

ENGLAND/PAXAZYZED/ TORN  
BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE PACIFIC

As yet I have said nothing about England's policy in Europe. It consisted in making one single <sup>substantive</sup> positive contribution to collective security in the Locarno treaty. This treaty was meant as a safeguard to France against possible German aggression and thus as a guarantee of the territorial ~~of the~~ status quo *on the Rhine*.

The essential point <sup>was</sup> that there was no need for England <sup>of</sup> ~~to~~ adjusting her Pacific policies to <sup>her</sup> a policy in Europe. There was no connection between the two. They were isolated from one another securely by the stretch of a whole continent.

<sup>one</sup> The fact which completely changed this situation was Russia's entrance into the League of Nations in 1934 <sup>as a</sup> ~~in~~ consequence of the advent of Hitler in Germany. Up to that time Russia was a power interested only in the Pacific Ocean. Not also in Europe. In 1934 she declares for the status quo in Europe, and comes down on the French side. Russia joins the League of Nations. The two storm centers of world politics ----the Far East and <sup>W</sup>Western Europe, the Amur Region and the Rhine region---are short circuited. England cannot be at the same time against Russia in the Far East and on the side of Russia in Europe. Her Locarno policy in western Europe <sup>became</sup> ~~was~~ incompatible with the consequences of her basic naval policy in the Pacific. England <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ paralyzed.

Incidentally Hitler's <sup>precisely</sup> position in Europe was based on the recognition of this weakness <sup>in</sup> Great Britain's <sup>position</sup>. Sir John Simon was faced in Berlin with the challenge of choosing between Russia and Germany. He managed to choose neither. But the weakness ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~Britain~~ remained.

For a great power will naturally aim at attaining a position in which it can choose either--and ~~will~~ <sup>need</sup> in consequence ~~will~~ choose neither.

The opposite is Great Britain's case. Being able to choose neither, she is in danger of being disregarded by both.

[ This explains why after Feb 3. d 1935 she slowly acquiesced in France's Russian entente ]  
The Ethiopian Conflict.

Ultimately, this was the main factor <sup>in</sup> of the failure of Gr. Britain in the Ethiopian episode. Serious as its results are for the future <sup>condition</sup> of the Empire, it would be a great mistake to overrate these negative results. Still, if Great Britain was too weak to challenge Italy's aggression, on the road to India, why did she try to block Italy's attack in a manner which made defeat very much ~~more~~ worse than if the unsuccessful attempt to block it had never been made at all?

This failure had more than one reason. One of them was certainly a military miscalculation <sup>concerning</sup> the probably duration of the Italian campaign.

But another set of reasons links up closely with Gr at Britain's basic weakness in this <sup>period</sup> sphere <sup>by</sup> being restricted to use the help of France <sup>only</sup> ~~alone~~ in ~~order~~ to work <sup>the</sup> mechanism of the League. Great Britain made herself one sidedly dependent upon France, ~~which incidentally affect~~ - a fact which ~~incidentally~~ was much resented by the British public. In effect this one sided dependence meant that Great Britain's League effort was doomed to failure.

June 34  
Feb 3.

Peace  
Playing for  
the  
Elbow

Great Britain could have taken an effective League line, only if she was determined to make use of Russia <sup>if and</sup> ~~when needed~~ for the purpose of working the League machinery, as a spare wheel in case the French <sup>wheel</sup> burst.

Indeed this was the <sup>best alternative</sup> ~~preparative~~ England was facing. <sup>Eden</sup> ~~She~~ had been cautious enough to make a visit to Moscow. He wanted to be on speaking terms with Russia. But ultimately the British cabinet, <sup>was</sup> ~~was~~ divided <sup>in favour,</sup> on this issue, ~~failed~~. It seemed impossible <sup>to them</sup> ~~to operate~~ <sup>into</sup> ~~in Russia~~, in view of <sup>the</sup> ~~her~~ position in the Pacific. There was some wavering, however. When Russia became strong enough in the Far East, so that Japan might have <sup>had to think</sup> ~~thought~~ twice before she attacked <sup>Russia</sup> ~~her~~, the British foreign office <sup>began</sup> ~~became~~ to take <sup>up</sup> tentatively a pro-Russian line in China and in Outer Mongolia.

But not for long. The basic weakness remained. The League machinery could not be ~~worked~~ <sup>worked</sup> independently <sup>of</sup> ~~of~~ one great power only, <sup>and for that matter, a reluctant one.</sup> ~~it~~ was bound to fail. <sup>(the machine)</sup>

#### THE LABOR PARTY

Here a <sup>other</sup> ~~third~~ and very serious factor enters with which we can ~~deal~~ deal only with the utmost reserve. We mean the internal aspect of the Ethiopian failure.

Not only the government, the opposition also ~~had~~ failed conspicuously. But parliamentary democracy cannot be run without an active and effective opposition, to keep the government of the day up to scratch. In this the Labor Party conspicuously failed.

The Labor Party <sup>had</sup> supported the governments' League line. But when it came to a point black alternative, the Labor Party split on the sanctions issue, and although the Sanctionists were in the majority and took over, the absolute Pacifists were still strong enough to make any kind of effective League policy impossible. It was not a conflict between the trade unions and the political section inside the party. It was a conflict in the minds of almost every member of the Labor movement as a whole. The political parties of the common people ~~in~~ England, which there is no reason to doubt, mirrors correctly the mentality of the masses, <sup>seriously</sup> proved a complete failure in practical politics from the national point of view. When we say national, we mean by no means nationalistic. National interests were in fact jeopardized both by the ~~die~~ <sup>die</sup>-hard Tories and by the Labor party pacifists. The die-hard Tories had hoped that they could win through <sup>in</sup> Ethiopia without having to risk a catastrophic, personal defeat of Mussolini, with whom they had some sympathy in political outlooks. Thus they missed their chance in autumn 1935. <sup>It never returned...</sup> The Pacifist Laborites, on the other hand, defeated the League policy of the nation, which had gained more than 12,000,000 votes in the Peace ballot of 1935.

The triumph of popular opinion in ruling out of court the Hare-Laval peace plan came too late to ~~repair~~ <sup>repair</sup> the serious damage inflicted on the prestige of Great Britain's foreign policy.

Indeed serious consideration must be given to the question whether the failure of the Labor party in 1931 and again in 1935 does not have underlying causes which could make it permanently difficult for Gr. Br. to overcome its present weakness in international affairs.

With some hesitation to broach ~~upon~~ a subject as delicate

as that of the intellectual and educational unity of the population of Gr. Br., we venture to suggest that such a unity in a real sense is conspicuously lacking in present day England. If we may use the term "comparative illiteracy" to designate a condition of things in which the masses of the population, the technically able both to write and to read, are yet so deficient in the use of their mother tongue <sup>as to</sup> ~~that they~~ practically <sup>to</sup> lack the faculty of normal human self expression, <sup>perhaps</sup> then it is not inappropriate to say that not only the working classes proper but also the broad strata of the lower middle classes in Great Britain today are comparatively illiterate. Their incapacity to sense the realities of politics and to face up to the exigencies involved in politics is very much more deeply rooted than the superficial observer would admit. The social structure of England which for a long time has been the admiration of the world now ~~begins~~ enters a period of serious testing, the outcome of which must be ~~cast~~ in doubt. Both the democratic and the ~~anti~~ anti-democratic countries are recently developing towards an intellectual and educational unity of the whole of society, embracing all classes of the population, <sup>a unity,</sup> to which England with its ~~two~~ "two nations" forms a most striking contrast. To compete with the new democracies and indeed even <sup>with</sup> ~~in~~ the Fascist countries <sup>a)</sup> either a dictatorship or <sup>b)</sup> a unified cultural outlook of the whole nation is needed, *such as America possesses.*

The English speaking nations of the world must be prepared to face the fact that the time may have <sup>arrived</sup> ~~come~~ when the U. S. A. type of civilization may come into its own and <sup>likely</sup> carry a ~~very~~ much increased weight within the English speaking world in comparison to the past within the English speaking world.

*We should suggest that*

*England is ~~not~~ faced with internal difficulties. It is her*

