What can structure his to migrove by foreging oling of Knowledge, Education and Foreign policy. acoupt

I am utterly at a loss what to say on a subject as vast as this.

Since I have to start somewhere, let me mention that these last sixted weeks I have been engaged in lecturing once a week - for two hours at a time - to an adult educational class in North London. The audience knew me well; we had worked together intimately before. And so I embarked on an experiment on which I had been keen for a long time. I tried to introduce them to the subject of foreign policy, without reservations or qualifications, without avoiding the controversial issues, rather seeking them out - while the bombs were still flying.

On the one hand I was teaching matters like the balance of power, the Hundred Years' Peace, the Holy Alliance, the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations, social and national factors on politics, the Versailles system, and so on; on the other, we were discussing in a group of the most variegate political complexion, composed of individuals holding widely divergent miners views on Germany, on Russia, on France, on the USA, and for all I know, on this country, matters like post war reconstruction, the peace settlement, reparations on kind, Poland, Greece, the Jewish question, or the Prime Minister's mosty recent speech in the Commons. We had with us 5 or 6 dogmatic and very able Liberals , two awoved Communists, one rather intelligent person of fascist leanings, the rest being either of some shade or mathe other of trade-union and labour opinion or persons religiously or artistiallouther is I fount. cally inclined. Only a very few appeared to be of no denomination at all. The reather unexpected result was (a) The class enjoyed its work to an exceptional degree, (b) they did more (written work than any class in my experience, (c) we never found ourselves hampered by the alleged popular pe prejudices current on the subject, (d) not in a single instance was there anything even faintly resembling unpleasantness caused to anybody. Personally, I do not believe that any member of the class changed his or her political allegiance as a result of our discussions. But I definitely felt that some of them at least had become more stable, responsible, mature persons in respect to the issues in question, while losing nothing of their energy and spontaneity. And isn't that, after all what we are trying to achieve?

(Incidentally, I should have mentioned that I meyself hold the strongest possible views on a number of these subjects and that I did not make in the least a secret of this. On the contrary, I put my own views for all they are worth, merely cautioning the students against the notion that my views carried any more authority than anybody else's on matters of this sort.)

It was a most encouraging experience.

However, I am afraid, that it is too slight to draw a definite moral from it. Much, I suppose, should be put down to the fact that they felt less self-conscious in the company of a non-Englishman and would & readily consider aspects of the matter which they might not otherwise. Even my partisan views would not strike them as English party views and would therefore call forth less violent reactions. And so on.

Still, while we are at it, why not try tomsum up this experience from the angle of our subject: How important is knowledge in international education? freeze follows an wheele for a ford

I do not think I ever gave the impression as if I believed that knowledge was of any special value to anybody wishing to understand foreign policy. I certainly dont believe it myself. Ignorance is not the source of conflicts between peoples. If there is no reason for conflict the fact that they know nothing about one another will not create a conflict. Should there, on the other hand, be good cause for conflict, then even complete knowledge will not eliminate it. All that can be said is that once there is such a reason ignorance makes it much easier to give a seemingly more plausible reason than the true ones, of which the

persons may be hardly conscious. Ignorance has therefore little to do with creating actual causes of conflict, but a great deal with assumed causes and even more with pretended ones.

Moreover, knowledge of mother peoples, character is mostly illusory.

The situation is very similar to that in respect to individual persons.

Poreign policy refers to survival, to life and death. From this angle knowledge of another person's character is even more difficult to achieve than knowledge of one's own character, and that is difficult enough...

Who can know what he will be like when faced with that question, unless he is actually faced with it? And would this not be even more true in respect to ano ther person? Acquaintance with the every-day life of another people is of no avail in foreign policy.

Knowledge is no help to understanding. It is an exasperating truth that the more you know about a person whom you fail to understand the less you can understand him... Now foreign policy refers, as I said, to the sphere of survival and to the deeply seated emotions that go with it. This level is laid over by the every-day psychology of the individual and nothing will normally reveal its presence. Ultimately this is so because the qualities which enable us to face death are entirely different from those which help us to carry on life.

Take two recent instances. Britain's excessive appeasement policy and her subsequent splendid resistance. I know only of one student of politics, Reinhold Niebuhr, who actually foresaw the first, but he made the mistake of asserting that Britain would never fight Hitler, thus patently missing the second and just as important point. Of course it is easy tom imagine that one foresaw these things, I mean, in the retrospect. Future historians will as usually confidently and complacently register the inevitable lity both of retreat and of rebound. But it is precisely this type of selfdelusionagainst which we wish to make people immune.

But it is not by discussing the nature of knowledge that we may hope to solve the problem. The answer lies in the understanding of the nature of foreign policy.

Policy is safeguarding of interest. Foreign policy is the safeguarding of a country's interest. All policy is selfregarding. Anis is man
axiomatic. May lack of clarity on this point is safetal as mistaking the more
roots of a plant for its flowers or vice versa. Countries differ and
interests are extremely arguable but policy can never be else than the safeguarding of a country's interest. The moral nature of politics comes in
by way of the definition of interest. This aspect can never be eliminated
from politics not even when bare survival is in question. For even them
the question is Whose survival? What way of life to you insist upon as manual
safeguarding the identity of your self? Manua Thus morality is as essential
to interest, as geography or language.

Policy can never serve interests other than those of the subject of the policy. That is why morality never enters into foreign policy under the heading of selfishness or unselfishness. If to follow one's interest w regarded as selfish than in foreign policy every country is selfish , while every individual member of the country is selfless. A country's foreign policy is not designed to serve the interests of the individual but those of the country. The question: Is it in the country's interest to go to war or not? never allows of the question: Is it jour interest that the country should go to war or not? In respect to his country the individual is therefore selfless by definition; the country is selfish by definition. These terms are pleonastic and confusing; they mean nothing at I all. That policy is selfregarding simply means that it is someone's policy, i.e., an attitude designed to attain ends. The data which determine these interests belong to a different level of the argument. There morality is as real and inevitable as geography; moral laws are as difficult to shift as mountains.

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Let me give examples of this method of aggressive sanity and how it may help us to live at peace with our neighbours.

First as to our neighbours abroad:

An island country lying off a continental littoral must see to it that the continent should not be dominated by one power. In order to prevent this it must follow a balance of power policy or support the weaker power against the stronger. Foreigners like to descibe this under the heading of Perfida Albion - (very naturally) while the British themselves may prefer to call of it "Standing for the underdog". As long as one perceives the necessity of me the policy itself it leads to a better understanding of the foreigner if one is able to agree that this "Ferfid Albion" is congenitally given to protecting the underdog.

An other instance.

while in act

Britain is repreached with Caning, pretending to follow asselfless policy whenactually following a selifish one. The terms selfish and selfless being suspicious in this context, what is it all about? Actually, the point is of substnatil intest. Good policy must and take account of other nountain countries interests, so as to steer a course which offends as few count tries as possible and runs parallel to the interests of as many as possible To froluante -- notin words but in deeds-- one's interests in such a fashion as to make them overlap with the interests of othersis the below hallyou their support nhahnmark of good policy . It will induce others to lend suppontuntuen and to fight your battles. Now aslong as your course actually runs parall et to that of totners it would be foolish tohide this fact and underline your own interests (which are taken for granted) and forgethologoto emphai size the factthat you are , even though incidentally, defending the tutty wybbbbinterests of others than yourself. To do so is the very essence of good policy and your enemies will envy you for it. Of course, if you make a habit of it, and merely pretend to stand for other people's interests

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for other peoples in ereste, when in actual fact you do not serve those interests , perhaps even damage them, then your pretences are mere Cant . You will soon be found out and thannothannonntnicannnidan be attacked than all the more bitterly for having tried to mislead the world by a show of sanctimniousness. But as long as a country is own interests/ interests able to seeve its/names while serving annames brander t han its own. in formulating that amananhanan it is justified annananhanananan policy in those asses of universal interests) mankandanganananananananan which we call international moralifty, and Let others call it Cant in theme their helpless rage, and nathannonin senuennanhandnneuannbehtenn They will netther desert nor get a hearing unless they a rve mankind even better than those whom they cheaply ing denoming accuse for Cant. And here again, it makes for interational understanding one to bear with the foriegner who accuses mnn of Cant, though he merely reveals ais ignorance of the true sources of the & rength of this country while, it keeps one from danning by habit, which only infuri ates the opponent without heaphngnan keep him in his place. mothing is serviceable to the the recognition of one's

interests than knowledge, and over and above, it allows the formulation of a gand policy which takes account of the interests of others time; condicated and the true stuff of human progress. For all wastrutive politics ultilately ale conderned with this the amenant traspodning of the another of pandminterests. thoroughnonnannannannanna to tungins that true knowledge would reveal irreality such the nonnemannes of the conflict is a dangerous fallacy ; but as their exists a hopeved slight for long as the danger of illewionary conflicts of therests duritred by is norance exists, it is impenative to make sure that such is not the case. Thus will be conefented with true conflicts of inerest only. The trasic

El us look at Finally, take foriegn policy as a cause of conflict not between differe parties in one and the same country. What in countries, but between the nun mah the heat of party controversy/easily appears as a nundeonnumber clash merely) between the interests of different parties, is bush of temmanananan the he formulation of the country's imerests from different points of view, or , pablitto more simply, of different interests of the country which may actually be irregor ilable. Here especially, it is true that while the real ressons of the parties may be good enes, their assumed reapns are often bad , and their pretended reasons and even worse. That is why political discussion, more especially on foreign affairs, seems no so ludicrously inadequite if not downright pedracion to the outside observe Actually, it is the observer who is mastaken, who failing to dredit the arguers with as much sense as behimself possesses, managebymentimentimentime is taking their argumnets at their face value instaed of probing into true nature of the difficulty. In that case we manne not only real nant the true alternatives before the country anen out also the infromble forbidding reasons which make it difficult, sometimes atmosphopmentha to state those ensannan reasons openly without endangering many generally recognised interests. Take the reluctance of the Tories to back up the League in the Twenties. Actually wider commitments bonnens under the an enromous sptrain on the British Navy Coveneant would have meant which need do have need not be which it would have fallen to implement League decisions through an almost permanent blockade in the Seven Seas; also in view of America's position on the Freedom of the Seas this would have meant almost instant conflict with the USA , and so on. Not these reades were wost prominentaly given in public discussion. Once it was decided to oppose a begges policy

oppose a League policy for Britain, the arguments were simply turned against the very idea of security through a League, -and the sillier the theywere the better. To listen to anti-beague discussions one would be arguments to accumed that only idiots of the oppose suchs policy. Similarly the disarmament policy of the Labour Party hardly ever insisted on the been sound reason for suchapolicy namely that it would name diminished Germany's inequality of status and thereby greatly helpen to normalise Europe, restore the League and make it eneffective instant. Instand Labour argued that disarmament was an answer to the problems of the period which it most emphatically was not. To listen to Labour speakers one would have assumed that they are weterly disregarding all the realities of the situation. Actually, both in the case of the Tories and of Labour merely the arguments were fallacious, not also the polici their true now advocated, once these latter were out in a inancontext. The same is true of arguments on India, on Russia etc. Apart from an irreducible difference of viewpoint asusally given by the differing interests of the par ties and groups in question, the rest of their divergnoies and very much more in the state of accumed, and even more of pretended reasons readns . that in that of the actual charter diverging unnamen policies. Knowledge on matters ofthis kind serves national unity greatly.

Maybe this was one of the reasons why mine class did not mind our seemingly fratricidal discussions.