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RUSSIA AND ASIA
PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPORARY AREA
STUDIES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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By KARLA A. WITTFOGEL

I

THE educated American of the middle nineteenth century who took an inventory of his knowledge of the world found himself much more poorly informed on Asia than on Europe. The reason for this is manifest. America's relations with Asia were fragmented and peripheral, trade alone being a major concern. Interaction with Europe proceeded on an entirely different plane: For the New World, Europe was an inexhaustible source of population increase and personal contacts, of monies for economic growth, and of technological, artistic, and educational inspiration.

Reflecting the compartmentalized and loose connections with Asia, American studies of this great continent were haphazard and limited in scope. America's comprehensive and intense relations with Europe, on the other hand, resulted in a comprehensive and intense interest in practically all aspects of European life. This interest went well below the surface of contemporary affairs. The educated nineteenth-century American was expected to know the historical roots of Europe's development: the era of enlightenment, the Renaissance, the Middle Ages, and finally, the civilizations of Palestine, Greece, and Rome, the acclaimed foundations of Europe's institutional and cultural greatness.

The world of 1950 differs profoundly from the world of 1850. All major areas of the globe have undergone radical internal transformations; simultaneously they have changed in their external relations to each other and to the United States. To say that the United States has suddenly risen to a

* The substance of this essay was presented before the Second National Conference on the Study of World Areas, New York, on May 8, 1950. Its basic ideas are developed in detail and with full documentation in a forthcoming book on Russia's Asiatic Restoration.

position of global leadership in the field of economics, diplomacy, and military strength is but one way of drawing attention to this country's vastly intensified contacts with Europe and with the rest of the world.

The new relations between the United States and Western Europe, Asia, and Africa—and in certain respects also Latin America—present an obvious challenge to our traditional way of studying these areas. The challenge is even greater in the case of the Soviet Union. Despite the many iron curtains separating the United States from the core of the Soviet world (and in varying degrees also from its outlying bastions), the presence and the activities of the U.S.S.R. affect nearly all, if not all, aspects of American life. The interplay of ideas is no less passionate because today it is openly hostile; it goes far beyond radio broadcasts. In the economic and political spheres the Soviet government is as merciless at home in eradicating all manner of Western institutions, as the proponents of Soviet society outside its borders are eager to paralyze and disintegrate the institutional order of the West and other non-Soviet areas. The great concentration of Russia's manpower in heavy industry and in the army, because of a presumably unavoidable new world conflagration, affects the military, technological, and political decisions of America to an extraordinary degree. It is a sad but undeniable truth that the international relations between the Soviet-controlled world and the non-Soviet world constitute the most important single fact in the present global situation.

II

The consequences of this fact for the social sciences are manifest. If new types of societies have arisen in the modern world, and if these new societies are bound together by new types of international relations, then their rational and orderly analysis requires new concepts and methods of investigation. To be sure, practically all new concepts have their roots in the past; and while voicing the need for new frames (and sub-frames) of reference, I am fully aware of the historical connections between whatever new concepts we may develop and previously held ideas—some

elaborated, some incipient, and some residual categories of obsolete systems of thought.

We claim to defend the values of the West, and of Western civilization and society. How far has modern social science gone in clarifying these concepts, which are basic for our entire contemporary life? Similarly we mention the "East," "Asia," the "Orient," indicating our belief in a cohesive Oriental reality, although we may see no common denominator beyond the accidents of geography and certain affinities in art and religion.

Considering the importance of the issues involved, such a view is highly unsatisfactory. What we urgently need is a meaningful institutional concept of the Orient. Such a concept, besides leading to decisive insights into the character of the East and the West, may even clarify the character of the Soviet system of power and social control.

The systematic campaign of the leading Soviet ideologists, headed by Stalin himself, against the concept of Oriental society as a specific structural and operational system re-emphasizes the desirability of investigating this concept, which is rooted in the thought of such pioneer institutional analysts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as Adam Smith, Malthus, Richard Jones, James and John Stuart Mill, and—closely approaching them in this respect—Marx and Engels.

III

The great Eastern civilizations of the Old World—and also the higher agrarian civilizations of pre-Columbian America—differed profoundly from the ancient and mediaeval developments in the West: In the first two mentioned areas governmental execution of certain vital functions of agriculture (primarily large-scale management of irrigation and defense against floods) involved a coordinated and autocratic system of social, political, and economic control. The semi-managerial states of Oriental society (or "hydraulic society" as I prefer to call it) differ operationally also from the mercantilistic governments of absolutistic Europe whose representatives encouraged and regulated rather than managed what they considered

the crucial spheres of contemporary economic life. Extending the range of Miliukov's formula beyond its original Russian realm, we may say that the Oriental state was "stronger than society," that is, stronger than the society's total nongovernmental forces.

On the managerial plane a much greater similarity exists between Oriental despotism and the U.S.S.R. In both cases autocratic governments perform essential economic tasks. But the Soviet state goes far beyond its Eastern predecessor. The technical difference between the predominantly agrarian Orient and the increasingly industrialized Russian society is easily recognized; the difference in the range of managerial operation becomes apparent as soon as we comprehend the institutional meaning of Russia's first Five-Year Plan.

During the first decade of Bolshevik rule the Soviet state established managerial dominance over one decisive sector of the country's economy: its large-scale industry. In this vital branch it surpassed the corresponding ambitions of the governments of all hydraulic societies. Even the most active Oriental despotisms, while eager to handle the "heavy waterworks," left the greater part of production proper in the hands of private cultivators. During the second decade of Soviet power the state enlarged the scope of its management until it established its integrated direction over all major productive and circulatory activities both in industry and agriculture. Thus a system of total operational control was created, which is indeed without precedent in the history of mankind.

IV

The concept of Oriental society permits us to define the institutional pattern of the great Eastern civilizations and to recognize basic relations between Asiatic despotism and Soviet society. But the concept will be productive only to the extent that the search for structure is combined with an investigation of process. Its analytic potential will be exhausted only if our inter- and multi-area approach is not merely institutional and typological, but dynamic and historical as well.

The heuristic potential of the concept of Oriental society

may be tested, among other things, by examining briefly certain key aspects in the historical and structural relations between two focal world areas of today: Russia and Asia.

Whatever may have been the influence of Russia on Asia before 1917—and this influence was by no means negligible—it is for this period that the reverse process, because of its effect on Russia's institutional history, requires special consideration.

European Russia never had a political economy of the Asiatic, hydraulic type; and a crude economic approach could therefore dismiss the problem of relationship before submitting the area to a broader comparative test. However, a pertinent historical parallel warns us against a hasty negative decision. During the later period of Byzantine history, government-controlled heavy water-works were practically non-existent in the shrunken territories of the Eastern Roman Empire. Nevertheless, this empire maintained its centralized bureaucratic despotism for more than eight hundred years after the Arabs had deprived it of all its important hydraulic provinces.

The Byzantine development and many analogous instances suggest that Oriental society, like feudal Europe and modern industrial society, is a very complex tissue, including centers of high institutional density and a variety of marginal and submarginal border zones. Was Russian society marginally Oriental before the Mongol conquest and during the so-called Kievan period? Or did it shift from a submarginal to a marginal Oriental position under the impact of Mongol domination?

V

If these questions are valid, then scholars familiar with the character of Oriental institutions should have an essential contribution to make. However, the Orientologist who is challenged to investigate the Asiatic potential of Russian society is drawn into a new field of empirical research. He must therefore proceed cautiously and in close cooperation with Russian area specialists.

As stated above, the society of pre-Mongol Russia lacked the

productive peculiarities of Oriental despotism altogether; and its acquisitive fiscal methods were Oriental only in the range of the government claim: they were not implemented by the coercive devices of a strong autocratic state. Thus Oriental trends were by no means absent in pre-Mongol Russia. But these trends were too weak to make early Russia marginally Oriental.

Russia crossed the institutional watershed when, under Mongol rule, from the middle of the thirteenth century to the end of the fifteenth century, it was part of a marginal Oriental empire. It was during this lengthy period of the Mongol Yoke—a period which, for a number of reasons, has been slighted by most investigators—that the coercive and acquisitive techniques of Eastern statecraft were vigorously imposed, making possible the consolidation of an Orientally autocratic and bureaucratic system of government and society.

The struggle between bureaucratic and proprietary interests was by no means confined to Russia. But nowhere in Central or Western Europe did an absolutistic state succeed in gaining control over the major portion of all land and in making possession of large estates depend upon full-time, life-long, and unconditional government service. The Muscovite autocrats were able to achieve all this. State-attached "serving men" constituted a ruling class with primary bureaucratic and secondary proprietary interests, radically unlike the nobility of Mediaeval and post-Mediaeval Europe, but strikingly similar to corresponding strata in certain periods of Asiatic history, such as Chou China, Mogul India, and Osman Turkey.

VI

How did the dominantly, if marginally, Oriental Russian state approach the problem of industrialization which became urgent under and after Peter the Great? It has been frequently asserted that, during this formative period, Russia's large-scale industry was primarily based on commandeered serf labor, forced labor; and this statement appears to be correct. Another aspect of the matter, however, the extent of government management, has not been so clearly defined. Taking Russia's

eighteenth-century large-scale industry in its entirety and considering heavy as well as light industry, one may say with a high degree of certainty that this industry was not only based on forced labor, but that it was also predominantly managed—not just supported or regulated, but managed—by the Tsarist bureaucracy.

VII

In the marginal Oriental despotisms of Byzantium and Osman Turkey, the representatives of the state "apparatus" maintained their dominant position and protected their vested interests, despite the considerable development of private property both in land and capital. Did the officeholders of the Russian autocracy proceed similarly from 1762 to 1917—that is, over a period in which large private property in land was fully established and in which there appeared an ever-increasing number of capitalistic private enterprises?

It is my considered opinion—an opinion which I submit to the area specialists for critical examination—that, after the Emancipation, the Tsarist state and its bureaucracy, far from being forced into a secondary position, succeeded in modernizing and maintaining its dominant place in Russian society. The Tsarist bureaucracy withheld from the landed nobility a large portion of the redemption money promised in the Emancipation settlement; and the same group, which effectively protected its bureaucratic interest, made little effort to prevent the rapid decline of its proprietary land-owning wing. According to the official statistics, which have been carefully interpreted by such experts as Geroid T. Robinson, the nobility lost about one-third of all its post-Emancipation land from the 'seventies to 1905 and more than forty per cent by 1914. At the same time, the acquisitive power of the bureaucracy over the villages remained unshaken. During the last decades of the nineteenth century the Russian government, by direct or indirect taxes, seems to have taken from the peasants practically the whole of their agricultural produce proper—almost fifty per cent of the entire peasant income.

In a country rich in industrial raw materials and labor power, any encouragement of private initiative was bound to

show spectacular results. The Tsarist bureaucracy, historically unprepared to assume over-all managerial leadership, encouraged private capital to operate in practically all branches of the country's changing economy. The proprietary and entrepreneurial upsurge was paralleled by a burst of creative energy in many intellectual fields and by the growth of legal institutions providing the individual with elementary means of protection against the autocratic "monster."

But the hegemony of the state apparatus continued to restrict the position of the Russian bourgeoisie. The native capitalists had to share their influence with foreign capitalists whose investments, in turn, were guaranteed and channelled by special agencies of the Tsarist government.

The bureaucratic methods of economic control were as manifold as they were effective. At the beginning of the twentieth century the greater part of the Russian railroad system was managed by the government. In addition, and different from Western European conditions, the Tsarist state "apparatus" exerted direct fiscal control over the very substantial monopoly industries which constituted almost thirty per cent of the country's light industry. It also exerted considerable influence over the non-monopoly light industry, a third of which depended on government-guaranteed foreign investments. In the core of heavy industry, mining, the state-directed foreign funds reached seventy per cent of all capital in 1900 and no less than ninety per cent on the eve of World War I.

These facts indicate the strategic financial position of the Tsarist regime in the Russian economy of the early twentieth century. The Soviet academician Lyashchenko expresses only a generally held opinion when he says that the organization of the Russian banking system "differed materially from the bank system of the Western capitalist countries. . . . The state bank was the central bank of the entire Russian credit system," and the director of the credit department of the treasury "controlled the entire finance apparatus of the country."

It is interesting that the official Soviet ideology which, following Lenin's concept of finance capital and industrial monopoly, stresses the crucial importance of credit control in the economic, social, and political developments of the West

has failed to apply this key thesis to its own historical background: pre-revolutionary Tsarist Russia. If Lenin and his adherents had been consistent, they would have pointed out that the Tsarist apparatus and its representatives were the dominant force in Russia's growing industrial order.

Lenin's interpretation of the role of modern finance capital is open to argument. But many social scientists who do not accept Lenin's (and Hilferding's) theory agree that credit control is a significant index of the power structure in modern economy. Evaluating the relation between bureaucratic and (private) proprietary forces in Russian society during the decades prior to the Bolshevik revolution, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Russian government and its bureaucratic representatives continued to be "stronger than society," and that even at the beginning of the twentieth century Russian capitalism was still under the shadow of a quasi-Asiatic government machine. Lenin in 1905 bluntly called Russian capitalism "Asiatic."

These facts explain the relative weakness of Russia's modern industrial middle classes—and for that matter also the lack of a strong and democratic labor movement. They also give a specific "Asiatic" meaning to the alarmed statement made by the aging Lenin (in the winter of 1922) that the new Soviet state apparatus was nothing but the old apparatus painted over afresh.

VIII

In stressing the genetic and structural relation between traditional Russia and Oriental despotism, I do not mean to imply that an *apparatchik* society of the Soviet type may arise only within the orbit or at the periphery of the Oriental world. Unfortunately there is no absolute historical guarantee against the emergence of such a society in the West or in any other area of the globe. But in the West the dice are not loaded as they were in semi-(or quasi-) Asiatic Russia. In the West the historical situation is open. It offers all anti-totalitarian forces of society the opportunity to make a genuine institutional choice.

Another lesson of an essentially theoretical nature may be derived from the historical data brought to light by a comparative inter-and multi-area analysis of Russia and Asia. The total managerial *apparatchik* society of the U.S.S.R., although not identical with the agrarian and semi-managerial bureaucratic societies of the Orient, is definitely related to these societies. If we restrict our observations to Western experience, then Stalin is correct in claiming that the Soviet state has no historical precedent. If, however, we draw upon the total institutional experience of mankind, then we are scientifically justified in claiming the genetic and structural affinity of the new Russian system of power to the semi-managerial autocracies of Oriental despotism.¹ Then we also have no difficulty in understanding the frantic efforts of the Soviet ideologists to destroy the theory of Oriental society (or "Asiatic society" or the "Asiatic mode of production"), a theory which is based on the empirically proved existence of an economically functional state and a bureaucracy as a ruling class.

¹A student of contemporary Russia, who, however tentatively, grants the validity of this claim, is methodologically bound to ask whether knowledge of the basic features of Oriental society is imperative for the analysis of the U.S.S.R. The question has an institutional as well as a genetic aspect; and each requires a separate answer.

Soviet society as an institutional phenomenon may, of course, be approached exclusively on the basis of Western experience and with purely Western criteria. But it soon becomes apparent that the traditional Western concepts are inadequate. They have to be modified or replaced by categories which take into account the peculiarities of a functional (managerial) state and the autocratic rule of the masters of such a state. Investigation of these phenomena may be greatly aided by comparison with related conditions; and in this respect the institutions of Asia are infinitely more suggestive than those of Western antiquity, feudalism, or absolutism.

Thus knowledge of Oriental society is an effective supplementary, though not a necessary, research tool for the analysis of the character of Soviet society. For the study of the genesis of this society it is essential. Whether or not we assume that until 1917 the Tsarist bureaucracy maintained a quasi- (or "semi-") Oriental hegemony over Russian society, the impact of Asia upon Russia's political, economic, and social development is too fully documented to be disregarded by serious scholarship; and the quality and dimension of the Asiatic impact can obviously be determined only by an analyst familiar with the institutional conditions that prevail in the centers and along the marginal and submarginal periphery of Oriental society.

As indicated above, the genetic analysis of the Soviet Union has fateful implications for the entire non-Soviet part of the globe. Did the Russian *apparatchik* society originate under circumstances similar to those of the West? Or was the growth of this society strongly—and perhaps decisively—encouraged by a peculiar "Asiatic" background that existed in Russia, but that was entirely, or almost entirely, absent in the property-based countries of the modern industrial world? This question cannot even be properly posed, and still less can it be properly answered, without a full knowledge of the character, the morphological shades, and the historical influence of Oriental society.

market

IX

Endeavoring to define the institutional heritage of modern Russia, I have so far discussed only Asia's institutional impact on Russia. Turning to the contemporary scene, Russia's impact on Asia assumes outstanding significance. After 1917, Russia became a closed society, much more tightly closed than the semi-open or open societies of the West and more tightly closed even than the Oriental societies of Asia which are today in various stages of dissolution and transformation. Whoever seeks to define the relations between the Soviet Union and a given foreign country must inspect both the basically new pattern of all Soviet relations with the non-Soviet world and the institutional vulnerability of the particular non-Soviet state under observation.

Soviet relations with other nations proceed on many levels. Some resemble at least externally the relations existing between non-Soviet countries (commercial intercourse, for example). Others are strikingly modified (diplomatic relations, for example). And still others are entirely new in content and largely new also in operational techniques (the spread of Soviet ideas fostered by a carefully integrated system of ideological engineering and the promotion of activities favorable to the interests of the U.S.S.R. through well-organized groups of Communists and their overt and covert aides and allies). An attempt to study the relations between the U.S.S.R. and any larger or smaller country from the compartmentalized standpoint of traditional diplomatic or economic relations is therefore doomed to failure. It can yield only a deficient and distorted picture of the real state of affairs.

To mention but one instance: It is difficult to imagine anything less revealing than the frequently heard account of the relations between the Soviet Union and Germany in the critical years before Hitler came to power. From 1931 to 1933 the Russian Politburo influenced Germany's inner development decisively, and it did so through the medium of a large and disciplined group of Germans who were ready to carry out directives emanating from the Comintern—that is, in the last analysis, from the leaders of the Russian state.

Of course, powerful nations have always used the internal conflicts of other nations to influence their domestic and foreign policy. But in the case of pre-Hitler Germany, the Soviet Union employed this time-honored device with unique effectiveness, because it could exploit to the limit Germany's social and political weaknesses and tensions. On the diplomatic and military level, the Kremlin encouraged the anti-Versailles aspirations of German nationalism, while, through the medium of the Comintern, it involved the German Communist Party in a fratricidal struggle against the Social Democrats, who were attacked as "Social Fascists," the "main enemy," and the "main support" of the bourgeoisie. This multiple policy was eminently successful in paralyzing the anti-Fascist energies of the German labor movement, in paving Hitler's road to victory, and in preparing the anti-Versailles war which—after a series of complex developments—was unleashed in 1939 through the Russo-German pact, the triumphant continuation of the Kremlin's earlier German policy.

By necessity I am oversimplifying a very intricate process. But I feel justified in asserting that the birth of Hitler Germany will never be satisfactorily explained unless the relations between Weimar Germany and the U.S.S.R. (including Russia's Comintern policy prior to Hitler's victory) are approached through an adequate type of area and inter-area study.

X

Events similar in importance to those preceding Hitler's rise to power occurred in the Far East during the years just prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. The establishment of a united front by the Nationalist (Kuo-min-tang) Government and the Chinese Communists initiated Chinese resistance to Japanese aggression. And the form in which, under the conditions of the united front, the Chinese conducted their war of resistance immensely facilitated the Communist penetration of rural China—a penetration which proved essential for the last phase of the Chinese civil war and the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek on the continent.

How did the united front between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalist government come into being? It is one of the standard legends of contemporary history that the Chinese Communists under the impact of Japanese aggression discovered the need for a broad "national" united front, that they made their first all-out offer in 1935 "in the heat of civil war," and that their new policy was determined, as a frequently quoted author writes, "by the will of the Chinese people." Actually this offer was first proclaimed, not in the heat of the Chinese civil war, but in the heat of a conference hall in Moscow. The Chinese Communists changed their political line not in response to the will of the Chinese people but in accordance with the directives of the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, that is, in the last analysis, by the will of the Russian government.

To be sure, there was no lack of sharp and early anti-Japanese pronouncements by the Chinese Communists; but until 1935, the Communist fight against Japan was subordinated to the fight against Chiang Kai-shek. The occupation of Manchuria (China's potential Ruhr) in 1931, did not lead to the demand for an all inclusive anti-Japanese United Front. During the early 'thirties, the U.S.S.R. pursued a policy which in Germany aimed at securing an anti-Versailles government and in East Asia tried to conciliate Japan. It was only in the year 1934—when the Soviet regime became convinced that, instead of turning westward, Hitler threatened the U.S.S.R., when the Soviet efforts to conclude a non-aggression pact with Japan failed completely, and when a Russo-Japanese war seemed highly probable—that a militantly hostile attitude toward Germany and toward Japan became the outstanding feature of Russia's international strategy. In 1935 a United Front policy that had received its first test in France was proclaimed as a new global strategy. Now the German Communists began to criticize as sectarian their previous attitudes toward the Social Democrats and Hitler—attitudes which had been determined in Moscow and not in Berlin. Now the Chinese Communist Party suddenly discovered the sectarian errors they had committed in the first years of Japanese aggression.

The Chinese speakers, who greeted the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern in its opening session, still stuck naively to the old anti-Kuo-min-tang line. It was only on August 2, the day when Dimitrov solemnly announced the new United Front policy, that the political attitude of the Chinese Communist Party was radically reshaped. On August 7, Wang Ming, speaking for the Chinese delegation, made his dramatic appeal for a Chinese United Front, stretching out his hand not only to all genuinely anti-Japanese elements within the Nationalist government but also to the heretofore particularly hated members of Chiang Kai-shek's secret police, the Blue Shirts. And so unexpected was the change-over that even after Dimitrov and Wang Ming had laid down the new line, several Chinese speakers—obviously using manuscripts prepared before the second of August—continued to appeal for an uncompromising struggle against Chiang Kai-shek and his "fascist" regime.

XI

Russia's China policy from 1935-37, as expressed in Soviet relations to the Chiang Kai-shek government on the one hand and to the Chinese Communists on the other, provides the institutional analyst with material for a singularly rewarding case study. The conclusion of the anti-Comintern Pact in the late fall of 1936 evidently confirmed the Russian Politburo's conviction that a Kuo-min-tang-Communist coalition ready to go to war against Japan was urgently needed. The arrest of Chiang Kai-shek by the Manchurian Nationalist general, Chang Hsueh-liang, in December 1936 enabled the Kremlin to demonstrate to the Nanking government beyond the possibility of doubt the sincerity of its desire for a *de facto* alliance against Japan. The American White Book on China reports a conversation held in 1945, in which Molotov proudly takes credit for Russia's role in the freeing of Chiang Kai-shek. Molotov claimed that "due to the political and moral support of the Soviet government, Chiang had been allowed to return to the seat of his government."

In the light of Russia's grand strategy, the temporary and tactical transformation of the Chinese Communist Party into

"agrarian reformers" becomes spectacularly meaningful. As early as 1936 Mao Tse-tung offered to modify the Communist attitude on the land question and other vital issues. But the new policy was not immediately or unconditionally put into operation; it became the decisive price for the "national" United Front and open resistance against Japan. Said Mao Tse-tung in August 1936, "If and when the formation of a United Front with Nanking is realized, that problem [the new agrarian policy] can be easily settled." Only on September 22, 1937, that is, after the Nanking government had taken up arms against the Japanese, did the Chinese Communists officially initiate their "reform" policy. Later Mao Tse-tung clearly defined the strategic purpose of this conciliatory step. Was the concession wrong? No. "The concession [was] right; it precipitated the Kuo-min-tang's participation in the anti-Japanese war."

XII

I am tracing these destiny-ridden inter-area developments, not to portray the Chinese Communists as helpless agents and pitiful victims of a Soviet policy which one-sidedly benefited the U.S.S.R. without profiting the Chinese Communist movement. The actual relations between the non-Russian Communist parties and the Soviet government are far more complicated than that. In my opinion, Communist China emerged after World War II not as a Soviet vassal, but as a supervised and guided junior partner in a colossal Eurasian Communist Axis.

But however we may evaluate the present position of the Chinese Communists, we certainly must remember that it was through their subordination to the Moscow directives that Mao Tse-tung and his followers learned to exhaust, technically and organizationally, the opportunities offered by the national and international conditions in the Far East during the fateful 'thirties and 'forties. No doubt the great majority of the Chinese people is being forced into submission by an increasingly coercive *apparatchik* society. But the masters of the new Chinese apparatus of political and economic control, who in many ways depend on the masters of the Russian totali-

tarian heartland, have under Moscow's direction achieved a colossal victory, a victory hardly conceivable in political, ideological, and technical isolation.

XIII

The underlying problems have far-reaching ramifications. I trust that sooner or later they will be investigated fully and systematically. At this time I should like to conclude with a few suggestions which are offered not as dogmatic certainties, but as working hypotheses that have been subjected to a preliminary testing.

1) The relations between any non-Russian sub-area of the Communist-controlled world and the U.S.S.R. must be studied within a frame of reference that takes into account the institutional background of the area in question, the specific conditions attending the rise of the Communist regime under inquiry, and the basic character and needs of its incipient or fully developed *apparatchik* society. References to political Titoism are apt to be misleading, if they are put forth as substitutes for an institutional investigation of the special sub-area and the general Kremlin-inspired patterns of power, privilege, and vested interest. Compartmentalized studies of the Chinese Communists are as deficient as are vague statements regarding their "ideological" ties to an undefined Soviet society. A junior member of the new super-axis is no vassal, although the U.S.S.R. may in time succeed in reducing it to that status. Conflicts and tensions between Communist sub-areas and the Soviet heartland are frequently severe—the history of Communism abounds with genuine and grim conflicts—but Titoism is only one among several forms of disagreement.

The possible conflicts between the strongest and the weaker members of a totalitarian axis present problems of a peculiar kind. The fascist Axis was a much less homogeneous institutional, ideological, and operational phenomenon than is the present Eurasian Communist Axis. This being so, it is all the more necessary to remember that, despite great frictions and even outright acts of betrayal, Mussolini eventually dropped

his neutrality to fight on the side of Hitler with whose regime fascist Italy was connected by vital ties of institutional similarity and socio-political interests.

2) Turning from the Soviet-controlled part of the globe to the non-Soviet world and to the structural and operational relations between these two gigantic super-areas, we are again faced with the danger of over-compartmentalizing. What is the actual weight of any individual technological, economic, military, or ideological factor in the societal whole to which it belongs, and how is it related to analogous factors that, although of the same kind, appear in profoundly different institutional settings?

Chingis Khan's economic potential was crude and inferior: the Mongols probably never produced as many calories as did the great agrarian society of China; and his tribesmen lacked the great walls, fortified cities, and war machines of their Chinese neighbors. But only an ostrich-strategist can console himself by stressing aspects of subsistence economies, when the relative total strengths of antagonistic power economies are at issue. A grand strategy aimed at containing Chingis Khan's expansion potential had to consider many factors besides the number of calories produced and the extent of individual technological achievement.

3) Analysis of the institutional stability of the present-day international situation is bound to disclose a variety of conflicts, cold-war fronts, and methods of coercion and aggression that cannot be understood by invoking obsolete criteria of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Machiavelli was struck by the relative openness of feudal France, which made it easy to approach dissatisfied elements of the French nobility and to play them against their government. He was equally struck by the political inaccessibility of the greatest near-by representative of Oriental despotism: Osman Turkey. Even if an outside force could find sympathetic friends among the Turkish subjects (Machiavelli was not yet familiar with the term "Fifth Columnists"), the nature of Turkey's centralized autocracy all but prevented such friends from engaging in any effective action against the hated regime.

XIV

Translating this historical experience into the language of modern area research, I suggest that susceptibility to foreign penetration and staying power under the impact of a new type of crisis—involving new pressures, new attractions, and new patterns of deceit—be given priority over problems that twenty or fifty years ago would have been considered relevant and even primary fields of inquiry. This is of crucial importance not only for studies of pre-Communist and Communist China, and for the adjacent areas of Southeast Asia and Japan, but also for India and Africa, for the various sub-areas of Western Europe, for Latin America, and even for our United States.

Examining Point Four of President Truman's international program, it is obvious that even America is neither rich enough nor secure enough to spend its resources abroad indiscriminately and without considering the topography of the global conflict and the to-be-expected political earthquakes and conflagrations. For the time being, only a politically focussed and integrated aid to economically under-developed areas can be responsibly recommended. The same holds true for our future area and inter-area studies: Only a focussed approach that is fully aware of the existing institutional, socio-economic, political, and ideological conflicts and to-be-expected convulsions can respond appropriately to the realities of the world situation.