

# COMMITTEE OF CORRESPONDENCE



p. 6  
newsletter

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CONCERNING THREE CHALLENGES TO AMERICAN RESPONSE

A Supplement to the September 15, 1961 Issue

Letter from Berlin  
by Rolf Meyersohn

Leaving West Germany, we drove to the Helmstedt crossing, where we had to fill out two sets of papers, one a transit visa application (for 10DM per adult, free for the children), the other a statement about how much currency we carried; an additional 5DM charge for using the autobahn (in West Germany they are free); at the same time, the time of entering the DDR was stamped; if one drives too fast there is a fine at the other end, if one dallies too long there is apparently also a fine. (In West Germany there is no speed limit and one is accustomed to driving more or less as fast as the car will go -- in our case 140-160 kms--80-100 miles-- per hour, on the DDR autobahn there is a 100 km per hour speed limit.) While I filled out the forms (which are more or less the same forms we had filled out for Jugoslavia) I talked to a couple of American boys who were also driving over (there were also various other foreign nationals: Italians, Finns, and some Africans) and who wondered -- as we did -- whether this was a bit foolhardy. The Vopos (Volkspolizei) were very polite with us and handled the red tape with at least as much efficiency as their West German brothers.

The 170 kilometers until Berlin seemed much longer since there is no light, no city, no diversion along the way, other than a couple of gas stations, and when we arrived in Berlin we were already impressed, simply by the light. West Berlin is really a metropolitan city, with very wide boulevards, all kinds of modern buildings, greenery, impressive vistas, and the rest. I understand that after the war, city planners made a master plan for Berlin, which may take 100 years to be achieved, but already now building permits are given only on this basis. The city is not vulgar, but still one feels a sense of splashiness and luxuriousness which, especially in contrast with East Berlin (which is not much rebuilt), gives a feeling that democracy=capitalism=consumer heraldry, which is placing the emphasis rather on the wrong symbols. That freedom should be equated with the good capitalistic life may not really be the message we want to give the East Germans, but that is how it looks. Our impressions though (and they are indeed first impressions) are that Berlin is an exciting adventure architecturally; it reminds me a bit of Los Angeles in its size and decentralization and some of its shops. I rather doubt that the communists would ever want the city -- they wouldn't know where to begin to turn it into one of theirs. One does not feel that this is an isolated island, perhaps because the area is quite large, perhaps because I haven't been here long enough to absorb the islanders spirit. I suppose during the airlift such a feeling was more apparent.

When I submitted my visum at the border I asked the Vopo whether I could get into East Berlin; he said, yes it is not forbidden and I am welcome to visit; one needs no special permission. But when I came into Berlin and had my papers examined by the West German police again, the policemen expressed great skepticism that I could get in (when I asked him the same question), and seemed to think I was insane to try.

Yesterday morning I tried to get into Marienfelde, but no success. The US Mission, which was supposed to get me the pass (they have a vast complex vis-a-vis the US Army base, PX, etc.) said sorry they couldn't, because in the past couple of weeks there has been so much processing work with all the refugees that no visitors are allowed (other than vip's).

We decided not to drive into East Berlin, in part because I didn't know where the entrance way was (the communists are building walls around E. Berlin now, replacing the barbed wire), in part because one needs a special permit, in part because we didn't want to be conspicuous, and finally because one can see more on the subway (which is really an elevated). So we parked our car at Zoo Station, took the S-Bahn to Ludwig Str., along with only a few other people, got out, walked down the stairs, and didn't know whether we were still in W. Berlin or already in E. Berlin. There was a passport check control booth, which at the time I thought was West German, but turned out to Vopo, which we went through with out trouble (along with throngs of other people, almost all West Berliners). And now we were in East Berlin; tourist signs to visit Czechoslovakia, notices of the Sunday proclamation to the East Berliners that they were no longer permitted to go to West Berlin, were plastered all over. We went to the station restaurant for lunch (I had bought for 1.00 DM, 50 Ostmark, but this was illegal and I had to use DM to pay for our lunch -- the waitress asked to see our passport, as did everyone with whom we had any monetary exchange). The prices in Ost Mark were identical to West German prices (70 pfennig for coffee -- but in E. Berlin very bad coffee; --1.50 for a ham sandwich, etc. and present 1:5 relationship of the currencies is unrealistic in terms of buying power -- except that one can't buy very much in East Berlin, other than books and food, and the latter is also a bit scarce. It is expected that the East / West currency relationship will get worse, and the refugees will have a hard time exchanging their money unless there is some government guarantee. No napkins available, a dirty tablecloth, generally unpainted, drab appearance, but the waitress very nice, and helpful. I forgot my sweater there; it was hanging on the same hook five hours later when I came back for it.

I then tried to call the man whose name my friend at the University of Frankfurt had given me, had to wait for ages for a phone, had trouble getting East German currency to put in telephone booth (there as here 20 pfennigs), finally reached the Univ. and he was told he moved, got his new address. We took a taxi there. When I asked the cab driver to drive us to the address via some interesting route so we could see something, he said, "Oh, there's really nothing to see here" and took us the shortest way. The ride cost 2.20, and I didn't find any small currency, so gave him 20 West DM; he shrank away, asked what he was supposed to do with that, told me he could only give me East DM change; I said that's ok, but fumbled around and scraped up 2.20 in West DM, which I gave him, much to his relief. It is apparently illegal for him to have West DM, and of course for us to have Ost DM. We were in Berlin-Mitte, a very drab neighborhood (though no drabber than what we saw of the rest of East Berlin), with bomb scars still showing, no flower boxes (something West Germany is rather over-decorated with), few curtains, women hanging out of all windows, few cars on street. I left Mary Lea and the children outside (in the light rain) to look around and hopefully find a playground (there was none in the neighborhood) while I dropped in on him. He lived in an enormous "Mietskaserne" (rent-barracks) built in the 20s or so,

Incredibly depressing looking, with a series of courtyards -- all empty, paved, with not even clotheslines --.

The bell didn't work so I finally knocked; the door was opened by a very attractive and well dressed young woman (around 25), who turned out to be his girl friend (or maybe wife?), and was also waiting for him. She is a West Berliner and their romance has apparently been carried on across the divided city; she was resigned to being prevented crossing sooner or later and neither talked about this rather likely prospect.

After around a half hour Braun came in; a very tall, blond, young looking man, serious and with a friendly face. He welcomed me cordially when he heard who I was and that I was a friend of X. I told him about the AFSC and their concern, and right off he asked whether I wanted to meet the East Berlin Quaker group (I said no, I didn't think I had time, though of course I would like to), and let me ask him questions. I didn't ask him what he thought, but rather used him as an informant -- though he made it clear that he is a communist, doesn't like Ulbricht but wants to live in the DDR and hopes things may some day be better.

He thought that about 30% of the people would vote for Ulbricht if there were an election, that on the whole the regime is unpopular, but there is nothing that can be done about it, so one might as well make the best of it, that the Western propaganda, especially RIAS only make things worse, that a number of people still hope the Americans will do something to liberate the East Germans.

About the closing of the border He told me the reaction of his uncle, a monarchist during the First World War, then a good Weimar republican, later an officer under Hitler, and then in the opposition movement who reacted "mit Humor and Ironie." There is a feeling on the one hand that the border must be closed to protect the state; so long as it was open one couldn't seriously establish the socialist society so long as this illusion of freedom existed, and this population drain. In this sense the closing is a relief, because it helps give a more realistic state, in which people can become committed. On the other hand (and I asked about this) there is a feeling of being trapped, but like being trapped in a marriage or a job (he didn't say this, but I think he meant it). This reality would be strengthened if the DDR is recognized, and he expressed very forcefully the hope that once the DDR is recognized the illusions (e.g. that the US will liberate the people, that there might be an uprising which would succeed, etc.) would really disappear.

Is Poland a model for what the DDR might achieve: No, too much dislike of the Poles because of the Oder-Neisse; the SU is the symbol; in Moscow one can say or do anything; there the DDR and Ulbricht, are regarded as a joke, as silly, as Stalinists. But there is (to continue this paraphrase) a great deal of freedom in the DDR; if one is a socialist one can say anything against the regime one feels like; if one is not a socialist, one can, also, but most people don't dare (sic!)

He told me he had just come from the Markthalle (an indoor outdoorlike market) where he spoke with the man who sells hardwares; everytime he sees him the man makes very critical statements about Ulbricht, and today again; "I don't think he knows I am a socialist party member; if he knew he might not say these things to me, but on the other hand he is the sort of man who might say them to anybody -- nothing would happen to him."

Can one listen to RIAS or is it illegal? He: yes, anybody can listen. His girl friend (who is against Adenauer and Ulbricht studies in West Berlin and plans to become

a teacher): "Oh, come on; it's not allowed." He: "It's allowed, but it is forbidden to tell others what one has heard." In general, there is (or was) a great deal of contact between East and West Berlin, some of which -- like the radio -- will of course continue.

What about the agricultural crisis? There is an economic crisis, but not so bad as the West claims; the industry has been retooled in the past 1½ years and this has caused difficulties. The collectivization has not worked out so well, partly because of the weather -- the ground has been too soft to use the machines that had been bought, etc. Christmas time he and girlfriend went to a farm, and he talked to the farmer, who agreed that large scale farming is better than small scale farming, also agreed that it could be done in a socialistic and not necessarily capitalistic way, but said it would take two generations for it to work. Why? Because -- and a number of contradictory and inconsistent things came out -- 1) the managers don't understand anything about farming, so that nobody feels much like working; 2) who knows whether this DDR will last, and maybe we'll get our lands back for ourselves -- perhaps Russia and the US will make a deal, and the US will give Russia something (maybe Laos or South Vietnam or South Korea) in exchange for East Germany; 3) there's going to be an atom war and nothing makes any difference.

She: If the people got what they wanted (to be part of Bundes-republik under Adenauer) they wouldn't like it because they've become so used to various socialist things, want both private property and socialism. (Apparently even among the refugees there is much support for socialized industry and medicine, Etc.)

In West Germany much talk about German Volk, divided country, etc. How about here? Not so much. Nationalism is kept down, except by some groups in regime; seen as dangerous. Is DDR in favor of two Germanys? No, not really; there is belief that eventually West Germany will go socialist, until then there will be two states; best would be a kind of federation. Very much afraid of atom arming of Bonn. (I said I'm equally afraid of atom arming of DDR, and he didn't say anything but was not offended.)

Mary Lea and the children came upstairs for a minute to say that the taxi came back (though we hadn't asked him -- I think he had nothing else to do, knew that we'd want to get back later), and they left, I stayed on. (We were all a bit nervous, since we had no special permission to visit, weren't sure whether this was necessary; also I had my new Leica with me, and this seemed foolish. I stayed on, we drank some wine (Hungarian,) smoked some cigarettes (Bulgarian) and he mentioned two books that I must read, one a Marxist analysis of early Greek thought by George Thompson, the other a French book called PHENOMENOLIE MATERIALISME DIALECTIQUE by a Vietnamese named Tran Duc Thao. We talked a bit about Adorno, and he asked me about Leo Lowenthal and Herbert Marcuse. On the trolley ride to the restaurant where we ate supper he told his girl friend that on their first date he mentioned Leo Lowenthal's article on biographies, in connection with her telling him that her mother was just reading Zweig's autobiography. He mentioned the Lowenthal thesis. She said jokingly that at the time he didn't mention that it wasn't his own idea (which he denied vehemently), and I suggested it might have never lead to a second date had she thought it was not his own idea. All very gay, and far from believable that on a trolley in East Berlin we'd be talking about dear old Leo. (The faces in East Berlin as Braun pointed out to me are grim -- I had asked him what the Berliners reaction to the border closing was, and he said: the only reaction can be seen on their faces.) I of course couldn't tell, since in Yugoslavia the faces had also been grim (before we went to Yugoslavia the Sillscs wrote us to find out whether the J's are so sullen because they're Slavs or because they're communists).

My hosts tried to make arrangements for me to meet with a friend of theirs, who is an actor in the Berliner Ensemble (the Brecht theater), and the plan was that after supper we would meet with him; but he could not make it, and since I was really tired by then, I left. (Also I hadn't told Mary Lea I'd be gone so long, and I knew she'd start worrying -- the border passing is not a pleasant affair; at least three different set of Vopos looked at my passport on the way back to West Berlin -- despite what the newspapers here in West Berlin say, there are a lot of visitors to East Berlin; or at least, a number of West Germans passed through the gate with me. On the platform was a subway train that he been completely wrecked, and had large Communist banners on it, cursing Bonn and the West Germans for their destructiveness. (At least one West Berlin newspaper suggested this morning that the Reds did the damage themselves, for propaganda purposes.)

The restaurant was pleasant enough and the food was not bad, but by then I got tense and was tired, so we didn't talk very much more. The girl friend said that she had an indescribable feeling of Sehnsucht, perhaps brought on by hunger, and it became clear that I ought to go soon, in part because the sight of a freefloating American who is taking a ship to the US in 2 days may have been too much for her, in part because she and Braun hadn't been together for a week (he just came back from visiting his family), in part because of the impending closing of the border for her. In paying for the bill there was some to-do again, since I had to pay in Western DM but didn't have anything smaller than 100 DM bills; in the end I gave my host the 40 DM Eastern currency which I had bought before crossing the border and told him for the difference he could send me a book sometime.

Some earlier conversation was about the future: I asked whether one could stand living in the DDR if one didn't believe in the future as he did or I guess I said wasn't future oriented. He said most people are not, though of course it helps. The important thing is not to have false hopes, and the border has helped wipe out false hopes. (Not all hopes?) No, it replaces one set of hopes with another set of hopes, which for the DDR are more constructive. We didn't discuss the tyrannical aspects of the regime, since I don't think he took them seriously.

The mood in West Berlin is highly militant, at least in the press. Berliners themselves are watching silently as the Communists build a wall around their sector. (Every night it grows. I asked my host whether he ever read Hersey's "The Wall" about the Warsaw ghetto; he hadn't but he knew what I meant -- at the time we were in the subway station, watching worker building a wall in the middle of it.)

The papers here refer to East Berlin and the DDR as a KZ (concentration camp) and earlier in the week the tabloids had banner headlines THE WEST DOES NOTHING. Brandt's speech to the 50,000 or 500,000 (depending on what newspaper you read) was also very aggressive, though for once Adenauer seems to be a restraining voice, and Kennedy too -- though God knows what Lyndon Johnson will tell the people here this afternoon. (We decided to leave Berlin this afternoon rather than early tomorrow morning to avoid the crowds and to be sure that we can get out. With 1,500 US soldiers coming in on the Autobahn, there will undoubtedly be some delays -- let's hope nothing worse. So far the DDR has been very careful to keep up the rights of the Allies, and though there are threats of economic sanctions (which would only make things worse) these haven't materialized as yet.

The aunt of the girlfriend was very pleased when the border was closed; she was equally pleased at the throng of refugees fleeing -- both she thought helped weaken the DDR which as a result might collapse and then there'd be freedom.

We're going out now.

(August 19, 1961)

The New Communist  
Program  
by Erich Fromm

The new communist program (full text published in The New York Times, August 1, 1961) is a most illuminating document, because more clearly than any previous publication, it gives a picture of the nature of Khrushchevism and its plans for the future.

The program is a peculiar mixture of crude and oversimplified Marxism, Leninist phrases, welfare state ideals, capitalistic materialism, Calvinistic work ethics, and Victorian morality. It is characterized by a deteriorated concept of socialism, by a reformist and evolutionary strategy for the achievement of socialism, and, most importantly, by the central role of the wish for international peace.

The program can only be understood properly in the context of communist ideology, and in the historical context of a comparison with the Chinese position. Anyone who reads the program without knowledge of these various frames of reference may, for instance, think that a phrase like that which speaks of the "inevitable collapse of capitalism" and the final victory of communism are aggressive statements, or even, as The New York Times editors put it "a new declaration of war against the free world." What such interpretations do not understand is that Marxist theory (even the crude form contained in the communist program) is a historical theory, which assumes that changes in productive forces lead to changes in social and political forms, and that just as feudalism was followed by capitalism, so capitalism will be followed by socialism. The prediction, and by no means a declaration that capitalism must be overthrown by violent means. What matters is not the prediction of the ultimate victory of communism, but the method by which the new program promises to achieve this end.

The most important point in this respect is the fact that the program constitutes a move from a revolutionary to an evolutionary and near-reformist position. Naturally the program cannot say so, but nevertheless this is the fact, which becomes clear if one analyzes the pertinent formulations. The program emphasizes that socialism will win by the example of a more perfect social organization, and especially of the economic superiority of communism. It stresses that such a victory should be achieved by "peaceful means," by "winning a solid majority in parliament." It defines dictatorship of the proletariat as "the dictatorship of an overwhelming majority," thus returning to Marx, and turning away from Lenin's "substitutionist" theory of the avant garde. In spite of predicting the final collapse of capitalism, the program makes certain important concessions: 1) that "capitalism may still flourish at particular times and in particular countries." 2) That "the working class of many countries can, even before capitalism is overthrown, compel the bourgeoisie to carry out measures that transcend ordinary reforms and are of vital importance to the working class and the progress of its struggle for socialism, as well as to the majority of the nation." 3) That even while part of the world is capitalistic, the aim of universal peace can be achieved. (The latter two assumptions are clearly in contrast to traditional communist teaching.)

The program's attitude toward social democratic parties points in the same direction. Even though they are criticized, the wish for cooperation with them is expressed. But the criticism is mainly directed against "right-wing socialists" -- again a distinction which was not customary in communist thinking.

It is of special importance to examine how Yugoslavia and China, respectively, are dealt with in the program. Yugoslavia is, of course, criticized in the program, but in an unusually mild way. It is said that "the Yugoslav leaders, by their revisionist policy, contraposed Yugoslavia and the socialist camp to the international communist movement thus threatening the loss of the revolutionary gains of the

Yugoslav people." (My italics.) Immediately after this sentence the program mentions China in the following eleven words: "The victory of the revolution in China was of special importance." Considering China's claims, this sentence is, certainly, a slap in the face. It is characteristic of the same attitude toward China that later in the program a criticism of Yugoslav "revisionism" is expressed in a parallel way to the criticism of "dogmatism and sectarianism," which are the conventional terms used when China is referred to.

*Overlooked the last minute version on China*

From the standpoint of American policy, the most important emphasis of the program is that on peace and co-existence. The program states that its aim can be fulfilled under the conditions of peace, and that the prevention of a new world war is "the focal problem of today." It is very interesting and in contrast to some of the Chinese utterances, that the appeal is made "to deliver mankind from a World War of extermination" and that the "all-destructive character of nuclear war" is mentioned in other passages without saying that it would hit mainly the capitalist camp. Only once is such an allusion made; after saying "peaceful co-existence or disastrous war -- such is the alternative offered by history," the program adds "should the imperialist aggressors nevertheless venture to start a new world war, the people will no longer tolerate a system which drags them into devastating wars. They will sweep imperialism away and bury it."

"General, complete disarmament, under strict international control" is mentioned several times as the safest road to a durable peace.

The attitude to the new sovereign states and the colonial revolution is also very interesting. In the first place the program states that "the young sovereign states do not belong either to the system of imperialist states or to the system of the socialist states." The program thus reaffirms the position taken before by Khrushchev, of the friendly recognition of neutrality of the non-committed states. Furthermore, the program asks only for "the elimination of the remnants of colonialism, the eradication of imperialist rule, the ousting of foreign monopolies, the foundation of a national industry, the abolition of the feudal system and its survivals, the implementation of radical land reforms, with the participation of the entire peasantry and in its interests, the pursuit of an independent foreign policy of peace, the democratization of the life of society and the strengthening of political independence. The solution of national problems is in the best interest of all patriotic and progressive forces of the nation." This is a relatively modest program for the colonial peoples, in fact essentially one to which the United States would agree. The program furthermore makes allowances for the participation of "the national bourgeoisie in the policy of the colonial nations," and analyses the dual character of this bourgeoisie. The program furthermore stresses the positive role which the neutral states can play by saying "the national states become ever more active as an independent force on the world scene....The countries and peoples that are now free from colonial oppression are to play a prominent part in the prevention of a new world war -- the focal problem of today." The fact that the program approves of "just anti-imperialist wars of liberation" by colonial peoples is nothing more than the expression of traditional Soviet sympathy with colonial liberation movements such as the Algerian, but cannot possibly be construed as part of a "new declaration of war."

The program speaks at length of the final abolition of the communist party, and the withering away of the state, and of fully developed democratic procedures. While this is in complete contrast to the totalitarian nature of the present Russian regime, the emphasis on these points plus emphasis on decentralization, which is somewhat more real in the present Russian situation, indicates at least a tendency to greater

freedom which, regardless of how much Khrushchev wishes it, is a concession which has to be made to the Russian population and which is of the same urgency as that of increased material satisfaction.

The new communist program not only is quite distinct from the more aggressive features of older communist tactics, it is basically different from the spirit of Marxist socialism. Nothing could be more telling than the statement which defines "the socialist principle" as one "which insures that the members of society have a material interest in the fruits of their labour." Indeed, this principle has been accepted in Western capitalism for many decades, and cannot be called a socialist principle. The whole concept of socialism in the program is that of a state-directed and owned economy which operates more efficiently than capitalism, and the last aim of which is the better economic performance for the people as a whole. Socialism in this program is not, as it was for Marx, a new society transcending capitalism, but one similar in spirit.

What the program promises in economic terms for the population as a result of further successful development does not transcend in essence the achievements of capitalist welfare states. Free medicine, schooling, books, higher education, and even the abolition of rents and public transportation fees are hardly very utopian aims. Some of them have been long realized in England and Scandinavia (although this fact is strictly omitted from the program). Even a measure about which there were many rumors before the program was published, like free bread, is not contained in the program.

While the economic aims of the program are those of a fully developed welfare state, the human aims are more reactionary than those of most capitalistic countries. This becomes very clear in the description of the communist moral principles: "the Party holds that the moral code of the builder of communism should comprise the following principles:

"Devotion to the Communist cause, love of the Socialist motherland and of the other Socialist countries;

"Conscientious labor for the good of society -- he who does not work, neither shall he eat;

"Concern on the part of everyone for the preservation and growth of public wealth;

"A high sense of public duty, intolerance of actions harmful to the public interest;

"Collectivism and comradely mutual assistance: one for all and all for one;

"Humane relations and mutual respect between individuals -- man is to man a friend, comrade and brother;

"Honesty and truthfulness, moral purity, modesty and guilelessness in social and private life;

"Mutual respect in the family, and concern for the upbringing of children;

"An uncompromising attitude to injustice, parasitism, dishonesty, and careerism;

"Friendship and brotherhood among all peoples of the USSR, intolerance of national and racial hatred;

"An uncompromising attitude to the enemies of communism, peace, and freedom of nations;

"Fraternal solidarity with the working people of all countries, and with all peoples."

"This moral program with its emphasis on family, work, patriotism, duty, has resemblances to the programs of Petain or Salazar, but certainly none whatsoever with Marxist thought. It naively uncovers the cultural reality beyond the revolutionary phrases of Soviet Russia, that of Calvinist work morale, Victorian petty bourgeois stuffiness, and authoritarian moral principles. One might suspect that any very conservative or very reactionary visitor to the Soviet Union, who knows Russian, with the exception of the words for "God" and "Communism," will find himself very much at home in this cultural environment.

To sum up: the program gives a clear picture of the present state of the Soviet Union, and the intentions of its leaders. It is successful in organizing a centrally directed state economy, and in increasing material satisfactions for its inhabitants. It needs peace, and wants peace, and expects the socialist principles to win eventually, without violent revolutions or international war. It is not a revolutionary system, but, on the contrary, a conservative one with, however, tendencies for increasing liberalization as its capacity for higher material standards increases.

It is a challenge to capitalism to compete successfully with communist performance, and the very opposite of a declaration of war.

*(not dangerous)*

The Russian Bomb by Tristram Coffin Why are the Soviets resuming nuclear testing? There are two basic reasons, military and propaganda.

Military. From a strategic view, the USSR has a reason of sorts for resuming tests. Therein lies some history. The Soviets began developing long range rockets after they had developed the atomic bomb, but before they acquired a thermo-nuclear or hydrogen bomb. The Soviet bomb, beefed up to many times the Hiroshima bomb, was a monster, a huge mass of metal. A long range rocket capable of delivering this "ogre" to a distant target needed tremendous thrust, and Soviet science and technology concentrated on this aim. (The US, feeling secure in its SAC bases and hydrogen bomb, ignored the rocket field.) The Russians obtained a double-barreled benefit from their research, an ICBM capable of delivering the "ogre" to a remote target with specific accuracy, and a thrust for space flights. However, the Soviet 8-megaton ICBMs require elaborate launching sights and permanent installations (The US has movable missiles which, because of a considerable sophistication in hydrogen warheads, can deliver a bomb effectively.)

Ever since the U-2 incident and more recently with the Samos "spy in the sky" satellites, the Soviet General Staff has been very agitated about the safety of its missile launching sites. It fears that the US now knows the location of all its sites and in a first strike could put the Soviet nuclear retaliation power out of business.

Pressure has been building up on Khrushchev by the military to develop a smaller, more sophisticated hydrogen bomb which could be delivered by a mobile missile. As Senator Humphrey said, "He caved in."

Mr. Ralph Lapp, who has studied this problem for some time and touched upon it in the September Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, believes the Russians will have to test in the atmosphere, simply because the time and effort required to build huge underground caverns for detonating hydrogen bombs is too much. The fall-out will be spread over a wide area, including the western US. (The strontium content in the Saint Louis milk shed was traced back to Russian testing in Siberia.)

As a footnote, Dr. Hans Bethe said in August 1960, "I believe that if tests are resumed... that the Russians will choose to test big weapons, hydrogen weapons, in the megaton class. I think that these are the weapons which are the most dangerous to us; these are the weapons which the Soviets consider to be of the greatest military importance to them."

Propaganda. The 100-megaton bomb which Khrushchev mentions is of little military value. It is a brutal weapon, like killing a man by cracking his skull with a baseball bat instead of drilling a hole between his eyes with a precision-made rifle. Scientists here do not believe that the USSR's testing program is primarily for the 100-megaton "dirty" bomb, but rather for the small hydrogen bomb. The 100-megaton is a propaganda weapon whose chief value is to frighten the allies of the United States. This is in keeping with the threats to bomb the Acropolis, Japan, and Italy should war break out.

The switch to a campaign of terror is not necessarily a complete reversal or a sign that the USSR has abandoned co-existence. What it does indicate is that Khrushchev had failed, for the moment, to win his objectives by co-existence and has turned on the other tactic. The target is not exclusively the West, for Khrushchev has suffered a series of political setbacks, as:

\* He failed at Vienna to persuade President Kennedy to accept the Soviet position on Berlin, and, at that point, adopted the threat technique by boasting of the new 100-megaton bomb. There was a revealing line in one of Drew Pearson's dispatches from the USSR. He quoted Khrushchev as saying that Dulles, despite his brinkmanship, was a good sort because when the Soviet put on pressure he backed down. Apparently, Khrushchev was quite surprised by Kennedy at Vienna. He had thought that the American President, because he had opposed the Eisenhower Administration, had made disarmament a campaign issue, and because of his youth would accept the Soviet position on Berlin. Subsequent pressure has failed to change the Western position or even flush out the Washington-London-Paris-Bonn position.

\* The Russians have lost both "face" and influence in the Middle East. The USSR in the Suez crisis threatened to intervene and this, in turn, led President Eisenhower to persuade London and Paris to stop their campaign. Russian prestige and influence in the Middle East soared high. Again with the revolt in Iraq, Russia was on top. But time and events have eroded the entire Soviet position. The UAR press and radio has been attacking the Soviet position in recent weeks, and Kasem in Iraq has cracked down on the Communist Party. But what has aroused the USSR to real anger is that Col Nasser has, with Tito and Nehru, formed a neutral bloc of Asian, African, and, possibly, Latin American nations. This has infuriated Moscow, since it had made great efforts to control the Asian-African bloc. The Soviet bomb test resumption and the brandishing of the 100-megaton bomb is taken as a strong warning to the neutralist meeting in Belgrade that Russia does not recognize "neutralism." Soviet envoys have been pressing the UAR with an insistence that the Arabs were either for or against Russia, and if they were not for the USSR they would have to accept the consequences of annihilation in a war.

\* Another setback of quite significant proportions was the failure of the USSR to gain a firm foothold in Africa by way of the Congo. When Patrice Lumumba was overthrown and the Russians ordered out, they left.

\* The Cuban revolution and Castro's political alliance with Russia has turned sour. The Soviet Ambassador to Havana, Sergey Kudryavtsev, before his departure for Moscow early this week, advised Castro to try to renew friendly relations with the United States. The reason is that Russia is unable to provide Cuba with food and farm machinery, despite promises made a year ago, and the island country is faced with serious shortages of food and machinery.

Thus, Russia falls back on its traditional role of "the bear that walks like a man."

What effect will the Soviet decision have on the United States?

Our military has been pressing since the beginning of the Administration (and on Mr. Eisenhower, too) to resume testing to "miniaturize" nuclear weapons, develop tactical weapons, and develop the neutron bomb. However, Mr. Kennedy has resisted this pressure on the counsel of his diplomatic and scientific advisors.

Pro-testing senators blame Dr. Jerome Wiesner of the White House staff for the Kennedy policy. The scientists argue that fresh tests would not provide enough valuable information to justify the political revulsion, and that we are well advanced over the Russians in nuclear weaponry.

The Russian testing will undoubtedly strengthen the military right-wing coalition both in credibility and political strength. The President will need a great deal of courage and coolness to resist their pressure not only to resume testing, but to rescind his order against military moving into foreign policy.

West Germany's demand for nuclear weapons will become louder. At present, NATO has nuclear weapons under US control. A British newspaper claims that NATO has 5000 nuclear weapons of varied sizes in the tactical range with a combined power of 7000 Hiroshima-type bombs.

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