industrial revolution addresses itself to the question, "did the English workers get better off or worse off during the period of rapid industrialization?" The writers then attempt to measure real income changes to find an answer. The ambiguity lies in implicitly defining better or worse off solely in terms of real income, despite the massive social dislocations involved in movement from a rural subsistence to an urban commercial way of life. See T. S. Ashton, "The Standard of Life of the Workers in England, 1790–1830," *Journal of Economic History*, Supplement IX, 1949.

7. Frankel, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

Despite any real income increases which may have resulted, European enterprise was devoid of social meaning for Africans because it required work which was not part of social obligation to kin, friends, or rulers. Work for Europeans was not done as a by-product of traditional social relationships, and work for Europeans meant not working at those traditional tasks which were expressive of social rights and obligations:

> Of [indigenous] labor itself, we can say . . . that it is a socially integrative activity. . . . Nor must we forget that wherever European and other more complex societies have encouraged primitive man, the carrot has been a bribe (and a pitiful indemnity) for those who must willingly neglect the performance of what are to them socially important functions so that they can perform during that time activities which are not integrative in their own society.[8]

Material income is important to Africans not only because it sustains life, but also — in Steiner's phrase — because the work processes which yield income and the transactional disposition of the labor, resources, and products are so organized as to express and strengthen social relationships and purpose: kinship, tribal affiliation, friendship and religious duty. It is noteworthy that in the few cases in which Africans have been able to work for Europeans without giving up most of their usual activities, traditional social life has remained intact.[9] Most frequently however, entering the newly created market economy as laborer, specialist producer of cash crops, or commercial trader buying for resale, has meant enlarged material income at the sacrifice of work activities which were necessary to traditional social organization, and so the latter deteriorated.

What has been called the "demonstration effect" — increased willingness to enter commercial activities in order to acquire Western material items — works in the same direction. In traditional society material wealth acquisition was largely a by-product of social status.[1] Typically, only those of higher social rank were permitted to acquire certain wealth items or an unusual amount of wealth. In the kingdom of Dahomey, for example, "The accumulation of wealth, except by those whose status entitled them to wealth, was deemed treason to the state."[2] A socially divisive impact of

8. Franz Steiner, "Towards a Classification of Labor," *Sociologus*, Vol. 7 (No. 2, 1957), pp. 118–19.

9. William Watson, *Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy* (Manchester University Press, 1958).

1. Douglas, *op. cit.*; Herskovits, *Dahomey, op. cit.*, p. 73.

2. Karl Polanyi, "Economy and Society in Historic Dahomey" (unpublished manuscript).

Western economy in Africa has been the democratization of wealth. Neither market organization nor industrialism impose status criteria on wealth acquisition. Rather the opposite is the case (as Sir Henry Maine has long since told us).

It should be added that the force of socio-economic change in Africa cannot be explained in the simple terms of changed ownership of property. To the extent that Africans sell their labor to European firms (and other Africans), they become proletarians. What strikes the Marxists is that the wage laborers engage in production processes the capital instruments of which they do not own. This is true, of course, but the crucial point is not that the workers do not own the buildings and machines, but that they come to depend for their livelihood on the impersonal market sale of their labor. Material income thereby depends upon forces, people, and institutions outside of and not controlled by the indigenous social community. Work becomes a thing apart from the other aspects of life, organized as a separate association, and not merely one facet of community life.

What is important for our purpose is that the same is true where Africans do *not* become proletarians, but enter market economy by producing cash crops on their own land. Here they own the instruments of production, but like the wage laborers also come to depend for their livelihood on market sale for a money income. The latter mode of entering the exchange economy can be as disruptive to indigenous social and economic organization as wage labor, and for the same reasons. It is not alienation from the means of production which is socially divisive, but rather the dependence upon impersonal market forces unrelated to indigenous social control; the separating of economy from society by divorcing resource allocation, work arrangement, and product disposition from expressions of social obligation. And, to be sure, the consequent loss of socially guaranteed subsistence, as well.

In advocating policy measures for developing African economies one must avoid the vice of utopianism: to create a blueprint of what ought to be which bears no relation to what is, and so is unachievable. However, to retain indigenous social organization in the new economies of markets and machines is obviously impossible. What is not impossible is to frame local economic organization and national policies which allow the expression of traditional values of reciprocity and redistribution within the new economic and technological context. As we are learning from our own welfare state experience, even within efficiency constraints, economic organization is capable of contrived flexibility to accommodate social

values.[3] The extent of diversity among the already developed nations indicates the possibility of creating distinctive African forms viable economically and socially.

> The real task is not to force change but to induce it in a manner which will be meaningful to the members of the societies it affects.[4]

The institutions being fashioned in the newly-independent countries of Africa may appear somewhat suspect in the West. They include strong central controls, unions, producer's and consumer's co-operatives, and much else of the paraphernalia of welfare and socialist states, even at the very beginnings of development; indeed, even in countries without industrialization.

What deserves emphasis is that political and economic structures transplanted to Africa from the West are being adopted with major changes to suit African needs and traditions. Neither democracy nor the welfare state mean to Africans what they do to Westerners because Africans did not share those Western political and economic experiences, in reaction to which democracy and the welfare state came into being in the West.[5] To us, the welfare state is a reaction against the social and economic experiences of squalor, depression, and war resulting from industrialism within the economic context of the relatively uncontrolled market system. The Africans neither shared our experiences of the pre-1930 system, nor committed themselves to our laissez-faire ideology (which we so painfully had to unlearn).

3. Gunnar Myrdal, *Beyond the Welfare State* (Yale University Press, 1960).

4. Frankel, *op. cit.*, pp. 78–79. Herskovits points out that the successful transition to market-oriented production in Ghana is characterized by, ". . . inner developments based on pre-existing patterns rather than development induced by the direct application of forces impinging from outside and cast in terms foreign to native practices. Here there is no lack of incentive to expand production." Hoselitz, *op. cit.*, p. 102. See also, Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 164; also, Kenyatta, *op. cit.*, pp. 317–18.

5. In much of Africa, creating conditions necessary for the success of democratic political institutions is likely to be even more difficult than creating the economic and technological bases for growth. Tribal instead of national identification, widespread illiteracy, and the initial power assumed by the single parties and leaders who brought political independence, all militate against democracy as it is known in the West. Moreover, unlike economic development, political democracy must be fashioned almost wholly from within; there are really no equivalents in the political sphere to the massive economic aid and technical assistance to be had from abroad. However, the existence of single political parties should not be taken as *ipso facto* evidence of dictatorship. Diversity, and dissenting views within unified political and juridical structures, are not uncommon African traditions. One must hope for the substance of democracy, but not for the familiar forms.

We should not be overly eager to create in Africa an uncontrolled market idyll the blessings of which we so insistently deny ourselves. To Africans, the welfare state and policies of strong central control mean techniques for rapid economic development and political unification, which, at the same time, express social responsibility in accord with traditional usages. It would be unseemly to deny the Africans material aid or sympathy because — like us — they insist upon having institutions shaped by historical[6] experience and current needs.

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6. Africa has two kinds of history: the conventional kind to be studied through European accounts of exploration, settlement, and colonial rule, and an unconventional kind to be studied through anthropological accounts of indigenous economic and social organization.

REPRINTED FROM

The ECONOMIC JOURNAL

THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL ECONOMIC SOCIETY

Editors: W. B. REDDAWAY, D. G. CHAMPERNOWNE *and* PHYLLIS DEANE

SEPTEMBER 1971

Vol. 81

LONDON: MACMILLAN JOURNALS LIMITED

A FACTOR ANALYSIS OF MODERNISATION IN VILLAGE INDIA[1]

Introduction

THERE does not now exist a field of study which analyses the economic and social processes that are transforming village communities in the developing world, and relates village to national development. Yet policies to increase agricultural productivity and inculcate attitudes and skills favourable to new economic and cultural achievements at the village level are important in developing countries.

There are three basic obstacles which must be surmounted in studying micro-development. First, the communities undergoing socio-economic change are many, and widely different. Studies of individual villages based on sustained fieldwork can provide us with insights into the process for specific communities,[2] but the conclusions reached cannot readily be generalised to other villages because of the extraordinary range of variation among them. Second, quantified information on village economic structure and performance is scarce and often of dubious accuracy. Third, there are no theories generating models of sequential change and development at the village level which are theoretically persuasive and amenable to policy implementation. Agricultural economists, anthropologists and rural sociologists usually concern themselves with the introduction of piecemeal innovations, and emphasise different aspects of the transformation process, even though they recognise that the effectiveness of modernisation policies is influenced by many disparate, mutually interacting, forces. Unlike planners working on macro-economic development, development planners who must devise policies to apply at the village level therefore have no knowledge of the functional relationships among variables.

In this paper we attempt to overcome some of these difficulties in analysing village development in India. Of the many forces at work we try, by statistical means, to isolate the few that are most important, explain their operation, and indicate their policy uses.

[1] We are grateful to the National Science Foundation for supporting this research under grant GS1235 and to the Council of Intersocietal Studies of Northwestern University for financing a trip to India to check out the results of the statistical analysis. We are indebted to Clarence Gulick, Robert Edminster, David Hopper, Wolf Ladijinsky, John Mellor, Ronald Ridker, Abraham Weisblat and Clifton Wharton, Jr., for their constructive comments, and to Dylis Rennie and Joyce Nussbaum for their research assistance. Professor Mellor has kindly allowed us to quote some of his comments on this paper as plausible alternative or supplementary interpretations.

[2] See, for example, T. S. Epstein, *Economic Development and Social Change in South India*, Manchester University Press, 1962. F. Bailey, *Caste and the Economic Frontier*, Manchester University Press, 1962. John W. Mellor *et al.*, *Developing Rural India*, Cornell University Press, 1968.

Data

The data for the research described in this paper are taken from village surveys carried out by the Indian Government in representative villages in each of the fifteen states between 1960 and 1962, as part of the overall Census of India for 1961.[1] The purpose of the village surveys was to obtain comparable information on the structure and performance of village communities. The published results contain statistics on income, landholdings, educational and transport facilities, etc., as well as verbal descriptions of village history, caste composition and styles of life.

Of the 300 village surveys available in the summer of 1967, we chose a representative sample of 108. The number of villages included from each state is proportional to the rural population of that state. We also chose our sample so as to reflect the full range of variation in village development contained in the original studies.

We were able to include in our analysis only those variables for which data were given in the published surveys. We had to leave out an index of ecological conditions, for example, because information on rainfall, soil quality, subsoil, water, etc., was not reported. An index of household wealth had to be excluded since it would have required data on savings, consumer durables, holdings of jewellery and other real assets which were not consistently reported. Nor were we able to include data on family planning programmes or data which would enable us to evaluate the effectiveness of land reform legislation.

Several variables were discarded from the study because they lacked systematic association with any other included variable. Among these were indicators of peasant indebtedness (the amount of household debt, the ratio of debt to income and the proportion of debt incurred for productive purposes), and of the quality of health facilities. Finally, we omitted a variable describing the type of religion because it proved impossible to define it in a manner which is both conceptually appropriate and capable of implementation with our data sources.

Extensive cross-checking of sources was used in the data preparation (this process took about nine months) and statistical techniques such as discriminant analysis were used to identify outliers which needed further checking. Nevertheless, even though the original survey was conducted from a single basic questionnaire there remain certain inevitable differences in reporting and in the reliability of the individual village returns.

Definition of Variables and Method of Classification

We ranked the 108 villages with regard to each of seventeen variables. Where the information or concept was not specifiable in numerical terms,

[1] Census of India, 1961, Part VI, Village Survey Monographs (Monographs on selected Villages) and District Census Handbooks.

we grouped the villages into three, four or five ranked categories depending upon the fineness of the survey data. In those cases, numerical scores were assigned to the ranked groups according to the scale described in I. Adelman and C. T. Morris, *Society, Politics and Economic Development*, pp. 14–15. Experiments with alternative scales (logarithmic and squared) indicated that the results were insensitive to the scale chosen.

1. *Population.* Villages were ranked according to the number of households, which ranges from 932 to 8, with a mean of 158 households.

2. *Number of Castes.* This indicator ranks villages into five categories according to the number of named caste groups resident in the village. The top group consisted of villages having more than 15 castes (the highest number being 26 castes). The second, third and fourth groups contained villages with 12–14, 8–11 and 1–7 castes respectively. The lowest group was composed of villages with predominantly tribal organisation in which castes are unimportant.

3. *Extent of Commercialisation.* This indicator groups villages into one of three sets (high, medium and low) depending upon the proportion of yearly village produce which is sold to markets. The top group contained villages which sold over 50% of production; villages in the lowest group sold less than 25% of their output. The proportion of total output sold ranged from 100% to 0.

4. *Quality of Agricultural Technology.* This composite index ranks villages according to the proportion of arable land which is irrigated and the proportion of farm households which use chemical fertiliser or pesticides. The percentage of cultivated land under irrigation ranged from 0 to 100%, with a mean of 24·3% and a mode of 0%. Villages were also divided into three groups according to the percentage of their households using improved tools, chemical fertilisers and pesticides. The composite index was formed by factor analysis.

5. *Location and Access to Transport.* This indicator also is a composite of several data series: quantity and quality of village access to transport facilities (all-weather roads, bus service, railway service), and the distance of the village from towns and cities. Villages were divided into four groups according to the following criteria: in the first group villages were six miles or less from a town, had access to an all-year motorable road and to frequent bus services and were within six miles of a railroad. In the second group, villages were ten miles or less from the nearest town with access to an all-year motorable road, or within five miles of a railroad. Villages in the third group were fifteen miles or less from a town, had no access to an all-year motorable road and no railroad within five miles. In the fourth group the villages were more than fifteen miles from a town and ten miles from a railroad and had no access to an all-year motorable road.

6. *Awareness of Social Legislation.* One of the very few indicators of social

attitudes we could contrive from the survey information was the extent of awareness in the village of legislation on social issues. This index was based on the percentage of villagers who were aware of legislation introduced since independence prohibiting untouchability. The range was from 100% to 3%, with a mean of 38·1%, and median and mode of 25·0%.

7. *Education.* This variable is a composite (determined by factor analysis) of four " primary " variables: (1) the percentage of children aged 5 to 14 who attended school, which ranged from 0 to 89% with a mean of 32·5%; (2) the percentage of female children aged 5 to 14 in school, which had a mean of 18·3% and a mode of 5% and ranged from 0 to 75%; (3) the number of literate males over 14 expressed as a percentage of all males over 14 (mean 30·6% and range 0 to 81%); and (4) the educational facilities available in and near the village. The type of school (primary or secondary) and proximity to the village were taken into account when dividing villages into four groups for this last indicator.

8. *Family Household Type.* This variable ranks villages according to the proportion of simple households, (i.e., containing one married couple with their unmarried children) in the village. This percentage had a mean value of 48% and ranged from 92% to 6%.

9. *Female Child Marriage.* This variable ranks villages by the number of married females who are less than 14 years old, expressed as a percentage of the total number of females under 14 in the village. The percentage ranged from 0 to 37%, with a mean of 3·8%.

10. *Percentage of Low-caste Households.* The number of people belonging to low castes expressed as a percentage of the total village population ranged from 0 to 100%, with a mean of 29% and median and mode of 11%.

11. *Co-operative Membership.* The number of village households which were members of multi-purpose co-operative societies was expressed as a percentage of all the village households. The range was 0 to 78%, with a mean, median and mode of 20·5%, 2·5% and 0.

12. *Income.* This variable combines two aspects of village income: the average monthly income per household and a measure of extent of inequality in income distribution. The latter was indicated by the percentage of households in the village with average monthly incomes below 50 Rupees.

Average monthly incomes range from 20 to 213 Rupees, with a mean of 80·9 and median of 72. The percentage of households in each village earning less than 50 Rupees per month had a mean of 40·7% and ranged from 0–95%.

13. *Land Per Capita.* This indicator classifies villages according to the quantity of arable land *per capita* (the total amount of land used for farming divided by the village population). The arable land *per capita* ranged from 0·1 acre to 9·2 acres. The distribution of land holdings has two modes—1·2 and 3·7 acres, and a mean and median of 1·85 and 1·2 respectively.

14. *Community Development Activity.* Villages were divided into four groups according to the number and size of development projects undertaken by the community. These ranged from villages which had undertaken more than four substantial projects (*e.g.*, building new roads or schools) to villages where no community projects had been undertaken.

15. *Employment in Agriculture.* For each village, the number of people aged 15 to 59 who were engaged in agriculture was expressed as a percentage of all people in that age group. It includes not only agricultural workers but also tenants, sharecroppers and family labour. The percentage ranged from 0 to 99%, with a mean and a mode of 56·0%.

16. *Percentage of Households Owning Land.* Villages were classified according to the percentage of households owning some farmland. The percentage varied from 14% to 100% with mean, median and mode of 71·9%, 80% and 100%. (The data were not available to calculate a frequency distribution of land ownership by amounts of land held.)

17. *Percentage of Tenant Farmers.* This variable classifies villages according to the percentage of households who lease land from owners or who work land they do not own, on a share-cropping arrangement. The mean percentage was 20% and the range was from 0 to 100%.

The Statistical Technique

Factor analysis [1] requires no pre-existing theory of functional relationships, can handle masses of diverse data relating to a large number of social and economic characteristics and communities, and is not sensitive to the scale chosen for the quantitative specification of the variables. Factor analysis therefore helps to circumvent many of the difficulties inherent in the study of micro-development.

The object of its use in this instance is to " explain " most of the variation between the villages of 17 economic and social variables in terms of far fewer " Factors," each of which is a linear combination of these 17 variables but is not highly correlated with any other one of the Factors. These Factors are to be determined in such a way, if possible, that each of the 17 variables is strongly correlated with just one Factor and only weakly with the others. If this can be done, the 17 variables can then be classified into a small number of clusters each of which is associated with just one of the Factors, and in this case the variables within any one cluster are likely to be quite strongly correlated with each other, but not, on the whole, so strongly correlated with variables outside that cluster.

[1] For full explanations of the technique see I. Adelman and C. T. Morris, *Society, Politics and Economic Development* (The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1967); H. H. Harman, *Modern Factor Analysis*, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1961); and L. L. Thurstone, *Multiple Factor Analysis* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1961).

The particular technique which was chosen for obtaining the Factors in terms of the variables has the following further properties:

(1) The Factors are completely uncorrelated with each other.

(2) The Factors are derived so as to maximise the percentage of the total variance (of the 17 variables) attributable to each successive Factor, given the inclusion of the preceding Factors.

(3) The number of Factors is determined by the rule that so soon as the next Factor to be extracted would "explain" less than 5% of the overall variance, that extraction should terminate without that Factor being extracted.

Factor analysis does not allow us to attribute cause and effect. It does, however, permit us to delineate the *underlying regularities* in a complex mass of data by extracting from a larger set of variables the *mutual interdependence* among the subsets of characteristics comprising each Factor.

The results of the Factor analysis are summarised in Table 1. Each entry in the table (or matrix) shows the importance of the influence of the Factors (or columns) on the variables (rows). More specifically, each entry or "Factor loading," is the net correlation between a Factor (set) and a single observed variable.

The Factor loadings may be interpreted more familiarly in terms of the squares of the entries in the Factor matrix. Excluding the last column, which will be explained later, the square of each entry in the matrix represents the proportion (percentage) of the total unit variance of each variable which is explained by each Factor, after allowing for the contributions of the other Factors. The first row of the table, for example, shows that 49% ($= 0{\cdot}702^2$) of the variation in population among villages is explained by Factor 1, an additional 8½% each ($= 0{\cdot}289^2$ and $0{\cdot}290^2$) by Factors 3 and 4, while the net contribution of Factors 2 and 5 is less than 1%.

The right-hand column of the table gives the sum of the squared Factor loadings, or the "communality" of each variable. The communality indicates the proportion of the total unit variance explained by all the common Factors taken together and is therefore analogous to R^2 in regression analysis. The communality of village population for example is

$$(0{\cdot}702)^2 + (0{\cdot}044)^2 + (-0{\cdot}289)^2 + (0{\cdot}290)^2 + (0{\cdot}045)^2 = 0{\cdot}664$$

That is, 66% of the variation in population size among villages is associated with the six common Factors extracted from the seventeen variables included in our analysis. The six influences associated with population in Factor 1 account for roughly 75% ($= 49/66$) of the "explained" 66% of inter-village variation in population.

In addition to indicating the weight of each Factor in explaining the observed variables, the matrix of loadings provides the basis for grouping the variables into common Factors. It is this power to extract statistically

cohesive sets of social and economic forces which vary together systematically that makes the technique of Factor analysis of interest to social scientists analysing development and modernisation. Each variable may reasonably be assigned to that Factor with which it has the closest linear relationship, *i.e.*, where it has the highest loading. Once variables have been assigned to Factors, each Factor may be " identified " by giving a reasonable explanation of the underlying economic and social forces which it represents.

TABLE I

Rotated Factor Matrix for 17 Economic and Social Variables

Economic and Social indicators.	Rotated factor loadings.					
	F_1.	F_2.	F_3.	F_4.	F_5.	R^2.
1. Population	0·702	0·044	−0·289	0·290	−0·045	0·664
2. Number of castes	0·820	−0·199	−0·113	0·026	−0·061	0·730
3. Commercialisation	0·665	0·124	0·149	−0·337	0·000	0·593
4. Level of agricultural technology	0·706	0·048	0·247	0·047	0·039	0·566
5. Transport and location	0·608	0·116	0·171	−0·043	−0·338	0·528
6. Awareness of national social legislation	0·540	0·383	0·096	−0·310	−0·079	0·550
7. Education	0·522	0·413	0·143	0·157	−0·105	0·499
8. Family type	−0·231	0·666	−0·225	−0·053	−0·250	0·613
9. % female children married	−0·193	−0·797	−0·060	−0·079	0·028	0·682
10. % low caste	0·012	−0·043	0·815	0·076	0·053	0·676
11. Co-operative membership	0·118	0·009	0·825	−0·107	−0·155	0·731
12. Income	0·402	−0·084	0·037	−0·577	0·023	0·503
13. Land *per capita*	−0·148	0·049	0·073	−0·689	0·410	0·672
14. Community development activities	0·326	0·123	0·280	0·474	0·244	0·484
15. % employment in agriculture	−0·154	−0·242	−0·096	0·054	0·742	0·645
16. % land owners	−0·203	−0·358	−0·075	−0·145	0·668	0·643
17. % tenant farmers	−0·084	−0·111	−0·053	0·086	−0·773	0·627

Table I is arranged so that variables with their highest loadings in Factor 1 are listed first, followed by variables with their highest loadings in Factors 2 to 5 consecutively. The boxes mark off the factor sets to which each indicator is assigned.

THE RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS

The First Factor

The economic characteristics which have their highest loadings in Factor 1 are the population of the village, the extent of commercialisation of productive output, the quality of agricultural technology, and the nearness of villages to towns and transport facilities. The included social characteristics are the number of castes, the extent of awareness of social legislation and the level of educational attainment of the village.

Villages which score high on Factor 1 have relatively large populations stratified into many castes. They use more modern agricultural techniques and sell a high proportion of their output to nearby, easily accessible towns. They are also more aware of national legislation concerning untouchability and have better educational facilities, more school age children in school, and a higher incidence of literacy. By contrast, the villages which score low on Factor 1 have small populations and few castes, use traditional agricultural techniques, produce principally for their own consumption rather than for market sale, are distant from towns and cities, and have poor access (or none at all) to modern means of transport. They are also less aware of national social legislation, have fewer educational facilities and are less educated. Theirs is a profile of traditional economic and cultural isolation and self-sufficiency and reflects the absence of integrative interactions with the larger economy and society.

The composition of Factor 1, therefore, suggests that it represents the extent of economic and social modernisation at the village level. Two of the variables in Factor 1, population and number of castes, indicate the scope for economic specialisation and division of labour. The extent of commercialisation, the quality of agricultural technology and the quality of access to towns and transport facilities (the other three economic characteristics which cluster in Factor 1), indicate the extent to which local communities are economically integrated with the regional and national economy. Extent of awareness of social legislation and extent of education, which also appear in Factor 1, represent the degree to which close economic linkages with the external world induce more cultural contact. In addition, our measure of income and its distribution has an important secondary loading (16% of variance) in Factor 1.

As of 1961, the base line of our data, inter-village differences in technology, commercialisation and transport still largely reflected historical conditions long in existence in India rather than recently initiated agricultural policies. Irrigation had been started as long as a century back; fertiliser use was still low and, for technical reasons, could be intensive only where irrigation assured abundant and certain supply of water. Irrigated, more productive land was also settled more densely, leading to larger villages and more castes. The economic characteristics which associate in this Factor therefore represent a slowly changing low-level static equilibrium.[1]

The Second Factor

Factor 2 characterises the extent of modern family practices. Villages with high scores on this Factor have a *large* proportion of nuclear (as compared to extended) family households and a *small* proportion of girls under the age of 14 who are married. The more traditional villages have a larger

[1] We are indebted to Hopper and Weisblat for this point.

proportion of joint family households and a higher frequency of child marriage.

We note that awareness of national social legislation (5% of variance), extent of education (16% of variance) and percentage of landowners (13% of variance) have secondary associations with Factor 2. Traditional villages have not only a high proportion of joint family households and frequent child marriages, but also a high percentage of land ownership, and little education and awareness of national social legislation.

Factor 1 explains 24% of overall inter-village variance in the 17 variables included in the analysis. Factor 2 accounts for only 12%. This, together with the low average levels of social development represented in our data (the average village in the sample still had 52% of joint families and 5·3% of child brides) implies that actual social modernisation in Indian villages has lagged behind economic development and attitudinal change.

The Third Factor

The variables which appear in Factor 3 are the proportion of all village households which are low-caste, and the proportion of households which belong to co-operatives. Villages that score high on this Factor have a high proportion of low-caste households, and a large percentage of households who are members of co-operatives. This Factor explains 10% of the overall variance in all characteristics among villages.

There are several possible explanations for the association shown in Factor 3. Governmental authorities may have deliberately established co-operatives in areas densely populated by low-caste villages. Alternatively, the high caste land-owning minorities, who dominate villages politically, may have induced their low-caste dependent clients to form co-operatives in order that the village receive some material benefits that the government provides through the co-operatives. The material benefits received in these paper co-operatives then accrue largely to the high caste persons.[1]

[1] Professor Mellor comments:

"It was my impression, although I have not seen statistical evidence to support it, that this is particularly true of the credit co-operatives which are the most numerous types of co-operatives. The higher-caste people dominate them and pull what is, in effect, subsidised credit for their own purposes. Perhaps high-caste people are more likely to organise, join and dominate co-operatives if there are a lot of low caste people in the community." The present authors are preparing another essay which uses a stepwise analysis of variance to extract additional information from this same set of data on 108 villages. It shows that the situation with regard to co-operatives is more complicated than the Factor analysis reveals. Briefly, there is a small group of a dozen villages largely composed of low-caste households with extremely high membership in co-operatives. It is this association which swamped the Factor analysis and yielded Factor 3. In removing this association between low-caste and membership in co-operatives, the stepwise analysis of variance does show positive correlation of some strength between membership in co-operatives and other indicators of development and modernisation. See I. Adelman and G. Dalton, "Developing Village India: A Statistical Analysis," in G. Dalton, ed., *Studies in Economic Anthropology*, Washington, D.C., American Anthropological Association (forthcoming), 1971.

The Fourth Factor

Income, land *per capita*, and (with a negative correlation) the extent of community development activities undertaken cluster in Factor 4. Villages that score high on this Factor have low incomes, small plots of land and undertake more than the average number of community development projects. This Factor therefore indicates the extent of village poverty.

That income has its highest loading in the fourth rather than the first Factor suggests that (as of 1961) income differences between villages were neither as strongly nor as systematically related to the other economic indicators of development as were the indicators which cluster in Factor 1.

The principal reason for income differences among Indian villages in our analysis is differences in the amount of land cultivated. Since our data are for 1961, technology had been largely static for a long time. Both the quality of technology and land tenure arrangements had therefore been able to adjust to the inherent productivity of land, with the result that income differentials are more the consequence of differences in relative abundance of land than of technological or economic improvements.

It is reassuring that income has its second highest loading in the economic and social modernisation Factor 1, and that the extent of commercialisation and awareness of social legislation have high secondary loadings in the present Factor. This suggests that village income may be responsive to policy programmes to improve agriculture: commercialisation of production, improvements in irrigation and in the use of fertiliser, and the provision of farm to market roads. As of 1961, these programmes were not the primary influences upon village income differentials most probably because there was little improved technology to be disseminated [1] and much of it required an expensive package of complementary resources.

It is in part puzzling that the variable representing community development activities is most strongly associated with the variables in Factor 4, in a negative way, and has its second highest loading in Factor 1, with which it is positively correlated. This suggests to us the possibility that villages scoring high on community development activities undertake them under two markedly different sets of circumstances. In villages with lower than average incomes and less than the average amount of land *per capita*, community development projects may have been initiated from above as an attempt to alleviate unusual poverty. Larger villages, with better than average commercialisation, technology and access to transport may undertake community development projects in response to perceived opportunities.

The Fifth Factor

Factor 5, which accounts for 8% of the overall inter-village variance, describes the extent to which the land tenure arrangements and land

[1] This point is stressed by Mellor, Hopper and Weisblat.

resources favour agricultural specialisation. Villages that have a high proportion of households owning land (and therefore relatively few tenant farmers), have many people engaged full-time in agriculture as well as a relatively large amount of land *per capita*. By contrast, the low-scoring villages have little land *per capita*, a smaller proportion of land owners, a higher proportion of tenant farmers and a greater than average percentage of households supplementing their agricultural income with non-agricultural employment. This Factor describes the degree of comparative advantage and specialisation in agriculture.

Professor Mellor suggests that the positive association of larger plots, more frequent land ownership and greater reliance on agricultural employment probably arise because

> " where the soil is highly productive as in the alluvial deltaic areas, there is a tendency for sharply rising production functions relating labor input and output. This provides a basis for labor productivity way beyond the subsistence requirements of the labor force which, in turn, provides a basis for a landlord class living off the land and labor of others. Such landlordism will be associated with high population density and small farms, both tracing from the high productivity of the land base. Where there is a prosperous landlord class of this type one would expect them to demand a number of services beyond those in agriculture and, hence, to have a substantial amount of nonagricultural employment."

When the land base is adequate, moreover, fewer households need to supplement their agricultural incomes with secondary and tertiary employments outside of agriculture.

Given the overwhelmingly agricultural character of village India, it is surprising that the present Factor explains the least variance among villages. It is also surprising that forces of agricultural dynamism such as better agricultural technology, greater commercialisation and higher incomes should have relatively small associations with the characteristics of land. (Their loadings in Factor 5 are only 0·039, 0·000, and 0·023, implying negligible correlations with this Factor.)

Specific Variables

The Factors that affect each variable and the extent of their influence are shown in the rows of Table 1. Each row of Table 1 represents a net regression equation of the variable appearing in that row with the vectors F_1 through F_5. These regression equations are all derived *simultaneously*, using the criteria described earlier. The Factor loadings in the matrix may be read as the net regression coefficients of the row-variables, considered as dependent variables, with the Factor vectors, considered as independent variables. However, in view of the simultaneity of the statistical derivation,

each of the 17 variables is at the same time dependent in its own equation and independent in the equations of the 16 remaining variables. As indicated earlier, the squares of the Factor loadings represent the percentage of the variance of the row-variable attributable to its covariance with each of the five Factors.

We comment here only on those rows which yield additional insights into the relationships between the variables discussed and each of the other 16 variables. Information of a non-statistical type is also used in these interpretations.

Income

A profile of high-income villages would include the following characteristics in order of importance: a relatively high amount of land *per capita* (in Factor 4), a high degree of commercialisation (Factors 1 and 5), better than average performance in adopting improved agricultural technology (Factor 1), a relatively large number of castes (Factor 1), more awareness of national social legislation (Factors 4 and 1) and a higher than average level of educational achievement (Factor 1).

As of 1961, the commercialisation of production, better technology and better access roads, while responsible for some variance in income, were not the most important influences upon income differentials among villages. There were probably two major reasons:

> (1) the technology differentials reflected in our data were largely historical differences, long in existence, and were all within the framework of traditional (rather than modern) agriculture; [1] and
>
> (2) the available spectrum of technology required an expensive package of complementary innovations and was not very profitable.

Agricultural Technology

The quality of agricultural technology bears no systematic relationship to the agricultural characteristics included in Factor 4 but relates instead to commercialisation, size of village and nearness to transport facilities and towns (Factor 1, 55% of variance). These associations indicate that, by 1961, differences in land tenure had had considerably less impact on technical innovations in Indian agriculture than had commercialisation and the creation of farm-to-market roads. However, as pointed out by Professor Mellor:

> "Your data show that improvements in agricultural incomes and agricultural methods are not associated with the tenure system when studied on a cross-sectional basis. However there may be a number of

[1] See W. D. Hopper, "The Mainsprings of Agricultural Growth," Dr. Rajendra Prasad Memorial Lecture to the 18th Annual Conference of the Indian Society of Agricultural Statistics, 28–30, 1965, and T. W. Schultz, *Transforming Traditional Agriculture* (Yale University Press, 1964).

> other factors such as the profitability of new methods and the basic productivity of land which are associated with the tenure system. Thus it may well be that where the land reforms were effective in India they brought about tenure changes which did bring about income increases greater than would otherwise have occurred and improvements in agricultural methods greater than would otherwise have occurred."

Extent of Commercialisation

The extent of commercialisation has considerable weight in three of the five Factors, which confirms findings elsewhere that growth in market activities is a particularly powerful solvent of traditional society.[1] Increased commercialisation means greater dependence on market sales, a corresponding reduction in production for self-use, and a resulting increase in the proportion of cash receipts to real income. Increased dependence on market sale for livelihood enhances the sensitivity of production decisions to market prices; farms thereby become integrated into the larger regional and national economy. The receipt of cash income enables producers to purchase technologically superior inputs, such as pesticides and chemical fertilisers, from the national economy. In addition, farmers are able to make economic decisions on the basis of cost accounting and to hire seasonal wage labour on short-run, cash-wage terms, instead of through long-run master-client dependency relationships. On the household budget side, cash income widens the range of choice of consumption goods, allows modern forms of savings to take place, and makes possible the purchase of services such as education, which enable people to move out of the traditional village-bound culture and economy.

Several of these effects are captured in Factor 1 (45% of variation in extent of commercialisation), which reflects interrelatedness among increased commercialisation, more economic specialisation, enlarged use of modern (purchased) agricultural technology, superior access to transport facilities and towns, higher village income and more progressive, outward-looking social attitudes. In addition, 10% of the variance in extent of commercialisation is associated directly with the income Factor (4).

On the other hand, we find that the extent of commercialisation does not vary with the amount of land *per capita* and the nature of land tenure (Factor 5).

Transport and Location

Better transport facilities allow goods and people to become outwardly mobile. Opportunities are created for new occupational choices, new earnings from market sale, and for imports of producer and consumer goods into the hinterland. The economic integration of villages into the national

[1] See " Introduction " in P. Bohannan and G. Dalton, Eds., *Markets in Africa* (Natural History Library 1965); also Ch. 6 in T. Smith, *The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan* (Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 297–338.

economy leads to the diversification and enlargement of commercial and cultural transactions between the village and the outside world.

The force of these remarks is shown in our Factor analysis which indicates that 36% of the total variance in transport and locational advantages is associated with the economic and social modernisation Factor (Factor 1). The effect of transport and location is also evident from the association in Factor 5 of relative isolation with higher dependence on agriculture. This association, which accounts for only 10% of variance, is probably best explained by the relatively limited employment opportunities outside of agriculture in inaccessible villages.

Employment in Agriculture

The low statistical correlation between agricultural employment and Factor 1 is noteworthy. Apparently the better located, highly commercialised, more technologically advanced villages do not differ significantly from their opposites with regard to the proportion of people engaged in agriculture. This lack of significant correlation between agricultural and other aspects of modernisation is probably due to the relative infrequency of livelihood alternatives outside of agriculture. Although it is common for village households to supplement their agricultural income with subordinate occupations, these are usually not sufficiently remunerative to allow villagers to move out of agriculture completely.

Land Per Capita

Land *per capita* has its greatest secondary loading in Factor 5 (16% of variance), indicating a relationship between the amount of land available, the extent of employment in agriculture and the prevailing system of land tenure. These associations probably capture the results of an historical adjustment to subsistence production and to the absence of real economic alternatives that characterise traditional systems. With low-level technology and a massive population, Indian villages are in a Malthusian and a Ricardian universe: population density varies directly with the capacity of land to produce subsistence requirements, and the more inherently productive land is cultivated more intensively.

Awareness of National Social Legislation

The extent of awareness of national social legislation is the only attitudinal characteristic we were able to include in our analysis. It is probably a proxy for other changes in attitudes which we were unable to capture with our data sources.

26% of the variance in awareness of national social legislation is associated with variance in the economic development indicators of Factor 1. This interaction may arise either because the wider horizons represented in the attitudinal changes induce greater economic integration or because the

transformations represented in Factor 1, which tend to integrate the village into the larger economy, also tend to expand the desire for outside information.

Education

Our variable indicating educational facilities and their effectiveness (as measured by adult literacy and percentage of school age children in school) associates most closely with economic and attitudinal modernisation as summarised in Factor 1. An examination of the simple correlations of education with the variables in Factor 1 suggests, however, that this association arises primarily because large villages also tend to be better endowed with educational facilities.

There are also discernible associations between educational achievements and Factor 2 (16%), which suggests that modern family practices are associated with attitudinal changes induced by education.

Family Household Type

The literature on kinship stresses that the extended household (three generations with or without collateral relatives living together) is an economic unit of peasants working co-operatively for subsistence and that the extended household tends to give way to the nuclear family household once cash earnings grow and alternative modes of employment emerge. Our analysis supports these views (see Factor 2). Where there are many nuclear households and infrequent child marriages, there is less land ownership and greater awareness of national social legislation.

It appears that ownership of land tends to keep extended families together in order to avoid uneconomical fragmentation of plots. This socially retarding influence is reinforced by the land reform legislation, which sets ceilings on legally permissible amounts of land owned according to family size. Material incentives therefore tend to encourage landowners to retain the joint family.[1]

Proportion of Low-caste Households

The absence of systematic relationships between density of low-caste households and Factors other than 3 implies that villages with a relatively large proportion of low-caste households are neither better nor worse off than other villages with regard to income and other positive attributes of welfare and modernisation. The probable reason for this is the greater geographic and occupational mobility of low-caste households.

Membership in Co-operatives

The frequency of membership in co-operatives is associated only with Factor 3, indicating that, as of 1961, co-operatives had not yet contributed

[1] This point is stressed by Epstein, *op. cit.*

significantly to economic development and to social modernisation. There are several possible explanations. The co-operative movement might have been too recent for its effects to be evident by 1961. Moreover, rural co-operatives may not in themselves be sufficient to generate conditions for an agricultural transformation, especially in the absence of strong supporting technical agricultural services, and without accessible markets for the product.[1]

Community Development Activities

The negative association between community development activity and income in Factor 4, which reflects the compensatory character of the programme, also suggests that, as of 1961, community development efforts had not been successful in raising village incomes sufficiently to overcome these differences.

Conclusion

Our data refer to rural India in 1961 when deliberate policies of agricultural development and cultural modernisation had just begun to have discernible effects. The differences between economically advanced and backward villages were largely the result of an historical adjustment to superior growing conditions and access to urban markets, rather than the result of recently initiated development programmes.

Our factor analysis points up the importance of various economic forces to village modernisation. Factor 1, which explains most of the inter-village variance, includes the extent of commercialisation, the quality of agricultural technology and nearness to transport and cities. The importance of economic forces is shown also in the relationships (in Factors 4 and 1) between higher income and commercialisation and improvements in agricultural technology. These economic associations suggest that rural development policy in India can profitably be concerned with conventional economic programmes—the creation of farm to market roads, agricultural extension services, profitable technologies, and the fostering of commercial crops.

Giving up traditional social practices in village India seems to lag behind economic improvement and behind changes in social attitudes. Our indicator of modern family practices (movement to nuclear households and decline in female child marriage) appeared in the second Factor, and accounted for only half as much variation among villages as the indicators of economic and cultural modernisation in Factor 1. Economic incentives worked to keep the extended family together.

The influence of caste in our study appears in the awareness of social legislation prohibiting untouchability, in the number of castes per village

[1] Mellor *et al*, *Developing Rural India*, suggests that many co-operatives in India are ineffective.

and in the percentage of village population composed of low castes. The factor analysis suggests that the weaker the caste system the higher the level of income and development, and that the income and modernisation status of the untouchables are equivalent to those of other rural Indians: the simple correlation between percentage of low caste persons in a village and village income is 0·09!

The evidence on what might be accomplished through land reform is mixed. Types of land tenure do not appear to influence agricultural incomes or agricultural technology. There is, however, a significant association between larger farms and higher than average incomes per head.

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Printed in Great Britain by Richard Clay (The Chaucer Press), Ltd., Bungay, Suffolk

Reprinted from STUDIES IN ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY, AS7, 1971

12

Developing Village India: A Statistical Analysis[1]

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The vastness and diversity of India and the lack of adequate data in many areas make generalization extremely hazardous. But that does not obviate the need to see cultural and social processes in an all-India perspective if only to locate some of the problems that need to be given priority in future research, and the areas where information is either totally lacking or very poor [Srinivas 1969:xiv].

ABOUT EIGHTY PERCENT of the people in today's developing countries still live in hinterland village communities and still acquire the bulk of their livelihood from agricultural production which they allocate in part for their own consumption and in part for market sale. There are millions of such small agricultural communities in Africa, Asia, Latin America, Oceania, and the Middle East. India alone has 500,000.

There is a large literature about these communities written principally by anthropologists, agricultural economists, and rural sociologists who describe village organization and performance in the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial periods. Much valuable work has been done. The present authors have drawn heavily on this literature as we make clear throughout this essay.

There are three basic obstacles to be surmounted in studying micro-development. First, the village communities undergoing socio-economic change number in the millions and are widely different. Studies of individual villages based on sustained fieldwork can provide us with insights into the process for specific communities, but the conclusions reached cannot readily be generalized to large numbers of other villages because of the extraordinary range of variation among them. Second, statistical information on village economic structure and performance is scarce and often of dubious accuracy. Third, there are no theories generating models of long-run sequential change and development at the village level which are theoretically persuasive and amenable to policy implementation. Agricultural economists, anthropologists, and rural sociologists usually concern themselves with the introduction of innovations piecemeal, and emphasize different aspects of the transformation process, even though they recognize that the effectiveness of modernization policies is influenced by many disparate, mutually interacting, forces (Myrdal 1957). Unlike those working on national or macro-economic development, planners who devise policies to apply at the village level often have little knowledge of the crucial determinants of village-level development.

Those who analyze village economies and societies with the hope of applying what they learn to improve or accelerate village development discover that there is little comparable information, particularly statistical data, relating to as many as, say, fifty villages in each developing country.[2] This paucity of comparable information forces those who study village communities to concentrate on intensive fieldwork studies gathering their own data in one or two villages either working by themselves (e.g., Epstein 1962), or in teams (e.g., Holmberg et al. 1965). Because of the time-consuming and labor-intensive nature of fieldwork studies, some investigators of village development are forced to analyze a sample of, at most, ten or fifteen villages (e.g., de Wilde et al.

1968) by making short field visits to each, relying on their qualitative assessments plus whatever statistical data they can gather in a short stay.

But there is enormous variability among villages. Even within a single country villages differ in size, extent of commercialization, nearness to towns and transport facilities, quality of technology and soils, access to educational and health services, and frequently in basic cultural dimensions such as language and religion, and in historical events leading up to the present (for example, their varying colonial experiences). It is extremely difficult to judge how representative any one village is, and therefore how generally applicable the analysis and conclusions are when derived from only one or a small set of villages.

A related obstacle to analyzing micro-development is that there is little systematic theory concerning village change within the context of national development. We do not mean to deprecate the findings of the many anthropologists, economists, and sociologists who have written about village-level transformation in Third World countries. We do suggest, however, that much of it relates to special colonial situations that no longer obtain.[3] For example, much of the anthropological literature on acculturation considers ethnic minorities, such as North American Indians, forced to acculturate to the larger, controlling, already developed American society and economy (e.g., see the excellent article by Colson, 1949). Such studies are addressed to essentially *different questions* from those that must be answered in order to understand today's rural development in Africa or India.

Much of the literature of applied anthropology (e.g., Spicer 1952), also considers very special cases that reflect another sort of colonial condition: attempts on the part of visiting experts to introduce into traditional hinterland villages one or a few modern practices, such as malaria prevention or an improved variety of seed, while no regional or national development program existed—dams, flood control, roads, new industry, electricity, provision of agricultural credit—to which villagers could respond. In the post-colonial period especially, much village-level change and development goes on for reasons other than the entrepreneurial presence of visiting experts transmitting new skills (see, e.g., Epstein 1962).

Finally, introducing innovations piecemeal into isolated villages under colonial conditions was an extremely difficult undertaking for reasons that are now very clear. Most traditional tribes and peasantries experienced sporadic hunger due to their use of poor technology, their great reliance on one or two staple foodstuffs, their relative isolation, and the absence of real alternative ways of securing livelihood aside from the primary activities of hunting, fishing, herding, and farming in their local communities. Many innovations, such as irrigation equipment and chemical fertilizers, are both expensive and complicated. That they are expensive means that the people must already have sufficient cash income to buy them or must be provided with credit (and thus incur debt). That they are complicated means that the successful employment of irrigation and chemical fertilizers requires a complementary set of new skills and usually more labor (for weeding, transplanting, etc.).

> Difficulties were encountered in harvesting groundnuts because the soil becomes incredibly hard when it dries. Sugar cane suffered from lack of irrigation facilities . . . the herbicides presently in use are ineffective in controlling the local weeds; techniques for irrigating wheat are scarcely understood; insecticides are misused . . . In 1909 cultivators reportedly gave three reasons for not transplanting their paddy [rice]: insufficient irrigation, poor soils, and scattered holdings. Farmers contacted during the 1963-64 farm survey claimed they did not transplant because their draft animals were too weak for puddling, labor was insufficient, and grazing was not controlled (Weaver 1968:194, 199).

Innovation therefore was inherently risky. Even with the cash to buy and the new skills and extra labor, failure meant impoverishment, or, indeed, hunger. In the post-colonial period, national development programs often reduce such risks by providing new, alternative and supplementary sources of income-earning, regionally, or provide credit through cooperatives (as well as the new skills and complementary package of inputs necessary to work the irrigation successfully).

The research reported in this paper draws on comparable data from 108 villages in India and uses a statistical technique that does not require any pre-existing theory of functional relationships. We do not suggest that statistical analysis is a complete solution to understanding

village-level transformations. We do suggest it is a useful instrument to get kinds of empirical insights that are difficult to obtain from single village fieldwork. The complexity of development processes and the diversity of village communities is so great that, inevitably, several approaches must be used. But surely we should welcome any technique that throws light on the underlying processes of modernization; a technique, moreover, that can be used anywhere if sufficient and comparable data are collected.

Data

The data for the research described in this paper are taken from village surveys carried out by the Indian government in representative villages in each of the fifteen states between 1960 and 1962, as part of the overall Census of India for 1961.[4] The purpose of the village surveys was to obtain comparable information on the structure and performance of village communities. The published results contain statistics on income, landholdings, educational and transport facilities, etc., as well as verbal descriptions of village history, caste composition, and styles of life.

Of the three hundred village surveys available in the summer of 1967, we chose a representative sample of 108. The number of villages included from each state is proportional to the rural population of that state. We also chose our sample so as to reflect the full range of variation in village development contained in the original studies.

We were able to include in our analysis only those variables for which data were given in the published surveys. This is a regrettable shortcoming. We had to leave out an index of ecological conditions, for example, because information on rainfall, soil quality, sub-soil, water, etc., was not reported. An index of household wealth had to be excluded since it would have required data on savings, consumer durables, holdings of jewelry and other real assets which were not consistently reported. Nor were we able to include data on family planning programs or data which would enable us to evaluate the effectiveness of land reform legislation.

Several variables were discarded from the study because they lacked systematic association with any other included variable. Among these were indicators of peasant indebtedness (the amount of household debt, the ratio of debt to income, and the proportion of debt incurred for productive purposes), and of the quality of health facilities. Finally, we omitted a variable describing the type of religion because it proved impossible to define it in a manner which is both conceptually appropriate and capable of implementation with our data sources.

Definition of Variables and Method of Classification

We ranked the 108 villages with regard to each of twenty-one characteristics. Where the information or concept were not specifiable in numerical terms, we grouped the villages into three, four, or five ranked categories depending on the fineness of the survey data. In those cases, numerical scores were assigned to the ranked groups according to the scale described in I. Adelman and C. T. Morris, *Society, Politics and Economic Development*, pp. 14-15. Experiments with alternative scales (logarithmic and squared) indicated that the results were insensitive to the scale chosen.

1. *Population.* Villages were ranked according to the number of households, which ranges from 932 to 8, with a mean of 158 households.

2. *Number of Castes.* This indicator ranks villages into five categories according to the number of named caste groups resident in the village. The top group consisted of villages having more than fifteen castes (the highest number being twenty-six castes). The second, third and fourth groups contained villages with 12-14, 8-11, and 1-7 castes respectively. The lowest group was composed of villages with predominantly tribal organization.

3. *Extent of Commercialization.* This indicator groups villages into one of three sets (high, medium and low) depending upon the proportion of yearly village produce which is sold to markets. The top group contains villages which sold over 50% of production; villages in the lowest group sold less than 25% of their output. The proportion of total output sold ranged from 100% to 0.

4. *Quality of Agricultural Technology*. This composite index ranks villages according to the proportion of arable land which is irrigated and the proportion of farm households which use chemical fertilizer or pesticides. The percent of cultivated land under irrigation ranged from 0-100%, with a mean of 24.3% and a mode of 0%. Villages were also divided into three groups according to the percent of their households using improved tools, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides. The composite index was formed by factor analysis.

5. *Location and Access to Transport*. This indicator also is a composite of several data series: quantity and quality of village access to transport facilities (all-weather roads, bus service, railway service), and the distance of the village from towns and cities. Villages were divided into four groups according to the following criteria: in the first group villages were six miles or less from a town, had access to an all-year motorable road and to frequent bus service and were within six miles of a railroad. In the second group, villages were ten miles or less from the nearest town with access to an all-year motorable road, or within five miles of a railroad. Villages in the third group were fifteen miles or less from a town, had no access to an all-year motorable road and no railroad within five miles. In the fourth group the villages were more than fifteen miles from a town and ten miles from a railroad and had no access to an all-year motorable road.

6. *Awareness of Social Legislation*. One of the very few indicators of social attitudes we could contrive from the survey information was the extent of awareness in the village of legislation on social issues. This index was based on the percent of villagers who were aware of legislation introduced since independence prohibiting untouchability. The range was from 100% to 3%, with a mean of 38.1%, and median and mode of 25.0%.

7. *Education*. This variable is a composite (determined by factor analysis) of four "primary" variables: (1) the percent of children aged 5 to 14 who attended school, which ranged from 0 to 89% with a mean of 32.5%; (2) the percent of female children aged 5 to 14 in school, which had a mean of 18.3% and a mode of 5% and ranged from 0 to 75%; (3) the number of literate males over 14 expressed as a percentage of all males over 14 (mean 30.6% and range 0 to 81%); and (4) the educational facilities available in and near the village. The type of school (primary or secondary) and proximity to the village were taken into account when dividing villages into four groups for this last indicator.

8. *Family Household Type*. This variable ranks villages according to the proportion of simple households (i.e., containing one married couple with their unmarried children) in the village. This percentage had a mean value of 48 percent and ranged from 92% to 6%.

9. *Girls Under 14 Married*. This variable ranks villages by the number of married females who are less than 14 years old, expressed as a percentage of the total number of femals under 14 in the village. The percentage ranged from 0 to 37%, with a mean of 3.8%.

10. *Percent of Low-Caste Households*. The number of people belonging to low castes, expressed as a percentage of the total village population, ranged from 0-100%, with a mean of 29% and median and mode of 11%.

11. *Cooperative Membership*. The number of village households which were members of multi-purpose cooperative societies was expressed as a percentage of all the village households. The range was 0 to 78%, with a mean, median and mode of 20.5, 2.5 and 0.

12. *Income*. This variable combines two aspects of village income: the average monthly income per household and a measure of extent of inequality in income distribution. The latter was indicated by the percent of households in the village with average monthly incomes below 50 Rupees.

Average monthly incomes range from 20 to 213 Rupees, with a mean of 80.9 and median of 72. The percent of households in each village earning less than 50 Rupees per month had a mean of 40.7 and ranged from 0-95.

13. *Land Per Capita*. This indicator classifies villages according to the quantity of arable land per capita (the total amount of land used for farming divided by the village population). The arable land per capita ranged from 0.1 acre to 9.2 acres. The distribution of land holdings has two modes—1.2 and 3.7 acres, and a mean and median of 1.85 and 1.2 respectively.

14. *Community Development Activity*. Villages were divided into four groups according to the number and size of development projects undertaken by the community. These ranged from

villages which had undertaken more than four substantial projects (e.g., building new roads or schools) to villages where no community projects had been undertaken.

15. *Employment in Agriculture*. For each village, the number of people aged 15 to 59 who were employed in agriculture was expressed as a percentage of all people in that age group. The percentage ranged from 0-99, with a mean and a mode of 56.0%.

16. *Percent of Households Owning Land*. Villages were classified according to the percentage of households owning some farmland. The percentage varies from 14 to 100 with mean, median and mode of 71.9, 80.0, and 100. (The data were not available to calculate a frequency distribution of land ownership by amounts of land held.)

17. *Percent of Tenant Farmers*. This variable classifies villages according to the percentage of households who lease land from owners or who work land they do not own, on a sharecropping arrangement. The mean percentage was 20% and ranged from 0 to 100.

18. *Health Facilities*. The villages were divided into five groups according to their quality of access to health facilities (hospitals, clinics, dispensaries). The distance from the village to such facilities was also taken into account. The top group contained villages having health facilities within the village. In the next highest group, villages had hospitals or clinics within 3 miles. The third group of villages had medical facilities from 3 to 5 miles away. Villages in the fourth group had medical services available 6 to 10 miles away. In the last group villages had no hospitals or dispensaries within 10 miles. The facilities ranged from a hospital and other medical services within the villages, to a village whose nearest medical facilities were 45 miles away.

19. *Agricultural Base*. This is a composite index which combines four of the individual indicators—all relating to agriculture—described above: land per capita; percent of households owning some land; percent of households that are tenant farmers; and the percent of the village population (aged 15-59) engaged in agriculture.

20. *Economic Development: Factor 1*. This is a composite index composed of five of the individual indicators that clustered together in a factor analysis of the same data. (See Adelman and Dalton 1971.) (These five are defined above as number 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.) The indicators which comprise Factor 1 are size of population, number of castes, extent of commercialization, quality of agricultural technology, and nearness to transport facilities and cities. Villages which scored high on Factor 1 are more developed villages.

21. *Family Practices*. This is a composite index composed of two of the individual indicators (defined above as numbers 8 and 9): type of family household organization, that is, the proportion of nuclear (as compared to joint) family households, and the frequency of female child marriage (i.e., percent of girls under 14 who are married). Using this composite index allows us to ask what else characterizes villages which are unusual for the extent to which nuclear family households predominate and in which child marriage is either absent or very infrequent; and what else characterizes more traditional villages where joint family households and early female marriage are still common.

The Statistical Technique

A computer is a mechanical slave who does only what it is precisely told to do. Its invaluable attributes are its ability to manipulate great masses of data almost instantly in ways it is instructed to do. The quality of the results depends on the quality of the initial data stored in the computer, the appropriateness of the instructions given to it—the statistical program chosen to order the data in a specific way—and the ability of the human investigators to interpret the results, especially when the results are capable of more than one interpretation. Our analysis can be defective for any of three reasons: the descriptive characteristics of the real-world villages –the raw data which forms the basis for ranking villages—may have been inaccurately reported by the fieldworkers who gathered the data; a stepwise analysis of variance may not be capable of yielding significant results; or the present authors may interpret the results poorly.

The computer is given twenty-one pieces of information about each of 108 villages. Each piece of information is a ranking of each village with regard to a specific characteristic such as the size of the village population, or the percentage of school-age children in school. Each stepwise analysis

starts by singling out one of the twenty-one characteristics to be the focus of investigation. Let us take the proportion of village produce which is sold (extent of commercialization). We first choose, on the basis of the literature and of our own judgment, which of the remaining twenty variables should be allowed to associate with extent of commercialization, discarding those (usually very few, sometimes none) that are not potentially interesting from the viewpoint of economic development and cultural modernization.

The stepwise program then instructs the computer to divide the entire set of 108 villages into two sets, a high commercialization and a low commercialization set, and to indicate which other characteristics (e.g., nearness to towns and transport, size of village population, etc.) are systematically associated with the highly commercialized compared to the less commercialized sets of villages; the program also indicates the weight of such correlations, that is, what percent of the variance among villages with regard to commercialization is associated with each of the other characteristics that prove to be significantly associated with commercialization.

The program continues to split each of the successively high scoring subsets of villages with regard to commercialization, and the successively low ones. This tells us for the highly commercialized villages which few other characteristics they also have in common; so too for the low subsets which produce overwhelmingly for subsistence purposes. In this way we get a profile of characteristics closely associated with high and low performance: What is true for villages very close to cities and good transport compared to isolated villages? What is true for villages composed largely of low-caste households compared to villages with few or none? What is true for villages with abundant arable land per capita compared to villages with little land? and so on.[5]

AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY

The modernization of agricultural technology is a matter of great importance to the economic development of India. The reasons are both short-run and long-run. Where, as in India, eighty percent of the population continues to rely directly on agriculture for the bulk of its income, broad increases in material welfare can only occur with improvement in agricultural performance. If social overhead capital is necessary for development, the taxable capacity must be enlarged. If urbanized industrialization and exports are to grow, food and agricultural raw materials in ever-increasing quantities must be sold by farms to cities. Improvements in agricultural technology—particularly an increase in irrigation facilities and the use of chemical fertilizers -are the most promising source of increase in agricultural productivity. The several tables which follow, drawn from a recent work on agricultural development in India (Mellor et al. 1968), show that only one-fifth the sown area is irrigated, that yearly output of foodstuffs varies sensitively with weather conditions, that those who earn their income in agriculture pay a much smaller rate of taxation than others, and what a large payoff Japanese farms get from intensive application of labor and fertilizer compared to those in West Bengal.

The 108 villages are ranked in accordance with a composite indicator combining the proportion of land which is irrigated together with the extent to which chemical fertilizer and pesticides are used. In our sample, the percent of cultivated area under irrigation ranged from 0 to 100%, with a mean of 24.3% and a mode of 0%. Villages were divided into three groups according to the percent of households using improved tools, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides.

We allowed all the variables to be associated with our indicator of the quality of agricultural technology to gauge the extent to which cultural, social, and economic variables impinge upon readiness to adopt modern agricultural techniques.

Results of the Statistical Analysis

Group 1. The entire set of 108 villages splits into a high set of 71 villages which, on the average, has an index for quality of agricultural technology more than three times as high as the low group of 37 villages. Twenty-two percent of the variance among villages in the quality of their agricultural technology is associated with the extent of commercialization of production. In the

FOOD GRAIN PRODUCTION, TREND, AND IMPORTS, INDIA, 1949-1950 TO 1965-1966 (IN MILLIONS OF TONS)

Year	Adjusted official production*	Production assuming constant rate of increase of 2.5% per year**	Difference between actual production and 2.5% trend	Food grain imports
1949-50	58	58	0	3.7
1950-51	52	59	−7	4.7
1951-52	53	60	−7	3.9
1952-53	59	62	−3	2.0
1953-54	69	63	+6	0.8
1954-55	67	65	+2	0.6
1955-56	66	66	0	1.4
1956-57	69	68	+1	3.6
1957-58	62	70	−8	3.2
1958-59	74	71	+3	3.8
1959-60	75	73	+2	5.1
1960-61	79	75	+4	3.4
1961-62	83	77	+6	3.6
1962-63	78	79	−1	4.5
1963-64	80	81	−1	6.2
1964-65	88	83	+5	7.0
1965-66	72	85	−13	12.0

*Government of India, Ministry of Food and *Agriculture*, *Bulletin on Food Statistics*, Aug. 1961 and succeeding issues.

**Because of the large year-to-year fluctuations in production due to changes in weather, it is difficult to estimate the trend in food grain production for India. It appears that the upward trend has been about 2:5 percent a year (see Uma J. Lele and John W. Mellor, *Estimates of Change and Causes of Change in Foodgrains Production, India, 1949-50 to 1960-61* (Cornell International Agricultural Development Bulletin No. 2 [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, Aug. 1964]).

During 1963-1964, food grains comprised 46 percent of the value of Indian agricultural production and occupied about 80 percent of the crop acreage. By definition, food grains include both cereals and pulses. Rice and wheat represented 46 and 12 percent respectively of the total food grain production.

PERCENTAGE OF NET AREA SOWN WHICH WAS IRRIGATED, FIVE-YEAR AVERAGES, INDIA, 1908—1964

Years averaged	Percentage of net area sown which was irrigated
British India	
1908-09 to 1910-11	19.6
1911-12 to 1915-16	21.3
1916-17 to 1920-21	23.0
1921-22 to 1925-26	21.8
1926-27 to 1930-31	22.3
1931-32 to 1935-36	23.0
1936-37 to 1940-41	24.7
1941-42 to 1945-46	26.1
Modern India	
1947-48 to 1951-52	18.2
1952-53 to 1956-57	17.3
1957-58 to 1961-62	18.1
1962-63 to 1963-64	19.1

Source: Figures for British India as compiled in George Blyn, *Agricultural Trends in India, 1891-1947: Output, Availability, and Productivity* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966), pp. 340-341; used by permission. The area covered is roughly that of modern Indian and Pakistan, excluding the former princely states. The comparison shows that British India was more intensively irrigated than modern India. The figures for modern India are drawn from *Agricultural Situation in India*, various volumes, and *Abstract of Agricultural Statistics, India*, issues during the years 1960-1966, both published by the Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Government of India.

PERCENTAGE OF AREA IRRIGATED, SELECTED CROPS, INDIA, 1960–1961

Crop	Percentage of each crop area irrigated
All food grains	22
Rice	37
Wheat	33
Barley	42
Maize	13
Jowar	4
Bajra	3
Ragi	16
Sugar cane	68
Oilseeds	3
Cotton	13
Tobacco	22
Fodder crops	16
All crops	18

Source: Government of India, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, *Indian Agricultural Statistics*, 1960-1961, I (Delhi, 1962).

TAXES PAID BY UPPER-INCOME* GROUPS IN THE AGRICULTURAL AND NONAGRICULTURAL SECTORS, INDIA, 1950-1951 TO 1960-1961

	Taxes as a percentage of income	
Year	Agricultural sector	Nonagricultural sector
1950-51	6.16	20.47
1951-52	6.26	17.86
1952-53	6.59	19.02
1953-54	6.47	16.60
1954-55	8.47	16.58
1955-56	7.50	16.68
1956-57	6.95	17.10
1957-58	7.24	17.45
1958-59	6.51	16.72
1959-60	6.84	15.14
1960-61	6.56	17.80

*Upper-income households are defined as those whose annual incomes are estimated to be over Rs. 3600.
Source: Ved P. Gandhi, *Tax Burden on Indian Agriculture* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Law School International Tax Program, 1966), p. 132, Table 30; p. 137, Table 32.

high villages 20% to 100% of village output is sold; in the low villages, less than 11%. (See Group 2 and 3.)

The first finding should be underscored because of its analytical and policy implications. With very few exceptions, improvements in agricultural technology require purchased inputs from outside the village (e.g., irrigation pumps, chemical fertilizers), which in turn requires cash income (or access to credit) with which to purchase them. It should not be surprising therefore to find a substantial correlation between extent of commercialization and the quality of agricultural technology.

Several other characteristics are almost as closely associated as commercialization with differences in the quality of agricultural technology used. The number of castes in a village, which, as a discriminator would have split the 108 villages in high and low sets of almost equal size, is associated with 21% of the variance in the quality of agricultural technology. Villages with a relatively large number of castes also typically have better agricultural technology. The analytical

AVERAGE TAX RATES IN THE AGRICULTURAL AND NONAGRICULTURAL SECTORS, INDIA, 1950-1951 to 1961-1962

	Agricultural sector			Nonagricultural sector		
Year	Taxes per capita (rupees)	Income per capita (rupees)	Ratio	Taxes per capita (rupees)	Income per capita (rupees)	Ratio
1950-51	7.7	212	3.63	36.2	411	8.81
1951-52	8.0	210	3.81	41.8	440	9.50
1952-53	8.2	199	4.03	37.7	422	8.93
1953-54	8.6	215	4.00	37.4	428	8.74
1954-55	8.9	175	5.08	39.0	427	9.13
1955-56	9.5	177	5.37	38.4	434	8.85
1956-57	10.6	210	5.05	44.6	451	9.89
1957-58	12.4	198	6.27	53.2	478	11.37
1958-59	12.5	228	5.48	55.7	578	11.65
1959-60	13.2	221	5.98	62.8	489	12.85
1960-61	13.4	239	5.61	68.9	529	13.02
1961-62	13.7	227	5.90	75.2	567	13.21

Source: Ved P. Gandhi, *Tax Burden on Indian Agriculture* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Law School International Tax Program, 1966), p. 56, Table 2.

COMPARISONS OF FARM INPUT STRUCTURE, WEST BENGAL, INDIA, AND KINKI DISTRICT, JAPAN

Region	Average size of holding (acres)	Labor per holding available for farm work (man-months)	Labor available for farm work per acre (man-months)	Labor utilization per acre (man-months)
West Bengal, India	2.9	24.0	8.0	1.9
Kinki, Japan	3.0	37.0	12.0	7.2


Region	Labor utilization as percentage of availability	Operating expenses per acre	Value of fertilizer per acre	Gross output per acre
West Bengal, India	23	$ 17.30	$ 2.70	$ 45.80
Kinki, Japan	58	132.00	34.90	448.30

Source: John W. Mellor, "Increasing Agricultural Production in Early Stages of Economic Development: Relationships, Problems, and Prospects," *Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics* XVII (Apr.-June 1962), 42.

point here is that irrigated crops require significantly more labor than unirrigated crops (Epstein 1962; Mellor 1968). The larger the number of castes the larger the labor force and the greater the likelihood that there will be a local supply of wage labor available to service the needs of irrigated crops.

Our first two discriminators between high and low villages with respect to agricultural technology are economic, the first being extent of commercialization and the second a proxy for the size and composition of the labor force. The next is cultural. The awareness of national social legislation, our simple indicator of awareness of external events, accounted for 19% of the variance in quality of agricultural technology.[6]

Nearness to towns and transport facilities is another significant characteristic associated with differences in quality of agricultural technology (.18). Once again we see a connection between superior economic opportunity—access to markets—and superior economic performance. A far higher proportion of villagers used improved agricultural techniques in villages which are within about six miles of a town and five miles of transport than in the more isolated villages.[7]



*Variance in group is less than 10%.

Diagram 1.

SUMMARY OF STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS

Quality of Agricultural Technology, five splits	
Education	4
*Awareness of National Social Legislation	4
Girls in School	4
*Number of Castes	3
Percent of Low Castes	3
*Location and Transportation	3
Cooperative Membership	2
Employment in Agriculture	2
Income	2
*Extent of Commercialization	1
Percent of Tenant Farmers	1
*Land per Capita	1
Family Household Type	1
Land Ownership	1
Agricultural Base	1
Community Development Activities	1
Family Practices	1

*Denotes principal discriminator in a split

Superior Agricultural Technology

Group 3. We now turn successively to the sub-groups representing higher levels of agricultural technology. The high group of 71 villages, on the first split, divides again into an upper group of 44 villages with a mean index for agricultural technology 60% higher than its low cohort group of 27 villages. The two best discriminating characteristics between the groups are nearness to towns and transport facilities (.15), and the number of castes, indicating again the importance of market access and labor supply.

Group 5. The 44 high villages split into a very high group of 12 villages whose index of agricultural technology is more than twice as high as its low cohort group of 32 villages. The systematic discriminators, however, are weak: number of castes (.13), awareness of national social legislation (.10), and the composite indicator for education (.08). Again, labor supply is associated with superior agricultural technology.

Group 6. The intermediate-high set of 32 villages splits once again into a slightly higher group of 24 villages whose index for quality of agricultural technology is twice as high as its low cohort group of 8 villages. The significant discriminators between them are awareness of the untouchability law (.23), frequency of cooperative membership (.18), girls under 14 in school (.17), and family practices (.13). Three out of four of these associations are cultural and attitudinal rather than economic. The 8 villages in Group 8 are not only traditional in their use of poor technology and infrequent membership in co-operatives; they are also less aware of national legislation, and traditional in not sending girls to school, marrying them early, and in retaining the joint family household.

Poor Technology

Group 2. We turn now to the group of 37 villages which split off from Group 1 as the low group. A large set of discriminants was significant in the initial split. The 37 villages in Group 2 have an average index of agricultural technology only one-fourth as high as the 71 villages of Group 3, its high cohort. The characteristics most closely associated with differences in agricultural technology between the high and low groups are extent of commercial activities, number of castes, awareness of national social legislation, and nearness to transport facilities and cities.

The amount of land per capita (35%) discriminates between a group of 10 villages with very little land and a higher average level of agricultural technology and the remaining 27 villages with more land per capita (see Groups 12 and 13). Population density tends to be highest in irrigated villages; hence the villages with smaller plots score highest on agricultural technology. Aslo closely associated with differences in agricultural methods in villages in Group 2 are the education factor (33%), and the percent of female children in school (32%). Generally, a higher level of agricultural technology is associated with greater education and more modern attitudes toward women as reflected by a higher percentage of girls in school.

Conclusions

The principal conclusions we draw from this analysis of the village characteristics which accompany modern and backward agricultural technology, are as follows:

Agricultural villages distinguished for their unusual employment of irrigation facilities, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides are also characterized by a greater supply of low caste wage labor necessary to service irrigated crops economically, by a greater enmeshment in the market economy, superior access to transport facilities and towns, and by greater educational attainment. Socio-cultural characteristics of modernizing sorts also tend quite frequently to accompany superior technological attainment: the high villages are also likely to have few tribal households, have greater awareness of events outside the village, and more modern family practices such as nuclear households and educating girls.

The policy implications of these findings are optimistic because they suggest that the bulk of agricultural villages in India are quite receptive to conventional economic development and modernization policies: that Indian farmers will improve their agricultural technology in response to commercial opportunities provided by good transport facilities, and by increased access to the greater labor supply required by irrigation. However, the limited extent to which the improvement of agricultural techniques within the framework of traditional agriculture has succeeded in raising incomes when income is high, suggests the need for more drastic changes in technology.

EXTENT OF COMMERCIALIZATION

The extent of commercialization of production is a significant attribute of village economies. Almost all peasantries in underdeveloped countries, including India, combine subsistence production with production for cash sale. The extremes of purely subsistence or purely commercial production are rare in the Third World.

The enlargement of commercial production is an important development goal. The greater the extent of reliance on cash sale, the greater sensitivity will producers display to market prices and the more responsive will be their allocation of resources to market-registered demands. The enlargement of cash receipts, moreover, creates new taxable capacity as well as new production and consumption alternatives for farm households. It facilitates the improvement of agricultural technology which requires enlarged cash outlays on purchased fertilizers, pesticides, and farm implements.

With its extreme heterogeneity and large numbers of agricultural villages, India is a particularly good place to investigate the underlying forces which propel ever-increasing numbers into commercial production, and the weights one must attach to economic forces of market opportunity as compared to predisposing social and cultural characteristics.

Each of the 108 villages was put into one of three ranked groups, high, intermediate, and low, depending on the proportion of yearly village output which is sold rather than self consumed. Villages in the high group sold more than half of yearly output; in the intermediate group, between 25 and 49%; and in the low group less than 25%.

In our analysis of forces associated with commercialization, the agricultural situation was reflected by the amount of land per capita, the percent of adult population employed in agriculture, the proportion of land owners and the quality of agricultural technology. The

frequency of co-operative membership and the extent of community development activities were also taken into account.

Family practices were represented by the proportion of simple households and by the factor combining this variable with female child marriage. The number of castes, the proportion of low castes, and the size of village population were also included.

A certain basic standard of education probably facilitates commercial dealings and easy physical access to markets in urban areas certainly encourages increased sales. Several education indicators and the location of the village and the availability of transport were taken into account as well as several indicators for income.

The results of the analysis are indicated in Diagram 2.

Statistical Results

Group 1. The single discriminant most closely associated with variations in the extent of commercialization is the extent of membership in co-operatives, which accounts for almost a third of the variance in commercialization. It splits the full set of villages into a high group of 59 villages in which 13 to 78% of households belong to co-operatives and a low group of 49 villages in which 12% or fewer households are co-operative members. On the average, households in the high group are more than twice as commercialized as households in the lower group; i.e., the average score representing percent of village output sold is more than twice that of low villages. Aside from membership in co-operatives, which has the highest association with variance in commercialization (.29), several other characteristics had almost as high associations: size of population (.21); access to transport facilities and towns (.20); extent of awareness of national legislation on untouchability (.17); and the number of castes (.15).[8]

Here, in the order of their importance, we have a profile of characteristics associated with villages that are most commercialized: a relatively high proportion of households belonging to co-operatives, in large villages with good access to transport, situated near towns, aware of external events, having a relatively large number of castes, high incomes, more education, more girls in school, fewer early female marriages, and fewer joint households.

The profile of villages producing mostly or exclusively for subsistence purposes is, of course, the opposite: co-operatives not present (or if present, having a tiny membership), small population, relatively isolated with poor access to transport and towns, less awareness of external events, low income, tribal, or, if Hindu, having relatively few castes, little education, frequently retaining the joint family household and other traditional cultural practices.

It is perhaps encouraging to note that extensive commercialization is associated with at least two characteristics that are subject to policy control: co-operatives and transport facilities. We cannot, however, be sure of the causal direction underlying the association of co-operatives and commercialization. It may be that farming households already producing principally for market sale have a greater predisposition to join co-operatives; or it may be that forming co-operatives induces farm households to enlarge production for sale relative to subsistence. The causal connection with transport and nearness to towns is more clear-cut. Both create market opportunities to which favorably located villages respond.

High Commercialization

Group 3. The 59 villages with a relatively high extent of commercialization split into a very high group of 15 villages which are 50% more commercialized than its lower cohort group of 44 villages. The principal discriminants are land per capita (.18), size of population (.17), and quality of agricultural technology (.14).[9]

Generally, villages in which there is greater commercialization, also have more arable land per capita, and are larger villages using better agricultural technology, having many castes and slightly higher incomes, and somewhat fewer low caste households. Again we see that larger villages socially differentiated by caste are typically more developed economically than small villages



GROUP 1
Extent of Commercialization
Cooperative Membership (.28)
GROUP 3
N = 59
ȳ = 63.4 σ = 30.2
(13-78)
Land per Capita (.18)
GROUP 5
N = 15
ȳ = 85.3 σ = 11.5
(2.15-9.25)
GROUP 4
N = 44
ȳ = 55.9 σ = 31.0
(.15-1.69)
Size of Population (.38)
GROUP 7
N = 28
ȳ = 70.3 σ = 24.1
(120-530)
Girls in School (.62)
GROUP 11
N = 16
ȳ = 84.5 σ =
(19-63)
GROUP 10
N = 12
ȳ = 31 σ =
(0-17)
GROUP 6
N = 16
ȳ = 30.6 σ = 28.9
(20-110)
GROUP 2
N = 49
ȳ = 26.4 σ = 26.2
(0-12)
Size of Population (.51)
GROUP 9
N = 12
ȳ = 59.2 σ = 22.5
(190-7600)
GROUP 8
N = 37
ȳ = 15.8 σ = 16.8
(20-180)
Size of Population (.13)
GROUP 13
N = 20
ȳ = 21.2 σ = 30
(100-180)
GROUP 12
N = 17
ȳ = 9.3 σ = 22
(0-100)

Diagram 2.

SUMMARY OF STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS

Extent of Commercialization, six splits	
***Size of Population	6
Number of Castes	4
Family Practices	4
Percent of Low Caste Households	4
Awareness of National Social Legislation	3
Quality of Agricultural Technology	3
*Cooperative Membership	2
*Land per Capita	2
*Girls in School	2
Location and Transportation	2
Education	2
Girls under 14 Married	2
Frequency of Low Income	2
Adult Male Literacy	2
Average Income	2
Family Household Type	1
Employment in Agriculture	1
Extent of Land Ownership	1

*Denotes principal discriminator in a split

which are homogeneous with regard to caste. We interpret this as indicating the importance of labor supply, especially where more modern agricultural technology is in use.

Group 4. These 44 villages are intermediate-high with regard to commercialization; they are less commercialized than the highest group of 15 villages, but on the average much more commercialized than the bottom-most group of 17 villages (Group 12). They had split off from the top group of 15 in their having less land per capita, smaller populations, poorer technology, and fewer castes (but a larger percentage of low caste households), and lower average incomes.

These 44 intermediate-high villages split in turn into a higher group of 28 and a lower group of 16 villages. The higher group is more than twice as commercialized as the lower group. The single best discriminator between these groups is size of population, which accounts for almost forty percent of the variance with regard to commercialization. The larger the population the more commercialized the village (or vice versa).

Several other variables are more weakly associated with this split between high and low commercialization: the quality of agricultural technology (.28), girls in school (.23), number of castes (.19), membership in co-operatives (.19), percentage of low caste households (.17), awareness of social legislation (.12), and the indicators of family practices (.12).

The direction of the associations is as one would expect, with two exceptions. High commercialization of productive activity is associated with larger populations, higher quality agricultural technology, more school-age girls in school, a larger number of castes, fewer co-operative members (surprisingly), fewer low caste households, greater awareness of national legislation, and more modern family practices (i.e., less frequent early marriage for girls and fewer joint family households).

Perhaps it is worth remarking again how, in some measure, economic and cultural modernization occur together. In this split, girls in school was almost as strong a discriminator (.23) between high and low commercialization as quality of agricultural technology (.28).

Group 7. The high-intermediate group of 28 villages splits into a very high group of 16 and a low group of 12 villages. The 16 very highly commercialized villages in Group 11 differ from their low cohort group very strongly in social and cultural practices. More than half the variance in commercialization is associated with the frequency of girls in school (.62). The highly commercialized villages have between 19 and 63% of girls in school, the less commercialized villages, less than 18%. Indeed, two other indicators of education are also very high showing the strong association between commercialization and educational achievement.

A profile of the 16 very highly commercialized villages would include, aside from unusually high educational attainment, fewer low castes (.36), less traditional family practices (.30), less employment in agriculture (.23), greater awareness of social legislation (.21), and less land per capita (.22).

Low Commercialization

Group 2. We return now to the low group of the first split (Group 2), the 49 villages which are less than half as commercialized as the high group of 59 villages. This low group splits into a higher group of 12 (Group 9) and a lower group of 37 villages (Group 8). On the average the high group is about 3 1/2 times as commercialized as the low group and is differentiated from it principally on the basis of population size (.51), and quality of agricultural technology (.41). The larger the village, on the average, the greater the commercialization and the better the farming technology. The number of castes per village is the second highest discriminator between high and low, accounting for 30% of the variance associated with differential commercialization. Generally, villages in which there is greater potential for division of labor, as indicated by a larger number of castes, sell a larger proportion of their output than villages in which there are very few castes, also have higher average incomes (.23), fewer low income households (.19), fewer low caste households (.11), and have slightly better access to towns and transport (.10).

Conclusion

Several generalizations about extent of commercialization in Indian villages can be made. Commercialization can be viewed as an economic process with important social consequences. The size of village, as reflected in the number of households and in the number of castes, is the most frequent important discriminator between the more commercialized and the less commercialized villages. Size affects possibilities of specialization on both the demand and the supply sides. The other distinguishing characteristics of highly commercialized villages are principally economic characteristics and others signifying above average development and cultural modernization: membership in co-operatives, nearness to transport facilities and towns, relatively abundant land per capita, better than average educational achievement, and more frequent departure from traditional family practices. The lower the extent of commercialization the more do the characteristics of village size and caste composition impinge. The weakly commercialized villages are very small and either tribal or, if Hindu, have relatively few castes.

AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME

Income is, of course, a crucial indicator in all analyses of economic development. Those characteristics which are systematically associated with high and with low village incomes are therefore of particular interest.

Total village monthly income in rupees divided by the village population gave average monthly incomes. The average ranged from 20 to 213 Rupees, with a mean of 80.91 and median of 72 Rupees.

We allowed nineteen variables to associate with income. Social and cultural characteristics were represented by the percent of nuclear households, the proportion of low caste households, and the Factor combining household type with frequency of child marriage. The composite index of education, reflecting various aspects of ecucational achievement[10] was also included. Economic characteristics were presented by almost all of our economic variables: the amount of land per capita, the percent of land owners and of tenant farmers, the percent employed in agriculture and the Factor combining these four agricultural characteristics.

The quality of agricultural technology and the extent of commercialization affect the ability to produce more than subsistence requirements; access to towns and transport affects the ability to sell produce and buy manufactured goods. The percent of co-operative members and the extent of



GROUP 1
Average Monthly Income
Extent of Commercialization (.11)
GROUP 3
N = 41
ȳ = 93.6 σ = 38.8
(60-100)
disregarding 2 villages
Cooperative Membership (.20)
GROUP 6
N = 33
ȳ = 102 σ = 38.2
(0-50)
Land per Capita (.20)
GROUP 9
N = 16
ȳ = 119.9 σ = 38.2
(1.38-9.23)
GROUP 8
N = 17
ȳ = 85.5 σ = 29.0
(.15-1.23)
GROUP 7
N = 8
ȳ = 58.3 σ = 13.8
(58-67)
GROUP 2
N = 65
ȳ = 69.3 σ = 28.7
(2-50)
Location and Access to Transport (.10)
GROUP 5
N = 20
ȳ = 83.1 σ = 35.5
(60-97)
GROUP 4
N = 45
ȳ = 63.2 σ = 22.3
(3-53)
*Variance in this group is below 10%

Diagram 3.

SUMMARY OF STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS

Average Monthly Income, four splits	
*Location and Transportation	2
Education	2
Employment in Agriculture	2
*Extent of Commercialization	1
*Cooperative Membership	1
*Land per Capita	1
Quality of Agricultural Technology	1
Family Household Type	1
Family Practices	1
Agricultural Base	1

*Denotes principal discriminator in a split

community development activities reflect the impetus to improve the economic well being of households and villages.

The level of income cannot be analyzed satisfactorily without taking the distribution of income into account. The percent of households earning below 50 Rupees a month, an indicator of the distribution of income at the lower end of the village income scale, was therefore also included in the analysis of level of income.

Statistical Analysis

Diagram 3 presents the results of the analysis. *Group 1.*

The full set of 108 villages splits initially into a high group of 41 villages whose incomes average one-third higher than the low cohort of 65 villages (94 compared to 69 Rupees). The systematic differences between the high and low income villages are relatively weak, but all are aspects of importance related directly to development and modernization: extent of commercialization (.11), quality of agricultural technology (.08), and educational achievement (.07). It is reassuring to find that these are the gross indicators of differences between high and low income villages since these aspects of village life are subject to policy manipulation. The results also confirm findings elsewhere on the importance for economic development of displacing subsistence production by production for market sale and of replacing traditional with modern technology.

That the numerical loadings are so small tells us either that there are frequent inaccuracies in the basic data on income (which would not be surprising given peasant suspicion of the uses to which income data might be put), or that differences in income among villages are not as striking as other differences, which our Factor analysis confirms (see Adelman and Dalton 1971). Because the weights are so low, the successive splits are likely to be more revealing than the first split; that is, more interesting information is likely to be revealed about the extreme subsets of relatively high and relatively low income villages.

High Income Villages

Group 3, the initially high group of 41 villages, splits into a higher group of 33 villages whose average income is almost twice that of its low cohort containing 8 villages. The single best discriminator between high and low income is extent of membership in co-operatives, which alone is associated with 20% of the variance between high and low. What is puzzling is that 13% of the variance between high and low income is associated with the strength of traditional family practices, in a retrogressive direction: villages with relatively high frequency of joint family households and child marriage have higher incomes. This is almost certainly due to the presence in the higher income groups of the dozen low caste villages having unusually high membership in co-operatives[11] as well as to the relationship between more joint families and more land ownership and less frequent land fragmentation.

Group 6 splits once again, into Group 9, the subset of 16 villages with the highest average income, and its low cohort, Group 8, containing 17 villages, averaging only 60% of the income of the very high group. The discriminators at this high extreme are land per capita (.20), agricultural base (.15), employment in agriculture (.14), and location and access to transport (.11). These indicators tell us that villages with very high incomes have more arable land per capita, better access to towns and transport, and few alternatives outside of agriculture.

Low Income Villages

Group 2, the low set of 65 villages in the first split, is capable of only one further split. It divides into a high group of 20 villages whose incomes are one-third higher than its low cohort (Group 4) of 45 villages. The systematic discriminators between these groups are nearness to towns and transport (.10) and extent of education (.08). The numerical loadings are weak, but as with the other splits, it is economic, technological, and educational criteria which principally distinguish between high and low income villages.

Conclusion

The numerical loadings associated with systematic differences between high and low income villages are weak, signifying that, by and large, differences in income between villages are not as pronounced as other differences. This is confirmed by another statistical analysis (Adelman and Dalton 1971) in which income appeared in Factor 4 (out of 5 factors).

In all the splits, high and low, it was principally economic and technological characteristics that were associated with income differences. The principal discriminants in each split were, successively, extent of commercialization, extent of membership in co-operatives, arable land per capita, and nearness to cities and transport facilities.

MEMBERSHIP IN CO-OPERATIVES

The co-operative movement was initiated under British rule. Since independence the government has continued to support the movement. Most co-operative societies at present are governmentally administered and financed.[12] The main functions of the societies are to supply credit and assist farmers to store and market their output. The co-operative societies probably could not continue to exist without governmental support which is substantial; some economists are critical of what they regard as an uneconomical allocation of governmental resources.[13]


Co-operatives in India are not only economic institutions in the sense of providing factor resources, technology, and services for agricultural development, they are also a new kind of voluntary assocation and modernizing institution. The propensity to joint co-operatives, therefore, may reflect attitudinal differences towards modernization in a larger sense than the economic alone.

In order to indicate the strength of the co-operation movement we calculated the number of village households which were members of multi-purpose co-operatives as a percentage of all village households. Membership ranged from zero to 78%, with a mean, median and mode of 20.5, 2.5, and 0 respectively.

Eighteen variables were allowed to associate with co-operative membership. All the economic variables were included as potentially influential. In addition, the variables characterizing aspects of village social organization, attitudes toward modernization, and extent of education were also included.

Results of the Statistical Analysis

Group 1. The full set of 108 villages first splits into a high group of 12 villages more than half of whose households (on the average) belong to co-operatives and a low group or 96 villages in which (on the average) only 1 in 6 households belong to co-operatives. The principal discriminator



*Only splinter splits can be found

**Variance in group is less than 10%

Diagram 4.

SUMMARY OF STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS

Cooperative Membership, four splits	
**Location and Transportation	4
*Extent of Commercialization	2
Awareness of National Social Legislation	2
Quality of Agricultural Technology	2
*Percent of Low Caste	1
Employment in Agriculture	1
Economic Development (F_1)	1
Family Practices	1
Education	1
Tenant Farmers	1
Agricultural Base	1

*Denotes principal discriminator in a split

between high and low membership is the percent of low-caste households in a village. Almost one-third of the variance among villages with regard to membership in co-operatives is associated with the frequency of low-caste households. We note that this splinter group of 12 villages (more than 80% of the village population consists of low castes) has more than twice the co-op membership of any succeeding high group (Group 5 and Group 9). The most probable reason for this association between co-op membership and proportion of low-caste households is the tendency, when the caste structure is mixed, for the high caste people to use co-operatives to further their economic interest at the expense of low-caste people. When a village is almost entirely low-caste, the benefits from co-operatives accrue to the low-caste; this may explain their popularity under these circumstances.

It seems likely that villages with greater than average membership in co-operatives are of two distinct sorts: (1) those containing a large proportion of low-caste households; and (2) more progressive villages as indicated by nearness to cities and good access to transport, and by a higher than average extent of commercialization. This conclusion is suggested by the fact that one or more such indicators of modernization appears in all the splits between high and low co-operative membership, but the percent of low-caste households does not.[14]

Once the stepwise analysis of variance removes this unusual splinter group of 12 low-caste villages having unusually high membership in co-operatives, we can analyze the remaining 96 villages to see what characteristics associate with high and low membership.

Group 2. The 96 villages in Group 2 split very evenly into a high group of 51 villages (Group 5) in which household membership in co-operatives is more than three times as great as in the low group of 45 villages (Group 4). The principal discriminator between high and low membership is extent of commercialization of output. In the 51 villages with high frequency of co-op membership, more than half of output was sold; in the low group, less than 40% of output was marketed. Almost one-fourth of the variance in the co-operative membership among villages is associated with extent of commercialization alone. We note that nearness to cities and transport facilities and awareness of national social legislation, which are also significant discriminators between high and low co-op membership, appeared as well in the first split, but were swamped by the weight of the characteristic of low caste.

Groups 5 and 4. Group 5, the intermediate-high group of 51 villages, splits into a high group of 32 villages (Group 9) in which membership in co-operatives is 2½ times as great as in its low cohort (Group 8) of 13 villages. The single significant discriminator between these two groups is nearness to cities and access to transport facilities, which accounts of 20% of the variance between high and low co-op membership.

Group 4, the set of 45 intermediate-low villages, splits into a set of 17 high villages (Group 7) which averages 12% of households belonging to co-ops, and a set of 27 low villages (Group 6) averaging slightly more than 1% of co-op membership. Again, the principal discriminator is village location with regard to cities and the quality of village access to transport services, which accounts of 20% of the variance between high and low membership in co-ops. The percent of tenant farms

and the nature of the Agricultural Base also appear as discriminators between high and low on this last split: villages with poorer agricultural bases and high proportions of tenant farmers have, on the average, a higher proportion of co-operative members, which suggests that these villages may be using membership in co-operatives as a means of escape from unusual poverty.

Conclusion

Villages with unusually high membership in co-operatives appear to be of two sorts. There is a small set of a dozen villages whose outstanding feature is that they are composed almost exclusively of low-caste households more than half of which (54%) belong to co-operatives.[15]

Once the 12 low-caste villages are detached from the set, we see that there are persistent associations between co-operative membership and indicators of development and modernization, particularly location and access to transport, extent of commercialization, and awareness of social legislation. There is some evidence that, at the extremes, push rather than pull accounts for greater co-operative membership. Co-operatives are more frequent in villages with poor agricultural bases as well as in low-caste villages.

EMPLOYMENT IN AGRICULTURE

The extent to which households are engaged in agriculture is not itself an indicator of village development or modernization. High dependence on agriculture can occur in relatively backward, stagnant villages, as well as in modernizing, technologically and commerically progressive ones. So, too, with low dependence on agriculture, which may accompany departures from traditional occupations and entrance into higher-paying, skilled, or service occupations, or indicate low productivity agriculture which households supplement with unskilled wage labor, gathering forest produce, or traditional handicrafts. We should therefore expect our stepwise analysis of variance to indicate differing clusters of characteristics for both high and low employment in agriculture.

For each village, the number of people aged 15 to 59 who were employed in agriculture was expressed as a percentage of all people in that age group. The percentage ranged from 0 to 99, with a mean and mode of 56%.

The size of the village and its labor force, and the arable land available, probably influence the proportion of villagers engaged in agriculture. Therefore the number of households in the village, the number of castes present, and the amount of land per capita were included as potentially explanatory variables. Since education, the extent of contact which villages have with towns, and the extent of commercialization influence alternative employment opportunities, these three characteristics were also included. In addition, two of the factor composites—the economic development indicator (Factor 1), and family practices—were included.

The Results of the Statistical Analysis

Group 1. Five characteristics are systematically associated with employment in agriculture for the entire set of 108 villages. Land per capita (.33); nearness to transport facilities and cities (.14); number of castes (.12); education (.10); and the composite factor for family practices (type of family household and proportion of females under 14 who are married) (.09).

The direction of these associations is mixed. Villages having *higher* than average employment in agriculture, are also characterized by *more* land per capita and *better* access to transport and towns. But they also have *fewer* castes, *lower* educational achievement, a *smaller* proportion of nuclear family households, and *earlier* age of female marriage.

For the entire set of villages, higher than average employment in agriculture suggests less cultural modernization, which is not surprising.



GROUP 1
Employment in Agriculture
Land per Capita (.33)
GROUP 2
N = 23
ȳ = 28.3 σ = 23.5
(.15-.46)
GROUP 3
N = 85
ȳ = 63.5 σ = 19.7
(.61-9.23)
Number of Castes (.13)
GROUP 4
N = 19
ȳ = 76.6 σ = 14.8
(10)
GROUP 5
N = 66
ȳ = 59.8 σ = 19.3
(30-90)
Family Practices (.45)
GROUP 10
N = 18
ȳ = 15.3 σ = 20
(34-56)
GROUP 11
N = 5
ȳ = 37 σ = 10
(6-32)
Family Practices (.24)
GROUP 12
N = 4
ȳ = 68.0 σ = 4.5
(58-63)
GROUP 13
N = 15
ȳ = 84 σ = 10.3
(31-55)
Family Practices (.13)
GROUP 6
N = 22
ȳ = 69.7 σ = 11.1
(0-32)
GROUP 7
N = 44
ȳ = 54.8 σ = 20.6
(34-59)
Extent of Commercialization (.15)
GROUP 8
N = 7
ȳ = 34.9 σ = 10.2
(10)
GROUP 9
N = 37
ȳ = 56.3 σ = 10
(17-100)
*Further splits are splinters
**Variance in group is less than 10%

Diagram 5.

SUMMARY OF STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS

Employment in Agriculture, six splits	
**Family Practices	4
**Extent of Commercialization	3
Size of Population	3
*Land per Capita	2
*Number of Castes	2
Location and Transportation	2
Education	2
Economic Development (F_1)	2

*Denotes a principal discriminator in a split

High Employment in Agriculture

Group 3. The 85 villages of Group 3 with relatively high employment in agriculture split into a very high group of 19 villages which average about one-third more agricultural employment than its lower cohort group of 66 villages. The single characteristic associated with the split is relatively slight: number of castes (.13). There is a weak tendency for villages with greater employment in agriculture to have fewer castes.

Group 4. The 19 highly agricultural villages split once more into a very high set of 15 villages averaging 84% of the adult population engaged in agriculture and a lower cohort group of 4 villages averaging 68 percent in agriculture. The 15 very highly agricultural villages have more modern family practices (more nuclear households and later female marriage); there is a slight tendency for them to have smaller village populations (11 percent of variance).

Group 5. The 66 villages in Group 5 with an average of 60% of the villagers employed in agriculture, which are intermediate in agricultural specialization, are divided according to family practices (.13). Villages with a *large* proportion of joint family households and a *high* frequency of child marriage, have a slightly *higher* average percentage of employment in agriculture (see Groups 6 and 7). The only other variable which helps to account for the differences in proportions of agricultural employment is the economic development factor (.12). Villages with low scores for the economic development factor have fewer people engaged in agriculture than villages with higher scores. But so few villages have low scores (only 7) that no conclusions can be drawn from this division.

Group 7. The 44 villages which are intermediate with regard to employment in agriculture split again. The 37 villages in Group 9 have 60% more employment in agriculture than the 7 villages in Group 8. The highly agricultural villages are more commercialized (.19), have larger populations (.17), and score higher on the indices for economic development (Factor 1).

Low Employment in Agriculture

Group 2. We turn now to the other extreme, villages with unusually low employment in agriculture. Group 2 contains 23 villages which, on the average, had less than half as much employment in agriculture as the remaining 86 villages in the entire set. These villages which do not specialize in agriculture differ markedly from the others in having much less land per capita, (.33) and in having poorer access to transport and cities (.14), a greater number of castes (.12), better access to educational facilities (.10), and more nuclear family households (.09).

Forty-five percent of the variance in agricultural employment between upper and lower villages is associated with differences in frequency of nuclear family households and age of females of marriage. The 18 villages in which under 16% of adults are in agriculture have a high proportion of nuclear family households and very little early marriage for females.[16]

The low villages are traditional in their economic organization as well as being more frequently subsistence producers rather than producers for commercial sale. Almost one-third of the variance

between upper and lower villages with regard to agricultural employment is associated with variance in extent of commercialization of village produce.

There are also some weaker associations with extremely low employment in agriculture: larger average population (.23), good access to transport facilities and towns (.22), and less land per capita (.12).[17]

EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

The economic value of primary education is a debated issue in the literature on development planning. Most countries have advanced significantly without universally literate populations. Economists frequently complain that too many resources are being devoted to universal primary education, producing a mass of semi-literate people who are not employable at greater productivity than the illiterates in any sphere of the economy. Bauer (1961:51) points out that this is not the case in India, where investment in heavy industry has been given primary consideration. Even though the declared aim of the Indian government is compulsory education for children between 6 and 12, in fact rather little expenditure was allocated to education. The second five year plan states that:

> As regards school buildings, it is inevitable that at the present stage austere standards should be adopted. Much of the work may be done out of doors, while the minimum covered accommodation needed is provided by the local community with some assistance from public authorities . . . A school could be started under whatever arrangements are immediately possible in a locality, and common buildings like village temples and "panchayat ghars" could also be used. Once a school is actually functioning, the provision of a building can be taken in hand as soon as circumstances are favorable and local contributions are forthcoming [Bauer 1961:52].

During the second five year plan, 1956-61, the growth of educational facilities was to depend on grass roots efforts (and possibly some missionary activity). The facilities existing in a village at the time of our study reflect mostly the past provision and, in part, the more recent desire for education.

An analysis of the educational facilities in our 108 villages should help to answer two kinds of questions: first what economic and cultural characteristics are associated with villages having easy access to educational facilities compared to those with poor access? Second (because of lack of central government provision of education), what determines the demand for educational facilities, i.e., are there underlying reasons for the differential placement of schools?

The villages in our sample were divided into three groups according to the educational facilities available in and near the village. The highest group consists of 18 villages with both primary and secondary schools in the village. The 75 villages in the middle group had primary education available in the village (some had secondary schools in nearby villages). Fifteen villages with no schools (whether or not primary schooling was available nearby) were included in the lowest group.

Education and economic status and activities are mutually dependent. Increased education may affect the village's economic development, provided the skills learned are directly applicable in the village situation (which frequently is not the case as indicated by the high level of unemployment among those with primary education). Villagers with a secure economic status will be able to spare their children from production activities and send them to school, thereby increasing the demand for school facilities. In order to allow for these interactions the following economic variables were included in the analysis of educational facilities: Income and its distribution, the level of economic development, land per capita and percent employed in agriculture, and the factor representing the Agricultural Base (by combining the latter two variables with features of land tenure).[18] The more dynamic indicators of economic activity in the village were also included, specifically the extent of commercial production, the percent of membership in multipurpose co-operatives and the extent of community development activities undertaken.

The demand for education is likely to depend on the location of the village and its access to transport facilities. Villages in contact with larger towns will probably demand more education



GROUP 1
Educational Facilities
Community Development Activities (.21)
GROUP 3
N = 17
ȳ = 73.0 σ = 18.7
(53-97)
GROUP 2
N = 91
ȳ = 46.9 σ = 18.9
(10-87)
Employment in Agriculture (.55)
GROUP 8
N = 6
ȳ = 91.7 σ = 3.7
(13-52)
GROUP 9
N = 11
ȳ = 67.7 σ = 15.4
(57-93)
Economic Development (.24)
GROUP 5
N = 59
ȳ = 53.7 σ = 12.9
(17-63)
GROUP 4
N = 32
ȳ = 34.3 σ = 21.6
(2-16)
Land per Capita (.11)
disregarding 6 villages
GROUP 7
N = 13
ȳ = 58.2 σ = 12.1
(.15-.46)
GROUP 6
N = 40
ȳ = 51.7 σ = 7.7
(.61-8.0)
Agricultural Base (.14)
disregarding 4 villages
GROUP 10
N = 18
ȳ = 36.2 σ = 17.8
(34-63)
GROUP 11
N = 10
ȳ = 16.0 σ = 10.7
(1-32)
Income (.13)
GROUP 13
N = 20
ȳ = 54.5 σ = 7.4
(32-63)
GROUP 12
N = 20
ȳ = 49.0 σ = 7.0
(6-31)

Diagram 6.

SUMMARY OF STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS

Educational Facilities, six splits	
Percent of Low Caste	4
*Land per Capita	3
*Economic Development (F_1)	3
Cooperative Membership	3
Number of Castes	3
*Community Development Activities	2
*Agriculture Base	2
Extent of Commercialization	2
Location and Transportation	2
Family Practices	2
*Employment in Agriculture	1
*Income	1

*Denotes principal discriminator in a split

than isolated villages. The less isolated villagers will be able to see the advantages of education—alternative employment opportunities and better agricultural instruction, among them—and will therefore probably demand more education. We therefore included in the analysis our variable indicating location and access to transport facilities.

Cultural characteristics which may affect the demand for education are the caste structure of the village, as indicated by the number of castes and by the percentage of low castes, and the extent of cultural modernization as represented by the percentage of nuclear families, the frequency of child-marriage, and the propensity to undertake community development projects.

Statistical Analysis

Group 1. The results of the analysis are presented in Diagram 6. Group 1 splits into a set of 17 villages having 50% more educational facilities than its low cohort group of 91 villages. The 108 villages are divided according to the community development activities undertaken (21% of variance). Villages which have undertaken many or large community development projects have better educational facilities than those which have not been active in community projects. This relationship is partly the result of the method used in estimating community development activity because a high weight was given to large projects such as new school buildings, and so there is an element of double counting here. Nevertheless the association may indicate that there has been some attempt at the grass-roots level to improve educational facilities through the community development program. Alternatively the relationship could indicate that communities which already have greater than average access to education are also more inclined to initiate other community development projects.

Four variables are of secondary importance in explaining the difference in educational facilities. There is a weak tendency (.13) for villages with more than 5% of low caste households to have more access to education than villages with less than 5% of low castes.

The location and availability of transport accounts for 14% of the inter-village variance—the more isolated villages tend to have fewer educational facilities than villages which are near towns and have good access to transport facilities.

Co-operative membership and the factor representing the level of economic development both account for 13% of the inter-village variance, but as with the percent of low castes, the relationships are not particularly strong. The 44 villages with less than 3% membership in co-operatives have, on the average, less access to schooling than the remaining villages where cooperative membership ranges from 3 to 78%. This might indicate that increased education is required to break down the suspicion of newly introduced co-operatives or that joining co-operatives increases the propensity to demand education. The relationship between the economic modernization factor and educational facilities[19] indicates that the less economically progressive villages also have less access to education.

Villages with Good Access to Education

Group 3. The 17 villages with good educational facilities and active community development programs in Group 3 are divided into groups 8 and 9 according to their dependence on agriculture, which accounts for more than half the variance in education facilities between the two groups. The greater the employment in agriculture the less provision there is for education, though both Groups 8 and 9 have better than average educational facilities. Group 3 could also be divided according to co-operative membership (33 percent). Villages with a low percentage of co-operative membership also tend to have fewer schools than villages in which a higher proportion of households are members of co-operatives. Here again the explanatory weight of the association is impressive (one-third of the variance). The 6 villages of Group 8 therefore appear to be modernizing in several ways: unusually good access to education, unusually high employment outside of agriculture, and a high percentage of households belonging to co-operatives.

Groups 5 and 4. Group 2, containing 91 villages, splits into an intermediate-high group of 59 villages (Group 5) whose access to education is more than 60% greater than its low cohort group of 32 villages (Group 4). The principal discriminant is Factor 1, which contains the economic modernization variables, and accounts for one-fourth of the variance. Villages with larger populations, larger numbers of castes, greater commercialization, a higher level of agricultural technology, and better access to towns and transport facilities also tend to have better access to educational facilities.

The percent of low caste households also appears as a significant discriminator. As in the first split, villages with more than 3% low castes have better access to educational facilities than villages with less than 3% low castes.

Groups 7 and 6, and 13 and 12. The 59 villages in Group 5, which on the average, have at least a primary school in the village, can be further subdivided.[20] The amount of land per capita accounts for 11% of the difference in schools available. Villages with less land (.15 to .46 acres per head) have slightly more educational facilities than villages with between .61 and 8.0 acres a head. This probably reflects the importance of child labor when larger areas of land are available for cultivation. The factor called Family Practices (family household type and percent of girls under 14 who are married) accounts for 10% of the difference in these villages, but no firm conclusions can be drawn from this division because only 7 villages with marginally better education facilities and factor scores of 48 and over are isolated by this split. The relationship might indicate that the more socially "modern" villages have a slightly greater tendency to provide for education than the more traditional villages.

Group 6 contains fairly homogeneous villages as far as educational facilities are concerned. They all have a primary school in the village and the majority of villages in this group have access to some higher education. Because there is so little variance in this group only tentative conclusions can be drawn from the division of the villages into two subgroups based on the scores of the factor combining income and its distribution. On the average, the difference between Groups 12 and 13 is that where the villages have higher scores on the income factor, they also have more access to secondary education. But there is so little difference between these two groups that it would not be justifiable to say either that increased education improves earning capacities and the distribution of income (and therefore results in a higher factor score), or that the greater and less unequal the income in villages, the greater is the demand for education. No other variable provides a significant split between the villages in Group 6.

Villages with Poor Access to Education

Groups 10 and 11. Group 4, containing the 32 villages with the poorest access to educational facilities, splits into a group of 18 villages having better than twice as good access to education than its low cohort group of 10 villages (Groups 10 and 11). The main discriminant for this split is the agricultural base of the village.[21] Where the agricultural base is reasonably good (scores between 34 and 63) the average village has at least a primary school. However where the agricultural base is very poor (scores of 32 and below) the villages usually have no school at all.

Thus there appears to be some basic level of economic development, or potential for development, which must be achieved before the people become concerned with education. Where the villagers are preoccupied with scraping a living from small areas of land which they have to rent, they apparently have little concern for education.

Of secondary importance in explaining the differences in educational facilities at low levels of education is the level of community development activity in the villages (13%). Those villages with more community development projects generally have a primary school, while on the whole villages without schools also do not have an active community development program. Possible explanations for this association have been discussed previously.

Conclusion

We find that the quality of access to education is strongly correlated with the extent of economic development. We see this throughout the spectrum of 108 villages. At the extremes, the 6 villages with the highest index for access to educational facilities are distinctive in the extent to which they have departed from agriculture and belong to cooperatives. The ten villages with the lowest index of access to educational facilities, have very low incomes, a very poor agricultural base, and have undertaken very few community projects. In the intermediate splits, it was also principally economic development characteristics that separated villages with good and poor access to education.

ADULT MALE LITERACY

It is commonly thought that increased literacy would improve the quality of the labor force in a developing country and thereby stimulate economic and cultural development. In this study we are interested in such connections between the extent of literacy and other characteristics affecting modernization in Indian villages; questions such as: Under what circumstances are the villagers receptive to education, i.e., what determines the demand for education? What are the effects of increased education on the social and economic activities and practices of the village, i.e., what is the result of an increase in supply of education?

Our measure of literacy is the percent of males over 14 who (in 1961) were literate.[22] Women in rural India generally remain illiterate. We use the percent of literate males rather than the percent of total population who are literate as probably being a more representative indicator for our analysis of the demand and supply of education. In another section we consider female literacy as an index of socio-cultural modernization.

Literate males in our sample ranged from 0 to 81% with a mean of 31%.

To reflect village social practices, the family household type was included (the proportion of simple households and the factor called Family Practices which combines household type with percent of girls under 14 who are married). We also included the percent of low castes.

The economic structure may also be expected to influence and be influenced by the level of literacy. Villagers with higher incomes would be able to forego the productive contribution of their children; thus the further the income is above the subsistence level the greater may be the potential demand for education. The relationship between literacy and income should also work from the supply side, with greater literacy enabling improved production and higher incomes. The level and distribution of income were therefore included in the analysis. The dependence on agriculture and the agricultural potential of the villages, as reflected by the percent employed in agriculture and the factor representing the nature of the Agricultural Base, also indicate economic characteristics as does the Factor 1, indicating the level of and potential for economic development. Inclusion of these variables will therefore enable us to draw conclusions about the factors influencing the level of literacy and about the effect of literacy on economic development.

Two other characteristics—location and access to transport facilities and the educational facilities available in and near the village—were also incorporated in the analysis. Both should affect the demand for education. Villagers who are aware of the benefits of education because of




Diagram 7.

SUMMARY OF STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS

	Adult Male Literacy, three splits
Agriculture Base	
*Educational Facilities	3
*Employment in Agriculture	2
*Economic Development (F_1)	2
Percent of Low Caste	2
Location and Transportation	2
Income (factor)	2
Family Household Type	1
Family Practices	1
	1

*Denotes principal discriminator in a split

frequent contact with towns (where the level of literacy is higher) may be specially motivated to educate their children. The more immediately available the educational facilities the more likely the villagers are to take advantage of them. Because literacy among adults obviously reflects educational facilities in existence for some time past, the availability of schools and contact with towns in the past may also influence the level of literacy in the village, but we have no variables which capture this time element.

Statistical Analysis

Diagram 7 summarizes the results of the analysis of the level of adult male literacy in the village.

Group 1. On the initial division of the villages the educational facilities in and nearby the village accounts for 18% of the difference between Groups 2 and 3. Those villages with secondary schools or technical colleges in or close to them have a much higher level of literacy (45%) than villages where there are only primary schools or no schools at all (25%). Thus the availability of education seems to have most influence on the level of literacy in the villages; this is more important than the social or economic influences on the demand for education.

Of secondary importance (12% of variance) in distinguishing between the levels of literacy is the quality of access of villages to towns and transportation. The less isolated villages have more literate adult males than villages with poor transport facilities.[23] The nature of the Agricultural Base explains 12% of the difference between the villages. Villages with a score below 45 on the average have a higher level of literacy (35%) than the villages with a better agricultural base (only 11%). The result suggests that a poor agricultural base is a spur to acquiring education for non-agricultural employment.

High Literacy Villages

Group 3. The 30 villages of Group 3 with an average of 45% literate males and better than average education facilities are subdivided into Groups 6 and 7 according to the percent employed in agriculture.[24] Villages with a diversified economic base (less than 47% employed in agriculture) have more literate males (58%) than villages which are primarily dependent on agriculture.[25] It could be that increased literacy has led to greater economic diversification, or alternatively, that households which are not primarily dependent on labor-intensive agriculture can afford to forfeit the labor and send their children to school, thus increasing the level of literacy.

Cultural practices are only of secondary importance in explaining the difference between these villages. On the average, villages with a larger proportion of simple nuclear households and higher scores on the Factor combining household type and percent of girls under 14 who are married, have higher levels of male literacy than villages with the more traditional social systems of joint family households and early female marriage.

Low Literacy Villages

Group 2. Using the Factor indicating the level of economic development as a discriminator, Group 2, the low group, is divided into Groups 4 and 5.[26] The 16 villages in Group 5 have 40% of literate males and factor scores 32 and over, while the 62 villages in Group 4 have an average of only 21% literate males and factor scores below 32. Higher levels of literacy are therefore associated with higher levels of economic development. This association might reflect the influence of increased literacy on economic development. It could also indicate that economic development raises the demand for education.

Another composite economic indicator—the Agricultural Base (11%)—is of secondary importance when differentiating between the villages in Group 2. As in the initial division, villages with a poor agricultural base (represented by low factor scores) have a higher average proportion of literate males than those with good agricultural bases. There are more males who can read and write in villages with good transport facilities and nearer to towns than in the more isolated

villages. This might be because more frequent contact with towns demonstrates the advantages of education.

Group 4, the lower group in terms of educational achievement, is not capable of further splits despite its large size.

Conclusion

There were only three significant splits, which indicates that there are relatively few systematic associations with levels of adult male literacy. The quality of the agricultural base appeared in all three indicating that literacy is higher where agricultural resources are poor. So too, where there is high employment in agriculture there is less literacy. Village access to educational facilities appeared twice, indicating that the better the access to education the higher the level of literacy; literacy is also higher where villages have good access to towns and transport facilities. Finally, literacy is greater where villages score high on our indices for economic development and social modernization: commercialization, quality of technology, late female marriage, and high frequency of simple family household organization.

CHILDREN IN SCHOOL

Because the role of education in economic development is currently attracting so much interest, we constructed several indicators of education. This one indicates the percent of village children aged 5 to 14 in school. The main disadvantage of using school registration is that the registered children do not always attend school. Another flaw in this measure is that frequently children from outside the village are registered at the village school, therefore our figures will tend to overestimate the percent of village children actually receiving formal education. However, this overestimation is likely to be a consistent error throughout the sample, and statistically will be least serious in an analysis of variance.

Education has an economic aspect because white and blue collar occupations require literacy, vocational skills, and professional training. Educational attainment also has social and cultural implications because it represents a departure from the traditional way of life.

The more modern are other social practices and attitudes the larger the proportion of children one would expect to find receiving a formal education. Most of our variables representing cultural practices and attitudes in the village were therefore included in the analysis. Family practices were indicated by the percent of nuclear households, and by the factor combining this variable with the percent of girls under 14 married. The caste system was reflected in the percent of low castes. Cultural forces were represented by the percent of girls under 14 who were married and by the frequency of awareness of the untouchability law.

The factor reflecting the level of economic development was included; the more advanced the village and the greater its potential for development the greater would one expect the demand for education to be in a world so dependent on written communication and technical training. For the same reason the factor combining income and its distribution was incorporated into the analysis. The agricultural base, the extent of dependence on agriculture, the quality of agricultural technology, the extent of production for commercial purposes, and the proportion of co-operative membership were included in order to reflect the levels and varieties of the economic activities in the village.

The location of the village and its access to transport facilities was included to capture any effects on the demand for education stemming from the influence of external contact.

The availability of education also influences the demand for education. The variable indicating the quality of village access to schooling (schools available in and around the village) was therefore included. The level of adult male literacy was included because it may affect the demand for education. Educated fathers and brothers are likely to appreciate the advantages of education and therefore want to send their children to school.



GROUP 1
Children in School
Adult Male Literacy (.51)
GROUP 3
N = 42
ȳ = 52.5 σ = 20.2
(35-82)
GROUP 5
N = 14
ȳ = 67.7 σ = 12.4
(54-78)
Family Household Type (.28)
GROUP 4
N = 28
ȳ = 44.8 σ = 19.0
(6-53)
GROUP 11
N = 5
ȳ = 60 σ = 15
(60-90)
Quality of Agricultural Technology (.29)
GROUP 10
N = 23
ȳ = 38.4 σ = 10
(0-50)
GROUP 2
N = 66
ȳ = 19.7 σ = 12.0
(0-30)
GROUP 7
N = 57
ȳ = 21.7 σ = 11.2
(20-80)
Educational Facilities (.18)
GROUP 9
N = 41
ȳ = 27 σ = 8.0
(18-90)
Agricultural Base (.12)
GROUP 8
N = 16
ȳ = 14 σ = 11
(0-15)
GROUP 6
N = 9
ȳ = 6.8 σ = 7.7
(2-10)
*Variance in group is less than 10%

Diagram 8.

SUMMARY OF STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS

Children in School, five splits	
*Quality of Agricultural Technology	3
*Agricultural Base	3
Extent of Commercialization	3
*Adult Male Literacy	2
Percent Low Caste	2
Cooperative Membership	2
*Family Household Type	1
*Educational Facilities	1
Girls Under 14 Married	1
Employment in Agriculture	1
Location and Transportation	1
Awareness of National Social Legislation	1
Economic Development (F_1)	1
Family Practices	1
Income	1

*Denotes principal discriminator in a split

Statistical Analysis

The results of the analysis of the percent of children registered in schools are presented in Diagram 8.

Group 1. The proportion of adult literate males accounts for 51% of the difference between the villages. Where over 30% of the men could read and write, an average of 52% of the children attended school; only 20% (average) of the children were receiving a formal education in villages where adult male literacy was less than 30%. This indicates very clearly that literate fathers are more likely to educate their children than are illiterate fathers.

Cultural practices are of secondary importance in explaining the difference between villages. Typically, where cultural practices are more modern as indicated by a low incidence of child marriage, 40% of the children are in school; school registrations are fewer where more traditional practices prevail.

High Education Villages

Group 3, the 42 villages with an average of 52% of the children in school and a high level of adult male literacy, divides according to proportion of nuclear households in the village.[27] Where there were between 54 and 79% of simple households, an average of 68% of the children were registered in school; but only 45% were in school when there were fewer nuclear households (6-53%). The less traditional form of household is therefore associated with greater frequency of educating children.

Two characteristics are of secondary importance in explaining the variation in school registrations between villages in Group 3. When over 90% of the villagers are aware of the untouchability law, nearly 70% of the children are registered in schools; however, the average percentage of children in school decreases where knowledge of the social legislation is less frequent.[28]

Group 4. The 28 intermediate-high villages of Group 4, averaging 45% of school-age children registered, splits again. Group 11, a high set of 4 villages averages 60% of its children in school, compared to its low cohort set of 23 villages (Group 10) averaging 38% of its children in school. The principal discriminants between high and low are the quality of agricultural technology (.29) and the agricultural base (.27). Secondary associations are the extent of commercialization (.12), and membership in co-operatives (.10). At this intermediate-high level, more children are in school in villages employing superior technology, having more arable land and land ownership per capita, less tenant farming, more production for sale, and higher membership in co-operatives.

Low Education Villages

Group 2. Access to education accounts for 18% of the difference between villages in Group 2, the low group of 66 villages in the first split. The nine villages with no schools and only 7% of the children registered to attend schools outside the village, are separated from the high cohort group of 57 villages with 22 percent average school registration and having at least a primary school in the village (with usually a secondary school or training center quite close).

Of secondary importance in explaining the difference between villages in Group 2 is the level of agricultural technology. Where traditional agricultural methods are used, the percent of children in school is low. The percent of school registrations is on the average higher where improved agricultural techniques are used. Farmers who are progessive in their use of modern technology seem also to be progressive in their wanting a better life for their children.

Group 7. The 57 villages in this intermediate-low set averaging 22% of their children in school splits once more. Group 9 contains 41 villages averaging 27% of their children in school compared with its low cohort group of 16 villages averaging only half as many children in school (14%). The only significant discriminator between them is the composite indicator of the agricultural base: more children are in school where there is higher employment in agriculture, more land per capita, a higher proportion of households owning some land, and fewer tenant farmers.

Conclusion

If we look at the primary variable in each of the five splits, we see the following: that the entire set of 108 villages splits first into a high set of 42 villages, which, on the average, has 2½ times as many children per village in school than the low set of 66 villages. Very sharply, the principal discriminator is adult male literacy, which alone accounts for half the variance in differential school attendance. Where more than one-third of fathers and elder brothers are literate, children are in school in much greater numbers than where fewer than one-third of adult males are literate.

The high group of 42 villages splits into a very high group of 14 villages in which 50% more children per village are in school than its lower cohort group of 28 villages. The principal characteristic associated with very high school registration is the prevalence of the simple family household. Where more than half the households per village are nuclear families, school attendance is very high.


It is only for the relatively low villages with regard to school registration that quality of access to educational facilities appears as a primary influence. Group 2 splits with regard to access, and even here the weight is not high (.18).

Finally, it is worth mentioning that systematic differences in the proportions of children in school are consistently associated with differences in other indicators of economic development and cultural modernization. In all the splits, the subsets of villages having larger proportions of children in school also have some combination of higher incomes, more commercial production, better access to cities and transport facilities, higher quality of agricultural technology, a better agricultural base, later female marriage, etc.

FAMILY HOUSEHOLD TYPE

In agricultural communities, joint family households (three generations, sometimes with collateral relatives) are both economic and social units. Commonly, the male head of household decides not only important economic activities—when and how much to plant; how much to market—but also social activities concerning marriage and education of his children, and anything else of importance concerning household members. The household group constitutes a tiny economic community, a producing, consuming, saving, and investing unit. The joint household is obviously a socializing unit as well, all older members playing some part in bringing up the children. So, too, is the joint household a unit in community affairs.

There are several connections between the type of family household and economic development. Family organization is related to the distribution of landholdings both through



*Only significant split that cannot be interpreted statistically.

Diagram 9.

SUMMARY OF STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS

Family Household Type, five splits	
**Employment in Agriculture	4
*Quality of Agricultural Technology	4
*Extent of Commercialization	3
Land per Capita	2
Education	2
Agricultural Base	1
*Percent of Low Caste	1

*Denotes principal discriminator in a split

inheritance and through the parcelization or fragmentation which may accompany the breakup of a joint household into several nuclear households. There is a great deal of historical evidence (see, e.g., Smith 1959; Sorokin et al. 1930) that the joint household in peasant economies tends to dissolve with enlarged commercialization and access to new income alternatives. Since the type of household organization has such direct and pervasive influence on its members, it seems reasonable to expect that there might be systematic differences of several sorts between villages with a high proportion of nuclear households compared to villages where the joint family household predominates.

Our indicator of the family household structure was the proportion of simple households containing one married couple with their unmarried children in the village. In our set of 108 villages the average number of simple households comprised 48%, and ranged from 92 to 6%. Thus, the joint family household is still the common traditional family organization in rural India.

Many of our social and cultural characteristics were included in the analysis of family household type. Low castes may tend to maintain the traditional extended family unit even when higher castes have moved toward the simple family structure. Therefore the percent of low castes was included, as was the extent of awareness of national social legislation.

It is generally recognized that as economic development occurs and as a village becomes more dependent on cash income and as new wage earning opportunities occur, the economic need for the extended family weakens. The continued maintenance of joint families may actually hinder capital accumulation and economic development. Several of our economic indicators were included as potentially influential forces affecting change in family household type: the quality of agricultural technology, the extent of commercialization of agricultural production, the agricultural land base, the amount of land per capita, the percent employed in agriculture, and the level of income and its distribution. Education, and location and access to transport facilities, were also included, as representing possible influences on household organization.

Statistical Analysis

The results of our analysis are presented in Diagram 9.

Group 1. In the first split, the percent employed in agriculture accounts for 10% of the difference between the two groups of villages. The joint family household is associated with traditional agriculture; the percent of simple households is smaller (only 44%) where employment in agriculture is larger (between 52 and 98%). Where employment in agriculture is below 50% the average proportion of simple households increases to 56%. It is probably the case that the existence of new income earning alternatives outside the family farm undermines the economic security rationale represented by the joint household.

Two other agricultural variables—the agricultural base (10%) and the quality of technology used in agriculture (9%)—are also associated with type of household. The proportion of simple households is greater (56%) when the villages have a poor land base and technology and so do not depend as greatly on agriculture.

More Modern Villages

Group 2. The 36 villages in Group 2 with an average of over 50% simple households and with less than 50% employment in agriculture divide according to the extent of commercialization of agriculture.[29] Group 9 contains 13 of the more economically progressive villages selling over 50% of their output; these also have a high proportion of simple households (an average of 63%). Enlarged commercialization is associated with the dissolution of the traditional joint family household.[30] In villages which sold less than 50% of their output an average of 53% of the households were nuclear families.

Group 8, containing 22 intermediate-high villages (53% of households are simple families), divides according to the proportion of low castes in the village. The proportion of simple households is higher (an average of 63%) in the 5 villages of Group 10 where there are no low castes, compared to the 17 villages in Group 11 where there are some low castes. Education and two economic variables—employment in agriculture and extent of commercialization—are of secondary importance in explaining the distribution of simple households. (There is an average of 47% simple households where employment in agriculture is less than 12%, and 57% simple households where between 17 and 48% of the village is employed in agriculture.) Villages with over 25% commercial production have an average of 56% simple households; the ratio of simple households is slightly smaller (49%) where there is less commercialization.

Traditional Villages

Group 3. A splinter group of 8 villages is removed from the 72 villages in Group 3. These eight villages have an average of 65% simple households, and over 90% employment in agriculture. The bulk of villages have a lower average ratio of nuclear families (41%) and between 52 and 88% employment in agriculture. The agricultural factor is of secondary importance in explaining the differences in proportions of simple households in these villages. Where the agricultural base is poor (as indicated by a low score on this factor) the proportion of simple households is 55%; but there are only 39% nuclear families where there is a better agricultural base. This may imply that where agricultural resources are poor and considerable labor is required, the joint family remains together in order to produce a sufficient amount to live on.

Group 4 (villages with between 52 and 88% employment in agriculture and an average of 41% simple households) divides according to the level of agricultural technology, which accounts for 13% of the difference in proportions of nuclear families in the 64 villages. Where the level of agricultural technology is very low (a score of zero) 52% of the households are simple, but where agricultural technology is better, an average of 37% of the households are simple. This division could represent a removal of the 16 villages which are unusual as regards agricultural technology. The association of poor agricultural technology and over 50% simple households may be the result of a third variable such as less dependence on agriculture and therefore less need for good agricultural methods and for a joint household to provide the labor.

The level of achievement in education explains 12% of the difference between proportions of simple households in Group 4. Surprisingly, where educational achievement is low there are more nuclear families than where educational achievement is higher.[31] This relationship may occur because joint families can afford to forfeit some manpower and send their children to school while simple households which are dependent on agriculture need all available manpower. The correlation, however, is weak (.12).

None of the included variables explain the differences between sub-groups of villages in Group 7.

Conclusion

The results of this analysis are weak, inconclusive, and conflicting. That the systematic associations between type of household organization and other characteristics are weak, is

indicated by the low weights attached to the discriminating variables in the early splits, and by the small differences in average scores between cohort groups: for example, Groups 2 and 3, which split off from 1, have mean percent of simple families of 56 and 44, which is a narrow difference.

The results are also conflicting in that in several splits, higher proportions of simple families are found to be associated with villages that are less modern on conventional criteria of education, quality of agricultural technology, etc.

GIRLS UNDER 14 MARRIED

In traditional India young children married legally. The marriages were negotiated within caste and usually involved property. The conditions associated with a movement away from such a deeply ingrained cultural practice to later marriage are worth examining. Later marriage may also reduce birth rates and have economic consequences.

Our indicator of early marriages was the number of married females under 14 years of age expressed as a percentage of the total number of girls under 14 in the village. The percentage ranged from 0 to 37% with a mean of 3.8%.

It seemed to us that many of the variables in our study would potentially influence the frequency of early female marriages. One would expect that the more advanced are the cultural practices and attitudes (reflected by fewer joint family households, a high percent of girls in school, a high level of education in the village, and a frequent awareness of national social legislation) the lower would be the frequency of female child marriage. The caste composition in the village probably also affects the frequency of child marriage. Our indicator of caste structure—the percent low castes—was therefore included as a potentially causal variable.

Economic development is usually accompanied by changes in cultural practices and attitudes, usually in a direction to encourage later marriage. Therefore our indicators of the extent of economic development, the quality of agricultural technology, the extent of commercialization of productive activities, and Factor 1, were included in the analysis. Indicators of the size of income and of the extent of employment in agriculture were also incorporated as potentially influential. Contractual marriages between children of land-owning families tend to consolidate land holdings; therefore the incidence of such marriages may well be influenced by the frequency of land ownership in the village. Finally, the variable summarizing the availability of transport was included since the ease of access to external influences and experiences probably has some influence on cultural and economic practices in the village.

Statistical Analysis


The results, shown by Diagram 10, indicate that other cultural practices have most influence on changing marriage customs in the villages.

Group 1, the entire sample of 108 villages, divides according to the percent of girls in school. Group 2 consists of 59 villages where fewer than 8% of the girls were in school and where an average of 8% of the girls under 14 were married. By contrast, in Group 3, containing 49 villages, 8 to 65% of the girls were in school, and an average of only 2% were married. Both indicators of cultural modernization tend to move together.

The family household type also associates with the age of females at marriage (.14); child marriages occur most frequently where the traditional joint family household persists. The economic characteristic most closely related to the frequency of child marriage is the percent of land ownership (.12). Where the proportion of land ownership is low the frequency of child marriage is also low. This probably means that land owning families enter into marriage contracts in part, at least, to consolidate land holdings.

Traditional Villages

Group 2. The 59 more traditional villages in Group 2 with a high proportion of child marriage and a low percent of girls in school, split again according to family household type. Group 4, a traditional set of 15 villages, has between 7 and 36% of simple households and an average of 13.5%



*Less than 10% of overall variance in group

Diagram 10.

SUMMARY OF STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS

	Girls Under 14 Married, five splits
**Family Household Type	4
Awareness of National Social Legislation	4
**Girls in School	3
*Location and Transportation	3
Employment in Agriculture	2
Land Ownership	2
Percent Low Caste	2
Income	2
Economic Development (F_1)	1
Extent of Commercialization	1

*Denotes principal discriminator in a split

married female children; Group 5, a less traditional set of 44 villages, has more than 37 percent of simple households, and an average of 6 percent of the girls were married. Group 4 contains the 15 most traditional villages in our study—a high proportion of married children, a small proportion of simple households, and very infrequent formal education for girls.

The extent of the awareness of national social legislation and access to transport and towns are also associated with the age of females at marriage in Group 2. Where fewer than 66% of the villagers were aware of the law concerning untouchability, an average of 10% of girls under 14 were married; but only 3% of the girls were married in villages where more than 66 percent of the population were aware of national social legislation. "Awareness of national social legislation" is almost certainly a proxy for deeper and more complicated attitudinal changes we were not able to capture with our data sources.

The more isolated villages with poor access to transport facilities still tend to practice traditional early marriages (they have an average of over 12% female child marriage). When the village is exposed to outside influences through better transport facilities and access to towns, the average percent of girls married drops to 5.

Group 5, which may be regarded as a set of 44 "intermediate" villages with regard to child marriage, divides into Groups 6 and 7 according to nearness to towns and access to transport facilities (.16), the extent of commercialization of productive activity (.13) and awareness of national social legislation (.11). In villages with good transport facilities only 4% of the female children are married; but where the village has poor transport facilities and access to towns, the percentage of married girls increases to 11. Only 3% of females under 14 were married in villages which marketed over 25% of their agricultural output; but 8% of girls in villages with less commercialization were married. The less isolated and the more economically developed villages were therefore also the less traditional. As would be expected, those villages where the inhabitants were fequently aware of the national social legislation had a lower percentage of child marriage than villages where there was less awareness of the national legislation.

Modern Villages

Group 3 consists of 49 villages with very infrequent child marriage, also characterized by more girls in school, more frequent nuclear family households, and less land ownership than the 59 villages in Group 2. Excluding two of the 49 villages in Group 3, the group divides according to the percent of girls in school. On the average, as the percent of girls in school increases, the frequency of child marriage decreases. Of the girls under 14 in the 27 villages in Group 8, an average of 2.5% were married and between 8 and 36% were attending schools; while in Group 9, less than 1% of the girls were married and between 37 and 65% were in school.

Family household type (.19) is also closely related to the percent of girls married in this "culturally more advanced" group. The higher the proportion of simple households the lower the proportion of traditional early marriages. These findings confirm the point that traditional

marriage practices weaken as villagers become more educated and as traditional economic and family structures weaken. Many institutions in traditional societies lose their functions as modernization proceeds.

Groups 8 and 9. The twenty villages in Group 9 have moved farthest away from traditional early marriage. Less than 1% of the girls under 14 are married and over 37% of the girls are in school.

Group 8 containing 27 villages with relatively infrequent child marriage divides according to the family household type (.36). The percent of children married is less (almost zero) where the proportion of simple households is large (between 60 and 79%). Group 10 consists of the more traditional villages where less than 57.5% of the households are simple families and an average of over 3% of the girls are married.

Conclusion

Several aspects of cultural modernization tend to occur together. Where the traditional practice of early marriage for girls has been largely abandoned, we also find a high proportion of girls in school and a high proportion of simple nuclear households (few joint family households); so too, we find greater awareness of national legislation, higher incomes, and greater economic development.

GIRLS IN SCHOOL

In village India, as in most traditional societies, the female's primary functions are to be housewife, mother, and sometimes agricultural worker. Formal schooling is not designed to train women for traditional life. Young girls are therefore instructed primarily in the home by the older women in their families. However, as the village society and attitudes change, home instruction of females gives way to formal education. Variations in the proportion of female children in school should tell us something about receptivity to modern innovations.

For each village the number of girls aged 5 to 14 who were attending schools was expressed as a percentage of the total female population of the same age. The percentage ranged from 0 to 75 with a mean and mode of 18 and 5% respectively.

Increased formal education of females may have demographic and economic consequences. Educated girls will probably marry later (certainly after they are 14) and later marriage will reduce birth and death rates, as well as infant mortality, particularly if school instruction includes hygiene and first aid. Where girls are used as agricultural workers, increased schooling may affect agricultural techniques to compensate for the reduction in available labor.

Because female education has strong cultural implications our two other indicators of cultural practice, frequency of early female marriage and extent of awareness of social legislation were included. One would think that where the villages have progressive attitudes toward marriage and greater awareness of national events they will also tend to be more willing to educate their girls. Outside influences are important in breaking down old cultural practices. Therefore the location of the village and its access to transport facilities were considered potentially important influences on frequency of educating girls.

The proportion of girls receiving formal education is probably also affected by the household and caste structures in the village. The indicators of type of family household, the factor combining household type and early female marriage, and percent of low castes were therefore included.

Villagers who have a secure income and do not depend on their children to assist with production activities will be able to afford to educate their children.[33] In addition, extreme dependence on an agriculture characterized by a low level of technology will reduce the incentive to educate girls if the farmer has to rely on his entire family for labor, particularly during peak demand periods (planting and harvesting). In order to allow for these effects the factor representing the extent of economic development, the percent employed in agriculture, and the agricultural base factor were included in the analysis of female education.




Diagram 11.

SUMMARY OF STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS

Girls in School, five splits	
*Quality of Agricultural Technology	4
*Location and Transportation	3
Employment in Agriculture	3
*Girls Under 14 Married	2
*Community Development Activities	2
Percent of Low Caste	2
Agricultural Base	2
Family Practices	2
*Cooperative Membership	1
Extent of Commercialization	1
Awareness of National Social Legislation	1
Income (factor)	1
Economic Development (F_1)	1

*Denotes principal discriminator in split

We also included four additional indicators of village economic activities: the quality of agricultural technology, the extent of commercialization, cooperative membership, and extent of community development activities undertaken.

Results of the Statistical Analysis

Diagram 11 shows that both cultural and economic characteristics are important in explaining different levels of female education in the villages.

Group 1. On the first split 23% of the variation in female education between villages is associated with differences in the percent of females under 14 who are married. Where less than 1% of the girls were married an average of 28% were in school, but this percentage dropped to an average of only 10% of girls in school where female child marriage was between 2 and 37%.

Two economic variables, the agricultural base and the quality of agricultural technology, were also associated with the differences between villages in sending girls to school. Villages which were largely dependent on agriculture—indicated by a high score (34 to 63) on the factor representing the agricultural base[34]—educated, on the average, only 13% of their girls. Where there was less dependence on agriculture (factor scores below 34) an average of 25% of the girls were in school. An average of 17% of the girls were being educated in villages with a higher level of agricultural technology (score of over 14); only 8% of girls were in school where the level of agricultural technology was low (under 14). It is difficult to say precisely what accounts for this association. Where improved technology is labor saving, child labor is less necessary in farming. But most agricultural innovations such as irrigation facilities are labor-intensive—requiring many more hours of labor per acre. The most likely explanation is therefore that where more modern agricultural practices have taken hold, more modern social practices are also growing, despite economic incentives to the contrary.

High Villages

Group 2. The 47 high scoring villages in Group 2 were further divided according to the quality of agricultural technology which accounted for 25% of the intervillage variance (between Groups 4 and 5). A higher quality of agricultural technology (a score of 14-63) was associated with a higher proportion of girls in school (an average of 35%). Where agricultural methods were more traditional (scores below 14) an average of only 12% of the girls were in school.

Differences in extent of awareness of national social legislation accounts for 12% of the intervillage variance in female education. When over 95% of the villagers are aware of the untouchability law as many as 42% of the girls are in school.

The extent of dependence on agriculture is also associated with the proportion of girls who are in school. When the score on the agricultural base factor is below 13, 34% of the girls are being educated. However, when the score on the agricultural base factor is over 13, indicating that there is more dependence on agriculture, only 21% of the girls are in school.

Group 5. Group 5, the set of 35 villages with the highest average number of girls in school so far identified (35%), is capable of further split. It divides into Group 6, 22 villages where slightly more than 40% of the girls are in school, and a lower set of 11 villages where roughly half as many girls, on the average, are in school. Here we get an odd association: the strongest discriminator (24%) is cooperative membership, but in the opposite direction to that expected. Where female education is high ($>$ 40% of girls in school) co-op membership is low ($<$ 25% of households are members). This result probably arises because of the positive association between co-op membership and low caste.

Low Villages

Group 3. Group 3, 61 villages with a comparatively low average number of girls in school and high proportion of female child marriage, divides according to location and access to transport facilities (23% of intervillage variance being associated). The 7 villages of Group 9 with good

locations and access to transport facilities have an average of 26% of their girls in school. The lower cohort group of 54 villages are not as well located and have only 8% of their girls in school. Access to outside influence seems to affect the proportion of females in school.

Cultural practices indicated by the percent of girls under 14 who are married, accounts for 14% of the intervillage variance in Group 3. The less frequent is early female marriage, the greater the proportion of females receiving an education.[35]

The economic characteristic accounting for most of the difference (15%) in Group 3 is quality of agricultural technology. Where agricultural practices are still mostly traditional, only 5% of the girls are in school, but where more advanced techniques are used in agriculture the percent of girls in school rises to 16.

Group 8. Group 8, 54 of the more isolated villages having a low percent of girls in school, divides according to the extent of community development activities in the villages. Where not many community development projects had been undertaken an average of only 6% of the girls were in school. In villages participating in more community development projects a higher proportion (17%) of the girls were educated.[36]

The level of agricultural technology accounted for 15% of the differences in proportions of girls in school in the villages in Group 8. As previously discussed, where agricultural technology is more developed a greater proportion of the girls are educated than where traditional agriculture is practiced.

Conclusion

The proportion of school age girls in school in rural Indian villages seems to vary in understandable ways. That educating girls is a departure from traditional social life and attitudes is shown by its association with later female marriage and awareness of national social legislation. That sending girls to school varies with economic forces is shown by frequent association (in 4 out of 5 splits) with the quality of agricultural technology. Where technology is better, there too, more girls are in school.

HEALTH FACILITIES

There has been much discussion about the importance of improving health in order to reduce human waste. We were unable to get a consistent direct measure of illness or malnutrition, but used instead an indirect measure—the health facilities available to the villagers. The villages were divided into five groups according to the type of health facilities (hospitals, clinics, dispensaries) available in and near the villages. The distance from each village to these facilities was also taken into account in the classification. The top group contained villages with dispensaries or hospitals in the village. Villages in the next group had no facilities of their own but had hospitals or dispensaries within three miles. The third group consisted of villages with medical services available 3 to 5 miles away. Villages in the fourth group had medical services available only 6 to 10 miles away. In the last group villages had no hospitals or dispensaries within 10 miles. (At the lowest end of the range was a village 45 miles from the nearest medical facilities).

Medical services have both social and economic consequences. The demand for medical services will depend both on the villagers' attitude towards modern medicine and on their ability to pay for treatment. Therefore both cultural and economic variables were included in the analysis of health facilities. The caste system was represented by the number of castes and by the percent of low castes in the village. The strength of traditional social practices in the village was represented by the factors combining family type with female child marriage, and was represented by the extent of contact with the outside world, the location and transport variable.

The economic situation in the villages was indicated by the economic development factor, by the combination of average income and low income, by the amount of land per capita, by the percent employed in agriculture, by the factor representing the agricultural base, and by the extent of commercialization.




Diagram 12.

SUMMARY OF STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS

Health Facilities, six splits	
***Percent of Low Caste	6
Employment in Agriculture	5
**Location and Transportation	3
*Agricultural Base	3
Economic Development (F_1)	3
Number of Castes	2
Land per Capita	2
Cooperative Membership	2
Extent of Commercialization	2
Income	2
Family Practices	1

*Denotes principal discriminator in a split

Statistical Analysis

Diagram 12 indicates the results of the analysis.

Group 1. The location of the village and its access to transport facilities seems to make a substantial difference to the health facilities available.[37] The less isolated villages (Group 3) have far better health facilities than those villages which are more than 10 miles from railway, road, or town (Group 2). It is easier to establish hospitals and clinics in areas well served by roads and railways. Supplies can be brought in and ill people moved out. Villagers in contact with towns moreover, are more likely to appreciate the advantages of modern medicine compared to those who associate mainly with traditional healers. There also may be problems in attracting medical personnel to live in remote villages.

Of secondary importance in accounting for the differences in health facilities are the economic development factor (19%), and the percentage of low-caste households (15%). Generally, the villages with diversified sources of income and more integrated into the regional or national economy have better health facilities than those villages which score low on this factor. The provision of health facilities is probably influenced by the ability of the villagers to pay for medical services; the demand for such facilities will probably increase as the village becomes integrated with the larger economy. Villages with more frequent membership in co-operative societies have better health facilities than villages in which less than 2% of the people are members of multi-purpose co-operatives.

Villages in which more than 20% of the households are low caste tend to be better provided with medical facilities than villages with fewer low-caste families. This may be the result of government policy to improve the position of scheduled castes and tribes.

Medically Well-Served Villages

Group 3, the villages with medical facilities on the average within 3 miles of the village, further subdivides according to location and access to transport (22%). As with the first split, villages which are less than 6 miles from a town, railway, or road have good services (usually a hospital or clinic in the village), while villages between 6 and 15 miles from towns and transport facilities do not have such good medical facilities. On the average those villages are within 3 miles of the nearest clinic or hospital.

Villages in Group 3 which have over 23% low castes on the average have better medical services than those with fewer low castes. A possible explanation for this has already been given.[38] Also of secondary importance in this split is the percent employed in agriculture. Villages which predominantly depend on agriculture tend to be less well provided with medical facilities than villages with a more diversified economic base.

Group 4. The 50 villages between 6 and 15 miles away from towns and transport (Group 4) divide further into Groups 8 and 9. Villages in Group 9 have over 32% low-caste households and health facilities an average of 3 to 5 miles away.

Villages With Poor Medical Facilities

Groups 6 and 7 are distinguished from Group 2 according to the nature of the agricultural base. The 20 villages in Group 6 score below 42 on the agricultural base factor and are on the average about 5 miles from medical services. Group 7 contains villages more than 5 miles from hospitals and clinics and with agricultural base scores over 43. It is surprising to find that villages with poor agricultural bases have better health services than those with more land per capita and larger proportion of landowners, and with a greater proportion of the people employed in agriculture. No explanation suggests itself.

Of secondary importance in explaining the differences between health facilities available to villages in Group 2 are the percent of low-caste households (19%), and the level and distribution of income (9%). As was the case in the previously discussed splits, villages with over 25% low-caste

households have health services more readily available than villages with fewer low-caste households. Villages with higher, more evenly distributed incomes, are on the average closer to health services than villages with lower income factor scores. This might be because higher income villages can afford to pay for treatment and therefore hospitals and clinics are established near them, or perhaps, better health (associated with closer health facilities) may enable people to earn more income.

Group 6 divides according to the percent of low-caste households, which accounts for 24 percent of the difference between these villages. As with previous splits, the larger the proportion of low-caste households the closer the nearest medical facilities.

Group 7. The percent of low-caste households is also important in discriminating between the villages in Group 7.[39] Villages with over 25% low-caste families are on the average between 5 and 10 miles from medical facilities; while villages with 20% or less low-caste households usually do not have a hospital or clinic within 10 miles.

The secondary relationships within Group 7 indicate that villages which are more than 10 miles from the nearest hospital or clinic sell almost none of their output. Commercialization is greater, however, in villages which are within 10 miles of medical facilities. Also, small, isolated villages with very few castes, are further from health facilities than villages in which there are more caste groups (and which are probably larger).[40]

Summary

The quality of village access to health facilities is systematically associated with other aspects of modernization, and with cultural attributes such as caste.

Villages close to towns and transport facilities, having high incomes, high membership in co-operatives, selling a large proportion of their produce also have good access to medical facilities, as do villages with high proportions of low castes, and villages less dependent on agriculture.

AWARENESS OF NATIONAL SOCIAL LEGISLATION

The village surveys which provided the basic data for this set of stepwise analyses of variance (and for the related essay on factor analysis), had very little information on the attitudes of villagers toward the nation-wide changes and policies that had been forthcoming since Independence, or information on their participation in events external to the village. We would like to have had data on attitudes toward birth control and land reform, indicators of political activity, and information on many other changes, to see what correlations existed between changes in attitude, action, and participation.


The only bit of information consistently reported in the village surveys of a semi-attitudinal sort was what percentage of the household heads were *aware* of national legislation concerning untouchability. All this tells us is something about village people's awareness of an external social happening. It tells us nothing about whether villagers approve of the legislative change, or whether it is actively being implemented in caste practices.

It seemed to us worthwhile to see what correlated with high and low awareness of the legislation because this crude indicator might serve as a proxy for deeper awarenesses and attitudes that we could not capture with our data sources.

We included in the analysis of this variable social and cultural characteristics relating to caste, age at marriage, type of household organization; indicators of educational achievement, community development activities, access to transport and towns, level of economic development, and the quality of agricultural resources.

Statistical Analysis

Group 1. The results of our analysis are summarized in Diagram 13. Of all the variables included in the analysis, the educational attainment in the village is associated with most of the difference in the percent of villagers who are aware of the untouchability law. Educational attainment



*The only statistically significant split does not make sense in terms of the associations it suggests
**Variance in group is less than 10%

Diagram 13.

SUMMARY OF STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS

Awareness of National Social Legislation, three splits	
Extent of Commercialization	3
Economic Development (F_1)	3
Family Practices	3
*Education	2
*Low Caste	2
*Cooperative Membership	2
Location and Transportation	2
Employment in Agriculture	1

*Denotes principal discriminator in a split

accounts for 29% of the inter-village variation. In a small group of 10 villages (Group 3) in which educational attainment is high (scores between 58 and 63) an average of 88 percent of the villagers know about the social legislation. In the remaining 98 villages of Group 2, fewer people are aware of the untouchability law and educational attainment is less (scores of 0 to 57). Three other characteristics also associate with significant differences in awareness of the national law: membership in cooperatives (27%), commercialization of agricultural production, and location and access to transport (both associate with 19% of inter-village variance). On the average few people are aware of the legislation in villages which are isolated from towns and transport, or where membership in cooperatives is small, or where there is little production for commercial purposes.[41]

Group 2. The villages in Group 2 divide according to the proportions of the heads and households which are members of multi-purpose co-operatives. Where membership in co-operatives is very low, knowledge of the untouchability law drops to only 20%; an average of 43% of the villagers are aware of the legislation where co-operative membership is over 2%.

Nearness to towns and transport facilities associates with 19% of the inter-village difference in Group 2. In the less isolated villages as many as 51% of the population are aware of the legislation. Commercialization of production also provides contacts outside the village; commercialization accounts for 16% of inter-village variance. Where less than 50% of production is marketed only 23% of the village population know about the legislation, whereas 43% of the villagers are aware of the law when over 50% of production is sold.

Little Awareness of Social Legislation

Group 4. The 43 villages in Group 4, with a very low average awareness of the national legislation, divide according to the percent of low castes (22%).[42] Unsurpisingly, where there is a large low caste group in the village, they are aware of the national legislation. Where there are no low castes only 11% are aware of the legislation, but where there are up to 75% low castes as many as 19% are aware of the legislation. The educational attainment (17%) and the level of economic development (16%) help explain the difference in awareness of social legislation in this group. On the average knowledge of the law is greater where there is higher educational attainment and the village scores higher on the economic development factor.

Conclusion

Our crude indicator, awareness of a piece of national legislation, seems to vary in understandable ways. High frequency of awareness of the untouchability law is consistently associated with better than average economic development and cultural modernization. Where there is markedly less awareness of the untouchability law, there is less economic development, less education, less access to towns and transport, and no low castes present.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

We undertook the research described in this paper for methodological and analytical reasons. We wanted to see whether statistical analyses of variance which yielded illuminating insights into national economic development and cultural modernization (Adelman and Morris 1967) could yield useful results when applied to village-level data. Along with others who have worked in development (e.g., Hill 1966; Stolper 1966), we also felt the need for more systematic analysis of village-level transformation within the context of post-colonial national development. Finally, our long-standing interest in the ways in which social organization and culture interact with modern economic activities in the transformational sequences of development, also led us to undertake this work.

Our first discovery was that it was easier to collect comparable data on seventy-four Third World nations than on seventy-four villages in any one of them. We were forced to confine our statistical analysis to villages in India alone, because no other nation (to our knowledge) has collected comparable information on as many as fifty of its villages. We were fortunate that the Indian village surveys contained data on matters of obvious importance to development and modernization—commercialization, income, access to transport and towns, caste composition, etc.—although we would have preferred the data to relate to a later period in the 1960s.

We were forced to use crude proxies—*awareness* of national legislation, percent of households owning *some* land—where insufficient data were available, and, more regrettably, ignore entirely matters of potential importance where no data at all existed from which to construct indicators and rank villages. And so we are silent on quality of land, reliability of rainfall, distribution of land ownership, effects of land reform legislation, holdings of assets and savings, extent of usage of purchased factors of production, fertility rates, birth control, political participation, effectiveness of agricultural extension services, and so on.

We think we have shown how statistical analyses of variance can simplify a mass of data relating to more than one hundred villages in ways which reveal underlying regularities and the interdependence of economic and social change. In showing what is systematically true for villages with above average and below average achievement, the statistical technique is an aid in formulating theories of micro-development and policy guidelines which at present do not exist.

NOTES

[1] We are grateful to the National Science Foundation for supporting this research under grant GS1235 and to the Council of Intersocietal Studies of Northwestern University for financing a trip to India to check out the results of the statistical analysis. We are indebted to Clarence Gulick, Robert Edminster, David Hopper, Wolf Ladijinsky, John Mellor, Ronald Ridker, Abraham Weisblat, and Clifton Wharton, Jr., for their constructive comments, and to Dylis Rennie and Joyce Nussbaum for their research assistance. (Additional statistical information on the same set of villages appears in Adelman and Dalton (1971), in which a factor analysis is applied to the same set of data.) We dedicate this work to our dear colleague, Robert H. Strotz.

[2] See Hill (1966) and Stolper (1966). The present authors began their statistical work in 1967 with the hope of analyzing village communities in three countries at different levels of development. We chose Mexico as the high, India as the intermediate, and Nigeria as the low country. To our great regret we had to abandon this scheme because comparable information on as many as 50 villages was available only for India. We hope that the results of this statistical study, together with its companion essay drawn from the same data (Adelman and Dalton 1971), are regarded as sufficiently promising to encourage other developing countries to gather the necessary village-level information to duplicate these kinds of statistical analyses.

[3] For a comparison of studies of "acculturation," "applied anthropology," and "micro-development," see Dalton (1971a,1971b).

[4] Census of India, 1961, Part VI, Village Survey Monographs (Monographs on Selected Villages) and District Census Handbooks.

[5] To give a technical description of the procedure used: The statistical technique used in the present study is based on an analysis of variance. It employs an assymmetrical branching process to subdivide the original sample into a series of subgroups constructed so as to enable one to predict the value of the dependent variable with the least error. At each step of the analysis, and for each candidate independent variable, one forms all possible mutually exclusive partitions of the parent

group into two subgroups. Each subgroup includes all observations which correspond to particular, usually successive, sets of values of the independent variable. The means of the two subgroups and the variances of the group means from the grand mean are calculated for every partition. For each variable, that partition is selected which maximizes the fraction of the total variance of the dependent variable accounted for by the means of the subgroups (i.e., which maximizes the sum of the squared deviations of the group means from the grand mean). At each step in the branching process, the results of the above calculation are compared for all the independent variables included in the analysis. That variable for which the best split accounts for the greatest portion of the overall variance of the dependent variable is chosen. The corresponding partition is then actually carried out.

For example, if the independent variable X assumes r distinct values X_r then the parent group is arranged initially so that all observations which have values $X_r \leq X_1$, are in Group 1, and all observations which have values $X_2, \ldots, X_r$ are in Group 2. One then calculates the means of the two subgroups, and the variance from the overall sample mean which is due to the group means (the "regression" sum of squares); this latter variance is equivalent to the variance attributable to (or "explained" by) the partition. Next, the partition which places the values of $X_r \leq X_2$ in Group 1 and the remaining data in the parent group in group 2, is tried and the same calculations are carried out. The process is then repeated for $X_r \leq X_3$, $X_r \leq X_4$, etc. For each independent variable that binary partition of the parent group which provides the largest reduction in the unexplained sum of squares (i.e., that partition which maximizes the "regression" or group sum of squares) becomes a candidate for splitting the parent group. The same analysis is carried out for each of the independent variables in turn, and the reduction in the variance provided by the best partition associated with each independent variable is then compared. At each step of the analysis, that split of the parent group is chosen which maximizes the sum of squares explained by the partition over all possible binary, non-overlapping partitions and over all the independent variables included in the analysis.

If the independent variables are ordinal in nature (i.e., are ranked in either ascending or descending order, so that X_{r+1} is either greater or less than X_r) only those splits which place all values of X_r which are less than or equal to a certain value, say X_m, in a given group are permissible. If an independent variable is only nominal (i.e., is assumed to have no natural order) then the analysis forms the partitions which correspond to all possible combinations of values of X_r taken 2, 3, 4, . . . , r-1 at a time, and selects that partition which performs best. The analysis can therefore accommodate dummy variables, or variables for which the investigator does not wish to specify a ranking.

It is evident from this description that this particular form of analysis of variance is extremely flexible. In spirit, it is akin to a highly non-linear type of stepwise multiple regression analysis. Like stepwise regression, the present technique finds, at each step, those combinations of values of the independent variable with least error. However, unlike regression analysis, the branching process used admits of highly non-linear interactions. The variables, interactions, and coefficients which best "explain" a difference of ΔY in the value of the dependent variable can be quite different for high values of the dependent variable from those which are required to account for the same difference at low, or intermediate values of the dependent variable. Furthermore, unlike regression analysis, the independent variables need not be assumed to be uncorrelated with each other. That is, the present statistical technique can accommodate interactions among independent variables. (These interactions, of course, constitute a particular type of non-linearity.)

The present technique of analysis is therefore ideally suited to the study of the systematic interactions among a dependent variable on the one hand, and a set of independent variables on the other, when there is reason to believe that the phenomenon to be analyzed affects different parts of the data differently and when the best principles for stratifying the original sample into sub-samples are not known a priori. Indeed, this technique of analysis is very well suited to revealing the best principles for meaningful stratification.

The criteria used to stop splitting groups are the following: (1) Any parent group (N) should have at least 20 villages. (2) The percent of variance in groups should be at least 10%. (3) Any cohort group is to contain at least 15% of the number of villages in its parent group (that is, we ignore splits which create splinter groupings). (4) That there be no more than 7 final groups formed. (5) All the splits reported are statistically significant.

[6] We emphasize again that awareness of the national legislation concerning untouchability is not itself a "cause" of anything. It is almost certainly correlated with modernizing attitudes which we were unable to measure with our data sources.

[7] Ten other variables are significantly associated with differences in quality of agricultural technology, ranging from educational access and achievement (.16) to income (.06).

[8] Some weaker associations with extent of commercialization are proportion of low income households (.12); adult male literacy (.08); educational achievement (.07); frequency of girls under 14 married (.07); and family household practices (.06).

[9] Some weaker associations with extent of commercialization, are number of castes (.11), percentage of low caste (.09), and average monthly income (.09).

[10] This factor combined the percent of female children in school, the percent of all children in school, the proportion of literate males, and the educational facilities in each village.

[11] This association swamped our factor analysis finding on cooperatives, and shows up clearly in the stepwise analysis of variance dealing with co-op membership (see Adelman and Dalton 1971).

[12] A department of co-operation has been established to supervise and organize the activities of village level co-operatives.

[13] See Bauer (1961:76-77).

[14] The factor analysis shows only the strong relationship between co-operative membership and density of low-castes, the same relationship indicated in this first split.

[15] This strong association between low-caste and co-op membership registered in the factor analysis, and accounted for our pessimistic conclusion with regard to the effectiveness of co-operatives.

[16] When the scores for the family practices factor are above 34 there is a much lower proportion of agricultural employment than in the more traditional villages with low scores on this factor.

[17] Factor 1, the composite we call the indicator for economic development, gives us a slightly peculiar result. It shows a positive correlation with very low employment in agriculture (.22). It is probably caused by several of the villages of the 18 in Group 12 being highly modern, commercialized, near cities, etc., mixed with others having opposite characteristics. See the opening remarks to this section where the mixed implications of low employment in agriculture are described.

[18] Land tenure is indicated by the percentages of land owners and of tenant farmers in the village.

[19] Most of the villages with no schools have factor scores below 15.

[20] Three villages with a poor agricultural base and no education facilities, one with over 8 acres of land per capita and excellent education facilities, and two villages with good education facilities but low scores on the social structure factor, were excluded from this analysis.

[21] Disregarding 4 villages with an average of only .77 acres of land per capita, with a primary school in the village, and higher education close by.

[22] The Indian Census (1961) defines a literate person as one who can read and write, though it is not clear what standard was required to classify as literate.

[23] Where the score for transport and location is 35 or less, only 23% of the adult males are literate, but 37% are literate where the transport and location score is over 35.

[24] 37 percent of the intervillage variance is explained by this factor.

[25] Villages with 48-93% employment in agriculture have only 35% literate males.

[26] Seventeen percent of the difference between the villages is accounted for by this composite variable, we call Economic Development (Factor 1).

[27] This variable accounts for 28% of the difference between the villages with regard to children in school.

[28] This variable explains 23% of the inter-village variance.

[29] One village with a high proportion of membership in co-operatives but only 21% simple households was excluded from this analysis.

[30] Eighteen percent of the difference in the proportions of simple households in this group was explained by the extent of commercialization.

[31] Villages which sell less than 50% of their output, have less than 50% employment in agriculture, and have an average of 53% simple households, are included in this group.

[32] The average of simple households is 51% where the education score is 17 and below and generally when the score is over 17 there are only 37% nuclear families.

[33] "The group with the highest school attendance includes those with the most economic security . . . it also includes occupational groups . . . whose work does not demand the help of children in the 5-14 age bracket" (Lewis 1965:43).

[34] Villages which rank high on this factor have a relatively large amount of land per capita, a high proportion of households owning land (and therefore relatively few tenant farmers) and many people employed full time in agriculture.

[35] Where fewer than 7% of the girls under 14 are married an average of 15% are in school, but an average of only 6% are in school where more than 7% of the girls are married.

[36] Many community projects of course consist of school buildings.

[37] This variable accounts for 31% of the difference between the villages.

[38] Twelve percent of the difference between these villages is explained by differences in the proportions of low-caste households.

[39] This variable accounts for 55% of the difference between health facilities available to villages in Group 7.

[40] The extent of commercialization, percent of low-caste households, and location and access to transport account for 52%, 24%, and 21% (respectively) of the difference between the villages in Group 7.

[41] Where less than 7% of the heads of households are members of co-operatives, an average of only 12% are aware of the legislation, but 51% are aware of the legislation where co-operative membership is more than 7%. Similarly, where commercialization is less than 40%, average awareness of legislation is only 24; it rises to 50% where commercialization is more than 40%; the difference in awareness between well-located and poorly located villages is 33% to 17%.

[42] Four villages which are well located and have good transport facilities, and therefore a great deal of contact with outside influences and an average of 45% of the population aware of the legislation, were excluded from Group 4 before this split was calculated.

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Jeova – with gratitude & love –
George

CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Vol. 13, No. 3–4, June–October 1972
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Peasantries in Anthropology and History[1]

by George Dalton

. . . literature on peasant communities is not, at the moment, a very likely place to look for ideas, and certainly not for systems of ideas.

CLIFFORD GEERTZ,
"Studies in Peasant Life: Community and Society"

Perhaps the single most challenging problem in peasant studies is still the conceptualization of the relationship of the villages to larger civilizational wholes.

ROBERT T. ANDERSON, "Studies in Peasant Life"

. . . I would like to make a plea for a careful typology of peasant economies.

SUTTI ORTIZ,
"The Structure of Decision-Making among Indians of Colombia"

This paper attempts to solve several problems in the anthropological literature of peasantry. One is the problem of specifying a distinctive set of economic characteristics that clearly distinguish peasant from tribal economies. Another is the problem of accounting for the extraordinary range of variation among peasantries, what Clifford Geertz quite rightly calls the need for a systematic understanding of the complexities of peasantry. A third is the problem of resolving contentious issues such as "Are African Cultivators To Be Called 'Peasants'?" (Fallers 1961); contentious issues are always symptoms of some sort of conceptual difficulty.

This paper tries to solve the problems by using a combination of historical, economic, and anthropological analysis. To understand the similarities and differences among peasantries currently studied by anthropologists in Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia, and the Middle East, it is useful to make very specific comparisons between their institutions and those of tribal communities before and after modernizing activities began, as well as those institutions prevailing in three sequential stages of West European peasantry: village communities and the larger cultures and societies of which they were a part before the modernization and industrialization of Western Europe (approximately 800–1300); the early centuries of modernization and industrialization (approximately 1300–1900); and late European development, during which the agricultural sector of national economies shrank and many of the remaining farmers became "postpeasants" (approximately 1900 to the present, and especially since the end of World War II).

Such elaborate bases of comparison are necessary because any peasant village community studied by an anthropologist today is in a developing, independent nation—India, Peru—and is composed of some sort of special mixture of traditional and modern characteristics. Either it is a "hybrid" peasantry, combining primitive or archaic and some type(s) of peasant institutions and technology (as in Latin America), or it is a "composite" peasantry, combining institutions (and technology) equivalent to those found in two, or all three, stages of West European peasantry (feudal, early modern, late modern).

I am suggesting that to understand today's peasantries in India or Peru it is useful to study European serfs in the 10th century and European farmers in the 20th century because we must know what Third World peasantries changed from and what they are changing

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The present paper, submitted for publication 21 IV 70, was sent for comment to 50 scholars, of whom the following responded: H. Russell Bernard, Beverly Chiñas, S. H. Franklin, David Kaplan, and Eric R. Wolf. Their comments are printed after the text and are followed by a reply from the author.

[1] This paper tries to disentangle some rather complicated matters relating to a large number of societies over long periods of time. I therefore adopt several expedients to enhance clarity. I use footnotes very frequently to cite supporting evidence and to make necessary qualifications and side remarks, in order to keep the text as unencumbered as possible, and I use tables to point up the conceptual classifications and distinctions crucial for the points I want to make.

I am grateful to Robert Anderson, Donald Brown, Paula Felt, George Foster, Ilona Polanyi, James Sheehan, and Conrad Totman for their critical comments on an earlier draft. I regret that several books relevant to the topics of this paper came to my attention too late for me to make extensive use of them, particularly Hunter (1969) and Franklin (1969).

into. Looking at a thousand years of European peasantry shows us what peasants were before, during, and after modernization and industrialization seriously began. As Thorner (1965:299) puts it:

> The study of peasant economies should encompass the whole process of their appearance, the changes they undergo through time, and the ways in which they become—or fail to become!—transformed into modern industrial economies.

PEASANTRIES: COMPLEXITY AND DIVERSITY

Even without the special difficulties that inhere in the study of peasantries, anthropology is an unusually complicated subject. Its universe comprises millions of small communities. India alone has half a million villages, and China (in 1949) a million. The rest of Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Oceania must contain at least another million. Anthropologists are interested in these millions of small communities as they were organized in all historical situations. For those that were colonized we can mark off the historical periods roughly as precolonial (aboriginal or traditional society), colonial (the period of European or American colonization), and postcolonial (which, except for Latin America, is barely one generation old). Geography and history alone make for enormous diversity. But there is much more.

Anthropologists are interested in all the principal activities, relationships, and institutions in these millions of small communities, past and present. They do the work of historians, political scientists, economists, psychologists, linguists, and specialists in law and religion, and, these days (see Vayda 1969), they also study agronomy, technology, medicine, and ecology—to give an incomplete listing. Anthropologists, moreover, are interested in the attributes of persons, of village communities, and of the larger cultures and societies of which the persons and villages may be part.

Anthropologists must also have some expert knowledge about activities, institutions, and relationships in their own European or American society corresponding to those they study in the field. Because they must write about Tiv or Trobriands economy in their own European language, they must know what meanings their readers will attach to the English or French words they use. This is particularly important in their usage of technical terms, such as "capital," "market," or "money" (therefore, anthropologists must also know how economists use words). Finally, anthropologists studying African or Asian communities must know about American capitalism or European Christianity because they continually compare and contrast what they study in the field with their own society's economy or religion.

This preamble about anthropology in general was necessary because the subject of this paper, peasantries, contains all the diversity and complexity characteristic of anthropological inquiry in general, and some special difficulties of its own. It is the extraordinary diversity among peasantries that makes necessary the special classifications and distinctions this paper will use.[2]

Once we point out that the large number of past and present peasantries comprise sets of characteristics with traditional European types providing some sort of reference group, the existence of conceptual difficulties in the anthropological literature is not surprising, especially when we add one further complicating feature. Their existence over long periods of time in many parts of the world means that peasantries have experienced internal and external shocks, such as war, revolution, famine, plague, emigration, colonization, and religous conversion. Yet we use the same designation—peasantry—before and after watershed changes. The French and Russian revolutions, the Irish famine, did change French, Russian, and Irish peasantries, and European industrialization affected them all.

The term "peasant," moreover, is sometimes used very loosely. It is being substituted for "primitive" and "tribal," which convey crudity and barbarity in English. Peasant is a less offensive term, apparently, and so it is sometimes used euphemistically to designate *all* the non-Western rural peoples or communities studied by anthropologists, without any specific social or economic institutions meant by the term.[3] According to Anderson (1963:178),

> A trend to broaden the frame of reference by changing the classification of many from tribal to peasant is perceptible.

A second way in which tribal and peasant are merged is by equating peasant with agriculturalist who produces some (unspecified) proportion of his own food (subsistence) requirements. Firth (1951:87) says, for instance,

> By a peasant economy one means a system of small-scale producers, with a simple technology and equipment often relying primarily for their subsistence on what they themselves produce. The primary means of livelihood of the peasant is cultivation of the soil.

When peasant economy is defined in this simple fashion, the agriculturalists of New Guinea (Malinowski 1935) and Africa (Bohannan and Bohannan 1968) are merged with those of India (Epstein 1962) and Latin America (Holmberg *et al.* 1965); the definition fits them all.

Similarly, Redfield's and Kroeber's characterizations of peasantries did not mark off peasant economy as a distinct type in contrast to tribal or primitive economy.

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[2] A statement by Fallers (1961:108) applies to this paper as well as to his: "The point of this [paper] is not, of course, merely to play with definitions but rather to explore some of the implications of the fact—of which we are all aware—that the concept 'peasant society' refers to a bundle of features which do not always go together."

I suggest in passing that much that is said in this paper about peasantry applies as well to "slavery" and "feudalism," in the sense that these too are complicated social-economic-political categories whose flesh-and-blood reality existed in different parts of the world over long periods of time, and whose comparative analysis also requires the kind of subclassification and scrutiny of sequential change that I attempt here for peasantry.

[3] Although "peasant" too has unlovely associations; Friedl (1962:6) says: "In describing the people of Vasilika [in Greece] I have avoided using the term 'peasant' for two reasons. First, the layman's concept of the peasant often includes the traits of stupidity and stubborn resistance to change that are by no means characteristic of the people of Vasilika. And second, social scientists have not yet arrived at a definition of the term that is generally accepted among them."

They showed that peasant communities were parts of larger societies or civilizations: world religion (Christianity, Islam), in contrast to the particularistic animisms and ancestor cults of tribal peoples; the presence of literacy in the larger culture; widely shared language, in contrast to the local languages of tribesmen. Finally, they observed that the peasant was subject to external political authority, i.e., that rank-and-file villagers were under the jurisdiction of superior political authority located outside the village (as in state systems), or political superiors who were not peasants (e.g., feudal lords).

The anthropological literature distinguishes peasant from tribal community by the characteristics of religion, language, and government, but not economy: reliance on agriculture, the presence of markets, the use of some form of money, simple technology, a combination of production for self-use (subsistence production) together with production for sale, low output, a narrow range of items produced, extreme ecological dependence (i.e., inability to control the vagaries of weather, plant disease, insects, etc.), the importance of family labor and the family as a production unit—all these characterize *some range* of tribal as well as *some range* of peasant economies.[4]

At the outset, then, we see how difficult it is to generalize about peasantries given the very many real differences among them and the absence of distinctive economic criteria marking off peasant from tribal. Yet the anthropological literature continually stresses what is true for some ideal type of "peasantry-in-general," regardless of time, place, and specific institutions of land tenure and political organization. This, we shall see, is the reason for the paucity of theoretical insights about peasantry the quotations heading this paper complain of.

SEQUENTIAL TYPES OF WEST EUROPEAN PEASANTRIES

I must explain why a systematic formulation of sequential types of West European peasantries provides a useful base of comparison with Third World peasantries studied by anthropologists.

There is rich literature because European social and economic history are old subjects and because some first-rate minds—Rostovsteff, Bloch, Pirenne, Maitland—have written analytically on European peasantries. But what makes this literature of special value to the anthropological study of peasantries is its depth, that is, the long stretches of time it covers. Anthropology is a recent subject compared to history, and fieldwork studies of peasantry more recent still (Geertz 1962); most of the fieldwork has been done only within the last 30 years, late in the colonial periods of the people studied (e.g., India), when the forces of economic development and cultural modernization were already distinctly present (Firth and Yamey 1966). Anthropological fieldwork is a microscope focused on a small community for a year or two; history is a telescope through which one can view the village and the larger society of which it is part over centuries (Hoskins 1957). Both are necessary to see peasantries properly.

For Western Europe we can study peasants from serfs to postpeasants, from the 9th to the 20th centuries:[5] before and after feudalism ended, before and after the mercantilistic expansion of foreign trade accompanying the discovery and colonization of North and South America, before and after the French Revolution, industrialization, massive urbanization, widespread literacy, the formation of modern nation-states, and, indeed, welfare and communist states. The historical literature for Europe, moreover, includes peasant villages as well as the larger societies and nonpeasant sectors for each of the three periods that interest us—before modernization, early modernization, and late modernization.[6] For Europe we can see *how peasant villagers changed in relation to nonpeasants in each stage of modernization.*[7]

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[4] Kroeber's (1948:284) celebrated characterization of peasantries includes economic characteristics, but not of a sort which differentiate tribal from peasant economies: "Peasants are definitely rural—yet live in relation to market towns; they form a class segment of a larger population which usually contains urban centers, sometimes metropolitan capitals. They constitute part-societies with part-cultures." Being rural, and having some (unspecified) connection with markets, is true for some range of tribal, as well as peasant, economies.

[5] Before the 9th century, the literature on European village communities is too fragmentary for my purposes. I should like to emphasize that I am drawing from West European history only. In eastern Europe, and particularly Russia, feudalism was intensified several hundred years after it had ended in England, and traditional peasantry remained intact much longer than in Western Europe. In Russia, moreover, the accelerated drive to industrialize and modernize was done under communism, not, as in England and Western Europe, under capitalism. Finally, more peasants have become "postpeasants" in West Europe because national development and modernization have progressed further than in eastern Europe.

[6] Each of the designations, "traditional peasantries," "early modernization," and "late modernization" denotes a broad category, within which there is much diversity on the principal defining characteristics. The definitions and characterizations used in this essay are to be regarded as ideal types, underscoring what is typical and true for most peasantries in each category. The first and third categories, "traditional peasantries" and "late modernization" (postpeasantries), are less heterogeneous than the middle category, for an obvious reason. Once modernization is underway (India at present, for example), clusters of peasant villages undergo different rates and sequences of transformation in each of the several defining characteristics—economic, social, cultural, etc. Thus we find within the same country in the same year individual villages of each of the three sorts delineated, although the preponderant number fit the second category best. "Dualism" increases in the early stage of modernization (Adelman and Morris 1967, Adelman and Dalton 1971*a*, Hunter 1969:48).

[7] There is one further reason to study European peasantries in historical sequence in order to obtain insights of use to anthropology. Colonial policies of the Spanish in Central and South America, and to a lesser extent, the English and French in Asia, transplanted Spanish, English, and French institutions to those societies now called peasant that are studied by anthropologists, the most obvious example being the hacienda system instituted by the Spanish (Holmberg *et al.* 1965). Economic policies in their overseas colonies, moreover, reflected the needs of the European home countries at the time, countries which themselves were changing with industrialization. The European powers which established overseas colonies before they really began to industrialize at home (e.g., Spain) viewed their potential economic benefits differently from powers which colonized after industrialization had burgeoned at home. Geertz (1963:105) contrasts the economic policies of the Dutch in the Outer Islands of Indonesia, after 1863, with their earlier policies in Java: ". . . rather than being focused on condiments [e.g., pepper], confections [e.g., sugar], and stimulants [e.g., coffee, tobacco], the [colonial] development centered on the production of industrial raw materials—a reflex . . . of the alteration in world market conditions attendant upon the spectacular growth of large-scale manufacturing in the West after the middle of the nineteenth century."

TABLE 1

CHARACTERISTICS OF WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THEIR PEASANTRIES

TRADITIONAL PEASANTRIES (approx. 800–1300)	EARLY MODERNIZATION (approx. 1300–1900)	LATE MODERNIZATION (postpeasant; approx. 1900–present)
Before industrialization:	By 1900:	By 1970:
$> \frac{3}{4}$ of population agricultural	Early industrialization	Highly industrialized
Weak monarch/feudalism	$< \frac{1}{2}$ of population agricultural	$< \frac{1}{4}$ of population agricultural
Petty rural/urban markets	Nation-state	Welfare state
Petty labor and land markets	Produce markets dominant	Integrated national resource markets
Subsistence/cash production	Factor markets dominant	Integrated national produce markets
Before mass literacy and education	Cash/subsistence production	Cash production
Servile peasantry	$> \frac{1}{2}$ of population literate	Universal literacy and education
Dependent land tenure	Legally free peasantry	Citizen-farmers
Little urbanization	Market land tenure dominant	Market land tenure
Small populations	Cities grow	Most of population urban
	Rapid growth of population	

In short, we can analyze European peasantries in a way that we cannot yet do for any other (except those in Japan): trace their changes from the traditional system of the Middle Ages, through early and then late modernization (see Table 1). We can determine which few of a larger set of defining characteristics are really central to peasantry by seeing what in fact changes and what does not change over time, and then to what extent their counterparts change or do not change in non-European peasantries studied by anthropologists.

Finally, we must distinguish between shared culture—what peasant villagers shared with nonpeasants—and the specific kinds of material and political transactions and social relationships that exist between peasants and their contemporary nonpeasants in each of the three historical situations.

Culture shared by peasants and nonpeasants (Redfield-Kroeber)

Material transactions between peasants and nonpeasants
Cultural and political transactions between peasants and nonpeasants
Social relationships between peasants and nonpeasants

These distinctions point up what I think is an essential characteristic of *peasant transformations*: in moving from traditional peasantry to early and then late modernization, the simple fact of shared culture between peasants and nonpeasants (language, religion) remains intact,[8] but specific *transactions* and *social relationships* between peasant and nonpeasant change radically.

[8] Although, of course, the culture or civilization they share with nonpeasants changes in early and late modernization, e.g., the growth of literacy and education comes to be shared by peasants and nonpeasants (in late modernization), as does the extent and quality of rural participation in national political and cultural life. If, with Redfield and Kroeber, one wants to stress the differences between traditional primitive (band and tribal) and peasant societies, the fact of shared culture—that peasants are part of wider language, religious, and political groupings—is important. If one wants to differentiate among peasantries before, during, and after the establishment of modern institutions and activities, the nature of transactions and social relationships between peasants and nonpeasants is important.

For each kind of peasantry we now consider the structured modes of interaction between the peasant and those nonpeasants in his local community and larger culture. Peasants and their village communities remain identifiable as distinct entities as long as significant aspects of local village organization, activities, and peasant rights and obligations remain different from those of urban and elite persons within the same contemporary larger society, culture, and economy. When this is no longer so, peasants have become postpeasant citizen-farmers, different from their fellow citizens only in their agricultural mode of livelihood and rural residence.

MEDIEVAL WEST EUROPEAN PEASANTRIES

We can explain at once why neither Redfield nor Kroeber assigned a distinctive set of economic characteristics to peasantries-in-general, and why Firth's simple definition of peasant economy would include the Tiv and Trobrianders as well as village India. Allocation of land, organization of work, and the disposition of ordinary produce in traditional (medieval) European peasantries (see Table 2) differ only slightly from traditional (precolonial) primitive or tribal economies in Africa and Oceania.

The principal economic difference between traditional peasant and tribal village economy in ordinary production of subsistence goods was in the *form* of dependent land tenure. This is a matter of importance.

Traditional tribal and peasant economies share several negative characteristics (when contrasted with developed, industrial capitalism), two of which are of immediate concern to us: the absence of industrial technology and applied science in production processes, and the absence of dominant, integrative, regional and national networks of markets for land, labor, and produce. Marketplaces and cash transactions most certainly existed in traditional European peasant (and some tribal) economies. But where they existed, as for example in towns and cities, they were most frequently controlled markets for small amounts of produce

TABLE 2

MEDIEVAL EUROPEAN VILLAGE ECONOMY (UNDER FEUDALISM, 800–1300)

ORGANIZATION	PERFORMANCE
1. Dependent land tenure feudalism: master-client relationship.	1. Narrow range of goods produced; bread grains as staple crops.
2. Subsistence production dominant; cash and markets, petty; sales primarily in local markets.	2. Low per capita real income.
3. Absence of integrative land, labor, and produce markets.	3. Threat of sporadic famine (material insecurity).
4. Primitive technology; ecological dependence.	

(foodstuffs); less frequently were labor and land transacted by commercial purchase and sale.[9]

By dependent land tenure we mean nonmarket land tenure. Land usage is acquired through social relationships—lineage affiliation, master-client relationships—that is, by means other than purchase or rental. The Tiv (Bohannan 1960, Bohannan and Bohannan 1968) and the Bantu, as well as societies in medieval Europe, institutionalized forms of dependent land tenure. According to Schapera and Goodwin (1937:157; see also Sadie 1960:297):

> Every [Bantu] household-head has an exclusive right to land for building his home and for cultivation. Generally he can take up such land for himself within the area controlled by his

[9] See Schultz (1969) and Slicher Van Bath (1963). Quantitative information is lacking to allow fine estimates of relative amounts of produced goods, labor, and land transacted via market sale compared to subsistence production and the amounts transacted otherwise (as corvée, tithe, etc.) in traditional European peasantries. It is almost certain that between 800 and 1200, the bulk of land, labor, and produce transactions were of nonmarket sorts: "The large number of markets might seem at first sight to contradict the commercial paralysis of the age for from the beginning of the ninth century they increased rapidly and new ones were continually being founded. But their number is itself proof of their insignificance. Only the Fair of St. Denys, near Paris (the Fair of Lendit), attracted once a year, among its pilgrims, occasional sellers and buyers from a distance. Apart from it there were only innumerable small weekly markets, where the peasants of the district offered for sale a few eggs, chickens, pounds of wool, or ells of coarse cloth woven at home. The nature of the business transacted appears quite clearly from the fact that people sold per *denaratas*, that is to say, by quantities not exceeding a few pence in value. In short, the utility of these small assemblies was limited to satisfying the household needs of the surrounding population, and also, no doubt, as among the Kabyles today, to satisfying that instinct of sociability which is inherent in all men. They constituted the sole distraction offered by a society settled in work on the land. Charlemagne's order to the serfs on his estates not to 'run about to markets' shows that they were attracted much more by the desire to enjoy themselves than by considerations of trade" (Pirenne 1936:10–11). Latouche (1966:235ff.) attributes much greater importance to markets, especially in Germany. It is also very likely that after 1150 agricultural production for commercial sale grew and the employment of wage labor became more frequent in England. See Gras (1915:Chap. 1), Postan (1954). Bloch makes a very important point in stressing that, although medieval documents frequently specify obligations to be paid in amount of coin (money), produce or labor could be the form of actual payment: ". . . far fewer payments in fact took the form of specie . . . than one would be inclined to infer from a casual and incautious reading of the documents. A particularly instructive example is found in the payment of the personal due(s), ordinarily known in France as '*chevage*'. Originally the sign of a protective relationship between lord and man, it became—at any rate in France—one of the symptoms of servitude in the new sense of the term; and under a variety of names it certainly constituted one of the most widespread of the seignorial dues in the Europe of the first feudal age. It is to be found commonly fixed at an annual rate of a few *deniers* per head. A literal interpretation of these requirements would make it appear that innumerable persons of both sexes and generally belonging to the humblest classes were in a position to make a payment each year of a number of small silver pieces. But the true situation was something quite different. Certain chargers, or other documents which happen to be less guarded in language, explain clearly how the *deniers* required for the *chevage* might be replaced by goods—the nature and quantity of which was sometimes specified and sometimes passed over in silence. Sometimes they could even be replaced by a few day's work. Among the great majority of texts which do not indicate the possibility of such substitution, most do not, it seems, assert that such a procedure was ruled out; they simply deemed it superfluous to allude to a universally known custom, and one that was often imposed by inescapable necessity. Everyone knew that to pay in *deniers* meant in *deniers* or their equivalent . . ." (Bloch 1967:236; see also Poole 1946:48, 58). Bloch also mentions that swidden agriculture (shifting cultivation using slash-and-burn techniques) survived in Europe up to the 18th century.

Goody (1969) makes a number of startling assertions about economy and technology in precolonial Africa (during the centuries equivalent to those in medieval Europe) that seem to me impossible to substantiate with existing evidence. He insufficiently appreciates the distinctions between commercial and noncommercial transactions, and between internal and foreign trade. ". . . the difference between [medieval] Africa and Eurasia does not lie in the presence or absence of markets and, in some spheres of activity at least, of a market economy. Much writing about non-European economics is based on the island communities in the Pacific—of the Trobriands, Tikopia, or Rossell Island. . . . The concept of non-monetary economics is hardly applicable to pre-colonial Africa, except possibly for certain hunting groups of minimal importance. Africa was involved in a vast network of wide-ranging trade [*nota bene*: commercial? internal?] long before the Portuguese came on the scene" (Goody 1969:394). Goody then cites evidence that foreign trade existed, and concludes that "from the point of view of mercantile economy, parts of Africa were similar to Western Europe of the same period" (p. 395). Goody is implicitly assuming that (1) the African foreign trade was strictly commercial; and that (2) the presence of commercial foreign trade means that internal market transactions were both present and quantitatively important; and, moreover, (3) that internal and external commercial transactions were quantitatively important in large areas of precolonial Africa. I suggest that none of these implicit assumptions is supportable by hard evidence. If the *mere presence* of markets—rather than their quantitative importance relative to nonmarket transactions, and the extent and frequency which land and labor enter the market—is stressed, then there is no difference between present-day Soviet, U.S., and Tiv economies: free, competitive markets are *present* in all three. See Bohannan and Dalton (1962), Arnold (1957*a*, 1957*b*), and Dalton (1962, 1964) for writings on "non-European economics" referring specifically to Africa.

Goody's assertion that food technology in medieval Europe was superior to that of Africa is also insupportable. He claims (1969:396) ". . . one fundamental invention that spread throughout the Eurasian continent never reached Africa south of the Sahara, with the exception of Ethiopia. I am referring to that Bronze Age invention, the plough . . . [which] increases the area of land a man can cultivate and hence makes possible a substantial rise in productivity, at least in open country. This in turn means a greater surplus for the maintenance of specialist crafts, for the growth of differences in wealth and in styles of life, for developments in urban, that is, non-agricultural life." Yet an authority on medieval European agriculture states (Slicher Van Bath 1963:18–19): "Meagre yields in relation to seed sown, that is low seed/yield ratios (proportion of seed to yield) of 1:3 or 1:4, which were the rule in the [European] Middle Ages and even in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries for the principal cereals such as rye and wheat, meant that a large part of the arable [land] had to be kept for growing the next year's seed. When the seed/yield ratio was 1:3, one-third of the whole arable had to be used to raise the seed for the following year." There is no reason to believe that agricultural productivity was consistently higher in medieval Europe than in medieval Africa. Goody does say that European soil conditions as well as technology were superior to those of Africa, but he omits a great deal; for example, that the harsh European winter meant not only short growing seasons, but that it was difficult to grow fodder crops for animals or, indeed, to keep them alive over the winter at all. On the attribution of such great social consequences to food surpluses, see Dalton (1960, 1963). Some useful essays on agriculture in preindustrial Europe are in Greenlaw (1958) and Warner (1966); for agriculture in England from 1200 to 1450, see Beveridge (1927).

sub-chief or headman, provided that he does not encroach upon land already occupied or cultivated by others. Failing this, it is the duty of his headman to provide him gratuitiously with as much land as he needs. . . . He also has the right, subject to the approval of his headman, to give away part of it to a relative or friend, or to lend it to someone else. But he can never sell it or dispose of it in any other way in return for material considerations. Should he finally abandon the spot, his land reverts to the tribe as a whole and can subsequently be assigned to someone else. The only other way he can lose his right to the land is by confiscation, if he is found guilty of some serious crime.

We are told what sorts of obligatory payments are made to headmen by Bantu household-heads having such rights to land (Schapera 1928:175):

By virtue of his official status as head of the tribe he also played an important part in the economic organization. . . . He received tribute from his people, both in kind and in labor. He was given a portion of every animal slaughtered or killed in the chase; the *lobola* [bridewealth] for his chief wife was paid by the members of his tribe; he had the right to call upon his subjects to perform certain tasks for him, such as building his huts or clearing the land for his wives' gardens; above all, he received fees for hearing cases and fines for misdemeanors, and, in cases of homicide the culprit paid compensation not to the relatives of the deceased but to him.

Traditional Bantu shared with medieval European peasants two crucial characteristics of livelihood and land tenure: neither had alternative means of procuring livelihood for themselves other than the agricultural or pastoral production undertaken in their local communities; and neither could acquire the use of land with which to produce their subsistence needs in ways other than through social relationships with their sociopolitical superiors who were the stewards of land allocation. Both lived in systems of dependent land tenure, the exact forms of which (the man-man relationship, and the man-land relationship, in Bohannan's phrase) differed; but both were nonmarket modes of acquisition, and both entailed the employment of a diffuse socioeconomic relationship with social superiors as the mode of land acquisition, requiring return payments of material goods, labor, and sociopolitical services and clientage (e.g., military service, labor for road-building).

In short, most medieval European peasants acquired the use of land through that variant of a patron-client relationship conventionally called feudal,[10] which, in its classic form, dominated Western Europe by the 9th or 10th century. In admirably succinct language, Bloch (1933:203) summarizes the nature of the feudal patron-client relationship based on dependent land tenure and the absence of commercial and industrial alternatives to subsistence agriculture:

In the absence then of a strong state, of blood ties capable of dominating the whole life and of an economic system founded upon money payments there grew up in Carolingian and post-Carolingian society relations of man to man of a peculiar type. The superior individual granted his protection and divers material advantages that assured a subsistence to the dependent directly or indirectly; the inferior pledged various prestations [obligatory payments] or various services and was under a general obligation to render aid.[11]

In medieval European society, the principal transactions between peasant and nonpeasant were these:

Peasant payments to feudal lord:
- annual specified material payments in produce and/or cash for use of land
- annual specified labor services to work the lord's land and herds
- annual specified obligation to attend lord's law court
- contingency labor services such as boon days to harvest lord's crop
- contingency noneconomic duties such as military service under lord
- contingency levies (special taxes) such as tallage at will (e.g., to ransom lord captured during war)
- obligatory payments to lord for use of lord's mill, fishpond, etc.
- contingency payments such as fines, marriage and death duties

Feudal lord's services and payments to peasants:[12]
- granting peasant right to use land for his subsistence and cash crops

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[10] For our purposes, it is useful to point out that there were two principal kinds of master-client relationships in feudalism; the relationships between the king and his landholding noble-warriors (barons and earls), and those between the landholding noble-warriors (or church estates) and their rank-and-file peasants. There were also intermediate kinds of master-client relationships, as when barons and counts infeudated lesser nobility who, in turn, infeudated peasant-serfs. Note also that the noble vassals of the king gave him military service and political counsel only; the peasants gave their feudal masters ordinary labor services, goods, and money, as well as political and military followership. For excellent expository accounts of feudalism, see Sayles (1961:Chap. 16) and Polanyi (1971).

[11] "The bankruptcy of the state represents the most potent fact during this period. . . . Men . . . lost the habit of expecting protection from a too distant sovereign. They sought it elsewhere and supplanted their obedience to the more remote ruler by other ties of dependence. . . . The social environment in which the feudal relations developed was characterized by an economic system in which [commercial] exchange although not entirely absent was comparatively rare and in which the not very abundant specie [cash] played but a restricted role. . . . the paucity of commercial relations caused the very existence of every man to depend narrowly upon his possibility of disposing in some way of the resources furnished by a portion of the soil placed under his control. But an important fraction of the population drew its revenue [livelihood] from the land only indirectly under the form of personal service in money or in kind for the use of the land. Moreover, the possession of superior rights to the land was for the possessor in many respects but a means of exercising an effective power of command over the men to whom he conceded or permitted the direct enjoyment of the fields. One of the essential characteristics of feudalism is that prestige and social worth sprang less from the free disposal of property than from the free disposal of human forces. But the difficulty of commercial exchange had a considerable effect upon the structure of society. The absence of an easy flow of sales and purchases such as exists in present-day societies prevented the formation of agricultural or industrial salaried classes and of any body of functionaries remunerated periodically in money" (Bloch 1933:203–4).

[12] Marxists suffer from a certain myopia with regard to these return services from lords to peasants, for several reasons. One is that they strongly disapprove of such systems and simply do not attribute any worth (value, importance) to community services provided by overlords, such as military protection and law enforcement. Another is their unequal regard for tangible goods and economic services compared to noneconomic services. The peasant-serfs paid upward to their lords tangible goods such as grain, chickens, eggs, and cash, and economic services such as days of work on the lord's land; they received back mostly noneconomic services of a public sort, such as defense, law, etc. That the lord also granted his peasant-serfs the right to use land to produce their own subsistence is, of course, simply dismissed by Marxists who disapprove of the lord's legal right to do so in the first place. For these reasons, the Marxists call the material transactions between lord and peasant "exploitation,"

military protection (e.g., against invaders)
police protection (e.g., against robbery)
juridical services to settle disputes
feasts to peasants at Christmas, Easter; also harvest gifts
food given to peasants on days when they work the lord's demesne
emergency provision of food in times of disaster

Peasant payments to church and priests:
obligatory tithes of produce and/or cash
death duties (mortuary payments)
fines for religious offenses

Church services to peasants:
sacraments at life crises—birth, communion, marriage, death
ordinary (Sunday) services of mass
church holidays as rest days
charitable gifts to the needy[13]

Peasant market transactions with townsmen:
peasants sell food and raw materials for cash
peasants buy goods fabricated in town or imported

Peasants were legal, political, social, and economic inferiors in medieval Europe. The structured subordination of peasants to nonpeasants was expressed in many ways, *de jure* and *de facto*, from restraints on their physical movement to sumptuary restrictions on what kinds of weapons, clothing and adornments they could wear and use, and foods they could legally consume.[14]

The details regarding the servile status of peasants vary enormously between regions of a country, between countries, and between centuries. There were degrees of unfreedom (Finley 1964). Pronounced social and economic stratification within the peasant village was not uncommon. In England, the peasant's obligations and rights were in rough proportion to the land he held from his lord. But even in his market dealings with townsmen the European peasant was controlled and subordinate. According to Sorokin, Zimmerman, and Galpin (1930:330):

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taking for granted that the peasant paid out to the lord much more than he received back. But it is impossible to make such a judgment objectively because of the *incommensurability* of what is paid out and received back by peasants. All this, of course, would apply to the Bantu and to the Soviet Union and the United States as well, where military defense and law enforcement are also obligatorily paid for by the rank and file. Are present-day Americans (and Russians) "exploited" by definition because we are forced under threat of legal penalty to pay one-third of our income to federal, state, and local governments? I suggest that whether or not "exploitation" exists in such situations should be made to depend on the tax or tribute payers' subjective reactions to such obligatory payments upwards; when U.S. (or, presumably, Soviet) citizens approve of the quantity and quality of public services they receive back for their tax money, they do not feel exploited. For a clear example of such subjectively felt exploitation in Africa, see Jaspan (1953). For a general discussion of peasantry from a Marxist point of view, see Thorner (1965).

[13] Chevalier (1963:261) comments on the Catholic Church providing emergency support and community services in 17th-century Mexico: "We also catch a glimpse in traveler's accounts of more unassuming bishops, devoted to their studies and spending more than their incomes on alms and good works. In 1639, His Majesty took the trouble of congratulating the Archbishop of Mexico City on his having sold his silver and books to aid the poor during a serious maize shortage. Many episcopal palaces seem to have had a special dining hall where the poor were fed and at the same time were edified with pious readings.

"The Jesuits distributed alms generously; the different convents gave free meals to anyone knocking at their doors between specified hours. Orders like the Brothers of St. João de Deus and St. Hippolytus maintained numerous hospitals. Bishops' palaces were always filled with travelers and visitors; while, for village monasteries, hospitality was a sacred duty that has persisted to this day in remote pueblos. The many brotherhoods fulfilled the function of modern mutual aid societies.

"A natural balance, somewhat medieval in flavor, was thus struck between what society gave the Church and what it received in return. Revenues from rich haciendas, dwellings, rents, and alms did flow into the Church's coffers; but they were returned in the form of charity, education, advancement of knowledge, and literary and artistic works."

[14] "The right and privilege of carrying weapons was . . . one of the distinctive marks of free status . . ." (Poole 1946:33). "But when the peasant had performed all the plowings and carryings demanded of him, and had sown and mown, and threshed and garnered for the lord, he was still under many obligations. His lack of freedom showed itself in a host of ways: he could neither brew nor bake where he would; he was not allowed to grind his own corn, to sell his own beasts, to give his own daughter in marriage . . . without his lord's permission 'prayed and obtained.' The lord's power was about him on all sides: not only did he fear the occasional visit of the [lord's] steward—armed with powers of life and death as it seemed . . . or the bailiff, whose authoritative commands everyone learned to respect, but he also came under the supervision of the local village officials—reeve, messor, beadle, etc. All these were constantly influencing his actions, and to some extent infringing on his freedoms" (Bennett 1937:129; see also Poole 1946:Chap. 2).

I realize that there were peasants in medieval Europe who were free and who owned their own land. But no source I have read suggests that they comprised a large proportion of the peasantry between 800 and 1300, in any country outside Scandinavia. Even in England in the second half of the 13th century it is estimated that freeholders did not comprise more than 40% of the peasantry (Sayles 1961:433). Slavery, moreover, still existed in England in the 11th century: "According to 'Domesday Book', over England as a whole, 9% of the counted population in 1086 were slaves, the proportion reaching 20% or more in the western counties" (Hilton 1969:14). Several sources emphasize that even free peasants paid dues and services to lords (e.g., Poole 1946:19), which is not surprising because feudal dues were an amalgam of taxes and rents, the feudal lord himself being both landowner and public official, endowed with political power and therefore the power to tax.

"Nothing could be more misleading than to dwell exclusively on the economic aspects of the relationship between a lord and his men, however important they may seem. For the lord was not merely the director of an undertaking [farming estate]; he was also a [political and military] leader. He had power of command over his tenants, levied his armed forces from them as occasion demanded, and in return gave them his protection. . . . [From] the Frankish period onward the seigneurial court was the recognized place for hearing most of the pleas affecting the lord's dependents. . . . Many a Frankish and French baron, if asked what his land brought in for him, would have answered like the Highlander who said "500 men." In economic terms the tenant owed his lord two types of obligation, the payment of rents and the performance of services [agricultural labor and craft work].

"The complex of rents was so intricate that it is not always easy to grasp the primary significance of each separate strand. Some payments represented a kind of ground rent, at once a recognition of the lord's proprietary right over the soil and a recompense for the tenant's enjoyment of it. Other rents, which were assessed like a poll tax, were a mark of personal servitude, and only affected certain categories of tenants; others again were payable in respect of auxiliary benefits made available to small-holders, pasturage, for example. Finally, there were the archaic charges formerly levied by the State which the lords had managed to usurp for their own profit. Sometimes, though this was rare, a proportion of the harvest was taken as payment. The majority of rents were fixed, sometimes in money, more often in kind. All in all they must have been a considerable burden—but the services were more oppressive still. The tenant of the Carolingian period owed more by way of [labor] service than he did in rent . . . the services were just as variegated as the rents; but leaving aside minor activities such as cartage, two major categories can be distinguished, agricultural labor and craftwork" (Bloch 1966:71–72). On page 76, Bloch tells us that "Frankish Gaul was not wholly manorialized. There were probably still small-holders unencumbered by any dues or services—save what they owed the king and his representatives. . . ."

The medieval system I am describing, then, is meant to portray the dominant organization, transactions, and relationships, not the only ones. For an excellent account of the English peasantry late in the medieval period, the 12th and 13th centuries, see Sayles (1961:Chap. 26); also Poole (1946:Chap. 2).

> Each of the [medieval] cities had its own trade area, which it kept in monopoly, partly even in a compulsory way: The rural population of the surrounding territory was obliged to buy and sell, and to pay corresponding duties [tolls] at the market of the city to which it was "attached."

We must use words carefully to describe the salient characteristics of medieval European peasant economy. To characterize it as "capitalist" or "communist," "cooperative" or "individualistic," "rational" or "irrational," is to confuse rather than illuminate.

The peasant's economic rights were carefully specified and varied with his status (as did his economic obligations). He had a lifelong and heritable right to land and other natural resources under the stewardship of his lord, as long as he made to his lord specified and contingent payments of produce and labor services, and as long as he fulfilled social and political obligations. The most important of the peasant's rights was to arable land to grow his subsistence staple of bread grains; he was also granted the right to gather wood for fuel, farm implements, and house repairs, and the right to pasture animals. In return, he paid his lord in specified amounts of labor services (provided by himself and his nuclear family) including work days to farm the lord's demesne; in specified amounts of his own produce, and, occasionally, petty amounts of cash; and in specified and contingent services of a more strictly and political sort, expressing, in diffuse fashion his subordinate-client status. The peasant got labor principally from his own nuclear family, and secondarily through reciprocal work arrangements with kin, friends, and neighbors, or by hiring occasional day laborers.[15]

His range of economic choice was very narrow. Even those who were not legally bound to their lord's service had no real alternative ways to secure livelihood outside of subsistence agriculture. Occupational mobility existed only for a few, late in the period when cities grew. Strip-farming within the two- or three-field system meant that the individual peasant had no autonomy in choosing his principal bread-grain crops.[16] Nor, after the harvest, could he choose to prevent animals belonging to others from grazing on the stubble of the strips he farmed.

In its organization and performance, medieval peasant subsistence economy very closely resembled tribal economy: in some areas market sales of land, labor, and produce did not exist and in others they were infrequent and petty transactions. Only a few items were produced, food staples being overwhelmingly important. Low-grade technology (tools and knowledge of production processes) meant low productivity, sporadic hunger, and extreme ecological dependence: the technology of farming could not compensate for or control the physical environment; just as in Africa (Allan 1965: Chap. 4) and India (Epstein 1967) flood, drought, and plant or animal disease meant widely fluctuating harvests and not infrequent hunger (Lucas 1930).

Although the similarities are more striking, there were also differences between medieval village peasant economy and primitive economy, and these too should be carefully specified: (1) Hunting, fishing, gathering, and slash-and-burn (swidden) agriculture were relatively more important sources of subsistence (compared to settled agriculture) in precolonial tribal economies than in medieval European peasant economy. (2) There were cities, markets, and cash transactions in the larger society of which the peasant village was a part, although most peasants in most of Europe from 800 to 1300 did not participate in these in a quantitatively important way. The presence of cash and urban markets we may regard as the legacy of Rome, surviving the centuries of upheaval accompanying the Germanic, Islamic, and Scandinavian invasions, in much diminished form.[17] (3) In both tribal and medieval peasant economies nonmarket forms of land tenure dominated; but the master-client form of dependent land tenure so inseparably a part of European feudalism is less frequently found in precolonial Africa, Oceania, and the Americas than other forms of dependent tenure (Bohannan 1960; Hogbin and Lawrence 1967).

For a significant proportion of medieval European peasants—impossible to quantify—their dependent-client form of land tenure was the economic expression of an inferior, servile status, expressed in all the important aspects of social existence. They were legal, political, and social inferiors as well. As the lowest class in a sharply stratified society, they were less constrained (more rights, choices, and mobility) than low castes and untouchables in traditional India, but almost certainly more constrained than, say Negroes in the U.S. between 1880 and 1940.

West European Peasantries: Early Modernization

> The penetration of money economy into the rural areas [of Europe] was a slow process, stretching from the 12th to the 19th centuries. [Slicher Van Bath 1963: 16]

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[15] For the equivalent organization in traditional village Japan, see Smith (1959). On wage labor in medieval England, see Postan (1954).

[16] He could choose what to plant on enclosed vegetable gardens near the house and on assarts (land newly brought under cultivation, isolated from other arable land).

[17] I can only mention in passing here, and elaborate a bit later in this paper, a matter that is important in economic anthropology and deserves detailed analysis. If one reads early European economic and social history after reading the descriptive literature on "primitive money" (e.g., Einzig 1948, Quiggin 1949), an interesting point emerges: that the "tribes without rulers" of traditional Africa and Oceania have characteristic valuables (the pig-tusk kind of primitive money) and transactions (e.g., kula trade) that disappeared in tribal Europe once the Roman Empire, with its sophisticated *state apparatus* and *coined money*, was established. It seems almost certain from the *analytical* literature of primitive money (Douglas 1958, 1967; Bohannan 1959; Polanyi 1968*a*, *b*; Dalton 1965, 1970*a*, 1971), that the highly ranked valuables (raffia cloth, brass rods, cows, kula bracelets, Rossel Island shells) are used by the elders and big men as devices of social control—to control access to status positions and to direct and initiate community activities. If so, the prestige sector (sphere) in that subset of tribal societies lacking centralized government and lacking money used in commercial (market) exchange contrasts directly with all peasantries. Peasantries are always parts of larger political systems (although, as under European feudalism, the monarchy may be weak), in which cash transactions and the use of cash as a unit of account in noncommercial transactions (e.g., fines for religious transgression, for not serving on juries, etc.) are present. In short, kula trade and the potlatch copper and pig-tusk sorts of primitive valuable do not appear in peasantries because central government, cash, and world religion perform the social control functions that the prestige sector performs in tribes without rulers. Displacement of traditional primitive valuables by cash and the transformation of the traditional prestige spheres of which they were a part (and also the powerful social control by big men) have been frequently reported in the anthropological literature. What happens when cash displaces cows as bridewealth, and ordinary people get access to purchased steel axes, are cases in point.

> . . . the [French] Revolution took up the work of the old regime with vigor. By creating the legal conditions for modern, progressive, commercial, capitalist agriculture, it confirmed a trend that had begun long before. [Lefebvre 1966: 93]

We conventionally date the beginnings of "modernization" for several European countries with wars, revolutions, and other such upheavals: Britain since the Black Death (1350), France since its great revolution (1789), Western Europe since the Napoleonic Wars (1815), Russia since the emancipation of its serfs (1861). From the viewpoint of our concerns with peasantry, these events are turning points because they accelerated changes in the *legal status* of peasants and in the traditional system of *land tenure* (from dependent tenure to market tenure). They endowed peasants with commercial, civil, legal, and political rights which eventually equalled those of nonpeasant elites. This legal freedom, together with the expansion of agricultural production for market sale and later—in England, 400 years later—the beginnings of industrialization, gave peasants new economic alternatives as well as the legal right to pursue them—in short, economic and social mobility.

During what I shall loosely call the early period of European modernization, from around 1300 to 1900, the transactions and social relationships between peasants and nonpeasants changed from those that existed under feudalism (Table 3; compare Table 2). However, in this radical restructuring of national political, economic, and religious life, the several aspects of life being transformed changed very unevenly. These time lags in rates of change in different dimensions of life are very important and they make generalization difficult. (I might add that different rates of change in economic, political, and social life also characterize the presently developing countries of the Third World.) Uneven change meant that differences between peasants and nonpeasants were still considerable for hundreds of years after feudalism ended. Nevertheless, that which distinguished the European peasant from the nonpeasant was for the most part different by 1900 compared to 900. The fact of continued differences allows one to identify peasantries as distinct entities until quite late, and, in some parts of Europe, up to the present time (Franklin 1969).

TABLE 3

EARLY MODERNIZATION OF EUROPEAN PEASANT ECONOMY (1300–1900)

ORGANIZATION	PERFORMANCE
1. Market land tenure: peasant land ownership; cash rental/share-cropping.	1. Widening range of foodstuffs and crops for industrial processing; increased specialization of agricultural production; growth of agricultural exports.
2. Production for cash sale dominant; subsistence production petty; sale to regional, national, and international markets.	2. Growth in per capita real income.
3. Presence of nationally integrative land, labor, and produce markets; growing price sensitivity.	3. Dependence on fluctuating market prices.
4. Beginnings of technological modernization of agriculture; rising productivity (and incomes); reduced ecological dependence.	4. End of chronic famine; rapid growth of population; massive imports of foodstuffs from outside of Europe.

It was not until the period of late modernization—since, say, 1900, and especially since 1950—with the coming of the welfare state in western and northern Europe, communism in eastern Europe, and accelerated industrialization and built-in economic growth in all of Europe, that peasants and their local economies changed radically from being distinct entities systematically different from nonpeasants and urban economies. In part the change was quantitative, i.e., the proportion of national populations directly engaged in farming diminished to the point that today, in all but a few West European countries, farm households comprise fewer than one-fourth of the population. But it is the qualitative changes in materials, political, and cultural transactions and in social relationships that concern us in the long-run transformation from peasant-serf to postpeasant citizen-farmer.

Early political modernization. In pouring old historical wine into new anthropological bottles, I shall inevitably destroy its flavor. Historians, quite rightly, are concerned with why and how these European transformations occurred. I am not. I must simply register the changes from the viewpoint of our anthropological interests in non-European peasantries of the present day.

Medieval European peasants and their village communities were changed by the momentous transformations now called "modernization," "development," and "national integration," which the historians have long called the end of feudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the rise of nationalism, and the Industrial Revolution. Peasants changed and nonpeasants changed. But for centuries yet peasantries neither shrank appreciably nor transmogrified themselves into nonpeasants or postpeasants; peasants remained agriculturalists different from townsmen in a variety of ways. In 900 peasants were legal inferiors with dependent land tenure. In 1900 they were legally free citizens with market land tenure, most of whom were still poor, semiliterate, backward farmers, using simple technology and living in semi-isolation from national cultural and political life.

Two features of the impact of early political modernization on European peasantries stand out. First, it is changes which affect the entire nation that are the important ones changing the peasants as well. Peasants along with nonpeasants became nationalized. Secondly, the changes in the legal and constitutional position of peasants were for centuries greater than the actual changes in peasant economic and cultural life because the new national economies of Europe remained undeveloped for centuries after feudalism ended. Both points apply as well to Latin American and Asian peasantries today. If we were to survey village peasantries of western (and eastern) Europe even as late as, say,

1870, we would find incredible varieties and mixtures of old and new economy, technology, political, social, and cultural life. These are the same sort of mixtures and variations that anthropologists now find in Asia and the Middle East because the peasantries of the Third World too are now in their early stage of political and economic modernization (see Hunter 1969).

The early political modernization of Western Europe consisted of abolishing the remnants of feudalism, disestablishing religion, establishing centralized governments with effective national jurisdiction, conferring civil rights and equality before the (national) law on all citizens (including the peasantry), and in the state's initiation of new public services such as elementary education, extended nationally.

It is startling to be reminded of how long so many European peasants remained *de facto* inferiors despite the legal freedom and civil rights conferred on them. In parts of Eastern Europe up to World War I their position resembled that of American Negroes in the South between 1880 and 1950. Poverty, lack of education, and the taint of traditional social inferiority meant little change from their feudal status and their transactions with nonpeasants.[18] Even in France, the fount of continental liberty, it is estimated that one-third of the peasants were still illiterate in 1880 (Wright 1964:10).[19] And in England, the birthplace of modern parliamentary government, property qualifications for voting were not abolished until the 1870's (when free, universal elementary education was also introduced) and women not given the vote until after World War I.

In short, early political modernization meant national political unification and legal freedom for peasants, but it did not change the *de facto* inferiority attributable to the peasants' continued poverty and *very weak participation in national political life*. Full-blooded democracy, education and the mobility it confers, and widely shared economic development were not yet in being anywhere in Europe; in several countries effective monarchies remained in political control; illiteracy, poverty, cultural isolation, and, in some areas, physical isolation continued. To be a peasant in 1900 meant to be a poor and backward farmer, culturally isolated, but it no longer meant a low-class, servile person, politically, legally, and economically dependent on his aristocratic superiors.[20]

Early economic and technological modernization. The economic life of peasants was also changed by forces that affected the entire nation. The mercantilistic creation of national markets and their international expansion (Heckscher 1955) meant the ever-widening and deepening commercialization of agriculture. From 1300 to 1700 national labor and land markets, as well as production for domestic and foreign markets, grew (Cheyney 1900)—all this before machines and factories came. As subsistence production declined, farmers' incomes came increasingly to depend on market forces—regionally, nationally, and internationally. After 1750, the growth of industrialization and cities meant an increased demand for food and agricultural raw materials, reinforcing the earlier commercialization of agriculture and giving peasants new occupational alternatives outside of agriculture. Improvements in agricultural technology meant increased productivity (and farm incomes) and increased control over the crop-reducing depredations of nature (flood, drought, insects, plant disease). Populations grew rapidly. Technological improvements also intensified the commercialization of agriculture by increasing the importance of purchased factors of production. Cash outlays for fertilizers and pesticides forced farmers to make cost-profit calculations, especially when expensive items such as farm machinery became available. With the bulk of income taking the form of cash receipts, farm households could buy an ever-widening range of manufactured consumption goods, as well as improved producers' technology, from the national (and international) economy.

Early national development also affected the rural sector in its provision of those powerful instruments of social capital, canals, railroads, and finally, electricity and that most powerful of institutional engines of capitalist development, the commercial banking system.

It is necessary to ask the same questions about European peasantries in 1900 that we asked about them in 900: Who are the nonpeasants? What has happened to shared culture, transactions, and social relationships between peasants and nonpeasants? We must then gauge what has changed the most and the least in peasant life.

The basic attributes of shared culture that struck Redfield and Kroeber as those which differentiated peasant from tribal member remain intact (with some very important qualifications). European peasants in 1900 still spoke the same language and shared the same

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[18] That dependent peasants comprised a "class" in medieval feudalism is a very clear and meaningful statement because the lowly position of peasants was expressed *de jure* and *de facto* and ramified into *all* sectors of life, economic, political, religious, etc. The social distance between peasant and lord was great, and the allowable interaction between them little. This social distance was reinforced by sumptuary laws prohibiting certain foods and weapons to peasants and by differences in allowable modes of dress, speech, deference, and respect. The differences between servile peasant and lord were as palpable and general as those between traditional Brahmin and low-caste Indian. With the end of feudalism and the beginnings of political and economic modernization (say, by the time Marx wrote), "class" became an ambiguous concept. There is now a discrepancy between *de jure* and *de facto* status: rich and poor, peasant and nonpeasant, lowborn and highborn became equal before the law and the government, *de jure*; but the status of each, *de facto*, depended on a combination of income, education, and lineage. The channels of upward mobility also widened and diversified.

The presence of "culture brokers" and of priests, schoolteachers, central government officials, and other outsiders in the village who form an alien elite in residence are all symptoms of the lag in rural compared to urban modernization.

In the literature of economic history it has long been recognized that England is a special case, compared to the Continent, because England was the first to industrialize and modernize. In England, moreover, feudalism ended earlier, a strong nation-state was formed earlier, and full-blooded market dependence in the form of widespread commercialization of agriculture and cottage industry occurred earlier. In his lectures Polanyi suggested that one of the reasons why industrialization had more traumatic social consequences in England than on the Continent was that factory employment at wages was a "step down" for the working-class Englishman, who had been free from feudal restraints for centuries. On the Continent, however, factory employment was frequently a step up for the more recently emancipated European peasant.

[19] Figures for illiteracy in 20 English rural counties in 1838–39 ranged from 34 to 60% (Hobsbawm and Rudé 1968:64). The authors suggest that they are underestimates.

[20] Friedl (1962), writing on a village in Greece, Wright (1964), writing on rural France, and Franklin (1969), writing on western and eastern Europe, all show that much technological and cultural modernization took place only *after* World War II. Wright emphasizes that an important impetus in rural French transformation was the effective national political participation by rural leaders.

religion as nonpeasants in their larger culture as they did in 900, and were still parts of larger political systems. But they were now citizens of nation-states; religion in some countries had been disestablished. The Protestant religion had displaced Catholicism as the principal religion in England and northern Europe, and as the 20th century approached agnosticism and atheism could be professed with legal impunity. What is important from the point of view of our anthropological interests in European peasantry is the heterogeneity—the variability—resulting from modernizing institutions and activities in *all* the principal aspects of life, and the specific ways in which changes in rural life lagged behind changes in urban life.

To say that peasants continue to share culture with nonpeasants in the period of early European modernization is a weak—indeed, misleading—generalization. It is, I think, an anthropological vice to attribute such great importance to statements which are true regardless of time, place, and specific institutions. And it is not entirely true to say that peasantries-in-general are parts of larger systems and tribal groups are not, for two reasons: The statement is analytically important *only* in contrasting traditional, premodern peasantries with traditional band and tribal communities,[21] say, European peasantries in the feudal period, and precolonial Tiv or Trobrianders. Once tribal groups begin to modernize—acquiring cash, commerce, machines, literacy, national political independence—tribal village communities also become parts of national cultures, societies, and economies.[22]

To say that European peasantries are parts of larger cultures before and after modernization begins is a misleading truth because the larger economy, polity, society, and culture of which the peasantries continue to be a part change structurally. In our terms, the material, political, and cultural transactions and the social relationships between peasants and nonpeasants change as modernization proceeds.

What is typical and true of West European peasantries of, say, 1900, compared to their medieval conditions under feudalism? The end of feudalism in England and Western Europe meant the substitution of market land tenure for the feudal variety of dependent land tenure. Peasants now either owned land outright and could themselves sell or lease it to others for a money rent, or acquire its use by paying only a money rent. Land tenure as part of feudal subordination and the social and political dues, tributes, payments, and labor services attached to servile status were abolished.

The end of feudalism also meant that peasants became the political subjects of their king and national government exclusively; they were no longer subjects of their (former) local lord of the manor. This legal and political nationalization of peasantries meant the enlargement of personal freedom. Physical mobility was to become legal; occupational mobility—locally, regionally, and nationally—was to provide increasingly important alternative sources of income as modernization proceeded in agriculture and then industry.

By 1900, most peasantries, in legal status and land tenure, had been radically changed from their feudal condition; a minority, particularly in eastern and southern Europe, had not. The peasantries of northern and western Europe sold most of their produce; their crops were diversified and their markets wide. They sold foodstuffs to urban markets for direct consumption by urban households; they sold produce for processing and industrial usage (e.g., sugar beets) in manufacturing; they sold produce destined for local, regional, national, and international markets. They were buying manufactured consumption goods and some improved technology (e.g., chemical fertilizers) from the national economy.

Economic life had changed in other ways as well. The growth of mining, transport, and manufacture brought urban occupations to the countryside and attracted peasants to the cities (Bendix 1956). In short, economic life became more and more commercialized; peasant farmers became increasingly dependent upon production for the national market, and upon purchasing consumer's and producer's goods from market with their cash income; and new occupational alternatives were available in the countryside and the cities. (And, from about 1850 onwards, the nations in which they lived were able to import foodstuffs cheaply from North and South America and Australia. See Slicher Van Bath 1963: 13–14.)

By 1900, the larger political system(s) and therefore political transactions between peasant and nonpeasant had also changed, but the political scene was as variable in Western Europe as the economic. As citizens, peasants now paid impersonal taxes in cash to local and national governments and were liable for national military conscription. They recieved back only a few modern social services; elementary education for their children and improved transportation (railroads) were perhaps the most important. Traditional public services such as the maintenance of law and order, defense, and justice were now provided in large measure by central and provincial, not local, government. The extent of political *participation* (in 1900) by peasants in national government varied enormously, with England and Russia representing the extreme cases.

Here we touch on a matter of some importance to our anthropological concerns with peasantry and modernization. Peasants and peasant villages remain distinct entities as long as they differ in important aspects from nonpeasants and urban groups *in their larger contemporary cultures* in ways other than those inevitably associated with differences in rural compared to urban life. For the period of early European modernization, there are, I think, two such differences, which are of primary importance because they account for several others as

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[21] Kroeber was probably aware of this. Both Foster (1960) and Geertz (1962) point out that Kroeber had in mind European peasantries of the 19th century. Unfortunately Kroeber's point seems to be regarded by the anthropologists who followed him as important for all peasantries, regardless of time and place.

[22] Again we see the need for historical demarcations in anthropology: precolonial/colonial/postcolonial; before modernization/early modernization/late modernization. To say that peasantries at all times and places are parts of larger systems while tribal groups are not is to generalize about peasantries before, during, and after modernization seriously begins, but to confine the comparison with band and tribal societies only to their traditional, premodernization forms.

well: differences in income and in education between peasant and nonpeasant.[23]

Most West European peasants by 1900 were citizen-farmers with low incomes and little or no education living in nation-states with market-integrated economies having just begun to industrialize.[24] There were two paths by which they were to become "nonpeasants," both of which were taken, especially after 1900. They could leave agriculture and rural life entirely by emigrating (to the United States, Canada, South Africa, Latin America), or by moving to towns and cities within their nations. But for large numbers of peasants to move to urban areas within their nations required massive and sustained industrialization, which, for most of Europe, was not to happen until after 1900.[25]

Or they could become "post peasants," citizen-farmers who remain in agriculture but with growing incomes and education which diminish the differences between rural and urban life. This too required sustained industrialization, development, and income growth in the national economy in which they lived, in addition to welfare-state policies and peasant participation in national cultural and especially political life—all these having the crucial consequences of reducing rural-urban income and educational inequalities (Myrdal 1960, Franklin 1969, Carr 1951), and therefore differences in "styles of life."

West European Peasantries: Late Modernization

> . . . one [Greek] farmer, at a time of unseasonable drought [in the 1950's] remarked as he looked at his tobacco fields, "I won't make the sign of the cross, I'll bring my pump over here and irrigate the field." [Friedl 1962:75]

The ideal case about to be described exists nowhere completely. What matters is that it is being approached by an ever larger proportion of European (and Japanese) farmers, and that it is again macrochanges in the national economy and culture that are the important levers changing rural life.

In 20th-century Europe large numbers of villagers became nonpeasants by moving to nonagricultural occupations in the cities and the countryside. What concerns us more are those who remain in agriculture but become postpeasant citizen-farmers. What was (and is) the process?

In the industrial capitalist countries of northern and western Europe—Sweden, England, France—it is the combined workings of the welfare state, democratic political institutions, a developed economy, and a sustained rate of national income growth which create economic, political, and cultural integration nationally; in the process, the systematic differences between peasant and nonpeasant with regard to income, education, cultural expression, and political participation diminish. Our first question, then, is, how have European peasantries been affected by the welfare-state policies of their governments in the 20th century?[26]

Sustaining the full-employment level of national output. Since World War II, all governments in the developed capitalist countries use fiscal and monetary policies to keep the level of gross national product from falling below the rate at which (near) full employment occurs. Such policies are intended to avoid a repetition of the disastrous decline in output and employment experienced in the 1930's, during which farm incomes and prices fell further than the average. Sustained full employment in nonagricultural sectors also affects farmers by continually giving them alternative employment opportunities outside of agriculture.

Market controls. Farm price support programs put a floor below which the prices of agricultural produce (and therefore farmers' incomes) cannot fall.

Regional development. The depressed, less developed, rural hinterland sectors of national economies have been helped directly by governmental programs which subsidize the creation of expensive capital facilities providing public utilities—electricity, irrigation, flood control, roads—as well as agricultural extension services and loans to farmers.

Direct welfare services. The provision of modern medical facilities and services through socialized medicine and old-age pensions increases the real income and material security of farmers, and enlarges the areas of common experience and activity farmers share with fellow citizens in cities and towns (see Franklin 1969). National governments' recently expanded provision of free or subsidized higher education, open to all on criteria of ability, is a potentially powerful solvent of rural-urban differences (as it has long been in the United States).

These welfare-state policies all work to reduce differences in the quality of life between rural and urban residents. Many of them have multiplier effects of the sort Myrdal emphasizes in his analysis of "cumulative causation" (Myrdal 1957: Chaps. 1–3). Marked increases in income and widened access to higher education

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[23] In 900 peasants were low-class subordinates, politically and legally inferior to nonpeasants. A crucial aspect of their inferiority was structured in their client position within the feudal system of dependent land tenure. By 1900 their political and legal inferiority to nonpeasants had disappeared and dependent land tenure had been displaced by market or commercial tenure. In 1900 there are two groups of nonpeasants to contrast them with: the urban working "class," also citizens, but quite like the peasants in their poverty, lack of education, and weak political participation; and the rural and urban upper "classes" (also citizens), legally equal to peasants and urban workers, but superior in lineage, or income, or education, and in *de facto* political participation.

[24] In many ways, the nonagricultural urbanized working classes, sharing the rural peasants' poverty and lack of education (and therefore their occupational and social immobility), resembled the rural peasants (see Mayhew 1851).

[25] Hicks (1969:120) says: "It is notorious that the technical improvements which have transformed the agriculture of so many countries in this century are diminishing the proportion of the population that is engaged in agriculture. What had been the chief of all economic occupations, is becoming a single 'industry' like the rest." He then cites the following figures for percentage of employed population engaged in agriculture, which shows the accelerated movement out of agriculture after World War II.

	1956	1966
U.K.	6.1	4.6
U.S.A.	9.9	5.5
Germany	16.9	10.8
France	25.9	17.6
Italy	32.7	23.8
Japan	38.5	24.2

[26] Welfare-state policies, of course, began much earlier than 1900. Legislation controlling the conditions of employment of children (minimum age, maximum hours) and safety requirements for hazardous occupations was initiated in England in the 1820's (see, Roberts 1960, Polanyi 1944:Chap. 17, and Carr 1951).

—obviously related to each other—are particularly powerful in eroding rural-urban differentials.

Welfare-state policies integrate the nation economically: differences in income and material security among regions and producing sectors are reduced; differences in social overhead capital facilities and governmental services between regions within a nation are reduced; differences in the quality of technology employed in agriculture compared to industry are reduced. National cultural integration is also enhanced by policies which reduce regional isolation by enlarging the means of transport and communication, and by late developments in technology, such as radio and television.

Perhaps one may sum up the economic changes that transform the peasantry during the late stage of development and modernization by saying that rural households and villages become more dependent upon market forces and governmental services external to the village. The *Gemeinschaft* qualities of local life carried over from the feudal period and early modernization are further weakened as villagers and villages become less and less isolated from urban and national life, and more and more dependent on their transactions with and participation in institutions outside the village.

APPLICATION TO PEASANTRIES IN ANTHROPOLOGY

How Do Peasant Economies Differ from Tribal Economies?

By "primitive" or "tribal," one means aboriginal Africa and Oceania before acculturation, applied anthropology, or microdevelopment began; i.e., before the changes brought by European colonial incursion (or postcolonial development). In short, one means traditional Trobrianders, Nuer, and Tiv as they are reported in the ethnographies of Malinowski, Evans-Pritchard, and Bohannan. These studies contain very specific descriptions of land tenure arrangements, kinds of technology used, modes of labor allocation, etc. But unless these tribal institutions are compared to equally specific institutions of actual peasant economies of time and place, one is confined to pointing out only a few noninstitutional similarities between tribal and peasant modes of livelihood. Traditional Trobriand and Tiv *economy* are made to appear similar to the *economy* of peasantry-in-general because the comparison is confined to both sorts being agricultural, using simple technology to produce some subsistence goods and some goods for market sale. When it comes to culture and society, anthropologists stress the difference between tribal and peasant: that peasantry-in-general shares language, religion, and government with nonpeasants within a larger culture, those characteristics that remain true of peasantries before and after modernization begins.

To compare tribal and peasant economies in an analytically revealing fashion requires us to choose specific peasant groupings of time and place, because the conclusions we reach will be different if we choose, say, the dependent feudal tenure of the French serf-peasant of 900 or the market tenure of the French citizen-peasant of 1900. As with land tenure, so too with the allocation of labor, the disposition of produce, the role of markets, the amounts of money used, and the quantities and types of foreign trade. We must compare the Tiv or Trobrianders not with peasantry-in-general or with a peasant community after modernization begins, but with a peasant community at the same stage of "traditionalness": for European peasants, this means after the Romans detribalized them and before modernization began. The appropriate comparison for aboriginal tribal economies is with European peasantries of the feudal period.

We must also describe how the economy of each was related to social organization. Otherwise, the differences between tribal and peasant economy remain invisible, as in Firth (1951:87):

> By a peasant economy one means a system of small-scale producers, with a simple technology and equipment often relying primarily for their subsistence on what they themselves produce. The primary means of livelihood of the peasant is cultivation of the soil.

Firth's definition applies equally well to the Trobriander and to the French peasants of 900 and 1800 because it omits comparison of specific economic and social institutions and the way social organization expresses material transactions. Traditional tribal societies have the pig-tusk sort of primitive valuable, bloodwealth, bridewealth, and land tenure as an expression of lineage affiliation. They have idiosyncratic religions. Tribes without rulers have no centralized government. Medieval European peasantries differed on all these counts.

The tribes of Europe were transformed by Roman institutions—central government, coined money, markets, cities—and by Christianity, all of which the German barbarian tribesmen also succumbed to. The differences between medieval European peasant economy and aboriginal Tiv are principally in the "prestige" sphere: the pig-tusk (actually, cows in Europe) sort of primitive valuable was displaced by Roman cash.[27] The bloodwealth kind of institution was displaced by courts of the king or the local lord.[28] Mortuary payments

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[27] "Money began began to depreciate after the Great [Germanic] Invasions. . . . When the barbarian monarchies took root in the West, they made no innovations, and were content to keep the Byzantine *solidus*. Most of their kings were incapable of a monetary policy; the newcomers followed the example of the local inhabitants and used the imperial gold *solidus*, which was in circulation throughout the whole of Europe and was everywhere accepted" (Latouche 1966:126).

[28] The same is true for the Inca's governing of conquered peoples: "Thus the central government [of the Inca] jealously reserved for itself the exclusive right to punish homicide. Neither the *ayllu* [endogamous lineage group] nor family of the murdered man, had any right to take the law into its own hands. The immediate governing official had to obtain permission from above. The central government alone had the authority to act independently.

"This is an extremely important indicator of the development of Inca [imperial] government. One has only to compare it with more primitive arrangements where self-help, clan feuds, and retaliatory killings are the order of the day to realize what the state had become by Inca times" (S. F. Moore 1958:79–80; see also p. 119).

So too for England: "Dependence on a lord was not the only check on the individual freedom of a free born man. Anglo-Saxon polity preserved, even down to the Norman Conquest, many traces of a time when kinship was the strongest of all bonds . . . when [there is] strife between hostile kindreds, it is shown in the war of tribal factions, and more specifically in the blood-feud. A man's kindred

within tribal lineage and affinal groupings were displaced by mortuary payments in cash and kind to the feudal lord and to the Catholic church. The ability of "big men" to work their way up to positions of leadership through the (pre-Roman) tribal European equivalents of prowess in kula, potlatch, and primitive warfare was displaced by formal political roles and military organization, and by formal social stratification into rigid classes. Reciprocal labor allocation and work parties based on lineage obligations were displaced by the nuclear family as the production unit and primary source of labor (supplemented by hired labor).

The medieval European peasant lacked those socioeconomic institutions and modes of cultural expression that are most peculiarly tribal—potlatch, kula, bridewealth, primitive monies. (These too, as well as agriculture, simple technology, etc., are parts of tribal economy.) The French peasant of 900 was a low-class dependent in a sharply stratified system who was outside the prestige sphere of the elite. He could not distinguish himself in battle or win eminence and reputation by success in kula or potlatch; nor could he win primitive valuables, the tangible means to make status payments and acquire power over clients in the community.[29]

In short, the French peasant of 900 was no longer tribal because he was part of a larger system containing the institutions of Catholicism, cash, cities, markets, kings and noble lords and their central and local governmental and military offices, and a kind of social stratification expressed in a master-client feudal land and political tenure arrangement. Each of the cultural, social, and political differences that anthropologists continually emphasize as differentiating peasant from tribal community expresses economic differences between them as well.

Catholicism, cash, cities, markets, and kings and noble lords all represent external ties between peasant villagers and institutions and people outside the village. Each also entails somewhat looser ties and weaker dependence *within* the village community compared to traditional bands and tribes (see Sahlins 1965:179–86).

Religion in band and tribal societies means beliefs and practices unique to the small group—idiosyncratic religions, as it were, which separate "us" from the rest of the world. Catholicism and Islam are universal religions. Where band and tribal languages are also idiosyncratic, they too intensify the special and inward identification of the band or tribe and its social distance from outsiders.

Cash, cities, and markets mean sources of income *not* dependent on local social ties, such as those with age-mates or extended kinsmen. So too with emergency support. In famine and war it is the church and the feudal lord who feed and protect their peasantry. Some characteristic features of peasantries follow: weaker extended kinship ties compared to those in tribal society (although the nuclear family, which is a farming and inheriting unit, remains important); village factions, rivalries, jealousies, and "the image of limited good."[30] These can persist without destroying the community because *mutual economic dependence* is structured differently in peasantries—especially once modernization begins—

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are his avengers; and, as it is their right and honor to avenge him, so it is their duty to make amends for his misdeeds, or else maintain his cause in fight. Step by step, as the power of the State waxes, the self-centered and self-helping autonomy of the kindred wanes. Private feud is controlled, regulated, put, one may say, into legal harness. . . . There is a constant tendency to conflict between the old customs of the family and the newer laws of the State. . . . In the England of the tenth century, we find that a powerful kindred may still be a danger to public order . . ." (Pollock and Maitland 1968:31–32; see also Sayles 1961:240).

[29] Malinowski never explained satisfactorily why the kula was so important to the Trobrianders. He said that possession of the kula valuables was important for its own sake (although some sort of unexplained "inland" kula also went on), and that the kula trade had taken on a heightened intensity since warfare had been curtailed by colonial authorities and dancing frowned on by the missionaries. Uberoi (1962) gives part of the answer in his persuasive analysis of the political implications of success in the kula. But there is more than this involved. Possession of kula valuables, as with possession of raffia cloth among the Lele (Douglas 1958, 1967) and traditional primitive valuables of several sorts among the Tiv (Bohannan 1959), enabled one to make important (noncommercial) payments, command the services of ritual and other specialists, initiate community activities, and thereby enhance one's public position and power. The primitive valuables are devices of social control over juniors and clients. But they do not for long survive the arrival of central government and cash (see Dalton 1965, 1970*a*, 1971).

[30] Foster's model combines some economic and technological attributes of medieval European village economy with postfeudal market land tenure and the sociopolitical status typical of peasants in the early stage of political modernization. It is not surprising that his paper (1965) evoked rejoinders. Other anthropologists have other combinations of old and new—composites and hybrids—in mind. None of them is wrong (all are to be found somewhere in the peasant world during some time period); but unless several models of peasantry are specified, each containing specific institutions drawn from the real world and explaining the sequential changes (and lags) that in fact occurred and are occurring, it is impossible to gauge what portion of peasant reality, at what times and places, any particular model (such as Foster's) describes.

The determining characteristics of Foster's model are poverty and economic stagnation at the village level, but a real potential exists nevertheless for some households to improve their material position (market land tenure? modernizing activities going on outside the village?). Those who attempt to do so evoke hostile retaliation by the economically stagnant majority, who perceive the potential material betterment of enterprising individuals as the relative material worsening of themselves. As Foster (1965:296–97) puts it, "I am considering a peasant community to be a closed system. Except in a special—but extremely important—way, a peasant sees his existence as determined and limited by the natural and social resources of his village and his immediate area. Consequently, there is a primary corollary to the Image of the Limited Good: if "Good" exists in limited amounts which cannot be expanded, and if the system is closed, it follows that *an individual or a family can improve a position only at the expense of others*."

Foster makes an important point which deserves emphasis and expansion. He asks what circumstances allow the unenterprising to punish and put down the enterprising. The answer he gives is that household organization within village life is extremely individualistic. The unenterprising can retaliate because they are neither socially nor economically subservient to nor dependent on the enterprising. Such conditions, which allow sustained factionalism, hostility, and strife, are more characteristic of peasant than traditional tribal economies. In tribes, there is much more material dependence (for labor, land, emergency support) on persons outside the nuclear family. And such faction-prone individualism is much more likely in peasantries in early modernization—market land tenure and cash transactions being important—than in traditional, dependent tenure peasantries, as the following statement by Foster (1965:301–2) suggests: ". . . economic activities in peasant societies require only limited cooperation. Peasant families typically can, as family units, produce most of their food, farm without extra help, build their houses, weave cloth for their clothes, carry their own produce to market and sell it—in short, take care of themselves with a degree of independence impossible in an industrial society and difficult in hunting-fishing-gathering societies."

But there is an amorphous quality to all this. How can one be sure that peasant households in the various sorts of peasantries described in this paper display *more* jealousy, distrust, factionalism, and inability to cooperate than do tribal households (see, e.g., Douglas 1962)? Once modernization begins in *both* peasant and tribal communities, cash-earning and market land tenure reduce dependence on local social ties, and make conflict less costly to one materially (see, for example, Jaspan 1953).

compared to bands and tribes: the persons and agencies from which one gets land, labor, and emergency support are different. To put it briefly, cash, markets, cities, world religion, and sharp social stratification kill reciprocity of the many sorts Sahlins (1965) so usefully delineates for traditional bands and tribes.

The difference between traditional primitive and peasant also tell us something about modernization. Despite the very real similarities between primitive and peasant food technology, subsistence production, and low output, traditional peasant communities are closer to being modern because cash, commerce, cities, literacy, and centralized polity were structured parts of the larger civilizations of which the peasant segments were part (see Hunter 1969:20–24).

Peasantry-in-General

Peasantry-in-general is a very misleading simplification and an illogical one for a profession which expresses a strong interest in modernization. Kroeber's definition applies to European peasantries under feudalism and after feudalism ended, but contrasts these only with aboriginal band and tribal societies. (When colonialism ends and modernization begins, tribal groups also become part-societies with part-cultures.) Those who emphasize the concept of peasantry-in-general, moreover, cannot then specify institutional structures of land tenure and polity, the kinds, frequencies, and amounts of material and labor transactions between peasants and nonpeasants, or the social relationships between them. Because these change after modernization begins, we have at least two structurally different kinds of peasant societies and economies to deal with: traditional and modernizing. (The same, of course, is true for primitive societies and economies.)[31]

[31] It is not at all clear why anthropologists have accepted Kroeber's definition of a timeless, placeless, and institutionless peasantry as in some sense a good thing. "Even as late as 1948 (p. 284), Kroeber, in his monumental survey of the state of the discipline, could dispose of peasantry in a single paragraph. . . . Kroeber managed to formulate most clearly and exactly what has turned out to be the recurrent theme in subsequent anthropological studies of peasants: namely, that they constitute part-societies with part-cultures. Peasants, he said, are definitely rural, yet they live in relation to market towns. They form a class segment of a larger stratifactory system, within which they are far from being the dominant group. They lack the isolation, political autonomy, and self-sufficiency of tribal populations. Yet their local units nevertheless retain much of their old identity, integration, and attachment to the soil and cult, to parochial custom and folk art. It was mainly the European peasantry of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth that was in Kroeber's mind as he wrote; but his stress on the fractional, incomplete quality of peasant society and culture has reappeared in virtually every anthropological study of peasant life from Mexico to India as well as in every theoretical treatise on the subject, that has since appeared" (Geertz 1962:1–2).

Summary phrases used to characterize peasantries-in-general are merely variations on Kroeber's theme. To call peasantries "intermediate" societies is to say they are different from traditional tribes and from the modern United States. To say that there is a "continuum" of peasantries is to say that they vary among themselves without saying what the *analytically revealing* structural differences are. To differentiate between "open" and "closed" peasantries is something of an improvement, especially if one goes on to specify the exact ways in which they are open (to the larger economy, society, and polity), and what difference this openness makes compared to life in closed systems. All modernizing activities and institutions, economic, political, and cultural, create "openness." Moreover, to use such terms as "protopeasant," "quasipeasant," "incipient peasant," and "so-called peasant" is simply to signal distress with the concept of peasant.

No ideal type of peasantry-in-general can be conceived which is equally informative about peasant economies under feudalism (or its traditional equivalent, e.g., Leach 1965:315), early modernization, and late modernization. Dependent land tenure with client status versus market land tenure with citizenship status should not be packed into the same ideal type of general peasant even though both depend on agriculture, and the qualities of being a part-society with a part-culture apply to both.

In their dubious quest for general statements which are true regardless of time, place, and institutions, anthropologists ignore some critical differences among peasantries: the nature of land tenure, and the political relationships and material transactions peasants have with nonpeasants. According to Redfield (1960:19),

> . . . one sees a peasant as a man who is in effective control of a piece of land . . . [this] does not require of the peasant that he own the land or that he have any particular form of tenure or any particular form of institutional relationship to the gentry or the townsmen.

Fallers' brief article "Are African Cultivators To Be Called 'Peasants'?" (1961) illustrates the difficulties that arise when one tries to fit actual societies existing in time and place into the general concept of peasantry, which is timeless and placeless and lacks specific institutional criteria for types of land tenure and polity—criteria the present essay argues are essential to make analytical sense of the enormous variety of peasantries in anthropology and history.

Fallers asks to what extent the standard concept of peasantry-in-general fits sub-Saharan, non-Muslim, pagan Africa. He takes as the essential characteristic of peasantries their being part-societies with part-cultures, a feature which is expressed in peasant economic, political, and cultural life (p. 108):

> . . . part-societies with part-cultures—we may take to be the heart of the matter. . . . Now this semi-autonomy of constituent local communities, which we may take to be the differentiating characteristic of the peasant society, may be decomposed into a number of aspects . . . (1) the economic, (2) the political, and (3) [less satisfactorily], the "cultural" . . . how far [do] they find counterparts in the more complex African societies [of sub-Saharan Africa, excluding Muslim areas and Ethiopia]?

The part-society, part-culture definition of peasantry is so general that Fallers has no difficulty deciding that the Africans he has in mind are peasants economically and politically (pp. 108–9):

> In economic terms, a peasant is presumably a man who produces—usually through cultivation—mainly for his own household's consumption, but who also produces something to exchange in a market for other goods and services. This is the economic aspect of the peasant community's semi-autonomy (Firth 1951:87). In this sense, peasants abound in Africa. . . . Economically, most Africans were traditionally peasants. . . .

If so, the concept of primitive or tribal economy disappears, and the detailed distinctions between types and consequences of land tenure arrangements (Bohannan 1960), primitive as compared to commercial monies

(Dalton 1965, 1970*a*), prestige sectors and spheres of exchange, and the extent of market participation (Bohannan and Dalton 1962) are seemingly of no distinguishing importance. To single out the simple criterion of production for both subsistence and market sale as that which defines peasant economy is to put the Trobrianders and the French peasant of 900 and of 1800 in the same category.

Fallers suggests that the larger governments having jurisdiction over local peasant communities vary greatly, e.g., the Roman Empire, medieval monarchies, colonial regimes, postcolonial independent states. The semiautonomy of the village group—the aspect Fallers sees as pivotal in defining peasantry-in-general—occurs in all these larger polities. Since kingdoms structurally connected to village communities exist(ed) in Africa, the characteristic of semiautonomy of local groups applies to parts of Africa politically, as well as economically. According to Fallers (pp. 109–10),

> These political peasant-like features, like the economic ones, are common enough in African states. . . . Thus, there would seem to be no reason why African villagers should not be called "peasants" politically and economically.

But this quality of semiautonomy of the village grouping vis-à-vis larger polity of *any* sort is so general that it excludes only the hunting bands and "tribes without rulers" of indigenous Africa, Oceania, and North America. For a village within the political orbit of the Roman Empire, the France of Louis XIV, Nazi Germany, Communist Russia, democratic Britain—monarchy, republic, dictatorship, democracy—no matter what, where, and when the larger political system, there is semiautonomy at the local level. A township in the rural United States arranges its own police force and elementary schools, but pays taxes to Washington as well; hence, it is semiautonomous. Surely such generality is not analytically interesting. All the interesting questions require that the specific institutions be described, that is, analysis of the exact ways a village is and is not autonomous, the exact ways it is a part-society with a part-culture, the exact political and material transactions it has with its larger polity and economy.[32]

Wolf's book on peasantry (1966) is similarly afflicted with this disease of generality which cripples the ability to analyze how specific institutions change in the course of peasant modernization. He gives an equally misleading restatement of Kroeber's theme (p. 3, italics added):

> In primitive society, producers *control* the means of production, including their own labor, and exchange their own labor and its products for the *culturally defined* equivalent goods and services of others . . . [in peasantries] . . . *control* of the means of production, including the disposition of human labor, passes from the hands of the primary producers into the hands of groups that do not carry on the productive process themselves, but assume instead special executive and administrative functions, backed by the use of force.

This is not really a distinction between all primitive societies on the one hand and all peasantries on the other; it distinguishes bands and traditional tribes without centralized polity from *all* other social systems, past and present, some primitive, some peasant, some in industrial capitalist nations, and some in industrial communist nations. Wolf's distinction lumps in one category the traditional Bantu (Schapera 1928, Schapera and Goodwin 1937), where chiefs allocate land and collect tribute, and primitive kingdoms, such as those discussed by Fallers (1961). In the same enormous residual category, however, in which all but bands and traditional tribes without rulers fit, one can place both land-renting American farmers of today and Soviet collective farmers, who also do not "control" the means of production. "Control," "surplus," "part-society," "agriculture" do not specify institutions, and it is precisely with regard to institutions that peasantries differ from one another and from tribal and modern societies.

The same criticisms hold for another attempt by Wolf to distinguish between primitive and peasant-in-general by using such unspecific terms as "control" and "surplus." Wolf's peasants in the quotation below would include any farmers who pay taxes to central government (e.g., both U.S. and Soviet farmers) or rent land from anyone who is part of a "dominant group of rulers," whatever that means. My insertions in brackets show how his definition of peasant applies to U.S. farmers today, even those with university degrees whose farms yield them $50,000 a year. (It applies equally well to Russian farmers before and after the Revolution.) According to Wolf (1966:3–4),

> In primitive societies, surpluses are exchanged directly among groups or members of groups; peasants, however, are rural cultivators whose surpluses [taxes] are transferred to a dominant group of rulers [local, state, and federal American governments] both to underwrite its own standard of living [President Nixon's salary] and to distribute the remainder to groups in society that do not farm but must be fed for their specific goods and services in turn [i.e., everyone in the United States who is not a farmer regardless of his kind of employment is consuming the farmers' surplus].[33]

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[32] The principal point of Fallers' article is that it is mainly in the cultural realm that the African kingdoms do not fit the "classical" (i.e., general) concept of peasantry because African kingdoms do not have the gap between folk and elite high culture, so stressed by Redfield. As Fallers says (1961:110), "Now it would seem to be just the relative absence of this differentiation into high and folk cultures which principally distinguishes the African kingdoms from the societies which have commonly been called 'peasant.' . . . Dahomean and Yoruba villagers were not separated from their urban cousins by a cultural gap of the same magnitude as that which divided medieval European and Asian countrymen from city folk. . . . In large part this difference is due simply to the absence in traditional Africa of the literary religious traditions which formed the bases for the European and Asian high cultures."

Fallers' article also exposes a certain ambiguity in the classification of preindustrial state systems (what Polanyi calls "archaic" states). If membership in a larger, centralized political grouping—a kingdom or empire—is *all* that is necessary to justify labeling some village community "peasant," then any village group within the tribute-paying orbit of the Inca or Roman empires automatically becomes "peasant," despite its cultural differences (language, religion) from the Inca or Romans. This is disturbingly simplistic, given the much greater extent of shared culture between peasant and nonpeasant in, say, traditional French or Japanese peasantries.

[33] To no avail, apparently, I pointed out ten years ago the morass of nonsense one lets oneself in for if one uses this treacherous notion of an undefined "surplus" (Dalton 1960, 1963). The critical points are these: anything any farmer pays over in money, labor services, or produce—as tax or rent—is "surplus." But taxes and rents are paid in all kinds of past and present societies. It is also necessary to be told what the farmer gets back from those to whom he pays taxes and/or rents. These return services also vary enormously in past and present societies. The peasant, moreover, sells some portion of his "surplus"

Finally, we come to Wolf's categorization of the components of peasant income and his employment of these categories to draw distinctions between primitive and peasant and analytical conclusions about peasantry-in-general.

In Wolf's terms, the income of a peasant's household is allocated to four kinds of outlays, expenditures, or purposes:[34] (1) Basic food requirements necessary to sustain life, which, if not met, mean hunger and a shrinkage in population. (2) A replacement fund (actually, a household and farm depreciation allowance, in modern terms); that is, material and labor to repair broken and worn-out household and farming equipment, seed for next season's planting, etc. If the replacement fund is not provided for, either capacity to produce output shrinks, or the cultivator's household welfare (real income) shrinks (e.g., a leaky roof, fewer pots to cook in), or both. (3) A ceremonial fund, meaning outlays on family ritual (marriage) and religious institutions and events (tithes). (4) Finally, a fund of rent (which is so defined as to include taxes as well as rent). This fund of rent plays a pivotal role in Wolf's concept of peasantry-in-general, so it is best to quote his own words (pp. 9–10, italics in original):

> . . . there exist in more complex societies social relations which are not symmetrical, but are based, in some form, upon the exercise of power. In the case of the Mecklenburg farm [in Germany during the 14th and 15th centuries] . . . more than half the effective yield [in grain] went in payment of dues to a lord who maintained jurisdiction, or domain, over the land. . . . This peasant, then, was subject to asymmetrical power relations which made a permanent charge, paid out as the result of some superior claim to his labor on the land, we call rent, regardless of whether that rent is paid in labor, in produce, or in money. Where someone exercises an effective superior power, or domain, over a cultivator, the cultivator must produce a fund of rent.
>
> *It is this production of a fund of rent which critically distinguishes the peasant from the primitive cultivator.* This production in turn is spurred by the existence of a social order in which some men can through power demand payments from others, resulting in the transfer of wealth from one section of the population to another. The peasant's loss is the powerholder's gain.

Although the example in this quotation is from German peasantry under feudalism, the pivotal fund of rent—"*which critically distinguishes the peasant from the primitive cultivator*"—is meant as a general statement (although the paragraph that follows it, which I shall also consider, essentially negates all these general statements).

Wolf's general fund of rent actually applies to almost all agricultural societies past and present. Any rural cultivator paying a tax (including present-day Soviet and American farmers) is paying it out of his fund of rent. This includes African cultivators in Bantu chiefdoms (Schapera 1928, Schapera and Goodwin 1937), as well as those in the African kingdoms described by Fallers (1961). Any rural cultivator today, in any part of the world, in any economic system, developed or underdeveloped, who rents land from a landowner, paying his rent in cash or kind, is paying it out of his fund of rent. But even in Malinowski's Trobriands, the kind of primitive economy which presumably is being contrasted with "the" peasant economy, a man pays over a large portion of his yam crop to his sister's husband in recognition of her matrilineal rights to land he is using (Malinowski 1935:352–54). This obligatory *urigubu* payment also comes out of the Trobriander's fund of rent. There is simply no point in defining terms so generally as to put markedly different systems into one gigantic category.

In the quotation just given on the fund of rent, Wolf really has in mind traditional European feudalism and the nearly equivalent hacienda system in hybrid peasantries of Latin America (e.g., Holmberg *et al.* 1965). It is these he thinks of as entailing "social relations which are not symmetrical . . . based in some form on the exercise of power" (meaning that feudal peasants are low-class, servile dependents of their lord). But instead of saying that he is characterizing feudal peasants under conditions of dependent land tenure, peasants whose inferior status is expressed politically and socially as well as economically, he generalizes this special case by using words which suggest that what he says is true for all peasants. It is not. The French peasant after the Revolution, owning his own land and paying taxes (fund of rent) to the French government as did other (non-peasant) citizens of France, is no longer in

> a social order in which some men can through power demand payments from others, resulting in the transfer of wealth from one section of the population to another. The peasant's loss is the powerholder's gain.[35]

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and receives back (buys) goods and services from nonfarmers. This too goes on in all sorts of societies, communistic and capitalistic, old and new. One simply cannot say anything analytically interesting without examining the specific forms these "surplus" transactions take in any given society (see also Pearson 1957). Where in the real world of actual economies, past or present, does there exist one that does not produce "surplus" of some sort?

[34] Wolf's determination to make general statements about peasantry is so pronounced that he wants his four funds to apply equally well whether the peasant's income is all (or mostly) in cash, partly in cash, or all in produce. But, obviously the form his income takes makes a real difference to the peasant's range of choice. The greater the proportion of his income that takes the form of cash receipts, the greater his options in purchasing consumer and producer goods.

[35] (Wolf 1966:10.) Even for the medieval feudal system Wolf distorts the situation by using language which suggests that the lord is simply extorting payments from the dependent serfs because of his superior power position—"social relations which are not symmetrical, based . . . upon the exercise of power . . . some men through power demand payments from others . . . the peasant's loss is the powerholder's gain." Wolf does not mention the return services the lord provided in the form of military and police protection, and perhaps, as well, as emergency provider in time of hunger, services sufficiently important for some peasants to have voluntarily infeudated themselves.

In another of his writings (1959:206–8), Wolf does point out the material security received by the serf-peon in the 16th-century Mexican hacienda system: "Each man [peon] was given a house, and—if he proved faithful and obedient—a plot of land on which he could raise crops for himself. If a man proved properly submissive, moreover, the owner would finance his wedding or a baptism or a religious devotion, or aid him in other times of financial need. To repay these advances, such a worker would then bind himself to work for the owner until the debt was paid, an occurrence not marked by its frequency.

"From 1540 on, growing numbers of Indians accepted the liabilities of peonage. Often they welcomed the system [*nota bene*] as a way of freeing themselves from the increasingly onerous bondage to Indian communities ravaged by death and disease, threatened with loss of land and water, yet all too often required to bear burdens of tribute and labor services assessed on the basis of their past number

He is still a peasant but now is just another citizen paying taxes and receiving back social services from his central government.

Wolf's four funds, subsistence, replacement, ceremonial, and rent, are so general as to apply to all low-income farm households, whatever the economic system of the village (primitive, peasant) or the nation (capitalist, communist).

All these misleading generalizations about "the" peasant are then destroyed by the paragraph (p. 10) which concludes the section on funds. My insertions in brackets indicate why.

> It is important to note . . . that there are many different ways in which this fund of rent is produced [cash, labor services, produce], and many different ways in which it is siphoned from the peasant stratum into the hands of the controlling group [the French peasant of 900 pays feudal dues in labor services and produce to his lord; the French peasant of 1900 pays taxes in cash as a citizen of France to his government, just as non-peasants and American farmers today do]. Since the distinctions in the exercise of this power [feudalism, monarchy, Republic, Dictatorship, Democracy, Communism, Fascism] have important structural effects on the way the peasantry is organized [medieval feudalism, early modernization], there are consequently many kinds of peasantry, not just one [amen]. So far, then, the term "peasant" denotes no more than an asymmetrical structural relationship between producers of surplus [almost all farmers, everywhere in the world] and controllers [all who rent land to others in any economic system together with all governments, everywhere, who tax farmers, and all kin who have a right to a portion of the cultivator's produce].

Hybrid-Composite Peasantries of Recent Settlement in Latin America

> We distinguish nine significant Latin American subculture types. . . . Undoubtedly there are many other[s] . . . . everywhere [in Latin America] Peasant type subcultures are characterized by a predominance of archaic European patterns which survive alongside the American Indian or African patterns and which are slowly giving way to new national patterns and institutions . . . [which] play a larger role in Peasant than in Modern Indian subcultures. Peasant subculture economies are closely tied with regional and national economies. [Wagley and Harris 1955: 429, 431–32]

> All stages of the process of transformation of tribal folk into peasantry culturally homogeneous with their urban elite are to be observed in Latin America. [Redfield 1953: 42]

> The trauma of the Conquest remains an open wound upon the body of Middle American society to this day. [Wolf 1959: 214]

Latin America and the Caribbean are of particular importance in the anthropological literature of peasantry, and especially in the writings of North American anthropologists. Many of the concepts, generalizations, and shorthand expressions one immediately associates with peasantry originated with them: "folk-urban continuum," and "great and little traditions" (Redfield); "penny capitalism" (Tax); "open and closed corporate peasant communities" (Wolf); "levelling devices" (Nash); "the image of limited good" (Foster); "the culture of poverty" (Lewis). Other anthropologists, such as Erasmus, Harris, Mintz, and Wagley, have written deeply and widely on Latin American and Caribbean peasantries.

Yet the peasantries of Latin America differ from all others in profound ways and differ very widely among themselves. The purpose of considering them here is to suggest that they are best regarded apart from the peasantries of long settlement in Europe and Asia because they have only recently been fabricated from primitive (band), archaic (Inca), and several sorts of peasant components. We must explain the underlying reasons for the extraordinary variation among them (see Table 4).

TABLE 4

Variability and Diversity Among Peasantries of Present-Day Latin America

Indigenous cultures:	Inca, Maya, Aztec, hunting and gathering bands
Colonizing powers and settlers:	Spanish, Portuguese, English, French, Africans, Asians
Village language:	Indian only; Indian and Spanish; Spanish and Indian; Spanish only
Extent of literacy:	from overwhelmingly illiterate to fully literate
Religion:	Catholicism only; Catholicism with pagan survivals
Legal status:	from full citizenship to *de facto* serfdom (hacienda)
Social stratification:	Indian as rural inferior to Mestizo
Technology:	primitive; early modernization; late modernization
Land tenure:	dependent; controlled market; free market
Labor allocation:	family labor exclusively; family plus market (hired) labor, with or without occasional reciprocity
Production:	subsistence dominant with petty cash sales; production for market sale dominant, with petty amounts for subsistence; production exclusively for market sale.
Extent of development of national economy:	great diversity (see Adelman and Morris 1967)

of inhabitants. Many of the newcomers were attracted also by the novel goods of Spanish manufacture, more accessible through hacienda channels than in the impoverished Indian villages. . . . Thus the system had advantages for both owner and worker: the owner was guaranteed labor, the worker a measure of novelty, together with security. . . . The owner's person became the governor of their lives, their relation with this person the major guarantee of the security and stability on which depended their daily bread and a roof over their heads."

In assessing Bolivia's agrarian reform of the 1950's, which abolished the feudalistic "fund of rent," Erasmus (1967:357) reports that ". . . a few [peasant households] felt they were worse off because there was no longer a patron to help them when in need. . . ." On patrons supplying emergency support to their clients, see also Smith (1959:27), Sorokin, Zimmerman, and Galpin (1930:411), Epstein (1967), Allan (1965: Chap. 4), Macquet (1967:84).

Latin American peasantries are special mixtures in two senses: some are "hybrid," combining both archiac (pre-Conquest) and peasant aspects of culture, economy, and society. Some are "composite" peasantries, combining institutions equivalent to those from feudal Europe (e.g., dependent land tenure) and postfeudal Europe (e.g., market land tenure). And yet others are both hybrid and composite simultaneously. Finally, Latin American peasantries are different from all others because there has been no colonial episode equivalent to the Spanish conquest.[36]

The peasantries of Latin America and the Caribbean were created since the 16th century in the aftermath of African slavery and Spanish conquest. They differ from European and Japanese peasantries of long settlement in the recency of their creation—they were quite literally fabricated out of several peoples and several sets of institutions 400 years ago. Their creation entailed unusually severe coercion and transplantation, either, as with Africans in the Caribbean plantations, enslavement and overseas resettlement (of individuals, not communities), or military conquest and enforced conversion, as with Central and South American Indians made into Catholics and colonial subject-inferiors (most of whom died or also were physically resettled in the process).[37]

The Spanish conquest was an unparalleled event for reasons both obvious and not so obvious. The sources say that 140 years after the Spanish arrived, the Indian population had declined by something like two-thirds (Wolf 1959: 30, 195): disease, famine, and warfare killed two out of every three Indians descended from those who were alive when Cortés arrived. Indeed, within only 20 years of the earlier arrival of the Spanish in Hispañola (Haiti and Santo Domingo), the Carib Indians were so reduced in numbers that the Spanish had to import Indian laborers from the Bahamas (Simpson 1950:18). The Indians who survived were able to transmit only bits of their indigenous culture and practically none of their social organization to future generations. Their elite transmogrified themselves into Spaniards or themselves suffered the same afflictions as the rank and file (Chevalier 1963: 209–14). Their scribes and craftsmen became extinct. What was transmitted to the cultural hybrids of the present day was language, slash-and-burn agriculture, some simple tools and household equipment, and a diet consisting principally of maize, squash, and beans. Latin America was repeopled by transformed Indians and by foreign ethnic groups rather different from the pre-Conquest Indians: Spanish, Africans, and a smaller number of Asians.[38]

There are other reasons why Latin American peasantries are different from those of long settlement and differ markedly from one another (nine subcultures, closed and open communities, etc.). The Spanish introduced two sets of European institutions simultaneously, both of which survive to the present day. They used European feudal institutions (encomienda, hacienda) to organize the Indian labor force (Chevalier 1963:36), and mercantilism to sell the cash crops abroad that were produced with the dependent Indian labor. This is an illustration of the composite structure of Latin American peasantries, built in right from the beginning of the Conquest. Finally, the Latin American peasantries differ from others studied today by anthropologists because their Spanish and Portuguese conquerers are still the least developed, least industrialized, least democratic, and least modern in Western Europe. The Latin American colonies, moreover, achieved political independence almost a century and a half earlier than other Third World ex-colonies of Africa and Asia we conventionally lump them with as underdeveloped.

In summary, the extraordinary diversity among Latin American peasantries is due to the deep and wide impacts of the Spanish conquest (physical decimation, Spanish and African settlement, ubiquitous Catholicism, feudal and mercantile institutions without sustained development and industrialization[39]), their hybrid aspects, and their composite aspects. The peasantries of Latin America, moreover, are today in nation-states in the early stage of development and modernization, which itself—as we have seen for Europe—means unusual diversity, because national economy, society, and culture change unevenly. When we add to these the usual complexities and diversities which stem from the conventionally broad interests of anthropologists in the peasant attributes of persons, villages, polities, economies, technologies, cultures, and societies—and their mutual interaction—the diversity is simply enormous. Yet, peasantry-in-general is an attempt to say things which are true about traditional and modernizing peasantries of long settlement in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East,

[36] Certainly there has been nothing on the scale of the Spanish conquest which at the same time so deeply disrupted—indeed, decimated and then transmogrified—aboriginal peoples. Much smaller groups, particularly those on islands in the Pacific and some North American Indians, did experience equivalent subjugation, traumatic disruption, and decimation of population through disease, and more or less apathetic acculturation. See Colson (1949) and Worsley (1957).

[37] We touch here on another complicated matter. The history of West European peasantries is not without its traumatic incursions. The Roman conquest, the German invasions and settlements within parts of the Roman Empire (including England), the hundreds of years of Arab occupation of parts of Spain and Sicily, the Viking forays and settlements in France, Ireland, and England, and the Norman conquest of England are cases in point. But the last-mentioned of these occurred 900 years ago; the quality of civilization of the Norman conquerers—economy, technology, literacy, religion, statecraft, etc.—was not on a higher level than that of the conquered, and the information available on the processes of acculturation following such European conquests is fragmentary: "It is hardly open to argument that the Normans were less literate and less civilized than the Anglo-Saxons [in England they conquered], and we can say nothing with certainty about the process whereby the [Normans themselves, who originally were] Danish heathen pirates became a French-speaking and christianized people. The obvious parallel is with the settlement of their [Danish Viking] fellows in England, where also they quickly adopted the language, the Church and the civilization of the people among whom they dwelt, leaving little trace of that transformation" (Sayles 1961:214). For a rough parallel to the Spanish superiority to and acculturation of the Indians, we have to go back to the Roman and Christian acculturation of parts of Western Europe.

[38] "The total number of Spaniards who migrated to Middle America [Mexico and Guatemala] has been estimated at 300,000.

"With the Spaniards came . . . the African slaves. Roughly 250,000 were imported into Mexico during the three centuries of the slave trade. . . . Negroes were not the only slaves imported into Middle America. Small numbers of [Asian] Indians, Burmese, Siamese, Indonesians, and Filipinos were also brought to serve in a similar capacity" (Wolf 1959:29–30).

[39] For an excellent account of the failure of Mexico to develop economically when silver production declined, see Chevalier (1963:291–92).

as well as the very mixed set of hybrid and composite peasantries of recent settlement in Latin America and the Caribbean.

CONCLUSION

The game of comparing tribal and peasant societies in general produces a cupful of dubious generalizations that cannot survive critical scrutiny. It is also a serious impediment to the formulation of theory in economic anthropology and microdevelopment.

Anyone who attempts to make generalizations which are true for all peasants, past and present, in Europe, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Middle East, is necessarily confined to Kroeber's definition: the peasant economy is based on agriculture, involving a mixture of subsistence production and production for market sale; peasant villages are partly autonomous and partly related to cities of some sort and to larger cultural and political groupings.[40] One cannot go further and still make generally true statements. To specify type of land tenure, legal and political rights and obligations of peasants compared to those of nonpeasants, material transactions between them, level of income, kinds of nonpeasants in the village, region, or larger society, extent of education provided, quality of technology—in short, specific institutions, activities, performance, and peasant/nonpeasant relationships—is inevitably to single out one of several structurally different peasant types.

The words chosen to characterize peasantry-in-general (which, according to the game, have to fit French peasants of both 900 and 1900), are therefore "part-society," "part-culture," "great and little traditions," and "surplus" (tax? rent? tithe? paid in cash? paid in labor? paid in produce?). Words such as "surplus" are chosen in order to find common denominators between different institutions, so that structural differences among peasantries may be turned into amorphous similarities.[41] The French peasant's feudal dues paid to his lord in labor services and produce in 900 are "surplus"; his taxes paid to the French government in cash as a citizen in 1900 are also "surplus." The differences between feudal status with dependent land tenure compared to citizenship status with market land tenure become glossed over. Although a thousand years and several kinds of revolution seperate them, what gets registered is that both kinds of French peasant are cultivators paying over their surplus.

All that the concept of peasantry-in-general tells us is that dualism of *some sort* exists: that the rural villagers and villages are in some ways systematically different from some of the nonpeasants and cities in their larger contemporary cultures, societies, and economies. This is certainly true for French villagers and villages of 900 and 1900. But all the interesting questions have to do with the specific forms these differences take, and the consequences of these differences.

The concept of peasantry-in-general, moreover, impedes the anthropological analysis of peasantries in the course of modernization, analysis that requires specification of sequential changes in economy, technology, polity, and culture: what does change, what does not, why, and with what consequences? To answer these questions one must reverse the concern with peasantry-in-general. It is not what the French peasant of 900, 1900, and 1970 have in common that is important, but how and why they differ.

The quest for general statements about peasantries of all times and places has its counterpart in "cultural or social change-in-general" with equally unfortunate results. Here, too, differences in historical circumstances and external shocks, in basic institutions, and in sequential change are too important to be left out of the analysis and too variable to permit definitions and generalizations of grand historical scope. What is being changed, how, by whom, over what period of time, for what purpose—these vary enormously.

The literatures of acculturation, applied anthropology, and microdevelopment put different questions about processes of change, and each is really addressed to real-world circumstances—institutional structures and historical situations of specific time and place—which differ markedly from one another. It is this latter point in particular which must be made clear. As with peasantry, much anthropological theorizing on social change is also stated in general terms unwarranted by the quite special historical and institutional circumstances that differentiate one sort of social change from another.

The literature of acculturation refers to specific situations of European and American colonial presence and political control of conquered peoples in the four and a half centuries that lie between the Spanish conquest of Central and South America and World War II.[42] The "colonial impact" made by the colonizing powers on their subject peoples varied enormously: in ferocity of initial conquest, according to the extent of economic development of the mother country at the

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[40] Agriculture is the predominant but not the only production line peasants engage in. On peasant fishermen see Firth (1946).

Aside from peasantries of long settlement, such as those in Europe and Japan, and hybrid-composite peasantries of recent settlement, such as those in Latin America and the Caribbean, there is yet another sort worth analyzing in a comparative framework: the transplanted peasantries from Europe that formed more or less cohesive communities in their overseas resettlement, such as the French in rural Quebec and the Dutch farmers in South Africa.

[41] To adduce an analogy that illustrates the point: It is perfectly true and general to say that from 1619 to 1970, Negroes as a group have occupied an *inferior position* to whites in America (this is equivalent to saying that peasantries are part-societies with part-cultures). But surely all the interesting questions about the position of Negroes require the sort of period analysis and subclassification I attempt to do for peasantry in this paper. Only if we can isolate turning points and show sequential change can we analyze the nature of the Negro's inferior position under slavery, in the early decades of emancipation, between 1880 and the massive emigration out of the South during World War II, and since 1954, during the drive, so to speak, toward "post-inferiority."

Another analogy would be the game of comparing all industrial with all nonindustrial societies, confining oneself only to statements which hold true in general. Soviet Russia and capitalist U.S.A. would then be put in the same category (and the differences between them ignored). The differences between French peasants of 900 and 1900 are also ignored (when one concentrates on what is true for all peasantries regardless of time and place), and questions about how they developed over time are not raised.

[42] Acculturation studies also include overseas ethnic minorities different from both the natives and the colonial power (e.g., Asians in East Africa under British rule) and immigrant streams to such countries as the United States.

time it colonized the natives, in the number of Europeans settling, in the types of natural resources present in the colonies, and so on. Those were centuries when slavery existed in the world and when differences in physiognomy were equated with differences in mental and moral capacity. The God of the Christians was the only true God and the colonizers used both guns and butter to prove it to the natives. The colonial powers had an unquestioned sense of their total superiority. These specific conditions rooted in time and place underlay studies of acculturation. They no longer exist.

In such special circumstances anthropoligists asked which features of the dominating culture of the colonizing power got transmitted to the natives, and with what consequences? Since culture included everything, anthropologists excluded nothing. They seemed not to feel the need to distinguish between big and little acculturation[43] One African learning to smoke French cigarettes and another learning French engineering are both "acculturating." But the social consequences are obviously of a different order of importance.

Applied anthropology, also born under colonialism, is also addressed to very special conditions and asks very special questions: how the visiting expert, in temporary residence, can succeed in inducing the hinterland villagers to adopt one or a few "innovations" (I use quotation marks to emphasize the general nature of the term). Smoking cigarettes for the first time is an innovation, and using irrigation equipment for the first time is also an innovation; anything new is an innovation.

During the colonial period (see, e.g., Spicer 1952), applied anthropologists were severely limited in the kinds of innovations they could introduce because macrodevelopment and modernization were not going on outside the village the existing expert was teaching to use vitamin pills or sewing machines. "Steel Axes for Stone-Age Australians" (Sharp 1952), of course, is an extreme example of such piecemeal innovation in utter isolation from regional and national change. In such circumstances, applied anthropologists stressed the need to know the past experience and present community structure of the villagers, so as to enlist their cooperation in introducing innovations piecemeal. Anthropologists stressed the people's cultural predisposition to accept innovations rather than the need to provide them with external facilities (roads, agricultural credit, electricity) and new regional and urban opportunities, to which the villagers could respond and which could provide the economic and technological bases for sustained growth in village income and diversification of production (e.g., as in Epstein 1962).

We reserve the term "microdevelopment" for the postcolonial period during which village transformation becomes part of national modernization and development: the long run process of continual interaction and growing mutual dependence between villages changing in response to changes in the rest of the country, in short, the process that West European peasantries have undergone in the course of their national political, economic, and cultural development (see Franklin 1969).

To create a theoretical framework for peasantry one must see that national institutions and national development policies vitally affect peasant village transformation. Turning points in the historical sequence transforming peasants and their village societies were (and are) macrochanges originating outside the village. These changed the larger society and polity, its peasant segment, and the previously existing relationships and transactions between peasant and nonpeasant. The transformation came earlier in England and Western Europe (Polanyi 1944) than in the parts of the world most anthropologists study. But the essential processes—the formation of the modern nation-state with a citizenry who are legally and politically equal, ever widening and deepening commercialization of production through nationally integrated markets, and industrialization—are the same. The new activities, institutions, and equipment that we lump together as "modernization"[44] all work to displace local with national ties, activities, and dependence (Smelser 1963).

Peasantries remain identifiable entities for so long because national economic development and national cultural modernization, once begun, still take centuries to transform all sectors of the nation, and are continually shunted in new directions by external shocks such as war and new technologies.[45] Except for countries like the United States and Australia, which had no traditional

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[43] The most likely reason for their failure to distinguish between major and minor acculturation is the absence of theoretical goals or perceived ends to the process, such as exist in today's analysis of economic development. We know that villages, say, in India, are underdeveloped because their present incomes, technology, educational attainments, etc., *compared to the farming sectors of developed nations*, are much lower. Since the colonized people who were the subject of acculturation studies were neither members of politically independent states nor citizens of the colonizing power, today's criteria for economic development and cultural modernization were not perceived by anthropologists as relevant ones. Rather, in studying acculturation, they were studying a process of piecemeal permeation, an amalgam of European activities (mining, plantation agriculture) and institutions (Christianity, modern education). Perhaps some of the acculturation studies did assume that the end of the process was a sort of total assimilation to the colonizer's culture, in the sense that descendants of European immigrants to the United States assimilate to American "culture." If so, they guessed wrong.

[44] "Modernization" is a very mixed bag: industrialization, the creation of national market networks for natural resources, labor, and products, a national banking system, railroads, expanded literacy and education, etc.

[45] To simplify, national development and cultural modernization take so long for at least three disparate reasons (and hence all the social sciences are interested in "modernization"): One is capital formation, the enormously expensive process of accumulating public utilities (systems of transport, communication, education, power supply, etc.), urban construction, and a manufacturing establishment. A second reason, much more difficult to analyze than the first (see Hagen 1962), is personality formation: the inculcation of values, attitudes, and capacities necessary to undertake modern activities. Third is the need for a relatively uncorrupt and efficient governmental organization and civil service devoted to national development and welfare policies (see Adelman and Morris 1967, Myrdal 1960, Carr 1951, Glower *et al.* 1966).

Peasantries remain identifiable entities so long for a less obvious reason. Until recently, anthropologists have concentrated their attention on rural villages rather than cities, and they contrasted *actual* peasant villagers with elite townsmen. When they come to study rank-and-file townsmen, the uneducated poor and the urban working classes (Mayhew 1851, Lewis 1964), they find personalities, ethnic enclaves, and neighborhood networks which are not so different from those of their rural peasant cousins, except in mode of employment and urban residence. On such "worker-peasants" in Germany, see Franklin (1969).

peasantries,[46] development and modernization of the agricultural sector typically lags behind the industrial-urban sector (e.g., as is markedly so in Italy).

The structural changes begun when market land tenure displaces dependent tenures, the modern nation-state displaces feudalism (or its traditional monarchical equivalent), the independent nation-state displaces colonial rule, and the growth of industrial employment begins to reduce the size of the agricultural sector are watershed changes for tribal as well as traditional peasant societies. For both, markets, cash, and modern technology change village economy. New and diversified economic, political, and cultural transactions make the village an interacting part of its larger society with ever diminishing differences between rural and urban life.

With the end of colonialism in Africa, for example, tribal groups became like peasants in the early stage of modernization, The Ashanti and Tiv became citizens of the states of Ghana and Nigeria, ruled by central governments based on territorial jurisdictions; the Ashanti and Tiv thereby became part-societies with part-cultures. Indeed, all the further modernizing changes that intensified when colonialism ended work as well to turn them outward, to "peasantize" and "nationalize" them: literacy, education, urbanization, the spread of Christianity and Islam, enlarged commercialization and cash-earning. Note also that dependent land tenure—structured, typically, through lineage affiliation rather than a feudal master-client relationship—changed to market tenure.[47] What the African farmers did not bring with them into early modernization was the stigma of class inferiority from a traditional system (the stigma of slavery and serfdom the medieval European peasants had).

To summarize: there are two different clusters of characteristics we mean by "peasant." First, we mean the medieval European cluster (or its traditional equivalent in Asia): low-class farmers in a sharply stratified system. Here, low political and social status is tied to dependent land tenure within a larger traditional system in which peasants—before national commercialization, market integration, and industrialization—had no real alternative means of livelihood. Daily subsistence and emergency support depended on their maintaining their client position with socioeconomic superiors. Second, we mean poor and backward citizen-farmers in a nation-state in the early stages of industrialization, cultural modernization, and national market integration.

Peasants of all times and places are structured inferiors. In traditional peasantries, their inferiority is structured legally and reinforced via dependent land tenure. During early modernization, their inferiority usually is *de facto*, not *de jure*, and takes the form of very low income, less literacy and education, and weaker national political (and economic) participation compared to nonpeasants.

Finally, there is another lesson in European history about cultural modernization and economic development. In England and Western Europe, hundreds of years intervened between the decline of feudalism and the beginnings of sustained industrialization (in England, 500 years, from about 1250 to 1750). During these hundreds of years vital changes of the sort we now call "modernization" occured, all *before* machine industry and applied science came to dominate economy and society (and finally to erode peasant/nonpeasant differences): the nation-state with an effective central government; the growth of market economy in agriculture, handicraft industry, and foreign trade; and important increases in agricultural productivity, changes in land tenure and farm organization—the potato, the turnip, enclosures, crop rotation so that no land ever need be kept in fallow (Warner 1966, Jones 1970). It is these hundreds of years of modernizing political, economic, and technological innovations—all before the machine—that the Third World tribes and peasantries studied by anthropologists did not experience (or experienced only weakly and partially) before colonialism ended. Broadly speaking, the modernization of Asia and Africa today differs from the sequences experienced by Western Europe because of the near-simultaneity of the structural changes initiated since colonialism ended, changes which, in Western Europe, were spread over 500 years or more: the coming of the nation-state, national market integration, widespread agricultural improvement, the displacement of subsistence production, the growth of literacy, education, and cities, and the beginnings of industrialization (see Postan 1965, Hunter 1969: Chap. 1).

[46] "The United States did not face the problem of dismounting a complex and well-established agrarian society of either the feudal or the bureaucratic forms. From the very beginning commercial agriculture was important, as in the Virginian tobacco plantations, and rapidly became dominant as the country was settled. The political struggles between a precommercial landed aristocracy and a monarch were not part of American history. Nor has American society ever had a massive class of peasants comparable to those in Europe and Asia. . . . Like many such terms it is impossible to define the word peasantry with absolute precision because distinctions are blurred at the edges in social reality itself. A previous history of subordination to a landed upper class recognized and enforced in the laws, which, however, need not always prohibit movement out of this class, sharp cultural distinctions, and a considerable degree of *de facto* possession of the land, constitute the main distinguishing features of a peasantry. Hence Negro sharecroppers in the present-day South could be legitimately regarded as a class of peasants in American society" (B. Moore 1966:111).

White American farmers were never like traditional European peasants under feudalism: they never had dependent land tenure nor were they ever political inferiors. Markets, cash, and citizenship characterize them throughout American history.

White American farmers were unlike European peasants in the early stage of modernization. Their education and income, extent of political participation, style of life, social and economic mobility, their use of modern technology did not systematically mark off white farmer from urban worker. Nor did American farmers carry with them the stigma of class inferiority from a traditional system in which they were servile.

[47] "The use of the words 'peasant society' in the title [*Modernizing Peasant Societies*] and constantly in the book itself, is particularly vulnerable to attack, especially in Africa. African rural settlements are not, in general, peasant societies as they could be strictly defined: tribal societies would be a little nearer. But they are *becoming* something much nearer to peasant societies as customary tenure changes toward individual ownership in a mixed subsistence and cash economy" (Hunter 1969:x).

Abstract

This paper describes three sequential stages of West European peasantry (feudal, early modern, late modern) in order to establish a basis for comparison with the peasantries currently studied by anthropologists in

Third World countries (almost all of which are in the early stage of economic development and cultural modernization). The village-community peasantries of the Third World may be regarded either as varying mixtures of tribal and some stage(s) of European peasantry (hybrids) or as combinations of institutions and technology from two, or all three, stages of European peasantry (composites).

Comments

by H. Russell Bernard☆

Pullman, Wash., U.S.A. 24 VIII 71

Dalton's most important contribution, I think, is his recognition of law as a (perhaps "the") major variable in defining traditional peasantries. His argument would have been more powerful had he demonstrated the parallels in the *de jure* status of peasants in feudal Europe, in Tokugawa Japan, and in colonial Latin America.

Dalton's attack on Wolf seems a bit ingenuous. Wolf certainly asserts that the peasant's status is that of the exploited; he certainly asserts that the relationship between a peasant and a lord (or beween a peasant and a city produce dealer) is asymmetrical in favor of the latter. But he does *not* claim that the relationship is "*no more than* an asymmetrical structural relationship between producers of surplus . . . and controllers" (italics mine). Wolf (1966) spells out several criteria for defining this category. His argument may be insufficient, but the level of Dalton's counterargument could easily have been raised.

I think that the differences between these two scholars can be linked with their political positions. Dalton states (p. 390): "That the lord also granted his peasant-serfs the right to use land to produce their own subsistence is, of course, simply dismissed by Marxists, who disapprove of the lord's right to do so in the first place." Wolf (1969) makes it clear that he is the sort of person who disapproves of the "lord's right to do so in the first place." Whether this makes Wolf a Marxist or not will have to be answered by Wolf himself. But it is clear that a growing number of scholars find the doctrine (even "dogma") of relativism an increasingly burdensome albatross—especially if it means that as scholars we have to approve of the right of one class to exploit another or ignore the question altogether as improper for real scientists. Dalton's position of relativist is in the best tradition of our discipline. But impassioned, dedicated relativism may itself be colonialist; and we may have to address ourselves seriously to this issue before we can progress further in understanding peasantry.

Dalton's digressions into comparisons of the merits of medieval European and precolonial African agriculture require much more discussion than can be attempted here. However, it should be noted that medieval European agriculture became efficient as the result of a complex of features rather than because of the plow as suggested by Goody. Dalton is certainly correct in his position that the plow was not responsible for any great agricultural leap in medieval Europe. But he is wrong to state unequivocally that "there is no reason to believe that agriculture productivity was consistently higher in medieval Europe than in medieval Africa." In fact, the question is an empirical one on which there is a great deal of suggestive, if not hard, data. It all depends, I suppose, on which "authorities" one believes and on one's predisposition. I am primarily a Mediterraneanist, so it is entirely possible that my comments reflect my predilection for Europe. But Dalton should certainly consider that medieval Europe saw the development of the *heavy* plow, the nailed horseshoe, the harness, four-wheeled carts with pivoted front axles, and the three-field rotation system. Other inventions which had a less direct but nonetheless powerful effect on agriculture were the water mill, the windmill, the steam bellows (reinvented or resurrected from ancient times), and a vast array of military paraphernalia and machines (White 1964:39–76). The actual effect of these technological changes on agricultural production, human longevity, and human as well as animal fecundity is still an open question; that the effect was significant there can be no doubt.

by Beverly Chiñas☆

Chico, Calif., U.S.A. 25 VI 71

Disagreement on several rather trivial points and mild dismay at omissions of both data and references I would consider pertinent in no way detract from my strong positive reaction to Dalton's impressive attempt to clarify anthropology's concept of peasantry. Although comment is possible on a variety of issues he raises, I address my comments to aspects of the second and third problems he mentions on (p. 385).

If my understanding is correct, Dalton is seeking to identify these significant transformations in the development of Western European peasantry from its prepeasant tribal state to its disappearance in full modernization. This analysis will presumably provide us with a basis for understanding transformations which are occurring today in contemporary developing nations with respect to their peasant populations. As he states (p. 397):

> We must compare the Tiv or Trobrianders not with peasantry-in-general or with a peasant community after modernization begins, but with a peasant community at the same stage of "traditionalness": for European peasants, this means after the Romans detribalized them and before modernization began.

But assuming that our ultimate goal is to understand recent transformations and those in process for particular cultural entities, can we limit ourselves to peasantry? Considering the immense degree of variability within the category we have been calling peasantry, is the concept useful for analysis of current modernization processes?

Recognizing the obvious confusion which exists between peasantry as a historical concept and peasantry as an analytical tool for the study of contemporary peoples, Dalton seems drawn toward, but does not reach, the logical conclusion: that we have been defining the term too loosely, that it is at once too exclusive and too inclusive to deal with the real world it is supposed to describe. The concept has always been particularly lacking in elegance (in the linguistic sense), and this should have warned us long ago that we need to search for a substitute that will better fit the data.

My proposal is that we retain the term "peasantry" in its historical, "medieval European cluster (or its traditional equivalent in Asia)" sense, thereby leaving Dalton's historical approach intact for those who wish to pursue such a course, and substitute a somewhat different analytical framework by which we can strive to measure modernization in all the groups anthropologists study today—villages, communities, subcultures, ethnic enclaves, poor ghetto inhabitants, rural migrants to the cities, the few remaining peoples not yet detribalized, those recently detribalized or being detribalized, those we have been calling peasants, and many more.

The transformational model I propose

TABLE 1

TRANSFORMATIONAL MODEL OF CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL UNITS

DEGREE OF MODERNIZATION	SIGNIFICANT TRANSFORMATIONS
Pretransitional	No significant changes toward modernization from baseline to present.
Early Transitional	Small minority of unit (perhaps less than 25%) has made from one to three significant transformations.
Mid-Transitional	Up to 50% of unit has made four to six significant transformations.
Late Transitional	Up to 75% of unit has made seven or more significant transformations.
Fully Modernized	90% or more of unit has made all or nearly all of significant transformations.

implies no similarity of the cultural units (villages, subcultures, etc.) involved beyond the assumption that they are all being inevitably drawn toward changes in the direction of the modern industrialized nations. Some changes toward modernization will improve the life conditions of the people involved, others will have minor and more or less neutral effects, while still others will have a negative effect. For the sake of simplicity, the model in its present form deals only with changes of the first variety.

Our first task, as Dalton points out, is to search for areas of significant transformations. Borrowing freely from Dalton and from the general literature on development and modernization, I would suggest that such transformations might occur, for rural populations, in the areas of cash cropping, market land tenure, and availability of markets; for urban populations, in the areas of semiskilled jobs and job training; and for both rural and urban populations, in the areas of literacy, nutrition, public sanitation, health services, public transportation, and effective enfranchisement.

The model entails measuring changes in terms of the proportion of the population participating in each of these transformations, having first established an arbitrary baseline (perhaps 1900 or the end of World War II, as Dalton suggests). As outlined in my Table 1, the model makes no statement about the degree of modernization on the national level, although this will influence the significant transformations which are possible for those units of the national population which anthropologists study.

Although many problems of delineation and measurement of dimensions remain to be dealt with, some advantages of this transformational model might be the following:

1. It would be possible to compare dissimilar contemporary peoples along the same dimensions without the necessity of deciding whether African cultivators are peasants or whether New Guinea cultivators in 1971 are becoming peasants or something quite different. At this point we are not concerned with African cultivators in general or New Guinea cultivators in general but with specific cases of each, with the hope that it would eventually be possible to generalize, if not to the entire class, at least to some subdivision thereof.

2. Anthropology would not be faced with determining the point of transition from "peasants in cities" to urban proletariat, but could focus instead on processes of change for all urban cultural units, one of which might be recent migrants of rural origin.

3. For many cultural units anthropologists study today (e.g., ghetto peoples, poor illiterate sharecroppers, American Indians, and other disadvantaged ethnic minorities in our own and other industrialized nations), it is not the degree of *national* modernization that is important, but the degree to which the various subgroups participate in the fully modernized national culture. By concentrating on cultural units, we would no longer find it necessary to exclude disadvantaged peoples in industrialized nations from discussions of disadvantaged peoples in "developing" nations, a practice which has always seemed to me astonishingly ethnocentric.

Dalton states (p. 400):

> All the interesting questions require that the specific institutions be described, that is, analysis of the exact ways a village is and is not autonomous, the exact ways it is a part-society with a part-culture, the exact political and material transactions it has with its larger polity and economy.

True, but why limit such analysis to only some of the cultural units anthropologists study (i.e., "peasantry") when it is applicable to a much wider range? Perhaps the moment has come to ask ourselves if the concept of peasantry as a contemporary social type has not served more to create and maintain barriers than to facilitate cross-cultural comparisons of processes of modernization.

by S. H. FRANKLIN☆

Wellington, New Zealand. 10 v 71

With the validity of Dalton's general case I do not think there can be any major disagreement. I hope that his article receives the widespread and detailed attention it merits.

My initial reaction to the emphasis he places upon feudal land tenure and the peasantry is one of misgiving. An historical period more relevant to the contemporary era is surely the one when feudal and communal rights on persons and property were abolished—when restrictions upon the mobility of factors were lifted rather than imposed. Therefore I would preface a reading of Bloch and Latouche with a reading of Morier (1881), especially, as well as with Lefebvre (1959) and Irvine (1923).

Anthropologists, it seems to me, have created great difficulties for themselves by the head-on nature of the attack they have made upon the question what set of economic characteristics clearly distinguishes peasant from tribal economies. I was inveigled into tackling this question by my anthropological colleagues in Wellington, but I approached it in a more circuitous fashion—and without benefit of knowing much about tribal societies.

Because I was dealing with the peasantry in neo-capitalist and socialist states, I had found it necessary to have a very clear idea of what distinguished a peasant economy from a capitalist or socialist economy in order to explain certain enduring features of peasant life (Franklin 1969). I came up with an answer with respect to the enterprise (see my Table 1), and as a tool of analysis it has not failed me—as yet (Franklin 1965).

When I look at the concept of tribal economy in the context of this scheme, the following points come to mind:

a) Like Dalton, I fail to see great differences between tribal (i.e., pre-European) and peasant economic systems as systems of production (technology apart). This in itself is instructive, just as are the similarities between the peasant and capitalist systems.

b) Nevertheless it is striking that in a tribal system, land alienation is generally prohibited, and once it is permitted it is difficult for the tribal system to survive. Such is not the case with the peasant system.

TABLE 1

SYSTEMS OF PRODUCTION COMPARED (AFTER FRANKLIN 1965)

THE ENTERPRISE	PEASANT	CAPITALIST
Labour commitment	Total	Partial
Institutional basis	Family	Family, joint stock
Control and direction	Family	Family-managerial
Means of distribution	Barter-market	Market
Medium of distribution	Kind-money	Money
Mechanisation	Possible	Usual
Ownership: direction	*Chef d'entreprise* for family	*Chef d'entreprise*, managerial
Ownership: alienation	(1) Agnatic interdiction (2) Testamentary custom (3) Permitted	Permitted
Regulator	Labour supply	Market

c) The enterprise is not always so distinct a phenomenon in tribal economies as in peasant economies, and when it is distinct, communal or tribal rights take precedence. In a peasant economy communal rights may persist, but they are contested. One of the characteristic features of post-Napoleonic European peasantry is the curtailment or total elimination of these rights.

d) Since the enterprise is less distinct, it is difficult to assign to it a labour commitment. Because of the communal rights which prevail over the enterprise it seems to me that the commitment is shared between the tribe and the enterprise. This difference is a vitally important one because in a peasant economy the labour commitment of the *chef d'entreprise* is restricted to the members of the family, extended or nuclear. Hence a person may be born into a family that is without rights to land. Neither society at large, nor property-owning families, have any commitment to providing that person with access to the means of production. Any society that is based upon a peasant economic system has therefore the potential for a rural proletariat to emerge and for poverty related to stratification to appear, and the need arises for some formal organization to cater for the relief of the poor, a role performed by the church in the medieval period. Birth within a tribal system, I take it, constitutes an entitlement to access to or co-partnership in the means of production. Landlessness and tribal membership are incompatible. Landless people in a tribe are usually slaves, members of another tribe, or members of an occupational caste.

e) Because of the indefiniteness surrounding the enterprise—especially in societies that practice a periodic redistribution of the land—it becomes difficult within my scheme of things to choose a regulator for a tribal system of production. In one sense the regulator may be the labour supply of the family, as in the peasant economy. I would, however, choose to emphasize the supply of land, rather than the supply of family labour, as the regulator, because tribal society finds itself in great difficulties when the supply of land markedly diminishes. In contrast, the peasant economy is never so endangered by a relatively fixed supply of land. The individualization of title permits the *chef* and his family to recoup some of the profits associated with the intensification of land use, which therefore makes it worthwhile. Furthermore, the creation within a peasant society of a small poverty-stricken class—denied access to land—provides the basis for an urban proletariat, who then provide the basis for small urban market and manufacturing centres, whose demand may contribute further to the intensification of land use.

I find it valuable when thinking about any type of economy—tribal, peasant, capitalist, or socialist—to treat its three aspects separately: (1) the economy as a system of production; this focuses one's attention upon the enterprise, firm, *exploitation*, or *Betrieb*; (2) the economy as a system of appropriation; this focuses one's attention upon the rights to the enjoyment and use of the "surplus" (pace Dalton!); and (3) the economy as a system of distribution (*a*) between factors of production, (*b*) between consumption and investment, and (*c*) between supply and demand, between the market and auto-consumption. I have found it fruitful to treat feudalism as a system of appropriation rather than succumb to the temptation of treating it as a system of production. This approach is useful in understanding a society in which the peasant economy represents the prevalent mode of production, but a feudal class takes a fair proportion of the "surplus." It is also useful when dealing with a society in which the peasant economy remains the principal mode of production but feudal rights are repealed, commuted, or destroyed. Unlike (1), which directs attention to the enterprise alone, (2) directs attention to the society as a whole.

Unfortunately—since it can create confusion—the economy as a system of distribution may be viewed at the level of the enterprise alone and at the level of society as a whole. If one focuses upon the enterprise, then one runs into great difficulties because of the nature of the enterprise in the peasant and especially the tribal economy. Chayanov (1966) got round the difficulty by arguing that one could not apply classical economic methods of analysis with respect to the factors of production to the peasant enterprise. And many writers have sought a non-Western type of economics with respect to tribal economies. Unfortunately, with respect to the post-war European peasantry, and it would seem with respect to the modernizing peasantry, one cannot avoid the matter. Peasants have to make decisions about the amount they will invest and what can be considered a reasonable return to labour and management. They cannot stay out of the market, even though in contemporary France auto-consumption accounts for 38% of the on-farm total food consumption. Investment is no longer a matter for the enterprise alone; the state and society at large assume responsibilities for a growing proportion of agrarian investment decisions.

by DAVID KAPLAN☆

Waltham, Mass., U.S.A. 25 v 71

The category "peasant" in anthropology has been, as Dalton correctly observes, very much of a mixed bag. Rural populations that have not clearly fit the "modern" or "primitive" label have usually been placed in this rather broad and somewhat indeterminate intermediate category. Yet anthropologists have never been entirely comfortable with a typological procedure that tends to treat a 15th-century English "peasant," a 20th-century Chinese "peasant," and, say, a present-day Malay fisherman or Tzintzuntzan potter as though they belonged to the same socio-economic type. Phrases such as "classical

peasantry," "modern peasantry," "semi-peasants," "postpeasants," and the like would seem to indicate some measure of unease with the indiscriminate nature of the category "peasant." But this conceptual malaise has not so far caused anthropologists to spell out these distinctions or systematically pursue their implications. Perhaps because anthropologists are ruralists at heart, or perhaps because rural communities lend themselves to investigation by participant observation in a way that others do not, the picture that emerges of "peasant society" in the anthropological literature has been overwhelmingly the view from the countryside or, more commonly, from some particular community. This is especially curious since one of the implications of Kroeber's oft-cited "part-culture, part-society" statement is that variation in types of peasantry reflects the larger systems of which they are part. Yet to get some general idea about the kinds of larger systems in which peasantry are structurally embedded, one has, more often than not, to go to the non-anthropological literature, as Dalton's essay clearly indicates.

I am in substantial sympathy with much of what Dalton has to say. On several points, however, I believe his discussion needs further clarification.

Dalton apparently intends his "feudal–early modern–late modern" typology, drawn from the European experience, to represent a developmental sequence relevant for other areas as well. But when I look at the contemporary populations that anthropologists and others usually refer to as peasants, I do not find them to fit the "classical feudal" or "citizen-farmer" molds. Nor is it clear to me that they can be accurately or usefully characterized as "early modern"—as though they were readying themselves for the final leap to full modernity.

By now it is fairly evident that the industrialization and/or modernization process spreads not in nice neat concentric circles, but rather unevenly, by fits and starts, and in many cases at such a snail's pace that to discern any forward movement at all requires an enormous act of faith. What strikes me about those populations commonly labelled "peasants" is that they exist on the margins of modernized enclaves, in the backwashes of industrialization, tenuously linked to these enclaves but not really integral parts of them. It is not so much that these "peasants" are poor and backward because they are exploited. Far worse. To a great extent, they seem to have become superfluous to what is going on in the more modernized sectors of their society.

Now it can be argued that this kind of "dualism" is merely temporary and that in the famous "long run" social scientists like to allude to these people will be absorbed, transformed, integrated. Maybe so. But 500 years is an awfully long "long run." The issue I am raising here is: to what extent does the presence of already advanced industrialized systems in the world change the timing, pace, and even character of all future industrializations? And what effect does this have on our attempts to generalize about the processes of industrialization?

Dalton is critical of anthropologists for trying to generalize about "peasantry-in-general" independently of time and place. Indeed, he seems to be sceptical of any sociocultural generalizations which do not pay sufficient attention to the "quite special historical and institutional circumstances" that characterize each individual case. But it is precisely the fact that they transcend the specifics of time and place that distinguishes generalizations from descriptive statements and gives to the former their explanatory power.

Generalizations, because they are by their nature abstract statements, can only approximate any specific case. If we wish to apply a generalization to a concrete instance, then we must supplement the general statement with a statement of the relevant historical circumstances that surround the case. To insist, however, that such historical factors be included in the law would destroy much of its usefulness by too narrowly restricting its application.

If anthropological attempts at generalizing about peasantry have sometimes produced more confusion than enlightenment, it is not because anthropologists have paid insufficient attention to the details of time and place, but rather because they have been careless typologists and have not been more explicit about the limits of their general statements. One of the values of Dalton's essay is that it tells us something about what those limits are.

by ERIC R. WOLF☆

New York, N.Y., U.S.A. 19 VI 71

At the beginning of his essay Dalton quotes with approval Geertz's statement of nine years ago that "the literature on peasant communities is not, at the moment, a very likely place to look for ideas, and certainly not for systems of ideas." He then proceeds to muddle the few ideas we indeed possess. He is dissatisfied with the intellectual yield of statements about peasantry-in-general, and suggests instead that the similarities and differences among peasantries can be understood more fruitfully by means of a different intellectual approach. This approach should involve (*a*) the use of a model of development of Western European peasantry as a type case for comparison with peasantries elsewhere and (*b*) the use of the concept of modernization as the guiding intellectual idea in the construction of such a model.

It seems difficult to believe that someone who calls himself an economic *anthropologist* would find utility in erecting the Western European sequence into a type case for studies of other peasantries everywhere. Apart from its obvious ethnocentrism, this proposal is weak on at least three grounds. First, his vaunted pure case is but itself the outcome of a process of hybridization of tribal groups in the shatterbelt of the disintegrating Roman empire. Second, Dalton vastly overschematizes the diversity of conditions characteristic of Western European peasantry during any phase of its existence. He disregards evidence of the great social and economic mobility of West European peasants; de-emphasizes the fact that many peasants were independent of the manor (40% of English peasants who were freeholders in the 13th century [fn. 13] is a lot of peasants); does little to distinguish systematically between various kinds of *rent* and other political payments which were *not rent*; says nothing of the degree to which peasants bought and sold land within the framework of feudal overrights; etc. Consideration of any of these factors would have shown Dalton that Western European peasantry, too, was splendidly "hybrid" and "composite."

Third, Dalton avoids any consideration of the degree to which European expansion determined the development or lack of development of societies elsewhere in the world, and of the degree to which European growth was itself predicated upon the establishment of "hybrid" and "composite" peasantries elsewhere. This was the crux of a previous criticism of Dalton's work, offered in the pages of this journal by André Gunder Frank, and with which Dalton has not come to grips. Yet if European expansion drastically altered the conditions of cultivating populations elsewhere, and if the curtailment and derailment of peasant development in other parts of the world contributed to the "purity" of the Western European case, then the thrust of peasant studies should indeed be in the direction of explicating this mutual cycle of determination, and not in the direction of erecting abstract models of "purity" and "hybridity." Modernization theory, however, is particularly weak in its ability to explain the mutual interdependence of "advanced" and "backward" features of the same system, or of dominant and dependent systems. Instead, it attempts to measure social and cultural reality against the improbable abstract model of "modernity," a procedure which seems to recommend itself less as a viable analytical instrument

for studying the real world than as a new form of unilineal social Darwinism, created to justify the advance of the enlightened at the expense of the wretched of the earth.

Since Dalton does me the honor of including me among those who have written about peasantry-in-general in terms of which he disapproves, a further point of explication may be in order. I did indeed say that "it is this production of a fund of rent which critically distinguishes the peasant from the primitive cultivator." I also said that this production and transfer of the surpluses takes place within the framework of the state. I thought that I had made it quite clear that I regarded the organization of peasants into states as the chief characteristic distinguishing them from populations of cultivators which do not form parts of states. I therefore regard rent not merely as an economic payment for the use of land, but as a payment made by virtue of relations of power that in the case of peasants, but not in the case of primitives, are guaranteed by the state. For clarification I might add that I here draw on the insight that property is not an economic but a social and political relation, and that the legal and political constitutions of states exist, among other things, to guarantee property relations. In my treatment of this problem I therefore spoke everywhere of *rent*, and not of taxes (as Dalton does, by inserting the word "taxes" into my text wherever it appears to suit his purposes), because I think it useful to point out that peasants pay *rent* for the use of land by virtue of existing political relations. Since Dalton has elsewhere called for an economics which treats the economy as a set of rules of social organization, I can only surmise that he is willing to apply this directive to primitives, but not to cultivators who form parts of states. The Trobrianders certainly pay *urigubu*; but as long as we do not regard the Trobrianders as a state society, this payment is not rent. On the other hand, the French peasants, freed from feudal overlords by the revolution of 1789, certainly continued to pay rent, though this time in the form of mortgage payments and repayments on loans advanced by credit merchants, loan associations, and private or public banks. Since Dalton himself says that "peasants of all times and places are structured inferiors" (p. 406), one can only assume that he attributes no analytical importance to conditions of structured inferiority. There is, however, a large literature that deals with this problem, and the paucity of ideas in peasant studies may be less characteristic of the work of those who have tried to come to terms with this literature than of his own efforts.

Since Dalton also assigns me to the category of people who write about peasantry-in-general, it seems only reasonable to point out that while 15 pages of my little book on peasants are devoted to characterizing the general problems of peasantry, 77 of the pages following are devoted to establishing dimensions for the study of variability among peasants. There I distinguish among nine kinds of peasant ecotypes, various systems of distribution, four types of political domain over peasants, and eight different kinds of social coalitions that occur among peasantry. Surely, the proof of such a typological pudding lies in the eating thereof, but I would have to be convinced by Dalton's further work that the comparative study of peasantry is going to be advanced by abandoning our quest for more discriminating distinctions in favor of lumping all peasantries into the mutually nonexclusive categories of "modern" or "traditional," or combinations thereof. Anthropologists, like others, are indeed in need of new ideas; what they do not need is a rehash of stale concepts, served up with new names.

Reply

by GEORGE DALTON

I agree with Chiñas that it is useful to analyze any given peasantry in terms of specific indicators of its relative modernization. I also agree that one can usefully consider some disadvantaged groups in already industrialized nations as being analogous to peasantries of the Third World in early modernization. For both, the developmental problem is to create and implement policies to integrate them fully with the modern sectors of the national economy, polity, culture, and society.

I am grateful to Franklin for his thoughtful comment and valuable references. His book on the late modernization of European peasantry (Franklin 1969) is very good indeed. He has misgivings about my emphasis on feudal land tenure and the medieval peasantry, suggesting that "an historical period more relevant to the contemporary era is surely the one when feudal and communal rights on persons and property were abolished...." There are several reasons why I described West European peasantries under feudal conditions in such detail. Writing for anthropologists, I wanted to show the relevance of early European economic and social history to several topics in economic anthropology. There are fundamental similarities between medieval European rural economies and the traditional economies of the Third World conventionally studied by anthropologists. Before labor, land, and product markets become the dominant and integrative transactional network (and, of course, before machine technology and applied science come to work their industrial revolution), we are in an anthropological setting, whether it is 11th-century France or 19th-century Africa. Therefore, I regard the abundant historical literature on medieval European village economies and their larger societies as a valuable additional source of empirical information on traditional peasantries. Happily, some of the best writings are now available in English (e.g., the works of Bloch, Latouche, and Duby cited in the references). I also had to specify the nature of European feudal land tenure in order to show how it changed with the commercialization of agriculture during the long period of European modernization. I went into such detail, moreover, in order to emphasize the strong connection between traditional land tenure and traditional political organization and social stratification. The end of feudalism meant—with time lags—the end of all three. It also seemed worthwhile to dwell on the medieval system in Europe because it probably is less familiar to anthropologists than the European peasantries among whom anthropologists have done fieldwork in the 20th century (e.g., Arensberg 1937). Finally, it seemed important to me to sketch in the full historical gamut of West European peasantry—from medieval times to the present—because West European farmers have achieved greater cultural modernization and economic development than other (former) peasantries.

Several of Franklin's conclusions must not be regarded as generalizations true for all tribal and peasant economies. When he says, e.g., "in a tribal system, land alienation is generally prohibited, and once it is permitted it is difficult for the tribal system to survive. Such is not the case with the peasant system," he implicitly means by "tribal system" precolonial and by "peasant system" postfeudal (early modernization, in the terms of my article). Indeed, if I understand him correctly, throughout his comment Franklin has in mind exclusively 19th- and early 20th-century

European peasantry as "the peasant system," except where he says explicitly he is talking about European peasantry since World War II.

I entirely agree with Kaplan that on several points my discussion needs further clarification. My paper is an attempt to order a large literature on peasantry from the viewpoint of my special interests in economic anthropology and modernization. To do so, I must address the complexity and diversity of peasantries: that they exist and existed over wide segments of the world, over thousands of years, before and after important political, economic, technological, colonial, and demographic changes. To answer questions that interest me, I find it useful to compare traditional tribal and peasant economies, to point up the changes that characterized the successive transformations of European peasantries, to call attention to the lessons to be learned from studying the long-run economic development and cultural modernization of European countries, and to show why it is useful to distinguish as very special cases the hybrid and composite peasantries of recent creation in the Caribbean and Latin America.

Kaplan says,

> Dalton apparently intends his "feudal–early modern–late modern" typology, drawn from the European experience, to represent a developmental sequence relevant for other areas as well. But when I look at the contemporary populations that anthropologists and others usually refer to as peasants, I do not find them to fit the "classical feudal" or "citizen-farmer" molds. Nor is it clear to me that they can be accurately or usefully characterized as "early modern"—as though they were readying themselves for the final leap to full modernity . . . modernization . . . spreads . . . by fits and starts . . . at . . . a snail's pace.

It would have helped to clarify his point if Kaplan had specified which peasantries of today he had in mind in writing this passage. From the viewpoint of a single lifetime (and even more so, a single field trip), economic development and cultural modernization are indeed slow processes. One can only gauge progress by measuring statistically specific aspects of performance—income growth, literacy, mortality rates, and so on—for the same group at two different time periods. Such studies are only beginning. Firth, returning to the Malay fishermen for a brief, six-week stay in 1963 (his original fieldwork was done in 1939–40), says, "What seems to appear quite clearly from this analysis is the strength of economic forces in making for a new kind of society" (Firth 1966:346). Others have done similar work on modernization in India, e.g., Epstein 1962; Mellor *et al.* 1968; Adelman and Dalton 1971*a*, *b*. For most peasantries of the Third World, anthropological restudies every 20 years—especially where there is statistical information for both periods on income, education, health, transport services, and such—will show perceptible increases in economic development and cultural modernization. The relevant comparison, surely, is with the same community one or several generations earlier, not with U.S. or English farmers in 1971; for, as Hunter (1969:6) points out,

> Even as far back as 1600, we find that Europe was in many respects well ahead of some developing countries today. England, for example, with a population of less than 5 million in 1600, was already far more differentiated in occupation and skills, in the range of mining, manufacture, shipbuilding, internal and external trade, than most of the countries of Tropical Africa and some of those in Asia when they gained independence.

Kaplan asks two important questions: "To what extent does the presence of already advanced industrialized systems in the world change the timing, pace, and even character of all future industrializations? And what effect does this have on our attempts to generalize about the processes of industrialization?" A number of writers have attempted to answer these difficult questions, in three ways: (1) by showing that even for the already industrialized countries, there were significant differences experienced by the late starters (e.g., Germany compared to England, Japan, compared to the United States) on such matters as the roles of the state and of the banking system as industrial entrepreneurs (Gerschenkron 1952); (2) by attempting to create a kind of scoresheet listing the advantages and disadvantages the late-starting countries of the Third World have compared to Western Europe at a comparable stage of underdevelopment (Rostow 1960, Hunter 1969); (3) by disaggregating the large set of presently developing countries—roughly 80 or so in all—into subsets, on the basis of comparable indicators of economic, technological, political, and cultural structure and performance, and then showing that policy priorities should be different for each of the subsets (see Adelman and Morris 1967).

One would have given different answers to Kaplan's questions 25 years ago. Before 1945, economists had two models of industrialization in their heads: *the* capitalist model, represented by England and the United States (Germany and France were regarded as minor variants; about Japan, we had only varying degrees of ignorance), and *the* communist model, represented by the U.S.S.R. since central planning and the collectivization of agriculture began in 1928. There were, of course, no other communist countries in 1945. What we now call the Third World simply did not exist as a set of national economies (or as a subject for developmental analysis).

In the last 25 years there has been a vast lessening of our ignorance about processes of economic growth, structural transformation, and industrialization in capitalist, communist, and developing nations. The industrialized capitalist countries have incorporated the traumatic lessons of the great depression of the 1930's, the lessons of successful economic planning during World War II, and the lessons of the dramatic economic recovery of Germany and Japan after the war. We have learned not only from these deeply important real-world experiences but from new economic theories and techniques of measurement as well. Keynesian theory, growth theory, the practical implementation and widespread adoption of input-output and national income measurement, linear programming—together with the availability of computers—allow quicker and better gathering of economic facts and much finer analysis and measurement of economic processes. The result is more effective economic policies (assuming, of course, that governments choose to use them, which is by no means always the case). Finally, the welfare-state ethic has become ubiquitous. The large number and variety of social controls over the economy reflect the cultures and polities of the capitalist societies, not economic laws. We also have been unlearning laissez-faire and with it the costly idea that there are iron laws of capitalism (compare Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom* [1944] with Shonfield's *Modern Capitalism* [1965]). The French have initiated novel planning devices because they are French, the Swedes welfare innovations because they are Swedish. The Americans and British have been less successful in economic growth and new welfare programs not because their economies or technologies are different from those of France and Sweden, but because of different cultural and political institutions. And, of course, we are now less ignorant about the remarkable development of Japan. (Anthropologists and sociologists should note that the Protestant ethic, as a predisposing force making for superior economic performance, looks rather dim in 1971. None of the three best performers in rates of economic growth in recent decades—Japan, the U.S.S.R., and Israel—is noticeably suffused with the Protestant ethic.)

Since World War II we have learned some things about communist industrialization and economic development

as well. In 1945 it seemed to us (and to them) that the Russians did what they did because they were communists. It is now clear that they do what they do because they are Russians. In 1945 there was only one industrializing country using communist institutions (and even it, between 1870 and 1914, already had almost 50 years of capitalist development—almost twice as long as the period since the first of the ex-colonies of the Third World, India, achieved political independence). There are now a dozen. In 1945 it seemed to the Russians (and to the rest of the world) that their policies and institutions reflected iron laws of socialist development. It seems rather different to the rest of the world now, particularly to the Chinese, the Yugoslavians, and the Cubans. Finally, we have learned some new things about development because we now have this set of 80 or so new national economies in the Third World.

I shall ignore Wolf's characterization of my article as "muddle," "superannuated social Darwinism," "a rehash of stale concepts," and "ethnocentrism" and respond to his one point of substance. Wolf disparages my attempt to erect "the Western European sequence into a type case for studies of other peasantries everywhere." I shall explain why I have done so.

I am struck by the essential economic and political similarities among traditional peasantries, including those of medieval Europe—all characterized by dependent land tenure as part of a system of sharp social and political stratification within a larger state system—and by the fact that the broad changes that comprise the modernization of peasantries are the same everywhere (except that market land tenure and purely commercial transactions are only of minor importance in those nation-states that became communist). In Japan and India as in Western Europe, the peasantry is transformed by national policies of economic development. During early modernization, the following watershed changes occur: (1) the legal abolition of dependent land tenure and with it abolition of the legally sanctioned social and political inferiority of peasants (the *de facto* political and social inferiority of some peasant segments may persist for generations, as with Negroes in America after the Civil War and untouchables in India today); (2) the increasing commercialization of agriculture; (3) the growth of cities and of nonagricultural production, giving new employment alternatives to peasants (thereby shrinking the peasantry and the proportion of the gross national product consisting of agricultural goods) and also reinforcing the commercialization of agriculture by providing growing markets for agricultural produce; (4) growth in importance, political, economic, and cultural, of the nation-state, with integrative effects on the peasantry: nationwide laws, tax obligations, governmental spending, markets, elementary education, and transportation; (5) industrialization, applied science, and agricultural innovation in some measure. These changes—with much variation in timing, sequence, and extent—occurred in Europe over several hundred years; all were well underway by 1900, except in a few places such as Ireland and southern Italy. In the Third World, some of these changes began during the colonial period (e.g., the growth of agricultural production for market sale, the beginnings of modern elementary education and transportation facilities), but it was political independence that accelerated the changes begun earlier and initiated the rest.

One lesson to be drawn from the European experience for anthropologists interested in modernization of Third World peoples and communities is that even for the peasantries of long settlement in Western Europe (and Japan), these early economic development and cultural modernization processes were inherently uneven and displayed much variation. For example, the economic role of government was much greater in Germany and Japan than in England (Gerschenkron 1952) and the extent to which political democracy was established by 1900 much less. In England, following the enclosures, the great concentration of ownership of agricultural land created much larger numbers of landless agricultural wage workers than was the case on the Continent. A second lesson is the need to appreciate the importance of *regional* and *national* development policies in modernizing village peasantries. Railroads, agricultural credit, electricity, dams, and factories are initiated neither by peasant villagers nor by visiting applied anthropologists.

These processes are neither automatic nor mystical. Some areas of Western Europe got a late start (after the Napoleonic wars); some, such as Ireland and southern Italy, had not undergone anything like the extent of agricultural development and industrialization of other parts of Europe by 1900. One must not conclude from the essential economic and industrial similarities of development, moreover, that the end result is absolute cultural homogeneity. There remain to this day rather significant cultural, social, and political differences between Germany, England, and Japan, despite their all having undergone the agricultural, industrial, commercial, and national integration changes described above.

In saying that structural similarities in economic development and cultural modernization are not mystical, I mean that they are explicable in commonsense terms. It was neither ethnocentrism nor social Darwinism that led me to use Western Europe as a model. Of all the parts of the world that have had traditional peasantries, Western Europe has gone the furthest in economic development and cultural modernization. I did not use the United States because it had no medieval system and therefore no feudalism, dependent land tenure, or traditional peasantry. I did not use the U.S.S.R. because it got a late start in political and economic modernization (serfdom was not legally abolished until 1861), because agricultural development lagged greatly (it is only within the last ten years that more than half the population has become nonagricultural), because its farming sector today is less modern than those in Western Europe, and because its industrialization was accomplished chiefly under communist institutions. Yet the basic constituents of development and modernization are the same for the United States and the U.S.S.R. as they are for Western Europe and the Third World.

I must register my distaste for Bernard's purple prose: his metaphor of aggression and his hyperbole ("Dalton's attack on Wolf . . . . Dalton's position . . . [of] impassioned, dedicated relativism may itself be colonialist . . . . the . . . dogma of relativism [is] an increasingly burdensome albatross . . . "). I am neither an "enemy" nor an "ally" of Wolf's; I neither "attack" nor "defend" him. I criticized severely his generalizations about peasantry-in-general for reasons I spelled out in detail. In the same article I quoted him with approval. In the two books of readings I edited I reprinted long pieces by him that I think are excellent. Nor do I think it is sensible for Bernard to attribute Wolf's views on exploitation, compared to mine, to our different political positions. Bernard knows nothing about my political position. To make such conjectures in print is irresponsible.

My point about exploitation is simple. One must not equate exploitation with coerced payments. If one says medieval peasants were exploited because they had to make payments to their lords, then, by definition, anyone who pays any sort of tax in any economic system is exploited, including Americans who are forced to pay taxes to Washington and Russians who are forced to pay taxes to Moscow. So too with payments of rent, which also occur in markedly different sorts of

economic systems. It seems more sensible to me (*a*) to spell out what each side gives and gets out of the relationship which induces the payments and (*b*) to describe the subjective reactions of those who are forced to pay toward the political-religious-economic superiors to whom they pay. A true believer who gladly gives one-tenth of his income to his church does not feel exploited. He approves of his religion, his church, and the services he gets from both. For an outside observer who disapproves of religion to call the true believer "exploited" is merely to register a prejudice.

I think it is better to avoid using words such as "exploitation," "surplus," "rational," and "maximizing," because they are very complicated and because readers attach different meanings to them. It is always possible to find other words and phrases to say exactly what you mean. If I were to call a relationship "exploitation," I would then say that I mean by it a face-to-face relationship between a social superior and an inferior in which the inferior feels he is giving his superior more than he's getting from him or disapproves of other actions of the superior he is forced to comply with.

To pretend that there is an "objective" or "scientific" definition of exploitation (one that can leave out the subjective reactions of the "exploited") is simply propaganda. If one asserts, with Marx, that workers in capitalist factories are exploited because the market price of what they produce is greater than their wages, then one should assert the same for workers in communist factories, where the (centrally planned) market price of what workers produce is also greater than their wages. It is elementary economics that wherever net investment in new capital goods is taking place, or wherever the government is providing services—defense, justice—that are not charged for directly, the take-home wage will be less than the market price of what the workers produce.

My disagreement with Goody's assertion that medieval European agriculture was superior in performance (productivity) to medieval African agriculture registered my belief that the evidence does not exist to support that assertion—unless, with Bernard, one stretches the medieval period to include the 17th century, and confines oneself only to selected parts of Europe.

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Mr. DALTON

Theoretical Issues in Economic Anthropology[1]

by George Dalton

THE PUBLICATION of *Trade and Market in the Early Empires* (1957), and other work associated with Karl Polanyi's analytical schema, has intensified theoretical disputes in economic anthropology having their origins much earlier when the subject was of interest to many fewer anthropologists (Firth 1939: Chap. 1; Herskovits 1940: Chap. 2; 1941). These disputes are principally over which of several alternative sets of analytical concepts are best to interpret real world processes and institutions, and what kinds of analytical questions should be put to primitive and peasant economies—those asked by economists about our own economy, or questions having to do with the connections between economic and social organization.

This paper is addressed to issues raised recently by anthropologists who have criticized the theoretical approach of Polanyi and myself (LeClair 1962; Burling 1962; Pospisil 1963; Cook 1966). Part I states the positions of Polanyi and his critics and explains why controversy persists; Part II suggests a theoretical framework for economic anthropology which takes account of both sets of ideas. Part III considers the recent extension of economic anthropology to processes of socio-economic change, growth, and development in communities undergoing "modernization".

I. THE CONTROVERSY

Whether one is collecting and analyzing fieldwork information (e.g., Salisbury 1962) or writing a general or comparative work drawing on the extensive ethnographic literature (Herskovits 1952, Belshaw 1965, Nash 1966), one must choose a theoretical approach. Both fieldwork and synthesis in economic anthropology suffer from inadequate theory.

(1) Anthropology has devoted less attention to economic organization and performance than to, e.g., kinship or politics. Only two anthropologists, Bronislaw Malinowski and Raymond Firth, have a large corpus of writings in economic anthropology and relatively few—principally Cyril Belshaw, Paul Bohannan, Mary Douglas, Clifford Geertz, Maurice Godelier, Melville Herskovits, Sidney Mintz, Manning Nash, Marshall Sahlins, and Richard Salisbury—have written at length on its theoretical aspects.[2]

(2) Anthropologists understand the economic organization and the economic theory of industrial capitalism much less well than they understand European and American politics, kinship, and religion and the theories which explain them. Some anthropologists seem not to understand that conventional economics—the most abstract and mathematical of the social sciences—does not

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The present article, submitted for publication 26 VI 67, was sent for CA ☆ treatment to 50 scholars, of whom the following responded with written comments: Conrad M. Arensberg, John Blacking, Helen Codere, Erik Cohen, Peter van Ernst, Ronald Frankenberg, Morris Freilich, G. P. Grigor'ev, Zbigniew Marcia Kowaleski, Edward E. LeClair, Jr., Lorenz G. Löffler, Simon D. Messing, P. K. Misra, Manning Nash, Roman Raczyński, Joyce F. Riegelhaupt, Richard F. Salisbury, H. K. Schneider, D. P. Sinha, Arnold Strickon, Carol F. Swartout, Louise E. Sweet, Stanisław Tabaczyński, and Andrew P. Vayda. Their comments are printed in full after the text and are followed by a reply from the author.

[1] I have been very fortunate in getting critical comments on earlier drafts of this paper from anthropologists, economists, and others whom it is a pleasure to thank here: Irma Adelman, Conrad Arensberg, Joseph Berliner, Paul Bohannan, David Brokensha, Heyward Ehrlich, Everett Hagen, Thomas Harding, Clifford Geertz, Peter McLoughlin, Sidney Mintz, Walter Neale, and Ilona Polanyi.

[2] I do not mean to slight the contributions of others, living or dead, (e.g., Mauss 1954) but only to name those who have written at some length on the theoretical aspects of economic anthropology. See Godelier (1965), and Dalton (1967) for further references to theoretical writings.

deal with what anthropologists mean by human behavior, and that the concepts of conventional economics relating to economic *organization* are not (with some minor qualifications) fruitfully applicable outside of market systems. What is a serious point of contention among anthropologists (LeClair 1962, Burling 1962, Cook 1966) is dismissed out of hand by a prominent development economist (Lewis 1962:viii):

> . . . the economist who studies the non-market economy has to abandon most of what he has learnt, and adopts the techniques of the anthropologist.

(3) Economists have not been concerned with primitive and peasant societies and economies. Until recently they had been concerned exclusively with one type of economy, industrial capitalism. The concepts, leading ideas, and causal analyses of price theory, aggregate income theory, and growth theory—as well as fields such as international trade, and money—deal with the structure, performance, and problems of U.S. and West European economies in the 19th and 20th centuries. Economists have had no reason to spell out the content and method of economics in such fashion as to make clear what in conventional economics is and what is not relevant to economic anthropology.

> The fact that the attention of economists has been focused so exclusively on just those aspects of our economy least likely to be found among non-literate folk has thus confused anthropologists who turned to economic treatises for clarification of problems and methods in the study of the economic systems of non-literate societies (Herskovits 1952:53).

Very few economists other than myself and those represented in *Trade and Market* (Polanyi, Neale, Pearson, and Fusfeld) have written on these issues. The few economists who have written on the relevance of economics to economic anthropology have done so principally in book reviews (Knight 1941; Rottenberg 1958; Boulding 1957).

The field of comparative economic systems came into being only in the 1930's and '40's (with central planning in the Soviet Union, enlarged governmental spending, borrowing, taxing, and market controls in fascist Germany, the American New Deal, and welfare state reforms in England and Scandinavia). The field remains confined to the study of national industrialized economies. It compares the structure and performance of U.S. and Soviet type economies, and considers the literature of socialism (Gruchy 1966). Comparative economic systems has never included the economies studied by anthropologists nor those described in the literature of pre-industrial economic history of Europe.

The field of economic development, which came into being after World War II with the achievement of political independence by former colonies in Africa and Asia, brought American and European economists for the first time into those areas of the world in which anthropologists have traditionally centered their interests. Most of the literature of economic development deals, however, with the same impersonal matters of investment and foreign trade relating to the *national* economy (e.g., Nigeria, not the Tiv) that economists are concerned with in analyzing our own national economy. A small part of the development literature written by economists is concerned with social organization and culture (what economists call "institutional matters"), as these relate to national and local community development (Lewis 1955; Myrdal 1957; Hagen 1962; Yudelman 1964; Adelman and Morris 1965, 1967; Dalton 1965*c*).

With the minor and recent qualifications of comparative economic systems and economic development, conventional economics excludes entirely from its formal analyses matters relating to social organization and other aspects of culture. Thus the relation of economic to social organization—a problem important in economic anthropology—does not arise in conventional economic theory. It is unfortunate that anthropologists have turned for guidance to post-industrial economic theory rather than to pre-industrial European economic and social history. Pirenne (1936), Bloch (1961, 1966), Bennett (1962), Weber (1950), and Polanyi (who was an economic historian) have more to teach anthropologists about the economies they study than do Marshall (1920), Knight (1941), or Robbins (1935).

(4) Almost all the communities anthropologists study in the field are now experiencing some degree of economic, social, cultural, or technological change as parts of newly independent nation-states bent on "modernization" and economic development. The subject of socio-economic change within the context of developing nation-states is extremely complicated and, of course, very recent. We know more about "traditional" systems before Western incursion and about the kinds of change that took place in the 19th century with colonialism. The scope of economic anthropology is now widening considerably. The older focus of interest was the organization and functioning of indigenous economy as it relates to social relationships at one point in time, or under conditions of slow change (Malinowski 1922; 1935). The new focus of interest is modernization. The newly established political independence of Asian and African nation-states and their governments' explicit intention to create and develop national societies and economies makes the context of present-day community change sufficiently different from that of the early culture contact studies (e.g., on the depopulation of Melanesia or the introduction of the horse among the Plains Indians) to require new theoretical approaches and new policy concerns.

In the absence of adequate theory, controversy persists as to the merits of various alternative frames of reference for the analytical treatment of primitive and peasant societies. The main point of contention has aroused heated controversy: the extent to which anthropologists should adopt conventional economics as the conceptual language with which to analyze primitive and peasant economies (Firth 1958:63). Unlike Auden's academic warriors who "fight with smiles and Christian names", some of the participants in this dispute display the ferocity of those engaged in theological battle, a battle which has now become a thirty years war (Goodfellow 1939: Chap. 1; Firth 1939: Chap. 1; Herskovits 1940: Chap. 2, 1941, 1952; Knight 1941; Polanyi 1944: Chap. 4, 1947, 1957; Rottenberg 1958; Sahlins 1960; Dalton 1961, 1962, 1965*a*; LeClair 1962; Burling 1962; Cook 1966).

The economic anthropologist finds two ready-made bodies of economic theory—concepts, leading ideas, terminology, and generalizations—both created to analyze industrial capitalist economies: conventional economic

theory and Marxian theory.[3] The question that confronts him is whether to borrow concepts and leading ideas from these, or to invent a special set of concepts and leading ideas having no counterparts in conventional and Marxian economics—or, indeed, to use some combination of conventional economics, Marxian economics, and a special set of concepts designed for primitive and peasant economies.

The problem seems no longer to arise in other branches of anthropological inquiry. Anthropologists seem to agree that it is inappropriate to borrow concepts and leading ideas from Western religious theory (Christianity and Judaism), and political theory (democracy and dictatorship) to analyze religious and political organization:

> Nothing is so misleading in ethnographic accounts as the description of facts of native civilizations in terms of our own (Malinowski 1922:176).

> The mistake of judging the men of other periods by the morality of our own day has its parallel in the mistake of supposing that every wheel and bolt in the modern social machine has its counterpart in more rudimentary societies (Maine, quoted in Bohannan 1957:iii).

> . . . most anthropologists have ceased to take their bearings in the study of religion from any religion practiced in their own society (Leinhardt 1956:310).

> One important discovery made in . . . [*African Political Systems*] was that the institutions through which a society organized politically need not necessarily look like the kinds of political institutions with which we have long been familiar in the Western world, and in the great nations of Asia (Gluckman and Gunnison 1962:vi).

In economic anthropology, however, there are those who argue that the leading ideas, concepts, and terminology of conventional economic theory (economizing, maximizing, elasticity, scarcity, supply, demand, capital, etc.) are applicable to primitive as well as peasant economies studied by anthropologists; that the basic similarities between primitive and peasant economies and industrial capitalism are sufficiently close so that some sort of universal economic theory—embracing the very large number of economies studied by anthropologists as well as our own—is achievable; and that anthropologists should learn more conventional economics so as to be able to put the same questions about economic *performance* to their data that economists put to theirs, and (as economists do) to quantify their data when possible (Firth 1957, 1964, 1965; Salisbury 1962: Chaps. 6–9).

With a few exceptions (Bohannan and Dalton 1965; Dalton 1964) Polanyi and the group associated with him have not concerned themselves with *peasant* economies. My own view is that conventional economics is relevant to the commercialized sectors of peasant economic *organization* (i.e., where dependence on purchased land, wage-labor, and the market sale of produce is quantitatively important), and useful in quantifying economic *performance*—the amounts and composition of produce—for any economy, primitive, peasant, industrial capitalist, or industrial communist. But that the differences between primitive economic organization (i.e., where market transactions of resources and produce are absent or present only in petty amounts) and our own are so great that a special set of concepts, leading ideas, and terms are necessary to analyze these subsistence economies. Special analytical concepts are necessary because social organization and culture—kinship, political organization, religion—affect economic organization and performance so directly and sensitively in non-market systems that only a socio-economic approach which considers explicitly the relationships between economy and society is capable of yielding insights and generalizations of importance (Sahlins 1968: Chap. 5). A special set of questions should be put to primitive economies and the non-commercial sectors of peasant economies: questions about the social aspects of economic organization.

> The ties between producers tend to reach out beyond this common interest in the act of production and its rewards alone. A production relationship is often only one facet of a social relationship . . . Economic relations can be understood only as a part of a scheme of social relations . . . Economic anthropology deals primarily with the economic aspects of the social relations of persons (Firth 1951:136–38).

Polanyi focuses on economy as a set of rules of social organization and on socio-economic structure (organization) rather than quantifiable performance (levels of output; productivity). Moreover, he confines his analysis to primitive and archaic (state-organized, pre-industrial) economies.

The two groups agree that knowledge of economics and of our own economic system, industrial capitalism, should figure explicitly and importantly in economic anthropology. They disagree sharply, however, on the appropriate way to incorporate conventional economics and knowledge of our own economy. The "formalist" group takes what it believes to be the universally applicable concepts of economic theory—scarcity, maximizing, surplus—as that which is to be incorporated in economic anthropology and analyzes the empirical data of primitive and peasant economies in these terms (Pospisil 1963; Firth 1965). They use the leading ideas of elementary economics (Samuelson 1967: Chaps. 1–3) as a guide to analyzing all economies.

Polanyi (1944: Chap. 4), Neale (1957*a*), Fusfeld (1957), and I (Dalton 1961; 1962) describe the salient characteristics of industrial capitalism and economic theory so as to provide a base of contrast with that sub-set of economies we call "primitive." We then show how variants of reciprocity and redistribution act as integrating organizational principles of land and labour allocation, work organization, and produce disposition (Polanyi 1957; Neale 1957), and how external trade and money uses in such economies are derivative expressions of reciprocal and redistributive modes of transaction (Bohannan 1959; Dalton 1965). Polanyi argues that the concepts of economic theory yield useful insights when applied to our own economy because the institutionalized rules of market exchange and the use of our kind of money and technology induce economizing and maximizing activities; but to employ these terms to analyze the non-market sectors of primitive and peasant economies is as distorting as it

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[3] Among those anthropologists who write in English there is only an occasional borrowing of Marxian concepts (such as economic surplus), rather than a systematic attempt to apply Marxian analysis to primitive and peasant economies (Herskovits 1952: Part V; Pearson 1957; Harris 1959; Dalton 1960, 1963).

would be to use the concepts of Christianity to analyze primitive religions.

The "formalist" group confuses the *ability* to translate any socio-economic transaction or exchange (potlatch, kula, bridewealth) into market terms with the *usefulness* of doing so (Homans 1958; Pospisil 1963). Describing the potlatch as an investment which yields 100 per cent interest (Boas 1897), bridewealth as the price one pays for sexual and domestic services (Gray 1960), and shell transactions on Rossel Island as cash payments for market purchases (Armstrong 1924; 1928), suggests they are basically similar to ordinary commercial transactions in our own economy. These are the analytical views of the anthropologist, his *interpretation* of real world processes which remain the same regardless of what he calls them. Whether it is analytically revealing to interpret the potlatch, bridewealth, and Rossel Island shells in such fashion depends on the folkviews of these events and usages, as well as on an assessment of the differences between these and commercial transactions (Dalton 1961: 10–14; 1966).

The Quest for a Universal Theory

There is a deep-seated yearning in social science to discover one general approach, one general law valid for all time and all climes. But these primitive attitudes must be outgrown (Gershenkron 1954:256).

Those who insist on the applicability of conventional economics to primitive economies are really in quest of a universal theory—a single set of concepts which would yield fruitful insights for all economies, those studied by anthropologists as well as those studied by economists and historians.[4]

What is required . . . is a search for the general theory of economic process and structure of which contemporary economic theory is but a special case (LeClair 1962:1188).

What is required from economic anthropology is the analysis of material in such a way that it will be directly comparable with the material of modern economics, matching assumption with assumption and so allowing generalizations to be ultimately framed which will subsume the phenomena of both price and non-price communities into a body of principles about human behavior which will be truly universal (Firth 1966:14).

The difficulty with this approach is that economic anthropology deals with an extraordinary range of matters in an extraordinarily large set of economies: it is concerned with *structure and performance of both primitive and peasant economies under static and dynamic conditions*. What Firth and LeClair suggest be treated under a single theory is assigned in economics (and sociology) to several subfields: price and distribution theory; aggregate income theory; growth theory; comparative economic systems; national income accounting; industrial sociology, etc. In economics we have one set of analytical concepts to answer the question, "What determines prices in U.S. type economies?" And we have a different set to answer the question, "What determines gross national product?"—and yet another to answer the question, "How do we measure national income?" In economic anthropology we also need several sets of analytical and measurement concepts because of the several kinds of economies we are dealing with and the different kinds of questions we put to the data.

In summary, those of the thousands of economies studied by anthropologists that are underdeveloped, small-scale market systems—peasant economies (Tax 1963; Firth 1946) can be fruitfully analyzed with the concepts of conventional economics. Moreover, the quantifiable performance of all economies, primitive and peasant included, can be measured in simplified terms analogous to national income accounting terms. But to put interesting questions about the organization of traditional, primitive economies, and primitive and peasant economies undergoing change, growth, and development, requires conceptual categories different from those used in conventional economics.

The Economy: Individual Behavior vs. Rules of Social Organization

Another underlying difficulty is the existence of two rather different ways of perceiving an economy: one is to concentrate on economic "behavior" of individual persons and the motives that impel the individual behavers, so that the economy is seen as a cluster of individual actors and their motives.

Economics . . . has long been confidently felt to include a tolerably well-defined type of human behavior . . . None of these definitions [of economics] covers exactly the same area of behavior as any other. . . . Even economists have long claimed to equate the material side of life with economic behavior. . . . Since this definition does not isolate any type of behavior from any other type. . . . If the unity of economics arises out of the fact that it deals with priced goods, then in some primitive societies it is silly to look for any behavior that can be called "economic". . . . Economics in this view focuses on a particular *aspect* of behavior and not on certain kinds of behavior (Burling 1962:802, 805, 808, 811).

The other approach is to perceive the economy as a set of rules of social organization (analogous to polity and political rules), so that each of us is born into a "system" whose rules we learn. It is from observing the activities and transactions of participants that we derive these systematic rules. This is how Polanyi regards an economy, and, indeed, it is the approach used in comparative economic systems in contrasting the organization (rules) of Soviet and U.S. economies.

Those who perceive an economy as a cluster of individual behavers frequently equate whatever economic activities the behavers undertake with explicit *choice* of those activities, and believe that such choice affirms the economics textbook dictum that in all economies there must be choice of what to produce, how to produce it, and who is to get how much of what is produced. This way of intro-

[4] Clifford Geertz quite rightly points out (in private correspondence) that people confuse the generality of a theory with its ability to be applied universally. Polanyi most certainly is not arguing against generalization or abstract conceptualization; rather, he argues against the position that conventional economics—designed to analyze nationally-integrated, industrial, market economies—provides an adequate conceptual basis for a universally applicable theory of economic structure and process. Specifically, he shows that for economies lacking the salient organizational features of developed capitalism (market integration, machine technology, and the modern kind of money—primitive and archaic economies, in his terms), principles of socio-economic organization exist which require for their analysis conceptual categories different from those of conventional economics (Polanyi 1957; Dalton 1961).

ducing the topics of resource allocation, production functions, and income distribution in industrial capitalism to beginning students in economics is useful because the individual households and firms in national market economies such as our own are confronted with many explicit choices: which of thousands of goods and services to buy; which of hundreds of job markets to enter; which of dozens of products to produce; which of several techniques to use to produce them. These alternative choices are subject to fine calculation because industrial capitalism makes extensive use of money and pricing, and because there are real alternatives among which economic choices can be made without calling down social opprobrium. For example, the American farmer, entirely depending on market sale for livelihood, must choose explicitly how much of each kind of cash crop to grow. The relevant considerations are not personal taste, social obligation, or physical yield, but physical yield times expected money price compared to money costs of production. He makes explicit "economizing" decisions about costs relative to expected market revenue for the several alternative crops he can grow, and the several alternative combinations of resources he can *buy* to grow them. His livelihood depends on such choices.

In subsistence (non-market) economies, the question of choice among real alternatives does not arise in such explicit fashion. A Trobriand Islander learns and follows the rules of *economy* in his society almost like an American learns and follows the rules of *language* in his. An American is born into an English-speaking culture. In no sense does he "choose" to speak English because no real alternative is presented to him. So too, the Trobriander is born into a yam-growing economy. He does not "choose" to plant yams rather than broccoli. The question does not arise in this form, but rather in the form of how much of each of very few conventional crops to plant or how to apportion a given work day to several tasks.

In the Trobriand subsistence economy, labor, land and other resources are not purchased, and produce is not destined for sale to others, so it is personal taste within the *ecological* constraints set by resource endowment, the *technological* constraints set by known techniques of production, and the *social* constraints set by the obligation to provide sister's husband with yams that dictate how much of each crop is to be planted.[6] So too for Tikopia:

> . . . in Tikopia on any given day a man has in theory a choice between working in his orchard and going out fishing, in a canoe or on the reef. It might be held that he will decide according to his preference at the time for an ultimate yield of crops or an immediate one of fish. But in practice his choice may be rigidly determined by social and ritual considerations. The recent death of a man of rank and the taboos associated with mourning may bar him absolutely from any resort to canoe-fishing out at sea, although such may otherwise be his preference and would yield him a greater material return. . . . Moreover, the period of his abstention from canoe-fishing tends to vary directly in accordance with his propinquity of kinship to the dead (Firth 1966:12).

In primitive economies, the constraints on individual choice of material goods and economic activities are extreme, and are dictated not only by social obligation but also by primitive technology and by physical environment. There is simply no equivalent to the range of choice of goods and activities in industrial capitalism which makes meaningful such economic concepts as "maximizing" and "economizing." Nor is there the possibility of fine calculation in monetary terms which pricing allows.

As the literature of theoretical contention in economic anthropology grows, it becomes increasingly clear that those who argue that conventional economics is *applicable* to primitive economies—the Trobriand and Tiv type of economy—have three things in mind:

(1) The first is the least difficult to unravel. It is to regard peasant economies as the typical cases to be analyzed in economic anthropology and to assume that what is true for peasant economies is also true for primitive economies because they are both within the universe of anthropological interest, and somehow a single set of concepts and generalizations should apply. Peasant economies are small-scale, underdeveloped market economies, in which production for market sale, the use of Western money, the availability of purchased factors of production, and other features of market economies are present. The structure and performance of the commercialized sectors of peasant economies are amenable to analysis and measurement in conventional economic terms (precisely because money, prices, and markets are important). But this does not mean that the same is true for primitive economies—the Trobriands, the Nuer—in which the crucial features of market organization which allow analysis in market concepts and measurement in money terms, are absent.

(2) The second reason some anthropologists think conventional economics is applicable to all economies is—to speak bluntly—due to their imperfect understanding of economic theory and its concepts. From Goodfellow (1939) and Herskovits (1952), to Burling (1962) and Cook (1966), there is misunderstanding of what economists mean by "scarcity," "economize," "maximize," and "rational choice." Given cost and demand schedules for a firm, there is one price-output combination at which a firm maximizes its profit. This can be shown unambiguously by reference to other price-output combinations for the firm. Anthropologists misuse—or better, mis-translate—this piece of analysis by erroneously equating all *purposeful* activities with economizing or maximizing, and then jumping to the conclusion that because purposeful choices are made in primitive economies, economic theory must apply.

> Our primary concern in these pages is to understand the cross-cultural implications of the process of economizing (Herskovits 1952:4).
>
> From this point of view, we are "economizing" in everything we do. We are always trying to maximize our satisfactions somehow, and so we are led back to the notion that economics deals not with a type but rather with an aspect of behavior. This economic view of society becomes . . . one model for looking at society. It is a model which sees the individuals of a society busily engaged in maximizing their own satisfactions—desire for power, sex, food, independence . . . (Burling 1962:817–18).

Such misinterpretations of economic concepts persist because economists who have had occasion to deal with anthropology or primitive societies—Irma Adelman,

[6] Just as an American who somehow chose not to learn English would be severely penalized by the social system in finding jobs, in his ability to communicate with others, etc., so too would a Trobriander be penalized in his society by choosing not to grow yams.

Joseph Berliner, Everett Hagen, Arthur Lewis—have not addressed themselves to these matters, and the economists who have are associated with Polanyi. Because a Tikopian chooses to fish today rather than to tend his garden does not mean that the economics of Tikopian fishing or gardening is usefully described by linear programming or oligopoly theory.

(3) The third way in which it is thought that conventional economics applies to primitive economy is in the measurement of economic performance. Several branches of applied economics and statistics measure production flows (e.g., input-output analysis), and total output and its composition (e.g., national income accounting), for large-scale, nationally-integrated, industrialized economies of both the U.S. and Soviet types. Some kind of measurement of output is possible for any type of economy, no matter how primitive and small, because it is always possible to measure output and performance in terms of the resources used (labor days to build a hut), or in the real terms of the produce forthcoming (tons of yams produced).

Salisbury's book on a primitive economy in New Guinea before and after the introduction of purchased steel axes is cited by Firth (1965) and Cook (1966) as proof of the ability to "apply" conventional economics to a primitive economy because Salisbury does some rather elementary calculations such as the number of man-days of labor required to produce a variety of items (1962:147). Such calculations can be done for any economy—Robinson Crusoe's, a medieval monastery, an Israeli kibbutz, or Communist China.

If what anthropologists mean by "applying economic theory" is to count the number of yams produced and the number of labour days needed to build a hut, then most certainly economic theory is applicable to all economies. But this is a rather simplistic notion of what "applying economic theory" means.

A prominent national income economist at Cambridge says the following about her experience in measuring subsistence income in rural Rhodesia:

> An attempt to examine the structure and problems of a primitive community in the light of the existing body of economic thought raises fundamental conceptual issues. Economic analysis and its framework of generalizations are characteristically described in terms appropriate to the modern exchange economy. It is by no means certain that the existing tools of analysis can usefully be applied to material other than that for which they have been developed. In particular it is not clear what light, if any, is thrown on subsistence economies by a science which seems to regard the use of money and specialization of labor as axiomatic. The jargon of the market place seems remote, on the face of it, from the problems of an African village where most individuals spend the greater part of their lives in satisfying their own or their families' needs and desires, where money and trade play a subordinate role in motivating productive activity (Deane 1953:115–16).

It is true that in attempting to measure economic performance quantitatively, anthropologists put the same questions to small subsistence economies that economists put to our own and the Soviet national economy: What is the total output and its composition for the community? How is income divided? But the absence of cash and pricing means that only crude estimates of output can be indicated—nothing like the detailed components of national income and gross national product for developed economies; and the small number of goods and services produced together with the absence of complicated processes of manufacture and fabrication (the absence of inter-firm and inter-industry transactions in developed economies) means that input-output analysis yields no useful information.

I would agree emphatically that output statistics for subsistence economies are worth having especially in the analysis of community change, growth, and development (Epstein 1962). They would give us additional information, along with knowledge of socio-economic organization, of the pre-modernization economy, as well as rough benchmarks from which to measure growth. I suggest, however, that for traditional, slow-changing, subsistence (and peasant) economies, it is the analysis of socio-economic organization rather than performance that yields insights of comparable interest and depth to those got in analyzing primitive religions, polity, kinship, etc.

Traditional, Subsistence Economies

Cook (1966) criticizes Polanyi and myself for analyzing in detail the structure of traditional subsistence economies such as the Trobriand Islands in Malinowski's time. In the mid-1960's very few such economies exist intact, almost all of them undergoing various kinds and degrees of economic, social, cultural, and technological change.[6] This kind of complaint seems not to be made in other branches of anthropology: do anthropologists criticize each other for studying traditional political organization or traditional religion because—like traditional economy—they are now undergoing change? Indeed, why study history, then, since it is concerned with forms of social organization no longer in being?

Here we have an example of an odd double standard in anthropology. Anthropologists who would condemn out of hand a theoretical approach which regarded primitive religion or political organization as being simply variants of European religions and polities to be analyzed in the conceptual language of Christianity and democracy, nevertheless approach primitive economy as though it were simply a variant of capitalism to be analyzed in the conceptual language of supply, demand, elasticity, capital, maximizing, (bride) price, etc. (LeClair 1962; Pospisil 1963).

To answer the question specifically: Anthropologists have both old and new reasons to study the organization of traditional, subsistence economies, even in the 1960's when these are changing. One old reason is precisely the same that justifies their studying other aspects of traditional social organization and culture—religion, polity, kinship, language: to find out how these are (or were) organized in as many societies as we can, make analytical generalizations about them, and compare them to our own Western systems. But there are special reasons as well.

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[6] Although, in the mid-1960's, there are very few pure subsistence economies, (economies in which commercial transactions are entirely absent), there are a good many primitive economies (especially in Africa) in which half or more of total income comes from subsistence production, and peasant economies in which smaller, but significant amounts of subsistence production are the rule. In the early 1950's, a UN agency reported that ". . . between 65 per cent and 75 per cent of the total cultivated land area of tropical Africa is devoted to subsistence production" (United Nations 1954:13). In the 1960's, the problem of transforming subsistence agriculture in Africa is still very much a matter of concern. See Yudelman (1964); Clower, Dalton, Harwitz, and Walters (1966); Adelman and Morris (1967).

Writings in economic anthropology are either descriptive ethnographies or theoretical analyses. The theoretical portion of economic anthropology has been poorly done. I do not mean to suggest that theoretical light began to dawn only with the publication of *Trade and Market in the Early Empires*. Malinowski (1921; 1922; 1935), Mauss (1954), and Firth (1929; 1939; 1946)—to name only the outstanding—have made contributions of great importance. But much was not done, and much of what was done was done poorly. And it is Polanyi's work on modes of transaction, money, markets, external trade, and operational devices in primitive and archaic economies that has begun important new lines of analysis, and, indeed, has allowed us to clear up some old muddles such as "primitive money" (Polanyi 1957; 1968; Dalton 1965), and economic "surplus" (Pearson 1957; Dalton 1960; 1963).

The peoples and communities of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Oceania traditionally studied by anthropologists are experiencing the several kinds of change entailed in economic development, industrialization, urbanization, and the formation of nation-states. Anthropologists are increasingly concerned with the processes and problems of socio-economic change. There is a rapidly growing literature of theory and case studies (Smelser 1963; Douglas 1965; Brokensha 1966). Indeed, anthropologists have returned to places they did fieldwork in 20 or more years earlier, to study socio-economic change (Firth 1959; 1966).

I suggest that analytical insights and generalizations about change and development have to be based on firm understanding of traditional socio-economic organization (Dalton 1964; 1965*b*). Change is always change of what is; and what is, depends on what has been: "Any planned growth is embedded in a set of institutions and attitudes which come from the past" (Keyfitz 1959:34).

One can illustrate the point from European and American experience. How is it possible to understand the causes and consequences of those New Deal, Fair Deal, or "Great Society" changes in the U.S. economy and their counterparts in the English and Scandinavian welfare states, except by knowing the structure and performance of 19th and early 20th-century capitalism in Europe and the U.S.? How is it possible to understand the impact of Western money on subsistence economies in Africa unless one first understands the nature of indigenous money and its uses, which, in turn, requires knowing how indigenous economy functioned before the monetary incursion (Bohannan 1959; Douglas 1958)? So too, in order to understand why litigation over land rights sometimes occurs when land is first made subject to contractual purchase and sale, one has to know the nature of land tenure before land was made marketable (Biebuyck 1963).

Processes of modernization—industrialization, the expansion of commerical production—ramify into all segments of society and culture. Many of the anthropological studies being undertaken are addressed to two broad questions, both of which require knowledge of traditional, "pre-modernization" structures: (1) What are those features of traditional social organization, culture, polity, and economy which make for receptivity or resistance to technological, economic, and cultural innovations (Douglas 1965)? (2) What are the "impacts"—processes of sequential change—on traditional social organization and culture when a group undertakes enlarged production for sale, the use of Western money and technology, and incorporates other such innovations (Gulliver 1965; Epstein 1962; Firth and Yamey 1964)?

II. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY

A good theoretical framework for economic anthropology should be clear about the similarities and differences between our own economy and primitive and peasant economies, about the relevance of conventional economics to economic anthropology, and it should contain an explicit statement of the matters to be analyzed, economic anthropology, for example:

TABLE 1

1. Socio-Economic Structure:	Primitive Economies, before modernization Peasant Economies, before modernization
2. Economic Performance:	Primitive Economies, before modernization Peasant Economies, before modernization
3. Socio-economic Organization and Economic Performance in Primitive and Peasant Economies Compared to Industrial Capitalism.	
4. Processes and Problems of Socio-Economic Change, Growth, and Development in Primitive and Peasant Communities.	

I shall discuss some of the conceptual categories I think most useful in economic anthropology, indicate the questions they help answer, and the leading ideas they are associated with (see Tables 2 and 3). In doing so I hope to make several points: to show how much at the beginnings of theoretical analysis we are in economic anthropology; to show what a wide variety of structures, processes and problems are dealt with in the subject; and to suggest lines of analysis and conceptual categories that seem promising.

Economic Anthropology as Part of Comparative Economy

The economies of direct interest to anthropologists are the large set of subsistence and peasant communities in Africa, Asia, Latin America, Oceania, and the Middle East. The focus of analytical interest is either their traditional structure and performance before serious Western incursion (Malinowski 1922; 1935), or matters relating to socio-economic change and development (Epstein 1962; Firth 1966). In either case there is an important literature outside of anthropology. The fields within economics which provide complementary information are pre-industrial economic history (Postan 1966; Takizawa 1927), comparative economic systems (Grossman 1967; Myrdal 1960; Carr 1951), and the institutional literature of economic development (Lewis 1955; Myrdal 1957; Hagen 1962; Adelman and Morris 1967).

Economic anthropology is best done within a framework of comparative economic systems which draws on all economies of record. The analysis of pre-industrial, developed, and developing economies is now scattered in

TABLE 2

ECONOMIES OF RECORD AND SOCIAL SCIENCE SUB-FIELDS

Economies of Record					
Small-scale			*National*		
Primitive and Peasant, Before Modernization	*Primitive and Peasant, Change and Development*	*Utopian*[a]	*19th-Century Capitalism*	*Welfare State and Fascism*	*Communist*
Economic Anthropology	Economic Anthropology Applied Anthropology	European and American History	Economic History	Comparative Economic Systems	Soviet Economy[b]
Pre-industrial Economic and Social History (e.g., Europe and Asia)	Economic Development		History of Economic Thought	Economic History	Comparative Economic Systems
	Economic History		Classical and Neoclassical Economic Theory	Modern Economic Theory	
			Industrial Sociology	Industrial Sociology	Industrial Sociology

[a] The important connections between the structure of traditional, primitive economies and utopian communities (Noyes 1870; Nordhoff 1961; Bestor 1950; Bishop 1950) have never been systematically analyzed. Both kinds are small-scale economies whose internal organization is of non-market sorts; where production processes—especially land tenure, work organization, and produce allocation—express social relationships. It is this feature which makes writers like Nyerere (1964) and Senghor (1964) assert that traditional African communities had a "socialist" ethos.

[b] Soviet economy has developed as a separate field of specialization within economics; see Nove (1962).

various branches of economics, history, sociology, and anthropology, all of which contribute information of use to the broad range of topics considered in economic anthropology (see Table 2).

WHAT IS AN ECONOMIC "SYSTEM"?

One of the many semantic difficulties in economic anthropology is that the word "economy" (like the words "society" and "culture") has no size dimension attached to it. We can speak of the economy of a hunting band comprising a few dozen persons or the economy of Communist China comprising several hundred million.

Whatever the size of the economy it will have several features in common, three of which are of special interest.

(1) Whether the human group is called band, tribe, village, or nation, and whether its economy is called primitive, peasant, capitalist, or communist, it consists of people with recognized social and cultural affinities—kinship, religion, language, neighborhood—expressed in some sort of shared community or social life. This means that two kinds of goods and specialist services[7] must be provided for use within the community (however defined): food and other material requisites of *physical* existence, and goods and services for religion, defense, settlement of dispute, rites of passage, and other aspects of *social* and community life. The acquisition or production of material items and specialist services necessary for physical and social existence are never left to chance because neither individuals nor communities can survive without them. It is for this reason that it is useful to regard all communities or societies as having economic systems. The word "system" refers to structured arrangements and rules which assure that material goods and specialist services are provided in repetitive fashion. One task of economic anthropology is to spell out these rules and systematic arrangements for that set of societies of interest to anthropologists.

(2) A second similarity among economies is that they all make use of some form(s) of natural resources (land, waterways, minerals), human co-operation (division of labor), and technology (tools, and knowledge of production or acquisition processes). Each of these features is structured: the use of tools, natural resources, and division of labor require social rules—specified rights and obligations. The rules for the acquisition, use, and transfer of rights to land, we call "land tenure"; the rules specifying human co-operation in production processes, we call "division of labor" or "work organization"; if tools and technical knowledge are important in any economy there will be rules for their acquisition, use, and transfer.

Two general points emerge: when the rules specifying rights of acquisition or usage of any of these components of an economy are expressions of kinship or political relationships, the economic component is inextricably related

[7] The concept of "services" causes difficulty in economic anthropology (as do the concepts of "capital" and "market") because the term is used to cover a wide range of items or activities in our own economy, only a few of which are found in primitive economies. In our own economy, the term "services" is used to describe ordinary labor, mechanized utilities (telephone and electricity services), the services performed by craftsmen and professional specialists, e.g., dentistry, TV repairs, musicians; and also the functions performed by political and religious office-holders. In our own economy, all but the latter services are organized for purchase and sale. In relation to primitive and peasant economies, I prefer to use the term "specialist services" to refer to those provided by craftsmen, such as blacksmiths, woodcarvers, and dancers, and those provided by persons performing political, religious, and ritual roles.

TABLE 3

ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES AND RELEVANT QUESTIONS IN ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY

I. TRADITIONAL ECONOMIES

A. Types

1. Primitive, without centralized polity (Tiv).
2. Primitive, with centralized polity: chiefdoms, kingdoms, empires (Nupe, Bantu, Inca).
3. Peasant (Malay fishermen, Latin American peasantries).

B. Analytical Distinctions

1. Organization
   a. Size of economy; technology; natural resource endowment.
   b. Transactional modes (reciprocity, redistribution, market-exchange; dominant-integrative modes distinguished from petty modes).
   c. Production processes: (1) allocation of resources (land acquisition, use, and transfer; labor acquisition and use; the acquisition, use and transfer of tools and equipment); (2) work organization; (3) disposition of produce; (4) specialist services and their remuneration.
   d. Organization and role(s) of external trade (reciprocal gift trade; politically administered trade; market trade).
   e. Organization and role(s) of internal markets and market places (marketless economies, petty market places, small-scale market-integrated economies; resource markets and produce markets).
   f. Organization of money and money uses (general-purpose and special-purpose monies; commercial and non-commercial uses of money; relation of money uses to transactional modes).
   g. Operational devices: record-keeping, accounting, and measurement devices (quipu strings, pebble counts); devices of culture contact (silent trade, border markets, ports of trade).
   h. Prestige economy contrasted with subsistence economy (transactional spheres and conversions; bridewealth; ceremonial transfers; valuables and treasures as special-purpose monies).
   i. The relation of economic to social organization (the place of economy in society): social control of resource allocation, work organization, and produce disposition; social guarantee of livelihood through resource allocation and the provision of emergency subsistence.
2. Performance
   a. Number of goods and specialist services produced or acquired.
   b. Level of output; fluctuations in output; frequency of dearth or famine (emergency devices in dearth or famine: use of trade partners for emergency gifts; use of less-preferred foods; emergency conversions, e.g., sale of treasures and people for food).
   c. Distribution of real income: equal or unequal? Why?
   d. Distribution of subsistence goods contrasted with distribution of prestige goods (spheres of exchange; conversion between spheres).

C. Special Problems Relating to Peasant Economies

1. The nature of market organization and dependence contrasted with national, developed market economies; why "penny capitalism" is an appropriate description of peasant economy.
2. Peasant economy and culture before and after the Industrial Revolution.
3. The mixture of traditional and market economy; of traditional and modern technology; of traditional social organization and culture and elements of modern culture.
4. Peasant economy and society in contrast to primitive economy and society, and in contrast to industrial capitalist economy and society.

II. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE, GROWTH, AND DEVELOPMENT: SEQUENTIAL PROCESS ANALYSIS

A. Contexts of change and development: colonialism-culture contact; independence-explicit national and village level modernization.

B. Types of change

1. Degenerative: cultural disruption and absence of substitute forms of organization.
2. Cash income growth without development: primitive economies becoming peasant; adoption of cash-earning activities with little or no disruption of ordinary life and without concomitant technological and other innovations which diversifies and sustains income growth.
3. Development: sustained income growth for the local community through integration-economic, political, cultural—into the larger socio-economic unit of which it is a part, without loss of ethnic identity or group malaise.

to the social, and we have a *socio-economic* practice, institution, or process. Aboriginal land tenure in parts of Africa are obvious examples, where land is acquired through kinship right or tribal affiliation (Bohannan 1954; Schapera and Goodwin 1937: 157). Secondly, what we call economic organization is the set of rules in force through which natural resources, human co-operation, and technology are brought together to provide material items and specialist services in sustained and repetitive fashion.

(3) A third similarity is the incorporation of superficially similar devices and practices in economies differently organized. Economies as different as the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and the Tiv make use of market places, foreign trade, monetary objects, and devices for measuring and record-keeping.

In summary, all societies of record—those studied by anthropologists, historians, and economists—have structured arrangements to provide the material means of individual and community life. It is these structured rules that we call an economic system. Economic anthropology delineates these social rules of economy by describing activities and folkviews, and analyzing transactional processes and relationships in the small-scale, pre-industrial communities of the underdeveloped world, and makes comparisons between primitive, peasant, and industrialized developed economies. So too with comparing the components and sectors of economy: the allocation of land and labor, the organization of work, the disposition of produce, and the organization and usage of forms of money, markets, and external trade. There are very important differences among economies, however, differences in structure and in performance, and much valuable analysis lies in contrasting them.

Traditional, Primitive Economies: Structure and Performance[8]

The questions about primitive economies of most interest to anthropologists relate to their organization (structure), and to comparisons of their organization with that of other types of economy (peasant, industrial capitalist). With regard to their performance, one can indicate the relatively narrow range of goods and specialist services produced or acquired. The level of output and fluctuations in output can be measured in terms of quantities produced (Deane 1953; Reynders 1963). Input measures can be devised (Salisbury 1962), indicating amounts of equipment used in production processes and work-days employed, and so arrive at some estimates of productivity. Dietary standards can be scrutinized (Richards 1939). Some impressions of the equality or inequality in real-income distribution can be conveyed. Given the absence of Western money and pricing and the relatively few resources used and goods produced, these measures of performance can only be rough indicators stated in terms of the resource and product units themselves.

[8] The literature of primitive (subsistence) economies—traditional economies most different from our own—is richest for Africa and Oceania, for small-scale communities rather than kingdoms and empires, and for agriculturalists rather than hunters, gatherers, herders, etc. Malinowski's work (1921; 1922; 1926; 1935; also, Uberoi 1962) is the single best source. On the economies of kingdoms and other politically centralized societies, see Nadel (1942), Maquet (1961), Arnold (1957), and Polanyi (1966).

The Scale of Primitive Economies

> It is this smallness of scale, so hard for a modern European to grasp imaginatively, which is the fundamental characteristic of primitive life . . . (Wilson 1941:10).

There are some useful distinctions to be made among traditional economies. Much of the literature of primitive economies describes those without centralized polities—"tribes without rulers"—Malinowski's Trobriands being the most minutely described case in the literature. In saying that most primitive economies without centralized polity are small, one means several things: that the economy of the Tiv, the Nuer, or the Trobriand Islanders is small relative to modern, nationally-integrated economies of Europe and America; that most (but not all) resource, goods, and service transactions take place within a small geographical area and within a community of persons numbered in the hundreds or thousands. It is true that external trade is common and, as with the Kula, sometimes is carried out over long distances. Typically, however, it is intermittent, petty in amount, or confined to very few goods. It is rare (except in peasant economies) for foreign trade transactions to be frequent, quantitatively important, or essential to livelihood.

There are two other ways in which primitive economies are small-scale. Frequently one or two staple items (yams in the Trobriands, cattle among the Nuer) comprise an unusually large proportion of total produce. It is common for these important staples to be produced within the small framework of village, tribe, or lineage. Lastly, a relatively small number of goods and services is produced or acquired—dozens of items and specialist services rather than hundreds of thousands as in developed, industrial economies.

There are mutually reinforcing connections between the size and other aspects of the structure and performance of an economy. Two widely shared characteristics of the small economies anthropologists study are a simple technology (compared to the industrialized economies of the West), and geographical or cultural isolation (again, compared to those of Europe and North America). The absence of sophisticated machines and applied science, and of the extreme labor specialization characteristic of national economies numbering their participants in the millions, means a relatively low level of productivity. Two direct consequences for primitive economies of their simple technology and small size is that their peoples are sharply constrained in production activities by physical resource endowment (ecology), and that their peoples depend greatly on human co-operation for ordinary production[9] processes as well as emergencies such as famine and personal misfortune. Low-level technology combined with small size and relative isolation results in ingrained mutual dependence among people sharing many relationships: those with whom one is economically involved are the same as those with whom one is involved through neigh-

[9] The extraordinary dependence on immediate physical environment for livelihood made it seem reasonable for an older generation of anthropologists to use classifications such as gathering, hunting, fishing, pastoral, and agricultural "economies". These categories do not classify according to *economic organization*, but rather according to principal source of subsistence, physical environment, and technology. Note that if we used these categories for developed economies, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would appear in the same category, both being manufacturing and agricultural "economies".

borhood, religion, kinship and polity. The primitive economy in that sense is "embedded" in other community relationships and is not composed of associations separate from these (Dalton 1962; 1964).

> Association is a group specifically organized for the purpose of an interest or group of interests which its members have in common. . . . Community is a circle of people who live together, who belong together, so that they share not this or that particular interest, but a whole set of interests wide enough and comprehensive enough to include their lives (MacIver 1933:9, 10, 12, quoted in Nadel 1942:xi).

Some points may here be underscored: (1) "Primitive" or "subsistence" economies require for the analysis of their *organization* conceptual categories which are socio-economic because material and service transactions are frequently expressions of kinship, religious, or political relationships. (2) Two general features of primitive or subsistence economies are the pervasive social control of production and distribution, and the assurance of subsistence livelihood to persons through the social determination of labor and land allocation and the social right to receive emergency material aid in time of need.

These points have frequently been made before: to Tönnies, primitive economies are *Gemeinschaft* rather than *Gesellschaft*; to Maine, they are characterized by status rather than contract; to Weber and MacIver, they are communities rather than associations; to Karl Polanyi (1944: Chap. 4; 1957), the economy is "embedded" in the society; to Raymond Firth (1951:142), the formula is "From each according to his status obligations in the social system, to each according to his rights in that system."

Primitive economies are so organized that the allocation of labor and land, the organization of work within production processes (farming, herding, construction of buildings and equipment), and the disposition of produced goods and specialist services are expressions of underlying kinship obligation, tribal affiliation, and religious and moral duty. Unlike the economist who can analyze important features of industrial capitalism (such as price and income determination) without considering social relationships, the economic anthropologist concerned with the *organization* of primitive economies finds there is no separate economic system that can be analyzed independently of social organization.

The ways in which tools and implements are acquired, used, and disposed of is another point of contrast between primitive, peasant, and industrial capitalist economies. Typically in primitive economies tools are either made by the user himself, acquired for a fee from a specialist craftsman, or, as is sometimes the case with dwellings, storehouses, and canoes, acquired from a construction group specifically organized for the task. The construction group providing ordinary labor as well as the services of craftsmen specialists is remunerated either by food provided by the host (Thurnwald's *Bittarbeit* and barn-raising in the American West), or with food and luxury tidbits (tobacco, betel), or with these as well as payments in valuables or special-purpose money to the craftsmen-specialists (Dalton 1965*a*). Western cash is not paid. The making of tools, canoes, and dwellings is an occasional event rather than a continuous activity, and the construction workers do not derive the bulk of their livelihood from providing such services. The tools, canoes, and buildings when put to use do not yield their owners a cash income. Typically, the implements are used until they are physically worn out, when they are either repaired or discarded. Unlike some peasant economies (Firth 1946), primitive economies have no second-hand markets for tools and buildings.

Polanyi's analytical distinctions between reciprocity, redistribution, and (market) exchange and their application to specific cases have been written up in detail (Polanyi 1944: Chap. 4; 1947, 1957, 1966; Dalton 1961; 1962, 1965*c*). Unfortunately, they have been misconstrued as applying only to transactions of produce (Smelser 1958; Burling 1962; Nash 1966). These socio-economic categories apply to inanimate resource and labor allocation and to work organization as well as to produce disposition—to production as well as to distribution of goods and craft services (LeClair 1962). It is misleading to regard "systems of exchange" as something apart from production processes because exchange transactions enter into *each* of the three component processes of production (Dalton 1962: 1964).

Consider any production process: automobile manufacturing in the U.S., yam growing in the Trobriands, collective farming in the U.S.S.R., Malay peasant fishing, or cattle raising among the Nuer. All these production lines require the allocation of land, labor, and other resource ingredients to the production process; the organization of work tasks within the production process; and the disposition of the items produced. Among the Tiv, acquiring farm land (in accordance with one's lineage affiliation) is as much a "reciprocal" transaction as yam-giving (in accordance with one's *urigubu* obligation) is in the Trobriands.

Primitive States: Internal Redistribution and External Administered Trade

As in other branches of anthropology, the typical unit of analytical interest in economic anthropology is a relatively small group, the tribe, the lineage segment, the village community. There is a small, internal economy to be analyzed whether our focus of interest is a primitive economy without centralized polity (such as the Tiv), a primitive economy within a centralized polity, such as the local farming communities in Nupe (Nadal 1942), or a peasant economy, such as the Malay fishermen (Firth 1946). To be sure, persons or groups within each of these small economies may carry out transactions with outsiders —external trade, tax and tribute payments to outside political authorities—but it is meaningful to distinguish between internal (local community) transactions and those external to the local group, however defined.

Primitive economies which are part of centralized political authority—what Polanyi called archaic societies and Evans-Pritchard and Fortes (1940) called primitive states—have socio-economic transactions in addition to those found within the local community and between local communities (see Figure 1). These are of two principal sorts, transactions between the political center and its local constituencies, and external trade transactions between the political center and foreigners (Arnold 1957*a*, 1957*b*; Polanyi 1963, 1966). The local constituents pay tribute to




FIG. 1. Socio-economic transactions in the primitive economy within a centralized political authority system.

the political center—ordinary subsistence goods, luxuries reserved for elite usage, labor for construction projects and military service—and usually receive from the center military protection, juridical services, and emergency subsistence in time of local famine or disaster.

Where there is a centralized political authority, there is a redistributive sector which has no counterpart in primitive economies without a centralized polity (i.e., that are not chiefdoms, kingdoms, or empires). Indeed, where there is an intermediary elite between the king (his royal household economy and his domain), and the villages or tribal segments which express their political subordination through tax and tribute payments and other upward transactions, there are socio-economic sectors that some writers call feudal (Nadel 1942; Maquet 1961), although others question the usefulness of so labeling them (Goody 1963; Beattie 1964).

PEASANT ECONOMY

Writers on peasantry (Redfield 1956; Wolf 1966) emphasize the special nature of peasant personality and culture as that which distinguishes peasant from primitive: the semi-isolation from urban culture with which it shares religion and (in Europe) language; that peasants and peasant communities are the rank and file, so to speak, of larger political groupings, so that in Latin America, Europe, and India there are political authorities externally located who exercise some formal political jurisdiction over the peasant villages.

It is important to note that if we confine ourselves to cultural aspects such as religion, language, and political subordination, we can point up what is common to an enormous number of peasantries, and, at the same time justify the use of the special category, peasant culture, by showing it is different in these ways from primitive culture. Trobriand Island culture has none of the characteristics so far enumerated for peasants.

To go further, however, requires some special distinctions because of the long periods of historical time over which groups called peasant by social analysts have existed intact, and because there are other criteria used to differentiate peasant from primitive and modern.

One line of demarcation is the Industrial Revolution. Before the Industrial Revolution occurred in their regions, all peasantries used primitive technology, differing in no important way from the technologies used by those groups (Tiv, Lele, Nuer) anthropologists identify as being primitive. Let us call peasant communities as they existed before the Industrial Revolution in their regions, "traditional" peasantries. Then we can point out immediately that traditional peasantries, although differing from primitive societies in those cultural ways specified earlier, were like primitive communities in their use of simple (machineless) technology, their small units of production (principally but not exclusively agricultural) and the relatively few items produced within a peasant community. In traditional peasantries as in primitive communities, there is the same reliance upon one or two staple foodstuffs which comprise a large proportion of total output, and the same unusually large reliance upon natural resource endowment because of the simple technology used and the absence of complicated fabrication processes. With regard to the size of production units, technology, dependence on physical resource endowment, and the narrow range of items produced, traditional peasant communities resemble the primitive much more closely than they do with regard to culture. Moreover, material performance is roughly the same as in primitive communities, and for the same reasons. The ethnographic record does not indicate that traditional peasantries were typically less poor materially than primitive societies.[10]

What anthropologists mean by peasant culture is clear; what they mean by peasant economy is sometimes not clear.

> By a peasant economy one means a system of small-scale producers, with a simple technology and equipment often relying primarily for their subsistence on what they themselves produce. The primary means of livelihood of the peasant is cultivation of the soil (Firth 1951:87).

But this is a perfect description of the Lele (Douglas 1965), the Tiv (Bohannan 1968), and the Trobriand Islanders in Malinowski's time—all have primitive economies. If we are to make analytical sense of the large literature of economic anthropology we need some finer distinctions.

It is as useful to distinguish between peasant and primitive economy as it is to distinguish between peasant and primitive culture. The *economic* organization of a peasant community has two sets of distinguishing characteristics: (1) most people depend for the bulk of their livelihood on production for market sale or selling in markets; purchase and sale transactions with cash are frequent and quantitatively important; and, frequently, resource markets are present: significant quantities of labor, land, tools, and equipment are available for purchase, rent, or hire at money price. It is the relative importance of markets for resources and products and of cash transactions that is the principal difference between peasant and primitive *economies*. It is this feature which gives peasant economies their crude resemblance to the least productive of our own farming sectors and which justifies Tax's appropriate phrase, "penny capitalism." But in all other ways relating

[10] For many traditional peasant economies (village communities), it is undoubtedly true that real income is no higher than in most primitive economies. But, aside from difficulties of measuring real output, there are complicating features of peasant society which make it difficult to say whether many peasantries had consistently higher levels of output than is typical in primitive communities. Peasant communities, for example, seem invariably to be subordinate units of larger political (and religious) groupings, which means that significant portions of peasant produce and labor are paid "upward" as taxes, tributes, rents, and tithes. The elite recipients of such taxes and tributes channelled portions of them into the creation of churches, palaces, pyramids, armies, etc., some of the services of which were received back by the local peasant communities. Again, the slow growth of improvement in agricultural and marketing techniques in some European peasant communities for several hundred years before the Industrial Revolution may have given some European peasant communities of, say, the 18th century higher incomes than is typical of other peasant and most primitive economies.

to productive activities, peasant economies—especially traditional peasantries—more closely resemble the primitive than they do the modern: small-scale, simple technology, a narrow range of output, a few staples comprising the bulk of output, unusual reliance on physical resource endowment because of the absence of applied science and the technology of extensive fabrication; low levels of output—poverty and material insecurity.

(2) What strikes the economist is that although the rudiments of capitalist (i.e., market) economy are present and important in peasant communities, they are *incomplete* and *underdeveloped* compared to market organization in a modern national economy. By incomplete is meant that within a given peasant community, some markets may be absent or petty—land may be frequently purchased or rented but labor is not, (Chayanov 1966) or vice versa; and that subsistence production may still be quantitatively important in some households. By underdeveloped is meant the absence of facilitative institutions and social capital of advanced capitalist countries: on the one hand, banks, insurance companies, and stock markets; on the other, electricity, paved roads, and educational facilities beyond the elementary school. In peasant communities the extent of economic, cultural, and technological integration with the province and nation is markedly less than is the case with hinterland communities in developed nations.

In summary, peasant society, like primitive society (and also feudalism, *jajmani* in village India, and slavery) is a socio-economic category (Firth 1964*a*:17). If we include peasantries of all times and places within our analysis, then it is fair to say that peasant culture is more homogeneous and distinctive than is peasant economy (Fallers 1961). The spectrum of peasantries is wide, and contains varying mixtures of primitive and modern institutions. At one end are those in medieval Europe—the Russian mir, the feudal village (Bennett 1962) and some of present-day Latin America, which are peasant cultures (in religion language, political subordination) with primitive economies (because of the absence of market dependence and cash transactions). There are also cases of peasant economy with a primitive culture, as in the early transition period of African groups enlarging their cash-earning production while retaining their tribal organization and culture (Fallers 1961; Gulliver 1965; Dalton 1964).[11]

[11] In this paper I can only call attention to how little work has been done on the economic aspects of peasantry (in the anthropological literature) and suggest that similar cultural features accompany dissimilar economic arrangements in the broad spectrum of peasant societies. There is a great deal more to be said about peasant economy. I am preparing an essay which classifies peasant societies into three sorts. Type I consists of peasant communities which have dependent (non-market) land tenure (such as those under European Feudalism) in which land is acquired by clients from patrons as part of a long-run social and political relationship. Clients reciprocate with obligatory payments of material goods or labor services (farm labor, military labor, road repair, etc.), as well as with more diffuse social and political "payments"—loyalty, respect, homage, ceremonial services. Type II consists of peasant communities of a post-French Revolution sort, in which land tenure is strictly a matter of market purchase (or rental at money price) with no social or political obligations attached to land acquisition or usage. Types I and II refer to communities of long settlement. Type III is a hybrid sort, referring to communities of persons resettled within relatively recent historical times, frequently, as the aftermath of slavery in the Caribbean and the Spanish conquest of Latin America. Kroeber and Redfield, understandably, seized upon cultural attributes to differentiate "peasant" from "primitive" cultures. What remains to be done is socio-economic analysis of peasant groups from an anthropological perspective which takes account of the rich historical literature of European peasantries (e.g., Chayanov 1966) as well as the more recent ethnographies.

III. COMMUNITY CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT

The most promising area for fruitful interchange and collaboration between economics and anthropology is the field of economic development. Most development economists, however, are interested in processes and problems of *national* economic growth and development that have little in common with anthropologists' interests in local community social and economic change. But a growing number of economists are working on matters requiring anthropological insight: creating an industrial labor force, transforming subsistence agriculture (Yudelman 1964), devising policies for investment in educational facilities. Others are devising techniques of measurement and analysis to show the connections between sociopolitical organization and economic development (Adelman and Morris 1965, 1967). And yet other economists are making use of anthropology, sociology, and psychology to analyze—what is for economists—an unusual range of processes and problems entailed in economic growth and development (Hagen 1962; Myrdal 1957).

Matters relating to what I shall call socio-economic change, growth and development at the local community level conventionally appear in anthropology under the headings of evolution, diffusion of innovations, social change, culture change, culture contact, acculturation, and applied anthropology. There are two points about this literature of socio-economic change that I should like to emphasize.

The subject is extraordinarily diverse and complicated. It includes a wide range of complex processes: urbanization, industrialization, commercialization, national integration (cf. Southall 1961, UNESCO 1963). Moreover, these processes take place over much longer periods of time than anthropologists customarily remain in the field, and their analysis requires consideration of the policies of central government which impinge on the small group (village or tribal segment) that traditionally has been the focus of interest in anthropology.

The case studies of socio-economic change reach back to the early days of European colonization of Africa (Schapera 1934; Hunter 1961), Latin America (Chevalier 1963), and Asia (Boeke 1942), when neither political independence was a fact nor economic development of indigenous peoples an explicit intention. The recent case studies are of socio-economic change taking place in villages which are now parts of independent nation-states whose central governments are initiating nation-wide development and modernization. The literature includes cases of piecemeal change, where a new cash crop or a new school or a new religion is introduced in an otherwise traditional community (Dalton 1964), and cases of comprehensive community development, such as the famous case of Vicos (Holmberg *et al.* 1965).

Given the complexity of the processes, the large number and diversity of case studies on record, and the changed political and economic national conditions under which local community development now proceeds, it is not surprising that relatively few theoretical insights and conceptual categories with which to analyze socio-economic change have been contrived. Some notable contributions

are Myrdal (1957), Hagen (1962), Smelser (1963), and Adelman and Morris (1967).

Socio-economic change as an anthropological subject is unusual in another way, as well. Many of us who work on problems of development and modernization hope not only to come to understand these processes, but also to use such knowledge to reduce the social costs of economic improvement. Therefore, this extension of the traditional concerns of economic anthropology into processes of socio-economic change and development has policy implications to an extent that is unusual in anthropology (Erasmus 1961; Goodenough 1963; Arensberg and Niehoff 1964).

What is also true is that each of us—the anthropologist, the economist, the sociologist—comes to a novel situation such as change and development in a African village community with two kinds of professional knowledge, the theory of one's subject, and an intimate knowledge of some portion(s) of the real world. The economist (typically) comes with price, income, growth, and development theory, plus his knowledge of the structure and performance of his own and perhaps several other economies. If he is a specialist in economic history or Soviet economy (Gershenkron 1963), he brings with him knowledge of the sequential processes through which England, Japan, Russia, or the U.S. developed. When he comes to examine local development in an African community, he is struck by similarities to and differences from what he is already familiar with.

First, with the exception of agricultural economics, there is no counterpart in conventional economic analysis to the study of local community change and development. European and American villages and townships—the local community counterparts of the Tiv lineage segment or an Indian village—are never the focus of analytical concern. Economics is about national economies and the component activities of business firms and households thoroughly integrated with their national economy through purchase and sale transactions. Immediately we can feed back into our new concerns knowledge that we know is important from our old ones. Empirically, *how do small groups—the tribe, the village—become part of a regional or national economy?*

Similarly, local community change or development seems never to be a "natural" process of immanent expansion of the village or tribe, but rather the local community's response to incursion from outside itself. Whether it is the Conquistadores' invasion of Peru 400 years ago, or Cornell University's invasion of Vicos 15 years ago, or European colonial incursion into Africa, or the slave-raider, missionary, or merchant who comes, the process of community change starts with impingement from without. Therefore, a second question we can ask of the empirical case studies is, *what is the nature of the initial incursion which starts the processes of socio-economic change, and to what extent does the character of the initial incursion shape the sequential changes that follows?*[12]

Most of the ethnographic case studies fall into one of three broad categories that I shall designate (*a*) degenerative change; (*b*) cash income growth without development; and (*c*) socio-economic development. The three categories—which are really ideal types—are not stages of progression. Moreover, they are clearly overlapping. Some of the empirical literature fits neatly into these categories, some does not. My point is to make sharp analytical distinctions, and to do so I must oversimplify.

Degenerative Change

Much of the early literature of culture contact consists of European and American incursions which produced decimation, misery, and community degeneration among indigenous groups (Rivers 1922; Jaspan 1953).

> Native [Fiji] society [in the 1880's] was severely disrupted by war, by catastrophic epidemics of European diseases, by the introduction of alcohol, by the devastations of generations of warfare, and by the depredations of labor recruiters (Worsley 1957:19).

By degenerative change I mean severe disruption of the traditional life of a community over several generations with accompanying indicators of novel sorts and frequencies of personal and social malaise. I do not postulate frictionless bliss in the traditional society; but whatever conflicts and malaise were generated by traditional society—warfare, vendetta, sorcery—were coped with by traditional institutions (Malinowski 1959), without prolonged disruption of ordinary life. Where degenerative change occurs, it is, obviously, because the situation is such that traditional institutions designed to deal with traditional sorts of stress and conflict are unable to deal with the novel change because it embodies forces which are at the same time without precedent, irreversible, and overwhelming to traditional organization.

The extreme cases are marked by military conquest and displacement of traditional political authority by conquerers who neither understand nor respect the culture of the society they now control. The indigenous people are unable to resist imposed changes, are prohibited from pursuing rituals or activities which are meaningful and integrative within traditional society, and are made to pursue new activities (e.g., forced labor in mines and plantations) which are not integrative—do not fulfill social obligation and so reinforce social relationships—in traditional society (Steiner 1957).

> For the sting of change lies not in change itself but in change which is devoid of social meaning (Frankel 1955:27).

Degenerative situations and the psychological processes of individual and group reaction to them have caught the attention of many writers, perhaps because the consequences are so dramatic. Having lost the primary ties of meaningful culture, social relationships, and activities (Fromm 1941), and having been forced into meaningless activities and degrading helplessness, individuals and groups react to the bewildering changes with fantasy, aggression, withdrawal, and escape (Hagen 1962: Chap. 17; Smelser 1963). And so we have the ethnography of cultural disintegration, from the Pawnee Ghost Dance to Melanesian Cargo Cults[13] and Navaho alcoholism.

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[12] A third general point of significance I believe to be the time rate of change which is experienced (Polanyi 1944; Chap. 3). This is not, however, independent of the other features of the transformation process.

[13] Cargo cults are complicated movements expressing several aspects of fission and fusion. Here, I simply want to emphasize that among other things, they are symptoms of malaise that indicate deep misunderstanding of the processes of modernization through which Western goods are acquired.

If one examines these cases of degenerative change from the viewpoint of community development, several features stand out:

(i) *The nature of the initial incursion.* In cases of severe degenerative change, the initial incursion causes cultural decimation: military conquest, political subjugation, and severe disruption of usual activities. A by-product of the incursion may be material worsening, or, indeed, slight material improvement. But these economic consequences are really beside the point because the force of change is perceived and felt to be deprivation of valued activities and the community's subjugation to militarily superior foreigners with hostile intentions and contempt for indigenous ways. The foreigners may come with the intent to deprive the people of gold or land, but typically it is not the deprivation of gold or land which causes the deep disruption.

> Not economic exploitation, as often assumed, but the disintegration of the cultural environment of the victim is then the cause of degradation. The economic process may, naturally, supply the vehicle of the destruction, and almost invariably economic inferiority will make the weaker yield, but the immediate cause of his undoing is not for that reason economic; *it lies in the lethal injury to the institutions in which his social existence is embodied.* The result is loss of self-respect and standards, whether the unit is a people or a class, whether the process springs from so-called "culture conflict" or from a change in the position of a class within the confines of a society (Polanyi 1944:157. Italics added).

The nature of the initial incursion seems invariably important, not only to the generation experiencing the initial impact but also—in its shaping the sequences of socio-economic change—to successive generations (Hagen 1962). The group's cultural memory of what they regard as early injustice is long (Schapera 1928), and sometimes is nurtured several generations later (Colson 1949).

(ii) *The absence of new economic, technological, and cultural achievement.* The incursion prevents the society from functioning in customary ways without providing substitute ways which are meaningful to the people in terms of traditional culture (Steiner 1957, Frankel 1955). It is disintegrative to traditional organization without providing new forms of organization which re-integrate the society along new lines (Smelser 1963). These are useful ways to state the problem, but much detailed analysis of socio-economic change needs to be done: What are the sequential processes of disintegration and subsequent re-integration? Which specific features of traditional society are most vulnerable? How long do these processes take? Under what conditions has re-integration taken place? We are here concerned with historical processes to be analyzed in sociological terms. The problems require explicit concern with long stretches of calendar time and with sequential process analysis of old and new economy, technology, polity, social organization, and culture.

Degenerative change does not mean that some people believe themselves to be worse off materially or culturally under the new conditions. Some people are made worse off by any kind of social change. Rather, it means that the old society ceases to function in important ways, most people perceive the changes as worsenings, and in no important area of social or private life is there widespread absorption of new culture (e.g., literacy), new technology and economy (e.g., new farming methods and enlarged production for sale), of the sorts which create social re-integration. Neither is degenerative change necessarily a permanent state of affairs. Worsley (1957*b*) argues that Melanesian cargo cults, despite their traumatic symptoms of malaise, misunderstanding of European economy, and distorted religiosity, contain the beginnings of wider political organization of an anti-colonial sort which may possibly evolve into more orthodox and productive political activity (see also Hagen 1962).

Growth Without Development

Most of the case studies of community change reported in the literature differ from the one described above in two principal ways. First, the incursion was not severely disruptive of traditional society. The Trobriands (during Malinowski's residence), the Tiv (at the time of Bohannan's fieldwork), and many other groups carried on their traditional activities largely intact for generations after the foreign presence was felt. Second, the peoples became engaged in new cash-earning activities (principally growing cash crops and selling wage-labor), and this was the *only* innovation of importance widely adopted. Subsistence economies became peasant economies as cash earnings and dependence for livelihood on market sale of crops or wage-labor grew, while traditional culture and society remained largely intact (except for those changes induced by the enlarged commercial production or cash-earning).

Here we have the two salient features experienced by a large number of primitive societies: untraumatic incursion which allows ordinary activities, ceremony, and social relationships to continue on much as before; and enlarged cash-earning activities without the concomitant adoption of improved technology, literacy, or any of the other important accoutrements of "modernization" (Gulliver 1965).

I call this situation "cash income growth without development." The community's cash income grows somewhat because of its enlarged sales of crops or labor, but those structural changes in economy, technology, and culture necessary for sustained income growth and the integration over time of the local community with the nation, are not forthcoming. During the period when cash income grows while old culture, values, and folk-views remain initially unchanged (because literacy, new vocational skills, new lines of production, new technology, are not adopted), some characteristic responses are generated:

(1) The use of new cash income for old status prerogatives (bridewealth, potlatch).

(2) New conflict situations (land tenure litigation).

(3) The undermining of traditional arrangements providing material security through social relationships (cash-earning and individualism).

Typically, cash income is earned by individual or household activities rather than lineage or large co-operative group activities (such as canoe building and reciprocal land clearing). Writers on peasant economy (Chayanov 1966; Yang 1945: Chap. 7) stress the economic importance of the *family household* as a production unit for good reasons. The growth of dependence on market sale

of labor or crops for livelihood means the lessened dependence on political heads, extended kin, age-mates, friends, and neighbors—in a word, lessened dependence on local social relationships—to acquire labor or land to use in production processes.

The new form of income, Western cash, is utterly different from anything known in traditional marketless economies. It is indefinitely storable, and so provides material security for its individual owner. It can be used to purchase a variety of goods and discharge a variety of obligations which no money-stuff or treasure item does in primitive economy. Not only a potentially enormous range of European imports—gin, tobacco, canned foods, steel tools, crucifixes, transistor radios—school fees, and colonial taxes, but also traditional subsistence goods (foodstuffs), traditional prestige sphere services, obligations, and positions (e.g., bridewealth), and natural resources (land), and labor, all become purchasable or payable with cash. This is what is meant by Western cash being a "general purpose" money (Dalton 1965*a*). The process of acquisition as well as the transactional use or disposition of Western cash in formerly primitive economies breaks down the traditional separation between spheres of subsistence and prestige goods and services (Firth 1958: Chap. 3; Bohannan 1959).

The use of new cash income for old status prerogatives, new conflict situations, and the undermining of traditional arrangements providing material security are related consequences of earning cash income *within an otherwise traditional setting*. For example, that bridewealth has come to be paid in cash rather than, as formerly, in high prestige items such as cows, indicates the great importance placed on cash (and what it will buy and pay for). The *social* consequences of such displacement are several. Consider the contrasting situations before and after cash has displaced traditional valuables as bridewealth. Indigenously, bridewealth in cows could be got by a young man wanting to marry only by soliciting the required cows from kin, friends, elders, chiefs, i.e., by drawing on social relationships and thus creating obligations to repay them (reciprocate) in some form (e.g., labor service, clientship, etc.). After cash becomes acceptable as bridewealth, young men can raise their own cash and pay their own bridewealth, thus weakening their dependence on traditional superiors.

Indigenously, where bridewealth required the payment of prestige goods, the items (such as cows) could be disposed of by the bridewealth recipients in very few ways. Cows (like kula bracelets) could only be exchanged or paid within the prestige sphere which was narrowly circumscribed. But cash received as bridewealth has no such limitations. It can be used for traditional prestige or subsistence goods, or any of the array of new goods. Bohannan (1959) has pointed out the moral ambivalence which results in the changed situation where bridewealth receipts in cash can be spent on goods in a lower prestige sphere.

Socio-Economic Development

Economists can answer the question, "What constitutes successful development?" with little difficulty. Their unit of analysis is the nation-state, and their base of reference is the already developed nations of North America and Europe. The indicators of successful development from the viewpoint of economics are impersonal, having little to do with folk-views, attitudes, social relationships, or culture. Development is characterized in terms of the country's yearly percentage rate of growth in gross national product, the size of per capita income and its distribution, and the use of advanced technology in major production lines.

If anthropologists are asked, "What constitutes successful development?" the answer is more difficult. The anthropologists' unit of analysis is the tribal or village community, not the nation-state[14]; anthropologists are not only concerned with economy and technology, but also with folkviews, attitudes, social relationships, and the rest of culture. And they do not use the already developed nations of Europe and North America as a base of reference for successful development. Moreover, anthropologists are analytically concerned with the wider social process of which economic development is a part, and sensitive to social and cultural costs of economic change.

There is no such thing as a small-scale community's development independent of the larger units of economy and society external to the tribe or village. The several kinds of change that constitute modernization all entail integration with external groupings, i.e., increased de'pendence upon external groups with whom new economic and cultural transactions take place.

Sustained income growth for the local community requires enlarged production for sale to regional, national, or international markets, and a return flow of consumption goods, producer's goods, and social services (health and education) purchased with the ever-increasing cash income. The community becomes economically integrated (and dependent upon) the regional, national, or international economy through a continual enlargement and diversification of purchase and sale transactions. These can be enlarged and made to grow only with the use of improved technology (tools and technical knowledge) acquired or purchased initially from outside the local community. Moreover, the experience of a significant growth in income seems frequently to be a necessary pump-priming condition if traditional groups are to become willing to take the risk of producing new kinds of crops and goods, or old ones with new, expensive, and unfamiliar techniques of production. Primitive and peasant unwillingness to change production is frequently a sensible expression of their poverty and material insecurity. They cannot afford unsuccessful experiments. The old techniques are not very productive, but they keep the people alive. One of the important lessons of the unusual (and unusually quick) development progress in Vicos (Holmberg *et al.* 1965), was that the *Cornell group* assumed the financial risk of planting improved varieties of potatoes. The demonstration effect of the sharp increase in the value product of the new potatoes convinced the people of Vicos to follow suit. A legitimate role for any central government wanting to accelerate local community development is for it to bear some portion of the financial risk of economic and technological innovation.

The local community's integration politically is yet another aspect of community development. But when central government acts only as a tax gatherer, the local community is likely to perceive any governmentally

[14] Clifford Geertz's work is a notable exception.

initiated project to expand community output as a device to increase taxes, and therefore to be resisted. Here too there must be demonstration effects: that government can provide the local community with important economic and social services and confine itself to taxing only a portion of enlarged income forthcoming.

Lastly, there is cultural integration with the larger society: learning new language, new vocational skills, literacy, private and public health practices, and acquiring a participant awareness of alternatives, events, and institutions of the larger world.[15]

What perhaps deserves emphasis is that successful development from the economist's viewpoint is compatible with successful development from the anthropologist's viewpoint. Anthropologists are concerned with minimizing the social costs of community transformation, and with preserving the community's ethnic identity in the new society of income growth, machines, and literacy. But we know from examining the sub-cultures in already developed nations, such as Japan, England, the U.S.S.R., and especially the U.S. (with its unusual ethnic diversity), that the retention of identity in both new and old institutional forms is compatible with modern activities. The point surely is to work with those powerful levers of new achievement which the people themselves perceive as desirable and which induce other positive changes—higher income through new economic and technological performance, and wider alternatives through education. If such developmental achievements are in fact incorporated, those features of traditional culture and social organization incompatible with the new are sloughed off without the personal and community malaise that characterize degenerative change and growth without development.

> Social policy has . . . to assure that the individual in losing both the benefits and the burdens of the old society acquire no weightier burdens and at least as many benefits as he had in his previous station (Okigbo 1956).

CONCLUSION

Karl Polanyi's analytical concepts, insights, and generalizations relate to the socio-economic organization of primitive and archaic economies in which market organization is absent or confined to petty transactions. Here, the components of economy—labor and resource allocation, work organization, product disposition—are expressions of kinship, polity, religion, etc. His analysis is not general in three senses. (1) He did not analyze peasant economies, where market organization, market dependence for livelihood, and the use of Western money are important. (2) He was not concerned with the quantifiable performance of primitive economies, but only with their organization. (3) His analysis of socio-economic change and development was confined principally to Europe (Polanyi 1944: Chaps. 3, 6, 7, 8, 13).

Much of the criticism of his work (and mine) is due to a misunderstanding of the range of economies we are referring to. Several anthropologists who have done fieldwork in peasant economies (Firth 1946), or in primitive economies at the beginnings of commercialization and use of Western money (Salisbury 1962, Pospisil 1963), look for a universal theory. They complain that Polanyi's categories and generalizations (designed for primitive, static economies), do not fit their peasant and changing economies, and so criticism of Polanyi's work ensues.

If, as with Polly Hill, an agricultural economist who specializes in Ghanaian cocoa farming (1963, 1966), the investigator is interested exclusively in peasant economy, cash crops, and economic growth, and particularly with measurable performance rather than socio-economic organization, then he is being rather short tempered when he criticizes those of us who are interested in economies different from those of Ghanaian cocoa farming, and with aspects of economy and society other than measurable performance (Hill).

If, as with Firth and Salisbury, anthropologists are interested in comparative economic performance—how much is produced, how much equipment and labor are used, how income is divided—questions economists put to our own economy, then (in vastly simplified fashion) some of the measurement concepts of conventional economics are usefully applicable, and they fail to understand Polanyi's criticism of conventional economics as inappropriate for analyzing the *structure* of primitive economies.

Some, like Pospisil (1963) and Burling (1962), perceive an economy not as a set of rules of social organization but as economic behavior of individuals and their subjective motivations; when they detect greed and self-aggrandizement they equate these with capitalism and assert that economic "behavior" in primitive societies is the same as in market societies and that Polanyi's conceptual categories are wrong and "romantic" (Cook 1966).

Finally, some anthropologists obliterate all distinctions between descriptive statements, analytical statements, and statements about folkviews, by describing and analyzing the economy, and stating folkviews about it exclusively in market terminology (supply, demand, price, maximizing, capital), and thus quite understandably convince themselves that conventional economics provides all the concepts necessary for economic anthropology (Pospisil 1963).

What must be recognized is that economic anthropology deals with two different sorts of economies, primitive and peasant, under two different sets of conditions, static and dynamic, and with two very different aspects of economy, organization and material performance. Polanyi's theoretical categories are addressed principally, but not exclusively, to the organization of primitive and archaic economies under static conditions. That he did not analyze peasant economies and small-scale economies undergoing change, growth, and development does not vitiate his important contributions to the analysis of nonmarket economies and the transformations of 18th and 19th-century capitalism.[16]

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[15] Gunnar Myrdal's point about the mutually reinforcing nature of developmental activities is indispensable for understanding the processes of sequential change, whether they be degenerative, cash income growth, or the structural changes entailed in successful development Myrdal 1957: Chaps. 1–3).

[16] Much that Polanyi said in *The Great Transformation* (1944) about the social and cultural consequences of the British Industrial Revolution is relevant to current socio-economic change in underdeveloped areas.

To adduce an analogy that illustrates the point: in the Anglo-America of 1933, the topics handled with Marshallian price and distribution theory (Marshall 1920), and its extensions into the analysis of markets in imperfect competition (Robinson 1932, Chamberlain 1933), were the dominant concern of economic theory (the pricing of resources and products under static conditions in market-integrated national economies). In the Anglo-America of 1968, this remains a concern of economic theory but has declined in relative importance as different questions became important and new theories and conceptual categories were invented to answer them: what determines aggregate national output (Keynes 1936)? What determines the rate of growth of aggregate output over time (Harrod 1952; Domar 1957)? Polanyi's system is akin to Marshall's in its traditional concerns.

Moreover, when Soviet economy began to take its present form, beginning in 1928, special concepts and analyses were invented to deal with what is special to Soviet economic organization and performance. So too with the economics of underdeveloped areas. Economists are used to living in several theoretical universes—price theory, income theory, growth theory, development theory, Soviet economy—which overlap only partially. They do not throw out Marshall because he did not answer Keynes' questions; they do not throw out Keynes because he did not answer Harrod and Domar's questions; and they do not throw out any of these market economy theorists because they did not address themselves to issues of collectivization and central planning in Soviet economy. This lesson must be learned in economic anthropology if we are ever to progress beyond the stage where deaf men ceaselessly shout at one another. Like the economists, economic anthropologists are dealing with several aspects of several sorts of economies, and need several sets of concepts to understand and measure them properly.

> . . . we have no doubt that the future of economic theory lies not in constructing a single universal theory of economic life but in conceiving a number of theoretical systems that would be adequate to the range of present or past economic orders and would disclose the forms of their co-existence and evolution (Chayanov 1966:28).

Abstract

While interest in economic anthropology grows rapidly, the creation of a widely accepted theoretical framework is impeded by the persistence—indeed, intensification—of disputes over conceptual issues. Part I of this paper clarifies the issues and explains why controversy persists. Part II attempts to reconcile opposing views by showing how the several different topics that comprise economic anthropology require different sets of analytical and measurement concepts for their fruitful investigation. Part III considers the recent extension of economic anthropology to processes of socio-economic change, growth, and development in communities undergoing "modernization."

Comments

by CONRAD M. ARENSBERG ☆

New York, N.Y., U.S.A. 29 VI 68

I am glad to comment on George Dalton's magisterial "Theoretical Issues in Economic Anthropology." Dalton is the logical successor of Polanyi, and his work represents the culmination of Polanyi's impetus toward the revival of historical institutional economics and the proper theoretical use of ethnographic and historical data in economics and in anthropology. When he writes or speaks he can do so as a man properly accredited and thoroughly professional in both these sciences, the limited one as well as the more general one. His is therefore a most significant voice. CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY is to be congratulated for offering this statement of the issues uniting and separating the two sciences.

The present statement will go far to end the silly shouting of the deaf in present-day anthropology that Dalton summarizes and rejects. It will put the economic institutions of the human record back into the cross-cultural and analytically comparative perspective that alone can illuminate them. As Dalton rightly points out, no one contends any more that the variant kinship, or social structural, or religious, or political customs among the tribes and civilizations of mankind derive from an elemental human nature which is enshrined and perfected in European institutions. No more should anyone waste further time over the universality of maximizing, or prestige-seeking, in creating the market system, or temple economics, or kula-ring reciprocities. Dalton's view of these things is squarely based on ethnographic and historical comparison of the social structures, including their interpersonal behaviors and customary rules, of the societies of the anthropological and historical record. Economic institutions are the systematically integrated culture patterns observed to make up the "substantive economics" (younger men today would say the "ecology") of the real societies and the real polities, primitive, peasant, and national, with which they have been reported. Dalton's is an inductive generalization of the cultural record of the kind we all began with, with Polanyi. It is fit to keep company with the empirical classifications and summations anthropology has already effected with kinship systems, political forms, and languages. Dalton has done us in anthropology a service by putting us back on our own path, by informing us once and for all what economics is and is not, and by uniting the two sciences in the service of our understanding of the developing world. He has shown us once again that economic institutions are culture traits, illuminated by the same methods of analysis we have used upon the others and equally subject to the processes of diffusion, persistence, syncretism, systemic linkage, and evolutionary transformation we have already learned to identify.

by JOHN BLACKING ☆

Johannesburg, South Africa. 5 VII 68

This is a very useful and well-written paper, and it successfully carries its point that economic anthropologists need, and are justified in using, several concepts. In particular, the spirited defence of Polanyi is impressive and wholly justified. I have, however, two criticisms of specific points, and a suggestion for an approach which may more effectively bridge the gap between economics and economic anthropology.

Firstly, I am not too happy about the view that patterns of economic organization in "primitive" or "subsistence" economies "are frequently expressions of kinship, religious, or political relationships." Is it not equally, if not more, likely that kinship, religion, and politics are crystallizations and ritualizations of economic processes? I am not advocating economic determinism, but I cannot see any need for kinship *organization* except for purposes of regulating land tenure, ownership of property and usufruct, inheritance and succession, etc. Likewise, religious activity is surely based on physiological experiences to which men attach value and which

appear to belong to another world. Of themselves, these experiences cost nothing (except time for meditation or submission), except in cases where facilities are required for communal worship. There are no good reasons for converting spontaneous worship into the systematic *relationships* of organized religious activity, unless some kinds of experience are thought to be relevant in economic activities; or unless people have come to accept the idea that such experiences can be attained only by, or with the help or instruction of, a group of religious specialists, who therefore have to be paid for their services. Magic and religious ritual are the results of alienation, of personal confidence and awareness shattered and economic organization gone wrong. Moreover, is it too naive to argue that political relationships are concerned basically with the allocation and control of material resources, even when priestly, military, and other apparently "non-economic" forms of power may be valued? —or have I been in South Africa too long to see politics as anything more than a device for improving or maintaining the economic prospects of groups?

Secondly, I wonder whether Dalton is justified in assuming that local community change comes from without, and that "degenerative change" springs not so much from economic exploitation as from "the disintegration of the cultural environment of the victim" (as Polanyi also argues). Does this not attach too much importance to the role of culture, rather than the quality of personal relationships, in the process of becoming? If personal relationships are not destroyed by the misery of serious economic disorganization, people seem to be able to abandon their culture without loss of self-respect. It is "the culture of poverty," rather than the loss of cultural identity, that hurts. Cargo cults, ghost dances, and the like are religions of the economically oppressed, not of the culturally deprived. "Development" is all too often a euphemism for economic exploitation. Even when the agents of change are kind and well-meaning, their smugness, their self-confidence, or their suppressed arrogance are keenly felt, and poverty and wealth become the yardsticks of cultural validity. The sudden awareness of poverty may make a peasant as dissatisfied with his culture as can be a professor, when he meets a less qualified age-mate who has twice the salary and more time for research because he went into industry. This loss of confidence can lead to a healthy neglect of obsolescent cultural institutions and a desire for more effective reorganization. Malaise and degenerative change set in only when there is no scope for adaptation, generally because it is politically impossible, or because it does not accommodate to the economic plans of the developers. When the interests of community development conflict with national development, communities invariably suffer. They may then respond in a fiercely chauvinistic fashion, not because they believe that ethnic or cultural identity is more important than individual identity, but because this is the hollow line that larger or national units use to implement their policies, and it looks as if it might bring a greater share of power. For similar reasons, Africans departed from traditional democratic procedures and threw up a series of quasi-charismatic leaders to bargain with colonial governors.

Finally, for the sake of the smoother development of poor nations, if for no other reason, a unitary framework of generalizations about economic activity is desirable. I think this may be possible if we look, after the fashion of Lévi-Strauss, Leach, and others, for the processes which underlie economic activity in many different societies. I do not think it is any more helpful to type societies on the basis of their patterns of economic organization than it is to class them as hunter-gatherers, horticulturalists, or pastoralists. What is needed first are generalizations on the folkviews of each society studied, to discover the structural processes employed in economic activity. Then, in comparison, different societies may be found to employ radically different sets of processes. It is unlikely that the processes used by each society will be entirely unique, though their application in the field of economic life may be. In other words, we may find that the economic systems of *any* societies (industrial, peasant, or otherwise) differ not in kind, nor even in degree, but in the application of a unique combination of processes to overtly economic transactions, one perhaps applying to the organization of economic life processes that others have applied to the organization of religion, kinship, or even music. If we knew what processes in technologically simple societies appear transformed as the economics of industrial capitalism, we would be nearer to solving some of the most pressing problems of modernization in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

by HELEN CODERE ☆

Waltham, Mass., U.S.A. 26 VI 68

This is not only an excellent review article, but it is also being published at an opportune moment in the development of economic anthropology. It is Dalton's contribution to the field to have for all practical purposes created the substantivist-formalist controversy in the sense that it is he who has been the most tireless in keeping Polanyi's views and work before us, it is he who has borne the brunt of the attack, and it is he who has constantly, and again tirelessly, sharpened and improved a number of major substantivist arguments. In this last connection, the particular contributions of this article are the spelled-out distinction between economic structure and performance and the thorough and systematic discussion of the varieties of the world's economic systems, past and present, and of the challenge to theorizing such variety presents.

It does not seem possible at this point for anyone interested in economic anthropology to avoid consideration and study of both the formalist and substantivist positions and acceptance of one or the other, along with the responsibility this entails to advance the general acceptance of that position according to the rules of our game —namely, that the best hypotheses shall win, that the soundest arguments in logic and empirical validation shall prevail, and that a scientific rhetoric shall be deemed the most effective and efficient.

In this spirit I should like to enter the fray on the substantivist side, in the hope of advancing it to however slight a degree by arguing against what seem to me to be mistaken ideas on Dalton's part about theorizing in general and anthropological theorizing in particular. I agree with Dalton that the attempt on the part of Burling *et al.* to take over and apply the formal (maximization) theory of one section of contemporary economics is, and will continue to be, a failure in the genuinely and broadly comparative field of economic anthropology. I agree not only for many of the reasons Dalton gives but also because a major issue in the field of economics itself is whether its elegant formal theory in microeconomics—the theory in question in economic anthropology—has any empirical relevance whatsoever (see Kaplan 1968).

Dalton is wrong, however, and weakens the substantivist cause, in judging the quest for what he calls "universal" theory as quixotic and in arguing that anthropologists do not take theoretical concepts from science (read "Western" science, if you wish) and that when they do so it is an ethnocentricity comparable to that of discussing exotic religions from the standpoint of some Western Judeo-Christian theology. First, it is precisely because anthropology has universal concepts that it has produced the solid results to date in such work, specifically approved by Dalton, as that on social structure. The concept of role, for example, applies equally well to the Eastern yogi or the Soviet industrial commissar. Other concepts in the field that are less universally useful descent and filiation, for example—are nonetheless "universal" in the sense that they are not restricted to any broad category or type of society. They will apply, where they apply usefully at all, as well to some primitive as to some archaic, peasant, or modern industrial societies, and applying them will confer

precision and comparability on the analysis being made or tested. Second, it may detract from our view of our own originality to say so, but the great majority of the ideas and theoretical concepts we use and test are those of science (again, read "Western" science, if you will, but note that it is the only body of accumulative knowledge and the only source of tried and operational research design and methodology that we have). The borrowings from science are often premature, ill-informed, or mistaken. Applications can be, and have been, clumsy, strained, metaphorical, and just plain wrong. The testing of such borrowed ideas can be, and has been, equally clumsy and inadequate. Such failures or stupidities no more vitiate the over-all process than the entry of the wrong digits vitiates the principles of any mathematical computation. The space considerations of this comment prevent any extended illustrations of points, but it is possible at least to note the career of the borrowed concept of evolution as first applied in an oversimplified way to unilinear sequences, as irrelevantly and mistakenly applied to such areas as that of language, as poorly tested in such schemes as that of Morgan; and as qualified, sharpened, and systematized by association with ecological variables—ecology being another borrowed field with borrowed theory.

The problem, then, of using formal economic theory of the sort described is not that of the irrelevance of any theoretical concept or any body of theory taken from science. Rather, it is either the case that it is poorly understood and used—that is, if it is a scientific theory—or, as not a few of us think, that it is not a scientific theory at all, since it is not about the only possible field of its application, human behavior, and is without empirical basis and untestable.

In contrast to the unscientific character of the formal economics in question, the concepts of Karl Polanyi have universality and empirical reality. Reciprocity and redistribution, for example, can occur in any of the broad types of society previously mentioned and are identifiable and even measurable empirical behavioral phenomena. These and other concepts of Polanyi's scheme give order, broad comparability, and theoretical coherence to our work. That elegance, refinement, and quantitivity are presently lacking does not matter. If concepts, or a loose body of theoretical concepts, are scientific, these formally more satisfying results will one day follow, whereas no amount of formal beauty alone will yield anything but an esthetic rather than a scientific result.

by ERIK COHEN ☆

Jerusalem, Israel. 28 VII 68

Dalton quotes Geertz to the effect that "people confuse the generality of a theory with its ability to be applied universally." He then proceeds to show that several theoretically constructed *general* types are needed for a fruitful analysis of widely divergent economic systems. He concludes that ". . . economic anthropologists are dealing with several aspects of several sorts of economies, and need several sets of concepts to understand and measure them properly." To my mind, this line of thinking, though acceptable as far as it goes, leaves open a basic theoretical issue, namely, is a *universally* applicable theory of economic anthropology really impossible, unfeasible, or unnecessary simply because the widely divergent *factual* economic arrangements found in different economies necessitate different sets of concepts for their analysis?

Obviously, a universal theory remains necessary as long as we assert, with Dalton, that different types of economies serve essentially the same social function, namely adaptation. Dalton has shown, however, that such a theory would be more complicated than previously thought—indeed, that it will have to be a kind of metatheory encompassing the existing disparate types of primitive, peasant, modern, and other economies.

All the existing purportedly "universal" theories of economic behavior assume rationality on part of the actor. Therefore, as Dalton has shown, the main problem of economic anthropology has been whether such rationalistic models are applicable or useful for the analysis of other than modern industrial societies. He shows convincingly that such models are not applicable over the whole range of economies; from this we learn that a really universal theory should be broad enough to be able to explain both rational and irrational aspects and types of economic systems. Stated differently, it should be a metatheory which would encompass the different theoretical types of economies, constructed by Polanyi, Dalton, and others, as so many points on a continuum or multidimensional property-space of possible types of economic systems. The polar points of the continuum, or the extreme points of the property-space, would represent the outer limits of variability of economic systems—the points beyond which no economic systems capable of fulfilling continuously the function of societal adaptation are conceivable. The continuum or property-space itself would be stated in highly abstract theoretical terms; its main variables would be such variables as rationality vs. irrationality, dependence vs. independence, of the economic system, generality vs. concreteness of economic values, etc. The main theoretical problem would become the clarification of the exact structural conditions in society under which concrete economies would approximate each of the general types of economic systems and thus necessitate the application of one of the various sets of concepts in the anthropologist's arsenal for their analysis. Such an approach would, in its turn, enable us to refine the crude typologies of societies still so widely used, such as primitive-peasant-modern.

Another possibility implied in such a universal theory would be the analysis of the interrelations between the several disparate spheres of a developing economy. As Dalton has stated, societies under conditions of modernization and development are often characterized by a dual economic system, composed of a more traditional and a more modern, commercialized, economic sphere; each of these is analyzable in terms of a different set of concepts. These spheres, however, are not wholly isolated from each other; there is some conversion between them (Bohannan and Dalton 1965), and the analysis of the mechanisms of conversion might be essential for the understanding of the economic dynamics of developing societies (Barth 1965). By providing a theoretical framework which subsumes systematically all types of economic systems, the metatheory would facilitate the analysis of conversions between types and the prediction of specific kinds of conversions which will occur under different structural conditions. The relationship between the rational and irrational types of economic behavior would thus in itself become a central theoretical issue for economic anthropology.

by PETER VAN EMST ☆

Groningen, Netherlands. 19 VI 68

Dalton is to be complimented for his thorough survey of how matters stand at this moment concerning the theoretical approach to economics in non-Western societies. Space doesn't permit taking sides in the theoretical thirty-years' war or trying to reconcile the parties to it; I can only underline a few points. Assuming that man is man, and that we in the West have a culture as much as the inhabitants of Pukapuka, there must be some conceptual tools for analysing and comparing all cultures, at least in a very general sense. Thus, in economics, we can use the concept of "price" everywhere, provided we broaden its meaning to the point that it is nearly—but not entirely!—devoid of meaning. When comparing cultures or parts thereof, economics for instance, we must start with these very general concepts and work down from there to the more specific ones suited to the culture or cultures in question. Of course, at the same time, we must look for the general concepts by working the other way round. Thus "price," or "price-mechanism," has a special meaning as it is used by conventional economists working with market-dominated societies, but this does not mean that it is impossible to find "price" in socialist countries or even in the New Guinea highlands.

Of course, there are differences in economic behaviour and organization between the economies of the modern state, the archaic state, the so-called primitive society, and the various forms of peasant society; but I think that principally these boil down to differences in scale. To say that there exist differences between, say, the economy of the Dutch nation and the economics of the inhabitants of New Guinea is only part of the story. Many traits of the economy of a Dutch household or even a small agricultural hamlet can—or could—better be analysed with the concepts useful for a Papuan household or hamlet than with the conventional concepts of the economists.

Economists, and sociologists, are not so bad as they seem to be. Of course, they still can learn a lot from the anthropologist, but many of them (Marx and Weber, to mention only two) have clearly seen the relations between the economic and other spheres of the society. In other words, we know that our economy is in many respects as "embedded" in society as a whole as primitive or peasant economies. Here again, we must consider the scale. It is not only in India that there is a great and a little tradition, culturally speaking. In fact we can find this dichotomy in a general way in Ashanti and in Europe as well, while in other cases, e.g., the former colonial countries, it takes the form of Boeke's dualistic economy.

Dalton gives attention to these points, be it in other words. I quite agree with him where he pleads for the study of the relation between the small economy and the great economy; as he puts it: "How do small groups . . . become part of a regional or national economy?" I agree, too, when he says that "Economic anthropology is best done within a framework of comparative economic systems. . . ." This framework, however, must include all systems, great and little, capitalist as well as socialist, archaic state, and peasant; and there must be some basis concepts in terms of which they can be analysed and compared.

by RONALD FRANKENBERG ☆

Lusaka, Zambia. 13 VI 68

Dalton's views on economic anthropology are always both stimulating and clear, and this article is no exception. Above all, one welcomes his determination to keep the discussion within a social framework rather than reduce a social system to a cluster of individual behaviours or dyadic relationships. As I have pointed out elsewhere (1967: 61), Burling, for example, feels no need to classify societies into primitive, peasant, industrial, or slave, feudal, capitalist since fundamentally he does not work within the context of society at all (Burling 1962). I would go further and say that I remain cautious in accepting that the anthropologist is unlike the economist in finding that "there is no separate economic system that can be analysed independently of social organisation."

This in fact is where those whom Dalton labels the formalists and Dalton himself come together in the acceptance that conventional economic theory applies even to advanced industrial capitalist society! When Dalton presents his pictorial contrast between the constrained Trobriand yam-gardener and the unconstrained American farmer, he is presenting a difference in quantity rather than quality. Both are constrained, and both are free. It is the nature of the constraints and the freedoms that is the basis of the problem for the student of comparative economic systems. I am reminded of a television discussion on Japanese culture I once saw in Britain, in which that culture was described as being ultra-conformist. "If four Japanese were gathered together like us," said Dr. Bronowski, "unlike us, they would all wear the same pattern tie." He had failed to notice that the difference between four Japanese wearing identical ties and four British wearing ties was not between conformity and non-conformity but between two kinds of conformity.

To some extent, therefore, and with characteristic arrogance, I feel that economists need anthropological theories and methods in the understanding of modern capitalist society rather than the converse. This is because economics as a science is based on the assumption or the heuristic device of ignoring the embeddedness of the economic within the social. As Dalton has suggested elsewhere, modern economists have consigned the social concomitants of economic activity to the limbo of Marxism and sociology. It may well be time to bring them back. Lewis (1962: vii) seems to be saying the same thing:

> Moreover in studying the market economy, economists have tended to take institutions for granted, and have tended to neglect interactions and conflicts between the market and other social institutions. This has left a gap into which some anthropologists are now sliding. They slip into factories, and study how workers set or react to production norms; they watch directors at work in the board-room; or they study the effects of prestige on occupations. It is clear that the anthropologist's technique of observation, and his understanding of the inter-relations of social institutions, have an important contribution to make to the study of even the most advanced market economies.

Perhaps, however, a more direct way for anthropology and economics to nourish each other might be through an intellectual dialogue with Marx. This for Dalton is not so much a blind spot as a slight myopia. I miss in the first part of his article an appreciation, critical or otherwise, of Dobb especially *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* [Dobb 1946]), Sweezy (n.d.), or Baran (1957), to name only a few Marxist economists who have concerned themselves with the kinds of problems with which we are here concerned. I have suggested elsewhere (Frankenberg 1967), to Firth's horrified and heartfelt disclaimer, that Firth himself operates within an evolutionary framework; that Belshaw (1949) and Salisbury (1962) rediscover the labour (time) theory of value; and that Epstein (1962) echoes the *Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy*. They are all Marxists *malgré lui*; it only remains for them to embrace their role and produce (perhaps with Dalton and Polanyi's aid?) a meaningful synthesis.

There remains, however, a difficulty in the classification of stages and the use of terms like primitive, peasant, and subsistence. Deane, quoted by Dalton, for example, is surely writing about what Dalton would define as peasant societies in Northern Rhodesia, and Allan (1965) has suggested that such economies produce enough for subsistence in bad years (which he estimates to occur only once in six years), leaving them with a surplus for redistribution or exchange in all the other years. Furthermore, it may be an error to abandon the term feudal too readily. I look forward eagerly to Dalton's promised article mentioned in footnote 11, confident that he will avoid the error of much writing, even by those influenced by Marxism, which tends, if only spasmodically, to confuse the industrial with the proletarian and the rural with the peasant (Fanon 1965, Worsley 1964*a*), ignoring such phenomena as Arensberg's peasant townsmen (Arensberg 1937) and Mao Tse Tung's rural proletariat (Mao Tse Tung 1954). *Cui bono* insists on creeping back into the discussion. The economic concepts of "scarce," "supply," "demand," have to be placed in the context of scarce for whom, supply to whom, demand from whom. In short, the sociological concept of stratification cannot be left out.

Presumably Joy's application (1967*a*, *b*) of linear programming to Darfur (as he would apply it, if given any encouragement, to Tikopia) was published too late for Dalton's comment. Does the same also apply to the publication in English of Marx's *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations* and Hobsbawm's long and penetrating introduction to it (1964)?

The third part of Dalton's article, concerned with social change, also invites comment. I think perhaps the point of involvement of anthropology with policy in the new situation is an ethnocentric one; seen from the British standpoint, modern British anthropology has always been heavily involved (Gough 1968). I have recently been classifying papers relating to the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, and it

and the Makerere Institute were concerned from their inception with practical matters of policy. I am tempted towards the generalisation that the relations between anthropologists and policy-makers have moved from the existential to the essential. Colonial governments tended to scrutinise who anthropologists were and to ask the question as to whether their intentions were honourable or subversive. Once they were satisfied—and within limits—the anthropologist could do what he liked, and if it happened to be relevant to the policy it was supposed to be relevant to, so much the better. Independent governments care less who people are but concern themselves more directly with the essence of what they do; they expect research to be directly useful in policy decisions.

Secondly, I doubt the generality of the statement that community change starts with impingement from without and regard it as perhaps heuristically dangerous. The job of the anthropologist is not to establish a pre-impingement base line but to gain an understanding of indigenous change and then examine how these processes are speeded up, slowed down, or changed in direction by external contact. One doubts that any society is left socially and culturally "much as before" by economic change. There are, however, convincing examples of the intensification of traditional patterns in one of Epstein's villages, Wangala (Epstein 1962), and in the work of Salisbury (1962).

Dalton makes no mention of studies which to my mind make a major theoretical contribution in this last field—namely Barth's (1963) on Northern Norway and Worsley's (1964*b*) on Saskatchewan. Their significance is enhanced because they enable us to compare similar structural processes in very widely different cultural contexts—an aim of *social* anthropology sometimes overlooked by those immersed in a cultural anthropology environment. As Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940: 3) said of political systems in a classic statement,

> A comparative study of political systems has to be on an abstract plane where social processes are stripped of their cultural idiom and are reduced to functional terms. The structural similarities which disparity of culture conceals are then laid bare and structural dissimilarities are revealed behind a screen of cultural uniformity. There is evidently an intrinsic connexion between a people's culture and their social organization, but the nature of this connexion is a major problem in sociology and we cannot emphasize too much that these two components of social life must not be confused.

While I would take issue with Dalton's dualistic conclusion—peasant/primitive, dynamic/static, organisation/material (I remain a trinitarian)— his article is a most useful, clear, and thoughtful contribution. Future students of economic anthropology can start from here, but they need perhaps three footnotes at least: one French, Godelier (1966*a*), one English, Firth (1967), and one deviant American, Sahlins (1958, 1960, 1962*a*, *b*, 1963, 1965).

by MORRIS FREILICH ☆

Boston, Mass., U.S.A. 29 VI 68

Dalton's article is a thoughtful and provocative analysis of matters of interest to all economic anthropologists. In Table 3 he provides an analytical tool kit that most researchers will want to take with them into "the field." The paper as a whole will probably become required reading in many graduate anthropology courses. With all this (and many additional complimentary statements can be made), the central goal of the paper is not achieved. A reconciliation of Polanyian economic anthropology and that of "the formalists" awaits yet another paper—perhaps by Dalton. Essentially we are presented with *two* approaches to the resolution: (1) that of a combatant, a partisan in the "thirty-years' war" and (2) that of a dispassionate scholar of comparative economic systems.

Dalton "the warrior" attacks "the enemy" for their quest of a universal theory. He charges them with having an "imperfect understanding of economic theory and its concepts"—providing as proof their use of the economists' definition of maximization, a definition which cannot be used in non-market economies. He wants them to give up their foolish attempts at formal analysis of subsistence systems because in

> traditional, slow-changing, subsistence (and peasant) economies, it is the analysis of socio-economic organization [Polanyian analysis] *rather than* performance [formal analysis] that yields insights of comparable interest and depth to those got in analyzing religions, polity, kinship, etc. [italics mine].

Anyone who wished to keep this conflict alive might begin by saying that the quest of a universal theory is a noble and proper goal for the game we are playing: *science*. One might go on to argue that the use of concepts from other disciplines does not necessarily entail the use of the same operational definitions for such concepts. We are discussing model-borrowing: the concern is with analogies, *not* homologies; with attempts to sharpen analytic tools to gain predictive ability, *not* simply with attempts to gain insights of comparable depth to those obtained in primitive religion, polity, and kinship. Social and cultural anthropologists wish to swim in deeper depths of understanding. To do so they will grab any concepts that appear fruitful. Further, Dalton might be asked to explain very specifically why, for example, it is not fruitful to think in terms of *surplus* and *supply and demand* in dealing with "primitive societies"? If, in a cows-for-women culture, at time *t*, there were *x* marriageable women and 3*x* surplus cows, we might predict that 3 cows will be the modal "price" which is "paid" for a bride. If significant differences were found between this expectation and the actual bride payments it would be tempting to think in terms of "price-fixing mechanisms" which do not allow "the market" to find its level. The argument that such "price-fixing" mechanisms are generally much more complex in primitive than in industrial society, because "tradition rules" in the former and "the market rules" in the latter, is a plausible one, but it is not demonstrated by the ethnographic record. It is only in recent years that anthropologists have really begun to count things—axes, man-hours, cows, etc.—and a continuation of this trend will indicate (I believe) that our mystical, superorganic views of culture (and its puppet man) are not in accordance with the data.

Since anthropologists are borrowing models—that is, using analogies—it is not correct to argue (as Dalton does, p. 66, italics mine):

> Describing the potlatch as an investment . . . bridewealth as the price one pays for sexual and domestic services . . . and shell transactions on Rossel Island as cash payments for market purchases . . . *suggests they are basically similar to ordinary commercial transactions in our own economy*.

Since we wish *to understand systems* and not simply to gain the understandings achieved by system members, it is not correct to argue (as Dalton does, p. 65, italics mine):

> Whether it is analytically revealing to interpret the potlatch, bridewealth, and Rossel Island shells in such fashion *depends on the folkviews of these events and usages*. . . .

It is possible to go on in this vein, but let us leave "the war" and look at Dalton the comparative economist. Wearing this more objective "mask," Dalton tells us (p. 66) that a number of important similarities exist in all economic systems:

> Whatever the size of the economy it will have several features in common . . . two kinds of goods and specialist services must be provided . . . material requisites of *physical* existence, and goods and services for religion, defense, settlement of dispute, rites of passage, and other aspects of *social* and community life . . . it is useful to regard all communities or societies as having economic systems . . . they all make use of some form(s) of natural resources (land, waterways, minerals), human co-operation (division of labor), and technology (tools, and knowledge of production or acquisition processes). Each of these features is structured . . . to provide the material means of individual and community life.

If important similarities exist among all economic systems, then it would appear useful to ask some similar questions and use some similar concepts to answer them irrespective of the type of system being investigated. Dalton tells us that this is a

good line of reasoning; that (p. 79) if "anthropologists are interested in comparative economic performance . . . some of the measurement concepts of conventional economics are usefully applicable." At this point a real resolution to the conflict could begin. As anthropologists looking to comparative economists for guidance, we would like to know which measurement concepts of conventional economics would be most useful, which least useful, and which completely fruitless. We would like to have some more realistic analysis of economic decision-making procedures in industrial societies. Who is this American farmer who selects cash crops purely on the basis of "physical yield times expected money price compared to money costs of production"? Where does he get complete information to maximize so efficiently? Are his personal likes really so irrelevant? Why is he so different from many an academic who gives up considerable money income to work in surroundings he considers "more agreeable"? If the American farmer really behaved in this way, then income could be adequately defined as net profit. Friedman (1962: 212) tells us, however, that income is actually made up of *money* and *other attractions*. These "other attractions" are considerable in peasant societies, making the peasant often appear "stupid" and "inefficient." Such other attractions may well be considerable in industrial societies, making them perhaps more similar to peasant economies than economists think.

It may well be feasible and indeed fruitful to work toward a unified theoretical framework which is general enough to encompass *the continuum* of subsistence, simple-market, and industrial economies. We look forward to Dalton's aid in this endeavor.

by G. P. GRIGOR'EV ☆

Leningrad, U.S.S.R. 15 VII 68

The theoretical issues proposed by Dalton are acceptable from my point of view. His view that "social organization and culture . . . affect economic organization and performance" (p. 65) is especially fruitful. According to the Marxist theory of economics, this rule is relevant to the study of all types of economy; therefore I do not see the grounds for Dalton's assertion that "the economist . . . can analyze important features of industrial capitalism . . . without considering social relationships" (p. 73).

Dalton's delineation of the main features of primitive economy seems to me accurate. Primitive economy is economy without centralized polities, small economy, with external trade confined to very few goods and the majority of goods produced used within the community. Primitive man is constrained in his production activities by physical-resource endowment and must depend on human co-operation. If we add to these characteristics the ownership by the primitive producer of the means of production, in contrast to the alienation of the means of production in other types of economy, this picture of primitive economy will fully coincide with Marx's understanding of it. Dalton writes that there is only occasional borrowing of Marxian concepts by anthropologists who write in English. He appears to underestimate the influence of Marx on economic anthropologists.

The study of economic history now begins with the examination of the remains of ancient towns for data on the beginnings of farming and cattle-breeding, metallurgy and pottery. The relations between these innovations, from point of view of economics, are different for different parts of the Old World, and so are their effects on economic and social development. The different effects of the same event (the introduction of pottery, for example) are partly due to differences in ecology, but this factor alone is not a sufficient explanation. Dalton's refinement of theoretical issues and definitions will be very helpful in the future concrete study of primitive economies.

by ZBIGNIEW MARCIN KOWALEWSKI ☆

Łódź, Poland. 15 VI 68

The special value of Dalton's article lies, in my opinion, in his critical and careful analysis of the applicability of categories within political economics—which, as a scientific discipline, is a product of highly developed industrial society—to pre-industrial societies (primitive and peasant) and, within these, to the contemporary underdeveloped societies of the so-called Third World. With reference to these last, however, the extent to which discussion of the applicability of these categories is really fundamental will depend on the degree of penetration of conditions characteristic of a capitalist economy into Third World peasant communities. Several studies by economists and sociologists have placed the majority of peasant communities in Latin America in the area of capitalist economic relations, thus refuting the thesis (e.g., Balandier 1958) that the economies of Third World societies are divided into "modern" (capitalist) and "traditional" (pre-capitalist) sectors. These capitalist economic relations, which penetrate into even the most "isolated" peasant community, are regulated within the community by their own mechanisms, through an internal structure analogous to "metropolis-satellite" economic dependence (Wolf 1955, 1959; Mariategui 1963; Stavenhagen 1963; Frank 1966, 1967); this structure has also been called "internal colonialism" (González Casanova 1964, 1965). In the same way—as Baran (1957) has shown—categories of Marxist political economics seem to be applicable to the economies of underdeveloped societies, especially, of course, with regard to these economies' undoubtedly unique position in the world capitalist system. At the same time, we must remember that in peasant communities economic relations with the outside world may have a capitalist character even though economic relations within the society are pre-capitalist (e.g., Pozas 1959); in such a case, an analysis of these relations could demand different categories.

Dalton approaches the economic structure of pre-capitalist societies as if it were as autonomous as that of capitalist societies, and as a result his economic anthropology becomes a kind of political economics of primitive or peasant communities. In my opinion, the autonomy of an economic structure which allows it to be subjected to a relatively independent scientific study, whether as a whole or as a regional part of a complex social whole, is the result of a long-lasting historical process; that is why economic structure in primitive societies is not autonomous, as was recognized by Malinowski and Mauss (Lévi-Strauss 1960)—from whence Mauss's theory of the total social fact (Mauss 1954). Godelier (1966*b*) rightly claims that in this kind of social whole, the economist can easily recognize productive forces, but not autonomous productive relations; for here kinship relations function as productive and political relations and thus these three structures are not yet autonomous in regard to each other. Godelier (1965) writes:

> The simpler the society, the less possible it becomes to isolate economic factors from other elements of social life, and the greater the extent to which the analysis of a mechanism that appears to be economic is complex, the whole social configuration being found directly in the centre of that mechanism. . . . [Thus] economic phenomena in the womb of a primitive society, simpler than the economy of modern society, are, however, more complicated socially.

Marxian analysis shows that the simplicity of economic categories is the result of a complex process, that simple categories appear on the highest levels of a society's development, in extremely differentiated social wholes, while on the lower levels of development the categories are more concrete, more complex (Marx 1953, Althusser 1965). Mauss (1954) and Malinowski (1922) have shown this in their studies of exchange, and it is also apparent in the property categories I have presented in my study of Andean agrarian communities (Kowalewski 1967).

It is as well that Dalton introduces to economic anthropology problems of the growth of peasant communities. Nevertheless, in building a theory of community development we should not ignore those sociocultural conditions of economic growth which, in vast areas of the

contemporary Third World, create, in the absence of strong social cohesion based on an internal market, its equivalent: the mobilization of peasants into a guerrilla-type revolutionary army, directed by urban intellectuals and regulated by "modernistic" cultural patterns; the organization of rural rear-guard economic support; and the breaking down of the cultural isolation of peasant communities by revolutionary war; all of this being inevitably accompanied by the emergence of the peasantry as a very powerful pressure group (Fanon 1959, 1961; Fals Borda 1965; Torres Restrepo 1966; Lê Châu 1966*b*; Kowalewski 1968) and the acceleration of economic growth of communities by the mechanisms of "ideological mobilization" manipulated by revolutionary authorities (Balandier 1956), as has happened in People's China, revolutionary Cuba, North Korea, as well as North Viet Nam (e.g., Lê Châu 1966*a*). Unfortunately, up till now, anthropology has ignored this, although it does not seem too "deviant" a process.

by EDWARD E. LECLAIR, JR.

Troy, N.Y., U.S.A. 21 VII 68

To deal adequately with the points made, the issues raised, the interpretations advanced in the paper under review would require at least as much space as that taken by the original article. This comment can only touch upon a few salient points.

I must begin with an objection. Early in the paper, Dalton suggests, rather gently, that anthropologists writing on these matters, among whom he at that point properly includes me, do not understand economics very well. Later, he makes the point far more bluntly, refering to "their imperfect understanding of economic theory and its concepts." Here, he refers specifically to Goodfellow, Herskovits, Burling, and Cook. It is not clear that Dalton intends to suggest that my understanding of economic theory and its concepts is imperfect. To set the record straight, I earned an A.B., and M.A., and a Ph.D. in economics, concentrating in economic theory, before making the decision to become a professional anthropologist. I am sure that my understanding of economic theory and its concepts is imperfect, but I would think not to a crippling degree.

Moreover, it has always been my impression that the work in economic anthropology of the people mentioned, and of others who are more or less in the "formalist" group, such as Firth, Belshaw, and Salisbury, has demonstrated an increasing understanding of formal theory and has improved in quality as that understanding has improved.

By the same token, I cannot accept Dalton's implied point that if anthropologists only understood economic theory well enough, they would all accept the "substantivist" viewpoint. At the same time, this does seem an advance of sorts; one could glean from earlier substantivist writing that anthropologists need not bother trying to understand economic theory at all. I'm all in favor of greater understanding along these lines, whatever the consequences.

In one brief passage labeled "The Quest for a Universal Theory," Dalton quotes, from Firth and from me, passages in which we call for what I refer to as a "general theory of economic process and structure." He then suggests that a "single" theory is not possible. It seems to me that "universal theory," "general theory," and "single theory" refer to different things. A general theory dealing with complex phenomena must certainly be complex; perhaps in my original statement I might better have said "general theories," although I would expect that such "general theories" would be interrelated in some ways. Such general theories would be "universal" only in a very limited sense. I argue this because in my original statement on the subject (LeClair 1962: 1188) I specified that behind the general theory would lie a series of special cases (or theories), potentially as many as there are different economies.

Twice, Dalton draws an analogy which I consider to be specious. He says that using the concepts of conventional economics "to analyze the non-market sectors of primitive and peasant economies is as distorting as it would be to use the concepts of Christianity to analyze primitive religions." Wallace (1966) has convincingly shown that it is possible to analyze any religion in relation to a single set of concepts. Christianity is a special case of religion in general, just as, as I have argued (1962: 1188), Western economy is a special case of economy in general. Wallace's approach to religion might be taken as a model analogue of what I mean by "a general theory of economic process and structure."

A large portion of Part I of Dalton's paper is devoted to re-explication of a cardinal tenet of substantivist economic anthropology: that the economic behavior of "primitive" peoples is so different from that of people in market-industrial systems that the two sets of behavior cannot be dealt with in terms of the same sets of concepts. The facts of differences of behavior between the Iowa farmer and the Trobriander are presumably not much in dispute. It is how those facts are interpreted which lies at the core of the controversy in economic anthropology.

Dalton would have us throw out the theory of choice because "in primitive economies, the constraints on individual choice . . . are extreme, and are dictated not only by social obligation but also by primitive technology and by physical environment." Elsewhere, he tells us that the "Trobriander is born into a yam-growing economy [and] does not 'choose' to plant yams rather than broccoli." He then tells us that the Trobriand farmer chooses in other dimensions. *All* human choices, however, are subject to constraints of the same sorts mentioned. The Iowa farmer does not choose to plant corn rather than bananas simply because he lives in a corn-growing economy, but his choice is constrained by the environment. He does not choose to plant marijuana rather than corn because of social (legal) constraints. He may choose to continue working rather than retiring partly because of the Protestant ethic or because he wishes to increase his patrimony to his sons. Iowa farmers choose different things for different reasons than is the case with the Trobriander; but within the constraints of various kinds imposed on each, each chooses.

Another related element in the argument is the idea that somehow primitives are to be analyzed differently because their social relationships enter into their economic activity in a different degree than is true of the Iowa farmer. Once again, the only thing that is involved here is that the parameters of choice are different. It is important to study the differences in the parameters of choice; but whatever the parameters of choice may be in a particular situation, presumably the principles of choice remain the same.

There is much more that could and should be said in response to Dalton's paper if space permitted. Nothing in his paper, however, has caused me to alter my basic position as expressed in the paper to which Dalton refers several times (LeClair 1962) nor does it cause me to regret anything I wrote, with Harold K. Schneider, in a book which is now in press (LeClair and Schneider 1968). The reader who is interested in exploring my thinking in greater detail is invited to consult those two works.

by LORENZ G. LÖFFLER ☆

Heidelberg, Germany. 9 VI 68

Dalton's contribution undoubtedly constitutes a useful and well-founded review paper. As an attempt to reconcile opposing views, however, it may not be successful. A classification of "economies" and an outline of types is no substitute for a general theory of economics: Dalton himself denounces any claim in this direction as unrealistic. For him there can be nothing but theories relating to special segments of the economic field, and, in consequence, he has to reduce all attempts to frame a suprasegmental theory to the level of segmental theories or to an even lower level where their value is to be judged against folkviews; the theories of Western economists, on the other hand, are exempt from any such "proof."

It may be useful to recall that sociology suffers from a similar dispute. There are sociologists who cumulate segmental theories but denounce any quest for a theory of society as modern metaphysics. The trouble with anthropologists is that they have folkviews (and ethnography) on the one hand and a yearning for metatheories (and general anthropology) on the other hand, while segmental theories are at best in the making and generally start either from the folkviews (new ethnography) or the general theories (old ethnology). Whatever the foundations of a general theory—behaviorism, functionalism, structuralism, etc.—its results are not to be measured against folkviews, but only against the possibility of deducing from its set of axioms the fundamentals of the different segmental theories. And in order to yield this possibility, the notions of any suprasegmental theory must, as a matter of fact, be more comprehensive. It is useless, therefore, to maintain that the proponents of such theories have misunderstood the conceptions used by Western economists: it will be necessary to "misconceive" them in order to proceed. In this sense, e.g., economizing and maximizing may be principles of any economic system, irrespective of whether they are consciously employed (and hence traceable in folkviews) or even calculated (and hence a subject of "higher" economics).

At any rate, Dalton himself has drawn up a list of general features valid for any economic system. Agnosticism cannot induce us to argue a priori that there is no functional or structural connection between these "features," since at least Marx succeeded in using them as premises for his general theory (on which he built, e.g., his segmental theory of capitalism). This general theory cannot be discarded by the argument that similar theories are *eo ipso* impossible and hence, if drawn, inconsistent; the inconsistency itself has to be shown first. Western economists generally tacitly accept the basic Marxian concepts and avoid the issue by clinging to the segmental level; economic anthropology, however, cannot avoid it. It should and must face it unless we want to perpetuate misconceptions. This criticism may apply (because of the level involved) more to Dalton's adversaries than to himself. He at least has clearly demarcated the level of Polanyi's and his arguments, a level which badly needed discussion and has profited from their contributions in a really fundamental way.

by SIMON D. MESSING ☆

Baltimore, Md., U.S.A. 19 VII 68

Perhaps the reason some economists are taking renewed interest in anthropology is a notion that anthropology is a form of witchcraft to be consulted for exorcism when well-laid plans of modernization go astray. Who else but an anthropologist could explain the accelerated litigation over land tenure? What's eating the natives who achieve cash-income growth without "development"? What's gotten into them that they won't "maximize"?

At the heart of the controversy between the two disciplines appear to be their purposes. The approach of most anthropologists has been to study unabstracted, existential human behavior, with emphasis on economics only to explain ecological survival or to reflect an emphasis on it by the natives themselves. Most economists have sought theoretical abstractions from the outset, and when unaccountable behavior was found it was left to the anthropologists. In recent years the demand of new "developing" nations that both disciplines do something useful to justify their existence has challenged the former division of labor.

Dalton's review article could pave the way for a more constructive confrontation than the polemics over reified abstractions that have been the practice. One major section, touched only at random in the article, would be the theories of mutual-aid traditions in relation to economic development. Here is a phenomenon of human behavior that appears to be as cross-cultural as may be wished by either discipline.

by P. K. MISRA ☆

Mysore, India. 28 V 68

Economic anthropology has come of age. There is no longer any doubt as to what an anthropologist is to look for when he studies the economy of a simpler society. The controversy has been as regards the theoretical approach and the definition of certain terms. The present paper of Dalton does not improve upon what has already been said on these issues by the advocates of substantive and formal meanings of economics. A dogmatic approach does not help the growth of a science. In Part I, Dalton states why the controversy between substantivists and formalists persists; this is already all too well known. The channels of communication between the advocates of the two points of view which were opened up by the broader definition of economizing by LeClair (1962) and of maximization by Burling (1962) and Cancian (1965) have been ignored by Dalton. Apart from the fact that maximization and economizing are present (whatever may be maximized and economized) in all societies, they are also specifically relevant at least for those primitive and peasant societies where money is becoming important and the economy is becoming involved in a wider network (a phenomenon now being observed the world over). The ideas of maximization presented by Burling and Cancian give us an opportunity to view the changing primitive and peasant economies within a single frame of reference. They would certainly help to obliterate the paradoxical situation which Dalton sets up by saying that the commercialized sectors of the peasant economies are relevant to conventional economics—as if the two sectors (commercialized and non-commercialized) could be dealt with separately. From the anthropologist's point of view, economists have studied only one aspect of the market-oriented, price-governed economies, for they have excluded in their analysis matters relating to social organisation and other aspects of culture. Economic anthropologists, on the other hand, take all these factors into consideration. With this approach, they can make significant contributions even in analysing the developed modern economies, and hence the scope of economic anthropology need not be limited to primitive and peasant economies.

Dalton's idea of comparing primitive and peasant economies with industrial capitalism seems highly idealistic. Comparison of institutionalized forms in different cultures is in itself a topic of debate in anthropology, and it is doubtful that a comparison of primitive and peasant economies with industrial capitalism could be achieved as long as they are approached with two different frames of reference.

by MANNING NASH ☆

Chicago, Ill., U.S.A. 21 VI 68

For an essay entitled "Theoretical Issues in Economic Anthropology," it is surprising how few such issues are mentioned or discussed here. (Compare, for example, the range of issues raised in Firth [1967], Belshaw [1965], or Nash [1966].) Dalton is concerned with a single issue—that of the relevance of contemporary economic concepts and modes of analysis to primitive and peasant economies—and it is one that was probably not even meaningful in the form in which Polanyi first raised it. The question is too global, too unspecified, and too inviting to reasoning by analogy and concluding by polemic.

It is obvious that economic anthropology and contemporary economics are different, and unfinished, intellectual enterprises. Many parts of economics are irrelevant, inapplicable, and unfruitful in understanding primitive and peasant economies. The general structure of thought in parts of neoclassical economics is meaningful, however, outside of the society in which it was developed. The general notions of supply and demand, opportunity cost, axes of choice, have surely enriched the ethnographic description of primitive and peasant economies when intelligently and sensitively used (Salisbury 1962, Epstein

1962, Firth and Yamey 1964). In light of the volume and the quality of work done by anthropologists who selectively use some of the ideas of economics, the global question of the relevance and realism of economics is simply an excuse for avoiding the construction of testable empirical generalizations. The utility of any body of ideas is not resolved in debate but by taking them to the point of encounter with the phenomenological world. Let us get on with the tasks of fashioning the concepts we need to handle and generate our data, rather than exhaust mind and pen in fruitless wordmongering.

In the template analogy between the Trobrianders and modern capitalists used by Polanyi and his followers, there is a great deal of loose reasoning and intellectual slippage. There is a confusion among explaining the institutional structure (obviously only partly an economic question), explaining economic performance (obviously only partly an institutional question), and explaining the cognitive and emotional bases for choice (obviously only partly a psychological question). The comparison of the Trobriand yam-grower, who has no choice but to grow yams (although the amount may be somewhat open), with the American farmer, who can grow broccoli or something else, is a fine example of the confusion. The confusion can be partly resolved by understanding some general principles of social anthropology, rather than the homemade sociology Polanyi uses in his explanations of primitive economies. These principles are simple: (1) choices in all social systems are structurally (technologically and socially) generated; (2) the range of perceived alternatives always and everywhere sets constraints on choice; and (3) within the structure and among the perceived alternatives, actors generally choose to maximize values and minimize penalties (what the values and penalties are is empirical). These principles bring the Trobriander behavior and the American farmer behavior into the same universe and disentangle the confusion of the *magnitude* of choices open with the *act* of choosing among them.

The institutional analysis of Polanyi is rather crude and ad hoc. His principles of exchange are descriptive of some societies, but have little analytical value. As Dalton's Table 1 indicates, the principles lead to mechanical, schematic, and static understandings at a superficial level. What Polanyi has to offer social and economic anthropology has already been absorbed and superseded, even by some of his adherents (Sahlins 1960). Polanyi was a catalyst in the confrontation of economics and economic anthropology, but like the catalyst in a chemical process he has been consumed in the reaction. "A science that neglects to forget its founders is doomed."

by ROMAN RACZYŃSKI ☆

Prague, Czechoslovakia. 1 VII 68

Economic anthropology as described by Dalton is a real science with a specific methodology (partly borrowed from sociology or from social anthropology) and with a particular object of research (subsistence and peasant economy). The lack of interest in economic anthropology on the part of both anthropologists and economists is due to its interdisciplinary character. Neglect of interdisciplinary studies is a weak link in the contemporary study of human society. A need for integration of the sciences of man has often been expressed. In the case of co-operation between anthropologists and economists, Yamey (1964) has set forth and theoretically justified a complex approach to subsistence and peasant societies. Important contributions to the field of economic anthropology were published in *Readings on Economic Sociology* (Smelser 1965), in the series *Working Papers in Asian Studies* (Bowen 1967), and in the Working Papers of the Economic Development Institute (Hill 1965).

A special problem is the terminology. The term used to refer to this branch of science is sometimes "economic anthropology" (especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries), sometimes "economic sociology" (especially in continental Europe). If the term "anthropology" were to be used for subsistence and peasant society and "sociology" for industrial society, the problem of determining the boundary between these two types of society would still remain to be resolved.

Another terminological difficulty arises in the case of the terms "socialist" and "communist." Socialism is a class society system (with workers, farmers, and working intellectuals) in which everyone works according to his capacities and receives according to his merits. Communism, on the other hand, is a highly developed industrialized society without classes in which everyone works according to his capacities and receives according to his needs; such a society does not exist anywhere. Again, to determine which society is capitalist and which socialist is, in my opinion, even more difficult than to distinguish a subsistence or peasant society from an industrial one. Furthermore, "Soviet socialism," mentioned several times by Dalton, is different from the contemporary Chinese, Czechoslovak, or Yugoslav points of view. Therefore the only antithesis of "subsistence and peasant society" which can be generally recognized is "industrial society."

by JOYCE F. RIEGELHAUPT ☆

Bronxville, N.Y., U.S.A. 30 VI 68

While I could not agree more with Dalton's statement that economic anthropology must "progress beyond the stage where deaf men ceaselessly shout at one another," I am not sure that this paper does in fact significantly enhance communication. Too much effort continues to be expended arguing with his (and Polanyi's) critics over who is right and who is wrong.

The task of economic anthropology would be greatly eased if the analysts did not try to deal with primitive and peasant societies together. Despite the fact that anthropologists study both types of societies, their economies are of very different sorts and should be handled as distinct conceptual categories. Specifically, this tendency to see the subdiscipline as comprising primitive and peasant economics has led the anthropologist to study peasant economics as though they were confined to the "little community."

By focusing on peasant culture rather than peasant society, Dalton obscures the integration, by definition, of the peasantry. In his comment,

> Most development economists, however, are interested in processes and problems of national economic growth and development that have little in common with anthropologist's interest in local community social and economic change.

he reflects a key component in anthropology's inability to deal with peasant economics. Substantial "local social and economic change" for the peasant community is possible only within the process of "national economic growth and development."

The integration of peasantries into larger systems can be clearly noted in Dalton's Type I and Type II peasant economic systems. These different forms of peasant society (but not necessarily culture) developed as the entire society changed: specifically, through the impact of the industrial revolution and the commercialization of agriculture (see Moore 1967, Tawney 1967). With respect to Latin America, Frank (1967) develops further the interrelationship between the economic system and policies of an entire nation and the economics of local life (see especially Chap. IV, "Capitalism and the Myth of Feudalism in Brazilian Agriculture").

Three further comments: (1) While it is useful to understand "traditional primitive" systems in order to understand change, the economic anthropologist must be especially wary in asserting that he has in fact knowledge of the "traditional" (i.e., untouched by modern economic and/or political forces) patterns (see Marshall 1968). In *The Great Transformation*, Polanyi distinguished *four* modes of allocation: reciprocity, redistribution, market exchange, and *householding*. To Polanyi, "householding" is a form of economic activity found in peasant-type households with the social organizational principle of "autarchy." Polanyi credits Aristotle with first recognizing this system, and he writes (1944: 54),

> production for use as against production for gain [is] the essence of the household proper; yet accessory production for the market need not, [Aristotle] argues, destroy the self-sufficiency of the household as long as the cash crop would also otherwise be raised on the farm for sustenance, as cattle or grain; the sale of the surplus need not destroy the basis of householding.

This comes very close to Chayanov's (1966) description of the peasant economy. For a further discussion of the appropriate theories of peasant economy see Dandekar (1962) and Georgescu-Rogen (3). The dynamics and processes of peasant economic life, particularly under the pressures of modernization, should be analyzed with greater attention to both the ecological situation of the peasantry (Yengoyan 1966) and the relationship between the distribution system and the production system. Recent work in Brazil has suggested that the role of peasant production in agricultural development can best be understood in terms of the types of distributive networks available (Forman and Riegelhaupt 1968). There, the distribution system creates certain demands which force changes in the production system and in the position of the peasantry. Specifically, in examining peasant society, where the relationship between subsistence and marketing is critical, the economic anthropologist must devote more attention to the tie between systems of production and systems of exchange; too much attention is focused on the distributive networks alone.

by RICHARD F. SALISBURY ☆

Montreal, Canada. 1 VII 68

My own disagreement with Dalton is virtually complete. I agree that Polanyi's 1957 classification of economies into three types is useful, but only to help beginning students appreciate the different repertoires of superficial economic forms found in different societies. Polanyi was moving away from classifying whole economies in his final work on Dahomey, but Dalton's paper merely attempts to elaborate the threefold classification. My own views on theory (Salisbury 1966) will be published at length shortly; here there is space for only a brief comment on the false assumptions on which Dalton's article is based.

"In subsistence (non-market) economies, the question of choice among real alternatives does not arise in such explicit fashion" (p. 67) is simply not true. It is an ethnocentric assumption of observers who see only the difference between their own culture and that observed and fail to recognise the diversity within other cultures. It is true that ethnographers have paid little attention to this diversity until recently, but it has always been there. The calculations of subsistence farmers involve a *wider* choice of alternative crops, detailed planning of sequences of cropping to insure against variable climatic conditions, planning of labour allocations to smooth out crisis needs, and planning when and how to seek access to the extra-familial labour market taking into account the costs of eventual reciprocation—all of which are more complex than many problems for which economists use linear programming. Studying such planning in detail, and generalising the principles involved, takes one directly to "the most abstract and mathematical of the social sciences." The behaviour studied by anthropologists, and from which theoreticians try to create their decision-making models, is *exactly* the same as that studied by economists. It is exactly those economists who reason most abstractly—I would add Adam Smith and Keynes to Dalton's list—who have the most to teach anthropologists. Anthropologists have most (potentially) to contribute at this level of theory.

Two areas where models based on anthropological observation of microeconomic decision-making could contribute are those of (1) optimising under conditions of uncertainty and (2) optimisation of returns when parameter conditions (technology, political context, etc.) are not fixed. The strength of conventional economics is in making determinate analyses "given cost and demand schedules for a firm"; predicting optimal levels in conditions of uncertainty is a major concern of modern economists. Individual subsistence farmers and peasants make such predictions constantly; anthropologists can study the reasons for their successes and failures and can generalise about them (cf. Foster 1965).

Parameter conditions are taken as given and extra-economic by traditional economists, who tend not to discuss changes in them. Anthropologists by training include the economic parameters in their analyses. Using methods of "controlled comparison" (following Eggan and Nadel) they can demonstrate how parameter differences affect economic choices, sometimes simply, and sometimes by restructuring the entire situation (cf. Goldschmidt *et al.* 1965). My own interest is in comparing a few societies at different times, maintaining close historical control. Such studies lead to models of economic development very different from Dalton's one of substitution of "modern" economies for "traditional" ones. Development is a process of successive single innovations. They are first adopted as advantageous within an existing structure of costs and benefits, uncertainties, and competing interest groups. Then, as information about them spreads, entire patterns of choice are restructured to incorporate them. Only when we understand the complexity of the decision-making which underlies the wide behavioural variation found in any society at any one time can we be in a position to predict the reactions to parameter changes. Dalton denies this internal variation to "non-market systems"; it is not surprising that his "theory" of development is a descriptive typology of incommensurable "economies."

He is right in deploring the current scarcity of contributions to theory made by economic anthropology. It is unfortunate that his paper does nothing to remedy the situation.

by H. K. SCHNEIDER ☆

Appleton, Wis., U.S.A. 18 VI 68

Dalton's paper is obviously an answer to his critics, produced, it would seem, by the goading of Cook (1966: 323), who accused Dalton of ignoring those who disagreed with him. As such, it piqued my interest, because I hoped it would raise the level of discussion of theory in economic anthropology from that of the "deaf men ceaselessly shout[ing] at each other" that Dalton describes. I am disappointed. As far as I can see, all that has been added is further clarification of Dalton's uncompromising approach, making easier its criticism by formalists. Since neither Dalton, as leader of the substantivists and spokesman for Polanyi, nor the formalists can come to terms, it is to be hoped that this discussion will at least benefit those who are attempting to find a proper theory or theories for economic anthropology.

I would like to direct my remarks to the first two sections of this paper and ignore the third on economic development, which stands or falls with Dalton's theory. First, however, I feel the necessity to comment on the manner in which Dalton presents his case, because I think it has contributed strongly to the polarization of the issues. His language is ungenerous ("Some anthropologists seem not to understand that conventional economics . . . does not deal with what anthropologists mean by human behavior . . ."; "The theoretical portion of economic anthropology has been poorly done"; "The second reason some anthropologists think conventional economics is applicable to all economies is—to speak bluntly—due to their imperfect understanding of economic theory and its concepts."). He is addicted to dogmatic pronouncements ("The new form of income, Western cash, is utterly different from anything known in traditional marketless economies"). He misrepresents his critics; e.g., he accuses Burling of describing maximization as purposeful behavior, when Burling's argument is more complicated than that, giving attention to the idea that this is an assumption which is made about behavior, not a psychological postulate (Burling 1962: 813):

> The assumption that it is money that is being maximized is only a convenient simplification

in line with the general attention of economists to those instances of choice and behavior in which money is involved.

In short, Dalton argues by means of ex cathedra assertions from a dogmatic position which assumes his critics to be ignorant. Those critics, such as Polly Hill, whom he accuses of being short-tempered, should not be blamed for being tempted to answer in kind.

At the heart of Dalton's position is the claim that there is a difference in kind between capitalist and "primitive" economies, that economic theory has been developed explicitly to explain capitalist economies, and that therefore, economic theory is not applicable to primitive economies. Ultimately this question will be settled by explaining "primitive" economies with so-called capitalist specific theory (as Massell [1963] has tried to do with my Turu data), but for now the discussion must confine itself to the level of logic and fact. Here the first thing one must do is appeal to the optimism of science, which does not declare any theoretical venture as unquestionably illegitimate. The theory's failure to predict will disprove it better than Dalton's insistence that it is inapplicable. As Frankenberg says well (1967: 65):

> He [Dalton] seems to me to show the limitations of formal economics rather than damage the anthropologists' use of it, for . . . the anthropologist has been eclectic and creative. And wisely so.

The issue here is a very old one: the choice between an inductive or deductive approach. Dalton has a predilection for the inductive and therefore, also, it seems, for the particular over the general. Hence, he sees the capitalist economy as a special type of system and he also is most aware of the way economic theory is specialized to fit it. He fails to see what is general in this particular theory. In fact, he ridicules the search for general laws. I don't know how such an extreme relativistic stand can be challenged. Bohannan, who has taken a similar stand with respect to the comparability of cultures, is a logical collaborator with Dalton (Bohannan and Dalton 1965) and is, likewise, irrefutable. I doubt that even predictions in different societies based on general theory would alter this point of view. Even allowing for this, however, it is anachronistic to see Dalton categorizing the world as consisting of Western (capitalist economies) and "primitives" (all the rest).

Probably the greatest contribution of this article is to bring to the fore the question of the relation of society and economy. Dalton makes much of this, and rightly. He notes that economists ordinarily ignore society but that anthropologists cannot. He argues that since societies differ, economies are differently adjusted to them, and ultimately capitalist economics will not apply. To Dalton, the economy in primitive societies is "embedded," by which he means it is made to serve social ends. In this article, for the first time as far as I know, Dalton invokes the conventional wisdom of the *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft* ideal-typical typology of Tönnies to bolster his argument, pointing out that it has been paralleled by Maine's status and contract and Weber's communal-associational distinction. To these I would add Riesman's tradition-directed and inner-directed and Durkheim's mechanical versus organic solidarity. Each of these polar categories contrasts primitive and civilized societies, most generally in the following way: in the former, relations among people are prescribed, obligatory, altruistic; in the latter, relations are achieved, voluntary, selfish.

I have dwelt upon the Tönnies distinction for the purpose of challenging it and thereby also challenging Dalton's position at a most fundamental level. The primitive-civilized dichotomy is spurious as used by Dalton and derives from his and Polanyi's tendency to think in evolutionary terms. The categories can be preserved while rearranging them along lines suggested by game theory. Society, or any portion of society, such as an institution, can be thought of as a game, that is, as having the essential structure of a game. This structure contains *rules* which govern the play (including the sanctioning elements, whether specialize or diffuse), *goals* or payoffs of the play, and *strategies*, means of achieving the goals within the rules. (Games also seem to require an *ideological* or religious component, belief in the game.) This "game analogy" approach, as I prefer to call it, is parallel to Firth's conceptions (Firth 1964*b*: 45) of social structure (rules), social organization (strategy), and goals, or the modes of conceptualization of Leach (1960: 123), Hart and Pilling (1960: 14–30), and others. Tönnies' *Gemeinschaft*, or Durkheim's mechanical solidarity, is the rule component of the game, and Gesellschaft, or organic solidarity, is the strategic component. What this theory says is that *all* societies have both rules and strategies, all are communalistic (the rule system) and associational (the strategic). What we do when we type societies as either civilised or primitive is focus on strategy in the former and on rules in the latter. This, I think, confuses the issue, which is precisely what Polanyi and Dalton are doing. Incidentally, the theory I have just outlined should be differentiated from that of Belshaw (1965: 4), who makes the point that ". . . all enduring social relations involve transactions, which have an exchange aspect." That is, what we ordinarily think of as "social"—relations of dependence—are of the same order as exchange of goods and services and are rule-governed in the same manner as the exchange of goods and services.

Interestingly, Dalton makes reference to games, but only to point out that each is different from all others, thus bolstering his point that comparing games is futile. I, in contrast, point out that behind the apparent differences in games is a structure which is comparable, as is so brilliantly demonstrated by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1964: 46).

Actually, Dalton's views are very close to mine, as is shown in his claim that Polanyi regards the economy as a set of rules of social organization, adding that the proper study of economic anthropology is the difference in these rules. I think there is much to be gained by studying rule variations and how they affect strategies. I see little of scientific benefit in studying the variations in rules for their own sake, but Dalton's failure to see strategies as universal in human behavior means that logically this is what he is urging upon us. If one sees choice only in our society, as is the case with Dalton, one cannot use a game analogy.

Dalton makes much of the necessity in economic anthropology of the study of the relation of economy and society rather than studying choice-making, as economists do in our society; but there seems no reason why both cannot be done. One could study the process of strategic choice in terms of maximization of utility within a certain frame of rules, or one could study how choices are affected by the rule structure. I do not think Dalton would accept this, however, because to him economy is merely the system of distribution of wealth and society is the whole range of dependency relations in a community, all of which, except in capitalist society, are altruistic. When he says we ought to study the relation of society and economy, he means we ought to study (teleologically) how the distribution system serves the society.

Up to this point, I have criticised Dalton's position and suggested how it could be revised to produce a more adequate economic anthropology. I would like to finish by discussing some of the fallacious points he makes to bolster his theory. The first is his claim that choice does not amount to much in non-Western economies. Coupled with this, Dalton seems to make the error of which he accuses Burling, that economic choice is deliberate, purposeful, objective. We can deal with choice theoretically in the same fashion as maximization—as an assumption of the theory; that is, we can assume that people make rational choices without having to believe that people are rational in some absolute sense. Whatever produces a maximizing outcome may be considered to have been a rational choice. Dalton gives the impression that choice is a luxury, or a component only of capitalist societies—that in non-Western economies rules take care of the distribution of wealth and choice is unnecessary. (His additional defense, that wealth is so scarce that there

is not much to exercise choice about, is, I think, simply a misconception, about which more below.) However it is conceived, wealth is scarce, and it must be allocated between alternative ends. The process of allocation can be dealt with as choice, and so choice must exist in non-Western economies (which are therefore not primitive). If we include, as I have done, the exchanges found in personal relations, the range of choice is far greater than is ordinarily supposed of such economies.

One of the defenses which substantivists have often resorted to is the extraordinary claim that primitive economies are "subsistence" economies, in which each household produces the food necessary to feed its members. A society whose members could expect automatically to produce the food necessary to feed themselves each year would be a paradise. My studies of the Turu (1964*a*: 60) showed that during the good production year of 1959–60, fully 50% of the households in each of two villages did not produce sufficient food to feed their members. Because food supplies were short, all sorts of decisions were forced upon the members: whether to sell livestock to obtain grain, which livestock to sell, whether to invest livestock to increase the land-labor resources of the household to prevent a recurrence of shortages, how to square these capital investments with the aim of maintaining and increasing the number of cattle owned by the household, etc. Dalton, of course, asserts that such economies are too small-scale for the range of choices to be comparable to those in our economy. I think that he is wrong and that we have not seen the complexity or quantity of alternatives because we have not looked for them. What is more, I am sure I am not alone in making this empirical claim. Joy, an economist, verifies it (1967*a*: 36):

> As I myself observed when I worked among the Acholi and peasant Punjabis, the range of choices of farming system, even in the most constraining environment, can be large and complex, involving as it does a nearly infinite permutation of cropping patterns and sequences, fallowing and cultivation practices, and so on.

Turning to another point, Dalton says (p. 78) that

> Indigenously, where bridewealth required the payment of prestige goods, the items (such as cows) could be disposed of by the bridewealth recipients in very few ways. Cows (like kula bracelets) could only be exchanged or paid within the prestige sphere which was narrowly circumscribed.

This is highly debatable. Dalton makes no reference to any of the things I (Schneider 1964*a*, *b*) or Barth (1964: 69–81) have written on this subject, so that I must presume he has not read them. I presume Dalton would also reject my claim that African cattle are money (actually part of a monetary system), but I would like to hear on what grounds, since they fulfil all the functions of money as he and others describe them.

I suspect that cattle would be rejected as money because they don't look like money; and this is the essence of Dalton's whole position. Non-Western economies are not analyzable like our economy because they don't look like our economy. This is the ultimate in cultural relativism, or particularism, and is utterly contrary to a scientific approach. It suggests that the solution to this formalist-substantivist controversy is to stop trying to decide on one or the other approach and recognize that one, the substantive, is essentially historical, and the other, the formalist, is essentially theoretical and scientific. They can exist side by side.

by D. P. SINHA ☆

Mount Hagen, New Guinea. 16 VI 68

Dalton has done an admirable job in calling our attention to the major controversy in economic anthropology and to the need for adequate theory to explain the economy of primitive and peasant communities. I particularly welcome his attempts to distinguish primitive economy from peasant economy and to offer an analytical framework for economic anthropology. In this brief comment, however, I shall confine my observations to the areas of disagreement rather than those of agreement.

Like Dalton, I believe that Polanyi has made most outstanding contributions to economic anthropology, but unlike him, I do not see the polarity between the approaches of Polanyi *et al.* on the one hand and Firth and others on the other. For one thing, Polanyi dwells on primitive, static economies, while Firth deals with primitive-peasant, both static and changing, economies. The real difficulty is that the anthropologist handling contemporary field data does not run across static societies—not even in the highlands of New Guinea, where I came in search of one nearly a year ago!

Dalton states that economic anthropology is "best done in the framework of comparative economic systems," and I think most of us would endorse this statement. His belief that comparison with historical economies is more relevant than with modern economic system(s) warrants scrutiny, however. Insofar as an anthropologist is concerned with a static economic system, this approach seems productive, but using it to analyse the economic systems of contemporary primitive or peasant economies, most if not all of which are in the process of change, places one in a grave theoretical and methodological dilemma. This dilemma, I believe (Sinha 1967, 1968), can only be resolved by a two-level approach, describing the traditional system in the light of historical economies and analysing the processes of change with reference to modern market economies.

Dalton asserts that generalizations about change and development have to be based on firm understanding of the traditional socio-economic organization. This is true if one asks questions, as he does, addressed to the receptivity or resistance to innovations or impacts on traditional social structure. If, however, one poses the question—"How have the features of the modern self-regulating market been introduced into the traditional economy?"—one must emphasize the principles of modern economy rather than those of traditional economy.

Much of the literature in economic anthropology indicates that traditional economies operate under the constraints of social, technological, population, and natural resources, and that it is the interrelationship between these factors which produces the broad configuration of their economic systems. Dalton accepts this, and yet in his excellent table summing up the relevant questions in economic anthropology he does not include as an area of inquiry the interrelationship between available and *utilized* social, technological, and natural resources in a traditional economy.

Dalton's observation that the most promising area for fruitful interchange and collaboration between economics and anthropology is the field of economic development deserves more consideration than he gives it here. By examining the context and types of economic change, he convincingly shows that mere contact, intervention, or introduction of innovations is not enough to ensure economic development in a community. He suggests, and I find myself in full agreement, that economic development in traditional communities must be measured in terms of its "sustained economic growth and its integration to the larger socio-economic unit of which it is a part without loss of ethnic identity or group malaise." He leaves implicit, however, the most crucial issue in economic development, that is, planning; for the kind of development he postulates would only be feasible by planned change. Here, I believe, economic anthropology has a great deal to contribute.

by ARNOLD STRICKON ☆

Madison, Wis., U.S.A. 29 VI 68

Although I basically agree with Dalton's analysis, I believe that the issues in the economic anthropology debate have become increasingly confused rather than clarified as the argument has continued. I think that the essential issues are simple rather than complex. The apparent complexity of the argument derives from the

fact that we have tried to deal with these issues all at once rather than taking them one at a time. I will treat the following points: (*a*) economic concepts and their applicability to non-market economies; (*b*) market theories and their applicability to non-market economies; (*c*) economic concepts and social theory; (*d*) theories of primitive economics; (*e*) assumptions about the nature of individual motivation.

Economic concepts and their applicability to non-market economies. We are all agreed that the study of economics has to do with the production and distribution of goods. We also agree that the economy of any society consists of the activities and things allocated to these ends. Obviously, on the ground, these things and activities consist of a multitude of unique events. Any sort of generalization is impossible at this level of abstraction. It is necessary, therefore, to set up categories into which the specific activities and things can be sorted and then dealt with as aggregates. Economic concepts such as labor, production, distribution, financing, investment, supply, profit, etc. represent such categories. Whether different phenomena are to be considered similar or not depends on the degree to which they satisfy the requirements for assignment to a particular category.

Are economic concepts applicable to primitive societies? Some of them are and some of them are not. In all societies, for example, there are things (tools, land, etc.) which we may accurately assign to the category of "capital goods;" but in some societies there are no phenomena which will satisfy the criteria of profit, taxes, interest, etc., as these are rigorously conceived.

Market theories and their applicability to non-market economies. As Dalton points out, there is no *one* economic theory, but rather many theories oriented to special needs and problems which shift over time. The question, therefore, is not really the applicability of economic theory, but rather the applicability of a special kind of economic theory, i.e., market theory—which in itself consists of a number of special theories.

The question of the applicability of market *theory* to primitive economies must be rephrased. The question must relate to the applicability of specific market *theories* to such systems. These theories are, commonly, not stated in prose (although they may be so translated) but rather as mathematical formulas. These use certain variables (i.e., the operationalized form of the concepts) which can be "filled" with quantitative data. The equations (ideally) describe a relationship among these variables such that changes in one, quantitatively stated, can predict changes in one or more of the others, quantitatively stated.

It is clear that an equation that predicts (e.g.) money price as a function of money costs, money profits, and demand cannot predict anything about activities in an economy which has neither profits nor money. The question as to whether or not market theories are applicable to primitive economies can be answered negatively on strictly operational grounds. Primitive economies do not present referents for at least some variables; *ipso facto*, the equation (i.e., the theory) does not apply. This would be the case whether or not some economic *concepts* are applicable to primitive societies and whether or not maximizing is itself a function of market systems or is a human universal.

The question as to *why* it is that in certain systems not all the variables called for by the equation are present is another question entirely.

Economic concepts and social theory. The use of economic data and/or concepts in a theory does not in itself make what results an economic theory. An economic theory is one that relates economic concepts or variables to each other, usually within specified social, political, and cultural parameters. Economic concepts and data may also serve as inputs to a theory whose outputs are statements about social or political relationships, activities, etc., or about the relationship between economic concepts or data and social ones; but such a theory ought to be seen for what it is: a *social* theory that utilizes economic concepts and data. Keynes presented an economic theory; Marx utilized economic data and concepts to formulate a social theory. To lump both together as economic theory and then argue which kind of "economic theory" anthropology ought to have is to further confuse an already confused argument.

Theories of primitive economics. From the preceding it follows that the logical parallel of market theories for market societies are theories of primitive economics wherein both input and output can be stated in terms of economic concepts (preferably quantified) while social and cultural variables are considered as the parameters within which the equations are operative. A statement which related variations in the number of transactions in the kula ring to specific quantitative variations in the production of yams would represent *a* theory of Trobriand economics (though I am not holding my breath waiting for such a demonstration).

As Dalton points out (p. 72), attempts to deal with primitive economies in strictly economic terms have not proven fruitful. If this is necessarily the case, let us accept it and address ourselves to social and cultural questions, problems, and theories, utilizing economic data and relevant economic concepts. Let us remember, however, that such questions, problems, and theories are about society and/or culture and not, as Dalton seems to suggest, about primitive economics.

Assumptions about the nature of motivation. Market theories assume that individuals will act in accordance with the demands of the market in order to maximize their financial returns, i.e., that they will economize. Clearly one cannot "economize" in the monetary sense in systems which have no all-purpose money. However, a good deal of the heat generated in the economic anthropology debate has centered on the question of whether the attempt to maximize certain returns is a universal. If so, it would be characteristic of participants in all types of economies in all social systems. Conversely, Dalton and others have suggested that economizing (maximizing—the two sometimes get confused) is itself a result of the characteristics of the market system as these ramify throughout those social structures in which this kind of economic system appears.

In either case the question has no direct, or operationally significant, bearing upon the questions of the applicability to *primitive* economies and societies of *market theories or concepts*. These questions, I have argued, can be answered on strictly pragmatic grounds, regardless of one's position in the maximizing argument. Nor do the answers to these questions support either position in the maximizing argument. The question as to whether or not all people maximize, then, must be dealt with independently of the other issues in the economic anthropology discussion.

Is a statement about maximizing one about the psychological state of an individual—"greed and self-aggrandizement" (Dalton p. 79)—or is it rather an assumption? If the latter, its value lies not in whether the statement is epistemologically true but rather whether or not it is intellectually and theoretically useful, i.e., whether or not it allows you to make certain predictions and orderings of the data which you could not otherwise make.

There is, of course, no question about assuming that participants in market systems attempt to maximize as they choose among alternatives. Dalton gives us the example of an American farmer making "economizing decisions" as he reaches a choice of which among several alternative crops to plant. Although Dalton does not say it, I am sure that he would agree that the farmer also considers technological and environmental parameters, though these too, in our system, could be reduced to monetary considerations (Dalton p. 66). In order to make his analysis comparable to the next step he takes, it is necessary for me to add that the American farmer must learn to economize, that is, to maximize a monetary return.

Dalton then goes on to contrast the American farmer with the Trobriander. A Trobriander, Dalton tells us (p. 67),

> learns and follows the rules of *economy* in his society almost like an American learns and follows the rules of *language* in his. An American is born into an English-speaking culture. In no

sense does he "choose" to speak English because no real alternative is presented to him. So too, the Trobriander is born into a yam-growing economy. He does not "choose" to plant yams rather than broccoli. The question does not arise in this form, but rather in the form of how much of each of very few conventional crops to plant or how to apportion a given work day to several tasks.

This example, meant to show the absence of choice, reveals that in fact there is choice. The latter part of the above quotation, as well as the primary sources, indicates that a Trobriander must indeed make choices among alternatives, though they are certainly different kinds of alternatives than those which the American farmer must face. Dalton tells us (p. 67) that the Trobriander is operating in terms of economic, technological, and social constraints which lead him to carry out certain actions. These are exactly the same kinds of considerations that are dealt with by Barth (1966, 1967) in his analyses of decision-making among Norwegian fishermen, Fur household organization, and Kurdish inheritance practices. Such an analysis necessarily assumes that the subjects are maximizing. The trick, of course, is to determine what it is that they are maximizing, since it is not always a monetary return.

What we are faced with, then, is not the opposition which Dalton originally presented to us: that of the American farmer who makes economizing decisions versus the Trobriander who "learns and follows the rules of the economy." Rather what we must now consider is, on the one hand, the American farmer seeking to maximize a monetary return by balancing a number of financial, technological, and other constraints and rewards in arriving at his choice of one among a great number of alternative actions; and, on the other hand, the Trobriander, operating within a system of constraints and rewards of different kinds and choosing among far fewer alternatives, but nevertheless also maximizing something (status, prestige, rank, power, though not a monetary return).

Conceptually, then, the difference between the American farmer and the Trobriander does not lie in the fact that the former is greedy and self-aggrandizing while the latter, presumably, is not. Nor does it lie in the fact that the American farmer learns to make decisions while the Trobriander learns to follow a few simple rules of the economy. The difference between the two is rather in the *systems* of rewards and constraints within which each makes his decisions and the number of alternatives each has available.

Suppose we assume that individuals do not maximize. What are the alternative assumptions? One alternative, of course, is that decisions by individuals in non-market societies are completely random. If this were the case, then all of us should change our line of work, for there could be no order to any human behavior. Another alternative is that individual actions are passive, and predetermined, responses to the imponderable workings of "the system." But "the system" as we know it consists of statements which represent abstractions generated from the observation of human behavior, and the latter is inseparable from decision-making. We are, therefore, right back where we started. The *assumption* of maximizing (something—not necessarily monetary returns) is intellectually and theoretically useful. If a theory were explicitly or implicitly raised upon any other assumption about the nature of individual motivation the result would be intellectual chaos or, at best, a social science very different from that which we now have.

I would maintain, further, that the assumption that individuals—all individuals—attempt to make decisions with the view to some form of maximum return is useful for another reason. This assumption permits us to translate statements at one level of abstraction into statements at another level, using the individual, maximizing, decision-maker to serve as the intervening variable. Economics, supposedly the least humanistic of the social sciences, is also the only one which explicitly has a position for the individual in its larger systemic theories. This permits the economist to make a statement at one level of abstraction (or level of aggregation, in his terminology) and trace out its effects at another; e.g., a change in the discount rate (national economy level) leads company managers (firm level) to maximize their profits by not borrowing money for further investment at the higher rates, which reduces the number of jobs at their disposal or the productivity of workers they already have and therefore will tend to hold their wages, all other things being equal, to a given level. This in turn means that the individual employees (consumer level) will have less of a disposable income, which in turn will affect demand for certain products, etc., etc.

In fact, anthropologists and other social scientists do this kind of analysis as well, though they often fail to be explicit about doing so (Homans 1964). Dalton, in fact, does implicitly assume that maximizing behavior occurs (even among primitives) when he deals with social-economic development. He tells us (p. 78, italics mine),

> *Primitive* and peasant unwillingness to change production is frequently a sensible expression of their poverty and material insecurity. They cannot afford unsuccessful experiments.

On the following page he tells us that, "Anthropologists are concerned with minimizing the social costs of community transformation. . . ." He goes on to say that we can achieve this end by using

> those powerful levers of new achievement which *the people themselves* [italics mine] perceive as desirable and which induce other positive changes—higher income through new economic and technological performance, and wider alternatives through education.

These three statements clearly assume that primitives, peasants, and anthropologists may be presented with alternatives to current practices, evaluate these alternatives, and choose among them in order to maximize some end.

To summarize: I believe that the controversy in economic anthropology has reached a point where it is useful to make some finer distinctions than have been made among the issues involved. The argument has centered on five issues which are conceptually distinct but which have been intermingled in the course of the argument. These are:

a) The applicability of economic concepts to primitive societies. It is clear that some economic concepts are applicable to such societies and others are not.

b) The applicability of market theories to primitive societies. It is clear, solely on operational grounds, that they are not.

c) The use of economic data to generate statements about society and culture. Anthropologists and other social scientists have been using such data, and rightly, for some time, although for one period in the history of our discipline this kind of data was ignored by many anthropological practitioners. The use of economic data, or even economic concepts, to generate and develop statements about society or culture does not transform such statements into economic analysis or economic theories.

d) Requirements for a theory of primitive economics. A theory of primitive economics must include not only inputs of economic data but also outputs stated in terms of relations among economic variables.

e) The universality of maximizing (economizing). In the narrow monetary sense, the concept of maximizing can only be useful in those situations and systems where the measurement of value is in terms of an all-purpose money. In the broader sense, however, we must assume that it does apply everywhere. If we assume otherwise we will be faced with chaos, not only within the confines of "economic anthropology" but in the discipline as a whole.

by CAROL F. SWARTOUT ☆

Long Beach, Calif., U.S.A. 1 VII 68

George Dalton's paper points up several serious problems in anthropology which have significance beyond the boundaries of economic anthropology. I cannot share Dalton's optimistic view that other branches of social-cultural anthropology have solved the problems of developing cross-culturally useful definitions and

theoretical models (p. 64). It is true that we do not use such blatantly ethnocentric concepts as "Christianity" and "democracy" in our analysis of primitive religious or political systems; but neither does formal economic theory imply that "capitalism" is the conceptual framework for analysis of primitive economies, rather simply that there should be some continuity between modern and primitive systems of economics.

The basic question can be broken down into two parts: (1) Can conceptual models developed to fit modern Western institutional arrangements be usefully, or validly, applied to primitive non-Western cultures? (2) Can a universalistic theory be developed which can adequately deal with the variability of the phenomena cross-culturally? A negative answer to the first question does not necessarily imply a negative answer to the second question.

Dalton argues cogently against the validity of applying Western economic theories to primitive and peasant societies, but he draws an illogical conclusion from his argument in assuming that the answer to the second question must also be "no." Dalton's argument appears to run that because there are several *kinds* of systems, there must be different kinds of analytic schemes. Conventional economic theory is not applicable to primitive systems because primitive systems are different in kind from modern economic systems. It does not follow, however, as Dalton implies (p. 66, that because conventional economic theory does not apply to primitive systems a universalistic theory of economics is not possible or desirable.

The key term in Dalton's argument is *kinds* of economies; for Dalton, the difference between modern and primitive systems is a matter of "kind" and not a matter of "degree." Given this assumption, then obviously, a universalistic theory of economics is logically impossible. Firth (1966: 14) and LeClair (1962: 1188) are arguing that the difference between modern and primitive systems is a matter of "degree" and not of "kind," and that one general theory can be developed which accommodates all of the variations.

Dalton's argument that we need different models for primitive, peasant, and modern economic systems is perfectly valid, but the fact that we use different models for different levels of complexity does not imply that these models cannot be linked together within a general theoretical framework. The real issue is not whether a general theory is possible or desirable, but whether the application of conventional economic theory is appropriate to primitive systems. One can accept that this is not a useful procedure without abandoning the idea of a universalistic theory.

One possible solution might be to deal with the phenomena in terms of a hierarchic arrangement such that attributes which occur at the lower levels of complexity will be found repeated at all higher levels of organization, while the higher levels of organization will possess attributes never found at lower levels of organization. Thus, one cannot analyze economic behavior among the Bushmen in terms of "pricing mechanisms," but one can apply the analytic concepts of "gift-giving" or "reciprocity" in a modern complex society. Gift-exchanging is found at precisely the same level of social interaction in both modern and primitive societies, i.e., at the level of personal face-to-face relationships.

Thus, I agree with Dalton that much of conventional economic theory is not applicable to primitive systems, but I would argue that the concepts developed for primitive systems are applicable to modern complex systems. The problem is that one must make the application at the same level of social interaction in both societies. One cannot compare the economy of a band or a tribe with a nation-state, but one can compare systems of exchange within families, neighborhoods, and friendship circles cross-culturally.

The problem with general theory is that the proponents have started with the most complex instance and attempted to use this as a model for analyzing simpler instances. This approach is invalid. One must start with a model of the simplest instances and then build a theory which accommodates the more complex instances. You can't build a model of a cell by staring at a whole human being.

by LOUISE E. SWEET ☆

Winnipeg, Canada. 28 VII 68

This excellent survey of "economic anthropology," with its fine bibliography for handy reference, provides a thorough "refresher" exercise. More importantly, it offers stimulating challenges to anthropologists studying the attributes and processes of a variety of economic systems, their conceptual problems, and their efforts to offer "theories" of change or analyses and classifications of types. Dalton mildly scolds anthropologists for an unsophisticated use of "conventional economics" (primarily capitalist-market economic theory with scarcely any reference to or use of socialist economics). Let us hope that in some equivalent journal of economics he will scold capitalist economists for their unsophisticated approaches to non-capitalist-market based societies.

It is true that many words remain our blinders. Dalton has pinned down, albeit in a bland and non-polemical manner, both the faults of those anthropologists who would convert all sociocultural events to greedy, or at best reciprocal, economizing transactions and the faults of economists who work within conceptual constraints based on the study of economies of market-based, industrial nation-states. At the same time, however, he himself obscures certain issues by avoiding some concepts and using others which, fashionable as they are, are to me euphemisms with ethnocentric derogatory implications. Terms such as "underdeveloped," "developed," and "modernization" obscure the increasingly destructive development and proliferation of industrial civilization: the most destructive proliferants are, it seems evident, particular Euro-American industrial polities. While Dalton does point to some examples of destruction (the "social cost," again a rather pallid term), his avoidance of such terms as "colonialism" and "economic imperialism," particularly in view of the fact that it has been bands, tribes, chiefdoms, archaic states, and peasantries under such impacts that anthropologists as ethnographers have studied, somewhat vitiates the force of his argument in Part III. Some anthropological archeologists, at least, have been far less hesitant to call an empire an empire, and to follow an old, scarcely read poet in delineating how "the Assyrian came down like the wolf on the fold."

I suggest that one generalization which Dalton offers here and elsewhere—that systems change only by stimulation from outside—is to be challenged. To judge from the position of the human species today, expansion and evolution are processes internal and inherent in the sociocultural mechanism of survival, and "adaptation" to external challenges is only one source of change. The dichotomy between primitive or peasant static and industrial dynamic systems is also, perhaps, a conceptual framework (or "model") as inhibiting to an understanding of the diversity and operation of cultures, in which their economies are subsystems, as the conventional economists' oversimplified dichotomy between "traditional" and "growing" economies.

I also have reservations about Dalton's discussion of peasantries. How can we divorce peasant economics from peasant culture if peasants are, as I would argue, primarily the food-producers in pre-industrial complex sociocultural systems? In Arabic-speaking countries, *fellah* (plural, *fellahiin*) is generally translated as "peasant"; it means, more literally, "sower of the land," with the connotation also of ruralness and that class and occupational status by which I have defined "peasant" above. Neither religion nor ethnic identity may be fundamentally as relevant as position in a structure—economic activity, social status, and sometimes political subordination to landlord and/or state. Peasant economy is a subsystem of the economy of a pre-industrial state, and *that* whole economy may include money, markets, craft industry, credit, and other specialized economic mechanisms.

Finally, Dalton's basic theme, that multiple theoretical frameworks are required because the very range of economic

systems that anthropology studies is so much greater than that of conventional economics, may be well taken at this point. He reinforces it by pointing out that, in fact, conventional economics has had to develop sets of theories as their range of interests and problems increased: economics is not all price theory. This has begun to happen in economic anthropology, certainly, and it is part of the trend toward ever increasing specialization and isolation of specialist from specialist, with greater and greater difficulty in maintaining the synthesizing, all-cultures, and species-wide or holistic focus of "traditional" anthropology. Therefore, it is amusing to me, and significant, that the last word in Dalton's essay occurs in a quotation from a work published originally in 1925 and is "evolution."

by STANISLAW TABACZYŃSKI ☆

Warsaw, Poland. 30 VI 68

George Dalton's work "Theoretical Issues in Economic Anthropology" meets the requirements of the present day and will certainly arouse lively interest among scientists employed in research on primitive societies. The economic theory of primitive society has up till now not been systematically elaborated, despite the fact that economic theories based on the capitalistic model and on the recently much-discussed feudal structure are obviously quite inadequate in respect to ancient epochs. An urgent need, therefore, is the creating of a scientific basis for economics for earlier periods of prestatistic time (Wolff 1961: 847–48).

The study of Dalton's work suggests a number of thoughts to an archaeologist interested in the economic development of European primitive societies. It seems to me that in constructing a general theory of the economics of primitive societies one must take into account archaeological sources as well as ethnographic observations. The value of archaeological data lies primarily in the opportunity they provide for the study of economic processes in broad and clearly outlined chronological perspective. Careful examination of archaeological data permits a general characterization of the economic bases of development in primitive societies from the early Stone Age up to the feudal period.

Only long sequences of evolution, however, involving repeated phenomena and socioeconomic processes of long duration, are accessible to archaeological study. The dynamics of short-term changes cannot always be seen in archaeological data. Further, neither the finds nor the mediaeval written sources provide direct data for a full *quantitative* characterization of economic phenomena (Cipolla 1949: 4–5). This difficulty is not only a result of insufficiency of research. Its causes are to be sought in the very processes that have created the sources and in the factors that distort the picture acquired by investigation. Determining the degree of quantitative representative value of our data is likely to remain for a long time a controversial problem. What we can obtain from archaeological data, then, is a rather general macroscopic picture in *qualitative* categories, complemented by certain, only relative, quantitative indexes—"growth" vs. "decline," "casualness" vs. "universality," "large" vs. "small"—of the economic phenomena examined.

Should we accept that the task of an economic theory in every epoch is the determining of the rules governing production and distribution, both in the short and the long run (Kula 1962: 12–13), then it will have to be acknowledged that the sources and methods we dispose of today will not allow us to accomplish this task. We cannot yet formulate an economic theory of primitive societies on the basis of archaeologic data alone. On the other hand, ethnographic observation is bound to be one-sided, partly because it operates over short periods of time and lacks a sufficiently deep and continuous chronological perspective. In view of this, it is encouraging to observe the recent progress of anthropological, economic, and historical (including archaeological) studies in the field of research with which we are concerned. This progress is clearly manifest in the elaboration of a common language and the establishment of means of sharing scientific information, both of which contribute to a fruitful dialogue between representatives of various disciplines.

Research on remote periods of prestatistic time presents particular difficulties. Overcoming these difficulties is an essential problem that now faces prehistory, on the one hand, and economic anthropology, on the other.

by ANDREW P. VAYDA ☆

New York, N.Y., U.S.A. 28 VI 68

Dalton continually talks about "the economy," but the closest he comes to defining it is when he refers to it as a "set of rules of social organization." If this is indeed intended as a definition, it comes no closer than other definitions (which I have criticized elsewhere [Vayda 1967]) to any adequate demarcation of the "economy" as a sphere of human activities, structures, or rules within the totality of human activities, structures, or rules. Does economic anthropology as Dalton conceives it have any distinctive subject matter or even any distinctive investigative techniques or theoretical framework? Can Dalton honestly say that in the study of primitive societies there is a place for something called "economic anthropology" as a subfield within social or cultural anthropology?

Reply

by GEORGE DALTON

Several of the comments illuminate the psychology of polemics more than they clarify theoretical issues in economic anthropology. Accordingly, I shall deal first with the points of substance raised, and then with the polemics.

The following *points of substance* seem to demand discussion:

Universal theory. Those who think that universal theory in economic anthropology is achievable and desirable should do two things: (1) They should clarify what they mean by pointing to models (if, indeed, they exist) in other branches of anthropology or other *social* sciences, and then show the usefulness of such theories. The point is that we attach different meanings to what a universal theory is. Swartout's question, "Can a universalistic theory be developed which can adequately deal with the variability of the phenomena cross-culturally?" does not make obvious sense to me. I do not know what such a theory looks like. Do any exist in social science? If so, where are they, and why are they a good thing? (2) They should go ahead and create such theory themselves and thereby convince those of us who are skeptical. In my article I quoted Firth as an advocate of universal theory. Firth has published a great deal of economic anthropology over 40 years without, I think, having produced such theory.

This semantic difficulty is a pervasive problem in economic anthropology. Each of the words, "capital," "market," "surplus," and "money," means several complicated things in our own economy. Their counterparts in primitive economies are in some ways similar and in some ways different, yet we use the same words. A digging stick (like a machine in a U.S. factory) is "capital" in the sense that it is a tool used in a production process and is not consumed directly by people, as is food. It is not "capital" in the financial or wealth sense, that is, a piece of property having attached to its ownership shares of stock which can be bought and sold on stock markets and which yields its owners a money income. When an anthropologist calls a digging stick "capital," he is stressing its similarity to tools and machines in our own economy, but he leaves the differences unmentioned. I cannot agree with Strickon's remark that

"in all societies there are things (tools, land, etc.) which we may accurately assign to the category of 'capital goods.'" Even in our own economy, a sewing machine bought by a seamstress is a capital good, while the same machine bought by a housewife is a consumption good.

The fact that intelligent men can disagree—and disagree rather heatedly—over long periods of time almost certainly means there are ingrained semantic difficulties underlying part of their disagreement. They are attaching different meanings to the same words—not only to "universal theory," and "capital," but also to "applying economic theory." Some anthropologists think they are applying economic theory when they use the vocabulary of price theory to describe whatever transactions they observe in primitive economies. Instead of using ordinary language and emphasizing the folkviews involved, they use the language of price theory and draw an unwarranted analytical conclusion: e.g., instead of saying that a Trobriander gives yams to his sister's husband partly to fulfil an obligation to his closest female relative and partly in recognition of her rights to land he is using, they say the Trobriander is "maximizing prestige." That the meanings of universal theory and of other concepts are real sources of contention is made very clear in a recent symposium volume which considers the relevance of conventional economics to the processes and problems of economic development (Martin and Knapp 1967).[19]

The social and cultural aspects of industrial capitalism. Three of the respondents (Frankenberg, van Ernst, and Grigor'ev) suggest that conventional economics is not sufficient for analyzing all the interesting features of Western economies. Economists would readily agree (see Lewis 1962), because they know that economics does not consider socio-economic processes and activities or even the minutiae of business-firm activity. Why else do Industrial Sociology and Business Administration exist as fields of study?

Choice in primitive economies. Schneider comments that

> . . . Dalton, of course, asserts that such [primitive] economies are too small-scale for the range of choices to be comparable to those in our own economy.

I certainly do. One can divide production lines in U.S. industrial capitalism into two kinds: the overwhelming majority that have no counterparts in primitive economies (e.g., steel and automobile production), and those that do (e.g., farming, fishing, and herding). For both sorts, the use of machinery and applied science create a range of technological choice that is incomparably greater than producing units have in primitive economies. The economic fact, moreover, that households in the U.S. economy receive income in the form of money and have market access to thousands of goods and services produced all over the country and the world means a range of consumer choice that is incomparably greater than the range of choice available to households in moneyless economies producing only a few goods.

Maximizing in primitive economies. Where anthropologists say that a person in a primitive economy (one without markets and Western money) "maximizes," I would substitute the phrases, "prefers more goods to fewer goods," "prefers one kind of good to another," or "prefers one kind of economic activity to another." Without money and pricing to compare real alternatives, there is no way of knowing that a specific choice yields the maximum. I agree with most of Strickon's comment, but not with the alternatives he poses: maximization or chaos. Choosing preferred goods or activities is not the same as maximizing. Again, anthropologists sometimes use the word maximizing to convey what I would call "ingenuity in exploiting the physical environment": knowing what is edible and what is not, the habits of game animals, etc. The Kalahari Desert pygmies' making the most of their environment with the simple technology they possess is not the same as an American firm's maximizing its profit.

Economic anthropology and archeology. I agree with Tabaczyński that there are mutual benefits to be had from economic anthropologists' considering archeological data and from archeologists using the data and theory of economic anthropology (as my colleague Stuart Struever is doing, and also Colin Renfrew and Creighton Gabel).

Community change begins with incursion from outside. A persistent difficulty in creating theory in all branches of anthropology stems from the fact that the real-world communities anthropologists study number in the thousands, are on all the continents, and have been studied at different points in time. It is such diversity and complexity, both in their empirical universe and in the many aspects of society they study, that leads anthropologists inevitably to create classifications, groupings, typologies, and subsets (matrilineal/patrilineal; acephalous/centralized; primitive/peasant; hunters/agriculturalists/pastoralists), and then to try to state similarities and differences among groupings so as to draw interesting analytical conclusions.

I have read what must be several dozen case studies of social and economic change in village-level communities, with three microdevelopment (i.e., modernization) questions in mind: (1) What features of traditional economy and society make for receptivity or resistance to modern sorts of innovations? (2) Once a community begins to use modern technology and expands commercial production, how and why do traditional social organization and culture change? (3) What have been the time dimensions of socio-economic change, and what sequential events characterize change over time?

For the cases I have read, I think it is true that socio-economic change is very frequently (if not invariably) initiated from outside the village-level community; and that the answers to all three questions are affected by the kinds of initial incursions that take place. We need typologies here because there are so many cases in so many parts of the world reported over such long periods of time. I would suggest, moreover, that studying pre-industrial compared to post-industrial Europe helps to understand pre-colonial compared to post-colonial Africa and Asia. The formation of nation-states, industrialization, and the creation of national-market integration are watershed changes (see Adelman and Morris 1967). Pre-industrial Europe, like pre-colonial Africa, was not static; but the kinds of change experienced—war, conquest, political subjugation, plague, famine, acquiring a few new material items from abroad, new religions—affected societies and economies differently from the radical structural changes generated by industrialism, national-market integration, and the formation of nation-states of the modern sort.

Polanyi on "householding." I agree with Riegelhaupt that Polanyi's discussion of householding is really about peasantry. His remarks are brief, however, and (to his later regret) he did not develop his ideas on householding at length in *Trade and Market in the Early Empires.*

Marx and economic anthropology. Grigor'ev and Frankenberg suggest that several writers on economic anthropology (including myself) are being unnecessarily original; that what we say about the way economy relates to social organization is quite close to Marx's views, and we are not giving Marx's writings sufficient prominence in economic anthropology. I think they are probably right, not only for Marx, but also for Maine, Tönnies, Weber, and Bloch. A history of economic anthropology is yet to be written which shows how the leading ideas of these earlier writers on economy and society influenced the theoretical framework of economic anthropology that has been created since Malinowski.

Economy and society. I agree with Blacking that my phrasing is misleading. Saying that "economic organization in primitive or subsistence economies is frequently an expression of kinship, religious, or political relationships" attributes primacy to the social relationships and a subordinate,

[19] The volume begins with the provocative article by Dudley Seers that brought about the symposium, "The Limitations of the Special Case." See also Myrdal (1957), Hagen (1962), Sawyer (1951), Singer (1950), and Rostow (1963).

derivative character to the economic arrangements. I should prefer not to attribute primacy to either. I think Godelier's (1965) phrasing, quoted in Kowalewski's comment, and Evans-Pritchards' statement (1954: vii) are good ways of stating the inextricable connections between economy and society and the social complexity in which economic arrangements are embedded in primitive societies.

Is there an economy separate from society? Should economic anthropology exist?[20] Vayda argues that for the communities anthropologists study, it is extremely difficult to define and demarcate the "economy," unless one makes the definition and demarcation so broad as to include virtually all activities, relationships, and institutions that anthropologists are interested in anyway: that kinship, religion, and other spheres of social organization and culture are so intimately bound up with land, labor, and material exchanges that one cannot say unambiguously what is "economic" and what is not. This is particularly so in what some anthropologists call the prestige sphere—bridewealth, potlatch, warfare, bloodwealth, fines, etc.—which involves exchanges and payments as well as honor, prerogatives, status, and social relationships.

In short, Vayda puts three related questions: (1) Can one define the economy in such fashion as to demarcate it from the rest of society? (2) Does economic anthropology have any distinctive subject matter, techniques of analysis, or theoretical framework? (3) Is it worthwhile retaining the special subfield called economic anthropology?

I readily agree that to analyze, say, land acquisition, usage, and transfer in primitive economies, one must bring in kinship or tribal affiliation; and to show the functions of treasure items or primitive money, one must bring in marriage and perhaps conflict resolution. Of course, the reverse is also true: if one had a special analytical interest in kinship, marriage, or politics, he would have to bring in land and other material transactions. This structured interleaving of what we separate out in Western societies as economic, political, religious, and social is a salient characteristic of organic or *Gemeinschaft* systems. In the pre-industrial societies studied by anthropologists and historians, many important institutions cannot be classified simply as economic, or social, or political: feudalism, peasantry, slavery, caste are socio-economic categories. To analyze them as though they were exclusively economic would be distorting. This does not mean, however, that there is no such thing as an economy in such societies or that economic anthropology is pointless. It means that to analyze economic organization and performance sensibly one must also analyze social organization, technology, and ecology.

I appreciate but do not share Vayda's underlying qualm: that unless the economy can be defined and demarcated as a distinct entity apart from the rest of society and culture, the special analytical concern with material organization and performance we call economic anthropology is not worth pursuing. To answer his questions directly:

An economy is a set of institutionalized activities which combine natural resources, human labor, and technology to acquire, produce, and distribute material goods and specialist services, in structured, repetitive fashion. Even in U.S. capitalism, the economy cannot be demarcated from the rest of society in watertight fashion, because material goods or money are used to express social relationships (e.g., gifts at marriage as an expression of kinship or friendship) and, more importantly with us, because of the several ways in which government (especially since the New Deal) affects the economy and households (taxes, welfare expenditures, drafting manpower for war, etc.). In our own economy, however, the private market sector is still so large, important, and pervasive that economists hive off its organization, performance, transactions, and measurement as their special analytical interest. They realize that in so doing they ignore many socio-economic activities. These, however, have come to be studied either by the occasional economist with "institutional" interests (the Veblens and Galbraiths), or by specialists in other subjects such as Business Administration, Industrial Sociology, or by those who do research on the psychology of consumer purchases.

In primitive societies, where there is no market sector (or only a petty one confined to a few produced goods), some functions that markets perform in U.S. economy are performed instead by kinship, religion, polity, etc. With us, labor for production is recruited principally through labor markets; in primitive societies principally through the nuclear or extended family.

Economic anthropology is coming to have a distinctive subject matter and theoretical framework and is worth retaining as a subfield within cultural or social anthropology. Just as economics delineates principles of economic organization for national capitalist and communist economies, so economic anthropology delineates principles of socio-economic organization for small-scale primitive and peasant economies. I should hope that those who specialize in economic anthropology would come to share my view that its distinctive subject matter comprises: (*a*) the organization and performance of pre-industrial economies as these relate to social organization and culture; and (*b*) past and present processes of socio-economic change, growth, and development, with particular emphasis on modernization and the integration of village communities into national economies and societies. Further, I should hope that, in their analyses of both traditional structures and dynamic processes, economic anthropologists would draw on empirical data from the other social sciences and from history. Comparative analysis is important to economic anthropologists whether they are interested in complicated institutions found widely—slavery, feudalism, peasantry—or in socio-economic devices whose organization and functions vary with underlying structure—money, markets, external trade.

I shall not attempt to summarize here what I have written over the last ten years on the theoretical framework of economic anthropology, but I should like to give the reasons why I think anthropologists have a distinctive contribution to make to that branch of comparative economic systems which is economic anthropology. Anthropology combines several special characteristics which equip anthropologists to undertake socio-economic analysis in a way both different from that of other social scientists and especially productive: (1) its traditional focus of interest on the small-scale societies of the village or tribal segment; (2) its technique of fieldwork immersion in the life of the community for a sufficient length of time for the anthropologist to feel and understand its workings; (3) its broad interests in all the principal segments of social life—family, polity, economy, religion, etc.; (4) its special concern with the interaction of the component activities, institutions, and relationships of society and culture. What Vayda (like, of course, Polanyi) underscores is anthropologists' inability to demarcate purely economic principles in the organically structured societies they study. Socio-economic principles can be delineated, however, and to do so requires what only anthropologists are professionally equipped to do: to show, as do Douglas (1962) and Epstein (1962), how culture and society, economy, technology, and ecology, and polity and religion mutually affect one another both in static institutional structure and in change.

Now, as to the *polemics*:

I can only account for the widely disparate assessments of my article (compare, e.g., the comments of Arensberg and Salisbury) and the scornful language used by several of the writers (particularly Schneider and Nash) by considering the psychological difficulties that obstruct the settling of theoretical issues in the social sciences by reason, logic, and dispassionate analysis. One's conceptual framework

[20] I consider some of the questions Vayda raises in several articles still in press (see Dalton 1968*c*, 1969*a*, *b*, *c*).

apparently, can become a sort of professional religion, the questioning of which evokes rage. Theoretical disputes therefore resemble theological battles. One doesn't listen to heretics, one merely slays them.

The slaying is done in several ways. One way is simply to dismiss the work (without further argument, analysis, or proof) as wrong, muddled, or trivial, as Nash does:

> The institutional analysis of Polanyi is rather crude and ad hoc. His principles of exchange are descriptive of some societies, but have little analytical value. As Dalton's Table 1 indicates, the principles lead to mechanical, schematic, and static understandings at a superficial level. What Polanyi has to offer social and economic anthropology has already been absorbed and superseded. . . .

Elsewhere, Nash (1967: 250) has simply dismissed, in very strong language, issues that anthropologists from Malinowski, Firth, and Herskovits to Bohannan and Sahlins have thought worthy of serious analysis:

> From the beginning the substantivists (as exemplified in the justly famous works of Polanyi and others) were heroically muddled and in error. It is a tribute to the maturity of economic anthropology that we [*sic*] have been able to find precisely in what the error consisted in the short space of six years. The paper . . . written by Cook [1966] when he was a graduate student neatly disposes of the controversy. I did not think it necessary [in my book] to regale readers with the history of error. [In social science] . . . it is virtually impossible to down a poor, useless, or obfuscating hypothesis, and I expect that the next generation of creators of high-level confusion will resurrect, in one guise or another, the substantive view of the economy.

Nash has never written on these issues that he condemns so vigorously. For him to make pontifical judgements in such abusive language is irresponsible. I suspect that he again finds it necessary to deprecate what he does not understand (see Dalton 1968*b*).

Another method of slaying is to attribute reprehensible qualities, base motives, and generalized sneakiness, as Schneider does in referring to "Dalton's uncompromising approach" and in saying that

> [Dalton] is addicted to dogmatic pronouncements . . . he misrepresents his critics. . . . Dalton argues by means of ex cathedra assertions from a dogmatic position which assumes his critics to be ignorant . . . he ridicules the search for general laws. . . . [Dalton's position] is the ultimate in cultural-relativism, or particularism, and is utterly contrary to a scientific approach.

Another slaying device is less obvious. It is a Gresham's Law of Ideas in which the detection of error of any sort is taken as sufficient reason to condemn everything the man writes. If a Karl Marx argues something silly (say, a labor theory of value), some Anglo-American economists, already disliking Marx, use this as an excuse to dismiss his entire corpus of work. If, on the other hand, a David Ricardo argues something silly (say, a labor theory of value), they do not dismiss his theories of rent or international trade; they like Ricardo. In theoretical disputes, it seems, we overkill only those we already dislike: says Salisbury, "My own disagreement with Dalton is virtually complete."

There is, moreover, the extreme difficulty of reading one's critics with the same concentration, absorption, and care with which one reads one's supporters. One reads critics for their weak, not their strong points; for ammunition, not enlightenment. It seems as though we all have deep grooves in our heads shaped by the conceptual categories we find most congenial. When we read our opponents we sometimes perform an instant translation in our heads, a transformation of their words into our own categorical grooves. The result is to attribute positions to our opponents rather different from the ones they are actually arguing, and by so doing, to create straw men. For example, Schneider remarks that

> . . . it is anachronistic to see Dalton categorizing the world as consisting of Western (capitalist economies) and "primitives" (all the rest).

My paper has a section on peasant economies; it shows awareness that Communist economies exist and also that underdeveloped national economies and changing village-level economies exist. Schneider goes on to argue that

> to him [Dalton] economy is merely the system of distribution of wealth and society is the whole range of dependency relations in a community, all of which except in capitalist society, are altruistic. . . . Dalton gives the impression that choice is a luxury, or a component only of capitalist societies—that in non-Western economies rules take care of the distribution of wealth and choice is unnecessary. (His additional defense [*sic*], that wealth is so scarce that there is not much to exercise choice about, is, I think, simply a misconception. . . .) I suspect that cattle would be rejected [by Dalton] as money because they don't look like money. . . .

Here he puts words in my mouth that are extremely distasteful to me. I hold no such views, nor does anything I say in print suggest that I do.

Nash, in saying that

> For an essay entitled "Theoretical Issues in Economic Anthropology," it is surprising how few such issues are mentioned or discussed here. (Compare, for example, the range of issues raised in Firth [1967], Belshaw [1965], or Nash [1966]).

is comparing this single journal article with three books; I invite comparison with the dozen or so journal articles on economic anthropology I have published. His statement that

> Dalton is concerned with a single issue—that of the relevance of contemporary economic concepts and modes of analysis to primitive and peasant economies—and it is one that was probably not even meaningful in the form which Polanyi first raised it.

is a bit of "intellectual slippage" on Nash's part. My article is also about the distinctions between primitive and peasant, and between static and dynamic economies; and between structure and performance of economies. There is also some discussion of the connections between economic and social structure and of the contrast between perceiving the economy as what individual behavers do and seeing it as a set of rules of social organization. There are sections on the difficulties of contriving universal theory, the importance of markets as a differentiating feature among economies, the crucial constraining role of small size and primitive technology in determining economic organization and performance, and the special redistributive and administered trade sectors where centralized government is present. Several other matters are discussed as well.

Polanyi, moreover, was not the first to raise the issue of the relevance of economics to economic anthropology. Aside from Malinowski (1922), Goodfellow (1939: Chap. 1), and Firth (1939: Chap. 1), Herskovits devoted an entire chapter to it in his *The Economic Life of Primitive Peoples* (1940) and defended his views in his exchange with Frank Knight (1941). Polanyi responded to the issues briefly in Chapter 4 and its appendix of *The Great Transformation* (1944), and in "Our Obsolete Market Mentality" (1947), and at length in Chapters 5, 12, and 13 of *Trade and Market in the Early Empires* (1957).

After simply dismissing Polanyi's work as "crude and ad hoc," having "little analytical value," and leading to such "mechanical, schematic, and static understandings at a superficial level," Nash concludes rather surprisingly by suggesting that Polanyi has contributed something (although it has already been absorbed and superseded) and by hinting that he is one of the founders of the science. Polanyi's book on economic anthropology was published in 1957. What has superseded it? How can anyone producing such "crude" work having so "little analytical value" still be regarded as one of the "founders of the science" who has written "justly famous works"? Nash not only overkills, he also contradicts himself, and his remarks are mere assertion throughout. I wish, moreover, that I could agree with Nash that Polanyi's work has been absorbed. There is so much evidence to the contrary —that essential points of his are misunderstood—that in 1968 I published a collection of his essays most pertinent to economic anthropology together with an expository

disagree only at the cost of his sanity. But it is not a definition of racist explanations or of scientific racism. Nor is it offered as such. The immediately preceding sentence does contain an informal definition of scientific racism:

> According to the doctrine of scientific racism the significant socio-cultural differences and similarities among human populations are the dependent variables of group-restricted hereditary drives and attitudes.

Freeman ignores this sentence and the following 30 pages of explication in which Darwin's racism is fully demonstrated. Darwin was a scientific racist not because he correlated hereditary endowment and group behavioral specialties; he was a racist because he supported the view that the overwhelming bulk of significant group behavioral specialties are dependent on special hereditary endowments which are the products of sexual and natural selection. To deny that Darwin subscribed to the doctrine known as Social Darwinism—better labeled Biological Spencerism—is to deny all that is historically distinctive in Darwin's contribution to the social sciences. It is to deny that "natural selection" meant "survival of the fittest" to Darwin as it did to Spencer, and it is, further, to deny the substantial ideological service rendered by this view of sociocultural evolution to racist and imperialist politics. Surely Freeman's observations about Darwin's genial nature and his hatred of slavery are not intended to diminish or seriously qualify Darwin's contribution to the biologization of history.

Freeman makes the additional false statement:

> Charles Darwin is a "racist," according to Harris (p. 119) because of his acceptance of the theory that there exist differences between races . . . that have resulted from natural selection.

I offer no such "because" on p. 119 or elsewhere.

I should like to take this opportunity to urge my colleagues not to assume they know what is on a printed page merely because the author disagrees with their fondly received truths.

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Current Anthropology Feb. 1970.

On Dalton's "Theoretical Issues in Economic Anthropology"

by ANDRE GUNDER FRANK

Santiago, Chile. 15 v 69

A medieval curse on both your houses (the substantivist one inhabited by Dalton plus eight of his commentators and the formalist one occupied by four of the latter [CA 10:63–102]) for continuing to debate how many angels can dance on the head of a pin or—to seem more advanced—on the moon. It is of less than credit to these protagonists who claim to study man, *anthropos*, and his home, *oikos*, to contest a race between astronauts and cosmonauts to a planet where no one lives, no matter who wins. No more credit is due the eight commentators who do not express a clear preference for either of the above celestial houses, but also do not dedicate their commentary to the construction of a theoretical house consummate with man's terrestial habitat.

If, as Dalton claims, economic anthropologists are increasingly concerned with socioeconomic change and its promotion, then they must—and he should let them—come down to earth and study its homely reality. Yet only four of the 24 comments evoked by Dalton even refer to this reality and the real issues it poses, and some of these refer only in passing from one of Dalton's nonissues to another. These lines, which did not reach the editor in time for inclusion among the comments on Dalton's article, remain in their original formulation, except for the addition of a few phrases placed in parentheses. Nevertheless, they serve equally as "discussion and criticism" of Dalton's article and of all the comments, with the exception of those by Blacking, Frankenberg, Riegelhaupt, and especially Kowalewski, who made some effort at earthly realism in their discussion of the theoretical issues posed by the reality of *anthropos*'s *oikos*.

The intensified disputes stimulated, as Dalton says, by Polanyi and others' publication of *Trade and Market in the Early Empires* in 1957, were perhaps justified in 1959. In that year I took the initiative (which I have lamented ever since) to organize such a discussion, which was reported in CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY (1:149–50). But if that and the ensuing discussion were justified at all, it was so only to bring home two obvious facts, both recognized by Dalton, Polanyi's disciple, himself. These facts were (CA 10:79, 65) that

> Polanyi's theoretical categories are addressed principally, but not exclusively, to the organization of primitive and archaic [early] economies under static conditions . . . and that he did not analyse . . . change, gro wth and development . . .

and that among his opponents reliance was on

> the leading ideas of elementary economics (Samuelson 1967: Chaps. 1–3) as a guide to analysing all economies.

Samuelson himself aptly demonstrates the uses to which this application of "the leading ideas of elementary economics" to "all economies" are put. He asks (1958:754–58):

> Why worry especially about the problems of underdeveloped countries? We can list a number of reasons, all vital. (1) Widening differentials. . . . Many authorities believe that living standards in India, Indonesia, and certain other underdeveloped countries have actually deteriorated. . . . (2) Ideological struggle. In the modern ideological war between the free and communist worlds. . . . (3) Great expectations. . . . (4) Desired markets. . . . (5) Need to avert slump by economic imperialism? . . . we never have to buy prosperity by throwing goods abroad. (6) Exploitation of colonial peoples? . . . the evidence tells against this notion. . . . (7) Plain altruism. . . . The key to development rests in the four fundamental factors: population, natural resources, capital formation, and technology.

For this professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who authored the most widely used introductory economics text of the capitalist world, who writes a column in the American business magazine *Newsweek*, and who was offered (but refused) the chairmanship of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, neither economic nor social structure, not to mention political structure, offers a key. He does think, however (p. 771), that

> the increasing political self-consciousness of such [underdeveloped] countries, plus the eagerness of the communist ideology to help them "skip the capitalistic stage of development," reinforces our own self-interest in finding new sources of mutuall y advantage ous trade—not, mind you, new objects for imperialistic make work programs.

To continue today this sterile debate between the methods of the irrelevant on the one side and of the self-interested on the other, and to add to it as Dalton (and

most of his commentators) do, only confirms Gough's contention (CA 9:406) that

> much of [post-war American writing in applied anthropology and in economic and political anthropology concerned with development] springs from erroneous or doubtful assumptions and theories that are being increasingly challenged by social scientists in the new nations themselves.

Gough goes on to list seven such assumptions, and has been sharply criticized by some of her commentators for doing so. Dalton recognizes "relatively few theoretical insights and conceptual categories with which to analyse socio-economic change" and names only the contributions of Myrdal, Hagen, Smelser, and Adelman and Morris. But in doing so Dalton (and his co-debatants, since only one of the four "formalists" writes from the U.S.) further confirm Gough's claim (p. 406) that

> a large number of studies, indeed a whole literature, on Western imperialism . . . tend in America to be either ignored or reviewed cursorily and then dismissed. They rarely appear in standard anthropological bibliographies.

Gough listed 15 examples. One might also add the following contributors to "theoretical issues in economic anthropology," many of whom are from the "new" nations: Amin (1965, 1966, 1967), Dike (1957), Davidson (1961, 1964), Suret-Canale (1961*a*, *b*, 1964), Afana (1966), Rodinson (1966), and Issawi (1961), all on Africa; Dutt (1955), Thorner and Thorner (1962), Thorner (1964), Mukherjee (1955), Sen (1962), and Singh (1964), on India; and Furtado (1965), Gibson (1964), Guerra y Sanchez (1964), Bagú (1949), and Prado Junior (1961, 1962) on Latin America.

Most of these authors (only some of whose works are listed here) are historians and economists. Their contributions are perhaps off limits to Dalton and his "economic anthropologists." If so, however, the limitations of Dalton and his followers and—as I shall maintain below—their total misstatement of the real theoretical issues in economic anthropology are all the more indefensible inasmuch as the past decade has happily seen a host of anthropologists and sociologists make major contributions to clarifying the real issues. One might mention only Wertheim (1959, 1964), Geertz (1966), Kosambi (1956), and Desai (1959*a*, *b*) for Asia; Verhagen (1964), Barnett and Njama (1966), Ziegler (1964), Laroui (1967), Abdel-Malik (1968), and Diop (1964) for Africa; or Wolf (1959), Stavenhagen (1965, 1968, 1969), González Casanova (1965*a*, *b*), Cardoso and Faletto (1967), Cardoso (1968), Quijano (1967, 1968), and Marroquin (1957) for Latin America. Yet none of these contributions seems to have made any impact on Dalton and his co-debatants (with the honorable exception of Kowalewski), for they go unnamed or—what is worse—if named, like Geertz and Wolf, unappreciated. That this is not a simple omission to conserve space is clear, since Dalton fails to appreciate even the contribution of his own study of "growth without development" in Liberia (Clower, Dalton, *et al.* 1966) to the real-life issues on this planet.

These real contemporary issues for economic anthropologists are the ones to which Gough and the authors cited here and by her have drawn attention, even if they have not yet exhaustively analysed them. The central fact is that the worldwide historical expansion of mercantile, industrial, and monopoly capitalism brought all humanity on this particular globe into a *single* social system. This system has always functioned, and still functions, so as to generate socioeconomic development for the few while simultaneously causing degenerative change without development for the many. This occurs irrespective of whether the "many" previously enjoyed high civilizations, as in the early empires of China, India, Ghana, the Aztecs, the Incas, etc., or "primitive" cultures in parts of the same continents. In all cases the majority of these peoples has been converted into peasants, proletarians, lumpen-proletarians or lumpen-bourgeois in the name of "the white man's burden." This process involved more than the destruction or restructuring of their economies, although not even that is recognized on either side of the debate. It also involved the destruction or drastic restructuring of their politics, cultures, and psyches. Therefore, this system, which was worldwide until some peoples began to escape from it through socialist revolution, is less aptly denoted by Samuelson's term "world market" or Polanyi's term "early empire" than by the term used by the adversely affected people themselves: "imperialism."

Rather than face the real theoretical issues raised by the existence of imperialism and the problems of war, starvation, racism, alienation, and genocide which attend its continuance, these scholastics in general and Dalton in particular raise a whole series of false issues. Thus Dalton asserts that the matter of the size of the economy to be studied is a "semantic" difficulty. On the contrary, as Gough has demonstrated in her CA article, and as the reactions of Beals (CA 9:407–8) and others of her critics make clear, the problem is empirical, theoretical, and ideological. It is empirical because the size of the determining and therefore most relevant social system—imperialism—is lamentably very large and quite objectively determined. The problem is theoretical in that—as Gough stresses (but at least 20 of Dalton's commentators fail to see)—we need a theoretical framework that is adequate for encompassing the size and complexity of the system, and therefore suitable for guiding our enquiry into how any particular peasant or other communities fit into the larger system and how it can liberate itself from that system. The problem is also, finally, ideological, in that these critics of Gough and practitioners of celestial economic anthropology, be they pious or liberal, steadfastly refuse to face the reality of the existence of the imperialist system because their ideological and political interests prevent them from doing so.

Dalton speaks of thousands of economies (and most of the debatants on *both* sides agree), whereas in fact he is confronted by only thousands of parts of a single economy. Dalton would have us compare the similarities and differences between these "thousands" of economies, and particularly the differences between primitive and peasant economies and between both of them and "our own." Yet the real issue for economic anthropologists is to follow the lead of the above-cited authors by analysing the connecting ties between "our" economy and "theirs" and by enquiring into the consequences of these ties for their cherished primitive and peasant peoples. Dalton cites the anthropologist Eric Wolf on *Peasants* in general, but has he read Wolf's analyses of particular peasant societies? Wolf writes (1959:176, 195, 199, 211, 213–14):

> The Indian before the Spanish conquest had been a cultivator, a seed-planter. . . . The Spanish colonist, however, labored for different ends. He wanted to convert wealth and labor into saleable goods—into gold and silver, hides and wool, wheat and sugarcane. . . . The motor of this capitalism was mining. . . . All claims to Utopia—economic, religious, or political—rested ultimately upon the management and control of but one resource: the indigenous population of the colony. The conquerors wanted Indian labor, the crown Indian subjects, the friars Indian souls. . . . Between 1519 and 1650, six-sevenths of the population of Middle America was wiped out; only a seventh remained to turn the wheels of paradise . . . the Conquest not only destroyed people physically; it also rent asunder the accustomed fabric of their lives and the pattern of motives that animated that life. . . . The growth of capitalism in New Spain did not produce a greater measure of liberty and freedom for the laborer; instead it sharpened exploitation and increased bondage. . . . Stripped of their elite and urban components, the Indians were relegated to the countryside. Thus the Indians suffered not only exploitation and biological collapse but also deculturation—cultural loss—and in the

course of such ill use lost also the feeling of belonging to a social order which made such poor use of its human resources. They became strangers in it, divided from its purposes and agents by an abyss of distrust. The new society could command their labor, but it could not command their loyalty. Nor has this gulf been healed in the course of time.

Instead, the spread of the worldwide capitalist system has created and re-created this gulf again the world over. It seems incredible, then, that Dalton should approvingly cite Deane (1953: 115–16) to the effect that

> the market place seems remote, on the face of it, from the problems of the African village where most individuals spend the greater part of their lives in satisfying their own or their families' needs and desires, where money and trade play a subordinate role in motivating productive activity

in reference to, of all places, Rhodesia (and it is strange that Frankenberg, writing from Zambia, should fail to rebut him).

Yet Woddis (1962:22), quoting *The Times Educational Supplement* (March 6, 1959, p. 388), says in contrast,

> a recent traveller in Northern Rhodesia says: "I went into many villages in Northern Rhodesia hundreds of miles away from the Copper Belt where only old men and women were living. All the able-bodied men . . . were off to the mine. . . ." Thus food production has been left mainly in the hands of women, children and elderly men. . . .

The *Keiskammahoek Rural Survey* (cited in Woddis 1962:26) reports further:

> The people of this district are seen to be dependent upon the earnings of emigrants for their very existence, and it is poverty which forces them out to work. But this very exodus is itself a potent cause of the perpetuation of the poverty at home, for the absence of so many in the prime of life inhibits economic progress and certainly accounts in no small measure for the low agricultural productivity of the district. In many cases land is not ploughed for the simple reason that there is no one to do the ploughing. . . .

Woddis (1962:25) also says:

> They cannot produce enough food to support themselves, and so have to purchase considerable quantities which are imported into the district. This is paid for, says the survey, "principally by the export of the large number of workers." In fact, so dependent are the villagers on the earnings of the emigrant workers that it would be more accurate, says the survey, to say that the economy of the district rests "firstly upon the fact that it is a reservoir of labour for the mines and industries of the Union, and secondly upon the subsistence farming of those that stay behind."

In the meantime Portugal earns foreign exchange by exporting over half a million migrant laborers a year on a contract basis from Mozambique to South Africa.

Unabashed, Dalton goes still further. He would have us distinguish the local economy from that "outside," instead of relating the two in order to find out how the "local" and the "outside" parts determine each other. Dalton alleges that peasant communities have markedly little economic, cultural, or technical integration into the world around them and that conventional economics is relevant only to the commercialized sector of the economy, which he suggests is small. But this is simply the "dual" economy or society thesis that Boeke (1942, 1946, 1953) invented to defend Dutch colonialism in Indonesia, a thesis which others the world over have since used as a figleaf to hide internal colonialism and its intimate connection with external colonialism or imperialism.

Dalton cites Geertz as an exception to those anthropologists who work on small "economies," but has he read him? Writing about the birthplace of the dual-society thesis, Geertz observes (1966:60, 62, 142, 143, 82):

> Peasant agriculture became a functioning element in the Indies' export economy rather than merely its backstop; peasant agriculture was developed, at least in part, into a business proposition rather than becoming frozen into a kind of outdoor relief. . . . The Dutch economy which was situated in the Indies ("tropical Holland," as it was sometimes called), and, cheek by jowl, the autonomous Indonesian economy . . . interacted continuously in ways which fundamentally shaped their separate courses. They steadily diverged, largely as a result of this interaction, to the point where the structural contrasts became overwhelming. What Boeke regarded as an intrinsic and permanent characteristic of Indonesian (or "Eastern") economic life, "a primarily spiritual phenomenon," was really an historically created condition; it grew not from the immutable essence of the Eastern soul as it encountered the incarnate spirit of Western dynamism, but from the in no way predestined shape of colonial policy as it impressed itself upon the traditional pattern of Indonesian agriculture. . . . The difference in "economic mentality" between Dutch and Javanese which Boeke took to be the cause of the dualism was in fact in great part its result. . . . The Javanese did not become impoverished because they were "static"; they became "static" because they were impoverished. . . . Similar practices connected with other crops did not isolate the disequilibrating forces of commercial capitalism from village life; they introduced them, following the path the Company and Culture system had blazed, into the very heart of it. . . . The real tragedy of colonial history in Java after 1830 is not that the peasant suffered. . . . The tragedy is that he suffered for nothing. . . . But what makes this development tragic rather than decadent is that around 1830 the Javanese (and thus, the Indonesian) economy could have made the transition to modernism, never a painless experience, with more ease than it could today.

Halfway around the world, the Instituto Nacional Indigenista (National Indian Institute) of Mexico—staffed primarily by anthropologists—observes (1962:33–34, 27, 60, translation mine):[1]

> The Indians, in reality, rarely live isolated from the *mestizo* or national population; there exists a symbiosis between the two groups which we must take into account. Between the *mestizos* who live in the nucleus city of the region and the Indians who live in the agricultural hinterland there is in reality a closer economic and social interdependence than appears at first glance. . . . The *mestizo* population in fact almost always lives in a city which is the center of an intercultural region, which acts as a metropolis of an Indian zone, and which maintains an intimate connection with the underdeveloped communities which link the center with the satellite communities. [Our study found] the Indian or folk community was an interdependent part of a whole which functioned as a unit, so that the measures taken in one part inevitably had repercussions in the others and, in consequence, on the whole. It was not possible to consider the community separately; it was necessary to take account of the totality of the intercultural system of which it was a part. . . . That the large Indian mass should remain in its ancestral status of subordination, with a strongly stabilized folk culture, was not only desired but even coercively imposed by the city. . . . [It is in] Ciudad de las Casas . . . that one sees with greatest emphasis the dominion which the *ladinos* exercise over economic and political resources and over property in general.

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[1] "Los indigenas, en realidad, rara vez viven aislados de la población mestiza o nacional; entre ambos grupos de población existe una simbiosis que es indispensable tomar en cuenta. Entre los mestizos, residentes en la ciudad núcleo de la región, y los indigenas, habitantes de hinterland campesino, hay, en verdad, una interdependencia económica y social más estrecha de lo que a primera vista pudiera aparecer. . . . La población mestiza, en efecto, radica casi siempre en una ciudad, centro de una región intercultural, que actúa como metrópoli de una zona indigena y mantiene, con las comunidades subdesarrolladas, una intima conexión que liga el centro con las comunidades satélites. [Nuestro estudio mostró] la comunidad indigena o folk era parte independiente de un todo que funcionaba como una unidad, en tal forma que las acciones ejercidas sobre una parte repercutian inevitablemente sobre las restantes y, en consecuencia, sobre el conjunto. No era posible considerar a la comunidad separadamente; habia que tomar en cuenta en su totalidad, al sistema intercultural del cual formaba parte. . . . La permanencia de la gran masa india en su situación de ancestral subordinación, con el goce de una cultura folk fuertemente estabilizada, no sólo fue deseada por la ciudad, sino aún impuesta en forma coercitiva. . . . [Es en] Ciudad de Las Casas . . . donde se ve con mayor énfasis el dominio que ejercen los ladinos sobre los medios económicos, politicos y de la propiedad en general."

Recently, recurring scandalous reports in the capitalist world press, as well as in specialized journals such as *Indian Voices* (January, 1966), testify to the fact that the world's most "isolated" and primitive Indians, those in the Amazon Basin of Brazil, many of whom "civilization" has long since obliged to retreat into further "isolation," are by no means exempt from the same forces and consequences of world and national capitalism. In short, they are being deliberately exterminated.

Notwithstanding this and endless other evidence from all around the globe that Boeke's and all other dual society theses are empirically fallacious and theoretically indefensible, not to mention politically reactionary, commentators Cohen and van Ernst (CA 10:82–83) explicitly refer to the thesis to give it their support. Grigor'ev (CA 10:85) goes so far as to invoke "*Marx*ist" theory to write from *Lenin*grad.—God is benevolent; he has spared both of the last named from noting as we must—that

> the theoretical issues posed by Dalton are acceptable from my point of view. . . . Dalton's delineation of the main features of primitive economy seems to me accurate. . . . Dalton's refinement of theoretical issues and definitions will be very helpful in the future concrete study of primitive economies.

On the contrary, it is not in Dalton's "refinement," but rather in the development of capitalism and imperialism that we must seek the cause and explanation for "growth without development," to use Dalton's felicitous terminology. Be the thousands of local "economies" in Mexico, Indonesia, or Liberia, the externally stimulated growth of the primary goods export sector condemns the majority of the people (whether they work directly in it or not) to a colonial and class structure that not only impedes development but generates underdevelopment. Yet all this hastens the development of those outside the underdeveloped world, and of a few intermediary junior partners inside. The im*plantation* of Firestone Rubber in Liberia, the colonization of the interior by the coast, and the resulting growth without development that Dalton studied is one classic case. But its significance for the real theoretical issues in economic anthropology everywhere in Asia, Africa, and Latin America seems to have escaped Dalton and other scientists who seem bent on studying a planet where the "thousands of economies" have few, if any, economic, cultural, and technological links with "our" world economy.

Dalton wants us to distinguish degenerative change, growth without development, and socioeconomic development among his thousands of economies. But it will never be possible to analyse the nature and causes of their differences if we do not first place each "economy" in the context of the forces that have done so much to shape them all. For that reason, among others, the structure and development of the whole system becomes the first theoretical issue in economic anthropology and all social science. Although the professional division of labor may well assign the study of small social units to anthropologists—and Dalton correctly observes that these are what they *do* study—it does not exempt them from the scientific responsibility of studying these units in the context of the social whole that determines their most important characteristics. Dalton is also correct when, speaking for himself and others, he states that "knowledge of our own economic system . . . should figure explicitly and importantly in economic anthropology." Contrary to his claim, however, that knowledge is certainly not obtained by reading the first three or any other chapters of Samuelson.

We must commend Dalton for posing the important questions,

> What is the nature of the initial incursion which starts the processes of socio-economic change, and to what extent does the character of the initial incursion shape the sequential changes that follow?

and,

> empirically, how do small groups—the tribe, the village—become part of a regional or national economy?

But to find the answers Dalton and his colleagues (instead of pursuing their sterile polemics) will have to follow the lead of the anthropologists and sociologists cited above. Further, to the extent that

> among those anthropologists who write in English there is only an occasional borrowing of Marxist concepts (such as economic surplus)

as Dalton correctly points out, they would do well to make more extensive—and intensive—use of these. Indeed, even this small loan is quite misused. Following Marx, it is necessary for economic anthropologists to *really* study the surplus value expropriated from peasant and primitive peoples. Following Baran (1957), it is also necessary for them to understand how a portion of this surplus is sucked out of primitive and peasant communities by "our" economy, and how the remaining surplus is misused as a result of the economic, social, political, and cultural structure that our economy has imposed on them in order to exploit them. Through such studies Dalton and his colleagues would discover the cause and significance of the growth without development he found in Liberia, as well as its long-run, fundamental similarities with (rather than differences from) the degenerative change that he laments. They would also have to conclude that substantial socioeconomic development is not possible for the vast bulk of humanity in underdeveloped regions so long as they live under "our" economic system and employ the concepts of economic anthropology so far used by Dalton (and all but a couple of his commentators, irrespective of the spacious—or specious—polemic among them).

Reply

by George Dalton

Evanston, Ill., U.S.A. 8 VIII 69

Frank hates social science that does not serve to justify revolution. His comment is not on economic anthropology. It is bombastic denunciation of almost everyone who does not share his revolutionary rage. There is no point in responding further to writing so full of anger and ideology.

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On Sarles's Views on Language and Communication

by George Gaylord Simpson

Tucson, Ariz., U.S.A. 25 VI 69

I was not among those invited to comment on the recent article by Sarles (CA 10:211–15), which has only now come to my attention in printed form. This article contains several misunderstandings or misstatements, some of which are ascribed to me explicitly, citing Simpson (1966), or implicitly in continuing text. I therefore wish to make brief correction of the three most important of these errors.

1. The view that man has language and other animals do not is misrepresented as "Somehow a giant, qualitative, *behavioral* jump is supposed to have occurred." It was once a fairly common error, but is not now an excusable one, to suppose that because a qualitative difference *now* exists between species (or other taxa) it must have arisen by saltation. I did not state or imply and I do not believe that this is true of the *origin* of language. Nothing I have ever written can be reasonably so interpreted.

2. In continuation of this misrepresentation and with further disapproving citation of Lancaster (1965), Sarles states that a contrast between the language of men and the "noise" (his quotes) of animals is assumed and that animal communication is considered a defective human system but (with what logic?) unrelatable to the latter. I do not venture to speak for Miss Lancaster, an authority on animal communication, which she calls communication and not "noise." For myself, I am aware of the obvious fact that animals communicate. It seems equally obvious to me that they do not use language, as I and most others have defined that word. Over some span of time in some group of primates some form of communication did evolve into language. That does not make the surviving nonlinguistic forms of communication of other primates and other animals either primitive or defective forms of language, especially as man retains such forms of communication in addition to language. The fallacy that because all language is communication all communication is language is too obvious to argue.

3. In a statement that is a confusion of taxonomy, diagnosis, and nomenclature, Sarles cites me as an example of those who consider man unique because he alone has language, language being "that which distinguishes man." What I actually wrote (1966: 476) was,

> Language is also the most diagnostic single trait of man: all normal men have language; no other now-living organisms do.

Until someone finds a normal man who cannot acquire a language or another now-living organism that can, I take that to be an acceptable provisional truth. I did not say that this single trait sufficiently characterizes or defines biological or social man. On the contrary, in the cited article I took pains to specify many other traits and to emphasize that these evolved in a unitary, organized way.

There is another misapprehension in Victor A. Litter's discussion of Sarles's paper. He says (p. 216),

> The views of Simpson (1966) must be accepted in their entirety: . . . It is impossible to believe that only man possesses language or even that it is his distinguishing characteristic.

But I do believe, as stated in the cited paper, that among extant organisms only man possesses language, and therefore that it is (one of) his distinguishing characteristic(s).

Reply

by HARVEY B. SARLES

Minneapolis, Minnesota, U.S.A. 23 VII 69

In the area of language studies, the definition of "language" is a primary concern to the linguist and to those who claim a knowledge of what constitutes language. There is a traditional view that language is exclusive to man, but this notion is now open to question. One of the implicit points of my paper was that to define language as uniquely human also tends to define the nature of animal communication so as to preclude the notion that it is comparable to human language. The view that language belongs only to man is quite old, and remains a part of the prevailing intellectual climate even today. It implies a notion of man's normality that must be re-examined.

As Simpson's other works indicate, he obviously is not a saltation theorist. He is, of course, a modern biologist of the first rank. I disagree with him only on the issue of his definition of language, because it implies a narrow, restricted notion of language behavior. I have elsewhere stated that our modern notions of what constitutes language and communication, even in humans, are far from complete or correct (Sarles 1966, 1967, 1969*a*, *b*).

Simpson states above:

> All normal men have language. . . . Until someone finds a normal man who cannot acquire a language or another now-living organism that can, I take that to be an acceptable provisional truth.

There are, in fact, a number of successfully reproducing humans who are considered to be "aphasic" or "imperfect" in their language. Granted that these persons are medically "abnormal," are they therefore biologically abnormal? (The medical model of normality is based to a large extent on our *social-cultural* ideas of what constitutes health and pathology.)

Who is to say what constitutes "normal language" and what, specifically, are its attributes? Are these scientific truths or "social truths"? There is a great deal of evidence that members of minority groups in this country are discriminated against in school for having "defective" language. Here the majority has defined its own language as normal and that of others (lower class, Negro, American Indian, etc.) as "abnormal." Although Simpson does not subscribe to the implications of this model, others who use essentially the same definitions have found it useful.

The relationship between language and communication remains unclear. Historically, most linguists have tied the two together by stating that language *functions* in communication. A few, particularly those, such as Chomsky (1966), who see themselves as deriving directly from the rationalist Cartesian tradition, view language as an independent system. Simpson says (1966: 476):

> Human language is also a system of interpersonal communication and a behavioral adaptation essential for the human form of socialization. Yet human language is absolutely distinct from any system of communication in other animals.

I understand Simpson to mean that language is an emergent system. Like most others who define language in the Cartesian tradition, Simpson separates the "systems of emotional signals" of "so-called [animal] language" from human "discourse" (1966: 476).

The basis of my disagreement with Simpson can be summed up by restating the title of his paper: "The *Biological* Nature of Man" (italics mine). It implies that we can separate the biological nature of man from his other aspects. I think it a far better and more open strategy to consider that man has/is his nature—and to avoid any premature definition of that nature—if we are ultimately to answer the question of mutual concern: "What is man?"

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On the Social Responsibilities Symposium

by HANS PETER DUERR

Heidelberg, Germany. 16 I 69

"Where do you come from?" said the Red Queen. "And where are you going? Look up, speak nicely, and don't twiddle your fingers all the time."

Alice attended to all these directions, and explained, as well as she could, that she had lost her way.

"I don't know what you mean by *your* way," said the Queen, "all the ways about here belong to *me*—but why did you come out here at all?" she added in a kinder tone. "Curtsey while you're thinking what to say. It saves time."

Let me enter a plea for "armchair guerrillas."

The problem of the "social responsibility" of science seems to be more complex than the treatment given it in the CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY symposium (CA 9:397–435).[1] To expose some weaknesses of the presuppositions upon which the symposium articles are based, I wish to present a few ideas towards a critique of some of the conceptual foundations of behavioral science. It is upon this *relative a priori* that the character of anthropology rests, and by which its specific relation to politics is determined. I consider a brief exposition of the ideas implicit to be necessary for an understanding of my position. Hence, I shall also examine some relevant views which are not directly represented in the CA symposium.

One of the main questions should be: What is the *epistemological* character of the relation between reflection upon the categorical framework of empirical theories (traditionally termed the "conditions of the possibility of knowledge") and the "morals" which motivate the application of scientific theories to a certain domain? The problem of this relationship is not considered in any of the contributions. By merely investigating which political groups should be

[1] These comments are dedicated to Edward E. Evans-Pritchard and Bertrand Russell. In this way I hope to thank them for stimulating discussions on this and related subjects. I also warmly thank Magdalena Melnikow and Charles McGruder, who, although he is an astronomer, helped me to translate the text. I am indebted to Ekkehard Schöller, William W. Bartley, Ernst Tugendhat, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Helmut F. Spinner for detailed criticism of the first version of the paper or views included in it. I also wish to thank several left-wing anthropologists of the London School of Oriental and African Studies, who have made apparent to me how little is in fact achieved in writing an article like this one. The comments were written at the Rosa Luxemburg Institut, since its occupation by the police again called Institut für Soziologie und Ethnologie der Universität im Haus Riesen.