

Great Britain's Foreign Policy Two - Day?

What are the ^{modern} causes of ~~our~~ present weakness in intern. affairs?

Is It Old England Still?

An Outsider's View.

Address at The Annual Meeting of the English Speaking Union of the U. S. A. at Denver, Colo., on Friday Oct. 9th, 1936.

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Introduction

It is a great subject indeed on which I, as a foreigner in, though by no means ~~or so~~ ^{also} as a stranger to, this country have the high appreciative privilege of addressing this ^{distinctly} gathering tonight.

But if frank and fearless discussion of all subjects pertaining to the question of the relationship of the English speaking nations be, as I understand, one of the aims of this union, my ~~mother's~~ ^{modest} contribution cannot fail but attempt to conform to these standards and to deal with the subject-matter of tonight either frank and fearless fashion called for by ^{in the} ~~our~~ ^{intrinsic importance.} statutes.

The subject matter is; what is the significance of England's present weakness ^{in international affairs} from the point of view of the English speaking nations of the world?

~~First~~ For the educated European ~~European~~ of a liberal background, the Anglo-Saxon tradition of religious tolerance, political democracy, and of a general humanitarian outlook is ~~a~~ ^{invaluable} most treasured asset to the ^{common front} ~~founder~~ of Universal peace and progress.

In many a European capital ~~where/what/paths~~ whether Paris, Budapest, or ^{Prague} it is either Westminster, in London, or the Capitol in Washington, that ~~is~~ ^{is} the beacon ~~is~~ on which progress orientated its march towards the goals of liberty and constitutional freedom.

~~and~~ ^{and} From Lafayette or Széchenyi and Kossuth to Benes and

Massaryk, it is the Anglo-Saxon tradition which permeates all that

most noble
is ~~best~~ in European progress.

It is in this spirit of gratitude, trust and sympathy ~~that~~ *that* which I intend to make my most realistic comments on the subject *of tonight*.

For realistic these comments shall be. It is only thus that I ~~we~~ can hope to be of some service to the great community to which you belong. The world cannot afford an easy going attitude today. We cannot pride ourselves ~~on~~ having attained a ~~very~~ ^{water} high mark on the road of peace and security. ~~W~~ On the contrary, the peace of the world is run on a narrow margin and we cannot afford to close our eyes to the perils of the age.

And now let us descend with both feet on the solid ground of fact and put ~~the~~ question bluntly:- What is the root cause of Gr. Britain's obvious weakness in this present world situation? The answer may lie in a rather unexpected ^{quarters} direction.
ENGLAND AND AMERICA.

England's one unchangeable point of mind is no war with the U.S.A.
Great Britain is a maritime power and therefore naval considerations are naturally paramount in her foreign outlook. But that these considerations make her policy ^{to-day rather inflexible.} ~~less~~ and ~~not more~~ flexible, has its reasons in the technical character of present-day navies. A country like England does not build a fleet and increase that fleet in a general way as you set up an increase ~~in~~ land army, division by division. Naval bases, ^{stations, naval communications} refueling, crusing range etc., are the determining factors which decide the kind ^{of} fleet you actually build. For as I said, you build one kind of fleet or another kind of fleet, not a fleet in general. And once you have embarked on building the one kind, it may take you a five year ^{long} struggle to complete it, and a decade to change its character altogether. The naval policy of England today is ^{thus} the rigid framework into which her land policy must be fitted.

contrast of the sea combat

oil storage, dry dock, etc.

Now the one underlying fact, ^{in this naval policy} is the one power standard of the United States of America. England is resolved not to fight the U. S. A. on any issue whatsoever. In fact she is unable, ~~to do so~~ to do so, even if she wished to, for various reasons, both of a military and of a political character too closely linked up with her general empire policy to need to be enumerated here.

This puts England into a very difficult position in the Pacific. The tension between Japan and the U. S. A. whatever it amounts to involves a very real danger for England. She is not able to defend her outlying ~~possessions~~ ^{possessions} against Japan, in case of war. The U. S. A. are neither able nor willing to do so. ^{In face of this,} England's policy consists in making it worth while for Japan ^{an} to keep the peace. This is the basic reason why England cannot veto Japan's tendency to move toward the Asiatic continent, ~~even~~ ^{even} though such a ~~policy~~ policy on England's part inevitably entails sacrifices on her own part. Still, England can do one thing and that is do ~~to~~ reflect Japan's westward thrust towards the north, as far as possible. --- ~~dash~~ towards the far-eastern positions of the U. S. S. R.

Openly of course, England cannot proclaim her determination to side with the U. S. A. in case of a conflict in the Pacific. This would bring the roof down in the Pacific at once, or rather knock the bottom out of the ^{situation} security. Think of the 3;5;5: ratio of battle ships. What would have been the chances of persuading Japan in London to continue on this Washington ratio and to accept them as an expression of actual naval equality, if England had openly made it a 3-10 affair by revealing the basic ^{weak} parallelism of her policy with that of the U. S. A.?

A romantic interpretation? - Sir John Simon's mistake. - England not retreating, but putting a head against the Chinese.