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'No man's coast': Sea and continent in the
~~COAST AND CONTINENT IN THE ANCIENT MEDITERRANEAN~~ Old World

by

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COAST AND CONTINENT IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST*

Introduction

In the ancient Near East, particularly in Asia Minor, Syria and Palestine, we have before us two separate territorial entities inhabited by different peoples: coast and continent. The narrowness of the coastal strip makes their co-existence almost paradoxical. Yet a mere handful of Greeks were able to establish themselves in what proved to be some of the most strategic and economically important areas of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. They proceeded to enjoy an independent existence spanning hundreds of years, despite the presence of great empires in their backyards. Indeed, ever since the middle of the third millennium trading cities were established peacefully on the Syrian coast. They flourished and remained unmolested by the military powers of the hinterland over many centuries.

The reasons for these coastal settlements remaining relatively undisturbed are complex. In certain areas, they were military, in others economic. Apart from fortified spots, especially walled off peninsulas or rocky islands, the coast was an indefensible and eminently unsafe area. Thus the military dangers of a coastal location may have produced the 'no man's coast' that invited the Greek colonizations, while mainly economic factors, as we will see, accounted for the spectacular independence of the Phoenician cities.

* The thesis here developed was suggested by Professor Karl Polanyi in Memorandum I, Interdisciplinary Project: Mincot Columbia University, June, 1954.

Significantly, we hardly ever hear of inland states offering any sustained resistance to coastal settlements. The Greeks are not the only instance. In southern Palestine the Philistines, participators in an unsuccessful invasion of Egypt, subsequently made good their settlement on the coast within the very confines of the Egyptian empire. Nor did the Israelites make any attempt to disestablish the Philistines when under David and Solomon they gained considerable military power over the hinterland.

Higher up on the coast, Sidon and Tyre present a similarly undisturbed development of even longer duration, with Al Mina and Ugarit as their predecessors. That they remained untouched by their powerful continental neighbors cannot in this case be attributed solely to military considerations. These wealthy cities happened to fit into an economic context fundamental to the international organization of trade, comprising that of the continental powers themselves; hence their relative safety.

If this state of affairs is to us astonishing, it is because it violates our accustomed notion of the behavior of empires. Illustrations of their capacity on land and sea form the very links of world history: witness the rivalry between England, Spain and Holland to control the Channel; the Russian drive for warm water ports from Peter the Great's fumbling campaigns against Sweden for dominance of the Baltic shore to Nicholas II's excursion into Manchuria. Modern history reflects a constant awareness on the part of the powers that without a strong navy and the possession of strategic coastal areas full status as a nation cannot be achieved.

Yet it would seem that in defiance of this allegedly universal law an opposite principle was at work in the ancient world. Indeed, well into the first millennium B. C. it seems to have lived under a law of its own, namely, a continentalizing attitude on the part of the inland powers, ranging from an outright avoidance of the coast, which was the rule, to a cautious co-existence and, in some cases, remote control.

To refrain from occupying coastal areas appears to have been the policy followed by the Mesopotamian empires and Egypt, as well as by the Hittite empire of Asia Minor. We first discuss Mesopotamia and Egypt (Part I) supplementing this by some new evidence on Hatti (Part II). There follows a survey of the Phoenician coast, drawing upon our more recent knowledge of Al Mina and Ugarit (Part III). Finally, an attempt will be made to show how shunning of the coast gives way, about the second quarter of the first millennium B. C., to a symbiosis between the empires and the trading cities of the coast (Part IV).

Part I. Mesopotamia and Egypt

The broad fact which in itself should establish a prima facie case of a kind of archaic thalassophobia was the persistency with which the city states of Sumer, Akkad, Babylonia, Assyria, Mitanni, etc., refused to shift their centers of gravity towards the coast. The same applies to Egypt. The location of the majority of these states was riverain, yet none seemed to make any effort to gain access to the sea. The vicissitudes of history brought about a variety of power configurations in the area between

the Lakes Van and Urmia in the north, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea in the south, the Mediterranean in the west, nevertheless at no time was a sustained effort made that would serve as proof of a seaward tendency on the part of the continental powers. This is the immutable framework of Mesopotamian history against which the shifting events should be judged which sometimes seem to point in the opposite direction.

Several inscriptions are extant which record ambitious far-western conquests of Mesopotamian rulers. There is the inscription about Sargon I of Akkad which speaks of Yammuti and Ibla having been subdued. Similar, but more authentic data refer to almost identical expeditions by his successor, Naram-Sin; in different contexts Gudea of Lagash and later Dungi of the third dynasty of Ur mention their Western exploits; and an inscription of Shamshi-Adad II of Assyria runs: "My great names and my stele I set up in the land of Liban on the shore of the Great Sea." ¹ Tukulti Urta made ² claim to the Bahrain Island and Melukha in the South.

What broadly was the nature of these claims to the coast? And do they justify a belief that the third and second millennium Mesopotamian empires intended to acquire, hold, and keep these coastal areas? Did they institute military garrisons, appoint governors or other officers, set up a religious hierarchy, administer foreign trade, or exact regular tribute payments? As far as our records go, none of this was in evidence.

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The inscriptions of Gudea of Lagash help us to spell out

the nature of some of his coastal adventures:

From Anants the mountain of cedar trees whose length was 60 cubits, cedar trees whose length was 50 cubits, ukarimu trees whose length was 25 cubits, he made into logs and brought down from the mountain.... Gold dust from mount Khakhu he brought down.... Gold dust from the mountain of Melukha he brought down.... With living ewes he brought living lambs; their shepherds he made to serve.

The details point to expeditionary procurements, often indistinguishable from raids, to secure material for temple building, such as huge stones or logs of rare timber, or to pan gold in mountain streams. It is a highly antiquous form of trading. The goods that may be carried to gain the goodwill of the local inhabitants, need not be the ultima ratio of these armed caravans. The organization would rather be that of forays to obtain booty or slaves, maybe to exact ransom payments from weak settlements, but mainly to facilitate expeditionary trade. A raid is made on a herd of cattle or sheep, if they happen to be about. Mule drivers are taken along with their mules, the ewes with their lambs, and the shepherds to boot to tend the flock. Occasionally, a town is destroyed if its peoples offer resistance to this kind of quarrying, cutting of timber and general procurement. It is a mixed undertaking.

There seems to be here nothing that would force us to conclude that other ventures emanating from Mesopotamia and Assyria were essentially different from such expeditionary raids and forays of supply. Such evidence as Shanshi-adad I's statement of setting up a stele holds nothing to indicate that he ruled rather than visited, administered rather than intimidated. Tukulti-Urta mentions places widely separated from the heartland of Assyria.

To incorporate them in his empire, he would have had to be the ruler of Babylon and also of the Sea-Lands. There has not been found any evidence pointing in that direction.

It would appear then, that the early Mesopotamian empires never established permanent control of the coast nor intended to do so. Hardly any of the conditions listed above and indicating control were, to our knowledge, fulfilled.

Three regions enter into Egyptian coastal policy: the Delta of the Nile; the Phoenician and Philistine cities; the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, scenes of the maritime activities of the Egyptians.

Since the time Egypt was first unified, she comprised the Delta of the Nile. However, a sharp distinction should be made between the inland Delta and the coastal strip, which alone is relevant to the argument. E. R. Hall has noted that in early times the people of the coastal Delta were regarded as foreigners. Its marshes had always been a place apart from Egypt proper. The invading Hyksos were able to consolidate their power in the Delta, set up their capital Avaris and, making use of the fens, strike out for the south. Ipower, the Egyptian prophet, wailed: "Behold it (the Delta) is in the hands (?) of those who knew it not like those who know it. The Asiatics are skilled in the arts of the marshlands. Even outside of the Delta the foreigners have taken root." ⁴ During Egypt's decline, reflected in the Wen-Amun story, the Delta would tend to be governed by independent

princes.⁵ The Libyans at several occasions infiltrated it and Libyan chiefs eventually established themselves there.⁶ The marginal character of the fens was still in evidence as late as the seventh century B. C., at the time of Psamtik's alliance with the "bronze men" of Ionia.⁷

If Lower Egypt had had a strong intent to hold this area securely, it seems unlikely that the splitting off of the coastal delta would so often have been successful. That area must have been somewhat of an unclaimed land, repeatedly harboring fugitives or foreigners, and in general, at a discount with the Egyptians.

After the expulsion of the Hyksos, Egypt marched into Asia, organizing in the wake of her armies the coastal Phoenician cities as satellites. These cities had to accept military garrisons and were put under native rulers friendly to Egypt.

Yet Egyptian interest in these maritime sites remained limited. They were not incorporated, but retained their sovereignty. The Egyptians, we are told, paid well for the favors of the native rulers,⁸ and the military garrisons were frequently composed of non-Egyptian mercenaries.⁹ It can then be inferred that the interest of the Egyptians in these cities was primarily to furnish their growing empire with military supply depots and to have their flanks protected when marching into the interior.¹⁰ For that, and not the coast, set unswervingly the direction for the military efforts.

The Red Sea and the Mediterranean, it was stated, were the scenes of Egyptian maritime trade activity. It comprised such notable achievements as the expedition to Punt; the Nile to Red

Sea Canal as well as continuous trading in the eastern Mediterranean.

Despite their seafaring exploits, the Egyptians managed to by-pass the coast. No permanent Egyptian settlement or port on the Red Sea or the Mediterranean is on record. Regular trade would have been greatly facilitated by the establishment of coastal ports or settlements; that none was made, suggests that Egyptian trade was of an adventitious, occasional, expeditionary nature. As in the case of the Mesopotamian raids to the West, these expeditions were aimed at procuring specific materials, e.g., aromatic woods and exotic animals as in the Hatshepsut expedition to Punt.

This is all the more surprising since Egypt was situated on two seas, both having a considerable amount of trade. However, this was largely passive trade, carried in foreign bottoms, Phoenician in the Mediterranean, other in the Red Sea. Her position in regard to seaborne trade was broadly the same as that -- with the possible exception of Ur -- of the Mesopotamian, the Eittite or, later, the Persian empires.

To sum up:-- The comparatively weak hold on the Delta, the vacuum of power on the coastal strip, the continental line of Egyptian military expansion in Asia, the relative independence of the Philistine and Phoenician cities even in times of Egyptian ascendancy, the absence of Egyptian coastal settlements in the north and east, the expeditionary nature of trade -- all this argues for a shunning of coastal possessions during most of the 2600 years of pre-Hellenistic Egyptian antiquity.

Part II. The Hittites

Both politically and culturally, the Hittite empire was the ruling force in the Asia Minor of the second millennium. At the height of its expansion, it bordered on Egypt in the south, the Mesopotamian empires in the east. Its constitutional ideas, its codes of law and the level of its political thought in general make it the immediate predecessor of the Greek and Persian empires together with which it bridged the gap between the early civilizations of Mesopotamia, Crete and Egypt, on the one hand, Rome on the other.

The heartland of Hatti was Anatolia, the central part of Asia Minor. Situated in the middle of a large peninsula, its boundaries related in three directions to the coast. Landlocked towards the East and Northeast by high mountain ranges, its only line of expansion, except towards the coast, was to the Southeast, leading by the Upper Euphrates even further into the heart of the Asiatic continent. As a matter of fact, this precisely was the line Hittite expansion followed. It provides, in effect, an extreme case of what we have called the relations of coast and continent in antiquity.

Aware of their peninsular situation, the Hittites appear to have consciously settled on a continentalizing bent. Endowed with the faculty of conceiving comprehensive political ideas and of relating these to moral and juridical norms, they reveal in their documents a clear reflection of that national policy.

Our interpretation of the evidence must, admittedly, often

remain doubtful as long as it is merely grounded on translations, without firsthand knowledge of the originals. However, even at this stage of the inquiry an attempt at collating some of the available instances may be permissible.

1. Relegating an enemy to the coast

One of the most important of these documents, the Telepinush Text (c. 1350) describes the traditional Hittite policy of forcing the defeated enemy towards the coast. Telepinush, among the latest of the early set of rulers, ascribes in his Annals this policy to the three founding kings -- Labarnash, Hattushilish and Murshilish -- perhaps in order to lend the authority of historical precedent to his own policy.

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Telepinush Text

- Art. 1. 1 Thus speaks the Tabarna Telepinush, the great king
2 At one time Labarnash was Great King....
- Art. 2. 5 And the land was small; but wherever he went to war
6 he ruled the enemy country with a (strong) hand (?).
- Art. 3. 7 And again and again he harassed their country and devastated (?) it.
8 And he made them to border on the sea [machte sie zu Grenz (nachbar) des Meeres]. Put when he came home from the campaign, 9 wherever each of his sons went, to
- Art. 4. 10 Hupish, Tuwanuwa Menashsha, Landa, Zanlar...they administered the land 12 and the big towns were given over into their hands.
- Art. 5. 13 After him reigned (?) Hattushilish...he went to war, he, too, 16 held the enemy country down with a (strong) hand (?).

- Art. 6. 17 And again and again he harassed their country and devastated (??) it.
- Art. 8. 24 When Murshilish ruled in Hattushash....
- 27 And he harassed the country and made them to border on the sea.
- Art. 9. 28 And he marched to Halpa (Aleppo) and razed Halpa.....
After this he marched on Babylon and razed Babylon,
he also 30 attacked the Harrites (Hurrites)....

The need for expansion was given because "the land was small."¹⁴

Cattle and horses require suitable pastures. Raids and harassment are followed by devastation "And again and again he harassed their country and devastated it."¹⁵ The formerly sedentary victims give way to the pressure of the Hittites, only to find themselves pursued by their enemies and driven off the plateau and towards the coasts.¹⁶ "And he made them to border on the sea."

Nowhere in the Telepinush Text do we read of a Hittite move to seize the coast or even to drive the dispossessed into the sea. The typical ways of disposing of the vanquished, best known to us from Old Testament, Hellenic and Far Eastern sources, was the massacre of the population (sometimes of adult males only), their subjugation on the spot; selling them into slavery abroad. Expelling vanquished peoples from their towns and driving them in the direction of the coast appears to have been the early Hittites' alternative means. Towns were not razed, but taken over intact; pastureland was enlarged; the peoples were not destroyed; the borderlands were not left empty; international relations with the defeated were continued, and empire building proceeded. In the light of Hittite practice these implications may well have been

obvious. At any rate, the verbatim repetition of the principles of policy allegedly followed by the empire builders is singularly impressive.

2. Pejorative references to the coast

The Madduwattash Text gives us an appraisal on the official level of the relative values of coastal lowland and continental highland locations.

Madduwattash was the chief of a people who were defeated by the Ahhiyawa and were fleeing from their conquerors towards the highlands. He was rescued by Shupiluliumash, Great King of Hatti, whose official title was The Sun. Madduwattash was permitted by Shupiluliumash to enter the hill country of Zippashta, thus escaping with his people both from his enemy and from deadly famine.

There is but little doubt that the Ahhiyawa were the Achaeans of Homer; their ruler Attarshshiyash is being identified with the Atreus, who may have been the father of Agamemnon.

In return for being rescued Madduwattash swore an oath of fealty to the Hittite king. But later in the reign of his son, Arnuwandas IV, he united with Arzawa and the Ahhiyawa to seize Cyprus. In the text the Hittite king expresses his displeasure of Madduwattash's ingratitude and accuses him of treason:

The accusations against Madduwattash

- Art. 1. Front 1 Attarshshiyash the Ahhiyawa has chased /you/,
Madduwattash, from your country
- 2 After that he pursued you and hounded you and
wished for your, Madduwattash's /airo/ death

- Art. 1. Front 3 and /would/ have killed you. But you, Madduwattash took refuge with the Father /of the Sun/; and the Father of the Sun
- 4 rescued you from death and kept Attarshshiyash away from you.
- Art. 2. Front 6 As the Father of the Sun 7...took you... together with your wives, your children, your troops (and) your chariot fighters, and he gave you chariots...grain (and) seeds to overflow,
- 8 and he gave you also also (and) wine... (and) malted loaves...and cheese to overflow. And you...9 kept alive by the Father of the Sun in your hunger.
- Art. 3. Front 10 And the Father of the Sun rescued you...
- 11But for him the dogs would have devoured you in all your hunger.
- 12 Had you escaped from Attarshshiyas with your bare lives, you would have starved to death.
- Art. 4. Front 13 Thereupon the Father of the Sun came (and) took you...into an oath, and defended /you/ and made an oath
- 14"Behold, I, the Father of the Sun, have rescued /you/, Madduwattash /from the sword/ of Attarshshiyash.
- 15 "Therefore you shall (belong) to the Father of the Sun and the country of Hatti. And behold: I have given /you/ the hill country of Zippashta /to rule/.
- 16 "/and/ you, Madduwattash, together with your /people/ shall live in the hill country of Zippashta; and so have in the hill country of Zippashta
- 17 "your mainstay(??)."
- 19"Behold I have given you the hill country of Zippashta....
- 20 "But do not then on your own further occupy any other vassal's (land), nor any other's land (at all) and be the Hill country of Zippashta your boundary.

- Art. 4. Front 21 "Thus be you my servant; also be your troops my troops."
- Art. 5. Front 22*/you/ have given /me/, my /lord/, the hill country of Zippashta to live in.
- 23 "Thus /I/ am /in these countries/ an outpost and a guard. And who /so even speaks to/ my face a word of enmity.
- 24 "(and) from whatever country I hear a word of enmity, I shall /not hide/ from you such man and such country
- 25 "but rather write you of them."

For the Hittites, the lowland towards the coast was a wasteland: "Had you escaped from Attarsheshiyash with your bare lives you would have starved to death." To be forced to sojourn there included the probability of death from starvation, enslavement by coastal raiders, and eventually becoming carrion for wild dogs — these were the alternatives awaiting him. Although neither the word "coast" nor lowlands is mentioned, it may be permissible to infer, in view of the Telepinush Text that what is meant are the desert lands lying towards the west. The area must have been a notoriously arid one since the possibility of starvation is mentioned three times. The few fertile valleys would have been occupied by their conquerors. The reference to the wild dogs which devour corpses is also to be found in Homer, where the area in question is the coastal strip lying opposite Troy. The hill country is contrasted to the lowland as a land of bounty and Zippashta is referred to as a "mainstay."

The dating of the two documents — Telepinush ca. 1650 and Madduwattash ca. 1350 — shows that a similar attitude towards the coast prevailed for at least three centuries. However, the as-

cribing of such a policy to such earlier rulers and its obvious survival to the end of the empire extends its ascendancy to rather double that stretch of time.

3. Banishment to the coast

Further confirmation of the marginality of the coast is to be found in the Hattushilish Text, the autobiography of a Hittite king. Hattushilish raised himself to the throne at the expense of the legitimate sovereign, his brother, whom he deposed. Having defeated his rival he "sends him off to the side of the sea." A chief supporter of the exiled king is allowed "to cross the border and escape," as the context would indicate, presumably also to the coast (which incidentally can be identified as the north or Black Sea coast. In another case banishment is to the south coast or an island off that coast. The disaffected persons "are sent to Alashiyash," which is commonly thought to be Cyprus, lying opposite Cilicia.

This important episode appears to indicate that any person exiled (or self-exiled) to the coast would have been thereby rendered harmless to the Hittite realm -- whether for lack of resources or on account of the political weakness of the peoples among which he lived.

4. Coastal buffer state policy of the Hittites

The economic needs of the Hittite empire made, of course, a complete insulation from the coast impracticable. As we have seen in the case of Cyprus, some contact was unavoidable, particularly

in order to ensure the flow of copper from the island. As a solution, the Hittites appeared to have favored leaving the coast in weak, semi-independent hands. Such a policy was apt to mitigate both the military disadvantages of coastal possessions and the economic drawbacks that would have resulted had they occupied the area themselves.

The political status of such a coastal area is documented in The Shunashshura Treaty,¹⁷ which concerns the relations between Kizzuwatna and the two great neighboring powers, the Hurrites to the East, the Hittites to the North. Convincingly located by A. Goetze in the strategically vital area of Eastern Cilicia,¹⁸ Kizzuwatna controlled the shortest route from Cyprus and the southern coast to Boghazköy via the Cilician gates. Situated on the coast opposite Cyprus, it was the chief natural point of entry for copper to the Anatolian plateau.¹⁹

Under modern conditions the political independence of such a commercially and militarily strategic area under the shadow of a vastly superior great power, would be a practical impossibility, or to say the least, it would be most precarious. Hence its relatively independent status, securing immunity from military attack, more than 3000 years ago, becomes most significant, especially since it was grounded on freely concluded international treaties.

The Shunashshura Treaty opens with a statement which comes very near the principle of what in modern terms is called the self-determination of small countries. It begins:

5. Previously in the days of my grandfather, the country Kizzuwatna
6. had become (part) of the Hatti country. But afterward...
7. seceded...and shifted (allegiance) to the Hurri country.

We are then told how the shift in allegiance of such a strategic territory was possible in terms of international usage. Three generations before, a neighboring people, the Ishuwa, had sought asylum from the Hittites and had fled to the neighboring land of the Hurrites. When the Hittites objected to this and said

12. to the Hurrian: 'Extradite my subjects!...the Hurrian sent word back
13. to the Sun as follows: 'No.'
17. '...the cattle 18 have chosen their stable, they definitely
19. have come to my country.

The Hittite king then asked the question

26. ...If some country 27 would secede from you (and) would shift...to the Hatti country
28. How would such a thing be? The Hurrian 29 sent word to me...as follows: 'Exactly the same.'

It was therefore on the basis of international usage, reciprocity and precedent, that Shunashshura, king of Kizzuwatna, arranged the transfer of allegiance of his state from the neighboring Hurrites to their enemies, the Hittites.

The treaty reflects a careful delimitation of boundaries. Access to the sea was to be guaranteed to the continental great power at one point of entry, Lamiya. The Hittites agreed, in

turn, that Lamiya would not be fortified.

40. Toward the sea Lamiya belongs to the Sun....

42. The Sun will not fortify Lamiya

In this delimitation of boundaries by the two kings, all areas are measured out cooperatively and then halved.

49. ...the mountain of Zabarashna 50 belongs to Shunashkura, they will measure out the territory together 51 (and) divide (it)

59. The river Shazri (is) his boundary. The great king will not cross the river Shazri.

As regards other non-maritime fortifications the Hittites -- the Great Power --- explicitly limit themselves to the places they may fortify. No such restrictions are made on Kizzuwatna, the much smaller and weaker state.

45. The Sun must not fortify Aruna.

51. The Sun may fortify Anawashka.

Such elaborate diplomatic methods seem to have served the purpose of enabling the Hittites to avoid coastal occupation by keeping a small friendly state on their coastal flank, permitting the access to the sea while the weaker state acted as a buffer zone between sea and hinterland.

5. Early Migration and line of expansion

The Hittites, an Indo-Germanic people, probably entered Anatolia via the Black Sea coast. The cultic seats of the oldest gods in their pantheon are found to the north in Kashka territory, which probably included the southern coast of the Black Sea. In the historical period we find the Hittites in Central Anatolia:

in other words, their national movement must have been initially inland, starting from somewhere on the northern coast. It should be stressed, that no monument has been yet found in the neighborhood of the west coast which can unquestionably be called a proof of Hittite expansion in that direction. ²⁰ On the contrary, the line of expansion has been consistently south-east, i. e., further towards the main Asiatic inland.

In the Telepinush Text we learn that the first efforts made by the Hittites are towards consolidation in the interior of the Anatolian plateau. Later they move into northern Mesopotamia, attacking the ancient cities of Aleppo and Carchemish and actually raiding southeastward as far as Babylon. The Black Sea region became for them a back door, permanently closed to new entrants. The Kashka peoples, conglomerate of "barbaric" tribes, were left ²¹ in occupation of the area. They were tolerated despite their ²² harassing of the Hittite Empire, to the point of burning Boghazköy. Significantly, there is no evidence that the Hittites ever retaliated against them in force.

6. Cultural frontier between East and West

According to Albrecht Goetze there was over some two millennia a permanent cultural and political boundary line in Asia Minor west of the River Halys separating Anatolia proper on the East from the early Aegean and — later — Greek culture on ²³ the West. This boundary of land running roughly in a north-south direction remained intact through all historical vicissitudes. Goetze traced it as far back as the first invasion from the European

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continent of which we have knowledge, surviving the sway of third millennium Aegean culture, Minoan thalassocracy, and even subsequent Greek settlement. Bostovtzeff asserted its presence right up to late Achaemenid times. ²⁴ No quite satisfactory explanation has ever been offered for the persistence of this non-political frontier.

Yet such a borderline would be a logical outgrowth of the policy of keeping away from the coast and orienting oneself inland which we have posited with the Hittites. Not only does it lend additional support to the idea that the Hittite Empire of the second millennium held policies of this kind, but it suggests that a similar principle held sway over a much longer period of time, and for many more peoples. The remarkable cultural frontier running behind and along the coast which Goetze found in Western Asia Minor was, in effect, general -- if to a lesser extent -- along the whole Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. The relative safety of coastal cities which we instanced for the Philistine and Phoenician ports, bears this out. All along the Syrian coast a padding of smaller and weaker states separated the port cities proper from the continental powers. This suggests that deeper causes were here in play than the military and cultural drawbacks of such possessions for the inland powers. They were, as we mentioned to begin with, of an economic order.

Part III. Ports of Trade

The port of trade belonged to an organization of trading fundamentally different from that of the nineteenth century. Trading did not depend primarily upon markets but had a history

and logic of its own, stemming from the principle of a politically neutral meeting place. In "silent trade" -- mainly for reasons of safety -- agreement was reached without either party communicating directly with its opposite number. This form of primitive trade may have lingered on in the Eastern Mediterranean into pre-historic times as the archaeological remains of some walled coastal sites indicate. Such enclosures, right on the coast, and yet outside of the towns proper, have been unearthed. They were provided with an altar to ensure the safety of men and goods.

Neither a place for silent trade, nor a neutral sanctuary provides of itself the authority required for transacting trade in any other than a haphazard and ephemeral manner. Permanent guarantees of safety and more elaborate facilities are needed to make trade possible under archaic conditions.

The complex instrument which fulfilled these conditions was the port of trade. Seen from inland, the port of trade was an "opinelon" as Lehmann-Hartleben called "the coastal approach of a definite region, be it that of a tribe, a countryside or a city."²⁶ The port of trade was such a place, though not necessarily on the coast, but quite often on a great river or where desert and mountain meet. There goods could be exchanged under the non-military protection of shrine, monastery or a weak political authority. Its inner organization would vary greatly according to the social context in which the administration of trade was embedded.

Its main function was to guarantee neutrality. Continuity of the supply of goods was essential, since it could not be

expected that traders — under the difficult conditions of archaic long distance travel — would come to a distant place unless they knew for certain that a safe exchange of goods was possible there. The presence of a strong military power on the spot would unfailingly frighten them away. Political neutrality, guarantee of supplies, protection of the lives and property of strangers had to be assured before trade could start. A prior understanding between the corporate parties was therefore needed, usually based on regular treaties. Such an understanding, no doubt, would include facilities for disembarking, lading, portage, storage, grading of goods and the fixing of equivalencies backed by the coastal authority. Without this mechanism of the port of trade, there could be no regular trading.

Here, in our view, lies the key to the lasting independence of the coastal towns of antiquity. It is too early to say how far the mainly agricultural settlements of the Greek colonists, e. g., on the north Black Sea coast performed such a function for the corn trade. Anyway the eastern Mediterranean ports of trade had distinguishing marks which set them aside from the common run of such outlets for regional produce. There is evidence of the existence of two outstanding ports of trade in Syria that antedate the Hittite empire by many centuries. Recent excavations have unearthed Al Mina north of the mouth of the Orontes, and Ugarit less than a hundred miles south of it. The first has been given currency by Sir Leonard Woolley in his booklet on the Kingdom of Alalakh, the second, by the writings of Claude Schaeffer, head of the French expedition at Ras Shamra.

When Woolley excavated Al Mina, he found a city with a large group of warehouses and only a very few residences or burial sites. The city, as far as we are able to ascertain, was devoted exclusively to trade between the Aegean and the Syrian hinterland, with evidence available that Aegean traders did settle there. But the actual habitations were situated off the marshy coast on a hillside, at some distance.

This high degree of specialization was sometimes part of an even more complex set-up which comprised a small neighboring state acting as middleman between the distant empires and the port of trade proper. This seems to have been true of the relations between the kingdom of Alalakh and Al Mina.²⁷

In excavating Al Mina's parent city, Alalakh, Woolley noted that the Hittites had occupied and administered that town. However, he offers no evidence of the Hittites ever having been at Al Mina. More conclusive evidence for the neutrality of Al Mina is the fact that this city neither suffered siege nor occupation in the second millennium in which the Egyptian and Hittite Empires clashed in its immediate neighborhood.

If we turn to Ugarit — operating in the Egyptian sphere of influence, as Al Mina operated in the Hittite — the same singular phenomenon is manifest.

Ugarit was an independent kingdom which probably combined the function of a port of trade with that of the neutral state to which it belonged. It has been found to be one of the richest sites in the ancient world. The royal palace had three times the area of the one at the Hittite capital of Boghazkoy. Yet

Ugarit had no territory to speak of. We must infer that its wealth came to it from the trade for which it specialized. Evidence of a scribe-school teaching four different languages; texts and inscriptions; a multilingual dictionary using three languages; groups of foreign residents, and the administration of an equivalence system based on the shekel, show beyond the shadow of a doubt that this area was designed to perform the functions of a port of trade.

And, again: Ugarit was neither besieged nor suffered occupation during the imperial rivalries. It was seized between the eighteenth and sixteenth centuries contemporaneously with the Hyksos period in Egypt. Schaeffer offers evidence that this conquest was by a non-literate, military, 'barbaric' people. This would confirm the view that the politically more sophisticated powers followed a 'hands-off' policy in regard to ports of trade.

The geographic proximity and exposed strategic location of these eminently important trading centers must force us to the conclusion that during centuries of the second millennium Hittites and Egyptians were tacitly agreed to respect the neutrality and inviolability of each other's spineion. Further confirmation of the neutrality of such ports of trade comes from the traditional pattern of Hittite avoidance of the coast, of which we have already spoken. Their main route into Syria ran past the Gulf of Adana, yet the Hittites are not known to have ever touched upon the coast. That this pattern did not merely reflect military considerations is confirmed by a letter of the King of Babylon to Hattushilish III

in which he complains of the loss of a caravan ambushed on the way from Babylon to Ugarit. Hattushilish, asked to investigate, replied that the locality was not under his control. ³¹ The event took place after the fall of the Mitanni empire and subsequent to the eclipse of Egyptian power in northern Syria. To our knowledge, one power alone remained in control of the area at this time: the Hittites. Yet they neither claimed control over the coastal cities, nor did they seem in practice to interfere with their political life.

Protection for trade was deemed a concern of the highest order, as we can see from the fact that the king of Babylon would correspond with the king of the Hittites in the interest of trade. According to Schaeffer other correspondence and treaties from Ugarit confirmed such a mutual interest in the security of traders. ³² In the Hittite law code the killing of a trader amounts to murder; the killing of others, to manslaughter. ³³

Up to the turn of the first quarter of the first millennium ports of trade functioned in this manner. About that time there are signs of a recession in the neutrality of the ports of trade, and the principle of 'hands off' the coast weakens.

Important changes were taking place in the Near East.

Part IV. Symbiosis

The great expansion of trade in the second quarter of the first millennium had an incisive effect upon the relationship between coast and continent. The Powers of the hinterland could no longer afford to indulge in their continental bias of ignoring the

...~~most~~ whenever possible. They were now reluctantly moving towards a new balance which was to have far-reaching consequences for the course of history in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Tyre, the leading port of trade of the period, now operates on a world-wide scale; the administration of trade brings in distant political powers as her agents in the exchange of goods. Ionia, the Persian Gulf, the Black Sea, Arabia and the Atlantic coast of Spain are now all part of a network which may have extended as far as India and Central Africa. This is the picture drawn in Ezekiel 27, on the trade activities of Tyre in the early part of the sixth century:

12. Tarshish was thy merchant...with silver, iron, tin and lead they traded in thy fairs.
13. Javan, Tubal, and Meshech...they traded the persons of men and vessels of brass in thy market.
14. They of the house of Togarmah traded in thy fairs with horses and horsemen and mules.
15. The men of Dedan were thy merchants; many isles were the merchandise of thine hand; they brought thee for a present horns of ivory and ebony.
22. The merchants of Shoba and Raamah they were thy merchants; they occupied in thy fairs with chief of all spices, and with all precious stones, and gold.
25. The ships of Tarshish did sing of thee in thy market: and thou wast replenished, and made very glorious in the midst of the seas.

Phoenician manufacture appears to have been universally in demand and to have been bartered for diverse goods — slaves, livestock, metals, prestige goods, and so on. The increasing

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volume and variety of the turnover no doubt went with extended treaty relations. While the Tyrian ships themselves carried a large amount of cargo, other ships, as well as land caravans, were coming into Tyre all the time. To secure a supply of merchandise for such far-flung trade, to arrange for the disposal of goods and for the safety of ships and caravans must have required a diplomatic activity spanning almost the whole inhabited world, as far as then known.

Thus, along with the growth of trade, the ports of trade were bound to become political factors. Part of the reason for this, again, may lie in the strategic importance of iron, the flow of which they controlled. Of this no direct evidence is available to us. There is ample proof, however, of the increasing importance of navies as a military factor. Combined naval-land operations were on record since the Peoples of the Sea and continued to grow in the first millennium. In the seventh century we find the Ionian amphibious troops hired by Psantik acting as a catalyst in the overthrow of the power of Assyria in Egypt. Allied with the Lydians, the Phoenician cities also engaged in similar politico-military intrigues.

Thus one of the vital attributes of the ports of trade — their neutrality — tended to disappear, not as if they had lost their independence to the hinterland powers; rather, they themselves had become powers to be reckoned with.

This change of role was reflected in the attitude of the inland powers. Warily and reluctantly, they saw themselves

compelled to move against the ports of trade. Straight conquest and subjugation was out of the question. This would have altogether done away with their value as a channel of entry for foreign goods. Other responses had to be devised.

One answer was demilitarization. This interpretation may be put on the policy of Assyria towards Sidon, when that city was transferred from a reef to the mainland, and resettled with Assyrian colonists; similarly, on the policies of Lydia against the Ionian cities, when the walls of Phocaea were torn down. In a milder form, the Lydian policy of making annual raids against the coastal cities had the same purport. These moves appear to have been as nondestructive as possible, while nevertheless rendering those cities militarily helpless on land.

A basic change of role was taking place which combined a more active policy of the empires towards the coast with maintenance of much of the traditional continental bias. Often this manifested itself in a show of force, even in transitory control, followed by a withdrawal. Sometimes this led to a symbiotic relationship (as Hostovtzeff called it) growing into a closer cooperation between coast and continent than ever before. Again, we are forced to ignore the important differences which subsisted between the simple emporia of a local range, and the elaborate organizations of foreign trade we called ports of trade. The situation, in somewhat greater detail, was this:

In the northern Black Sea area, Scythia and the Greek colonies achieved a firm symbiosis, avoiding overt military

pressure. Rostovtzeff describes how the Scythians exchanged their surplus goods for products of Greece and Ionia:

...the Scythians favoured the Greek colonies, left them uncollected, entered into personal relations with them, and probably contented themselves with levying a nominal tribute as a sign of sovereignty. Neither from Herodotus nor from other 6th or 5th century sources do we hear of any conflict between the Greek colonies and the Scythians.

In Lydia, Gyges moved against Miletus (ca. 683), Colophon,³⁴ and Magnesia ad Sipylum. That this was merely a military demonstration and an assertion of nominal suzerainty is apparent, since Gyges did not seem to aim at capturing citadels.³⁵ He raided only the fields of Miletus and did not attack the two nearest coastal cities, Cyme and Ephesus.³⁶ Eventually, his military activities against the coastal cities came to a halt. In a significant move, Lydia permitted Miletus to colonize Abydos on the Hellespont,³⁷ on plainly Lydian soil. Gyges, himself, in the latter part of his reign, turned openly philhellene.³⁸ The coastal cities and Lydia later cooperated in the face of the Cimmerian invasion.

Gyges' successors, too, followed a policy of mild pressure, essentially aiming at a symbiosis. Alyattes devastated the Milesian fields every year, but left farmsteads uncollected. He destroyed the walls of Smyrna in an evident attempt at demilitarizing the city, yet did not occupy it.³⁹ He concluded a treaty favorable to Miletus and, in the second half of his reign, a mutually advantageous relationship was fostered by the strong cultural affinity that was springing up between Lydia and Ionia.

Herodotus declared there was but little difference between them.

Croesus, following in the traditions of Alyattes, had the hill forts of Ephesus destroyed. ⁴⁰ The other cities were left unmolested after they allowed peaceful entry to his troops. While they had to pledge annual payments, and military aid in extraordinary cases, they were not garrisoned, nor were their domestic affairs ⁴¹ interfered with. Croesus was out and out friendly towards the Greek ports of trade. Last of the Lydian monarchs, he was the most thoroughly hellenized of them all.

So far, in talking about the symbiosis of empire and port of trade, we had in mind the region of the northern Black Sea and Western Asia Minor, directing our attention to the Scythian and the Lydian empires respectively. In either instance the Greek ports of trade such as Miletus, Ephesus, or Theodosia were in the center of interest.

In turning south now towards the Syrian coast where history starts a thousand years earlier, a difference meets the eye. Al Mina and Ugarit were faced with the inland empires of Babylon, Assyria, the Hittites, and Egypt. Their successors, Sidon and Tyre, had to deal with the Neo-Assyrian empire, Chaldean Babylonia, and the Persians. In following up the changes that occurred in the first millennium in the policies of these new continental powers we will have to substitute for Kanaanite Al Mina and Ugarit their successors, the Phoenician cities of Sidon and Tyre.

At first sight there is a striking change in Assyrian policy.

The western military escapades of the Mesopotamian rulers of the third and second millennium now turn into regular warfare, which seems to aim at the permanent conquest of the West with a Mediterranean coast as its ultimate object. In this move Assyria, with its almost yearly campaigns, has the lead. The inhuman cruelties committed against their prisoners reveal a deliberate policy of intimidation.

Yet, delving deeper it is doubtful whether in regard to the coast the change is really as big as it appears on the surface. Up to about 782, though Assyria collected tribute from the coastal cities, her interference was tentative in character. Shamshi-Adad V⁴² visited the Mediterranean region only twice during his reign. These visits were booty raids and military demonstrations rather than campaigns of conquest. Adad-Nirari also assured himself of the tribute of Tyre, Sidon, Israel and Philistia, but did not repeat his visit to the coast.⁴³ Shalmaneser III and Tiglath-pileser III both exacted annual tribute while otherwise leaving the Phoenician cities alone⁴⁴ except for Philistia, which was raided though not then incorporated.⁴⁵ A policy of fierce aggression starts with Sennacherib who occupied Phoenicia in 701, with the sole exception of Tyre. Esarhaddon and Ashurbanipal following in his footsteps destroyed Sidon and exacted heavy tribute from Tyre. No doubt, the end of the eighteenth century saw a new Assyrian policy, much more reminiscent of the nineteenth century A. D. than of the nineteenth century B. C. Military pressure against the coastal cities was now constant.

Nevertheless, it would be easy to exaggerate the "modern-ness" of the neo-Assyrian drive towards the coast. Tyre was made to pay tribute and some attempt was made to subject her foreign policy. Yet her relationship with Assyria was for the most part one of cooperation. Assyrians had right of entry into Tyrian territories, but Tyrian traders were granted full reciprocity by Sarrhaddon.⁴⁶

Though Tyre had an Assyrian resident magistrate watching her rulers she was otherwise independent. Later, Nebuchadnezzar kept Phoenicia under subjection, and tried to take Tyre, but was defeated. Neo-Assyrian and neo-Babylonian policies broadly amounted to an economic activation of the coast through the ports of trade, which, however, were not incorporated, pressure being mostly exerted by methods of remote control.

Persia represented entirely new principles of empire building. To use a minimum of coercion was among its tenets. Herodotus credited its rulers with professing a remarkable principle of empire government, according to which their interest in peoples diminished in proportion to the distance from the center of the country. This may well have held out to the coastal towns a promise of autonomy. Its fulfillment seems to have depended on whether or not the cities were willing to accept Persian suzerainty. Miletus was treated mildly, other Ionian cities harshly -- obligation of military service, payment of tribute and native rules chosen by the Persians were imposed. Still, to call these rulers tyrants is essentially misleading. Over the whole of the Hellenic world the fashionable

monarchy of the non-traditional type went under the name of tyrannis. But the sinister overtones that the term later acquired are thoroughly anachronistic. Seventh and sixth century tyrannis were anything but unpopular; the typical self-made ruler arose from the ranks of the aristocracy with the help of the populace to rid them of oppression from oligarchic class rule. In metropolitan Greece, by the middle of the fifth century the new monarchy had been generally superseded by free forms of popular rule and the tyrannis was now under a cloud. Yet the ambiguity is still apparent in Herodotus. The Ionian tyrants of his grandfathers' time often owed their opposition to the Persians who preferred to deal with monarchs rather than with assemblies, and to that extent the Ionian "tyrants" were justly dubbed Persian puppets. Herodotus mentioned that the Ionian kings during the Scythian wars did not cut the bridge on the Danube which Darius had entrusted to their care because they felt they would only be in power as long as the Persians were around.⁴⁷ Persian tyrannis was then often merely a method by which popular but sympathetic satellite governments were established. In preparation for the second invasion of Greece the Persians, who nourished no ideological preferences, replaced the tyrannis in all Ionian cities by democratic regimes. When the wars were over, a return to the old policy of almost complete political independence occurred, yet with a closer approximation to a symbiotic relationship between coast and continent.

The Phoenician cities did not go through the same sharp fluctuations of Persian policies as those of Ionia. They retained their native kings, free to join or refuse to join Persian

expeditions. There was a break in the mutual goodwill when Xerxes beheaded some Phoenician officers for poor conduct. The Phoenicians thereupon withdrew their fleet from Persian service for approximately fifteen years.⁴⁸ The bitter revolt of 353 in which many Sidonians⁴⁹ immolated themselves in their city was not severely punished: the city was rebuilt and Phoenicia continued to enjoy a fair measure of independence and prosperity under Persia, who seemed to be tolerant of all but open rebellion. Co-operation was based on a smoothly functioning trade organization of the coast which the Persians implemented by contributing a metallic standard, an efficient road system, and a secure hinterland.

When in the last third of the first millennium, Macedonia cut across Europe, Asia, and Africa to create a world empire, the demise of the port of trade seemed imminent. Both the strategic and the cultural perils of the coast had lost substance and actuality. The coastlines, now lying for the first time within the boundaries of the all-inclusive empire, were left without political and military significance, and the hellenization of the oecumene was the order of the day. Symbolic of the change was the defeat of Tyre at the hands of Alexander the Great. The man who embodied the novel idea of a universal civilization, had possessed himself of the impregnable rock which harbored Ezekiel's admired and hated Mistress of the Seas, and which had braved the might of Assur and Babylon. A vast expansion of peaceful trade was on, fusing the hitherto separated continents and transforming the Eastern Mediterranean into a Hellenic lake.

It is all the more remarkable to find instead a revival of the early port of trade almost in its classic form. For a long time to come, the port of trade with its neutral administration of transactions between many foreign peoples proved indispensable. To channel the commerce of the Orient which would flow through the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, Cleomenes of Naucratis was commissioned by Alexander the Great to plan a city at the point of entry to the west. The outcome was the port of trade par excellence, Alexandria. Neutrality was its raison d'être. Although situated on Egyptian soil, and erected under a Greek government, neither the Egyptians, nor even the Greeks themselves were to wield power in it. It was built outside the administrative boundary of the Egyptian chora and its autonomy was to prove indestructible. Its neutrality was guaranteed by settling there traders of all nations in large numbers, so as to reduce the preponderance of the Greeks themselves! The security of trade under the municipal authority was assured by business transactions being sworn to before the altar of Hephaestion, the deified friend of Alexander. The great king who bestowed his genius to those details had ordered two temples to be erected to Hephaestion, and all business documents to invoke the sanction of the guardian god.

Alexandria was the nodal to which, in Hellenistic times, many other ports of trade conformed, whether on the Phoenician coast, in Greece, or in Asia Minor. Ports of trade now had an informal status of their own. Tyre, Byblus, Sidon enjoyed the same independence as did the Greek cities of the coast; but the

same independence was not granted to the Greek poieis of inland

Babylonia.⁵¹ Thus the trans-continental empires of the Hellenistic age, far from discarding the concept of the port of trade, rather strengthened and renewed it. But the shunning of the coast that the ancient world had known was now overcome. And the time was near when, in the Western Mediterranean an utterly novel constellation of power in relation to coast and continent would arise to revolve around the Roman axis.

FOOTNOTES

1. A. T. Olmstead, History of Assyria. New York: 1923, p. 28, not quoted; CAH, I, 568, quoted.
2. Ibid., p. 54.
3. G. A. Barton, The Royal Inscriptions of Sumer and Akkad. New Haven: 1929, p. 181 ff.
4. Robert Engberg, The Hyksos Reconsidered, Chicago: 1939, p. 10.
5. Breasted, CAH, II, 192. 'As Wenamon was obliged to pass through the territory of Nesubeneded, who now ruled the Delta, Hrihor supplied him with letters to the Delta prince, and in this way secured him passage in a ship....'
6. Ibid., p. 167.
7. H. R. Hall, CAH, III, 295.
8. Breasted, op. cit., p. 193.
9. Cook, CAH, II, 308.
10. Breasted, op. cit., p. 78.
11. In this section we closely follow J. Friedrich's and A. Goetze's translations. Cf. Memorandum 14, Interdisciplinary Project, on "Hittite Policies in Regard to Coastal Areas" by Karl Polanyi, Columbia University, March, 1955. (Mimeographed)
12. Polanyi, op. cit.. J. Friedrich, Aus dem hettitischen Schriften, A. O. 24, 3 (1925), The Talepinush Text, op. cit., (trans. into English).
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., Art. 2, Line 5.
15. Ibid., Art. 3, Line 7.
16. Ibid., Art. 3, Line 8.
- 15a. A. Goetze, Madduwattash, MVAeG, 32, 1 (1928), Accusations Against Madduwattash.
- 15b. A. Goetze, Hattashilish, MVAeG (1925).
17. A. Goetze, Kizzuwatna and the Problem of Hittite Geography. New Haven: 1940, 'The Samasarna Treaty,' p. 36 ff.

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18. Ibid.
19. R. Dussaud, Frétydiens, Hittites et Acheens, Paris: 1953, fig. I.
20. Ibid., p. 62.
21. A. Goetze, Klein Asien (1936), p. 168.
22. Dussaud, op. cit., p. 59.
23. A. Goetze, op. cit., p. 168, 'The old border line that separated the West from the East remained all through the Hittite period, that is, almost through the whole of the second millennium.'
24. Ibid., p. 31.
25. M. Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World, Oxford: 1941, I, 81, 'These cities, though subjects of Persia in the 4th century B. C., in fact belonged not to the Oriental but to the Greek world. They were, so to speak, fragments of the Western world on the fringe of the Eastern, serving as connecting links between the two. Behind them, however, the interior of Anatolia and the adjoining parts of north Syria remained essentially Oriental.'
26. Lehmann-Hartleben, Die antiken Hafenanlagen des Mittelmeeres, Leipzig: 1923, p. 24.
27. Sir Leonard Woolley, A Forgotten Kingdom, Harmondsworth: 1953, p. 151.
28. Claude Schaeffer, Cuneiform Texts, p. 38.
29. Claude Schaeffer, 'Reconstructing an Ancient Civilization,' The Listener, June 30, 1955, LIII, No. 1374, p. 1162. 'And here were sets of weights based on the shekel, that is one-third of an ounce. There are many small weights for fractions of a shekel, probably for the silversmith, and others for two, three, five, ten, twenty, thirty and fifty shekels. These are in bronze or in haematite. The heavy stone weights for 300, 500 and 1,000 shekels are in stone. One, which is cut with particular care in hardstone, corresponds to one talent, that is, 3,000 shekels. These weights show that at Ugarit a decimal system was in use different from the system in vogue in Mesopotamia or in Egypt at the same time, which was based on multiples of sixty.'
30. Ibid., p. 1163.
31. Claude Schaeffer, Cuneiform Texts, p. 35. This letter is confirmed by the extraordinary lack of objects from Anatolia on the site of Ugarit. There are a sufficient number to indicate that there was trade, but an insufficient number to postulate an occupation.

32. Claude Schaeffer, in The Listener, op. cit., p. 1163.
33. O. R. Gurney, The Hittites, Harmondsworth: 1952, p. 97.
 'It is curious that the only case which we should describe as wilful murder is mentioned in connection with a merchant, who seems to be treated rather in a class by himself, and is associated with the motive of robbery.'
34. Hogarth, CAH, II, 508.
35. Ibid., p. 508 - cites Nicholas of Damascus on Magnesia - no reference.
36. Ibid., p. 508.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., p. 513.
40. Ibid., p. 519.
41. Ibid.
42. Smith, CAH, III, 26.
43. Ibid., p. 29. No case as far as I know.
44. Ibid., p. 41.
45. Ibid., p. 30.
46. Olmstead, op. cit., p. 375 ff.
47. Arrian, III, 1417. 14, 17. 4.
48. H. Cary, HAW from 323 - 346 B. C., 1951, p. 268.