

Adheses
Papers

Steiner

CHAGGA TRUTH

A NOTE ON GUTMANN'S ACCOUNT OF THE CHAGGA CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN *DAS RECHT DER DSCHAGGA*¹

FRANZ BAERMANN STEINER

GUTMANN'S *Das Recht der Dschagga* is one of the classics of anthropology, for it is based on that sound and valid knowledge of a people which, even when outdated, sets standards for knowledge and its presentation. Here I wish to consider only one of the most stimulating chapters of the book, that containing Gutmann's analysis of Chagga concepts of truth, veracity, lying, and feeling guilty.

Before turning to a critical appreciation of this Chagga material, I should like to outline, as briefly as possible, my own viewpoint. First, I must insist that any concept of truth to which observable behaviour relates and which can thereby be made the object of sociological study, is something very different from a logician's concept of truth. I do *not* mean by this that the Westerner, holding the logician's concept of truth, finds among the Chagga another and incompatible sort of concept.

Secondly, truth has many meanings in any society. If we, for instance, were to ask a neo-positivist logician about truth, we should be told that truth is a substantive which ought to be avoided: this substantive is abstracted from statements about properties of verified statements; it is sense to talk about true statements; it is nonsense to talk about the truth; furthermore, there is an emotional residue in 'truth' which has nothing to do with verification. Agreed. But this 'emotional residue' is of interest to the sociologist. It is a social reality, while logical properties of statements are not. As anthropologists we are interested in the social reality of 'truth' rather than in its logical connexion with verification. The logician may restrict himself, but the anthropologist is concerned with all the applications of 'truth' in a given society, and in simpler societies—the Chagga are a case in point—he finds it connected with the institution of the oath and he finds oath, vow, and swearing concerned in the formation of jural relationships and in legal procedure.

Here again there are significant variations in emphasis. The Greek word *ἀλήθεια* in itself means non-forgetting, and it refers to the exact rendition of a past event. The Hebrew oath as mentioned in the Bible refers in most cases to the future: the person committing himself to the formality declares that he will do something and, when he has actually done it, the word is true; but there is neither truth nor falsehood in words when they are uttered.

Witnessing is another context of truth. While today—I do not want to go into the procedure of Roman law—the witness is the eyewitness, an instrument of verification, in other societies he is nothing of the sort: he helps to establish 'truth' because no 'verification' is possible. This latter attitude to witnessing prevails to some extent even in our approach to verification. No statement of one of the parties is evidence,

¹ This note formed part of a paper read by the late Dr. F. B. Steiner at Oxford in 1949. It has been prepared for publication by Dr. Laura Bohannon

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while the statements of witnesses are evidence, although from a logical, and not a contextual viewpoint, they need verification and are different from objects which judge and court can directly examine and 'witness' themselves.

In many types of legal procedure the place of the verifying witness is taken by persons who, under oath, declare their solidarity with one of the parties and his statements. Thereby the character of their assertion is changed, and it must call forth a different reaction. This change lies in social reality and not in the logical properties of the statement. We know witnessing of this type from Teutonic and Celtic Europe and also from African societies, for example, the Bogos of Eritrea.¹

Witnessing and the oath are interdependent in a very significant way. The oath invokes as witness (usually not as an eyewitness) a person, a great power, or a powerful being: with some Africans, it is the chief or the king; with others it is a divine power; with some Siberian tribes it was the dangerous bear in the forest. This power would then become hostile to the oath-taker if his claims to the power's solidarity were unwarranted. Functionally, such an oath is an abridged ordeal.

We can thus see that truth and verification are not the same. We can also see that there are at least two groups of truth concepts: the one relating to a change in the social reality of a statement, the other to the degree of applicability of a myth to one or more situations of life. The difference between the two is plainly visible when one considers how they have been fused together in the Pentateuch (Ex. xxxv, xxx, xxxi) to create absolute truth. There the centre of religious life is what the text calls *ohel mo'ed*, which is usually translated as 'tabernacle'. *Ohel* means tent and nothing more. *Mo'ed* occurs in this context alone and is therefore much discussed. Rosenzweig—the philosopher and collaborator in the Buber translation of the Hebrew Bible—has written an interesting essay on the translatability of a group of terms including this phrase. *Mo'ed* is apparently derived from the same root as 'od', 'still', 'yet', 'ad', 'till', and 'ed', 'witness'. Other derivatives of the word occur in statements about what happens inside the Holy of Holies: the shrine of 'edut', 'witness?'; and about the perpetuated *hivva'ed*, action of God, i.e. 'his making himself present as a witness'. It means that in the tent of witness the God bears witness to himself for man, with the help of the shrine of witness which contains the law, the paramount social reality.² The manifestation of the God of the People is thus explained in terms of jural truth, and thereby jural truth and mythical truth become one.

Through the identification of the Greek truth of the past and the Hebrew truth of the future, European truth achieved a timeless quality. The acceptance of Absolute Truth in turn made possible mystical truth, which is identified with life and with the way to the absolute, all three being one and accepted as the incarnate God. Then, with the secularization of religion in the West, truth as absolute was misapplied to scientific statements and theories, which seek verification only in order to lead to further verifiable statements and theories. After this had been accomplished, the completely perverted question was asked, whether this absolute truth—now attributed to science—could be found in religion as well.

A full understanding of the nature of truth, in the sense in which I use the word, will be attained only after studies by many people who are experts both in com-

¹ Vinogradoff, 1920, pp. 318 and 330. Grönbech, 1931, vols. i and ii, *passim*. Münzinger, 1859.

² Buber and Rosenzweig, 1936, p. 126.

parative religion and comparative jurisprudence. Here I have outlined merely what I think the necessary equipment for an investigation into the truth concepts of a simple society.

To describe Chagga concepts of truth and lie, Gutmann deals first with these words and indicates the contexts in which they are used.¹ This method was rare enough when he wrote, and we can only wish he had devoted more than a few paragraphs to it. Unfortunately, he is most concerned with eliciting meaning from common derivation, and some error consequently creeps into the investigation. It is one thing to enumerate the various contexts in which a word is used at any one time and to derive the meaning of the word from the sum total of its associations. It is quite another thing to relate words in terms of their common derivation as I have just done with some words in the Pentateuch. Once a word has been separated from its associates, its separate existence and usage are a significant part of the current mode of thought and expression. An investigation of current concepts may then be obscured by the philological approach. For example, an historical study of the word 'litter' would give us little relevant information on the connexion, if any, between British attitudes to birth-control and the Anti-Litter League concerned with keeping Britain tidy.

The Chagga call a completely reliable statement *lohi* or *lai*. *Ki lohi*: this is true. *Kja lohi*: to speak true. The related verb *iloha* refers to actions of magic designed to damage another person. Gutmann therefore assumes that the original meaning of the *lohi* group is 'to utter incantations'. One can, however, avoid the derivational approach and say, from Gutmann's data, that the *lohi* group implies incantation and response to it: the binding and the bound word. Gutmann does, however, qualify his statement by saying that the 'oath character' of *lohi* is still felt. He tells us: 'For this reason members of the Moshi District who had become Christians, several times said they would like to have not only the chiefs' oath formula, *so mangi*, together with its associated variations, but also the word *lohi* banned from Christian speech usage.'²

There are three words that can be used for 'report, message, statement': *mboni* from *ivona*, to see, to say what one has seen; *sumu* from *isuma*, to dig out. The phrase *isuma mboni* means 'to transmit a detailed account of a fully grasped group of circumstances'. The third word, *oloho*, is a rarer form from the *lohi* family of words.

All these words seem, to us, to imply veracity of statement; consequently, one interesting feature of their usage is that only *lohi* words are felt as opposites to something that is not true. *Sumu*, the seen, for example, does not stand as antonym to some other word. Still more interesting, *lohi* seems to have two alternatives. One, connected with the Swahili *uwongo*, lie, has a curious field of meaning: *yongwo*, to make public; *mhanbo*, mere rumour. The chief meaning of *wongo*, according to Gutmann, is 'mere talk' (*Cerede*);³ perhaps he means informal talk. But the opposite of *ki loha*, 'this is true', is *ki wongo*. One wonders whether Gutmann is justified in translating it, as he does, by 'It's a lie'.⁴ The other word, or rather usage, is a composition of *wongo*, talk, and *wumvu*, fear: to talk out of fear; an intentional lie. Talk influenced by fear and the statement of jural relevance are thus opposites. Again Gutmann gauges

¹ Most of the data to which Dr. Steiner refers occur in Part VI: *Der Sprachrasen und die Einzelreste* (pp. 689-735), and particularly in the section *Die Lüge* (pp. 702-25), Gutmann, 1926. [L. B.]

² *Ibid.*, p. 703.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 702.

⁴ *Ibid.*

the field of meaning of *wonny*, fear, with the help of related words meaning to escape, extricate oneself; one word is used of reptiles throwing off their skins.¹

The survey of Chagga truth concepts would not be complete without a mention of certain signals or signs—I hesitate to call them symbols, as they seem to me part of the language and in no way more symbolic than other parts of speech behaviour, though resisting verbal conceptualization both in Chagga and in our languages. I refer to certain ejaculations and to the use of the *Dracaena* leaf.

From the way in which this leaf is used we may deduce that it implies impersonal identification, serving as a mark of ownership without reference to individuals. I will select three of its uses to illustrate this point.

The clan copses where the ancestor shrines are to be found are clan property. Clan members may do things there which other people may not; they may even cut wood. But when people bearing arms cross their own clan copse, they must attach *Dracaena* leaves to their weapons. Apparently no awe was felt during this procedure, which was not explained as a protective measure: it was the link between the clan's arms and the clan's ancestors. Every clan used the same leaves.²

When a man had been aggressive to another and had persuaded himself, or had been persuaded by others, that he was in the wrong, he would take an animal—goat, calf, or even cow—arrange a wreath of *Dracaena* leaves around the animal's neck, and take it as a present to the man he had wronged. This procedure made explanations unnecessary; it revealed the guilt and resolved it at the same time.³

When a man had a grudge against another and wanted to harm him, he would, when his enemy had become intoxicated at a feast, follow him to his hut and crouch outside to eavesdrop, in the hope that in his drunken state his enemy might grumble against or even curse the chief. If he did so, the eavesdropper plucked a *Dracaena* leaf, stuck it into the thatch of the hut and ran for another witness who had to join in his listening. When the case against the enemy is made fool-proof by the extra witness, the future accuser makes some nasty jeering noises. The enemy then leaves his hut, sees the *Dracaena* leaves and realizes his position. But even if the second witness had heard nothing, he would still swear to the words of the first witness, saying: 'I had been called for such and such a purpose; I saw the *Dracaena* leaf, but they had stopped speaking.'⁴ I suggest, therefore, that the use of this leaf is complementary to the *lohi* words and that one cannot be discussed without the other.

A witness in court merely agrees to the words of the party under oath. He speaks *lohi*. In addition an eyewitness identifies the man with ejaculations which do not identify individuals and do not include names. Such ejaculations are: 'You, I am holding you!', or 'I have seen you are caught!' These ejaculations are regarded as important, but they do not belong to the words sworn to. They refer to a reality of a different relevance and establish a relation between the accused and the witness, not between the witness and the court.⁵

Gutmann devoted many pages to the defence of his Chagga against European statements that they are constantly lying. He does so on psychological grounds, speaking of bullying officials and the defence mechanisms of the individual soul. But clearly the *Dracaena* leaf and *lohi* obtain apart from the culture contact situations to

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 709 ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 618 f.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 308-9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 605 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 615-17.

which Gutmann's defence is relevant, and it is also clear that Chagga concepts of truth apply to contexts covered by the European concept of lying. For example, Gutmann describes the talks preceding law cases, when the clan members assemble and decide to stick to the version of their fellow clansman. All this is just talk, but the story to which they finally bind themselves is *lohi*.¹

Gutmann thus leads us a long way towards an analysis of truth concepts and their relation to structural situations. He stops at the threshold. I have actually over-elaborated some of his remarks, for I am convinced that they open a new approach to important problems.

Gutmann also contrasts the feeling of justice, which he very concisely describes, with the love of fairness. He recognizes these as two different principles, and again moves towards a structural arrangement of these matters and again stops short. His material shows that fairness concepts predominate in the jural relationships between chief and clans and that they have no place in clan law, the harshness of which he rather deplures.²

His very human analysis of what could be called Chagga conscience shows that here too there are two different spheres. One is that of clan conscience. When a man has wronged or murdered, without being found out, a member of another clan, he makes a dying confession to his kin so that they may compose the matter. But he does so as a concession to clan interests, not through his fear of death.³ Individual conscience, which acts upon a man who has not the backing of his clan, is quite another matter. Here too Gutmann, although he does not go very far in his comparison of conscience types and structural situations, shows what could be done by relating a people's institutions to the individual.

I wish to conclude with Gutmann's analysis of a crucial phrase which for him sums up the Chagga householder's feeling of frustration brought on by his own misbehaviour: 'The posts of my house are hitting me.'⁴ A similar phrase was used in olden times of Chagga life and strife. When raiding parties had overrun a district and the inhabitants had in advance taken their cattle and valuables into safety, leaving only houses for the raiders to burn, the strange and lonely country-side made the raiders feel awkward. To describe this sensation, one said: 'The banana-plants are beginning to hit them.' When a speaker came up to the war-leader to persuade him to return, he said simply: 'The banana-plants are hitting the men.' After this announcement retreat was usually ordered. The enemy was defeated not by armed strength but by the emptiness of a man-made landscape. The banana-plants implied agriculture and an ordered life; but they were seen in a frustrating and alien emptiness.

When the householder himself had gone astray in his ways, overreached himself, or quarrelled with kinsfolk it was not the alien land which turned against him, but the very texture of his most familiar retreat proved alien land. His house, everywhere the symbol of a man's safety and independence, is not after all his own; it is built with the consent, help, and blessing of his kinsmen, and important house-building ceremonies testify to this interdependence. If a man alienates himself from the source of solidarity, he feels lonely where he was supposed to be independent.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 706.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 716 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 689-96 and *passim*.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 730 ff.

When I read these passages in Gutmann's book, I felt that very few of us can aspire to so profound a knowledge of another people's thought. In this as in many other chapters, I felt that more important—as human achievement—than the author's analytical work was this vast formulated knowledge and insight.

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Résumé

LA VÉRITÉ CHAGGA

L'AUTEUR examine les idées de la vérité, du mensonge, et de la coupabilité qui ont été développées par Gutmann dans ses études du peuple chagga. Il fait une distinction entre le concept du logicien concernant la vérité comme une abstraction à laquelle il arrive par l'analyse de la qualité de déclarations véridiques, c'est-à-dire susceptibles d'être vérifiées, et la réalité sociale de la vérité au sein d'une société déterminée, qui n'est pas la même chose que la vérification. L'institution du serment et la nature du témoignage sont liées au concept de la vérité sociale. Dans l'Ancien Testament l'aspect religieux ou mythique de la vérité a été amalgamé avec l'aspect juridique, afin de créer la vérité absolue; dans la pensée européenne le concept de la vérité absolue a été mal appliqué aux déclarations et aux théories scientifiques.

Gutmann parvient à une définition des concepts chagga de la vérité et du mensonge par l'examen des dérivations des mots qui sont employés et de leurs associations et contextes. Il constate une corrélation entre la parole et les déclarations véridiques d'une part, et les serments d'autre part. Parmi le peuple chagga certains gestes et exclamations ont un rapport avec leur concept de la vérité; par exemple, l'emploi d'une feuille de dragonnier (*Dracaena*) par un délinquant pour exprimer son sentiment de coupabilité, ou par un accusateur afin de fournir une preuve de la coupabilité de la part de l'accusé. Gutmann indique le moyen d'analyser les concepts de la vérité et du mensonge par rapport aux circonstances structurelles; toutefois, il n'en développe pas l'idée. Il reconnaît, également, la distinction faite dans la pensée chagga entre la justice et le sentiment de l'équité et entre la conscience individuelle et la conscience du clan, mais il ne développe pas cette comparaison et il n'examine pas les rapports entre les institutions et les individus. La façon profonde dont Gutmann sait pénétrer la pensée du peuple chagga est surtout démontrée par son analyse de la phrase 'Les piliers de ma maison me frappent'. Le Chagga qui viole les règles du maintien social a le sentiment que sa propre maison, symbole de la sécurité et de l'indépendance de l'homme et de sa solidarité avec son groupe, lui est devenue étrangère et hostile.

Pirangi

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Pottery from the substance sphere is
accumulation comes; only from the
prestige sphere.

+ No catallactics!
The ultimate in "english" primitive economics. ??

Notes on Comparative Economics

FRANZ STEINER¹

land left out from list of objects!

ANTHROPOLOGISTS HAVE for some time known that wherever livestock is herded in large units, whether the animals be cattle, horses, camels or reindeer, the attitude of the owners to the value of the animals cannot be expressed merely in terms of utilization or exchange. A dialogue between a rich herdsman of the Yurak-Samoyede and a stranger poses the problem:

STRANGER: Sell me a reindeer!

YURAK: There is none for sale.

STRANGER: Why don't you take money? You may buy brandy with it.

YURAK: I have got brandy enough.

STRANGER: You may buy something for your womenfolk; or you may get furs of the arctic fox to use as bridewealth and get yourself another wife.

YURAK: I have got two sledges full of fox already.

STRANGER: You own 3,000 reindeer. What are you keeping them for?

YURAK: The reindeer wander about and I look at them. Money I have to hide, I cannot see it.²

Similar sayings of Lapplanders have been noted. Hatt points out that this "lust for ownership" stands in the way of a more intensive care for and utilization of animals.³ Herds become too big to be useful as far as labour and subsistence are concerned; they are an impediment to the owner. The same sentiments have been attributed to many a cattle-owning tribe in Africa.

It is the purpose of this article to investigate attitudes such as are here displayed with a view to discovering their implications for (1) the general interchangeability of goods (which underlies all trade), (2) the process of

¹ Late University Lecturer in Social Anthropology, Oxford University. This article was eventually to have been turned into a book on the economics of primitive peoples. It has been slightly edited by Paul Bohannan, and is one of a number of publications of Dr. Steiner's manuscripts being prepared by his friends and colleagues at the Institute of Social Anthropology, Oxford. It is published with permission of Dr. Steiner's literary executor, Dr. H. Adler.

² Lehtisalo, T., "Beiträge zur Kenntnis der Rentierzucht bei den Jura-Samoyeden", *Institute for Samoyedische Kulturforschung*, Series B, Vol. 16, Oslo, H. Aschehng & Co.

³ Hatt, Gudmund, "Notes on Reindeer Nomadism", *American Anthropological Association Memoirs*, Vol. VI, p. 117.

commerce?

On the contrary, the
Spec. of am goods
"trade as general
production
money
inter
exchange
of all goods"
"??"
paper money

All free exchange incorrect

increasing the utility of goods (which is the essence of all production as understood by Western economists), and (3) the classification of economics dependent primarily on exchange without the use of coin or paper money.

By an economy here is meant a system of production and distribution of units of value.¹ This is a very broad usage of the word.

I. TWO CATEGORIES OF NON-MONETARY ECONOMIC TYPES

Leaving aside the economy based on the extensive use of money and related to complex class structures, two widely representative types of economy may be distinguished. The first is characterized by the existence of three groups or categories of goods, always kept separate and distinct: raw materials, implements, and personal treasure. In the second type of economy, raw materials are not kept separate from the implements, and there is no class of goods which has value solely as personal treasure.

Foodstuff

In the first type, with its three groups of goods (1) foodstuffs and other raw materials, (2) implements, including everyday clothing, and (3) personal treasure, it is possible to make subdivisions according to the various relations which may be thought to exist between the items belonging to these various groups. For example, the objects of the second and third groups—implements and personal treasures—may or may not be exchanged for one another, depending on the ideas of the people involved, hence leading to different sub-types. By personal treasure we mean things valued by their owners, either because of their rarity or because of the memorably intensive attention given to them during their production. Examples of objects of this kind are the boomerangs made by some Australian aborigines, which are carved so beautifully that they are not used in hunting, or the magnificent "luxury bows" of the Andamans which are precious but are also not used, or the carvings of the Eskimoids—objects executed in hours of leisure and not related to religious life. These things are treasured by their owners, but no universal value attaches to them. Parallel cases are found in the animal kingdom, and in the human child.

are not raw materials

very queer

but not waste!!!

But all these sub-types have one decisive feature in common: the social unit, based on co-operation in the task of preserving the lives of the constituent members, is concerned in its organization only with the first group of goods. In so far as we can speak of the circulation of goods in these societies, it must be with regard to goods of the first group: foodstuffs and other raw materials. These goods may be gained in a common enterprise and then distributed, or they may be gained by the various sub-units (households, families) who distribute their surplus. The members of the society respond to the distribution by actions of solidarity enabling further production.

yes

redistributed

Whatever arrangements are made for the distribution of the raw materials once they are gained, two conditions are preserved: (1) no object belonging

what

arrested public works

¹ In the terminology of economics, this word "value" should probably read "utility"; the wording of the original has been retained.—P.B.

No
this stands for labor gain
Share out

WAS-1336

no equivalent linking food and artifacts

Subsistence economy

Disorganized

No surplus

No food

is marketed

Barter economies

U = E
R = E

pro-
money

Commodity money

cowrie
brass
iron bars

staples

to the first group is exchanged for objects belonging to either of the other groups—in fact, there is no value relation, no common value standard, between these groups. It follows, then, that (2) any object into which raw material has been transformed—be it a piece of meat cooked by the members of a household, or a tool or clothing—*ipso facto* is disengaged from what we may call the primary economic cycle. Thus, additional human labour, far from adding "value" to the thing, removes it from the economic sphere. This does not mean, of course, that these objects are not desired (that is, they have not lost "utility" in the terminology of Western economists): as presents they function in the creation of alliances, as loot they function in war. *No? Surplus*

No wealth is accumulated in such societies, no markets are held. It is only within the sphere of the primary economic cycle—that is, exchange of foodstuffs and raw materials—that market-like situations arise, if by that we mean that demand conditions the distribution. *And storage?*

In the economies of the second type, on the other hand, exchange of objects differentiated into different categories from raw materials are not so detached from the primary economic cycle. Subdivisions of this type are constituted by the various modes by which people integrate, classify and interrelate the different groups or categories of objects. The feature which is common to all economies of this second type is that they do not recognize merely personal treasures: treasures have either a generally recognized value bestowed upon them by ritual, or else they have a limited exchange value. Thus, broadly speaking, there are two kinds of objects present in economies of this type: those whose value is generally recognized and founded on usage, and those whose value is ritual, or at least non-utilitarian.

The value of those objects which is generally recognized and founded on their usage is called utilitarian value. Some of these objects may be used in exchanges as standard units of value—pots, iron bars and salt in Africa are examples. Such exchange goods are not only valued because of their prominent utilitarian function, but wherever they are used in this manner, they are not produced within the society. Their exchange character is based on steady supplies from alien centres of production. Such external monopolies function in the same way as does limited and controlled production within a society, perhaps by a privileged group. *Kanish cloth*

The whole group of objects may be expressed in symbolic terminology¹ as $U \pm E^n$, if we let U stand for "useful objects", \pm for "value" and E for "exchange". Thus, E^n comes to denote such useful objects (U's) as have standardized exchange properties. Thus in the same language we may distinguish barter, or the exchange of one useful object direct for another [$U \rightleftharpoons U$], from trade, which is exchange of a useful object for the exchangeability-of-a-useful-object [$U \rightleftharpoons E^n$], or the exchange of a useful object for the exchangeability-of-a-useful-object which is in turn exchanged for a different useful object [$U \rightleftharpoons E^n \rightleftharpoons U$].

¹ A glossary of symbols is appended at the end of the article.

The paper suffers from vagueness about (1) Trade and the function of market; (2) no distinction of money uses.

But shells are used as money ritual
 i.e. non-utilitarian **FRANZ STEINER** 121

The second group of objects comprises, among others, units of ritual value and such treasures as may be used in exchanges. No utilitarian value is attached to either. Thus "shell money" or "money" consisting of strips of plaited feathers differ from salt and iron "money". This second group of objects can be described as $R^+ E^+$, because there are units which have ritual [R] value $[+]$ or are exchangeable [E] treasures [t].

(B)
 "Prestige"
 goods
 trade =
 ??
 Commerce

Taking both groups $U^+ E^+$ and $R^+ E^+$ into consideration, further exchanges are possible: a useful object for exchangeability-of-treasure $[U \rightleftharpoons E^+]$, or a useful object exchanged for exchangeability-of-treasure which is in turn exchanged for another useful object $[U \rightleftharpoons E^+ \rightleftharpoons U]$. Both mean trade, whereas the exchange of the exchangeability-of-useful-objects for exchangeability-of-treasure $[E^+ \rightleftharpoons E^+]$ is a financial transaction akin to trade.

staple

II. TRANSLATION

? oh oh

We must be very careful to distinguish from all these transactions of barter or trade, another exchange—that of a useful object for a ritual object $[U \rightleftharpoons R]$, a process which I shall call "translation".¹ The two main logical models describing the activities to be discussed will be called negative and positive translations.

Convergence
 Conversion

Negative translations

The general form of a negative translation is $U \rightarrow R$, the translation of a useful object into a ritual object, where useful objects [U] may or may not include exchangeability-of-useful-objects $[E^+]$ or exchangeability-of-treasure $[E^+]$. The ownership of these objects, and thus their utilitarian or exchange values to the owner, are all relinquished by the transaction which related the former owner to units of ritual value. Thereby these units of ritual value become pure, or isolated. They are detached from the economic cycle. In all these contexts the units of value do not occur grouped logically, according to their relation to usage, as $U^+ E^+ : R^+ E^+$ objects of utilitarian value and exchangeability-of-useful-objects set against objects of ritual value and exchangeability-of-treasure. Rather, we find such forms as objects of utilitarian value, exchangeability-of-useful-objects and exchangeability-of-treasure set against ritual objects $[U^+ E^+ E^+ : R]$. In such cases the relations $U^+ E^+ E^+$ can be called "empirical values" $[U^+]$.

Reserve sphere
 $R^+ E^+$
 Subsistence
 spl.

$U^+ E^+$
 "Disengaged"

Harry

Negative translations occur among the Yap Islanders when goods which have been accumulated for several years are exchanged for circular plates of stone broken in a distant quarry.² The stones are so huge that many days' labour of groups of people is required for their transport. At their destination

"Proves that ritual is non-rational"
 "can't be made into objects"
 final
 trade
 except
 vappa

¹ In order to get the full meaning of this word in this context, it should be thought of with reference to its Latin original, or even better, with reference to its German equivalent, *Übersetzung*.—P.B.

² Harness, W. H., 3rd, *The Island of Stone Money*, Philadelphia, 1910. Müller, Wilhelm, *Yap, Ergebnisse der Südpazifischen Expedition 1908-1910*, Hamburg, L. Friederichsen & Co., 1917, pp. 129-32.

The paper is in terms of 'objects'
 What does it mean in terms of
 objects? that exchangeability is an
 object

relative
 "can't be made into objects"
 Wirthenthal

"Disengage"
prestige

they are buried under the huts, after a ritual has been held to acknowledge their value. These stones do not function in any further transaction. They are left in the ground and not "used" in daily life. Their value, rather, attaches to the status of the owner and to the ground on which the hut stands; it increases the respect shown to the hut's inhabitants, the family. Thus, the translation of empirical values into ritual values $[U^i \rightarrow R]$ has various phases: some useful objects are converted into exchangeability-of-useful-objects, while others are converted into exchangeability-of-treasure, then finally all are trans-

lated into ritual objects $\left[\left(\begin{array}{c} U \rightarrow E^u \\ \searrow E^t \end{array} \right) \rightarrow R \right]$. This instance may suffice to

illustrate one of the modes of negative translation.

Another mode of negative translation can be seen in that type of gift exchange in which the presents given do not merely establish or confirm an alliance between the exchanging persons, but the amount given away (not received) under ritual circumstances affects a person's rank.

The instance of this mode of negative translation most often referred to is the potlatch which obtained among the various Northwest American societies. There at more or less regular intervals, or on important occasions like the birth of a child or the building of a new house, families and larger competitive kinship units invited the other members of the society in order to give them a feast and to present them, under ritual circumstances, with goods which had been accumulated over long periods. Whenever it suited their disposition, the invited parties reciprocated invitation and gifts. The value of the distributed gifts attaches either to the kinship unit who called the potlatch, or to the person in whose honour the potlatch was given, and each potlatch modified the status of those concerned. The value of the goods disposed of in this manner is the social agens, while no public recognition attaches to their value contexts. This recognition is implicit only in the public transfer of ownership. In such a transfer the values of the object are split: (1) the units of empirical value (which are not social agens in these societies) are at the receiver's disposal, while (2) units of ritual value in quantity correlated with the empirical values can become overt in terms approximating those of ownership, and are related to the giver.


A variation of the custom obtaining in the same area is one to which ethnographers have given much attention: in the course of potlatches goods may be not given away, but burned or destroyed, which approaches still closer the model of sacrifice, which is the paramount model for all activities designed to disengage units of value from the economic cycle. Through annihilation of the goods the empirical values are completely eliminated, and the ritual values "owned" by the promoters of the potlatch are certain, pure and unambiguous. The competitive element in the ownership of these ritual values is strengthened by discarding the co-operative one which is, however, a negligible concomitant of this gift exchange.

Herodotus
simple
presentation

(reciprocal)

Before the Administration ^{ritual} interfered with these customs, it had been known that competitive sacrificial potlatches were becoming ruinous to the communities concerned. From this it was inferred that the whole potlatch custom is an economic anomaly. But in answer to such a contention two points have to be made.

It can be shown that procedures such as those creating the giant stone "money" of Yap can be related to the same logical model as those creating gift and sacrificial potlatches. While the Yap example can be symbolized as $(U^i \rightarrow) \rightarrow R$ [translation of empirical values becomes of ritual value], the gift exchange of the potlatch must include two occasions: on one occasion A gives objects of empirical value to B; the empirical value of the objects goes to B, but the ritual value of the giving remains with A; in the second transaction, we get the exact reverse: B gives A objects of empirical value, whose empirical value goes to A, but whose ritual value remains with B. This can be symbolized as:



The sacrifice potlatch, on the other hand, approaches the Yap formula more closely, since there is no splitting of values, but rather a direct translation of empirical to ritual values:

$$\begin{array}{c} U^i \rightarrow R^a \\ R^b \leftarrow U^i \end{array}$$

A transaction conforming to so general a pattern cannot be dismissed as an anomaly. Certain features of the "ruinous potlatch", however, must be considered abnormal, reflecting a disnomic state of the communities where they occur. These features I would explain as modification of the potlatch in two ways as a result of culture contact. First, a reaction against the disintegration of tribal society would throw into relief the major features of social cohesion. In the societies in question the structural basis is indicated by the competition of rigid sub-units and respect shown to rank. Thus, before complete disintegration sets in, we should have to expect the solidarity within the sub-units to become exaggerated, and greater emphasis to be laid on their competition at the same time that rank consciousness is becoming more vulnerable. Second, the introduction of money economy made more things exchangeable, thus the range of objects eligible for translation into ritual value increased. Boas' comparative lists testify to this. Thus potlatch economy, far from being an anomaly, is so much a consistent pattern

- à la Core du Bois -

(d) In Positive translation money is on the prestige side!
(e) no money used in substantial sphere, all money used in the prestige sphere

that it is incompatible with other economies. Alien elements made the system ruinous to the respective societies; integration was impossible.

Positive translations

Conversions
Core du Bois
pf
Surplus?

In positive translations, we find a different basic arrangement of values: $[U : (\pm E^a E^b) R]$, that is, exchangeability-of-useful-objects and exchangeability-of-treasure are here associated with ritual objects and excluded from useful objects (instead of, as with negative translation, associated with useful objects and excluded from ritual objects), where useful objects are seen in opposition to objects of treasures with exchange value or ritual value. Accumulation of wealth, trading and marketing are, in varying degrees, characteristic of societies which stress positive translation.

External markets

Intertribal exchanges of the following types take place: (1) Useful objects from society A traded for useful objects from society B $[U_a \rightleftharpoons U_b]$, (2) useful objects of society A are exchanged for exchangeability-of-useful-objects from society B $[U_a \rightleftharpoons E^u_b]$, (3) exchangeability-of-useful-objects from society A exchanged for exchangeability-of-treasure of society B $[E^u_a \rightleftharpoons E^t_b]$, and (4) treasures with an exchange value of society A being traded for treasures with an exchange value from society B $[E^t_a \rightleftharpoons E^t_b]$. When each exchanges between areas of productive units occur, with or without professional negotiation, at regular intervals, at fixed prices, we speak of "markets".

Neither on sociological nor on purely economic lines has a classification of market types yet been attempted—treatments classifying markets as to their time intervals (yearly, monthly or weekly) can be discarded as not relevant.

What type?

It may be felt by many that if one extends the range of the term "market" to include, at one end, regular meetings at which barter exchange takes place between the members of two or more villages, and, at the other end, a regular disposal of surplus produced solely for this purpose (while professional traders compete and calculate their profits), it has no claim to be used in scientific contexts. The chief disadvantage, however, is that the term "market" suggests to most of us the operation of laws of supply and demand, while clearly such laws can relate only to exchanges of certain types.

market + equivalence

When, for example, New Guinea tribal groups exchange regularly useful objects of society A for treasures with an exchange value from society B $[U_a \rightleftharpoons E^t_b]$, it certainly does not mean that a surplus of useful objects [U] has been produced by society A for the exclusive purpose of purchasing society B's exchangeable useful objects or exchangeable treasure; nor does it mean that society B's exchangeable treasure is produced in order to be exchanged for the useful objects from society A. Therefore, the exchange rate equating quantities of the two kinds is more or less stable and does not depend primarily on laws of supply and demand.

money mechanism

(B) Market situations can arise from the relations of two social groups under only two conditions, or in a combination of the two. One possible condition is that a common denominator of value applies to the exchangeable useful

money
relat. restrictedness
markets

(in either case get prices
markets occur...
(a) intertribal money
(b) intra " " absent

objects, exchange value of a useful object, or exchange value of a treasure [U, E^a and E^b] of societies A and B. The other condition is that the two social (and perhaps political) units are functioning as parts of one economy.

what's
that?
why 'one'?

Social units integrated into one economy will be found to exchange primarily useful objects [U]. A most fascinating instance has been recorded from the Manus people of the southern part of the Admiralty Archipelago.¹ There groups of "sea people", the true Manus, are allied to groups of "land people", the Usiai (inland) and Matankor ("eye of the land"). They depend on daily exchange to such a degree that we must regard every economic unit as being composed of groups of both populations. Political life has been adapted to this symbiosis, and in warfare a settlement of Manus would keep truce and entertain exchange with its Usiai partner, while attacking another Usiai group which enjoys the partnership of another Manus settlement. This symbiosis is based on carefully balanced cession of economic sovereignty, and goes to the extreme of barring the sea people from direct use of the land and its products, and the land people from any use of the sea. Nevertheless, the sea people who live out in the lagoons in pillar dwellings, need boats, the wood for which grows on the land; the land people eat the fish of the sea. Intentional restrictions make possible a regular exchange, in which boats and vegetable produce are given for sea products.

Throughout this arrangement, which retains many features of barter (as Margaret Mead points out) a market situation obtains; the policy in dealing with these situations is made possible by the absence of a common denominator of value.

Very
important

There is [writes Margaret Mead] one quaint example of this tendency outside the realm of food proper. While the land people grow the betelnut and the pepper leaf, the sea people burn and refine the coral lime with which the betel and pepper leaf are chewed. In the market the same sized fish will command ten taro or forty betelnuts. But a cup of lime commands eighty betelnuts, but only four taro. Betel chewing need is matched against betel chewing need, to coerce the sea people into providing enough lime for the land people.²

1:4
instead of
20

Here we see the laws of supply and demand functioning without a common denominator expressing the values of the exchanged goods. In such cases, there is a tendency to group exchangeable goods in pairs.³

equivalencies
as a function
of quantitative
relations
(A)

This standardized and business-like bartering in Manus goes on side by side with more elaborate exchanges such as E^a ↔ E^b and U^a ↔ E^a ↔ E^b, etc., and with the accumulation of exchangeable treasure [E^b] within one group. This latter value-boarding of the exchangeability of treasure goes with the rank system within the social group, but not with the sea-land

¹ Mead, Margaret, "The Manus of the Admiralty Islands", in Mead, Margaret (Editor), *Cooperation and Competition among Primitive Peoples*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1937, pp. 210-39.

² Mead, Margaret, "Melanesian Middlemen", *Natural History*, Vol. XXX, No. 2, 1930, p. 130.

³ In a very general manner such asymmetrical equations can be thus symbolized, the small letters referring to quantities, the capitals to kinds: aM = bN; aM = cO; bN = dO. I would, instead of referring to an economic system as "rational" or "logical" merely say that the equations, though manifold, are symmetrical.

equivalency system = symmetrical equations
The resistance against money
explained by P B + S & T.

18

the latter runs on simple transactions of parts.
 intergroup exchange. Thus, two different economic processes, involving different social relationships, interlock. These junctures are very different from negative translations, in which two spheres of value are brought together. In these two types of transfer, for which I am suggesting the term "positive translation", no units of value become completely detached from economic life, (in spite of accumulation) *No assembly value!*

The difference between the two processes cannot be over-emphasized. Dealing with the *kula* system of the Trobriand Islanders, a system of intertribal exchanges of treasure [F²] of very wide circulation, Malinowski remarks on the generosity and decorum displayed in the (ritually relevant) *kula* transactions:

The natives sharply distinguish it from barter which they practise extensively, of which they have a clear idea, and for which they have a settled term—in Kirinwinian: *gim wali*. Often, when criticizing an incorrect, too hasty, or indecorous procedure of *Kula*, they will say, "he conducts his *kula* as if it were *gim wali*".¹
(no money used here; treasure money is in gim wali)

III. COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS

These facts have hitherto received very little systematic treatment. No classification of exchanges and markets in simpler societies has been essayed, and nobody has worked on a comparative sociology of trading groups. The position of specialists in simpler societies (e.g. that of the smiths in Africa) has not been brought under comparative survey, although concomitant ideologies (the smith's magic power or inferiority) have been noted. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that the comparative method has not yet been extended to economics *anthropology!*

Of late this deficiency is more noticeable, since we have become possessed of precise monographs detailing the economies of South African and Oceanic communities. But so far as the rest is concerned, we are left with the pioneer work of men like Schurtz, a type of research which has been discontinued and which is outdated by far more accurate material and more pertinent problems.

Generalizing on a large body of facts which have not been systematically treated, and making surmises in a field in which the little which is known is obscured by worse than meaningless terminologies, does not allow the formation of valid theories. The few remarks that one can make are either stressing the obvious or must be made subject to constant correction.

To the reader of ethnographic accounts, it is clear that many economies cannot be classified exclusively in accordance with a single type of economic process which is accompanied by many activities. Several types of economic process may together build up the economy of a society. To call one of them dominant is premature in many cases; as even criteria of such predominance have not been discussed *(excellent!)*

Thus, Mead has shown in the case of the Admiralty Islanders a function

¹ Malinowski, B., *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, London, Routledge, 1922, pp. 95-6.

2
 Stephens
 Carns
 Equivalency of
 adya
 exchanging
 xxx
 Economics
 My
 My
 xxx
 coexistence
 patterns
 My

of asymmetrical equations of quantities in barter exchanges between social groups $[U_a \rightleftharpoons U_b]$. The same, however, cannot be said of either group's internal exchanges of useful objects or treasure $[E^a \text{ and } E^b]$.

On the other hand, on Rossel Island, as described by Armstrong, different kinds of exchangeability-of-treasure $[E^t]$ build up a monetary system in such a way that there are several species of "money", and in every species several kinds of units (coin). The intricacy of the system is due to the existence of asymmetrical equations between currency units. Because of the fact that we associate asymmetrical properties least of all with monetary systems—indeed, they are thought to prevent asymmetry—Armstrong calls the Rossel economy anomalous.¹

Whenever we find the establishment of prices and the fluctuation of exchange rates between two economies, it must be caused by changes in the internal evaluation of exchangeable treasure connected with conditions of its production. There is no exchangeable treasure which a society produces for "export only". Seligman records from the Koita of British New Guinea that at a marriage, after the appropriate gift exchange, the woman's parents received as bridewealth a number of armrings. In 1876 this number was ten, but as iron tools made the manufacture of the rings easier, the number had risen by 1909 to forty or forty-three rings given on the same occasion.² Thurnwald concludes quite rightly that this change in evaluation can be explained in terms of supply and demand.³ But it must be insisted that, however a change in the internal evaluation of exchangeable treasure may affect external change in the long run, no supply-demand relations inherent in the external exchange can be made responsible for the change.

One can find a great variety of economies in which negative translations do not seem to function predominantly (using this qualification with the above reservations)—that is true, in fact, of the economies of most known societies. One such type is of particular interest. In this type we find instead of (or co-existing with) the situation "useful objects opposed to objects associated with ritual value" $[U : (E^t \text{ or } E^a) R]$, an arrangement whereby the quantity of the useful objects becomes decisive. Useful objects are being hoarded and treasured, but the units thus treated are not dealt with in conformity to any mode of exchange or translation: they are not excluded from use by the owners. Yet the great quantity of these units is not related to the needs of usage; the stores have a value transcending the empirical value of the units. The empirical values are merely a component potential.

We find the non-empirical aspect of sheer quantity acting in the same way as $U : (E^t \text{ or } E^a) R$. In storage assembly of units it is not particular qualities of particular units which matter, but the quality of the organized whole. To make this clear, we may assume value units I-100 which relate

¹ Armstrong, W. E., *Rossel Island*, Cambridge, at the University Press, 1928, pp. 59-75.

² Seligman, C. C., *The Melanesians of British New Guinea*, Cambridge, at the University Press, 1910, p. 77.

³ Thurnwald, Richard, *Werten, Wandel und Gestaltung der Wirtschaft*, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1932, p. 179.

Exchange
Equivalent
of
Substance
and
Treasure

Exc

?

stater

440:500

?

Exc

hoarding!

to the objects' usefulness as nutrition or clothing. We see then, that under certain conditions a storage assembly of 100n (U) exceeds the evaluation of n(100 U), non-empirical assembly value overruling the empirical values contained in the units.

The greater the quantity of units in an organized assembly, the more numerous are the possibilities of arranging these units and the greater is the owner's power when expressed in terms of control of the assembly. In this context, it does not matter whether this assembly is a store of vegetable produce or a herd of animals.

Among the Trobriand Islanders the houses for the storage of yams are built so that the quantity of the food can be gauged and its quality ascertained through the wide interstices between the beams. The yams are so arranged that the best specimens come to the outside and are well visible. Special varieties of yams, which grow up to two meters in length and weigh as much as several kilograms each, are framed in wood and decorated with paint, and hung on the outside of the yam houses. That the right to display food is highly valued can be seen from the fact that in villages where a chief of high rank resides, the commoners' storehouses have to be closed up with coconut leaves, so as not to compete with his.¹

These assemblies, says Malinowski, serve to enhance social prestige.

Magic is intended to make the food last long. . . . [It] will make food plentiful in the village and will make the supplies last long. But, and this is the important point for us, this magic is conceived to act not on the food, but on the inhabitants of the village. It makes their appetites poor, it makes them, as the natives put it, inclined to eat wild fruit of the bush, and mango and bread fruit of the village grove [not individually owned]; refuse to eat yams, or at least to be satisfied with very little. They will boast that when this magic is performed well, half of the yams will rot away in the storehouses and be thrown on . . . the rubbish heap at the back of the houses to make room for the new harvest.²

It is important to recognize that the value transcending the utilitarian properties of the stored yams are confirmed by something that is nearly a resolution not to use it. The magical rites are rites of thrift and not of fertility. Only the fact that these objects are perishable makes the wastefulness of the procedure so obvious. This aspect of the attitude to value may be weaker, or may escape us altogether, when we consider, instead of yams, objects with properties which remain unchanged over longer periods—or better still, objects which reproduce or even multiply themselves.

The similarities between negative translations and assembly values of the Trobriand kind are striking. On the other hand, there is a similarity between Trobriand assembly values and those of people who apply such notions to their herded animals, where "wastefulness" is less prominent. Two features are common to negative translations and assembly values: the existence of values transcending the empirical ones, and the connection between the non-empirical value and the attitudes negating the empirical values. As the differences have already been stressed, the similarities can be summed up in the following manner: affirmation of non-empirical values is accom-

¹ Malinowski, E., *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, pp. 168-9.

² *Ibid.*, p. 169.

Herded

panied by and made possible by destruction or rejection of empirical values. These affirmations may be strengthened by ritual functions of the units of transcending value, as in the case of African cattle economies.

The principle stated above is general; it applies not only to simpler economies. After all, the conquest of Western civilization by a total money economy meant the bestowing of transcending values on money. The holding of money, the position in which a person's money is "working" for him and does not lie "idle", are aims the evaluation of which transcends the evaluation of the goods which can be purchased with this money and used. The rise of capitalist economy came in the guise of a gospel of saving and ascetic rejection of the use of goods. No reader of the works of Max Weber and Tawny can doubt the fact that this ascetic rejection was postulated in a religious terminology.

It is for the psychologist to state the ultimate affinities, or rejections, in favour of transcending values and of sacrifice; it cannot be the concern of the anthropologist. For the student of social anthropology who can see thrift and protestant ethics in connection with potlatches and Trobriand yam stores, a much discussed controversy loses its significance: whether puritanism has made capitalism or vice versa (Weber-Tawny). Moreover, if science were ever in need of an experiment to test the thesis of the relation between the transcending nature of economic values in modern civilization and a society's religious life, an experiment can be pointed out which took place on the largest scale history can provide. After the first European war an inflation caused the loss of property of the German middle classes. This was followed in Protestant Germany by a complete disintegration of not merely what Weber called Wirtschaftsethik (itself a Protestant departmentalization) but by the disintegration of the whole ideals and codes of the middle classes. No short-lived hardship, however severe, can account for a loss of confidence on such a scale.

For the most general aspect it is irrelevant which side—whether abstention from usage or glorification of transcending values—is reinforced by religion, or expressed in religious terminology. The inevitable is common to all forms: the acceptance of ownership of units of value as a virtuous state, and the disparaging of tendencies contrary to that virtue.

GLOSSARY OF SYMBOLS

↓	Value	E	Exchangeability
U	Useful object	U ¹	Empirical value: $U + E^u + E^t = U^1$
R	Ritual object	E ^u	Exchangeability of useful-objects
T	Treasure	E ^t	Exchangeability of treasure.

Though the last two symbols [E^u and E^t] are sometimes transcribed "exchangeable useful objects" or "exchangeable treasure" for purposes of convenience, the primary sense is always the exchangeability itself.

Tawny!
Wirtschaftsethik
Coon

Trobs (yams)
Capit

K

exchange
potlatch: equivalency system includes
equivalencies of exchange
of substitution
of adequacy

limited Calabodis, without metal; as

- (a) Confused trade & market money;
- (b) the money used are confused no prestige
- (c) the ornaments end of some money disappear
- (d) Pre money (drop of money) objects over looked
increase of exchangeability

(e) identified in the two phenomena of
 "graded" club circulation
 the "exchange spiral" & gearing up

A premature attempt of a
 man of genius ~~with~~ which I
~~caused the effects on our efforts~~
~~is neutralized~~ gravely
 impede our own efforts
 at classification unless neutral
 by in time.

200
2000

FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY

NOTES ON COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS

by

Franz Steiner

Late University Lecturer in Social Anthropology
Oxford University

in

British Journal of Sociology, V (1954), 118-119.

NOTES ON COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS

1
Franz Steiner

Anthropologists have for some time known that wherever livestock is herded in large units, whether the animals be cattle, horses, camels or reindeer, the attitude of the owners to the value of the animals cannot be expressed merely in terms of utilization or exchange. A dialogue between a rich herdsman of the Yurak-Samoyede and a stranger poses the problem:

- Stranger: Sell me a reindeer!
- Yurak: There is none for sale.
- Stranger: Why don't you take money? You may buy brandy with it.
- Yurak: I have got brandy enough.
- Stranger: You may buy something for your womenfold; or you may get furs of the arctic fox to use as bridewealth and get yourself another wife.
- Yurak: I have got two sledges full of fox already.
- Stranger: You own 3,000 reindeer. What are you keeping them for?
- Yurak: The reindeer wander about and I look at them. Money I have to hide, I cannot see it.²

Similar sayings of Lapplanders have been noted. Hatt points out that this "lust for ownership" stands in the way of a more intensive

1. Late University Lecturer in Social Anthropology, Oxford University. This article was eventually to have been turned into a book on the economics of primitive peoples. It has been slightly edited by Paul Bohannan, and is one of a number of publications of Dr. Steiner's manuscripts being prepared by his friends and colleagues at the Institute of Social Anthropology, Oxford. It is published with permission of Dr. Steiner's literary executor, Dr. H. Adler.

2. Lehtisalo, T., "Beiträge zur Kenntnis der Rentierzucht bei den Juraksamoyeden," Institute for Sammendignende Kulturforschung, Series B, Vol. 16, Oslo, H. Aschehng and Company.

1

care for and utilization of animals. Herds become too big to be useful as far as labour and subsistence are concerned; they are an impediment to the owner. The same sentiments have been attributed to many a cattle-owning tribe in Africa.

It is the purpose of this article to investigate attitudes such as are here displayed with a view to discovering their implications for (1) the general interchangeability of goods (which underlies all trade), (2) the process of increasing the utility of goods (which is the essence of all production as understood by Western economists), and (3) the classification of economies dependent primarily on exchange without the use of coin or paper money.

By an economy here is meant a system of production and distribution of units of value.² This is a very broad usage of the word.

I. TWO CATEGORIES OF NON-MONETARY ECONOMIC TYPES

Leaving aside the economy based on the extensive use of money and related to complex class structures, two widely representative types of economy may be distinguished. The first is characterized by the existence of three groups or categories of goods, always kept separate and distinct: raw materials, implements, and personal treasure. In the second type of economy, raw materials are not kept separate from the implements, and there is no class of goods which has value solely as personal treasure.

In the first type, with its three groups of goods (1) foodstuffs and other raw materials, (2) implements, including everyday clothing,

1. Hatt, Gudmund, "Notes on Reindeer Nomadism," American Anthropological Association Memoirs, Vol. VI, p. 114.

2. In the terminology of economics, this word "value" should probably read "utility"; the wording of the original has been retained. - P.B.

and (3) personal treasure, it is possible to make subdivisions according to the various relations which may be thought to exist between the items belonging to these various groups. For example, the objects of the second and third groups -- implements and personal treasures -- may or may not be exchange for one another, depending on the ideas of the people involved, hence leading to different sub-types. By personal treasure we mean things valued by their owners, either because of their rarity or because of the memorably intensive attention given to them during their production. Examples of objects of this kind are the boomerangs made by some Australian aborigines, which are carved so beautifully that they are not used in hunting, or the magnificent "luxury bows" of the Andamans which are precious but are also not used, or the carvings of the Eskimoids -- objects executed in hours of leisure and not related to religious life. These things are treasured by their owners, but no universal value attaches to them. Parallel cases are found in the animal kingdom, and in the human child.

But all these sub-types have one decisive feature in common: the social unit, based on co-operation in the task of preserving the lives of the constituent members, is concerned in its organization only with the first group of goods. In so far as we can speak of circulation of goods in these societies, it must be with regard to goods of the first group: foodstuffs and other raw materials. These goods may be gained in a common enterprise and then distributed, or they may be gained by the various sub-units (households, families) who distribute their surplus. The members of the society respond to the distribution by actions of solidarity enabling further production.

Whatever arrangements are made for the distribution of the raw materials once they are gained, two conditions are preserved: (1) no object belonging to the first group is exchanged for objects belonging to either of the other groups -- in fact, there is no value relation, no common value standard, between these groups. It follows, then, that (2) any object into which raw material has been transformed -- be it a piece of meat cooked by the members of a household, or a tool or clothing -- ipso facto is disengaged from what we may call the primary economic cycle. Thus, additional human labour, far from adding "value" to the thing, removes it from the economic sphere. This does not mean, of course, that these objects are not desired (that is, they have not lost "utility" in the terminology of Western economists): as presents they function in the creation of alliances, as loot they function in war.

No wealth is accumulated in such societies, no markets are held. It is only within the sphere of the primary economic cycle -- that is, exchange of foodstuffs and raw materials -- that market-like situations arise, if by that we mean that demand conditions the distribution.

In the economies of the second type, on the other hand, exchange of objects differentiated into different categories from raw materials are not so detached from the primary economic cycle. Subdivisions of this type are constituted by the various modes by which people integrate, classify and interrelate the different groups or categories of objects. The feature which is common to all economies of this second type is that they do not recognize merely personal treasures: treasures have either a generally recognized value bestowed upon them by ritual, or else they have a limited exchange value. Thus, broadly speaking,

there are two kinds of objects present in economies of this type: those whose value is generally recognized and founded on usage, and those whose value is ritual, or at least non-utilitarian.

The value of those objects which is generally recognized and founded on their usage is called utilitarian value. Some of these objects may be used in exchanges as standard units of value -- pots, iron bars and salt in Africa are examples. Such exchange goods are not only valued because of their prominent utilitarian function, but wherever they are used in this manner, they are not produced within the society. Their exchange character is based on steady supplies from alien centres of production. Such external monopolies function in the same way as does limited and controlled production within a society, perhaps by a privileged group.

The whole group of objects may be expressed in symbolic terminology¹ as $U \leftrightarrow E^u$, if we let U stand for "useful objects," \leftrightarrow for "value" and E for "exchange." Thus, E^u comes to denote such useful objects (U 's) as have standardized exchange properties. Thus in the same language we may distinguish barter, or the exchange of one useful object direct for another [$U \leftrightarrow U$], from trade, which is exchange of a useful object for the exchangeability-of-a-useful-object [$U \leftrightarrow E^u$], or the exchange of a useful object for the exchangeability-of-a-useful-object which is in turn exchanged for a different use object [$U \leftrightarrow E^u \rightarrow U$].

The second group of objects comprises, among others, units of ritual value and such treasures as may be used in exchanges. No utilitarian value is attached to either. Thus "shell money" or "money"

1. A glossary of symbols is appended at the end of the article.

consisting of strips of plaited feathers differ from salt and Iron "money." This second group of objects can be described as $R \rightleftharpoons E^t$, because there are units which have ritual [R] value [$\frac{1}{2}$] or are exchangeable [E] treasures [t].

Taking both groups $U \rightleftharpoons E^u$ and $R \rightleftharpoons E^t$ into consideration, further exchanges are possible: a useful object for exchangeability-of-treasure [$U \rightleftharpoons E^t$], or a useful object exchanged for exchangeability-of-treasure which is in turn exchanged for another useful object [$U \rightleftharpoons E^t \rightleftharpoons U$]. Both mean trade, whereas the exchange of the exchangeability-of-useful-objects for exchangeability-of-treasure [$E^u \rightleftharpoons E^t$] is a financial transaction akin to trade.

II. TRANSLATION

We must be very careful to distinguish from all these transactions of barter or trade, another exchange -- that of a useful object for a ritual object [$U \rightleftharpoons R$], a process which I shall call "translation."¹ The two main logical models describing the activities to be discussed will be called negative and positive translations.


Negative translations

The general form of a negative translation is $U \rightarrow R$, the translation of a useful object into a ritual object, where useful objects [U] may or may not include exchangeability-of-useful-objects (E^u) or exchangeability-of-treasure [E^t]. The ownership of these objects, and thus their utilitarian or exchange values to the owner, are all relinquished by the transaction which related the former owner to units of

1. In order to get the full meaning of this word in this context, it should be thought of with reference to its Latin original, or even better, with reference to its German equivalent Übersetzung. - P.B.

ritual value. Thereby these units of ritual value become pure, or isolated. They are detached from the economic cycle. In all these contexts the units of value do not occur grouped logically, according to their relation to usage, as $U \leftrightarrow E^u ; R \leftrightarrow E^t$, objects of utilitarian value and exchangeability-of-useful-objects set against objects of ritual value and exchangeability-of-treasure. Rather, we find such forms as objects of utilitarian value, exchangeability-of-useful-objects and exchangeability-of-treasure set against ritual objects $[U \ E^u \ E^t ; R]$. In such cases the relations $E^u \leftrightarrow E^t$ can be called "empirical values" $[U^i]$.

Negative translations occur among the Yap Islanders when goods which have been accumulated for several years are exchanged for circular plates of stone broken in a distant quarry.¹ The stones are so huge that many days' labour of groups of people is required for their transport. At their destination they are buried under the huts, after a ritual has been held to acknowledge their value. These stones do not function in any further transaction. They are left in the ground and not "used" in daily life. Their value, rather, attaches to the status of the owner and to the ground on which the hut stands; it increases the respect shown to the hut's inhabitants, the family. Thus, the translation of empirical values into ritual values $[U^i \rightarrow R]$ has various phases: some useful objects are converted into exchangeability-of-useful-objects, while others are converted into exchangeability-of-treasure, then finally all are translated into ritual objects



1. Furness, W. H., 3rd, The Island of Stone Money, Philadelphia, 1910.
Müller, Wilhelm, Yap, Ergebnisse der Südsee Expedition 1908-1910, Hamburg, L. Friederichsen and Company, 1917, pp. 129-32.

This instance may suffice to illustrate one of the modes of negative translation.


Another mode of negative translation can be seen in that type of gift exchange in which the presents given do not merely establish or confirm an alliance between the exchanging persons, but the amount given away (not received) under ritual circumstances affects a person's rank.

The instance of this mode of negative translation most often referred to is the potlatch which obtained among the various Northwest American societies. There at more or less regular intervals, or on important occasions like the birth of a child or the building of a new house, families and larger competitive kinship units invited the other members of the society in order to give them a feast and to present them, under ritual circumstances, with goods which had been accumulated over long periods. Whenever it suited their disposition, the invited parties reciprocated invitation and gifts. The value of the distributed gifts attaches either to the kinship unit who called the potlatch, or to the person in whose honour the potlatch was given, and each potlatch modified the status of those concerned. The value of the goods disposed of in this manner is a social agens, while no public recognition attaches to their value contexts. This recognition is implicit only in the public transfer of ownership. In such a transfer the values of the object are split: (1) the units of empirical value (which are not social agens in these societies) are at the receiver's disposal, while (2) units of ritual value in quantity correlated with the empirical values can become overt in terms approximating those of ownership, and are related to the giver.

A variation of the custom obtaining in the same area is one to which ethnographers have given much attention; in the course of potlatches goods may be not given away, but burned or destroyed, which approaches still closer the model of sacrifice, which is the paramount model for all activities designed to disengage units of value from the economic cycle. Through annihilation of the goods the empirical values are completely eliminated, and the ritual values "owned" by the promoters of the potlatch are certain, pure and unambiguous. The competitive element in the ownership of these ritual values is strengthened by discarding the co-operative one which is, however, a negligible concomitant of this gift exchange.

Before the Administration interfered with these customs, it had been known that competitive sacrificial potlatches were becoming ruinous to the communities concerned. From this it was inferred that the whole potlatch custom is an economic anomaly. But in answer to such a contention two points have to be made.

It can be shown that procedures such as those creating the giant stone "money" of Yap can be related to the same logical model as those creating gift and sacrificial potlatches. While the Yap example can be symbolized as $(U^1 \rightarrow) \rightarrow R$ [translation of empirical values becomes of ritual value], the gift exchange of the potlatch must include two occasions: on one occasion A gives objects of empirical value to B; the empirical value of the objects goes to B, but the ritual value of the giving remains with A; in the second transaction, we get the exact reverse: B gives A objects of empirical value, whose empirical value goes to A, but whose ritual value remains with B. This can be symbolized as:



The sacrifice potlatch, on the other hand, approaches the Yap formula more closely, since there is no splitting of values, but rather a direct translation of empirical to ritual values:

$$\begin{array}{l} U^i \rightarrow R^a \\ R^b \leftarrow U^i \end{array}$$

A transaction conforming to so general a pattern cannot be dismissed as an anomaly. Certain features of the "ruinous potlatch," however, must be considered abnormal, reflecting a disnomic state of the communities where they occur. These features I would explain as modification of the potlatch in two ways as a result of culture contact. First, a reaction against the disintegration of tribal society would throw into relief the major features of social cohesion. In the societies in question the structural basis is indicated by the competition of rigid sub-units and respect shown to rank. Thus, before complete disintegration sets in, we should have to expect the solidarity within the sub-units to become exaggerated, and greater emphases to be laid on their competition at the same time that rank consciousness is becoming more vulnerable. Second, the introduction of money economy made more things exchangeable, thus the range of objects eligible for translation into ritual value increased. Boas' comparative lists testify to this. Thus potlatch economy, far from being an anomaly, is so much a consistent pattern that it is incompatible with other economies. Alien elements made the system ruinous to the respective societies; integration was impossible.

Positive translations

In positive translations, we find a different basic arrangement of values: $[U : (\pm E^u E^t) R]$, that is, exchangeability-of-useful-objects and exchangeability-of-treasure are here associated with ritual objects and excluded from useful objects (instead of, as with negative translation, associated with useful objects and excluded from ritual objects), where useful objects are seen in opposition to objects or treasures with exchange value or ritual value. Accumulation of wealth, trading and marketing are, in varying degrees, characteristic of societies which stress positive translation.

Intertribal exchanges of the following types take place: (1) Useful objects from society A traded for useful objects from society B $[U_a \rightleftharpoons U_b]$. (2) useful objects of society A are exchanged for exchangeability-of-useful-objects from society B $[U_a \rightleftharpoons E^u_b]$, (3) exchangeability-of-useful-objects from society A exchanged for exchangeability-of-treasure of society B $[E^u_a \rightleftharpoons E^t_b]$, and (4) treasures with an exchange value of society A being traded for treasures with an exchange value from society B $[E^t_a \rightleftharpoons E^t_b]$. When such exchanges between areas of productive units occur, with or without professional negotiation, at regular intervals, at fixed prices, we speak of "markets."

Neither on sociological nor on purely economic lines has a classification of market types yet been attempted -- treatments classifying markets as to their time intervals (yearly, monthly or weekly) can be discarded as not relevant.

It may be felt by many that if one extends the range of the term "market" to include, at one end, regular meetings at which barter exchange takes place between the members of two or more villages, and,

At the other end, a regular disposal of surplus produced solely for this purpose (while professional traders compete and calculate their profits), it has no claim to be used in scientific contexts. The chief disadvantage, however, is that the term "market" suggests to most of us the operation of laws of supply and demand, while clearly such laws can relate only to exchanges of certain types.

When, for example, New Guinea tribal groups exchange regularly useful objects of society A for treasures with an exchange value from society B [$U_a \xrightarrow{\quad} E_b^t$], it certainly does not mean that a surplus of useful objects [U] has been produced by society A for the exclusive purpose of purchasing society B's exchangeable useful objects or exchangeable treasure; nor does it mean that society B's exchangeable treasure is produced in order to be exchanged for the useful objects from society A. Therefore, the exchange rate equating quantities of the two kinds is more or less stable and does not depend primarily on laws of supply and demand.

Market situations can arise from the relations of two social groups under only two conditions, or in a combination of the two. One possible condition is that a common denominator of value applies to the exchangeable useful objects, exchange value of a useful object, or exchange value of a treasure [U , E^u and E^t] of societies A and B. The other condition is that the two social (and perhaps political) units are functioning as parts of one economy.

Social units integrated into one economy will be found to exchange primarily useful objects [U]. A most fascinating instance has been recorded from the Manus people of the southern part of the

1

Admiralty Archipelago. There groups of "sea people," the true Manus, are allied to groups of "land people," the Usiai (inland) and Matankor ("eye of the land"). They depend on daily exchange to such a degree that we must regard every economic unit as being composed of groups of both populations. Political life has been adapted to this symbiosis, and in warfare a settlement of Manus would keep truce and entertain exchange with its Usiai partner, while attacking another Usiai group which enjoys the partnership of another Manus settlement. This symbiosis is based on carefully balanced cession of economic sovereignty, and goes to the extreme of barring the sea people from direct use of the land and its products, and the land people from any use of the sea. Nevertheless, the sea people who live out in the lagoons in pillar dwellings, need boats, the wood for which grows on the land; the land people eat the fish of the sea. Intentional restrictions make possible a regular exchange, in which boats and vegetable produce are given for sea products.

Throughout this arrangement, which retains many features of barter (as Margaret Mead points out) a market situation obtains; the policy in dealing with these situations is made possible by the absence of a common denominator of value.

There is [writes Margaret Mead] one quaint example of this tendency outside the realm of food proper. While the land people grow the betelnut and the pepper leaf, the sea people burn and refine the coral lime with which the betel and pepper leaf are chewed. In the market the same sized fish will command ten taro or forty betelnuts. But a cup of lime commands eighty betelnuts, but only four taro. Betel chewing need is matched against betel chewing need, to coerce the sea people into providing enough lime for the land people.²

1. Mead, Margaret, "The Manus of the Admiralty Islands," in Mead, Margaret (Editor), Cooperation and Competition among Primitive Peoples, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1937, pp. 210-39.

2. Mead, Margaret, "Melanesian Middlemen," Natural History, Vol. XXX, No. 2, 1930, p. 130.

Here we see the laws of supply and demand functioning without a common denominator expressing the values of the exchanged goods. In such cases, there is a tendency to group exchangeable goods in pairs.¹

This standardized and business-like bartering in Manus goes on side by side with more elaborate exchanges such as $E_a^t \rightarrow E_b^t$ and $U_a \rightarrow E_a^u \rightarrow E_b^t$, etc., and with the accumulation of exchangeable treasure [E^t] within one group. This latter value-hoarding of the exchangeability-of-treasure goes with the rank system within the social group, but not with the sea-land intergroup exchange. Thus, two different economic processes, involving different social relationships, interlock. These junctures are very different from negative translations, in which two spheres of value are brought together. In these two types of transfer, for which I am suggesting the term "positive translation," no units of value become completely detached from economic life, in spite of accumulation.

The difference between the two processes cannot be over-emphasized. Dealing with the kula system of the Trobriand Islanders, a system of inter-tribal exchanges of treasure [E^t] of very wide circulation, Malinowski remarks on the generosity and decorum displayed in the (ritually relevant) kula transactions:

The natives sharply distinguish it from barter, which they practise extensively, of which they have a clear idea, and for which they have a settled term --- in Kiriwinian: gin wali. Often, when criticizing an incorrect, too hasty, or indecorous procedure of Kula, they will say, 'he conducts his kula as if it were gin wali.'²

1. In a very general manner such assymetrical equations can be thus symbolized, the small letters referring to quantities, the capitals to kinds: $aM = bN$; $aM = cO$; $bN = dO$. I would, instead of referring to an economic system as "rational" or "logical" merely say that the equations, though manifold, are symmetrical.

2. Malinowski, B. Argonauts of the Western Pacific, London, Routledge, 1922, pp. 95-6.

III. COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS

These facts have hitherto received very little systematic treatment. No classification of exchanges and markets in simpler societies has been essayed, and nobody has worked on a comparative sociology of trading groups. The position of specialists in simpler societies (e.g. that of the smiths in Africa) has not been brought under comparative survey, although concomitant ideologies (the smith's magic power or inferiority) have been noted. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that the comparative method has not yet been extended to economics.

Of late this deficiency is more noticeable, since we have become possessed of precise monographs detailing the economies of South African and Oceanic communities. But so far as the rest is concerned, we are left with the pioneer work of men like Schurtz, a type of research which has been discontinued and which is outdated by far more accurate material and more pertinent problems.

Generalizing on a large body of facts which have not been systematically treated, and making surmises in a field in which the little which is known is obscured by worse than meaningless terminologies, does not allow the formation of valid theories. The few remarks that one can make are either stressing the obvious or must be made subject to constant correction.

To the reader of ethnographic accounts, it is clear that many economies cannot be classified exclusively in accordance with a single type of economic process which is accompanied by many activities. Several types of economic process may together build up the economy of a society. To call one of them dominant is premature in many cases.

as even criteria of such predominance have not been discussed.

Thus, Mead has shown in the case of the Admiralty Islanders a function of asymmetrical equations of quantities in barter exchanges between social groups $[U_a \rightleftharpoons U_b]$. The same, however, cannot be said of either group's internal exchanges of useful objects or treasure $[E^a \text{ and } E^b]$.

On the other hand, on Rossel Island, as described by Armstrong, different kinds of exchangeability-of-treasure $[E^t]$ build up a monetary system in such a way that there are several species of "money," and in every species several kinds of units (coin). The intricacy of the system is due to the existence of asymmetrical equations between currency units. Because of the fact that we associate asymmetrical properties least of all with monetary systems — indeed, they are thought to prevent asymmetry — Armstrong calls the Rossel economy ¹ anomalous.

Wherever we find the establishment of prices and the fluctuation of exchange rates between two economies, it must be caused by changes in the internal evaluation of exchangeable treasure connected with conditions of its production. There is no exchangeable treasure which a society produces for "export only." Seligman records from the Koita of British New Guinea that at a marriage, after the appropriate gift exchange, the woman's parents received as bridewealth a number of armrings. In 1876 this number was ten, but as iron tools made the manufacture of the rings easier, the number had risen by 1909

1. Armstrong, W. E., Rossel Island, Cambridge, at the University Press, 1928, pp. 59-75.

to forty or forty-three rings given on the same occasion.¹ Thurnwald concludes quite rightly that this change in evaluation can be explained in terms of supply and demand.² But it must be insisted that, however a change in the internal evaluation of exchangeable treasure may affect external change in the long run, no supply-demand relations inherent in the external exchange can be made responsible for the change.

One can find a great variety of economies in which negative translations do not seem to function predominantly (using this qualification with the above reservations) — that is true, in fact, of the economies of most known societies. One such type is of particular interest. In this type we find instead of (or co-existing with) the situation "useful objects opposed to objects associated with ritual value" [$U : (E \pm E^t E^u) R$], an arrangement whereby the quantity of the useful objects becomes decisive. Useful objects are being hoarded and treasured, but the units thus treated are not dealt with in conformity to any mode of exchange or translation: they are not excluded from use by the owners. Yet the great quantity of these units is not related to the needs of usage; the stores have a value transcending the empirical value of the units. The empirical values are merely a component potential.

1. Seligman, C. G., The Melanesians of British New Guinea, Cambridge, at the University Press, 1910, p. 77.

2. Thurnwald, Richard, Werden, Wandel und Gestaltung der Wirtschaft, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1932, p. 179.

We find the non-empirical aspect of sheer quantity acting in the same way as $U : (E \pm E^t E^u) R$. In storage assembly of units it is not particular qualities of particular units which matter, but the quality of the organized whole. To make this clear, we may assume value units 1-100 which relate to the objects' usefulness as nutrition or clothing. We see then, that under certain conditions a storage assembly of $100n (U)$ exceeds the evaluation of $n(100 U)$, non-empirical assembly value overruling the empirical values contained in the units.

The greater the quantity of units in an organized assembly, the more numerous are the possibilities of arranging these units and the greater is the owner's power when expressed in terms of control of the assembly. In this context, it does not matter whether this assembly is a store of vegetable produce or a herd of animals.

Among the Trobriand Islanders the houses for the storage of yams

are built so that the quantity of the food can be gauged and its quality ascertained through the wide interstices between the beams. The yams are so arranged that the best specimens come to the outside and are well visible. Special varieties of yams, which grow up to two meters in length and weigh as much as several kilograms each, are framed in wood and decorated with paint, and hung on the outside of the yam houses. That the right to display food is highly valued can be seen from the fact that in villages where a chief of high rank resides, the commoners' storehouses have to be closed up with coconut leaves, so as not to compete with his.¹

These assemblies, says Malinowski, serve to enhance social prestige.

Magic is intended to make the food last long....
[It] will make food plentiful in the village and will make the supplies last long. But, and this is the important point for us, this magic is conceived to act not on the food, but on the inhabitants of the village. It

1. Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific, pp. 168-9.

makes their appetites poor, it makes them, as the natives put it, inclined to eat wild fruit of the bush, and mango and bread fruit of the village grove [not individually owned]; refuse to eat yams, or at least to be satisfied with very little. They will boast that when this magic is performed well, half of the yams will rot away in the storerooms and be thrown on...the rubbish heap at the back of the houses to make room for the new harvest.¹

It is important to recognize that the value transcending the utilitarian properties of the stored yams are confirmed by something that is nearly a resolution not to use it. The magical rites are rites of thrift and not of fertility. Only the fact that these objects are perishable makes the wastefulness of the procedure so obvious. This aspect of the attitude to value may be weaker, or may escape us altogether, when we consider, instead of yams, objects with properties which remain unchanged over longer periods — or better still, objects which reproduce or even multiply themselves.

The similarities between negative translations and assembly values of the Trobriand kind are striking. On the other hand, there is a similarity between Trobriand assembly values and those of people who apply such notions to their herded animals, where "wastefulness" is less prominent. Two features are common to negative translations and assembly values: the existence of values transcending the empirical ones, and the connection between the non-empirical value and the attitudes negating the empirical values. As the differences have already been stressed, the similarities can be summed up in the following manner: affirmation of non-empirical values is accompanied by and made possible by destruction or rejection of empirical values. These

1. Ibid., p. 169.

affirmations may be strengthened by ritual functions of the units of transcending value, as in the case of African cattle economies.

The principle stated above is general; it applies not only to simpler economies. After all, the conquest of Western civilization by a total money economy meant the bestowing of transcending values on money. The holding of money, the position in which a person's money is "working" for him and does not lie "idle," are aims the evaluation of which transcends the evaluation of the goods which can be purchased with this money and used. The rise of capitalist economy came in the guise of a gospel of saving and ascetic rejection of the use of goods. No reader of the works of Max Weber and Tawny can doubt the fact that this ascetic rejection was postulated in a religious terminology.

It is for the psychologist to state the ultimate affinities, or rejections, in favour of transcending values and of sacrifice; it cannot be the concern of the anthropologist. For the student of social anthropology who can see thrift and protestant ethics in connection with potlatches and Trobriand yam stores, a much discussed controversy loses its significance: whether puritanism had made capitalism or vice versa (Weber-Tawny). Moreover, if science were ever in need of an experiment to test the thesis of the relation between the transcending nature of economic values in modern civilization and a society's religious life, an experiment can be pointed out which took place on the hugest scale history can provide. After the first European war an inflation caused the loss of property of the German middle classes. This was followed in Protestant Germany by a complete disintegration of not merely what Weber called Wirtschaftsethik (itself

a Protestant departmentalization) but by the disintegration of the whole ideals and codes of the middle classes. No short-lived hardship, however severe, can account for a loss of confidence on such a scale.

For the most general aspect it is irrelevant which side — whether abstention from usage or glorification of transcending values — is reinforced by religion, or expressed in religious terminology. The inevitable is common to all forms: the acceptance of ownership of units of value as a virtuous state, and the disparaging of tendencies contrary to that virtue.

GLOSSARY OF SYMBOLS

	Value	E	Exchangeability
± U	Useful object	U^{\dagger}	Empirical value: $U \div E^u \div E^t = U^{\dagger}$
R	Ritual object		
T	Treasure	E^u	Exchangeability-of-useful-objects
		E^t	Exchangeability-of-treasure.

Though the last two symbols [E^u and E^t] are sometimes transcribed "exchangeable useful objects" or "exchangeable treasure" for purposes of convenience, the primary sense is always the exchangeability itself.

A PRECIS

of

Steiner, Franz, "Notes on Comparative Economics," The British Journal of Sociology, V, No. 2, 1954, 118-129.

In the introductory section the author states his intention to discuss: 1) the general interchangeability of goods (trade), 2) the process of increasing the utility of goods (production) and 3) the classification of economies "dependent primarily on exchange without the use of coin or paper money." However, the paper concentrates on the third, almost to the exclusion of the other two.

Abstracting from economies which make extensive use of money and are related to a complex class structure, he distinguishes two widely representative types of economies. The first type, a very simple primitive economy recognizes three groups of goods — foodstuffs and raw materials, implements (including clothing), and private treasure. The treasures are private in that they have no value that is generally recognized by other persons, but are similar to those objects which may be treasured by a child or a dog. The key distinguishing features of this first type of economy are two: 1) The social organization is concerned solely with the production of the first type of goods; 2) No object belonging to the first group is exchanged for objects of the other groups. Whatever exchange relations may exist between the implement and the treasure groups, there is no value relation or standard between these and the first group.

In this kind of society no wealth is accumulated, and no markets appear. The goods of the first group are produced by co-operative effort and distributed, or by households and families who distribute their surplus. Such distributions create feelings of solidarity which support continuing productive activity.

In the second type of economy the treasure objects either have a generally recognized ritual value, or they have a limited exchange value. Merely personal treasures are not recognized. The economy recognizes both objects whose value is utilitarian, and those whose value is ritual or treasure, or at least non-utilitarian. The utilitarian objects include some which may be used in exchange as standard units of value. Similarly the non-utilitarian group of objects includes some treasure of varying degrees of exchangeability which may be used in transactions. Thus there are four categories of objects: simply useful objects, useful objects with a recognized exchange value, treasure objects with a recognized exchange value, and objects of ritual value. The first three categories are "empirical" values.

Given these four categories a range of transactions is possible. Steiner defines barter as the exchange of a useful object directly for another useful object. Trade is the exchange of a useful object for a useful object or recognized exchange value, or the exchange of a useful object for an object which has recognized exchange value which is in turn exchanged for another useful object, or the corresponding transactions using an exchangeable treasure. The exchange of an exchangeable useful object for an exchangeable treasure is a financial

transaction similar to trade. The author distinguishes sharply between these barter and trade transactions, and those in which useful objects are used (directly or indirectly) to acquire ritual objects — a process which he calls "translation." He gives two main logical models of this process → positive and negative translation.

The general form of negative translation is the conversion of useful objects into purely ritual objects which have no exchangeable value whatever. With the acquisition of the ritual values this economic process comes to a full stop. The units of ritual value are "disengaged" from the economic circuit. Two clear examples are set out for us as prototypes. The first is that of the Yap Islanders who accumulate goods for years in order to acquire huge stone discs which, after an appropriate ceremony, are buried beneath their huts. While the stones do not participate in further economic transactions, their ritual value attaches to the status of the owner. In the author's second example, the Kwakiutl potlatch, the empirical values are transferred to the receivers, while units of ritual value proportionate to the units of empirical value attach to the status of the promoter of the affair. In the destructive variant of the potlatch the empirical values are destroyed, and the ritual values accrue to the promoter.

In this dead-ended negative translation the ritual value is set apart from and in contrast with the three "empirical" values. The positive translation illustrates a different grouping of values. The use value is seen in opposition to the other three, i. e., the ritual and exchangeable objects are now grouped together. These values may be wealth. Here, no units of wealth become completely disengaged from economic life, despite accumulation. (Thus this is positive

translation.)

Societies which stress this pattern may accumulate wealth, may trade and may have markets (in Steiner's sense) in varying degrees. The author's example is the Manus where a standardized business-like bartering goes on between the sea and the land people in the useful goods sector, while at the same time in a distinctly different economic process those of the sea people who are free from the immediate pressures of subsistence needs can accumulate spondylus shell strings, dogs' teeth and other forms of wealth. This wealth-hoarding is reflected in the rank system of the group, as is the ritual value in the groups stressing negative translation, and as attitudes reinforcing the system of production are created by the system of distribution in the first type of economy.

During his discussion of positive translation the author remarks on the existence of asymmetrical exchange ratios between land and sea peoples. Exchangeable goods here tend to be grouped in pairs, i.e., a sea-people's good tending to exchange for a complementary good of the land-people -- fish for taro, lime for betel nuts, etc. While taro may be obtained for lime, with the monopoly on taro and a strict quota on its export, a particularly high price in lime is asked for additional taro to coerce the sea-people into the wearisome preparing of the lime. This arrangement he says would break down with the introduction of a common denominator.

There is another type of economy which does not use the negative translation process, and in which a distinctive characteristic may function either instead of, or together with, the positive translation

value pattern. Here the decisive matter is the quantity of useful objects. Useful objects are hoarded, and while not excluded from the owner's use, they are not used in any transactions. This hoard of objects creates what the author calls "assembly value," a value "transcending" the total empirical value of the objects. Together with this transcending assembly value and reinforcing it are social values which encourage the hoarding. "The magical rites are rites of thrift, and not of fertility." Thus we have the Trobriand magic to make their appetites poor while the yams rot, and the Protestant virtue of thrift.

There is a striking relationship between negative translation and assembly value. Both stress a value transcending the empirical one, and the stress on the transcending value is accomplished by, or made possible by attitudes negating the empirical value. Accumulation is virtuous, and consumption is contrary to virtue.

This precis has tended to deal with Steiner's logical system, and may have obscured his awareness of the nature of the data which he seeks to explain. Behind these groupings of values lies the real world. "Subdivisions of this type are constituted by the various modes by which people integrate, classify and inter-relate the different groups or categories of objects."

The author has commented strongly on the lack of useful comparative studies. Such as we have are based on outdated material and obscure the problems in terminology that is worse than meaningless. This material can only be explained in terms of a precise and systematic frame of reference. His aim was to make a comprehensive contribution in this direction.

E. M. - TORONTO

Comments on Franz Steiner's "Notes on Comparative Economics"

Part One: Range of Subjects

Part Two: General Characteristics

Part Three: Points of particular Merit

Part Four: Critical remarks

PART ONE: RANGE

1. Classification of Economies: The investigation of the economy is limited to primitive and archaic societies of a simple class structure in which, however, money may be widely used for exchange except coin and paper money. (p. 119, 1.7 on money to be interpreted accordingly.)

2. Exchange: By exchange the vice-versa appropriational movement of objects is meant (corresponding to our "first" or operational level of exchange). Redistribution from a center and reciprocative gift giving are comprised under exchange. (p. 119, 1.36). An exchange of empirical objects for non-empirical "transcendent" values is construed as a (non-economic) extension of the economic cycle.

Exchange is not therefore dependent upon the presence of markets, whether at "set" or at fluctuating prices, neither are gainseeking motives nor higgling-haggling attitudes assumed.

For forms of integration cf. also "organization of labour."

3. Catallactic triad: Of the trade-money-market group of institutions money-objects may be said to be central here. They are represented by useful objects (U's) as have standardized exchange properties (p. 120, 1. 6 below) (our "quantifiable units") which makes them exchangeable --- a matter of degree attaching either to useful objects or to treasure

objects.

Trade is the exchange of useful objects for exchangeable utilities or exchangeable treasure objects (or for the further exchange of either of the latter for a different useful object (p. 120, bottom). There is no reference to distance.

Barter is the exchange of useful objects for other useful objects, with no higgling implied. (p. 120, bottom).

Markets are regular meetings between areas of productive units with or without professional negotiation, at regular intervals, at fixed prices. (p. 124, 1.20). The term market (p. 124, 1.25) should not cover both (a) regular meetings for exchange (as above), and (b) a situation in which surplus is deliberately produced for exchange, particularly if "market" implies "laws" of supply and demand. Steiner excludes the assumption of production for the market, especially in the form of creating surpluses of recognized treasure objects.

Market situations are defined (p. 120, 1.15) as situations where "demand conditions the distribution" (cf. also p. 125, 1.22).

4. Finance: Finance is the exchange of exchangeable useful objects for exchangeable treasures -- a kind of trade (p. 121, 1.11).

Our staple finance as an operational category is discriminated against in favor of "exchange." His approach is unfavourable to the recognition of staple finance, since the problems of storage and its redistribution are different from those of exchange-sequences. The role of equivalencies, especially substitutive ones, in this context are ignored.

5. Equivalencies: Under intertribal trade (e. g., New Guinea, p. 124, 1.33) "More or less stable" exchange rates are mentioned, not

primarily dependent on laws of supply and demand. Price or equivalency is always related to exchange, not also to substitution.

6. Patterns of Integration: Exchange is credited with comprising re-distributive and reciprocal patterns (p. 119, bottom), on the tribal and household level, including labour organization.

7. Organization of Labour: In the "first type" of primitive economy labour is not a recognized value on the contrary, addition of labour may 'remove' the value of the otherwise exchangeable object (e. g., meat).

On this level labour would be organized as "the members of the society respond to the distribution by actions of solidarity enabling further production." (p. 119, 144). This is applied both to goods "gained in a common enterprise and then distributed or gained by the various sub-units (households and families) who distribute their surplus." Our "methods of food distribution" are made pivotal to the labour organization in the "first type" of primitive society.

8. Prestige Phenomena: These are treated as criteria of "objects" either of treasure or of ritual value. The latter are described as of transcendent character, and analogous up to a point to assembly values, i. e., the valuation of quantity beyond the aggregate value of the units comprised.

Exchange may be accompanied by splitting of the value into a ritual value remaining with the giver and an empirical value passing to the recipient. (p. 122, 1.30).

PART TWO: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

1. This is an exchange approach which is limited to the economy (cf. disengagement, p. 122, 1.38), yet the economy is not presented as dominated by the market institution. On the other hand "exchange" is expanded so as almost to comprise the other forms of integration (p. 119, bottom).
2. The author insists on the need for comparative studies based on a system of adequate definitions.
3. His definitions are primarily operational, avoiding implied normativity. He employs symbolic notation for semantics.
4. Economistic associations of a psychological valuational order are avoided, such as gainfulness of motives, utilitarian value scales or competitive attitudes.

PART THREE: POINTS OF PARTICULAR MERIT

1. Market situations are not to be assumed, but their occurrence should be regarded as dependent upon specific conditions such as the presence of a general denominator or the inclusion of the partners in one society (p. 124, bottom).
2. The author attempts to determine the factors that would isolate the economic process from the non-economic sphere by the "disengaging" of objects from the economic cycle (p. 122, 1.37).
3. The appliance of labour to food or raw materials in an early type of primitive economy may "disengage" them from the economic cycle (p. 122, 1.6), as when meat loses exchangeability when cooked and prepared for consumption.

PART FOUR: CRITICAL REMARKS

There is a vagueness in the use of such terms as distribution, trade, markets, money uses, accumulation, surplus, equiva demand, and equivalencies, especially as related to other patterns than exchange.

The place of production and distribution in the economic process, as well as the place of the latter in society as a whole remains indeterminate.

limited liability

- (1) without market preference
- (2) no sep. money concept
- (3) " " " " " " " "
- (4) Dring government.

A precis of

Steiner, Franz, "Notes on Comparative Economics", The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. V, No. 2, 1954, pp. 118 - 129.

In the introductory section the author states his intention to discuss: 1) the general interchangeability of goods (trade), 2) the process of increasing the utility of goods (production) and 3) the classification of economies "dependent primarily on exchange without the use of coin or paper money". However, the paper concentrates on the third, almost to the exclusion of the other two.

Abstracting from economies which make extensive use of money and are related to a complex class structure, he distinguishes two widely representative types of economies. The first type, a very simple primitive economy recognizes three groups of goods -- foodstuffs and raw materials, implements (including clothing), and private treasure. The treasures are private in that they have no value that is generally recognized by other persons, but are similar to those objects which may be treasured by a child or a dog. The key distinguishing features of this first type of economy are two: 1) The social organization is concerned solely with the production of the first type of goods; 2) No object belonging to the first group is exchanged for objects of the other groups. Whatever exchange relations may exist between the implement and the treasure groups, there is no value relation or standard between these and the first group.

In this kind of society no wealth is accumulated, and no markets appear. The goods of the first group are produced by co-operative effort and distributed, or by households and families who distribute their surplus. Such distributions create feelings of solidarity which support continuing productive activity.

In the second type of economy the treasure objects either have a generally recognized ritual value, or they have a limited exchange value. Merely personal treasures are not recognized. The economy recognizes both objects whose value is utilitarian, and those whose value is ritual or treasure, or at least non-utilitarian. The utilitarian objects include some which may be used in exchange as standard units of value. Similarly the non-utilitarian group of objects includes some treasure of varying degrees of exchangeability which may be used in transactions. Thus there are four categories of objects: simply useful objects, useful objects with a recognized exchange value, treasure objects with a recognized exchange value, and objects of ritual value. The first three categories are "empirical" values.

Given these four categories a range of transactions is possible. Steiner defines barter as the exchange of a useful object directly for another useful object. Trade is the exchange of a useful object for a useful object ^{of} recognized exchange value, or the exchange of a useful object for an object which has recognized exchange value which is in turn exchanged for another useful object, or the corresponding transactions using an exchangeable treasure. The exchange of an exchangeable useful object for an exchangeable treasure is a financial transaction similar to trade. The author distinguishes sharply between these barter and trade transactions, and those in which useful objects are used (directly or indirectly) to acquire ritual objects -- a process which he calls "translation". He gives two main logical models of this process -- positive and negative translation.

The general form of negative translation is the conversion of useful

objects into purely ritual objects which have no exchangeable value whatever. With the acquisition of the ritual values this economic process comes to a full stop. The units of ritual value are "disengaged" from the economic circuit. Two clear examples are set out for us as prototypes. The first is that of the Yap Islanders who accumulate goods for years in order to acquire huge stone discs which, after an appropriate ceremony, are buried beneath their huts. While the stones do not participate in further economic transactions, their ritual value attaches to the status of the owner. In the author's second example, the Kwakiutl potlatch, the empirical values are transferred to the receivers, while units of ritual value proportionate to the units of empirical value attach to the status of the promoter of the affair. In the destructive variant of the potlatch the empirical values are destroyed, and the ritual values accrue to the promoter.

In this dead-ended negative translation the ritual value is set apart from and in contrast with the three "empirical" values. The positive translation illustrates a different grouping of values. The use value is seen in opposition to the other three, i.e., the ritual and exchangeable objects are now grouped together. These values may be wealth. Here, no units of wealth become completely disengaged from economic life, despite accumulation.

(Thus this is positive translation.)

Societies which stress this pattern may accumulate wealth, may trade and may have markets (in Steiner's sense) in varying degrees. The author's example is the Manus where a standardized business-like bartering goes on between the sea and the land people in the useful goods sector, while at the same time in a distinctly different economic process those of the sea people who are free from the immediate pressures of subsistence needs can accumulate spondylus shell strings, dogs' teeth and other forms of wealth. This wealth-

hoarding is reflected in the rank system of the group, as is the ritual value in the groups stressing negative translation, and as attitudes reinforcing the system of production are created by the system of distribution in the first type of economy.

During his discussion of positive translation the author remarks on the existence of asymmetrical exchange ratios between land and sea peoples. Exchangeable goods here tend to be grouped in pairs, i.e., a sea-people's good tending to exchange for a complementary good of the land-people -- fish for taro, lime for betel nuts, etc. While taro may be obtained for lime, with the monopoly on taro and a strict quota on its export, a particularly high price in lime is asked for additional taro to coerce the sea-people into the wearisome preparing of the lime. This arrangement he says would break down with the introduction of a common denominator.

There is another type of economy which does not use the negative translation process, and in which a distinctive characteristic may function either instead of, or together with, the positive translation value pattern. Here the decisive matter is the quantity of useful objects. Useful objects are hoarded, and while not excluded from the owner's use, they are not used in any transactions. This hoard of objects creates what the author calls "assembly value", a value "transcending" the total empirical values of the objects. Together with this transcending assembly value and reinforcing it are social values which encourage the hoarding. "The magical rites are rites of thrift, and not of fertility". Thus we have the Trobriand magic to make their appetites poor while the yams rot, and the Protestant virtue of thrift.

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E. M. - TORONTO

Comments on Franz Steiner's "Notes on Comparative Economics"

Part one; Range of SUBJECTS.

Part two: General characteristics

Part three; Points of particular merit

Part four; Critical remarks

PART ONE: RANGE

1. Classification of Economies; The investigation of the economy is limited to primitive and archaic societies of a simple class structure in which, however, money may be widely used for exchange except coin and paper money. (p. 119, 1.7 on money to be interpreted accordingly.)

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Exchange is not therefore dependent upon the presence of markets, whether at "set" or at fluctuating prices; neither are gainseeking motives nor higgling-haggling attitudes assumed.

For forms of integration of, also "organization of labour."

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Markets are regular meetings between areas of productive units with or without professional negotiation, at regular intervals, at fixed prices. (p. 124, 1.30) The term market (p.124, 1.25) should not cover both (a) regular meetings for exchange (as above), and (b) a situation in which surplus is deliberately produced for exchange, particularly if "market" implies "laws" of supply and demand. Steiner excludes the assumption of production for the market, especially in the form of creating surpluses of recognized treasure objects.

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On this level labour would be organized as "the members of the society respond to the distribution by actions of solidarity enabling further production." (p. 119, 1.44) This is applied both to goods "gained in a common enterprise and then distributed or gained by the various {sub-units (households and families) who distribute their surplus." Our "methods of food distribution" are made pivotal to the labour organization in the "first type" of primitive society.

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~~The same observation applies to his view of the place of production and distribution in the economic process, as well~~

The place of production and distribution in the economic process, as well as the place of the latter in society as a whole remains indeterminate.

Walter C. Neale

Comments on Steiner on Labor

Steiner says "labour is any socially integrating activity which is connected with human subsistence. . . and which thus presupposes, creates, and recreates social relationships." (p. 11)

I think the key, and the key to possible trouble, lies in "subsistence." Earlier (p. 10) labor is activity "in accord with laws of . . . society . . . in order to gain . . . livelihood." Steiner differentiates between activities irrelevant to the group (sports) and those which assure a role in the group. Agreed that economics (labor) is of the latter sort. But so are many non-economic (and therefore not-labor?) activities. Question remains of where to draw the line (of a borderland march). In Steiner this is decided in terms of "livelihood" or "subsistence."

Of these two terms "livelihood" is certainly the better since it has a greater inclusiveness. "Subsistence" is either food or food and shelter, but has to be stretched to include beer and china, and stretched much too far to include movies and night-club singers. "Livelihood" includes these, but actually "livelihood" is not synonymous with "subsistence" for Steiner's purposes. "Subsistence" defines in terms of the immediate product of the activity, while "livelihood" defines in terms of the activities which result in the acquisition of subsistence goods. Thus we arrive at the point where what one does for a "livelihood" is "labor", and I am afraid that "livelihood" becomes itself defined in terms of "labor."

To a large extent the material-means-of-want-satisfaction definition solves the problem, for "labor is that activity which produces the material means." I think one might add "socially integrating" before "activity."

The real problem arises in regard to "services." To the economist it is apparent that there are satisfying or useful streams-of-utility which have no material embodiment: personal services, medical advice, dancing for the entertainment of others. The question is when are these economic services (Natch girls?) and when non-economic activities (sermons?). If it is integrative activity leading to livelihood, virtually every integrating activity becomes economic (labor) and we really have no particular field of study. If it is integrative activity in ^{the} area of subsistence, too much that would commonly be called labor -- and rightly so -- would be left out.

It was this problem of services (non-material means of satisfying wants) which I dealt with in my previous note, "The Substantive Definition of the Economy: Services and Material Want Satisfaction." The difficulty has been that the activity itself is not clearly economic or non-economic (singing in night-clubs and singing in church) and that the particular wants satisfied are not clearly economic or non-economic. The latter approach has been attempted through arguing that utilitarian wants ("lower order of wants" in Jevon's phrase) are economic, but wants are physical or psychological and while some are pleasant and some necessary (in how many senses?), no satisfactory line has been drawn (for the paid painter satisfies higher aesthetic wants).

It seems that the answer is to ignore the quality of the activity or of the want, and concentrate on the organizing institutions. Where the service is organized in the same way by the same institutions which organize the provision of material means, the service is labor and is economic, and this implicitly includes the "integrative" idea.

The difficulty with the Steiner is related to the difficulty of the utilitarian school: each depends on a word ("subsistence" or "utility") to which we cannot give a satisfying definition.

(2)
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August 0th

Dear Dr. Polanyi:

Enclosed the note. I've been off camping with my son & so have not read the Behannan-Steiner, although I did start it. Barbara read it & says it is good.

All the best,

Walter

Report on a (1.) discussion of the late

~~The program was to discuss the late~~

Franz Steiner's "Notes on ~~Primitive~~ ^{COMPARATIVE} Economics" (1954) edited by Prof. Paul Bohannan whose work on the Tiv people had excited our interest.

led us to the work of his friend Steiner.

~~Prof. Kronberg in the chair commented on the program for the near future which would likely include money-uses broadly, and the narrower topics of debt-bondage and capital accumulation. There is nothing in anthropology on capital accumulation or public works except in the field of religion, and the suspect case of some leiturgies, e.g., in India and North America. On money-uses there is~~

Prof. Bohannan provided us with background material about Steiner the man. Steiner, late lecturer ⁱⁿ at the Institute of Social Anthropology, Oxford, was ^{born in Austria and held} a Prague Ph.D. in linguistics. He was a man of exceptional ability and erudition, a poet who studied and taught social anthropology for a livelihood. His major work in anthropology was his research on labour -- labour everywhere in all types of societies -- how it was viewed, how organized, the division of labour, etc.

Steiner's original manuscript and all the related notes were lost in a train, but the author had reconstructed a part of his material before his death. Some of this, dealing with slavery is forthcoming in a book being prepared by Dr. Bohannan. Unfortunately the material will be much abridged -- not by Dr. Bohannan's wishes, but because of the requirements of Steiner's literary executors.

Steiner denied that there ^{is} ^a such (thing) as economic relationships. There are only social relationships. Economics can no more be compared in economists' terms than systems of jurisprudence can be discussed in lawyers' terms. Such aspects of society can only be discussed by the institutional method.

Dr. Bohannan then went on to discuss his field work among the Tiv people which had been greatly influenced by Steiner through discussions during trips home from the field. The basic requisite for anthropology field research is proficiency in the language of the people. With the language the researcher can search for his data, and for the concepts about which they organize their lives, and then for the concepts about which he, at second remove, can organize his views.

The Tiv, a subsistence agricultural people in the Benue Valley

of Northern Nigeria, organize a large part of their lives about the farm, and in farm terms of reference. Another key organizing sphere is the "kasoa", the market. "Kasoa" significantly would seem to be a trader's word, being used by various tribes even as far as the Swahili of the western Sudan.

To the Tiv, "kasoa" has many ramifications, but the two principal usages refer to a non-economic social institution and to a specifically economic exchange institution involving subsistence goods.

In the former social aspect the market is a meeting place for all sorts of disagreements which are settled by the authorities. On tribal marginal areas tribes may mingle under the peaceful auspices of the market magic. Groups of people at war may send representatives to a neutral market to meet under the peace of the market.

The economic aspect of the market functions almost entirely within the subsistence sphere of the economy, and is replacing the older sphere of reciprocative gift-giving between kin-groups. The individual market is a unit in a system of feeder markets in which items may move into a big central market and then out to other units. In this market they do butcher cattle, not their own, but animals bought from outside.

The Tiv have three indigenous economic spheres: (1) food, native-made cloth, and pots; (2) Slaves, cattle, brass rods, and tugudu cloth; and (3) Rights in women. These spheres are ranked in order of prestige. The brass rods have an acknowledged exchange value. Dr. Bohannan doubts that the Tiv used to take brass rods to market despite their assertions, and suggests that they may have taken yams. The brass retains its exchange value when made into ornaments.

Money, introduced recently, has broken down the customary barriers between the indigenous spheres, with the result that the Tiv are now selling to much of their very food to exporting traders, and the price of brides is correspondingly inflated.

Dr. Bohannan provoked an enthusiastic theoretical discussion among the group by his suggestion that the Tiv might be viewed in terms of a "necessary distribution" of goods and services, of prestige, and of women with the relations between persons being determined by their relation or "cathexis" to objects. He suggested that while this does not provide an explanation of how the distribution is arranged, how it happens, still it does provide a framework, which no other theory does.

Prof. Polanyi suggested alternatively that we might regard the economy as an institutionalized process with permanence and unity. The economy might be separated from the rest of society in terms of Steiner's "disengagement." Further, he suggested that the meaning of "cathexis" might be included within our "appropriational movements" which covers all possible connotations of economic relations of persons to things.

Prof. Arensberg observed that this leaves all the who and the what of the relations to the anthropologists.

2:30 p.m., May 28, 1957.

The afternoon session began at 2:30 p.m. Dr. Polanyi, in the chair, gave a brief talk illustrating from his material several topics on which the work of Steiner and Bohannan seemed likely to shed considerable light. After a brief discussion of the definitions of money-uses, equivalencies and patterns of integration, in order to familiarize Prof. Bohannan with the conceptual background, Prof. Polanyi took up the data on elite circulation and a configuration of related institutions -- poor man's money, poor man's markets, ranking of currency, money as an operational device, etc.

Elite circulation is the exchange of items of a certain group of pretige goods only for other items of the same group, and taking place only among a certain select group of persons. This situation has appeared broadly in archaic societies, with the outstanding example being the large movements of gold from Croesus to the Alcmeonids.

At the other end of the scale there are a few rare but important bits of evidence that there has been in certain places at certain times "poor man's money", used for the purchase of poor man's food.

Ibn Batutah records that in Gogo in the 14th century there were two ^{non-interchangeable} kinds of money: thick iron wires for the purchase of superior goods, and thin iron wires for which only meat (poor man's food in Gogo) and firewood could be acquired. The thin wires could buy nothing else, but nothing else could buy meat and firewood. Barrett, a British official in Ormuz in records two different lengths to the ell -- one for measuring fine cloths, and another two-thirds as long again for measuring the poor man's cheap cloth.

Over vast areas of space and time poor man's markets have functioned in which only the poor obtained their food in return for poor man's money. This would seem to have been the first function of the market. Some sources suggest that the King gave cowries to the poor. Further sources suggest that the King may send oxen to the market to be slaughtered for the poor. While the data cannot produce positive conclusions, there is overwhelming evidence of the government's concern with the peoples' food in the market.

The topic of money includes the use of money objects as operational devices in which they serve other purposes than their specifically money use. Exchange of goods may be measured by each man counting his goods in terms of the other's. Thus equality is maintained step-by-step to the conclusion of the overall transaction. Ezekiel 27 says that they reckoned in goods. Aristotle uses the terms "stoichos" and (peg and limit).

Prof. Polanyi concluded with a suggested question for HRAF: "In what situations do we find prices but no market?"

Prof. Pearson took off a discussion on the methodological implications of the Steiner paper. If we are interested in comparative and developmental studies, our main interest in Steiner would be his ⁱⁿ treatment of prestige circulation and institutions. He contrasted Steiner's first, closed subsistence economy with his second which broadens into equivalencies, exchange of prestige goods, etc., and seems to focus on the relation ~~between~~ of prestige factors with the subsistence economy. The speaker has already done some work dealing with prestige institutions as mobilizers, setting in motion economic activity, and suggested that further enlightenment might come from further investigation into the problem of the extent to which prestige alone (i.e., involving no quid pro quo) can command the resources and services of others.

Steiner is relevant to an old problem of Mr. Hazard's -- how to deal with the inter-linking of the prestige and subsistence sectors and yet differentiate between them. It would be marvellous to find a sharp border, but Mr. Hazard assigns a low rating to the probabilities. For example, he asked, does the potlatch handle the local and appropriational features of both the feasts and normal every-day consumption? Further, regarding prestige institutions, Mr. Hazard suggested that the power of the chief among the North West Indians may not be a fixed institut-

ionalized thing rising out of the chieftainship alone. It may in fact be dependent to a considerable degree on the personal attributes of the individual, and the willingness of his supporters.

Mr. Hazard included some obiter dicta on problems of contradictory evidence, suggesting some possible explanations. While there may be a fundamental misunderstanding on the part of one of some of the observers, it may, alternatively, be that the statements come from different periods of history (cf. the cataclysmic changes on the North West Coast). Too, the information may have come from persons of different rank.

Prof. Palanyi suggested that conflicting statements may also come from the same person speaking in different roles. He added some remarks on the seemingly equivocal position of persons in positions of great prestige or power. It often seems that their views of their station brand them as consummate liars (cf. Stacy's assumption that the monarchy of Dahomey was a purely Machiavellian device for the benefit of the family.) A more reasonable first approximation might be to state the reverse probability -- that they are all sincere -- and then qualify this position.

The group returned to the topic of Steiner on prestige and wealth and how to account for wealth. Exchange between objects of equal status can never produce a surplus. Steiner may have made a contribution by providing ~~an~~ theoretical scheme for the exchange of objects of rank differences which may allow for capital accumulation.

Prof. Arensberg gave an example of capital accumulation in the religious sphere from Robertson Smith's views on the development of shrines in . From this Prof Arensberg mentioned the possibility that capital accumulation in the form of certain kinds of public works may arise from a kind of emotional spontaneous mass action.

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