

The bands of the League: through gold. The Danubian experiments of the Danubian experiments. Racial minorities, frontiers, economic co-operation, The discreptor security denounced as chautinism, the need for regionalism denied in the name of the discreptor of the Danubian experiments.

Ch. V. England's wasted decades.

Great Britian, the classical country of post-War unemployment and of the vicissitudes of the gold standard. The return to gold and the so-called disarmament policy of futile and frivolous. Democracy at its best se saved England, in 1926, from a catastrophe. Eventually, off gold, and suggested German rearmament, both continue too late.

Ch. VI. France's paralysis.

The dead lock of classes , the most ominous feature of a tenometry marketsociety, was shown here in perfect purity. he gold standard to used

and details Probabagament belance of proved and the second s Merian mythe that there is mulathing 1939 - 1918 Find bulber } guarier Well an encubal of Mebalance of More whore whilis miletate affected 944 by the porter of Japan . Reme of Unlain with bring withe bed the property of the proper exembral to the W.J. - The same of the same Bof Pinturope. adharan and the companies of the compani the state of the s nigation of the contract of th oravia de la composición del composición de la composición del composición de la com the manuages roted to detter gares. In good interpreters. Profice of the first of the court of the call of the contract of the first of the call of the first of the first of the call o

The confidence of the color of

the dear lock of gladest , the art of the transfer to the contents of the contents of

. dearwel Reinka a tealigh

of the state of the control of the c

.elendaring a scaeta .P. . A

as an insturment of class war by the capitalists, and even national securitywis subadinated to the requirments of class warfare. In the competition of social systems the deadlocked country succombed. E.en its military strategy-Maginet line determined by the lack of true national unity. In the person of Laval, the force of pure evil nepeabedly taked the lead, yet me alism merely precipifited the catetrophe. but anagnamen his supposed on te

Russia forced munn socialism. Ch. VII. Russia's first revolution, induced by which she which she teenth and nineteenth centuries, her second revolution was prophetic, and was forced upon her by the failure of Western market society. The only country that was able to establish itself as an autarch empire, was retained to do so . Trotzkyjem the primitive and universalist was retroited do so . Trotzky ism, the primitive, much universalist form of paparation socialism was overcome by the more highly developed, much regional solution of the Five Year Plans.

and gapitalist universalism. Ch. VIII.

In the presence of a free supply of land, coarse labour and mongy, market economy worked suncessfully. This explains why the United States and tied an independent solution of the problem of an industrial society; abroad, hower, standard and free trade, these/Trotzkyist forms of capitalism, The contradiction between (printive) her domestic and her external economics may for a considerable time be overcome by virtue of her great political and economic strength. A see universabist temporation.

Ch. IX. Satans due.

Ch. IX. Satans

The Hitlerian crime wave beffted from the latent tensions which were rending the world. Some of the most obstructive feathes of the old world perished in the process, such as nuisance soveriegnties, the gold standard fetish as well as chaotic markets. ditlerian barbarism could preend to offer a solution abutarchy and domination, eventhough it was only that of slavery for all under the heel of the Nordics of the Munich beer garden.

Chrone Tame empires.

The greatest single step towards the achievment of a more effective division of labour and enlargment of the peace area lies in the establishment of, es sentially autarch and essentially especceful empires the close/cooperation of which is institutionally safeguarded. Such empires economic might come into being out of the USA, Latin America, the British Commonwelath, German Central Europe, Smuts's colonial zones, India, Chinaand other German Central Europe , Smuts's colonial zones, regions. All but the predatory empires are eligible under the new dispensation . The tame empire need not be anymore an utopia.

show from the testiming of the facts did patently show for a work of the traveled with a self of fall blooded and property wealth to restore peace and property with the stated directly derived from the relical & The Standard tond nature of he rike & of their Fine. Fruhen hashe word been rike & in just sit and queens purpose thankles one? Ansharthur autention and making peaking amone public spirited and frame of the formand so the formand the contraction of the fitter of the contraction of the fatter of the contraction of the contraction of the fatter of the contraction of the contract

EMPIRES" "TAME institutional system of the 15th conly = the four rubitutions is south, ebalan of power of 3 market execus regrectaling Seice, 4 Cosposala Sala I They wet, you = Me break Jone of the 48 the paming the suffer washeld The present true formation the pursolved problems,

(1) and futile ward & fully to and the purson; new problem appearing on the horizon: freedom : Folgrance homesticating the washing ind what we were the Solutions: ingloqued to "shape the Course, The present transformed fin. a) functional Juiane (4) planed protecting unnecessary want (2) Toual recurit (4) monaris Confictor New Deat lan wishtook Perendellan Comportive Solution, (3) and Confiction Solution revisitation of income Reveridge blan Tree ma whet shirters high works ce ingrains of the total advings futile was:

suclusion (involving anarch

Ch.I. It is generally admitted that fintolerant nationalism, analyse soverpegnty and economic characters but it is not equally accompanisent of market-economy, but it is not equally realized that this scourge maken may disappear again with the passing of the market stay of the market economy.

This book is mainly concerned with the consequences of this recognition in the broader sphere of world affairs.
Nineteenth century

Ch. 2. Historical introduction. The spread of market economy, of national credit and monte fary institutions breed national ism everywhere.

- Ch. 3. The history of the Twenties. The transfer to restore peace and profferity by the business man's methods. From the League to the Dames and Young plans. Danubian confederations, the Dames and Young plans. Danubian confederations, Not sufficiently business like apparoach anaglogy of R.C. ism in Spain in the 17th century)
- Ch.4. The incompatiblity of free markets with democracy is not over come by planing those markets; unless the planned markets are regulated ones, democracy remains incompatible with the them.
- Ch. 5. Not nationadism soveriegaty and economic competition in general, but that kind of nationalism, sovieriegatyand economic competition which was developed under market economy, is inimical to peace and proseprity.

From liberal nationacism, to national liberalism

n hierarchic soveriegnty to anarchisticsoverienty
n regulated to unregulated competition (?)

Ch.6. The premature universlasm of the Christian Commonwealth and Cobdneite liberalism. The change from 13th century univer salism to 16th century nationalism, paralleled by the change from 19th century universal market to 20 the century regionalism

Ch. 7. Tame empires.

What we want is (a) cultimat freadom (b) suspendie refairs
and (c) economic cosperation.
all the can be achieved my five can mit
ourselves (3) of the timbre recipit
state (b) of absoluter forereigns
with the contract the properties.

TAME EMPIRES.

Governing view -points: Inineteenth century

collpase of cultiviscial system of the part I: Origins l. The mundamentation was not caused by the conflict of anabotions

of the Crisis. empires, warring ideologies or a single bhanne event like the

World War I, but by an underlying process of vast scope

nhinhnnmight the origins of which reach far back into the

social history of the period.

PartII: World dis- 2. The unsolved problems which forced the great trasnformation location will imperiatively demand their solution in and after this war: the survivial of democracy depends upon the measure of its success in tackling this manner global task.

itself

Part III: Freedom 3. The / task/lies mainly in the field of the organization of international life; yet the internal problem not the name life of the peoples willy to some extent/conform to the requirements of/

the name of the peoples willy to some extent/conform to the requirements of/

the name of the peoples willy to some extent/conform to the requirements of/

the name of the peoples willy to some extent/conform to the re
quirements of/

the name of the peoples willy to some extent/conform to the re
quirements of/

the some extent of the r

Part I. : End of an Age: Origins of the Crisis.

TAME EMPIRES.

INTROUDCTION. .

Chapter 1. Atter The Paris Treaties.

Chapter 2. Vientorious impotence.

Chapter 3.

Chapter 4. Tong to Hitler to Hitler

Chapter 5. England's wasted decades.

Chapter 6. Paralyz ed France .

Chapter 7. Bus USA and capitalist universalism.

Chapter 8. Russia forced intercolalism. wene country

Chapter 9. Satan's due.

Chapterlo. Tame empires.

Chapter 11. Freedom and federation.

Chapter 12. Regionalism versus universalism.

Chapter 13. Land, labour, and money the commodities.

Chapter 14. Freedom lost - freedom won.

After the Paris Treaties. gradually realized has been been been too It was only wery e. The re hav Cu the end of the Nineteenth Century world. This was (allers) at letertily date tics than es economics. John Maynard Keynes at least had warned of the with which unexpected type of financial problems, involved is the transfer of would confront us.) reprations. Though his warnings were thrown to the wind , something to remember when things began to look ill in economics of the public was ever more working the factor of the public was ever more than the was no one to denounce the taddette futility of the so- called peace system. sed sentimental former which me (those) and no who did so warn, adduced a sentimental Acces which merely confrom bad to worse fused the issue. When things people ice not whye brough Yet the reason was simple even though it was not apparent at the time. Europe had enjoyed a hundred years peace undert he balance of be it was true by the con now destroyed by the permanent disarmament of the defeated countries. Taken literally their mountains that they were expected to remain disarmed for everwould have involved the end of all history. tably, a deep seated uncertainty was created which in spite of all app earances to the contarrary precluded the resumption of normal state life depeated in the foresteed countries, notably in Germany. No International parties of force was some, but and the segment in had taken its place. The impossible had become the actual : a political vacuum had been created which continued to persist, despite all laws of politics. Niether war nor the threat of war had been made illegal, nor were the defeated guarnateed their secutiry in any other way . The pine that att novel int e ognificaring that Current the dinote which started around 1900, but however that

In the League of Nations the organized /balance of power works was merely organish in a technically more rati onal manner, blan before. Provision was made for regular meetings, and (greatly) forms of normal consultation were laid down which would facilitate the working of the balance of power, thus helping to avoid avoidable wars and increasing the aggressor's risk in making any sudden because against it was hoped to All the state of t the status que. In this way ansanightahapanan acutave what the old substituting damp balance of power system, did not achteve freetively. However, the machine used to did not work, for the system had been deprived of its precondition . namely the possessignef power on the part of the units belonging to it. And the this state of disequilibirum by part of the The League had de la recognizing the permanent uniliteral disarmament of the defeated as hhan/

legal constitution of Europe. much someto This state of affairs and have become apparent atmente, but for These implied that the economistic prajurice which implies that the time of politics had gone and that the true consitution of the world was economic. This Very different liberal brought two wenged infineent groups to the fore: the pacifist Left and the Manal While the political Left embodied the peaceful and angelic banker. lugh turance side of economics, the menses big business represented the its satanic and cythical aspect. Morally the Left was " above" politics, the Big was 'below' it. they were at one in their belief in the pre valance of economic forces in society and in their discouting of the political factors in history. - The pacifist idealism of the Left was as removed from the factual factor of the maternalialistic But while the realism of the bankers . Left was convined than only madmen executive matrices started wars, while the princes of finance reserved this ple rale to the hungary and needy. That peace might be threathfened from other sources than those of physical stravation of mental deficiency

in different forms of the harmonistic illusion, they were united in the babbbbbb their manufacturing belief in the

the

economic mane whom

harm in practice. While the pacifist disnegament the necessities of simply to substitute of them state, ver power and ervoisotry, then and wished to substitute for them the smooth working of a mythical free trade which would upon resolve evrything in harmony, the banker insisted on the restoration tion at allcost of a set of definite economic is titutions then the manufacture obsoleteness. Neither

It wentified with vational man

which they vied in denouching, the ones as evil the other as silly.

nanhun according to their manpachtrann adherence to an idealistic and or a number of the pacified. In actual fact, the banker proved even more harmful than the pacifist, perhaps only because it he had more direct influence on events and certainly exercised minn

medestly in the background and to leave the scene to the strutting pollitician, he wealth spotlighted hisifigure bunchen relegating evry
lining olds to the background. At the came time he did not cease to
the featured asaking of mennin, silent annu, industrious, hunnimperviou
to the vanities of the world. General Dawes, then tupican a tunium a
public figure of humdrum the if ever was, ross to the statur
of the silent strong man whose practical common sense manthe hope
of the world, while Morgan annumen s person was madentuning surrounded with a terttable halo of puritan privacy.

Psygnesty withdrawing

they as a rule. White moral eminence, MINON compensated for the lack of realism of the Left & the materallietic illusionism of the banker was/aggravated intellectual inferiroity. The impression of inadequacy might at first glance have resulted from an unfair comparison between the measure of their abilities and the immensity of the responsibilities that fell to them under our economic system. There is however reason to believe that bankers as a class were habitually below average since the highly speci fic abilities required bytheir profession bore but little relation to qualities of the nanatanantanan the trained mind. The faculty which makes the great banker is as accidental and as homanshan perpheric from the human point of view as that which makes the blind folded chess player, an other type of geinus showing no correlation with general ability. Chess matadores have known to have been rather dumb. The chances that the banker of all persons would understand the catherly new and complex problems of economi mics was slight. Though some international bankers were knowned have ha possessed a high I.Q. , mann idols of the financially minded 'Twenties were but poer representatives of the species outside the narrow falling field of directing credit operations. Chapter 2. Weiman werd Victorious impet Post-War Germany paid bitterly for the imperviousness of the victors to the needs of the time. Her re-education proceded along the lines of True pacifism plus gold standard , the ignoring the the issues facing the Malinalle made automati Westly This the liberal Left and the foreign poditios of the bankers the onlyn spokesmen of the nation, the dairing the Gountry wan even deeper into the deadlock. Weimar was pacifist. The Weimar colationreje

-54 mildanil 9

many's equality of status as a reactionary slogan. The three internationalies red, black and yellow-produced a thoroughly pragmatic and thoroughly undound approach to the problem of peace. Socialism, Catholicism and High Finance minner pooled their resources to produce outlook an internationalism postations with a permanently disarmed country.

and enlightened forces in the camp of the victors. The progressive and enlightened forces in the camp of the victors. The for the gold standard craze which prevented Bruning from alleviating unemple ployment at the hight of the crisis Cermany would never have suffered the fate of Nazi domination. But the fear of inflation natural to the a country which has undergone the herro's of this scourge at its least, was made to serve the naturally different aim of opposing the management of currency and deficit firence. Famous economists mounted the scented dispensed soap box and supensed political demagnogy.

The Germany was the victim both of her foes and her friends. The nearer she appeared to have come to the Versailles ideals of the faction of the Seld was, the farther from permalcy she setuplis was.

The solutions of her manh problems was left to the care of the Davil.

VIII.

Victims of an antiquated outlook, the Grans were quickest to grass

its weaknesses.

They had

Their basis experience has that of the inadequacy of the mineteenth

the party order. Primarily, suited Englands other countries only
as long as the amiginal conditions afinite management had been been of

which it arose. Disarmed Germany gradually learnt to understand the role

of force in the establishment of power. They noted the earlier attainment of mational and social unity in England as well as the fact that it was not achieved through methods of parliamentary democracy.

Intellectually, this was a time of debunking. German idealism was working in the reverse. The rewells was as usually, numerimpathe non-pitte less of orientation on the part & of the radical debunkers.

The descovery that WesternEuropeam ideals had not benefited all so equally, led to the mistaken conclouion that these ideals was were. Instruments of power in the hands of definite nations as, for instate the EMBRERER BB British.

nationalism. They were made to serie the totalitarian cause, and It's politics named was based on iniversalist cannot be unreality of the individual, while its economics were to be unmaintain planned national agrandium primarium national agrandium primarium national agrandium national national

Socialism was personned to an Socialism was personned to the acquiescence of bourgeois nationalism, by perverting it into account of the acquiescence of the common people, in their ewn inferiminately while the European outlook was the into MM a vehicle of master race policies. Thus were satanastic assumptions were introduced into /fabric of Western idealism, and the accountly post-Christian outlook of mast inhabiting complex society turned into an anti-Christian outlook.

The good intentions were those of the League, minimum waves slogan mintentions.

The good intentions were those of the League, minimum waves slogan mintentions.

Peace through gold. To the idealism of the pacifist was supersided the idealism of the high-pressure salesman. To Wilson and Shotwell was a supersided the idealism of the high-pressure salesman.

were formed to

The League overleoked the intimate causal connection between the chauvinism it feared and the laissez-fairs it preached. For laissez-fairs in world economy raises fears in the single nations and manners which were the real source of economic nationalism. Thus the League unconsciously for fost steed the nationalism of which it complained and at the same time block and the rand to the true solution. Instead in denounced the demand for security as chauvins and the need for/regionalism was discounted in the name of universalist ethics (The Maxi made the opposite mistake of extending regionalism, justified only in the apparent political and economic ethics.

The three problems of the Danubian region—radial mineirites, frontiers and sociomic non-scoperation—were not brought nearer to solution the the problem. The road to Hilton was paved with good intentions.

Ch. V. England's wasted decades.

Great Britian was the classical country of post-War unemployment and the vicissitudes of the gold standard. Her physical and moral effort; in winning World War I was more great; her subsequent in the test of the peace, was almost nil. The first that we great the peace, was almost nil. The first that we great the peace was almost nil. The first that we great the peace of the peace

Actually, of the Wistern countries, Britian experienced the most severe and perfect unemployment, and more than anywhere else itwas here that the gold standard developed its meatives qualities on alarge scale. The meturn to gold and the so-called disarmament policy were in theme conditions frivolous and futile. England, in spite of Kaynes's warding restored the value of the pound sterling, thoughall arties were determined not to allow a fall of nominalwages. Also England continued to land to Gentral and as tern Enropean countries as before, thus bearing the burden of the resotration of their currencies. The short term lendings to Germany which eventually endangered the pound amound not have been permitted. And after all the talk of 'currency first' and admonitions to lesser peoples, ultimately logic in went off gold simply to save been the banks from insolvency. Tough this was these certically a valid reason; first, it was mistakenly denied seconds Britian never gave really account to here if of what has happened. Incidentually, this would have into volved the clearing up of the issue of the general strike, whichwas, so to speak fought and lest in the dark.

Thethe

The deadlock of classes, the most ominous feature of a market-society, was represented inthe France of the 'Thirties inits perfect purity.
World War II was primarily a struggle Bor social systems .Germany and
Russia regarded their social organizations as the primary assets both militarily and in the realm of international politics. As late as munich, sepatember 1938, Germany was banking onher anti-Bolshevik credentials, and, in March 2 1939, Russia was still officially stating her world-revolutionary connections. The U.S. made her social and industrial section the crucial issue of the War; it was on the strength of her way of life that she claimed leadership. To a lesser extent the same was true of Italy and Japan. Even a number of smaller countries showed tremendous nowers of resistance, their patriotism being to a large extent represented powers of resistance, their patrictism being to a large extent represented by themselves as loyalty to their way of life. It is in this light that the spectacular failure of France in 1940 is to be understood regular.

Everyting was subordinated to class war. The gold standard was used

by the capitalists constituely as a weapon of political constraint. Even WARRED AND military

> strategy, -- Maginot line - was determined by the lack of the national unity. French appeasement policy was the outcome of capitalist sympathies with Germany's regime, and, for the rest, to the inherent weakness of a upunny a country devided against itself. In the person of Laval the principle of evil took the lead and made a last bid of coloring the countire problems with the help of the methods of out and out cycnism, for in vain his supposed realism merely properties to consumed the catagorical to t

more complete

The USA and capitalist universa ism.

Gerse Constant, her

[coarse] Constant, her

[iven a free supply of labour, land and money , market -economy worked successfully in America. Section Market provides foreign policy se stid! tied to the pre-1914 system. Even though at home the New Deal might mean the begining of an independent solution of the problem of an industrial society, abroad America must insist on the economics of the gold standard and free trade, these primitive 'Trotzkyist' forms of capitalism. The contradiction between her domestic and her external economics may for a consterable time be numbered bridged by virtue of her great political and economic strength. The USA represents to the temptations of auniversalist lines of policy.

Russia forced on to socialism. Ch. VIII.

Russia's first revolution (1917-1924) was induced by the evils of absolut ism , fedualism and national oppressions which she shared with the Western coutries of the lithe 18th and 19th centuries. Her second revolution (1929-1939) was not backward looking but prophetic, and was forced upon her by the failure of Wastern market society . Russia, the only country able to establish berself as an autorch empire, was ctually competled to take this course. Trotzkyism, the primitive universalist form of socialism was evercome by the more highly developed regional solution of the Five Year Plans.

The effect of the Satan's due.

The effect of the wave bentefited on the latent tensions which were burst ing the world wide open. Some of the most obstructive features of the old world perished in the process, such as nuisance sovertighties, the gold chaotic markets.

(explosion)

Tame Empires. Ch.X.

The greatest single step towards the achievment of a more effective division of labour and enlargment of the peace area lies today in the establishment of escentially autarchand essentially peaceful empires the close economic cooperation of which is institutionally safeguar ded. Such empires might come into being out of the USA, Latin America, the British Commonwealth, German Central Europe, Smute's cotonial zones, India, China and other regions. All butthe predatory empires are eligible under the new dispensation. The tame empire need not be is not an utopia.

Such empires must be regarded as essentially indestructible and their wars were merely peripheric and lead to minor adjustments hven the wars of the Roman empire were comparatively small professional affairs; so were the Chinese of the classic priod , membraneous It seems doubtful thousand when whether total war will continue to be afeature of warfare as it cereposly is with waring tribes and was the case in the recent past.

Freedom and federation. Ch.XI.

Nineteenth century Powers could not refrain from spreading their constitu tionaland business pattern to all other countries for apart from these to trade name and type passibles and capital transactions handophposnibhan were hardly possible. Autarch surices are under to such countries and capital transactions handophposnibhan were hardly possible. Autarch empires are under no such compulsion to an a institutional and cutlural uniformity, and can yet cooperate effectively. Only the similarty of the organs of external economics, not also that of demestic economics.

Regionalism vs, universalism. Cn. XII.

Both capitalism and socialism start from primtive universalist conceptions the truth of which lies in the moral and spiritual sphere, the translation of which into political and economic institutions may be however premate Confer the prem ture munhumn universalism of the Christian Commonwwealth of the early middle Ages, which had to be superseeded by the national states inorder to ensure economic and politicalnementant progress. The fascist rightly insisted on the negation of universalismin the political and economic sphere while norm falsely deping it in the appointmentanentanent entities and rationality. The nelpless methods of free trade to be replaced by the height form of political resposibility. (Confer the fallacy of the authomatism of the gold standard as opposed to manusen the alleged inferiroity of managed currencies). The organs of external ecomputes developed in the .! Twe nties in order to save the old system, can be used to day in order to launch the new. met ceasing to be

Land, labour and money are as commodities. Ch. XIII.

We must retain the institutions of moneyand, markets, but master hhaden them through regulation. Labour's price kenould not be formed on the market; /land and other natural recourses should be determined by the the use of and other natural recourses should be determined by the the use of market; money, his it is argely blocked today, should be reunmanadabyn in the hands the supply of of public bodies. The icrease identralization involved must be counteracted by a positive will to freedom, and such instatitutions awan as are able to safegarud a Bill of Rights.

Freedom lost; freedom von. Ch. XIV.

but Note fod alone knows what the course brings of history was meant to be writing history in a reason of way In trying toneritenhistory /we are before man speiled it. tayingatannecenspusatahata truth tapingnameanstructingnathannounsern unconsciously comparing the actual e vents with what they ought to have been. In this sense ell writing of history - namenon can be no more than a guess. However, we cantry to guess that meaning, and I for one never ceased time to follow when events commonwhimm with idea in mind. that one I started life as a socialist, and referred all my hopes a However, even ideal. NNNN before the First World War I became convinced that our civilization me moving towards a great trashforma in which the role of socialism itself wall change radically. attack called the The Orisis tion ./I out down of our Aldeologies' wh Hungarian I argued in the mentional we were moving towards an age of Barxian phrase clas that monopoly capitalism commonwemen in which the capitalist class itself would elevate the socialist ideal into a statereligion , without honnuern completely divesting it of its humanitarian and democratic In other words I was foresasting the national-soialist content. Inevitable though I believed to developenniamina development. menisheless on economic grounds that it should be opposed and dunghamm opposed an Sucha \ soon) and fought. The contadiction implied in position turned me materal lism and made me cabanan reject the eruda auuma against I embraced the idea of ethical activism positivism of the 3 presently indubna converted to inhigh had namen property and an inhibitation of the had named and the converted to the had named and the h and was Christians. Whienhausenbannanusus The next twenty years of my life were devoted to the attempt of reconciling thesocial gospel man's earthur In an industrial society.

Introduction

Not a few people still appear to be clinging to the trions belief that the right treatment fof Germany is the problem the Allies will have to face after victory. We are not referring here to this or that, school of thought whether that mild or harsh, but to the problems that any conditions imposed upon the defeated could resolve the problems raised by the war. Should such a conceit prevail with the peace-makers, the the comic tangle in our affairs got lafter the First World War would be as nothing to their tragic collapse after the Decond.

Not as if the future in Germany were not of the highest importance to Europe. To give way in regard to that country to a brainless sentimentalism would be the land, as unjustifiants as to indulge, in # blind vindictive sadism at its cost. But assuming, as one reasonably should, that the right course in this case lies somewhere in the middle, it would falal mistake still be a batelest trlusion of the wort dangerous kind to imagine that any treatment of Germany matsocrar could in some miraculous fashion by the first and from teaching ills of our civilization. as the a ailments of our present society do not date from the German Wars and the will not vanish whatever will, be the fate of Germany. So much, believe, I believe, should be absorbed as axiomatic. Since the turn of ... wighly integrated the century our societies had become wirely unstable, hests of industrieur persons were left from time to time without incomed, the Powers were inonies to keep employment and profits on an triguing for markets and col even keel, and their all but mobilized was armies were waiting only, while for the work to cross the frontiers, /uncontrollable Liliputian states himdened concerted peace action. Such was the picture, of our world before,

Germany's first war of aggression; while a dozen years after her utter these droubles, far from disappearing, had become many times worse. Unemployment which had been reckened by the hundred thousand in the 1910's was per counted by the million international anarchy which was rampant; and internal tensions, both national and social, which had been held in check, before the forth at all ends. How could Germany - or for that matter any other single nation - be credited with having created a state of affairs which antedated its aggressive acts, and which became even more calamitous after the animous complete elimination of the form the scene? And how could one expect that any conceivable behaviour towards Germany, however forgiving or vindictive the, would free our society from ills clearly not caused by the doings of any one country?

And yet of all the crude superstitions that throve in the credulous atmosphere of the time, belief in the panacea of Vansittertism was not even the most incongruous. The Razis heaped up a record of misdeeds that no modern nation ever equalled. Even when their acts were morally no worse than those of other power-loving governments in the past, they put themselves out of court by their insistence on acting in an almost exultant defiance of the fact that some of their actions which were formerly merely reprehended as an unnecessarily harsh use of force had been in the meantime recognized as innuman crimes. Vansittartist Wodoo had therefore its psychological source in the ghastliness of Mazi practices which confounded the judgment even of such who would have otherwise shyed at the strange notion that if we only discovered the precisely correct manner of settling the German question, Western society would be well on the way towards the solution of its problems, including mass-unemployment, fluctuating currencies; revelting because unnecessary want,

and criminat because futile wars. There was instance, the contrior that the disintegration of our institutional system in the Twenties and Thirties was due to a clash of fassict and folsbevik idealogies, idisregard of the circumstance that the crowning institution of international capitalism, namely the gold standard, was destroyed not by a Bolshevik, but by Neville Chamberlain, a representative of the percent the City of London, and that he was followed in the wicker a ccuple of years later not by a fascist, but by Franklin Roosevelt, head of the American democracy. The Carnegie Foundation, again, preconized the view that the First World War was responsible for the fatal dislocation, As if our institutional system had been hale and sound before that bloody event, incidentally, itself only a symptom of the failure of those institutions which, together had made possible the Hundres Years' Peace of 1815-1914. An even more superficial view tried to fix the blame for the failure of the League, the International Labour Office, the Disarmament Conference and the other unfunded trusts of the Nineteen Twenties on the alleged greed of the businessmen and the shortsightedness of the politician who supposedly blocked the working of the se otherwise as perfect institutions showthat grarely in all rooms was a more sustained effort made to restore peace and prosperity methods directly deduced from conceptions about the nature of the so-. Wot often had there been seen a more public spirited generation of international statesmen than the Stresemanns and Briands, the merriots and mendersons, or indeed even that of the doctringires of the gold standard. Let all their attempts to restore peace and prosperity at whatever price merely hastened general ruin.

The stripe truth of it is that the whole institutional system of the nineteenth century has broken down and that we will have to replace it by a new one, if we want to save the lives of hundreds of millions of people who have become dependent for their work textstence on the services

of an industrial civilization. And this gigantic transformation was as little the result of the violent imperialism of single peoples such as the Teuton or the Nipponese, as it was the outcome of a clash of creeds 🕟 such as fascism or bolshevism. Its true causes and not far to seek. by the turn of the century it was widely held that a great change in the economic system was inevitable; somewhat crudely the this was put in the terms that capitalism had had its run, and that the non too distant future belonged to socialism. Today we may be inclined to avoid general such formulae and to put the unselved problems of our time in more pragmatic terms such as unemployment, wonetary fluctuations, social insecurity, international anarchy, and so on, while discounting purely economic slogans ar from weakening the public conviction of the instability of on tutions, such a pragmatic attitude tender reinforce that conenormously, and to make it practically general. A quarter century ago hardly anybody but a socialist would have argued that the business cycle. contracts, or trade wars ought to be abolished! foday capitalists would emphatically agree history des complains of the powerless be to the status of unsolved problems, an extremely significant due to the state fact that circumstances made a solution or ratheresoluineffectual tions possible where formerly none were in sight. reinforced by the superior strength of the powers by all of them) In more decisive turn in that be (though not. social development than a change is conceivable. Almost over night the existing state of affairs comes to be felt as insufferable and as from nowhere irresistable forces make their appearance pressing for change. However, of the rival solutions not necessarily that one will prevail which was advanced by the critics; sometimes, in effect, the solution favoured by the criticised will take precedence over the one preconised by the critics themselves. It might then, indeed, seem us if their criticism

had been ill founded, while actually it may have been borne out by the event only in a form unexpected to themselves. Their demand for socialism, for instance, may have merely bred fascism for the time being. In spite of this apparent refutation of their theses it would still be true that a well-defined problem, the failure of market-sconomy had forced the course of events. In such periods historical analysis is almost reduced to a record of the circumstances which brought the unsolved issue to the fore and the peripeties of history apparent the unsolved issue to the fore and the peripeties of history apparent.

The First World War offered some examples. It was to be expected,

that, whichever side won, the end of feudal conditions in Russia would be the result - in the case of Russia's victory, because to could not modern have been accieved without giving, capitalism a chance, in the case of Russia's defeat, because the revolutionary peasantry and proletariat would destroy feudalism as surely as the escendency of the capitalists mound would. Actually, victory and defeat combined to fulfill the task, Bolshevik defeatism finishing the job which the Kerenski's and Milyukovs began. Similary, the long standing issue of racial minorities was due for solution, whether the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy won or lost; with the only difference that in the first case racial minirities would secure their free dom inside the Dual monarchy, in the latter case, cutside. In respect to min the Yugoslavs events, brought both solutions to the test: in 1917, when the successful offensive of the Germans brought berois under the occupation of the Dual Monarchy, plans were set afoot in Vienna tonoffer to the Yugoslavs freedom inside the Monarchy; when within the Monarchy lost the war the Yugoslav parts seceded and gained their freedom outside the Monarchy. This does in no way imply that the alternative solutions are the all respects equivalent; usually the one fits into an entirely different pattern than the other. The liquidation of Russian feudal remnants on the hand of Nilyukov and Kerenski would have been

much less radical thrugh also less costly than that indicated by the Bolsheviks. Similarly, the destruction of German and Magyar ascendancy over Southern Slav peoples would have been less complete and less costly fragmentation, as it actually happened. To the historian, however, in his quest for the roots of that variegated development which comprises the antecedents of the War, as well as its consequences, mummumbasemesm issues such as feudal survals in backward huseia or racial minorities in the Dual Monarchy may well offer a clue.

Frecisely The same is the case on an even much I to-day. The First World War was progressive and constructive only in the backward regions of Europe and the Fear East where it acted as a vehicle of constitutional, national and economic emancipation. For the rest, notably in the West, it was werely one of those clashes of the vital forces of communities which seem to serve no other purpose than to measure their relative mammachup strength for the benefit of the gods. In the Second World War the unsolved problems of a whole period of civilization provided the background. Germany, Japan, Italy merely tried to clutch as large chunks as they could out of the body of a disintegrating much maken system. Their own contributions to the solutions of these problemp for from hoing utterly valueless were rather in the nature of tentacles with the help of which depredation was to be carried into effect. Russia, England and America contributed their share in the chaping of a new world less in the spirit of acquisition (seeing that they were in possession) as in that of a reluctant participation in constructive efforts. adually shapping " new order - Indeed, the very fact that they were ied was not admitted and by the Allies, while the Axis paraded its supposedly new order even where this phrace covered up merely an utter lack of plan and principle. While the Axis was thus dramatizing its missionary role the Allies denied, at least by implication, that such a mission was called for. However, neither

party should be judged simply on its own testimony which, paradoxically enough, often tended to be unfair to themselves.

Atlantic Charter, contained no recognition of the causes of the present world crisis. On the contrary. It definitely implied that absolute sovereignty and self-determination are not amongst these causes, the opposite of which is a patent fact. It implied also that the equal status of great and small nations in international life is not amongst them, despite the fact that the whole history of the League proved the contrary. It did not even mention the dangers which derived from a market economy and unregulated world trade; it was silent about the mass unemployment resulting from the gold standard and the insecurity of income inherent in the wage system. And these are only the major points on which a docuwent was necessarily misleading which failed exact to refer to the economic ans social carthquake that shook the world after 1929 and thus falcely. implied that the chaos in international life was the result of the aggressive or criminal action of one Power or another. The Vansittartism wodes can justly claim as its origin the Atlantic Charter. Scapegoate form part of the rites of wizardry. One need not have undue sympathy with the goat to insist that its sacrifice will not cure our ills, and may even prevent us from seeking out the true remedy.

This book will try to indicate such remedies, on the simple assumption that the obvious diagnosis of the illeges is the right one, and that the conflicts of ideologies are merely mammatand superadded gate a broad and the conflicts of ideologies are merely mammatand superadded gate a broad and problems of the age are stories for their solution.

Introduction

Not a few people still appear to be clinging to the curious belief that the right treatment fof Germany is the problem the Allies will have to face after victory. We are not referring here to this or that school of thought, whether it be labelled mild or harsh, but to the optimistic delusion that any conditions imposed upon the defeated could resolve the problems raised by the war. Should such a conceit prevail with the peace-makers, the almost comic tangle in our affairs after the First World War would be as nothing to their tragic collapse after the Second.

Not as if the future in Germany were not of the highest importance to Europe. To give way in regard to that country to a brainless sentimentalism would be obviously as unjustifiable as to indulge in a blind vindictive sadism at its cost. But assuming, as one reasonably should, that the right course in this case lies somewhere in the middle, it would still be a baseless illusion of the most dangerous kind to imagine that any treatment of Germany whatsoever could in some miraculous fashion prove an antedote to the agonizing ills of our civilization.

The ailments of our present society do not date from the German War and they will not vanish whatever will, be the fate of Germany. So much, I believe, I believe, should be accepted as axiomatic. Since the turn of the century our societies had become highly unstable, hosts of industriou persons were left from time to time without incomes, the Powers were intriguing for markets and colonies to keep employment and profits on an even keel, and their all but mobilized mass-armies were waiting only while for the work to cross the frontiers, uncontrollable Liliputian states him dered any concerted peace-action. Such was the picture, of our world bese

Germany's first war of aggression, while a dozen years after her utter defeat these troubles, far from disappearing, had become many times worse. Unemployment which had been reckened by the hundred thousand in the 1916s was now counted by the million, international anarchy which until 1914 had been precariously hald in bounds by the balance of power was rampant, and internal tensions, both national and social, which had been held in checks before the First war, burst forth at all ends. How could Germany - or for that matter any other single nation - be credited with having created a state of affairs which antedated its aggressive acts, and which became even more calamitous after the all but complete elimination of that country itself from the scene? And how could one expect that any conceivable behaviour towards Germany, however forgiving or vindictive it be, would free our society from ills clearly not caused by the doings of any one country?

And yet of all the crude superstitions that throve in the credulous atmosphere of the time, belief in the panacea of Vansittertism was not even the most incongruous. The Mazis heaped up a record of misdeeds that no modern nation ever equalted. Aven when their acts were morally no worse than those of other power-loving governments in the past, they put themselves out of court by their insistence on acting in an almost exultant defiance of the fact that some of their actions which were formerly merely reprehended as an unnecessarily harsh use of force had been in the meantime recognized as inhuman crimes. Vansittartist wodeo had therefore its psychological source in the ghastliness of Mazi practices which confounded the judgment even of such who would have otherwise shyed at the strange notion that if we only discovered the precisely correct manner of settling the German question, western society would be well on the way towards the solution of its problems, including mass—unemployment, fluctuating currencies, revolting because unnecessary want,

and criminal because futile wars. There was, for instance, the opinion that the disintegration of our institutional system in the Twenties and Thirties was due to a clash of fascist and bolshevik ideologies. in disregard of the circumstance that the crowning institution of international capitalism, namely the gold standard, was destroyed not by a Bolshevik, but by Neville Chamberlain, a representative of the power of the City of London, and that he was followed in this suicidal course a couple of years later not by a fascist, but by Franklin Roosevelt. head of the American democracy. The Carnegie Foundation, again, popularized the view that the First World War was responsible for the fatal dislocation. as if our institutional system had been hale and sound before that bloody event, incidentally itself only a symptom of the failure of those institutions which, together had made possible the Hundres Years' Feace of 1815-1914. An even more superficial view tried to fix the blame for the failure of the League, the International Labour Office, the Disarmament Conference and the other unfunded trusts of the Ninetsen Twenties on the allaged greed of the businessmen and the shortsightedness of the politician who supposedly blocked the working of the se otherwise so perfect institution: - as if the testimony of the facts did not show that rarely in all recorded bistory was a more sustained effort made to restore peace and prosperity by methods directly deduced from conceptions about the nature of the society of their time! Not often had there been seen a more public spirited that of generation of international statemen than the Stresemanns and Briands, the merriote and mendersons, or indeed even that of the doctrinaires of the gold standard. And yet all their attempts to restore peace and prosperity at whatever price merely hastened general ruin.

The simple truth of it is that the whole institutional system of the nineteenth century has broken down and that we will have to replace it by a new one, if we want to save the lives of hundreds of millions of people who have become dependent for their very existence on the services

of an industrial civilization. And this gigantic transformation was as little the result of the violent imperialism of single peoples such as the Teuton or the Ripponese , as it was the outcome of a clash of creeds , such as fascism or bolshevism. Its true causes are not far to seek. Already by the turn of the century it was widely held that a great change in the economic system was inevitable; somewhat crudely, meybee, this was put in the terms that capitalism had had its run, and that the non too distant future belonged to socialism. Today we may be inclined to avoid general formulae and to put the unsolved problems of our time in more pragmatic terms such as unemployment, monetary fluctuations, social insecurity, international anarchy, and so on, while discounting purely economic elogans. Far from weakening the public conviction of the instability of our institutions, such a pragmatic attitude tended to reinforce that conviction enormously, and to make it practically general. A quarter century ago hardly anybody but a socialist would have argued that the business cycle, individual labour contracts, or trade wars ought to be abolished; today capitalists would emphatically agree with them. Over and over again in the course of human history the complains of the powerless have thus advanced to the statue of unsolved problems, an extremely significant preferment, due to the simple fact that circumstances made a solution or ratheresolutions possible where formerly none were in sight. Consequently an ineffectual opposition found itself reinforced by the superior strength of the powers that be (though not, perhaps, by all of them). No more decisive turn in social development than such a change is nonceivable. Almost over night the existing state of affairs comes to be felt as insufferable and as from nowhere irresistable forces make their appearance pressing for change. However, of the rival solutions not necessarily that one will prevail which was advanced by the critics; sometimes, in effect, the solution favoured by the criticised will take precedence over the one preconised by the critics themselves. It might then, indeed, seem as if their criticism

had been ill founded, while actually it may have been borm out by the event only in a form unexpected to themselves. Their demand for socialism, for instance, may have merely bred fascism for the time being. In spite of this apparent refutation of their theses it would still be true that a well-defined problem, the failure of market-economy had forced the course of events. In such periods historical analysis is almost reduced to a record of the shifts in circumstances which brought the unsolved issue to the fore and the petipeties of history appear as mere links in the conflict of competing solutions.

The First World War offered some example. It was to be expected that, whichever side won, the end of feudal conditions in Russia would be the result - in the case of kussia's victory, because it could not have been achieved without giving capitalism a chance . in the case of Russia's defeat, because the revolutionary peacentry and proletariat would destroy feudalism as surely as the ascendancy of the capitalists washed would. Actually, victory and defeat combined to fulfill the task, Bolshevik defeation finishing the job which the Kerenski's and Hilyukov's / began. Similary, the long standing issue of racial minorities was due for solution, whether the Austro-Aungarian Monarchy won or lost; with the only difference that in the first case racial minirities would secure their free. dom inside the Dual monarchy, in the latter case, outside. In respect to thin the Yugoslavs events brought both solutions to the test: in 1917, when the successful offensive of the Germans brought Serbia undervihe occupation of the Dual Monarchy, plans were set afoot in Vienna tonoffer to the Yugoslave freedom incide the Monarchy; when ultimately, the Monarchy lost the war the Yugoslav parts seceded and gained their freedom outside the Monarchy. This does in no way imply that the alternative solutions are in all respects equivalent; usually the one fits into an entirely different pattern than the other. The liquidation of Russian feudal remnants on the hand of Milyukov and Kerenski would have been

much less radical though also less costly than that indicated by the Bolsheviks. Similarly, the destruction of German and Magyar ascendancy over Southern Slav peoples would have been less complete and less costly when achieved within the confines of the monarchy than by the way of its fragmentation, as it actually happened. To the historian, however, in his quest for the roots of that variegated development which comprises the antecedents of the War, as well as its consequences, muchanimum issues such as feedal survels in backward Russia or racial minorities in the Dual Monarchy may well offer a clas.

Precisely the same is the case on an even much larger scale to-day. The First World War was progressive and constructive only in the backward regions of Europe and the Hear East where it acted as a vehicle of constitutional, national and economic emancipation. For the rest notably in the West it was merely one of those clashes of the vital forces of communities which seem to serve no other purpose than to measure their relative momentand strength for the benefit of the gods. In the Second World War the unsolved problems of a whole period of civilization provided the background. Germany, Japan, Italy merely tried to clutch as large chunks as they could out of the body of a disintegrating manipappe system. Their own contributions to the solutions of these problems far from being utterly valueless were rather in the nature of tentacles with the help of which depradation was to be earried into effect. Russia. England and America contributed their share in the shaping of a new world less in the spirit of acquisition (seeing that they were in possession) as in that of a reluctant participation in constructive efforts-- indeed, the very fact that they were so occupied was not admitted reddily by the Allies, while the Axis paraded its supposedly new order even where this phrase covered up merely an utter lack of plan and principle. While the Axis was thus dramatizing its missionary role the Allies denied, at least by implication, that such a mission was called for. However, neither

party should be judged simply on its own testimony which, paradoxically enough, often tended to be unfair to themselves.

The Atlantic Charter contained no recognition of the cause of the present world crisis. On the contrary. It definitely implied that absolute sovereignty and self-determination are not amongst these causes, the opposite of which is a patent fact. It implied also that the equal status of great and small nations in international life is not amongst them, despite the fact that the whole history of the League proves the contrary. It did not even mention the dangers which derive from a warket economy and unregulated world trade, it was silent about the mass unemployment resulting from the gold standard and the insecurity of income inherent in the wage system. And these are only the major points on which a document was necessarily misleading which failed even to refer to the economic ans social earthquake that shook the world after 1929 and thus falsely implied that the chaos in international life was the result of the aggressive or criminal action of one Power or another. The Vansittartist wodoo can justly claim as its origin the Atlantic Charter. Scapegoats form part of the rites of wisardry. One need not have undue sympathy with the goat to insist that its sacrifice will not ours our ilis, and may prevent us from seeking out the true remedy.

This book will try to indicate such remedies, on the simple assumption that the obvious diagnosis of the illness is the right one, and that the ambitions of empires and the conflicts of ideologies are merely maps and superadded unto a broad and deep process through which the unsolved problems of the age are seeking for their solution.