Britain's Foreign Policy

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I. The Aims.

To put a stop to the period of World Wars and to establish another Hundred Years' Peace, without its almost continuous sequence of isolated conflicts and exotic wars.

To ensure the safety maintainementalisms and security of these Isles and to safeguard their communications.

To sustain the unity and coherence of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

To be in the vanguard of world progress and to combine the Present general advance towards racial and social equality with Britain's own inheritance of liberty and toleration.

To serve this cause as a first-rank power: this implies freedom to make her fundamental contribution to international organization as well as freedom to shape her own institutions, including domestic and foreign economy.

II. General Policies.

Co-operation with the World Powers should be based on the principle of common participation in an international organizati as well as on that of understandings in regard to specific tasks

Britain must keep free of policies committing her to either the one or the other of the World Powers. A balance of power is to be maintained with regard to the world as a whole, not with regard to the Continent of Europe.

III. The Commonwealth and Western Europe.

a. The Commonwealth.

The Crmr 1 is Britain's foremost achievement in the sphere - r main asset in

respect

The rise of India to effective Dominion status would represent an outstanding contribution to the problem of a multinational commonwealth.

b. North Western Europe.

. Concern for the immediate safety of the Pritish Isles in an age of long range missiles extends to conditions in the North Western zone of Europe. In regard to the small states it gives rise to an interest of a special though limited character.

c. Collaboration with France.

The reTherrestored French Republic can be expected to become a leading Continental power. Considerations of safety alone would make close and friendly relations touchest with France necessary.

By. Anglo-American Co-operation.

The comminity of English speaking peoples embodied in the Eritish Commonwealth and the United States of America contains the promise of an Oceanic collaboration of lang range, provided that Great Britain's freedom to co-operate with the U.S.S.R. is not thereby inhibited.

The maintenance of the Commonwealth in a shrinking world demands a constructive policy which recognizes America's interest in her Oceanic Security. Regionalism may provide the forms of organization required in the Atlantic, the Pacific, and on the American Continent.

Anglo-Russian Co-operation.

Fritain in the West, the U.S.S.R. in the East are the two fully organized Great Fowers in Europe. Notwithstanding the expected rise of France to a status comparable to that of Great Britain, Britain's co-operation with the U.S.S.R. should be envisaged as providing a fundament for the structure of Europe.

Britain should endeavour to link her co-operation with the U.S.S.R. on the Continent with the solution of her chief industrial problems, such as full employment, heavy industrial exports and the maintenance of a comparatively stable exchange.

VI. The Organization of Europe.

The organization of Europe can not but take account of two

broad facts which result from the War: foreign control of Germany and the existence of a Western and an Eastern security zone.

Occupation of Germany involves the maintenance of institutions which safeguard the use of fortified airfields and ports, the movement of troops, the transportation of munitions and food, the safety of communications, and so on. To these must be added the a safeguarding of the elementary requirements of civilian administration tion such as food, fuel, employment, raw materials, health and education.

Countries and peoples inhabiting the Western and Eastern security zones, must arrange their military and foreign policy in such a manner as to reassure Great Pritain and the U.S.S.R., respectively, that their territory is not being used for the organizing of forces hostile of them. Reciprocal recognition of this situation on the part of Britain and the U.S.S.R. would remove many possible points of conflict.

It is in conditions such as these that the independence and co-operation of the European states must be established, both in the political and in the economic sphere.

VII. The Future of Germany.

Germany must for some time remain under the joint control of the victorious powers with a view to their own safety and to an eventual safeguarding of a future Germany in the framework of an organized Europe.

Her long-term disarmament should be ensured through and within such a framework. An organized Europe involves reduced significance of political frontiers on that continent; this will, again, allow the continued existence of a united Germany on a not much reduced territory. Such unity is also a requirement of the type of planning which is the prerequisite of full employment. There will the then be no need to deprive her people of any social and industrial achievements they might have attributed to the Nazi régime.

It is for the German people to formulate their function in Europe in such a way as to establish a permanent and peaceful co-operation with Great Britain and the U.S.S.B. The operators

nize the interest of a future Germany in the development of the traditional institutions of an organized Europe, while Germany recognizes their special interest in their respective security zones.

No German government can claim international recognition which fails to offer safeguards as to its determination to build the future Germany on these foundations.

VIII. Foreign Economy, Regionalism and Confederation.

a. Foreign Economies.

Appropriate use should be made of the -largely economicregionalist approach in international affairs. It is given by the rec recent spreading of controlled forms of foreign economy, that is, the movement of goods, loans, and payments across the bordern of a country. Such forms of foreign trading permit of a comprehensive use of the resources of whole populations. This again creates the possibility of far more effective methods of economic co-operation in matters of trade, currency, investment, and raw material supplies than were possible in the past. At the same time domestic institutions may vary widely in the countries concerned. .

b. Confederacies.

The political advantage of the regional approach lies mainly in the facilities which it offers for federalist solutions. The obstacle to such solutions in the past lay chiefly in the requirement of fairly uniform domestic institutions in the countries con-Cerned. Planned foreign economies would obviate such a necessity, and thus greatly facilitate the formation of loose confederacies. c. Democratic policies.

Pritain's European policy must take account of the needs of the post-fascist age. The defeat of German fascism has left the field free for a democracy more virile than that of the past. Most of Europe has been under the heel of the Nazis. The experience was not wholly negative. Terrorism and utter loss of freedom was often accompanied by full employment. Bemocracy thus starts on a higher man social level which takes efficient economic planning for granted. The aims of the national resistance move, ents reflected conscious

of this, Everywhere the popular forces are using the democratic idea as an instrument of national reconstruction. The traditional forms of democracy are being supplemented by new forms better adapted to the requirements of a period of transformation.

If Britain's foreign policy broadly follow lines which meet the hopes and endeavours of the popular democracies, they will, in their own interest, lend support to that policy.