e. Head others 1932.

The meaning of Peace.

1. The Postulate of Peace.

assert that war is the central problem of our time is to go straight to the heart of the crisis of our civilization. For such an assertion implies two basic assumptions: (1) that, unless war is abolished our civilization must perish in and through wars and (2) that the obstacles to the abolishment of war are bound up with the fundamental political and economic institutions of our society. To declare war the greatest evil and its abolishment our chief task is, there-

This has been clearly recognised by the consistent upholders of the present system. "A doctrine which is founded upon the harm-ful postulate of peace is an enemy to Fascism" declared Mussolini in his statement on Fascism in the Ecyclopaedia Italiana. The postulate of peace is the dividing-line between two worlds to-day.

What, then, is the exact content of this postulate and what, precisely, are the premises on which it is based?

Postulating peace or , in common English, insisting on a peaceful world, is simply to assume that we could carry on to-day without the institution of war. But let war cease to be a paramount necessity of numan existence and it becomes the negation of humanity by humanity itself. Once it is not inescapyable, it must be abolished at all costs and no other task can claim priority over this one. This is the content of the postulate of peace. Its validity depends, as we see, upon the truth or falsity of the premise, i.e., the assumption that the need for

war as a condition of human society has passed away.

pate in it was the common let from which such only would contract out as were prepared to accept personal safety at the price of breaking away from the community. But neither the Old Testament nor the New, neither Greek nor Roman philosophy saw as much as a moral problem in the institution of war. The common people are the problem of the problem is an entirely new development. It is feel to be the problem in the problem in an entirely new development. It is the most liquid hand change that has come to pass in the Consciousts. It is the most liquid hand that has come to pass in the Consciousts. I make the problem of war.

That war is no longer necessary by no means implies the idealise that the idealise ideal

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Human institutions are not explained by pointing to the procession motives of individuals for making use of the institutions. The existence of courts of justice is not due to the motives for which individuals repair to the courts, There motives to the reasons, homeometrical, social or anti-social, the validity of the reasons, homeometricals.

certain types of society are entirely unaffected by the nature of those motives. For The real motive for which courts are established, i.e. the need for deciding conflicts between members of the community without recourse to private warfare has nothing whatever to do with the actual motive, of such conflicts in individual cases. These latter motives may be good or bad, permanent or transitory, conscious or unconscious, emotional or rational, the validity of the motive for establishing the law-courts themselves bear no the court of the advantages (or disadvantages) to the individual which derive from the existence of the court are of an entirely different character from the advantages on disadvantages deriving from the existence of the court to the community and contages deriving from the existence of the court to the community and contages deriving from the existence of the court to the community and contages deriving from the existence of the court to the community and contages deriving from the existence of the court to the community and contages deriving from the existence of the court to the community and contages deriving from the existence of the court to the community and contages deriving from the existence of the court to the community and contages deriving from the existence of the court to the community and contages deriving from the existence of the court to the community and contages deriving from the existence of the court to the contages deriving from the existence of the court to the community and contages deriving from the existence of the court to the contages derived the contages derived the contages derived the court to the contages derived the contages derived

while in his eventual capacity as a litigant he may be securing for himself (or having to suffer) the various advantages (or eventual disadvantages) inherent in his personal contact with the law.

Similar is the case of war. It is an institution the primary function of which is the deciding of issues which arise between various territorial groupings and which can not be otherwise decided noncen remain in abeyence without impairing the existence of the communities concerned, Such issues are chiefly though not exclusively territorial. For States can exist only within definite boundaries; uncertainty about these reacts upon the state itself as fatefully

as a permanent challenge to its sovereignty would the state is inevitably thrownsinto anarchy. But while a challenge to sovereignty is met by the action of the executive or, in the last resort, by civil war, doubts in regard to frontiers must be removed either peacefully by agreement or else forcibly, by war. Failing peaceful agreement, war is unavoidable whenever the states at conflict owe no common allegiance to a higher sovereignty. The reasons for their quarrel may again be good or bad, rational or irrational, material or ideal - this affects in no way the imperative lead for a final decision whenever there is a conflict. In certain typical cases such as the migration of the peoples, the rise of national states, the great movements of social emancipation, it can not reasonably be doubted that the very progress of mankind would have been impeded, if by some miraculous intervention of a superhistorical authority the motives for the dispute would have been ruled out as invalid. The close connection between civil and national wars in various periods of history should alone warnous from lightly assuming that wars were always carried on for reasons which in the retrospect can not be recognised as valid.

War exists because people wish it to exist" (Aldous Huxley)

This, in a probably the probably the probably to exist. He should cease at last to discuss human institutions in terms of the pleasant or unpleasant moods commonly associated with the personal discharge of the social functions in question. Judicial systems do not exist on account of the grim humour often attributed to

to judges but by virtue of the need of developed societies for some institutional provisions against the breaking of laws. Similarly wars are neither called by people who happen to be in a "warlike spirit" nor are they carried on by the soldiers primarily owing to that spirit. Such a spirit is rather the result than the cause of war; the people directly affected by the war and actually present on the bettlefield may be in a comparatively peaceful state of mind. Handbooks of military science/contain more than a passing reference to hate or greed. Neither in the period of dynastic wars nor in that of cabinet wars hate any appreciable influence upon the decision of governments to carry on the war against the one or the other of the eligible enemies. Even the U.S.A. went to war in 1917 mainly because iit could temain neutral no longer without suffering grave damage as a sovereign state; as far as this goes it mattered little whether the U.S.A. declared war on Great Pritain (as it had done in similar circumstances in 1912) or on Germany (the alternative , in 1812 had been France) It was not hate that impelled the U.S.A. to go to war , although once peace was untenable , hate may have helped to decide who should be the enemy. War, in effect, is as litt. little caused by hate as the stock exchange is the outcome of the need for excitement or the newspaper of that for litter. Wars as such are not concerned with sentiments . If they could be waged without emotions, this might make them even more cruel; and that emotions have to be aroused to-day in order to wage war, effectively,

is rather an incidental result of modern mass-democracy than of the nature of war.

It ought to be evident that no community can settle down to its job as long as doubts about its boundaries about the loyalty of the members of the community, drain the treasury of its income and deprive the approximate itself of one of his attributes of sovereignty. That is why the arbitament of war was vital to the existence of human societies. Being so, it was sanctified.

The postulate of peace, simple as it is comports no less than

"a new foundation of politics. It stands for an act of faith which
heralds the oncoming of a new age in the history of the race. The
sudden emergence of the widespread contition of the criminal
nature of war is to be regarded as the intimation of the birth
of a new and wider community for which overlordship of the sovereign
states of the Earth is claimed. The time has come when a power
is to be set up over the nations and a sovereignty established which
will achieve peacefully what war did in the past by blood and from,

How is this to come to pass? It is at this point that the pacifist fallacy enters.

3. The pacifist fallacy.

pacifist policy is based on the erroneous belief that war had r no vital functions in the past and that it can, therefore, be simply abolished. This is a fateful error which, in case of a substantial

ould be bound to rouse a reaction success of the pacifist movement wo would in which the pacifist movement itself necessarily be destroyed. For as long as the need for war has not passed away, a society that was made unable to use this means of asserting its existence in a conflict would thereby be automatically deprived of avery one of the precumb toring of the ag its existence. No community could follow such a path to the end. The danger is that if the pacifist movement had gained an important measure of success before it collapsed its failure might engulf the cause of the postulate of peace as well. And necessarily so. For, if the forces of peace failed to realize the implications of the postulate for which they stand and if, in effect, their subjective and individualistic mode of thought reflects a past stage of human development, then the postulate of peace will fulfill the profession of the millionists of become a means of paralysing progress while condemning mankind to a futile search for peace in passivity , anarchy and decay.

4. The tolerance analogy.

Yet the principle for which the pacifist standis a true one.

How, then, can that which appears as its consistent practical application inevitably lead to its uniter refutation?

A similar dilemma faced the early protagonists of the principle of tolerance in this country. The principle of religious toleran ance was transferred from the realm of religious experience to the field of politics by that greatest of all Englishmen, Oliver Cromwell.

The Puritan in him had developed into the Independent; freedom of conscience was translated into tolerance. He set the first example in modern history , perhaps in the history of the World, for a dictatorship that fought for the enforcement of liberty and enlightenment. His conflict with Parliament was a struggle of a determined adherent of religious tolerance against a pseudo-And yet what representative body of religious intolerance. That, however, would the result of Cromwells triumph over Parliament have been, is such familiang much an outcome, was historically conceivable? (Undoubtedly) In the long run it would have been the victory of Roman Catholic intolerance over his own tolerant Protestantism. For, if Cromwell and the army had had their way, and England had m Le 1640-165 embarked on that regime of religious tolerance which was to be, ultimately, the bistorically the outcome of the Great Rebellion, the immediate results could have been hardly other than the ascendancy of counter-reformation, an its mest ruthless and victous form. The church and the state had not yet been disentangled. Thus/tolerance on the part of the state would have meant the victory of an intoleran religion over the state or else chaos. For, unless the state had the - ated religious lauchino pour its freed 100 own legislation from religious sanctions, and religion had, at the same time, recognised the sovereignty of the national sta state, the separation of church and state would have inevitably knows 6 brought about the disintegration of both with the consequent collapse of the national and social system. Whether Roman victory or minimizen disintegration, in either case England would have woon fallen under

the sway of the European counter-reformation and the cause of religious tolerance would have been buried for many generations. (Where, as in New England, institutional conditions were shaped accordingly, tolerance was gracuelly put into practice without endangering the community itself) . The triumph of Catholicism was thus awarted only owing to Cromwells failure to force tolerance assuming that it is correct, prematurely upon the country. But does this prove Cromwells ideas false? No, for the true refernce of his religious experience lay in the prophetic recognition of the coming of a time when the state would allow freedom to all religions and religions would accept freely the sovereignty of the state - a condition of affairs, however, which could be brought about only a manifold and farreaching changes in the abjective institutional structure of society. Crowwell's fate was that of a C.O. in power: he had mistaken his prophetic vision for a political mandate.

5. What is to replace war?

what, then, are the corresponding institutional changes which will make the postulate of peace actual reality?

its place. But no international sovereignty is conceivable without a new international as economic order to replace that which is passing away. This second of which the international gold standard with its three movements of capital and labour, commodities and payments form the part will never come vback again.

But unless the international division of labour is maintained in some form or mother a general commonstant fall combined in the standard of life is inevitable, and even if such a fall can be avoided, a great increase in the standard of life will always be attainable in the future by the simple means of re-establishing than international division of labour. Whatever the immediate future may have in store internationalism will remain one of the irresistible driving forself of history.

derives from the fact that a new international economic order must necessarily involve far-reaching economic readjustments not so much as botween the Have and Have-nots as between all the various countries of the globe in a great number of ways.

Accordingly, the chief task of domestic politics will be to equip the nations with a social organisation which is receptable to copy the gigantic strain inseparable from any major readjustments in the international economic field. In the last resort, it is the class-structure of society which will prove the obstacle to international economic readjustment, for massive economic sacrifice can be borne to society which will prove the obstacle to international economic readjustment, for massive economic sacrifice can be borne only by communities which are closely united in the service of transcending ideals. This is the abiding many shift make the first state of the inevitable coming of socialism which will make

The setting-up of an international peace order can not be brought to fruition by a simple refusal to fight, but only by

-establishment of such communities possible.

the actual achievement of the institutional basis of such an order. The first step towards the achievement of this state in the transformation of our capitalist nation states into actual communities by bringing economic life under the control of the common people and abolishing thereby the property cleavage in society.

6. The reform of consciousness.

Insofar as it is possible for us to reconstruct the meaning of New Testament ethics in terms of institutional life, its tendency was undoubtedly both pacifist and communist. The practice of the Early Church reflected these tendencies, they implied the rejection of society as a set of permanent institutions.

Human consciousness itself had been refformed by the discovery of the personal nature of human life and the essential freedom of personality. Accordingly, a negative attitude towards institutional number society was implicit in New Testament ethics. Neither institutions nor customs, nor laws, but community as a relationship of persons was the substance of social existence - an interpretation of the nature of institutional society which amounted to its refer rejection.

In terms of the modern world, the social philosophy of Jesus was anarchist. Its pacifism and communism was based on the denial economic of the inescapable nature of institutional society. Power,/value, coercion, were repudiated as cvil. The discovery of the nature of personal life was thus linked with the refusal to accept the need for permanent forms of social existence.

In our epoch human consciousness is being re-formed again. The recognition of the inescapable nature of society sets a limit to the imaginary freedom of an abstract personality. Power, economic value, coercion, are inevitable in a complex society; there is no means for the individual to escape the responsibilities of choosing between alternatives. He can not contract out of society. But the freedo we appear to lose by this knowledge is illusory, while the freedom we gain through it, is valid. Han reaches maturity in the recognition of his loss and in the certainty of ultimate attainment of freedom in and through acciety.

The truth about human life discovered by Jesus secrets itself to So in the recognition that in our present society man is in a condition of self-estrangement and that the socialist transformation is the only means of re-claiming personal life in a complex society.

In transforming our greatest society in each a manner contaction to the contact of the Christian truth becomes active in mirrory.

7. Pacifish and the working-class movement.

Proverbially, the Wesledan revival saved England from a revolution Social pacifism - the rejection of the class-struggle in every sense of the term we was established as part of the Christian way of life. So far as the working-class is concerned, modern pacifism we merely extending the application of this harmonistic creed from home to foreign affairs. The responsibilities with which members of the ruling class

as such see invested naturally precluded them from putting such doctrines into practice.

On the whole non-conformism tonded to foster an idealist philosophy in the walking there and dealist philosophy manninger and persisted, even after the religious concepts originally associated with it had faded away and been replaced by secular ones. Thus. in spite of the decay of religious life the world of ideals remained a separate world; ideals were simply divested of theirsupernatural felling observed and became attached to secular contents the fateful gap, ever, which and opened up between ideality and actuality outlived. the change. The ideal of soc ial justice under the name of Righteous ... ness became separated from the institution which could alone embodion them. Similarly, button, the League of Mations as an ideal became separated in the minds of the people from the League of Mations as an institution. It is in the history of the working-class movement of this country that we must seek worth for an explanation of a development which has made parifism process to the a the bostacle of the fulfilment of the postulate of beace.