

** CRITIQUE OF PACIFISM **

Prepared by a Christian Left Group

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THE MEANING OF PEACE

1. The Postulate of Peace.

To assert that war is the central problem of our time is to go straight to the heart of the crisis of our civilisation. For such an assertion implies two basic assumptions: (1) that, unless war is abolished our civilisation must perish in and through wars and (2) that the obstacles to the abolishment of war are bound up with the fundamental political and economic institutions of our society. To declare war the greatest evil and its abolishment our chief task is, therefore, to formulate a revolutionary principle.

This has been clearly recognised by the consistent upholders of the present system. "A doctrine which is founded upon the harmful postulate of peace is an enemy to Fascism" declared Mussolini in his statement on Fascism in the Encyclopaedia Italiana. The postulate of peace is the dividing line between two worlds today.

What, then is the exact content of this postulate and what, precisely, are the promises on which it is based?

Postulating peace, or, in common English, insisting on a peaceful world, is simply to assume that we could carry on today without the institution of war. But let war cease to be a paramount necessity of human existence and it becomes the negation of humanity by humanity itself. Once it is not inescapable it must be abolished at all costs and no other task can claim priority over this one. This is the content of the postulate of peace. Its validity depends upon the truth or falsity of the premise, i.e. the assumption that the need for war as a condition of human society has passed away.

War was "destiny unshunnable, like death." To participate in it was the common lot from which such only could contract out as were prepared to accept personal safety at the price of breaking away from the community. But neither the Old Testament or the New, neither Greek nor Roman philosophy saw as much as a moral problem in the institution of war. The common people refused to regard it as a crime. The acceptance of the postulate of peace by the broad masses of the population is an entirely new development. It is the most significant change that has come to pass in the consciousness of modern man.

2. The Institution of War.

That war is no longer necessary by no means implies sharing in the delusion that war is an atavistic remnant which has come down to us from the cave-man and which our enlightened age has discarded at last. It is improbable that our cave-dwelling ancestors knew war; they had neither the reasons nor the means for carrying on such highly organised activities. The need, the instruments and the capacity for waging war developed probably in the mutual interdependence once a certain level of civilisation was reached. War is neither "as old as mankind" nor will it "last as long as human beings do not change their nature." Dogmatic statements about the psychological nature of war are meaningless.

Human institutions, it should be recognised, are not explained as a rule by pointing to the psychological motives individuals may have for making use of the institutions in question. The existence of

courts of justice, for example, is not due to the motives for which individuals repair to the courts once these are in existence. And the need for deciding conflicts between members of the community without recourse to private warfare has nothing whatever to do with the motives of such conflicts in individual cases. These latter motives may be good or bad, permanent or transitory, conscious or unconscious, emotional or rational, the validity of the motive for establishing the law courts themselves bears no reference to them. The advantages (or disadvantages) to the individual which derive from the existence of the court are of an entirely different character from the advantages (or disadvantages) deriving from the existence of the court to the community, and, incidentally, to the individual as a member of the community. In this latter capacity the individual reaps the benefit of internal peace, while in his capacity as a litigant he may be securing for himself (or having to suffer) the various advantages (or eventual disadvantages) inherent in his personal contact with the law.

Similar is the case of war. It is an institution, the primary function of which is the deciding of issues which arise between various territorial groupings and which cannot otherwise be decided, and which cannot remain in abeyance without endangering the existence of the communities concerned. Such issues are chiefly, though not exclusively territorial. States can exist only within definite boundaries; uncertainty about these reacts upon the state itself as fatefully as a permanent challenge to its sovereignty would - the State is inevitably thrown into anarchy. But while a challenge to sovereignty is met by the action of the executive or, in the last resort, by civil war, doubts that arise in regard to the frontiers must be removed, either peacefully by agreement, or forcibly by war. Failing peaceful agreement, war is unavoidable whenever the State in conflict owes no common allegiance to a higher sovereignty. The reasons for their quarrel may be good or bad, rational or irrational, material or ideal - this effects in no way the imperative need for a final decision, whenever there is a conflict. In certain typical cases such as the migration of the peoples, the rise of national States, the great movements of social emancipation, it cannot reasonably be doubted that the very progress of mankind would have been impeded, if, by some miraculous intervention of a super historical authority the motives for the dispute would have been ruled out as invalid. The close connection between civil and national wars in various periods of history should alone warn us from lightly assuming that wars were always carried on for reasons which in the retrospect cannot be recognised as valid.

"War exists because people wish it to exist" (Aldous Huxley). This, in a nutshell, is the psychological theory of war. But very few institutions exist because individuals wish them to exist. It is time to cease to discuss human institutions in terms of the pleasant or unpleasant moods commonly associated with the personal discharge of the social functions in question. Judicial systems do not exist on account of the grim humour often attributed to judges, but by virtue of the need of developed societies for some institutional provisions against the breaking of laws. Similarly wars are neither caused by people who happen to be in a "warlike spirit" nor are they carried on by soldiers owing to that spirit. Such a spirit is rather the result than the cause of war; the people directly affected by the fighting may be in a comparatively peaceful state of mind.

Handbooks of military science hardly contain more than a passing reference to hate or greed. Neither in the period of dynastic wars nor that of cabinet wars did hate have any appreciable influence upon the decision of the governments to carry on the war against the one or the other of the eligible "enemies". Even the U.S.A. went to war in 1917 mainly because it could remain neutral no longer without suffering grave damage as a sovereign state; as far as this goes it mattered little whether the U.S.A. declared war on Great Britain (as it had done in similar circumstances in 1812) or on Germany (the alternative, in 1812 had been France.) It was not hate that impelled the U.S.A. to go to war, although once peace was untenable, hate may have helped to decide who should be the enemy. War, in effect, is as little caused by hate as the stock exchange is the outcome of the need for excitement or the newspaper of that for litter. Wars as such are not concerned with the sentiments. If they could be waged without emotions, this might make them even more cruel; and that emotions have to be aroused to-day in order to wage war more effectively, is rather an incidental result of modern mass-democracy than of the nature of war.

It ought to be evident that no community can settle down to its job as long as doubts about its boundaries blur the loyalty of the members of the community, drain the treasury of its income and deprive the organised community itself of one of the attributes of sovereignty. That is why the arbitrament of war was vital to the existence of human societies. Being so, it was sanctified.

The postulate of peace, simple as it seems, comports no less than a new foundation of politics. It stands for an act of faith which heralds the oncoming of a new age in the history of the race. The sudden emergence of the widespread conviction of the criminal nature of war is to be regarded as the intimation of the birth of a new and wider community for which overlordship of the sovereign states of the earth is claimed. The time has come when a power is to be set up over the nations and a sovereignty established which will achieve peacefully what war did in the past by violence, i.e., to arbitrate amongst the nations.

How is this to come to pass? It is at this point that the pacifist fallacy enters.

3. The Pacifist Fallacy.

Pacifist policy is based on the erroneous belief that war had no vital functions in the past and that it can, therefore, be simply abolished. This is a fateful illusion which, in case of a substantial success of the pacifist movement is bound to rouse a reaction in which the pacifist movement itself would necessarily be destroyed. For as long as the need for war has not passed away, a society that was rendered incapable of using this ultimate means of asserting its existence in a conflict would thereby be automatically deprived of one of the preconditions of its existence. No community could follow such a path to the end. The danger is that if the pacifist movement had gained an important measure of success before it collapsed, its failure might engulf the cause of the postulate of peace as well. And almost necessarily so. For, if the forces of peace failed to realise the implications of the postulate for which they stand, then the postulate

of peace might, in effect become a means of paralysing progress while condemning mankind to a futile search for peace in passivity, anarchy and decay.

4. The Tolerance Analogy.

Yet the principle for which the pacifist stands is a true one. How, then, can that which appears as its consistent practical application inevitably lead to its refutation?

A similar dilemma faced the early protagonists of the principle of tolerance in this country. The principle of religious tolerance was transferred from the realm of religious experience to the field of politics by that greatest of all Englishmen, Oliver Cromwell. The Puritan in him had developed into the Independent; freedom of conscience was translated into tolerance. He set an example in modern history, perhaps in the history of the World, for a dictatorship that fought for the enforcement of liberty and enlightenment. His conflict with Parliament was a struggle of a determined adherent of religious tolerance against a pseudo-representative body of religious intolerance. And yet what would the result of Cromwell's triumph over Parliament have been, assuming an outcome was conceivable? In the long run, undoubtedly, the victory of Roman Catholic intolerance over his own tolerant Protestantism. For if Cromwell and the Army had had their way, and England had embarked in the 1640-ies on that regime of religious tolerance which was to be ultimately the outcome of the Great Rebellion, the results could have been hardly other than the triumph of counter-reformation. This can easily be shown. The Church and the State had not yet been disentangled. Thus religious tolerance on the part of the state would either have resulted in an immediate victory of an intolerant religion over the State or chaos. For, unless the state had eliminated religious sanctions from its own legislation, and religion had recognised the sovereignty of the national state, the separation of Church and State must have led to the disintegration of both with the consequent collapse of the national and social system. But whether Roman Catholic victory or disintegration, England would soon have fallen under the sway of the European counter-reformation and the cause of religious tolerance would have been buried for many generations. (Where, as in New England, institutional conditions could be shaped accordingly, tolerance was introduced without endangering the community itself). The triumph of an intolerant form of Catholicism was thus averted only owing to Cromwell's failure to force tolerance prematurely on the country. But, assuming that it is correct, does our analysis prove Cromwell's ideas false? Hardly, for the true reference of his religious experience lay in the prophetic recognition of a time when the State would allow freedom to all religions and religions would accept freely the sovereignty of the State - a condition of affairs, however, which could be brought about only after manifold and far-reaching changes in the institutional structure of society. Cromwell's fate was that of a C.O. in power; he had mistaken his prophetic vision for a political mandate.

5. What is to replace war?

What then, are the institutional changes which will make the

postulate of peace actual reality?

If war is to be abolished, international order must take its place. But no international sovereignty is conceivable without a new international economic order to replace that which is passing away. This order of which the international gold standard formed a part, with its free movements of capital and labour, of commodities and payments, can never come back again. But unless the international division of labour is maintained in some form or other, a general fall in the standard of life is inevitable, and even if such a fall can be avoided, a great increase in the standard of life will always be attainable in the future by the simple means of re-establishing international division of labour. Whatever the immediate future may have in store for us, internationalism will remain an irresistible driving force of history.

Another fundamental feature of our period derives from the fact that a new international economic order must involve far-reaching economic readjustments, not so much as between the Haves and Have-nots as between all the various countries of the globe in a great number of ways. Accordingly, the chief task of domestic politics will be to equip the nations with a social organisation which can stand the gigantic strain inseparable from any major readjustments in the international economic field. In the last resort, it is the class-structure of society which will prove the obstacle to international economic readjustment, for massive economic sacrifice can be borne willingly only by communities which are closely united in the service of transcending ideals. This is the abiding source of the forces which make the coming of socialism inevitable in our age.

The setting-up of an international peace order cannot, therefore, be brought to fruition by a simple refusal to fight, but only by the actual achievement of the institutional basis of such an order. The first step towards the achievement of this end lies in the transformation of our capitalist nation-states into actual communities by bringing economic life under the control of the common people and abolishing thereby the property cleavage in society.

6. The Reform of Consciousness.

In so far as it is possible for us to reconstruct the meaning of the New Testament ethics in terms of institutional life, its tendency was undoubtedly both pacifist and communist. The practice of the early Church reflected these tendencies which implied the rejection of society as a set of permanent institutions.

Human consciousness itself had been reformed in the Gospels by the discovery of the personal nature of human life and the essential freedom of personality. Accordingly, a negative attitude towards institutional society was implicit in New Testament ethics. Neither institutions nor customs, nor laws, but community as a relationship of persons was the substance of social existence - an interpretation of the nature of institutional society which amounted to its rejection.

In terms of the modern world, the social philosophy of Jesus was anarchist. Its pacifism and communism was based on the denial of the inescapable nature of institutional society. Power, economic value, scarcity, were repudiated as evil. The discovery of the

nature of personal life was thus linked with the refusal to accept the need for permanent forms of social existence.

In our epoch, human consciousness is being re-formed again. The recognition of the inescapable nature of society sets a limit to the imaginary freedom of an abstract personality. Power, economic value, coercion, are inevitable in a complex society; there is no means for the individual to escape the responsibilities of choosing between alternatives. He cannot contract out of society. But the freedom we appear to lose by this knowledge is illusory, while the freedom we gain through it, is valid. Man reaches maturity in the recognition of his loss and in the certainty of ultimate attainment of freedom in and through society.

The truth about human life discovered by Jesus asserts itself to-day in the recognition that in our present society, man is in a condition of self-estrangement and that the socialist transformation is the only means of reclaiming personal life in a complex society.

7. Pacifism and the Working-Class Movement.

Proverbially, the Wesleyan revival saved England from a revolution. Social pacifism - the rejection of the class-struggle in every sense of the term - was established as part of the Christian way of life. So far as the working-class is concerned, modern pacifism merely meant extending the application of this harmonistic creed from home to foreign affairs. The responsibilities with which members of the ruling class as such were invested naturally precluded them from putting such doctrines into practice.

On the whole, Nonconformity tended to foster an idealist philosophy which persisted even after the religious concepts originally associated with it had faded away and been replaced by secular ones. Thus, in spite of the decay of religious life, the world of ideals remained a separate world; ideals were simply divested of their supernatural setting, and became attached to secular contents - the fateful gap, which had opened up between ideality and actuality outlived the change. The ideal of social justice under the name of Righteousness became separated from the institutions which could alone embody them. Similarly, after the war, the League of Nations as an ideal became separated in the minds of people from the League of Nations as an institution. It is in the religious history of the working-class movement of this country that we must seek for an explanation of a development which has made pacifism into a chief obstacle to the fulfilment of peace.

ENDS AND MEANS

Mr. Aldous Huxley began as a poet. The mocking sensuousness of Leda was driven below the surface by his natural distaste for the lechery of post-war society. In a brilliant series of novels (of which the best were Those Barren Leaves and Point Counter Point) he depicted "the expense of spirit in a waste of shame". His essays, where they were not dealing with strictly literary topics, preached the same lesson. By degrees morality hardened into Puritanism.

There seemed to be a chance between 1928 and 1932 that under the influence of Lawrence and Blake he would free himself from his puritanical impedimenta: he professed himself a life-worshipper.

But he had to contend also with a magpie habit of picking up unconsidered trifles from anthropological and psychological works, which he has always been tempted to take too seriously. He was bitten by behaviourism, and his Liberal mind recoiled from it in horror, instead of with laughter. His portrait of a scientific Utopia in Brave New World is a world which denies all the cultural and moral values of Liberal idealism, and he apparently assumed that Soviet Russia would acquire all the vices of Capitalist civilisation and Hollywood culture, but without Shakespeare, Beethoven, and the arts and ideals which alone make life bearable. Finally, Huxley began to realise the horrors of Fascism, and to be dominated by fear of war.

About this time Matthias Alexander taught Huxley how to walk and sit correctly, and in so doing, made a new man of him, physically; but it made him suppose that if everyone could be taught a healthy posture, all the world's problems would be solved, and strengthened his belief that the salvation of the world could only come through the conversion of individuals. Up to this time Huxley's style had been admirable in its clarity and grace, but in Eyeless in Gaza, which describes the conversion of Anthony Beavis to pacifism, it becomes woolly and sentimental. The Huxley of ten years ago would have made fun of it.

Ends and Means, however, is a plausible and well-written book, and is already exerting some influence. It is, therefore, desirable to consider the book in some detail. It exhibits considerable if superficial erudition; that is to say, Huxley quotes from a variety of books, philosophical, mystical, anthropological, psychological, theological and historical. He has taken all knowledge for his province, but his mind seems to have a filter which keeps out any facts that cannot be used to support his theories. Inconvenient facts which pass through the filter are discreetly transmuted.

His main argument can be stated simply:

- (1) There is a general agreement about the ideal goal of human effort, and there is general agreement amongst 'free' people that the ideal man is the non-attached man.
- (2) But there is general disagreement about the means of reaching the goal. You can only reach the End by using appropriate Means. You cannot reach the end of a universal human community except by loving and peaceful means.
- (3) Therefore only very gradual reform is desirable.

Leaving for a moment the question of the non-attached man, let us consider the three points of this argument, one by one.

(1) Unfortunately, there is NOT a general agreement about the goal. Though Isaiah, Jesus and Marx are roughly in agreement, there have always been plenty of dissentients. We need only mention Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini.

(2) This is largely true. Ends are to a great extent conditioned by the means used to attain them. If a communist wishes to convert a Tory to his faith, he will not succeed by denouncing him as a

villainous exploiter. If a teacher wishes to make his pupils free and intelligent but uses repressive discipline and the usual character-moulding methods, he will only succeed in turning out the convention-ridden, unimaginative, good-natured snobs and prigs that are the unconscious goal of much English education.

But it is not wholly true. When ideal means fail, it is sometimes necessary to employ means which are not theoretically ideal. Doubtless, the results will be, to a greater or less extent, contaminated by the means employed; but they will at least be better than no results at all. Even in education, where there is more opportunity of using ideal means than in politics, it is generally recognised that although methods of freedom should be the normal ones, it may sometimes be necessary to use coercion of one kind or another. It is the same with crime. A policeman may have to lay out a man with a truncheon, or even shoot him, for the sake of avoiding worse evils, such as the death of innocent people. When the criminal is rendered harmless, he can be handed over to the psychologist to be cured. Non-resistance on the part of the murdered is not likely to deter the murderer; and it is kind to neither the victim nor the murderer to let the former die as a saint - for the remorseful killer will ruefully complain that he was not stopped in time.

(3) To Huxley's third point, it must be objected that to rely on gradual methods of reform is to misunderstand the world in which we live, and to exhibit complete ignorance of the development of capitalist society. Capitalism is less and less able to afford concessions, and if we hope to convert the opponents of socialism so that they will give up their privileges without a struggle, we are living not in the world of fact, but in a world of dreams.

Huxley assumes that violence of the Right is always provoked by violence of the Left, and that if the Left moved gradually, all would be well. But the dilemma before the Left, even on Huxley's assumptions is simply this: if they move so slowly as not to antagonise the property-owning classes, they will find themselves in an epoch of Fascism; and if they move fast enough to prevent the triumph of Fascism in the world, they will undoubtedly provoke the Right. But, as we have already pointed out, this is not a real dilemma, because the Right will be unable to grant concessions in the future, even to the mildest professors of reform; so that if the Left continues its gradual programme, they will both antagonise the Right, and fail to achieve their ends. Furthermore, time is short. Each year with the strengthening of the Fascist powers, socialism becomes more difficult of attainment.

And, of course, Huxley's assumption that Right-violence is the result of Left-aggression ignores the real facts. Anything but reaction will provoke the Right.

Huxley quotes with approval from a pamphlet entitled What about Spain? and this quotation is perhaps the low-water mark of his book: "If the Spanish Republic had actually been pacifist in theory and practice, the present counter-revolution could never have arisen. A pacifist republic would, of course, have immediately liberated the conquered Moors and transformed them into friends; it would have dismissed the old regime generals and returned their armies to civil life."

It would have done away with the fears of the Church and peasants by requiring from Communists and Anarcho-Syndicalists the renunciation of violence during the period of the Popular Front."

This charming hypothesis is what Huxley calls a historical 'Uchronia'. He calls this 'a useful word'; but the process it describes would seem to be singularly useless. If by a miraculous combination of miracles the Spanish Republic had attempted to carry out the policy suggested, it would only have precipitated the rebellion. What the Church feared was not violence, but the removal of some of its privileges, and most of the violence before the outbreak of the war was stirred up by the Right to make it seem that the Government could not preserve order.

This quotation will serve to show how much Huxley is out of touch with the actual world. He moves in a queer space-time continuum, in which the ghostly projections of idealist wishes play their non-attached parts -- non-attached to historical fact, non-attached to their actual characters in the world of men, non-attached to anything except Huxley's desire to prove his case. But we may well admit that if Franco were St. Francis, (as the Catholic Press seem to imagine), if Hitler were Einstein, if Mussolini were Marx, and if Chamberlain were Charlie Chaplain, the world would be a nicer place to live in!

Another example of Huxley's historical sense is his statement that "the long campaign of non-violent resistance and non-cooperation conducted by the Hungarians under Deak was crowned with complete success" while the "violent Hungarian revolution of 1848" under Kossuth "completed failed to liberate his country". The facts are less convenient for the cause of non-violence. It is true that Kossuth was compelled to raise an army to defend the liberal achievements of 1848 against a Croatian army egged on by Austria, but these achievements had been won peacefully. It is true that Deak succeeded, but only after Austria had been defeated at Sadowa. Bismarck and Moltke committed the violence by which Deak profited.

No one will deny that non-violent means should be used whenever possible, i.e., whenever there is a possibility of their succeeding. They will succeed when behind them there is a threat of force sufficient to make the opponents realize that resistance is futile; they will often succeed when there is general sympathy with the users of non-violent methods, and when their opponents can afford to make concessions. In the present stage of Capitalism, these conditions of success are rare, and they will become still rarer. In international affairs the use of non-violence is still less likely to succeed, for it would be necessary to persuade a whole nation to agree to non-violent methods: a handful of patriots using force, or even losing their tempers, will be sufficient to ruin everything. Furthermore, the people of the opposing and aggressive nation must be informed of the kindness and decency of the country using non-violent methods; and the possibility of this happening in Fascist countries is wildly remote.

At the present time Pacifism implies the making of concessions to Fascist countries and the support of Chamberlain's policy. But the more concessions you make, the stronger the Fascist powers become, and the more difficult will be the task of the Democratic powers, when the war comes. The use of violence will be prolonged and intensified, and the struggle will be bitterer than it would have been. You do not avert the use of violence; you make it certain that it will be used

only by those of your own country who are not hampered by a tender conscience. The violence will be directed, not by the ideals and motives which alone could justify it, but by sordid self-interest, aggression, pugnacity, fear, and patriotic greed.

The truth is that you cannot apply the canons of individual morality directly to politics. Christian love can only be expressed in the political field as Justice. In politics you seldom or never have a policy which is absolutely good. You have to choose between different evils. If you refuse the choice you abdicate from responsibility.

The centre of Huxley's position is his ideal of the non-attached man: "Non-attached to his bodily sensations and lusts...to his craving for power and possessions...to his anger and hatred...to his exclusive loves...to science, art, speculation, philanthropy". He claims that the practice of non-attachment entails the practice of all the virtues (intelligence, courage, &c.,) and that it depends on certain physical conditions, such as freedom from maladjustment.

In so far as non-attachment is the sum of all the virtues, one can only approve of it. But to all the virtues it seems to add but one elusive quality, which nullifies the practical effects of the virtues. Love and courage lose half their value in a person who regards non-attachment as the highest good. It is only in the personal life that most virtues find a congenial soil. Huxley seems to have carried over the idea of "dirtless farming" into the spiritual realm, where it has less of a future than in the material world of agriculture. It may, or may not, be significant that Huxley disapproves of a personal God.

Even supposing the ideal of the non-attached man were a valid one, what chance is there of having enough people to follow it, in time to save our civilisation? While the non-attached were in a minority, they would be at the mercy of those who use force; and though kindness conquers in the long run, the run before us is not long enough to give it a fair trial. Under the present system, non-attachment is an ideal which only the comfortably-off can afford to follow. Most people lead a cramped existence which makes non-attachment impossible. If we make concessions to Fascism, we bring more and more people into the class which can never be non-attached.

We can all admire the desire of Huxley and his friends to swell the noble army of martyrs, but in some circumstances the pursuit of perfection and martyrdom is a luxury as immoral as the comfortable sanctity of the Church in Spain, which was rooted in the soil of oppression. When we deduct all the good resolutions of the non-attached man and consider his programme, we are forced to conclude that he will do nothing material to avert the triumph of Fascism, that his non-resistance to aggression does little to comfort its victims; that he will do nothing material to bring in that economic system, without which the universal human community is a dream; that he will acquiesce in the oppression of nations and in the exploitation of classes; that for the sake of an ideal non-attachment, he will deny it to nine-tenths of his fellows; and that he will do all this with the comfortable assurance that he is more noble, more righteous, and more Christian than his fellows. Lest he should be soiled by the Means, he banishes the End to the world of ideals. It is one more device for pushing back the New Jerusalem into the clouds from which it was beginning to descend.

The Meaning of Peace.

1. The Postulate of Peace.

To assert that war is the central problem of our time is to go straight to the heart of the crisis of our civilization. For such an assertion implies ~~two basic assumptions~~: (1) that, unless war is abolished our civilization must perish in and through wars and (2) that the obstacles to the abolishment of war are bound up with the fundamental political and economic institutions of our society. To declare war the greatest evil and its abolishment our chief task is, therefore, to formulate a revolutionary principle.

This has been clearly recognised by the consistent upholders of the present system. "A doctrine which is founded upon the harmful postulate of peace is an enemy to Fascism" declared Mussolini in his statement on Fascism in the *Encyclopaedia Italiana*. The postulate of peace is the dividing-line between two worlds to-day.

What, then, is the exact content of this postulate and what, precisely, are the premises on which it is based?

Postulating peace or, in common English, insisting on a peaceful world, is simply to assume that we could carry on to-day without the institution of war. But let war cease to be a paramount necessity of human existence and it becomes ^{the supreme crisis} the negation of humanity by humanity itself. Once it is not inescapable, it must be abolished at all costs and no other task can claim priority over this one. This is the content of the postulate of peace. Its validity depends, as we see, ^{entirely} upon the truth or falsity of the premise, ~~i.e., the assumption~~ ^{which is} that the need for

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Similar is the case of war. It is an institution, the primary function of which is the deciding of issues which arise between various territorial groupings and which cannot otherwise be decided, and which cannot remain in abeyance without endangering the existence of the communities concerned. Such issues are chiefly, though not exclusively territorial. States can exist only within definite boundaries; uncertainty about these reacts upon the state itself as fatefully as a permanent challenge to its sovereignty would - the State is inevitably thrown into anarchy. But while a challenge to sovereignty is met by the action of the executive or, in the last resort, by civil war, doubts that arise in regard to the frontiers must be removed, either peacefully by agreement, or forcibly by war. Failing peaceful agreement, war is unavoidable whenever the State in conflict owes no common allegiance to a higher sovereignty. The reasons for their quarrel may be good or bad, rational or irrational, material or ideal - this effects in no way the imperative need for a final decision, whenever there is a conflict. In certain typical cases such as the migration of the peoples, the rise of national States, the great movements of social emancipation, it cannot reasonably be doubted that the very progress of mankind would have been impeded, if, by some miraculous intervention of a super historical authority the motives for the dispute would have been ruled out as invalid. The close connection between civil and national wars in various periods of history should alone warn us from lightly assuming that wars were always carried on for reasons which in the retrospect cannot be recognised as valid.

"War exists because people wish it to exist" (Aldous Huxley). This, in a nutshell, is the psychological theory of war. But very few institutions exist because individuals wish them to exist. It is time to cease to discuss human institutions in terms of the pleasant or unpleasant moods commonly associated with the personal discharge of the social functions in question. Judicial systems do not exist on account of the grim humour often attributed to judges, but by virtue of the need of developed societies for some institutional provisions against the breaking of laws. Similarly wars are neither caused by people who happen to be in a "warlike spirit" nor are they carried on by soldiers owing to that spirit. Such a spirit is rather the result than the cause of war; the people directly affected by the fighting may be in a comparatively peaceful state of mind.

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Handbooks of military science hardly contain more than a passing reference to hate or greed. Neither in the period of dynastic wars nor that of cabinet wars did hate have any appreciable influence upon the decision of the governments to carry on the war against the one or the other of the eligible "enemies". Even the U.S.A. went to war in 1917 mainly because it could remain neutral no longer without suffering grave damage as a sovereign state; as far as this goes it mattered little whether the U.S.A. declared war on Great Britain (as it had done in similar circumstances in 1812) or on Germany (the alternative, in 1812 had been France.) ~~It was not hate that impelled the U.S.A. to go to war, although once peace was untenable, hate may have helped to decide who should be the enemy.~~ War, *by effect* is as little caused by hate as the stock exchange is the outcome of the need for excitement or the newspaper of that for litter. Wars as such are not concerned with the sentiments. If they could be waged without emotions, this might make them ~~even~~ more cruel; ~~and~~ that emotions have to be aroused to-day in order to wage war more effectively, is rather an incidental result of modern mass-democracy than of the nature of war.

It ought to be evident that no community can settle down to its job as long as doubts about its boundaries blur the loyalty of the members of the community, drain the treasury of its income and deprive the organised community itself of one of the attributes of sovereignty. That is why the arbitrament of war was vital to the existence of human societies. Being so, it was sanctified.

The postulate of peace, simple as it seems, comports no less than a new foundation of politics. It stands for an act of faith which heralds the oncoming of a new age in the history of the race. The sudden emergence of the widespread conviction of the criminal nature of war is ~~to be regarded as the~~ intimation of the birth of a new and wider community for which overlordship of the sovereign states of the earth is claimed. The time has come when a power is to be set up over the nations and a sovereignty established which will achieve peacefully what war did in the past by violence, i.e., to arbitrate amongst the nations.

How is this to come to pass? It is at this point that the pacifist fallacy enters.

It means that

3. The Pacifist Fallacy.

Pacifist policy is based on the erroneous belief that war had no vital functions in the past and that it can, therefore, be simply abolished. This is a fateful illusion which, in case of a substantial success of the pacifist movement is bound to rouse a reaction in which the pacifist movement itself would necessarily be destroyed. For as long as the need for war has not passed away, a society that was rendered incapable of using this ultimate means of asserting its existence in a conflict would thereby be automatically deprived of one of the preconditions of its existence. No community could follow such a path to the end. The danger is that if the pacifist movement had gained an important measure of success before it collapsed, its failure might ~~on~~ itself the cause of the postulate of peace as well. And almost necessarily so. For, if the forces of peace failed to realise the implications of the postulate for which they stand, then the postulate

the

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What is different and it is false

of peace might, in effect become a means of paralysing progress while condemning mankind to a futile search for peace in passivity, anarchy and decay.

4. The Tolerance Analogy.

Yet the principle for which the pacifist stands is a true one. How, then, can that which appears as its consistent practical application inevitably lead to its refutation?

A similar dilemma faced the early protagonists of the principle of tolerance in this country. The principle of religious tolerance was transferred from the realm of religious experience to the field of politics by that greatest of all Englishmen, Oliver Cromwell. ~~The Puritan in him had developed into the Independent, freedom of conscience was translated into tolerance.~~ He set an example in modern history, perhaps in the history of the World, for a dictatorship that fought for the enforcement of liberty and enlightenment. His conflict with Parliament was a struggle of a determined adherent of religious tolerance against a ~~representative~~ representative body of religious intolerance. And yet what would the result of Cromwell's triumph over Parliament have been, assuming an outcome was conceivable? *1/2 inch* In the long run, undoubtedly, the victory of Roman Catholic intolerance over his own tolerant Protestantism. ~~Had~~ Cromwell and the Army ~~had~~ had their way, and England had embarked in the 1640-ies on that regime of religious tolerance which was to be ultimately the outcome of the Great Rebellion, the results could have been hardly other than the triumph of counter-reformation. This can easily be shown. The Church and the State had not yet been disentangled. Thus religious tolerance on the part of the state would either have resulted in an immediate victory of an intolerant religion over the State or chaos. For, unless the state had *first* eliminated religious sanctions from its own legislation, and religion had recognised the sovereignty of the national state, the separation of Church and State must have led to the disintegration of both with the consequent collapse of the national and social system. But whether Roman Catholic victory or disintegration, England would soon have fallen under the sway of the European counter-reformation and the cause of religious tolerance would have been buried for many generations. (Where, as in New England, institutional conditions could be shaped accordingly, tolerance was introduced without endangering the community itself). The triumph of an intolerant form of Catholicism was thus averted only owing to Cromwell's failure to force tolerance prematurely on the country. But, assuming that it is correct, does our analysis prove Cromwell's ideas false? Hardly, for the true reference of his religious experience lay in the prophetic recognition of a time when the State would allow freedom to all religions and religions would accept freely the sovereignty of the State - a condition of affairs, however, which could be brought about only after manifold and far-reaching changes in the institutional structure of society. Cromwell's fate was that of a C.O. in power; he had mistaken his prophetic vision for a political mandate.

5. What is to replace war?

What then, are the institutional changes which will make the

postulate of peace actual reality?

If war is to be abolished, international order must take its place. But no international sovereignty is conceivable without a new international economic order to replace that which is passing away. This order of which the international gold standard formed a part, with its free movements of capital and labour, of commodities and payments, can never come back again. But unless the international division of labour is maintained in some form or other, a general fall in the standard of life is inevitable, and even if such a fall can be avoided, a great increase in the standard of life will always be attainable in the future by the simple means of re-establishing international division of labour. Whatever the immediate future may have in store for us, internationalism will remain an irresistible driving force of history.

Another fundamental feature of our period derives from the fact that a new international economic order must involve far-reaching economic readjustments, not so much as between the Haves and Have-nots as between all the various countries of the globe in a great number of ways. Accordingly, the chief task of domestic politics will be to equip the nations with a social organisation which can stand the gigantic strain inseparable from any major readjustments in the international economic field. In the last resort, it is the class-structure of society which will prove the obstacle to international economic readjustment, for massive economic sacrifice can be borne willingly only by communities which are closely united in the service of transcending ideals. This is the abiding source of the forces which make the coming of socialism inevitable in our age.

The setting-up of an international peace order cannot, therefore, be brought to fruition by a simple refusal to fight, but only by the actual achievement of the institutional basis of such an order. The first step towards the achievement of this end lies in the transformation of our capitalist nation-states into actual communities by bringing economic life under the control of the common people and abolishing thereby the property cleavage in society.

6. The Reform of Consciousness.

In so far as it is possible for us to reconstruct the meaning of the New Testament ethics in terms of institutional life, its tendency was undoubtedly both pacifist and communist. The practice of the early Church reflected these tendencies which implied the rejection of society as a set of permanent institutions.

Human consciousness itself had been reformed in the Gospels by the discovery of the personal nature of human life and the essential freedom of personality. Accordingly, a negative attitude towards institutional society was implicit in New Testament ethics. Neither institutions nor customs, nor laws, but community as a relationship of persons was the substance of social existence - an interpretation of the nature of institutional society which amounted to its rejection.

In terms of the modern world, the social philosophy of Jesus was anarchist. Its pacifism and communism was based on the denial of the inescapable nature of institutional society. Power, economic value, coercion, were repudiated as evil. The discovery of the

nature of personal life was thus linked with the refusal to accept the need for permanent forms of social existence.

In our epoch, human consciousness is being re-formed again. The recognition of the inescapable nature of society sets a limit to the imaginary freedom of an abstract personality. Power, economic value, coercion, are inevitable in a complex society; there is no means for the individual to escape the responsibilities of choosing between alternatives. He cannot contract out of society. But the freedom we appear to lose by this knowledge is illusory, while the freedom we gain through it, is valid. Man reaches maturity in the recognition of his loss and in the certainty of ultimate attainment of freedom in and through society.

The truth about human life discovered by Jesus asserts itself to-day in the recognition that in our present society, man is in a condition of self-estrangement and that the socialist transformation is the only means of reclaiming personal life in a complex society.

7. Pacifism and the Working-Class Movement.

Proverbially, the Wesleyan revival saved England from a revolution. Social pacifism - the rejection of the class-struggle in every sense of the term - was established as part of the Christian way of life. So far as the working-class is concerned, modern pacifism merely meant extending the application of this harmonistic creed from home to foreign affairs. The responsibilities with which members of the ruling class as such were invested naturally precluded them from putting such doctrines into practice.

On the whole, Nonconformity tended to foster an idealist philosophy which persisted even after the religious concepts originally associated with it had faded away and been replaced by secular ones. Thus, in spite of the decay of religious life, the world of ideals remained a separate world; ideals were simply divested of their supernatural setting, and became attached to secular contents - the fatful gap, which had opened up between ideality and actuality outlived the change. The ideal of social justice under the name of Righteousness became separated from the institutions which could alone embody them. Similarly, after the war, the League of Nations as an ideal became separated in the minds of people from the League of Nations as an institution. It is in the religious history of the working-class movement of this country that we must seek for an explanation of a development which has made pacifism into a chief obstacle to the fulfilment of peace.

ENDS AND MEANS

Mr. Aldous Huxley began as a poet. The mocking sensuousness of Leda was driven below the surface by his natural distaste for the lechery of post-war society. In a brilliant series of novels (of which the best were Those Barren Leaves and Point Counter Point) he depicted "the expense of spirit in a waste of shame". His essays, where they were not dealing with strictly literary topics, preached the same lesson. By degrees morality hardened into Puritanism.

There seemed to be a chance between 1928 and 1932 that under the influence of Lawrence and Blake he would free himself from his puritanical impediments: he professed himself a life-worshipper.

But he had to contend also with a magpie habit of picking up unconsidered trifles from anthropological and psychological works, which he has always been tempted to take too seriously. He was bitten by behaviourism, and his Liberal mind recoiled from it in horror, instead of with laughter. His portrait of a scientific Utopia in Brave New World is a world which denies all the cultural and moral values of Liberal idealism, and he apparently assumed that Soviet Russia would acquire all the vices of Capitalist civilisation and Hollywood culture, but without Shakespeare, Beethoven, and the arts and ideals which alone make life bearable. Finally, Huxley began to realise the horrors of Fascism, and to be dominated by fear of war.

About this time Matthias Alexander taught Huxley how to walk and sit correctly, and in so doing, made a new man of him, physically; but it made him suppose that if everyone could be taught a healthy posture, all the world's problems would be solved, and strengthened his belief that the salvation of the world could only come through the conversion of individuals. Up to this time Huxley's style had been admirable in its clarity and grace, but in Eyeball in Gaza, which describes the conversion of Anthony Beavis to pacifism, it becomes woolly and sentimental. The Huxley of ten years ago would have made fun of it.

Ends and Means, however, is a plausible and well-written book, and is already exerting some influence. It is, therefore, desirable to consider the book in some detail. It exhibits considerable if superficial erudition; that is to say, Huxley quotes from a variety of books, philosophical, mystical, anthropological, psychological, theological and historical. He has taken all knowledge for his province, but his mind seems to have a filter which keeps out any facts that cannot be used to support his theories. Inconvenient facts which pass through the filter are discreetly transmuted.

His main argument can be stated simply:

- (1) There is a general agreement about the ideal goal of human effort, and there is general agreement amongst 'free' people that the ideal man is the non-attached man.
- (2) But there is general disagreement about the means of reaching the goal. You can only reach the End by using appropriate Means. You cannot reach the end of a universal human community except by loving and peaceful means.
- (3) Therefore only very gradual reform is desirable.

Leaving for a moment the question of the non-attached man, let us consider the three points of this argument, one by one.

(1) Unfortunately, there is NOT a general agreement about the goal. Though Isaiah, Jesus and Marx are roughly in agreement, there have always been plenty of dissentients. We need only mention Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini.

(2) This is largely true. Ends are to a great extent conditioned by the means used to attain them. If a communist wishes to convert a Tory to his faith, he will not succeed by denouncing him as a

villainous exploiter. If a teacher wishes to make his pupils free and intelligent but uses repressive discipline and the usual character-moulding methods, he will only succeed in turning out the convention-ridden, unimaginative, good-natured snobs and prigs that are the unconscious goal of much English education.

But it is not wholly true. When ideal means fail, it is sometimes necessary to employ means which are not theoretically ideal. Doubtless, the results will be, to a greater or less extent, contaminated by the means employed; but they will at least be better than no results at all. Even in education, where there is more opportunity of using ideal means than in politics, it is generally recognised that although methods of freedom should be the normal ones, it may sometimes be necessary to use coercion of one kind or another. It is the same with crime. A policeman may have to lay out a man with a truncheon, or even shoot him, for the sake of avoiding worse evils, such as the death of innocent people. When the criminal is rendered harmless, he can be handed over to the psychologist to be cured. Non-resistance on the part of the murderer is not likely to deter the murderer; and it is kind to neither the victim nor the murderer to let the former die as a saint - for the remorseful killer will ruefully complain that he was not stopped in time.

(3) To Huxley's third point, it must be objected that to rely on gradual methods of reform is to misunderstand the world in which we live, and to exhibit complete ignorance of the development of capitalist society. Capitalism is less and less able to afford concessions, and if we hope to convert the opponents of socialism so that they will give up their privileges without a struggle, we are living not in the world of fact, but in a world of dreams.

Huxley assumes that violence of the Right is always provoked by violence of the Left, and that if the Left moved gradually, all would be well. But the dilemma before the Left, even on Huxley's assumptions is simply this: if they move so slowly as not to antagonise the property-owning classes, they will find themselves in an epoch of Fascism: and if they move fast enough to prevent the triumph of Fascism in the world, they will undoubtedly provoke the Right. But, as we have already pointed out, this is not a real dilemma, because the Right will be unable to grant concessions in the future, even to the mildest professors of reform; so that if the Left continues its gradual programme, they will both antagonise the Right, and fail to achieve their ends. Furthermore, time is short. Each year with the strengthening of the Fascist powers, socialism becomes more difficult of attainment.

And, of course, Huxley's assumption that Right-violence is the result of Left-aggression ignores the real facts. Anything but reaction will provoke the Right.

Huxley quotes with approval from a pamphlet entitled What about Spain? and this quotation is perhaps the low-water mark of his book: "If the Spanish Republic had actually been pacifist in theory and practice, the present counter-revolution could never have arisen. A pacifist republic would, of course, have immediately liberated the conquered Moors and transformed them into friends; it would have dismissed the old regime generals and returned their armies to civil life.

It would have done away with the fears of the Church and peasants by requiring from Communists and Anarcho-Syndicalists the renunciation of violence during the period of the Popular Front."

This charming hypothesis is what Huxley calls a historical 'Uchronia'. He calls this 'a useful word'; but the process it describes would seem to be singularly useless. If by a miraculous combination of miracles the Spanish Republic had attempted to carry out the policy suggested, it would only have precipitated the rebellion. What the Church feared was not violence, but the removal of some of its privileges, and most of the violence before the outbreak of the war was stirred up by the Right to make it seem that the Government could not preserve order.

This quotation will serve to show how much Huxley is out of touch with the actual world. He moves in a queer space-time continuum, in which the ghostly projections of idealist wishes play their non-attached parts -- non-attached to historical fact, non-attached to their actual characters in the world of men, non-attached to anything except Huxley's desire to prove his case. But we may well admit that if Franco were St. Francis, (as the Catholic Press seem to imagine), if Hitler were Einstein, if Mussolini were Marx, and if Chamberlain were Charlie Chaplain, the world would be a nicer place to live in!

Another example of Huxley's historical sense is his statement that "the long campaign of non-violent resistance and non-cooperation conducted by the Hungarians under Deak was crowned with complete success" while the "violent Hungarian revolution of 1848" under Kossuth "completed failed to liberate his country". The facts are less convenient for the cause of non-violence. It is true that Kossuth was compelled to raise an army to defend the liberal achievements of 1848 against a Croatian army egged on by Austria, but these achievements had been won peacefully. It is true that Deak succeeded, but only after Austria had been defeated at Sadowa. Bismarck and Moltke committed the violence by which Deak profited.

No one will deny that non-violent means should be used whenever possible, i.e., whenever there is a possibility of their succeeding. They will succeed when behind them there is a threat of force sufficient to make the opponents realize that resistance is futile; they will often succeed when there is general sympathy with the users of non-violent methods, and when their opponents can afford to make concessions. In the present stage of Capitalism, these conditions of success are rare, and they will become still rarer. In international affairs the use of non-violence is still less likely to succeed, for it would be necessary to persuade a whole nation to agree to non-violent methods: a handful of patriots using force, or even losing their tempers, will be sufficient to ruin everything. Furthermore, the people of the opposing and aggressive nation must be informed of the kindness and decency of the country using non-violent methods; and the possibility of this happening in Fascist countries is wildly remote.

At the present time Pacifism implies the making of concessions to Fascist countries and the support of Chamberlain's policy. But the more concessions you make, the stronger the Fascist powers become, and the more difficult will be the task of the Democratic powers, when the war comes. The use of violence will be prolonged and intensified, and the struggle will be bitterer than it would have been. You do not avert the use of violence; you make it certain that it will be used

only by those of your own country who are not hampered by a tender conscience. The violence will be directed, not by the ideals and motives which alone could justify it, but by sordid self-interest, aggression, pugnacity, fear, and patriotic greed.

The truth is that you cannot apply the canons of individual morality directly to politics. Christian love can only be expressed in the political field as Justice. In politics you seldom or never have a policy which is absolutely good. You have to choose between different evils. If you refuse the choice you abdicate from responsibility.

The centre of Huxley's position is his ideal of the non-attached man: "Non-attached to his bodily sensations and lusts...to his craving for power and possessions...to his anger and hatred...to his exclusive loves...to science, art, speculation, philanthropy". He claims that the practice of non-attachment entails the practice of all the virtues (intelligence, courage, &c.,) and that it depends on certain physical conditions, such as freedom from maladjustment.

In so far as non-attachment is the sum of all the virtues, one can only approve of it. But to all the virtues it seems to add but one exclusive quality, which nullifies the practical effects of the virtues. Love and courage lose half their value in a person who regards non-attachment as the highest good. It is only in the personal life that most virtues find a congenial soil. Huxley seems to have carried over the idea of "dirtless farming" into the spiritual realm, where it has less of a future than in the material world of agriculture. It may, or may not, be significant that Huxley disapproves of a personal God.

Even supposing the ideal of the non-attached man were a valid one, what chance is there of having enough people to follow it, in time to save our civilisation? While the non-attached were in a minority, they would be at the mercy of those who use force; and though kindness conquers in the long run, the run before us is not long enough to give it a fair trial. Under the present system, non-attachment is an ideal which only the comfortably-off can afford to follow. Most people lead a cramped existence which makes non-attachment impossible. If we make concessions to Fascism, we bring more and more people into the class which can never be non-attached.

We can all admire the desire of Huxley and his friends to swell the noble army of martyrs, but in some circumstances the pursuit of perfection and martyrdom is a luxury as immoral as the comfortable sanctity of the Church in Spain, which was rooted in the soil of oppression. When we deduct all the good resolutions of the non-attached man and consider his programme, we are forced to conclude that he will do nothing material to avert the triumph of Fascism, that his non-resistance to aggression does little to comfort its victims; that he will do nothing material to bring in that economic system, without which the universal human community is a dream; that he will acquiesce in the oppression of nations and in the exploitation of classes; that for the sake of an ideal non-attachment, he will deny it to nine-tenths of his fellows; and that he will do all this with the comfortable assurance that he is more noble, more righteous, and more Christian than his fellows. Lest he should be soiled by the Means, he banishes the End to the world of ideals. It is one more device for pushing back the New Jerusalem into the clouds from which it was beginning to descend.

THE MEANING OF PEACE

1. The Postulate of Peace.

To assert that war is the central problem of our time is to go straight to the heart of the ~~present~~ ~~crisis~~ of our civilisation. For ~~the~~ ~~assertion~~ implies that unless war is abolished our civilisation must perish in and through wars and that ~~the~~ ~~obstacles~~ to the abolishment of war are ~~inextricably~~ bound up with the fundamental political and economic institutions of our society. ^{Therefore} To declare war the greatest evil and its abolishment ^{our} ~~the~~ maintenance ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~present~~ ~~system~~ to formulate ^{the} ~~the~~ revolutionary principle of our ~~epoch~~ ^{epoch}.

^{True} (This has been recognised) ^{It is not consistent} ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~present~~ ~~system~~ upholders of the present ~~system~~. "A doctrine which is founded upon the harmful postulate of peace is ^{an enemy} ~~opposed~~ to Fascism", declared Mussolini in his authoritative article on Fascism in the ^{new} Encyclopaedia Italiana.

What is ^{then} ~~the~~ exact content of this postulate and what are precisely the premises on which it is based?

Postulating peace, or, in common English, insisting on a peaceful ~~world~~ world, is simply to assume that ~~the~~ ~~world~~ could carry ^{on to-day} without the institution of war. But let war cease to be ^{a necessary evil} ~~inevitable~~ and it becomes ~~murder~~ ~~the~~ ~~negation~~ of humanity by humanity itself. If it is no longer ^{indefinitely} ~~necessary~~ then it must be abolished at all costs and no other ^{task can claim} ~~priority~~ priority over this one. This is the content of the postulate of peace. ^{And its} ~~its~~ validity, ^{as can be seen,} ~~depends~~ ~~entirely~~ upon the ~~factual~~ ~~premise~~ i.e. the truth or untruth of the ~~assumption~~ ^{assumption}.

This disposes ^{also} of the ~~theological~~ argument that war ~~is~~ ^{is} an outflow of original ~~sin~~ ^{sin} and cannot therefore be abolished. Original ~~sin~~ ^{is} ~~is~~ ^(or no) ~~is~~ ^{less} responsible for war than for other human institutions including marriage, law, parliament, cannibalism or the International Red Cross. Some of these institutions are new, some ~~old~~; some are ~~old~~ ^{permanent} contemporaneous with mankind, others are ~~transitory~~ ^{transitory}; some ~~are~~ ^{are} ~~regarded~~ ^{regarded} as morally positive while others ~~are~~ ^{are} more or less negative, ~~but~~ ^{but} none of them can claim to be either the embodiment ^{of complete} or the overcoming of original sin. It is thus useful to remember that ~~whenever~~ ^{if that} the time will be that war will cease, there certainly was a time when ~~it~~ ^{was} did not ~~yet~~ ^{yet} exist. ~~This~~ ^{There is a} ~~ought~~ ^{counter} also dispose of ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~modern~~ ^{modern} ~~argument~~ ^{argument} which regards war as the outcome of psychological factors such as ~~the~~ ^{the} fear, pride and greed. ~~But~~ ^{But} ~~this~~ ^{this} is merely a ~~mere~~ ^{mere} superficial restatement of the theological ~~reference~~ ^{reference} to original sin. ~~reference~~ ^{reference} to original sin which has been ~~dealing~~ ^{dealing} with. We ~~ought~~ ^{should} ~~at~~ ^{at} last ~~to~~ ^{to} cease ~~discussing~~ ^{discussing} human institutions in terms of the ~~psychological~~ ^{psychological} moods which ~~are~~ ^{are} ~~popularly~~ ^{popularly} associated with the personal discharge of the functions in question. Judicial systems do not exist on account of the grim humor ~~often~~ ^{often} ~~attributed~~ ^{attributed} to ~~associated~~ ^{associated} with judges, but ~~of~~ ^{by} ~~the~~ ^{the} institutional ~~need~~ ^{need} of ~~most~~ ^{most} societies.

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pleasant or unpleasant

Need

of ~~most of the~~ ^{the} developed societies ~~in~~ ^{of} the past for provision against the breaking of laws. Similarly, wars are ~~caused~~ ^{caused} neither by people who happen to be "in a warlike spirit", nor are they ~~being~~ ^{being} carried on by soldiers ~~in~~ ^{by virtue} consequence of that spirit. ~~Such~~ ^{at least} spirit is rather the result of ~~the~~ ^{the} wars, ~~on~~ ^{on} respect to persons of the ~~not~~ ^{not} directly ~~its~~ ^{its} effects upon the imagination / ~~not~~ ^{not} concerned with the war directly. The people ~~are~~ ^{are} concerned ~~may~~ ^{may} be in a ~~more~~ ^{more} peaceful frame of mind.

~~The~~ ^{The} most elaborate handbooks on military science hardly contain more than passing reference to ~~the~~ ^{the} hate or greed. ~~Neither~~ ^{Neither} in the period of dynastic wars nor of cabinet wars had ~~any~~ ^{any} influence upon ~~the~~ ^{the} decision of governments to carry on war against the one or the other "enemy". The U.S.A. in 1917 ~~could~~ ^{could} remain neutral ~~whether~~ ^{whether} it declared war on Great Britain (as it had done in a similar case in 1812) or on Germany (the analogous alternative in 1812 was France). War ~~is~~ ^{is}

is as ~~little~~ ^{little} "caused by hate" as the stock exchange is the outcome ~~for~~ ^{for} the need for excitement or the newspapers of that for litter. Wars ~~as~~ ^{as} such ~~have~~ ^{have} nothing to do with emotion; that ~~emotions~~ ^{emotions} must be aroused ~~to~~ ^{to} carry on wars, is ~~not~~ ^{not} a ~~modern~~ ^{modern} phenomenon, the result of mass democracy. ~~There~~ ^{There} are of course numerous other connections between war and emotions. Barbarians ~~never~~ ^{never} attack ~~without~~ ^{without} getting deliberately excited and ~~attempting~~ ^{attempting} to frighten the enemy by ~~their~~ ^{their} wild war-cries, ~~which~~ ^{which} may incidentally ~~help~~ ^{help} to also to overcome their ownness. ~~But~~ ^{But} the ~~what~~ ^{what} we are discussing now is not the manner wars are carried on, but the causes of war i.e. the causes of one of the ~~most~~ ^{most} general ~~social~~ ^{social} institutions of mankind.

are mainly concerned ~~and as a result invariably linked with territorial~~
 disputes. A State exists only within definite boundaries; uncertainty
 about ~~the~~ ^{how these} frontiers react upon the State as ~~regions~~ ^{the state itself} as ~~territories~~ ^{unfavorably} ~~territories~~ ^{settled}
~~territories~~ ^{a permanent challenge to} uncertainty about ~~the~~ ^{their} sovereignty would

As a result

The State is inevitably thrown into anarchy. But while ~~uncertainty~~
~~territories~~ ^a challenge to ~~the~~ ^{met} sovereignty is removed by the
 action of the executive or in the last resort, by civil war, ~~uncertain~~ ^{any}
~~territories~~ ^{double regard} in ~~frontiers~~ ^{removed} to frontiers ~~removed~~ ^{either} peacefully by agreement
 or else forcibly by war. Failing peaceful agreement, ~~the~~ ^{war} latter alternative
~~is~~ ^{indeed} inevitable whenever the communities at conflict owe no common
 allegiance to a higher sovereignty. The ~~reasons~~ ^{the} reasons for
 disputing ~~frontiers~~ ^{may} ~~be~~ ^{of course}, again, be good or bad, rational
 or irrational, material or ideal, permanent or ~~transitory~~ ^{transitory}
 ory, but ~~this~~ ^{this} does not affect the imperative need for
 a final decision once the conflict has arisen. ~~As there is nobody~~
~~available to judge which of the two parties (if either) is right,~~
~~there can be also nobody in the position to judge whether either of the~~
~~parties was right in causing the conflict to be inevitable.~~ In
 certain typical cases as the ~~great~~ migration of the peoples, the
 rise of national states, the great movements of social emancipation
 it ~~can~~ cannot be doubted that the very progress of mankind would have
 been ~~unimpeded~~ ^{unimpeded} ~~by some hypothetical authority~~ ^{by some hypothetical authority}
 would be ruled out as invalid. The close connection between ~~the~~
~~civil and national wars~~ ^{some periods of} in history should alone warn us
 from ~~assuming~~ ^{assuming} that wars were ~~always~~ ^{always} carried on ~~for~~ ^{for} reason
 which we in the retrospect can

X
~~could~~

The pacifist fallacy

It is ~~instructed~~ ^{needed} that war is no longer necessary, because the time is ripe for replacing it by international sovereignty. But the pacifist ^{taunts} believes that war ~~is~~ ^{has been} always wrong and that ~~its justification~~ ^{at moral excuse for it} if ever there was one, ~~has passed away~~ ^{disappeared through} by the recognition that ~~war is a necessary evil~~ ^{the terrible ordeal of war} has never been ~~justified~~ ^{justified}. The pacifist, in fact believes in one or the other of the erroneous explanations of war which we have ~~discussed~~ ^{discussed} under Ch. 2. ~~He believes~~ ^{He believes} that war is an atavism which modern man is on the way of overcoming; that it is due to original sin; that it is due to psychological causes such as hate and fear; ~~or~~ ^{or} unconscious complexes originating in ~~the~~ ^{the} personal life of individuals. The objective functions of war under certain historical conditions are hidden from his view by his ~~abhorrence~~ ^{sheer} of war itself. He fails to realize the ~~imperative~~ ^{need for} for ~~decisions~~ ^{decisions} concerning the physical boundaries of human societies; ~~and~~ ^{and} believes that his pertinent criticism of the accidental reasons which ~~have often~~ ^{prompted people through} led to war in the past, disposes ~~of~~ ^{of} the argument that ~~conflicts due to these reasons~~ ^{whatever the merit of the case} should ~~continue~~ ^{continue} in the communities concerned; ~~that war has become an abomination~~ ^{but not the fault of man} by the fact that it is no longer ~~needed~~ ^{needed} for the performance of the vital functions which ~~it performed during the long~~ ^{it performed during the long} period of human history and that this change is due ~~not to the passing~~ ^{fundamentally} away of the need for ~~war~~ ^{final decisions} but to the emergence of the possibility of replacing the institution of war by other ~~peaceful~~ ^{peaceful} institutions ~~that do~~ ^{in this function}.

The pacifist fallacy can thus be summed up in the belief that war had no vital function in the past and that it can therefore

no vital function in the past and that it can't ~~be~~ ^{therefore} be abolished. ^{simply}
~~This is a most fatal mistake, which in case of~~
~~without replacing it by other institutions, any real suc-~~
~~cess of the pacifist movement would be bound to rouse a reaction~~
~~in which the pacifist movement would be destroyed.~~ ^{shall} ~~For~~ as long as the
~~the new institutions~~ ^{desired to replace war} haven't been set up ~~and they are not going~~, the
~~need for war has not~~ ^{passed away.} ~~the~~ community that ~~would~~
~~have been incapacitated~~ ^{incapable of} ~~reasserting its existence in~~
~~case of conflict would be automatically deprived of all~~ ^{community} means of asserting
~~its existence.~~ ~~No~~ ~~community~~ can follow such a path to the end.
~~A reaction would be bound to set in which would bring the pacifist~~
~~movement to a point where it had gained a substantial degree of success~~
~~before it collapsed, then there is~~ ~~no~~ ~~great~~ ~~danger~~ ~~in~~ ~~its~~ ~~failure~~
~~might~~ ~~engulf~~ ~~because~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~postulate~~ ~~of~~ ~~peace~~ ~~as~~ ~~well.~~ ~~For~~ ~~if~~ ~~the~~ ~~forces~~
~~of~~ ~~peace~~ ~~are~~ ~~unable~~ ~~to~~ ~~recognize~~ ~~the~~ ~~true~~ ~~meaning~~
~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~postulate~~ ~~of~~ ~~peace~~ ~~as~~ ~~well,~~ ~~then~~ ~~the~~ ~~postulate~~ ~~of~~ ~~peace~~
~~will~~ ~~be~~ ~~of~~ ~~no~~ ~~value~~ ~~indeed~~ ~~as~~ ~~a~~ ~~means~~ ~~of~~ ~~paralysing~~
~~progress~~ ~~and~~ ~~condemning~~ ~~to~~ ~~an~~ ~~eternal~~ ~~struggle~~ ~~for~~ ~~peace~~ ~~in~~
~~and~~ ~~decay.~~ ^{promote} ^{anarchy}

The tolerance analogy.

Let the principle for which the pacifist stands is true. ^{of any} How then
 can it ~~be~~ ^{be} that what ~~seems to be~~ ^{appears as} its consistent ~~assertion~~ ^{assertion} in practice
 should inevitably lead to its complete ~~disappearance~~ ^{reluctance?}

A similar dilemma faced the early protagonist of the principle
 of tolerance in this country. The ^{principle} ~~idea~~ of religious tolerance
 was first transferred from the realm of religious experience to that

of politics by that greatest of Englishmen, Oliver Cromwell. The Puritan in him ^{had} developed into the Independent; freedom of conscience was translated ~~into~~ ^{into} tolerance. He set ~~an~~ ^{an} example in modern history perhaps in the history of the world for a dictatorship that stood for the enforcement of liberty and freedom. His conflict with Parliament was the struggle of a determined adherent of religious tolerance against a pseudo-representative ^{body} of religious intolerance. But what would the result of Cromwell's ^{triumph} ~~victory~~ have been, if such a thing was conceivable? Obviously, the ~~complete~~ ^{triumph} victory of Roman Catholic intolerance over his own tolerant Protestantism. If Cromwell and the army had had ~~had~~ ^{had} their way and England had at that time embarked on that regime of religious tolerance which was historically the ultimate outcome of the ^{Great} ~~great~~ Rebellion, the immediate result could have been no other than the triumph of counter-reformation in its most intolerant and ~~and~~ ^{and} vicious form. ~~Tolerance was possible at the time~~ ^{at the time} only as a religious attitude, not yet as an institutional system, ^{for} church and state had not yet been disentangled. Religious tolerance would have ~~simply~~ ^{simply} meant the victory of the intolerant religion. For unless the state itself was first transformed ~~in such~~ ^{in such} its legislation ~~made~~ ^{made} independent of the religious sanctions supplied to civil law ~~by~~ ^{by} religion (of marriage laws) and at the same time religion ~~was~~ ^{was} made to recognise the claims of the ~~national~~ ^{national} state to sovereignty (Cf. the supremacy of the Pope) the separation of church and state ~~simply~~ ^{simply} meant the ~~collapse~~ ^{collapse} of both with the consequent collapse of the national and social system. England would

triumph of Cromwell's army
Protestantism

Great Rebellion
Accordance

Thus

Religious

God

state

of the disintegration of all dependencies led

would have
(and) disintegration

Lutherway

^{been bound to}
 have ~~very soon~~ fallen under the sway of Catholic counter-reformation and /religious tolerance would have ~~been~~ suffered a ~~very~~ severe set-back. Where as in New England ^{the European wave} were shaped institutional conditions ~~had~~ ^{emerged} accordingly, tolerance could be/put into practice ^{gradually}. In England the ~~complete~~ ^{triumph} victory of Catholicism which ~~was very close~~ ^{was very close} almost ~~to~~ pass, was averted only by Cromwell's failure to force tolerance prematurely upon the country. But does this prove ~~that~~ Cromwell's ideas ~~were~~ false? ^{No!} It merely proves that he misunderstood their ^{reference} true significance. It ~~was~~ in the prophetic recognition that the time would come when the state would allow freedom to ~~all~~ religious and religions would accept the sovereignty of the state, but that ~~such~~ ^{the} condition/ of affairs could be brought about only by ~~the~~ ^{manifold} ~~cross~~ ^{cross} and far-reaching changes in the objective and institutional structure of society.

What is to replace war?

What then are the corresponding institutional changes to-day which will make the postulate of peace actual reality?

(order)

In order to abolish ~~the~~ ^{the} war an international order must be established. ~~The issues which led to armed conflict in the past will then partly cease to exist in consequence of the new encompassing organization of life, and insofar they will continue to exist, they will be peacefully and effectively arbitrated by the new international authority.~~

But no international sovereignty is conceivable without a new international economic order to replace the one which is passing away. The economic

economic order under which we have grown up
 Technically, it cannot and will not return. ~~It~~ was based upon the international gold standard, a most useful contrivance as long as it lasted which was ~~however~~ made possible ~~in actual fact only~~ in the nature of things ~~that~~ *has been* by a number of chance conditions that cannot recur; necessarily it was a transitory phase in the ~~in the organization of~~ international cooperation. The refusal of government of all descriptions to allow the domestic level of employment to be dependent ^{in the future} upon the uncontrollable movement of prices on the world market has brought ~~it~~ *this was* to an end.

But unless the international division of labour is maintained by some means ^{or this}, a general fall in the standard of life is inevitable and even if ~~it~~ ^{such a fall can be} avoided, ~~with~~ a vast increase in the standards of life will always be possible in future by the simple means of reestablishing ^{whatever the immediate future may bring} international division of labour. Internationalism will become ^{inevitable} one of the driving forces of history.

a new economic order
 At the same time, no permanent international system is conceivable without far-reaching economic readjustment, not so much as between the so-called "have and have-nots" as between all the various countries of the globe in a great number of ways. The main task of ^{in our time} politics ~~to day~~ is, ^{savings} to equip the nations with an internal organization which can cope with the strain ~~inherent~~ inseparable from major economic readjustments ^{to} for all concerned. In the last resort, it is the class structure of society which will prove the ~~main~~ ^{international} obstacle to economic ~~readjustment~~ ^{readjustment}, for ~~massive economic sacrifices can~~

massive economic sacrifice can ~~be borne only~~ ^{which are} ~~by~~ ^{closely united} ~~communities~~ ^{in the service of} ~~transcending ideals.~~ ^{transcending ideals.} "Lies the ~~reason~~ ^{make} for the inevitable coming of socialism which will ~~open the way~~ ^{open the way} for the establishment of such communities. ^{possible}

The setting up of an international peace order cannot thus be brought ~~to~~ ^{to} fruition by a single refusal to fight, but only by the actual achievement of the institutional basis of such an order. The first step towards ~~this~~ ^{this} lies in the ~~transformation~~ ^{transformation} of our ~~capitalist nation states~~ ^{capitalist nation states} into ~~actual~~ ^{actual} communities by bringing economic life under the control of the common people and ~~abolishing~~ ^{abolishing} the property cleavage in our present ~~capitalist~~ ^{capitalist} society. ^{For this} ~~ultimate reason~~ ^{ultimate reason} why capitalist states are constitutionally ~~unable~~ ^{unable} to solve ^{the} ~~the~~ problem of peace ^{lies} ~~is~~ the fact that international cooperation entails massive economic readjustment under the strain of which the present pseudo-united nations would simply break.

The "Fascist" solution of the problem of ~~international~~ ^{international} division of labour lies in enforced class harmony at home and an effort at the erection of ~~Empires~~ ^{Empires} abroad. ~~This~~ ^{This} represents an effort at economic integration for the purposes of war, not of peace. The ~~invisible~~ ^{invisible} tension between the ~~imperialistic~~ ^{imperialistic} solution and the ~~international~~ ^{international} solution of the ~~problem~~ ^{problem} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~restoration~~ ^{restoration} of division of labour ^{in the world} ~~dominates~~ ^{dominates} the history of our ~~modern~~ ^{modern} epoch.

The pacifist variant of social ~~incompetence~~ ^{incompetence}.

Pacifist ~~incompetence~~ ^{only} is ~~another~~ ^{another} form of that ~~secularised~~ ^{secularised} pseudo-religion which ~~governs~~ ^{governs} the outlook of the British working class.

class since the passing away of Chartism. The ~~transcendental~~ ^(but only) Wesleyan revival ~~was~~ ^{had} proverbially saved in England from a revolution) at the price of dissociating the minds of the people from reality. They became accustomed to divorce ideals ~~and~~ from actuality. The world of ideals formed into a separate world and when those ideals became secularized (as happened in the course of the second half of the 19th century), the reference of ~~transcendental~~ ^{the} was to the new secular ~~secular~~ ^{became} content. The League of Nations idea ~~was~~ ^{idea of} hopelessly ~~distinct~~ from the League of Nations as an institution. The ~~idea of~~ ^{idea of} became separated from ~~the~~ ^{the} institutions. Social ideals of justice ~~was~~ ^{was} separated from the actual institutions ~~in which~~ ⁱⁿ in which along they could be embodied. Pacifism is simply an extension of the traditional idealist attitude ~~in domestic~~ ⁱⁿ in domestic affairs to the field of foreign affairs. The social harmonism of the internal ~~scene~~ ^{lack of} scene is transferred to the external scene. The political realism in questions of social reconstruction is completed by a similar attitude of ~~in the field of~~ ^{a self imposed incapacity} in the field of international construction.