

1943 Moscow - 30th October
1944 Dumbarton Oaks - August 21st - October 7th.

1945

Crimea Conference February 4-11
San Francisco Conference April 25- June 26th
Potsdam Conference July 17th-July 25th.
Five Power Conference (London) September 11th- October 2nd.
Moscow Conference of Far. Min. December 16th- December 26th.

1946.

UNO in London. 10. Jan. 1946

United Nations Organisation.

USA

A. The main forces shaping this new organisation were the needs of the Grand Coalition which won the War. The USA could not fully cooperate without some safeguards as to the war aims of the various powers. Yet she herself could not offer any contribution unless she first dropped her isolationism. But American internationalism was (as we saw) necessarily universalist, i.e. directed towards all-inclusive international institutions like the League of Nations or the Permanent Court of International Justice or more recently the Bretton Woods agreements.

b. Ideological factor : The rôle of the idea of the rule of law in the history of American internationalism. DISTR. OF BALANCE O.P. and against the League. The history of isolationism and the battle for/this/League.

All resolutions brought in in Congress to further internationalism (post-War commitments) were ~~mainly~~ without exception of a 'universalist' nature.

Small

b. The realist factor : American political clientel is amongst the countries of Latin America. American capitalist dependancies are amongst the assets of American foreign policy.

URSS

Russia, on the other hand, tended towards Great Power organisation.

a. Ideological factors: Traditional distrust of the League, which acted for a long time as an anti-Russian coalition of Western capitalist powers.

b. Realist factors : The bad experience made with the League. The camouflaging of Great Power policies in the garb of the League Covenant hid the absolute need for Great power cooperation.

This was powerfully reinforced by all the universalist traits of the Covenant like aa) unanimity rule, bb) the preponderance of the Assembly over the Council of the League. cc) the preponderance of the small powers over the big in the Council. (Fifteen powers in the Council, acting under unanimity rules, not even procedure being always exempt). This paralysed the League and allowed sabotage of all its actions even when some degree of great power solidarity was forthcoming.

Russia does not possess the clientel of the USA or even of the UK. She is the first socialist country in the world and must meet the distrust and hostility of all. May be this will be different (aa) the Slav states may rally around her, (bb) She may become influential with the colonial or exotic or non-coloured peoples. (cc) Even may be sometimes in the future with socialist countries, but this certainly is not now the case.

Consequently, the UNO Charter had to be a compromise between the Russian and the American view, with Great Britain acting as a mediator. This actually was what happened.

To the extent to which Russia thought she could trust the UNO, she was prepared to relinquish territorial safeguards in Europe & Asia.

UNO - problems and prospects.

I gather you had an excellent lecture by Capt. Swinler. He did not mince his words. I also am going to be ~~outspoken~~ and ~~preservative~~ ~~inflammatory~~ ~~and~~ ~~not~~ ~~open~~ ~~and~~ ~~proactive~~, since I am sure you do not want me to waste your time. In diplomatic formulae which satisfy everybody except ~~the~~ persons who happen to be sincerely interested. UNO is, of course, the next step ~~backward~~ on the road towards the establishment of world government on this planet. Not very much than a year ago, the chances of such a venture would have had to be discounted. To-day the position is ~~more~~ different. UNO is a ~~practical~~ ~~proposition~~ of great practical importance.

For two reasons, ~~now~~ (1) the outcome of the war and the unprecedented ~~scale~~ ~~range~~ of the victory which it brought;

(2) the ~~atomic~~ release of nuclear energy and its use in the Atom Bomb. In other words the great permanent danger of war and the great permanent danger from war.

The first has created a power vacuum which constitutes the greatest permanent danger of war. Two of the ~~greatest~~ power centres of the globe have been eliminated; Germany and Japan. On these hung Continental Europe (~~except~~ from Russia) in Europe, the ~~whole~~ of the Far East, ~~including~~ including not only Manchuria but ~~the~~ political ~~sense~~ of the ~~same~~ China & Indonesia. To this vast dislocation must be added--partly as a direct consequence of the war, the rise of India to independence. Altogether Hardly more than the populations of the USA, the UK and the Dominions, and the USSR remained within their traditional power fixtures. Some 1500,000,000 people are either without a roof of power over their heads, or have lost ~~their~~ contact with the ~~central~~ systems of power, Germany, ~~or are losing~~ and Japan, the ~~victorious~~ U.K., and in some cases, smaller powers, as the Netherlands (in

~~the case~~ ~~regarding~~ of the Indonesian Empire.) The small neutrals were even in peace time non-powers, and kept the map merely by the ~~balance~~ right way in which they balanced between the ~~atomic~~ Powers. This is true of Switzerland, or Sweden. As to the other countries of ~~Europe~~ the European continent, none that has been occupied by Germany or co-operated with it, can be regarded as a Power on its own (for the time being not even France). In other words the colour scheme on the map is misleading, for ~~entirely~~ a European Continent is a power vacuum.

Now, if there is one law in political science which holds ~~with absolute~~ rigour, it is the inevitability of conflict between Independent ~~great~~ Powers, which find themselves separated only by a power vacuum. The only alternative is (a) either to agree ~~on allowing~~ the territories to build up their own independent nations power ~~and assist them in doing so~~ to fill in the vacuum, or (b) to agree on preventing any ~~state~~ ~~government~~ being established in that territory (1903). (strong) If neither of these happens, conflict cannot be avoided, even though both parties sincerely wish to avoid it, in their own interest. Unless they do agree on how to deal with the vacuum, their ~~common~~ safety ~~but~~ ~~one~~ will draw them into conflict. For the simple reason that the peoples in the vacuum-- which we assume to be in a state of chaos-- will in their own interest create situations which must affect the safety and security of one or the other great neighbour, thus leaving them no alternative but to interfere and thus get involved in the affairs of the buffer territory. Mind, we have been assuming ~~all the time~~ that neither of the great Powers has ambitions, business interests or national or religious preconceptions which would make them take a less unselfish and disinterested attitude-- a rather idealistic assumption. ~~Today~~ ~~the~~ ~~FAIR~~ ~~is~~ ~~such a power vacuum~~ ~~as regards~~ ~~USA~~ ~~& UK~~, ~~France~~ ~~Germany~~ ~~Japan~~ ~~etc~~ ~~etc~~

The second has made war ~~considerably~~ more dangerous than it was even in the last war. For the first time the perspective includes the possibility of the destruction of mankind, if not of this planet. The scientist may say, he cannot tell ~~anything about it~~, but the political philosopher must say it. You use your common sense: If this is only the beginning, a modest tentative beginning, what are the perspectives of a somewhat more distant future?

~~banana~~ These are the two reasons why world government has become a much more real issue than it was before.

Personally, I never liked the idea of a world-state, nor did I ~~ever~~ ~~peace~~ ~~the~~ dominating prime interest of political man. That ~~has~~ to change my mind. To-day I accept both.

UNO - Problems and prospects (cont.)

Geography

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B. But ~~history~~ ^{in general} is not governed ~~by~~ ^{by} man's interests nor his ideals ^(whether). In vain would we need ~~to~~ ^a world state or agree that ~~that~~ ^{it was} ~~impracticable~~ ^{to}, if no real forces were available ^{to} achieve that end.

Cpt. Swinlor, I understand ~~what~~ said, that our Treaty with the USSR was not the result of British policy or of Russian policy of German war strategy. ~~This is entirely true~~ but a

Now in the same way this I believe to be true.

In the same way UMO has become a practical proposition not on account of the great danger to peace involved in the vast power vacuum left by the War, nor on account of the Atom Bomb, but on account of the participation of the USA in the war.

UNO for something of the kind is the only form in which the USA can or will participate in world affairs. This is not necessarily so of Russia which actually prefers a Three Power, ~~nonaligned~~ system, and is not necessarily so in the case of Britain which can equally well (or, ~~rather~~ with equal difficulty) fit into either of these systems.

The reasons which bind the USA permanently to universalist forms of organisation are twofold: (1) the nature of isolationism and the consequent meaning history and meaning of internationalism in the States; (2) the organisation of American world power.

Some history of - the meaning of Internationalism -
The first goes back to the time of the battle for the League. ~~After the war~~ Americans believe that they made a bad mistake by ~~returning~~ going back to isolationism after World War I. Roosevelt's Chicago speech in which he first warned his people that isolationism may have to go, revived the Wilsonian issue. For or against isolationism therefore meant, (for or against) the League. For or against internationalism, ~~then~~ consequently, means for or against the League. ~~(This was the manner)~~ The struggle of Democrats and Republicans crystallized the issue. This is a political fact of the first importance. It resulted in ~~a~~ compromise which removed the whole question from party politics, on the understanding that internationalism involved something like the League, something that will call a universal form of organization. Such an organization had the following characteristics (1) it is inclusive -- the more countries are included the better (2) the principle of the sovereignty of the individual states is maintained (this is essential, since the reservation of American sovereignty was the basis of the compromise). No party ~~ever~~ suggested that the USA should relinquish her own sovereign rights. The constitutional position of the Senate alone would have made this impossible. (3) it is based on a number charter and invokes the unwritten law as based

The second factor (the principle of authority) is directly linked with the first, especially with the inclusive character of a League or U.N. type of body. The strength of the USA derives from her ~~large~~ geographical & temporal position (1) from her continental position, (a) in respect to the North American continent, where Canada is a vital part of her strategic system. (b) in respect to Central America which is essential to the defence of the Panama Canal, and therefore to the maintenance of her Two Ocean strategy. (c) in respect to ~~and~~ South America, a large part of which is nearer to Africa and even to Europe by sea than to the USA. The Panamerican clientel of the USA amounts to almost 20 states. No policy ~~can~~ makes sense to Americans which would deprive them of this asset. The need for a universalist type of organisation is apparent. (2) it derives also from the non-continental links of finance and trade with many countries in the world. Again, ~~no~~ American will willingly consent to discuss world affairs with other Powers in an apartment too small to permit her camp followers to congregate around her.

These are the two group of reasons why the USA, if she is to depart from isolationism must and will insist on a League or UNO type of body, inclusive, ~~but~~ ^{and} useful of the maintenance of unrestricted sovereignty and absolutely safe against the very possibility of the USA being forced to do anything counter to her will, and equally useful to have the ~~force~~ law as a backing, were she to ^{have to} use force against others.

UNO- Problems and Prospects.

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(c) The present problems ~~and~~ ^{also} of UNO arise from the situation from which the war ~~ended~~ participation of USA in the war. ^{esp} together with Russian participation.

That participation involved military co-operation ~~which~~ with Russia without any safeguards in regard to ~~Russian~~ aims. Russia would not even discuss such safeguards with the USA as long as the USA could not offer any indication whether or not she would continue to participate in world affairs after victory was achieved. ^{to the Russians}

May I dramatise the situation, Roosevelt may have said? What territories are you going to claim after the War? The ~~Russians~~ might have answered: That will depend upon our security needs. Can you do anything about them? Of course, Roosevelt had no answer, since the Senate ~~man~~ veto made his signature worthless. On the other hand, how could Roosevelt get an informal authorisation from Congress to participate in world affairs after the war, unless -- this is the point -- he left no shadow of a doubt in the mind of Congress and American opinion that he is going to keep to the great compromise -- namely, to proceed on the 'universalist' lines, -- on the lines of some organisation like the League -- inclusive, based on ~~non-safeguards~~ absolute sovereignty, on a written charter and leaving the USA in charge of the law?

Roosevelt achieved the almost impossible: He convinced the American people that they had to give up isolationism and go in for internationalism, -- always, this was understood, within the framework of a universalist body, or as the Americans call it, under 'the rule of law.'

But the Russians had never agreed to this. The Russian conception was that peace could not be maintained unless the three Great Powers continued to co-operate after the War. This being the one supreme need, it should be the openly proclaimed form of the organisation of peace. ~~but~~ Obviously, Russia's lack of ~~clients~~ of numerous supporters, came in. A head-on clash with the American conception was averted by the ~~charter~~ formula of ~~Yalta~~, which is of the greatest importance for the understanding of the problem of UNO.

As long as the UNO charter was ~~meant~~ as embodying ~~the~~ Three Power co-operation, Russia agreed. If it meant the supersession of Three Power co-operation by ~~then~~ ^{the} ~~universalist~~ type of organisation ~~which excluded the Three Power rule~~, it was unacceptable. ~~to~~ The Dumbarton Oaks text -- it is worth studying -- seems to me to embody the Russian proposition fairly closely. The Assembly is to have no powers at all. The Security Council is to have all the Power. The Assembly accepts the Security Council as its executive, and undertakes to carry out its decisions. On the Security Council there is the Rule of the Five Powers, which, through the 'veto' is made into a Three Power rule. We know that Russia was even safeguarded at San Francisco in respect to the numerous ambiguities of the Charter by the declaration that all ~~procedural~~ decisions should be subject to veto including the decision ~~non-procedural~~ about what is and what is not procedural decision. True the Russians agreed that the 'veto' could not be used lightly....

How ~~this~~ this was felt ^{to be} an uneasy compromise might be inferred from what happened at Yalta. The Russians did not relinquish their right to ~~Three Power meetings~~. It was later invoked for Potsdam. They did not accept UNO, if it should turn out to clash with the Three Power principle. They expressed this by demanding safeguards for anti-fascist policies, and definite safeguards in regard to Poland (which was a ~~vital~~ issue from their point of view).

Now a further shunting took place: the term democratic was gravely水化. The Russians first suggested that this should be a grouping of the 'democratic' powers. In other words, they claimed to have a form of democracy of their own. We accepted this, under the pressure of war circumstances -- to prevent Hitler from winning the war. We know now that he was ~~still~~ very much hoping to do so.

Later, the responsibility for the ambiguity is assumed by the Russians. Churchill made a speech in Italy, in which he described democracy ~~with a dozen varieties~~, and far from making its meaning more elastic, he made it clear that in the interpretation of the British govt

(claimed to be)

4.

UNO - problems and prospects. (cont.)

at least the Soviet system ~~man~~ lacked most attributes of a democracy. Yet The Russians persisted in basing their policy on the text of documents, the moral validity of which was increasingly impaired by patently different interpretations put on vital terms by the parties concerned,

To sum up: Insofar as the future political organisation of the world is concerned, there continued to be an unbridged difference between the USA and the USSR ~~but~~, The first is universalist, the latter favours Three Power Co-operation. UNO is the scene of the battle field of these two ~~mutually~~ conceptions.

D. Where does Britain come in, on this level?

~~British~~ Britain is ~~uninterested~~ and disinterested in this issue. She might feel safe and happy in a League of Nations type of organisation, ~~which~~ which would allow the Self-governing Dominions to take their place alongside the mother country, and also other countries in Western Europe and the Mediterranean to make their voices heard. (free)

But, alternatively, she might also co-operate with the USA and the USSR as long as the two do not combine ~~to annihilate~~ against her. It seems that the British government was not originally forcing the veto issue, at the time of Dumbarton Oaks, and would have accepted ~~the~~ ~~whole~~ a continuance of the League of Nations type of voting where, as you know, not ~~permanent~~ permanent members of the ~~permanent~~ permanent members of the Council only, but all members of the Council-- there were 13 of them had the veto.

Such a state of affairs cannot be allowed to continue if we are to make any progress towards an ordered peace in the world. The powerless small states ~~are~~ is an ~~obstacle~~ obstacle to the

with its absolute sovereignty ordering of human affairs. In this respect ~~both~~ moral and material considerations. ~~both~~

On the first, there is the radically undemocratic nature of the small states claim, where countries of 1-million population claim

1. the same right, vote and influence as countries of 1,000,000,000 population.

This is paralleled by the ~~lack of responsibility~~ which is ~~parallel~~ ~~as~~ ~~small~~ ~~countries~~ ~~conflicts~~ reigned indefinitely unsettled in the inter-War period: Poland and Czechoslovakia could not agree after the World War I on the partition of Teschen. ~~But~~ They both ~~had~~ ~~succumbed~~, on Hitler's hands-- they had still not agreed. They have been restored as by a miracle from the dead. ~~But~~ They still continue to disagree and quarrel ~~as~~ as before... Why? One reason is ~~that~~ that they are trying to bring in some great Power on their sides, to fight it out for them. Take Greece and Bulgaria, or ~~now~~ Yugoslavia and Italy-- what does it amount to but trying to bring in Russia on the one side, the Western Powers on the other? And

3. Finally, the very concept of sovereignty has grown into a danger to the world. At a time when Powers, like Britain offer to reduce their claims to sovereignty, it does not appear justified to boost the claims of ~~tiny~~ small states to absolute sovereignty. What they can claim is cultural and military safety, but not a type of sovereignty which merely endangers others without being any ~~real~~ help to themselves.

This leads to the second group of considerations, of a more practical character: ~~I mean defence~~

1. Equal sovereign rights for small states-- I believe even the sovereignty of the powerful should be reduced-- meant the right of Holland and Belgium to refuse to co-operate in their own defence until it was too late, without actually being able to offer effective resistance to an aggressive great Power. ~~NEVER~~ Belgium refused to let Britain know what her intentions were; she went down in a few weeks, opening the gate to Hitler. Holland equally refused, and went down in three days. What is the good of talking about the right to absolute sovereignty when it involves the endangering of 100,000,000's of others?

The same is true of economic necessities in ~~in~~ an age of ~~airways~~ and directed missiles. ~~air~~ ~~in~~ transport Channel

E. Now let me return ~~mainly~~ to the British position, and look at it briefly from the point of view of ~~problems and prospects~~ the American and the Russian thesis.

What the Russians call Three Power Co-operation is the same thing as what historians call balance of power. For as long as you have independent power units - more than two of them - you have the play of the balance of power ~~state~~, as surely as there are ~~any~~ laws in politics. It consists in this: if any one power tries suddenly to increase its power substantially the others will band together to try and prevent ~~the~~ this. Ever since the Treaty of Westphalia, (and especially, since the Treaty of Utrecht, in 1713), such a system (1648) was in force in Europe, and ~~subsequently~~ maintained the independence of all the small states ~~such as~~ Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, etc. In effect, no ~~state who was~~ signatory of the Treaties of Münster and Westphalia, in 1648, ~~would~~ disappear from the map for an other 200 years (Poland was not a signatory).

This should not be confused with the balance of power policy, which is a British national institution, and was the natural policy of an island ~~strategically~~ lying off a continental ~~coastal~~ littoral. It goes back far beyond the 17th century, and was practised ~~by~~ by the founder of ~~Martin~~ Christ Church, Cardinal Thomas Wolsey, in the 1520's.

Such a policy cannot be followed to day since there is no strong continental power ~~except~~ Russia. Consequently, there is no possibility of supporting some other Continental power against Russia. To bring in the USA into Europe, raises the question of world policy, which is an entirely different matter. For the USA is the strongest world power, and the balance of power policy would then put us on the side of Russia, against her, which again would be a ~~bad~~ mistake. In other words, the ~~balance of power policy~~ ~~must~~ be dropped altogether. They do not apply anymore.

This leaves us with the question: Does the balance of power, on which the Russians rely, exclude ~~from~~ the League or UNO or any other form of Universalist organisation? Not at all. The balance of power continued to act inside the League ~~as well~~ as inside UNO. It is a law of a different kind, it belongs to life itself and will cease to operate only if there are no independent sovereign powers in existence, ~~in other words~~ the world state is established.

Does this exclude the rule of law? Not at all. Somebody must operate the law and if that body is going to function there must be a balance of power in it, ~~as long as that body consists of independent sovereign states.~~

There is ~~no~~ contradiction ~~in~~, in an independent British foreign policy which at the same time decides to put its effort behind UNO. A foreign policy which does not link its fate with either Russia or America, but reserves its right to independent decisions. This might be the best peace policy.

Barely, from this angle Britain should try to increase her influence on the Continent, and in the world. It is the natural leader of the new Europe and should feel free to make use of this lead, irrespective of Russian suspicions. Those are mainly due to the Atom Bomb which Britain does not possess anyway.

The prospects of UNO depend upon the prospects of the co-operation of the Great Powers. Should ~~there~~ there be a rift, UNO might have to play a rôle which would be indistinguishable from banding together to stop one Power. We might then call that the rule of law, but it ~~would~~ be better to call ~~it~~ by some more familiar name, ~~a~~ ~~war~~ ~~should~~ here.

A stronger Britain might more easily make concessions to Russia where ~~its~~ vital British interests are involved, and not vital British ones. Also we should not overrate the strength of the Communist parties on the Continent. They are much weakened by their allegiance to Soviet Foreign policy. Britain in other words has many assets which she does not make full use of. Her influence in UNO might much depend upon ~~this~~ ~~on the making of~~ ~~the~~ wall ~~here~~.

F. Let me finish by saying that this country ~~can~~ gain enormously in strength by developing an enlightened public opinion ~~on~~ in foreign affairs. We are rapidly ~~moving towards~~ times, when there will be great need for such an opinion, if we are to avoid ~~an~~ atomic war.