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Policies of Peace.

War/Peace
War/Peace Report, published monthly by War/Peace Report Inc., 5 West 36th Street, New York, N.Y., Editor Richard Hudson, Subscription Price \$ 5 per year, educational rate (for schools, students, libraries etc) \$3.50 p.a. The following review refers to Vol. 4 (April) to 6 (June) 1964

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Review of International Affairs-Politics, Economics, Law, Science
is represented as a fortnightly by The Federation of Yugoslav Journalists, Beograd, November 24, 1963 #13, Chief Editor Milorad Milovic, subscription \$ 4.40 per annum. Reviewed are the issues from No. 230 (May 28th) to July 12th, 1964.

No 343
The two journals here reviewed differ in many points, notwithstanding the connection created by a sincere desire for peace and the occurrence of certain ~~problems~~ ^{events} during the period under review. One of them is a non-official American publication, issued with the support of a Board of Sponsors not all the members of which can be described as pacifists in the ordinary sense of the word. The other emerges from a communist yet non-aligned country (with some contributions from other non-committed countries, in particular India). Its authors may be regarded as more or less representative, if not of the official views of the country of publication, then of those of other members of the non-aligned group of states. The Review of International Affairs is not exclusively devoted to the problems described in its title. In this journal, however, we need not deal with the much smaller section which is devoted to the problems of individual countries, including Yugoslavia herself.

What does the review say about gov n
2 In two journals so different, certain contemporary events are bound to be seen ~~in~~ ^{from} different perspectives, even if near-identical solutions are arrived at. The April issue of War/Peace Report starts with a discussion of experts on the possibility of a neutralization of Vietnam, leading to the prospect that a South-Vietnamese settlement, by direct negotiation or with the help of French mediation, might result in the transfer of power to a broad political combination, within which the weight of the (communist) left-wing would be likely to increase, while a neutralist attitude would be preserved. Such an outcome, though unavoidable from the ^{point of view} ~~standpoint~~ of supposed US interests, is regarded as ~~an avoidable~~ ^{an outcome} consequence of the American failure to come to terms with the National Liberation Front ^{which} ~~to~~ ^{an outcome} the communist influence within it was still weak. Such ^{an outcome} ~~abscuted~~ ^{compared to} the War/Peace Report only as a minor evil ^{unending} ~~in comparison with the endless~~ continuation of a hopeless war, not to speak of its possible extension. It would enjoy the full sympathies of the Review of International-

82 ~~International Affairs~~ yet this sympathy ^{extends} includes ^{in a positive sense} not just as some unavoidable result of bargaining ^{to} the non-aligned as well as to the leftist ^{aspect} part of the ^{proposed solution} prospect. Non-alignment is conceived, not ^{only} just as an institutional device, organised by Conferences ^{etc.} ~~this aspect with special emphasis on the underdeveloped countries, received the Yugoslav attention, too~~ but also as a mode of co-operation between states with similar interests in peace, (notwithstanding) their temporary belonging to different ^{blobs} ~~blobs~~. No. 342-3 of the Review of International Affairs, apart from an article by W. Opacic on 'The New Non-Aligned Conference', ^{of which more below} ~~(to which we shall later return)~~ ^{brings} has also articles on Balkan Co-operation ^{launching on} (L. Mojssov) ^{the line} including Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Roumania, and, at the occasion of ^{visit} ~~X. Khrushchev~~ ^{to Scandinavia}, on 'Scandinavia in East-West Relations' ^(R. Petkovic). In either case the positive aspects of inter-bloc co-operation in countries particularly interested in forming bridges, ^{are} emphasized, without immediate demands for any country leaving its bloc, ^{being raised} though the ^{authors} ~~obvious~~ ^{aim at} intention is a ^{all} ~~promotion~~ of an eventual 'withering away' of the blocs. ^{in the} ~~in the~~ Petkovic's ^{article appreciates the varied} ~~the diverse~~ ways in which the individual Scandinavian countries serve the cause of ~~which~~ peace-by contributing within NATO to the relaxation of international tensions, by ^{the} ~~traditional~~ ^{neutrality of} in the case of Sweden or of Finland - the positively non-aligned ~~(Finland)~~ neutrality is appreciated, though with a natural sympathy for the last-mentioned ^{way} ~~one~~, and with the hope that the relations of all Scandinavian countries to the USSR might become 'the most substantial example of co-existence in the sphere of East-West relations in general'.

Naturally enough, this approach is also applied to the discussion of the problems of individual countries. No. 340 of the Review of International Affairs has ^{an} ~~a~~ ^{article} report on Finland which emphasises the great and ~~by J. Djerdja~~ ^{unusual} headed 'Different Contributions - ~~unusual~~ results' ^{from the standpoint of the Great Powers concerned} ~~the outcomes~~ of the US-policies towards Cuba, and of the Soviet policies towards the United Arab Republic. Of the developments in the ~~Caribbean~~ ^{Caribbean}

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The key issue of ^{Comm} ~~War/Peace Report~~ ^{was} an extensive interview with Fidel Castro; ~~where~~ he emphasises that ~~it is impossible to export~~ ^{it is} revolution from Cuba, just as it is impossible to import counter-revolution from the USA to Cuba. He suggests that, after three years of experience as President, Kennedy was on the way to correct the earlier mistakes of US policies. ~~(The all know the tragic way in which this impending correction was thwarted, in its part, in the course of events.)~~ As to the Soviet policy towards the UAR, Mr. Djerdja, in the ~~xxxxx~~ quoted article, concludes from the ~~xxxxx~~ behaviour of both Khrushchev and ~~Nasser~~ during the former's visit to Egypt 'that the maturity and stability of the non-aligned and socialist orientation of the UAR was fully manifested, while the Soviet policy of a new realistic and equal approach to the non-aligned and developing countries was markedly confirmed. But even where these attitudes were not quite identical in all their aspects they were no obstacle to fruitful co-operation and understanding'. The italics in the above quotation are mine: the marked words show that the Yugoslavs, even after the recent rapprochement, do not conceive ^{their} (non-alignment as identification with Soviet policies. A fortiori, descriptions ^{of} not in a toast, but in an article supposedly analytic ^{of} Nasser's ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ orientation as 'socialist' are likely to ^{be} ~~form~~ a source of argument, not with the Chinese only ~~but~~ ^{the} interest here, however, is devoted not to the individual issues discussed in the

Like most American supporters of peace-policies, many contributors to the 'War/Peace Report' suffer under a tendency to take ^{for granted} most of the assumptions of the predominant trends in USA ^{and} the 'images' artfully built up of the 'prospective aggressor' and of the 'third world' ^{This, is} by the establishment, in fact, the very setting within which the Goldwater candidate ^{above} became possible ^{immediacy} at all. We have ^{noticed} the shyness with which 'neutralist' solutions to burning issues of foreign policies are defended as mere 'minor evils' instead of frankly stating that a policy of positive co-existence is the only one which can preserve the USA's capacity to ~~to~~ make

further major contributions to the progress of mankind. If 'Peace after War/Peace Reports' says something positively do, it is in connection of refuting

their argument ^{about what the USA could} certainly weighty with American politicians and the electorate that disarmament means economic breakdown. ^{correctly} In this connection ~~that~~ W.B. Gramp ~~xxxxxx~~, in the April issue, stated that

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Disarmament does not mean ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ government would be on friendly terms with every other. It does not even mean there would be no animosity or tension. It simply means that national power no longer could take a massive military form and that disagreements would no longer be settled by war (though possibly they would be settled by other violent means). ^{What kind of violence? Set it continuous}

[These new forms of expressing power could be expensive. The great powers could decide to call attention to themselves by showpieces of foreign aid, by spectacles of space exploration, by ostentatious public works, monuments, buildings, parks, by lavishing hospitality to the world, by some generosity even to their own subjects.. These things are not just possible. They are probable']

Gramp
Prof. Gramp follows this argument ^{numbers} up by enumerating a lot of expenditure items-including increasing the conventional armaments of ^{the U.S., both} USA, on its own, and on behalf of ^{the UN - without even raising} the question of what other ^{UN} members may/say ^{have to} about an ^{a 'UN' N} H.F. force financed and equipped by either of the 'Big Two' ^{is not even raised}, space and atomic ^{re} expenditures, and ^{must}

"Other forms of rivalry'. With an implicit logic, to which we shall later have to return, 'rivalry' is supposed to be a competition in non-economic expenditure: Grapp does not even ~~ask~~ ^{hint at} the ~~question whether~~ ^{possibility that} healthy rivalry--to speak with the leading article of the Review of International Affairs, No. 341, a policy of peaceful and active co-existence in the international economy--~~may~~ ^{pursue} ~~include~~ 'the aim of promoting economic development throughout the world, and especially of stepping up economic growth in the emergent countries'. The June issue of War/Peace Report prominently features a statement by Walt/er Reuther where massive US AID for the underdeveloped countries is suggested as a means to force the USSR (which evidently is supposed to interpret its own interests as opposed to disarmament) to participate in it, and thereby to set US resources free for other more useful purposes. Yet thereby Reuther takes (as ~~an~~ ^{the} ~~aim of the world~~ ^{aim of the world}) within which, for example, the ~~Republic of China~~ ^{Democratic People's Republic of Korea} ~~explains the Revolution~~

platform for the 1964 Presidential elections can state that 'trade with communist powers... could only be justified if it would serve to diminish their power' and in relation to the development of the young nations that 'America's tax revenues derived from free enterprise sources must never be employed in support of socialism'. Walter Reuther, and the editors of War/Peace Report ^{entirely as assuredly disloyal} ~~would, of course, combat~~ such concepts ^{which by the way is so} contradict the old-standing liberal interpretation of trade as involving mutual benefits. Yet ~~what~~ I miss in their ~~and most American friends' of peace~~ analysis of the 'war-industrial complex' ^{blatantly} is a readiness ~~straightforwardly~~ to counter the prejudices of a part of the electorate, fed as it is by the propagandist annexes of that ~~war-industrial complex~~, and to develop a positive ^{image} picture of an America dependent on ^{and not just propaganda} sources of strength alternative to the 'cold war'.

For the Yugoslavs the positive character of their non-alignment policy is ^{un-}uncontroversial; its very merits rest in its anti-colonial ~~character~~ character and in the involved support for the emancipation of the ex-colonial countries. This is fully understandable but, of course, not yet an answer to the problems of progressive Americans who have to tackle the problems of their own country from its own, and not merely from a charity standpoint. The positive meaning of Non-alignment is ^{No. 339 of} treated in the leading article (by L. Erven) of the Review of International Affairs and in a discussion article by Dinesh Singh (then Deputy Foreign Minister of India). Starting from the internal debates in India which followed the border conflict with China in late 1962, Singh concludes that 'non-alignment

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1) From the context it is not clear what Mr. Altmeppen has in mind when speaking of whole countries and socialist parties (not merely of individual entities). He may have overlooked the difference in viewpoint existing between supporters of international understanding according to whether they operate in a country associated with a bloc and, hence, necessarily bound to emphasize the importance of understanding with the opposite bloc, whatever importance they ascribe to what I have described as the first issue of this journal, or the broader concept of co-existence or are mainly concerned with securing closer co-operation of the non-aligned countries, most of which are underdeveloped.

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issue they published a highly critical letter, by John S. Gilmore from
the Industrial Economics Division of the University of Denver Research
Institute, and three positive attempts at approaching the problem, by
Emile Benoit (of Columbia), ~~co-editor,~~ ^{co-editor,} ~~with Kenneth Boulding, of the~~
~~book Disarmament and the Economy,~~ Charles M. Bliss, Chairman of the Board
of The Bank of New York, and Ben D. Segal, a leading official of the I.U.E.
of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. Gilmore joins issue with a) Grapp's taking a very
-and hence a very modest amount of the resources to be ^{for granted,}
gradual process of Disarmament/~~for granted~~ diverted each year ~~for~~
~~granted,~~ and b) ~~with~~ his neglect of the specific character of the industry
ies subject of disarmament (a point more specifically elaborated by
Bliss) which implies very serious problems for the communities involved
(a point particularly made by Segal) unless ^a positive answer, by national
planning, is found. Bliss remarks that while, on the whole, a 'mere'
ten per cent. of the U.S. labour force earn their livelihood as members
of the armed forces ⁱⁿ or from defence employment, ~~thirteen~~ seven states
(all in the 'West') ^{as} ~~by the way,~~ ^{this} ~~which,~~ I may add, may be part of the explanation
for the Goldwater candidature) ~~which~~ more than twenty per
cent. of ^{the} ~~the~~ manufacturing employment (in the ~~main fields~~ of defence
industries. ^{is} ~~Moreover,~~ ^{more} ~~there is~~ Not only a quantitative but a qualitative
problem is involved: 52 per cent. of the engineers and scientists doing
research work in American industries ^{are} engaged in defense and space
programs. ^{me} As Gilmore notes, 'the hard core of our defense production is
becoming uniquely dissociated from the mainstream of our economy' ~~the~~ ...
largely segregated from the commercial market and its processes'.
[It would appear that] ^{the potentialities of} technologically ^{advanced} parts of American industry ~~are~~
^{are} already ~~exceeding~~ ^{exceed} the ^{limiting} ~~framework~~ ^{limitations} of a capitalist market economy: ~~if~~ (hence)
these ~~potentialities~~ are not to be scrapped, they have to be absorbed

and ~~for~~ directed by public planning. All the contributors to the June-
 issue to War/Peace Report draw, in diverse terminologies, this consequ-
 ence which is implied in the very nature of things: after all, the
^{Republican} ~~democratic~~ platform ^{also} implies planning ^{though} ~~not~~ for destruction only. Why
 should it not be possible, to speak with Benoit, to develop 'new, larger
 scale Research and Development programs, organised and financed primar-
 ily by government, since the rewards will generally be too long range
 and indirect to be of interest to private investors unless the
 government guarantees a market?'

The answer lies, of course, in the political field—in what Senator
 Fulbright has called the American electorate's attachment to the
 Cold War, ^{and the other contributors, are} ~~and~~ Prof. Benoit ~~is~~ very conscious of these difficulties, but
 do they ~~not~~ ^{may} perhaps, commit a mistake by taking ^{(in practice) long-term} in a discussion of ~~the~~
 life-and-death issues of the nation a certain politico-propagandist
setting, for granted. In his argument against Prof. Gramp's expectation
 of a very slow disarmament process J.S. Gilmore quotes authors as
 different in their general views as Hermann Kahn and Arthur Waskow
 as authorities for the possibility that a disarmament agreement, to
 be carried out perhaps even in a few weeks' time, may be 'triggered off'
 by a nuclear confrontation, or perhaps a real nuclear accident. ~~Is it~~
~~believable that the present American political setting, with the~~
~~involved prejudices against non-military planning, would survive such~~
~~a crisis, and may it not be the duty of the American supporters of~~
~~Peace, modest though their influence is on the immediate outcome of~~
~~elections, to clear their and their fellow-citizens' minds about~~
~~what is possible and desirable if, for some reason or other, the~~
~~present one-sided orientation of the American national economy should~~
~~break down?~~

2) Cf. his article in 'Peace & Society', Summer, 1969.

Meanwhile they expect, and appreciate, a very gradual progress. The
June issue of War/Peace Report gives a detailed survey of the individ-
-very pessimistic-
ual issues under discussion, the June issue a survey about the way in
which the American Senate would vote in a Disarmament Treaty: the im-
plication is that only small and implicit steps are likely. A not so
different estimate of the short-term prospects (as distinct, of course,
from the desirable developments) appears in Dr. Iakovlev's Review of International Affairs, No. 340, concentration of the attack against such 'big powers' as, within their military-political alliances deny, in fact, the value of certain initial agreements reached between East and West, and
...refute the possibility of the further process of the relaxation of

international tensions'. In Dr. Iakovlev's military-political commentary,
published in No. 339 of the Journal Review under the heading 'Moder-
ate Optimism', M. Badyrina has analysed various recent, and less advert-
-well known-
ed measures of disarmament under the viewpoint that they reflect,
in substance, technological obsolescence of those particular pieces
of rocketry: a glance at the pages of War/Peace Report shows that, also
in the opinion of its editors this is the kind of disarmament at
present feasible, or already in progress.

Yet such an appreciation of the present situation, probably correct,
should induce supporters of a consistent peace policy to approach
with extreme caution the various diverse efforts, to derive
as to the desirable characteristics of an international peace order
-from extremely individualistic conceptions of the
state as evolved in Western Europe and particularly embodied in
American constitutional ideology, less in American constitutional life,
which protects the farmers' interest by the equal representation of
all states, large or small, in the Senate just as the so-called 'veto'
protects the socialist third of mankind against being outvoted in UNO.
The ideal type of international peace order is not the sheriff-hero of a 'Western'
who shoots down the law-breaker, the latter being classified as a foe
by the supposed consensus of the community, but the conciliation cham-
ber in which the main three types of social organisation co-existing
at present meet, majority decisions being admissible only if they
cross existing groupings instead of amounting to a misuse of the
appearances of international organisation for the dividing up the dividing up For the
support of a certain alliance against one, or more, social formations.
No institutional scheme, eliminating the one or other esthetic
shortcomings, say, in the voting procedure of UNO, can even contribute

3) Sometimes in appearance rather than in substance. For example, the
inflation of 'the vote' from one through the former co-
fact that India and China have only one vote each

for hundreds of millions of people.

Perhaps Mr. Sch... may of the pacifists thinking in mere institutional terms, simply fails to see the international-sociological implications of his suggestions: if so, the co-existence with some suggestions made, some months later, in the Goldwater platform should cause him to think again. I would not suggest that the struggle of the underdeveloped countries for equal rights, and for non-interference with their internal conflicts (and the USSR's refusal to contribute to the costs of the Congo operation was caused precisely by such considerations) is the only criterion to which suggestions 'to organise peace' should be subjected: but certainly it is a very important one and any suggestion, even before being scrutinized as regards its practical realizability, should be assessed from this point of view, as well as from that of the co-existence of the two major socio-economic systems, each of which embodies a certain system of values. The co-existence of these systems can be secured, not by ideological generalisations from the process in which the constitution of the USA came into being but only in the outcome of a prolonged process of argument and efforts at mutual understanding.

Rudolf Schlesinger

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to the removal of the very serious political obstacles standing, at present, in the way of organising peace. In the February issue of ~~xxxxx~~ War/Peace report the editor, R. Hudson, ~~has~~ entered that well-ploughed field by suggesting, in support of Disarmament Agreements, ~~rules~~ about a 'Peace-Keeping Majority' to be embodied in the UNO charter: ~~according to this~~ ^{suggested suggestion} the 'Veto' in the Security Council ~~should fall but be replaced~~ ^{should} by the ruling, that UN intervention was admissible only by the concurrent votes of at least ten members of a Security Council enlarged to fifteen, and ^{the formal} a majority in the General Assembly representing the absolute majority of mankind. If ~~xxxxxx~~ statements are translated into practical policies, we see that the ~~Communist~~ ^{major} powers ~~would enjoy absolute~~ ^(if in agreement) safety not less absolute than under the 'Veto' system since they with their closest friends, ~~was~~ ^{they with} hardly ~~be supposed~~ ^{to} to dispose of less than five votes ⁱⁿ ~~in~~ reformed Council; the underdeveloped countries would be fully safe if they proceeded ^{or} with a minimum of honesty; the socialist countries ~~(representing)~~ ^{representing} themselves ~~good third of mankind~~ ^{non-committed} would require the concurrent votes of ~~countries with~~ ^{about 400 million inhabitants} which is likely but not absolutely safe, say, in the event of an aggression against Cuba, at a time when Sino-Indian disputes happen to be exaggerated. Yet in the April issue J.B. Schny (co-author with G. Clark of the book World Peace through World ~~disputed~~ ^{suggested} ~~disputed~~ ^{suggested} that Hudson's ~~was~~ ^{already} insufficient since China and India, voting together, which they would probably ~~do~~ ^{do} when the interests of all underdeveloped countries were involved, could block a majority. In his opinion 'it is more important that nations which would have to pay for it should have a stronger voice in the decision'. Pacifists who thought in such terms may reconsider their position after having read the Republican platform for the 1964 Presidential elections, which was adopted a few months after the quoted lines were written. Yet more correction of detail within the institutional approach is insufficient. Peaceful co-existence of states representing different social structures can emerge, not from generalisations ~~for~~ ^{for} the process in which some western constitutions came into being-or were, ex post facto, ideologically explained-but only from a prolonged effort at mutual understanding.

University of Glasgow

Rudolf Schlesinger

Review - article
Policies of Peace.

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2 ~~lona~~ Affairs, yet this sympathy includes, in a positive sense, not just as some unavoidable result of bargaining-the non-aligned as well as the leftist part of the prospect. Non-alignment is conceived, not ^{only} just as an institutional device, organised by Conferences ^{etc.} ~~this aspect, with special emphasis on the underdeveloped countries, received the Yugoslav~~ attention, too, but also as a mode of co-operation between states with similar interests in peace, notwithstanding their temporary belonging to different ~~blocks~~, bloc No. 342-3 of the Review of International Affairs, apart from an article by W. Opacic on The New Non-Alligned Conference (to which we shall later return) has also articles on Balkan Co-operation (by L. Mojssov), including Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Roumania, and, at the occasion of ~~X. Khrushchev~~ ^{the} ~~to Scandinavia~~ ^{visit}, on 'Scandinavia in East-West Relations' (by R. Petkovic). In either case the positive aspects of inter-bloc co-operation, in countries particularly interested in forming bridges, is emphasized, without immediate demands for any country leaving its bloc being raised (though the ^{authors} ~~obvious~~ ^{aim at} intention is a ~~pro-~~ ^{all} ~~motion~~ of an eventual 'withering away' of (the blocs). ~~Na kma~~ ^{article appreciates} Petkovic's (the diverse ways in which the individual Scandinavian countries serve the cause of ~~which~~ peace-by contributing within NATO to the relaxation of international tensions, by traditional (in the case of Sweden) or positively non-aligned (Finland) neutrality, is appreciated, though with natural sympathy for the last-mentioned ^{method} ~~one~~, and with the hope that the relations of all Scandinavian countries ⁱⁿ to the USSR might become 'the most substantial example of co-existence in the sphere of East-X West relations in general.

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further major contributions to the progress of mankind. If 'Peace-Report' says something ^{about what the USA could} positively so, it is in connection of refuting their argument—certainly weighty with American politicians and the electorate—that disarmament means economic breakdown. ~~It is by this connection that W.D. Grampp writes, in the April issue, stated that~~ ^{correctly} ~~that every~~

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rivalry-to speak with the leading article of the Review of International
Affairs, No. 341, a policy of peaceful and active co-existence in the
international economy-~~for its own sake~~ ^{purpose} 'the aim of promot-
ing economic development throughout the world, and especially of stop-
ping up economic growth in the emergent countries'. The June-issue of
War-Peace Report prominently features a statement by Walther Reuther
where massive US-Aid for the underdeveloped countries is suggested
as a means to force the USSR (which evidently is supposed to interpret
its own interests as opposed to disarmament) to participate in it, and
thereby to set US resources free for other more useful purposes. Yet
thereby Reuther takes a picture of the world for granted within
which, for example, the Republic ~~of the Congo~~ ^{is a}

platform for the 1964 Presidential elections can state that 'trade
with communist powers... could only be justified if it would serve
to diminish their power' and (in relation to the development of the
young nations) that 'America's tax revenues derived from free enter-
prise sources must never be employed in support of socialism'. Walter
Reuther, and the editors of 'War-Peace Report' ^{certainly do} ~~must~~ of course, despise
such concepts ~~which by the way, also~~ contradict the old-standing
liberal interpretation of trade as involving mutual benefits. Yet what
I miss in their ~~and most American friends~~ of peace analysis of the
'war-industrial complex' is a readiness straightforwardly to counter
the prejudices of ^a part of the electorate, fed as it is by the propagand-
ist annexes of the ~~war-industrial complex~~ ^{and not just propaganda}, and to develop a positive
picture of an America dependant on sources of strength alternative
to the 'cold war'.

For the Yugoslavs the positive character of their non-alignment
policy is uncontroversial: its very merits rest in its anti-colonial
~~character~~ character and in the involved support for the emancipation of the
ex-colonial countries (this is fully understandable but ~~of course~~, not
yet an answer to the problems of progressive Americans who have to
tackle the problems of their own country from its own, and not merely
from a charity standpoint). The positive meaning of Non-alignment is
treated in the leading article (by L. Erven) of ^{No. 339 of} the Review of Internat-
ional Affairs and in a discussion article by Dinesh Singh (then Deputy
Foreign Minister of India). Starting from the internal debates in
India which followed the border conflict with China in late 1962,
Singh concludes that 'non-alignment

as a basic concept remains unchanged; only new directions have to be added to it. In this connection, the argument, of course, only concerns foreign policies ^{in the same issue} ~~of the same issue~~, however, arguing ~~them~~ ^{of making} against the Chinese dogmatists, ~~to be added to the socio-economic~~ ^{of making} implications of co-existence:

It goes without saying that co-existence has been and is still interpreted in various ways and it is inevitable that these interpretations also include such as are contrary to the essence of a democratic concept of international relations. In the developed capitalist countries there have been and there still are attempts to make of co-existence, once they cannot help accepting it, a dam against progressive changes in society; to interpret agreements on vital international problems as agreements for maintaining the status quo in social relations; and to guarantee spheres of interest in former and present colonies. There also have been, and there still are, one-sided interpretations of co-existence by certain socialist countries, communist or labour parties, with exaggerated emphasis on the priority of improved East-West relations, and with a lack of understanding for the needs and aspirations of peoples of the liberation movements and recently liberated countries. In practice this has meant insufficient support of their aspirations and has facilitated the Chinese leadership in assuming role as the chief protector of the interests of these movements and countries.

2. Co-existence must be understood as the co-operation of independent, sovereign countries, regardless of the differences in their social systems; a co-operation in which they renounce violence and pressure in their mutual relations, in which is (this should be particularly emphasized) a system of international relations founded on the recognition of the joint responsibility for diminishing the differences between the developed and the underdeveloped. There can be no talk of universal victory for the principles of co-existence as long as there is a single dependent territory, as long as every pressure and interference has not been eliminated from international life.

In his already quoted article in No. 342-3, W. Spasie says that

The non-aligned policy has never conceived the struggle for world peace as separate from the struggle for conditions to ensure a stable and lasting peace... for the final ~~and~~ complete elimination of all causes of unequal relations, crisis and instability. In concrete political activity this means an uncompromising struggle for the liquidation of all kinds of subjugation and domination amongst nations, for the abolition of all forms of colonialism, racism, political or economic monopolies, for the prevention of imperialist interference in the life of the newly-emancipated countries, for the elimination of unequal and discriminatory relations in international economic life, for the acceleration of the economic and general emancipation of the emergent countries, and for their inclusion on terms of equality in world trade and division of labour.

It is ~~only~~ natural that the Yugoslavs, starting from such an attitude to the World Trade Conference (devoted quite a few articles (one each in No. 339 and 340, two in ~~xxx~~ 342-3) after its conclusion), with increasing optimism (the deplorable aloofness of the American peace-movement on the other side, from international economic issues, and its tendency to deal with the underdeveloped countries only when in connection with one or the other of them a ~~xxxxx~~ threat to peace (usually by threatened US-intervention) arises, have resulted in a practically complete neglect of that ~~important~~ Conference in War-Peace-Report, the latter, on the

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let is, in the first part
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The comparatively optimistic attitude developed in the, already quoted, article by Prof. Grampp (in the April issue of the War-Peace report, did not for long satisfy its readers and editors: in the June

1) From the context it is not clear whom Mr. Altman has in mind when speaking of whole countries and socialist parties (not merely of individual ~~articles~~). He may have overlooked the difference in viewpoint existing between supporters of international understanding according to whether they operate in a country associated with a bloc and, hence, necessarily bound to emphasize the importance of understanding with the opposite bloc, whatever importance they ascribe to what I have described in the first issue of this journal, as 'the broader concept of co-existence' or are mainly concerned with securing closer co-operation of the non-aligned countries, most of which are underdeveloped.

issue they published a highly critical letter, by John S. Gilmore from
 the Industrial Economics Division of the University of Denver Research
 Institute, and three positive attempts at approaching the problem, by
 Emile Benoit (of Columbia), ~~collaborating~~ ^{co-edited} with Kenneth Boulanger, of the
~~Book Disarmament and the Economy~~, Charles M. Bliss, Chairman of the Board
 of The Bank of New York, and Ben D. Segal, a leading official ^{for granted} of the I.U.E.
 of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. Gilmore joins issue with a) Grampp's taking a very
 -and hence a very modest amount of the resources to be
 gradual process of Disarmament/~~xxxxxx~~ diverted each year ~~for~~
~~granted~~, and b) ~~with~~ his neglect of the specific character of the industry
 subject of disarmament (a point more specifically elaborated by
 Bliss) which implies very serious problems for the communities involved
 (a point particularly made by Segal) unless ^a positive answer, by national
 planning, is found. (Bliss remarks that while, on the whole, a 'mere'
 ten per cent. of the US labour force earn their livelihood as members
 of the armed forces ⁱⁿ or from defence employment, ~~thxxxxxx~~ seven states
 (all in the 'West') ~~by the way - which~~ ^{as} ~~I may add, may be part of the explanation~~
~~for the Goldwater candidature~~ ~~xxxxxx~~ more than twenty per
 cent. of ~~the~~ ~~their~~ manufacturing employment ^{is} in the ~~main fields of~~ defence
 industries. ~~Moreover, there is~~ ^{not} only a quantitative but a qualitative
 problem is involved: 52 per cent. of the engineers and scientists doing
 research work in American industries ~~are~~ engaged in defense and space
 programs; as Gilmore notes, 'the hard core of our defense production is
 becoming uniquely dissociated from the mainstream of our economy'.
 largely segregated from the commercial market and its processes'.
^(the potential relief) ~~It would appear that~~ ^{technologically} the most advanced parts of American industry ~~are~~
^{imitating limitations} already exceeding the framework of a capitalist market economy: ~~it asks~~
 these ~~potentialities~~ are ~~not~~ to be scrapped, they have to be absorbed

3
and ~~for~~ directed by public planning. All the contributors to the June-
issue to War/Peace Report draw, in diverse terminologies, this consequ-
ence which is implied in the very nature of things: after all, the
^{Republican} ~~Goldwater~~ platform, too, implies planning - ^{though} ~~yet~~ for destruction only. Why
should it not be possible, to speak with Benoit, to develop 'new, large-
scale Research and Development programs, organised and financed primar-
ily by government, since the rewards will generally be too long range
and indirect to be of interest to private investors unless the
government guarantees a market?'

The answer lies, of course, in the political field - in what Senator
Fulbright has called the American electorate's attachment to the
, and the other contributors, are
Cold war, and Prof. Benoit/kx very conscious of these difficulties, but
do they not, ^{may} ~~perhaps~~, commit a mistake by taking, in a ^{long-term} discussion of
life-and-death issues of the nation, a certain politico-propagandist
setting for granted? In his argument against Prof. Grampp's expectatio
of a very slow disarmament process J.S. Gilmore quotes authors as
different in their general views as Hermann Kahn and Arthur Waskow
as authorities for the possibility that a disarmament agreement, to
be carried out perhaps even in a few weeks time, may be 'triggered off'
by a nuclear confrontation, or perhaps a real nuclear accident. ~~Is it~~
~~believable that the present American political setting, with the~~
~~involved prejudices against non-military planning, would survive such~~
~~a crisis, and may it not be the duty of the American supporters of~~
~~Peace, modest though their influence is on the immediate outcome of~~
~~elections, to clear their and their fellow-citizens' minds about~~
~~what is possible and desirable?~~ ^{What, indeed, should ~~can~~ happen}
^{for some reason or other, the} ²⁾
present ~~one-sided~~ orientation of the American national economy should
break down?

2) J. his article in 'Science & Society', Summer 1969.

Meanwhile they expect, and appreciate, a very gradual progress. The issue of War/Peace report gives a detailed survey of the individual issues under discussion, the June issue ^{discusses} about the way in which the American Senate would vote in a disarmament treaty: the implication is that only small and timid steps are likely. A not so different estimate of the short-term prospects (as distinct, of course, from the desirable developments) appears in the Review of International Affairs, No. 340) concentration of the attack against such 'big powers' as, within their military-political alliances deny, in fact, the value of certain initial agreements reached between East and West, and ...refute the possibility of the further process of the relaxation of

international tensions'. In Vo. 339 her military-political commentary, published in No. 339 of the Journal Review under the heading 'Moderate Optimism', M. Badyrina had analysed diverse recent, and less advertised, measures of disengagement under the viewpoint that they reflected, in substance, technological obsolescence of those particular pieces of rocketry: a glance at the pages of War/Peace Report shows that, in the opinion of its editors also, this is the kind of disarmament at present feasible, or already in progress.

Yet such an appreciation of the present situation, probably correct, should induce supporters of a consistent peace-policy to approach diverse efforts, with extreme caution the ~~current~~ ^{to drive} since long, ~~current~~ ^{to drive} people as to the desirable characteristics of an international peace-order ~~in the generalise~~ ^{and its goals} from extremely individualistic conceptions of the state as evolved in Western Europe and particularly embodied in American constitutional ideology (less in American constitutional life, which protects the farmers' interest by the equal representation of all states, large or small, in the Senate just as the so-called 'veto' protects the socialist third of working against being outvoted in UNO). The ideal type of such an order is not the sheriff-here of a 'Western' who shoots down the law-breaker (the latter being classified as a foe by the supposed consensus of the community) but the conciliation chamber in which the main three types of social organisation co-existing at present meet, majority decisions being admissible only if they cross existing groupings instead of admitting to a misuse of the appearances of international organisation for thrashing up for the support of a certain alliance against one, or more, social formations. To institutional schemata, eliminating the one or other esthetic shortcomings, say in the voting procedure of UNO, ³⁾ can even contribute

whole of world's people

to the removal of the very serious political obstacles standing, at present, in the way of organising peace. In the February issue of War-Peace Report the editor, R. Hudson, had entered that well-ploughed field by suggesting, in support of Disarmament Agreements, rules about a 'Peace-Keeping Majority' to be embodied in the UNO charter: according to this ~~rule~~ ^{suggestion} the 'Veto' in the Security Council would ~~not~~ be replaced by the ruling that UN intervention was admissible only by the concurrent votes of at least ten members of a Security Council enlarged to fifteen, and $\frac{2}{3}$ majority in the General Assembly representing the absolute majority of mankind. If ~~we~~ ^{these} ~~statements~~ ^{formal} are translated into practical policies, we see that the ~~capitalist~~ ^{major} powers would enjoy ~~absolute~~ ^{major} safety not less absolute than under the 'Veto' system since they with their closest friends, ~~can~~ ^{will} hardly be supposed to dispose of less than five votes ^(won) in reformed council; the underdeveloped countries would be fully safe if they proceed with a minimum of homogeneity; the socialist countries (representing themselves ^{good third of mankind}) would require the concurrent votes of ^{non-committed} countries with about 400 million inhabitants, which is likely but not absolutely safe (say in the event of an aggression against Cuba, at a time when Sino-Indian disputes happen to be exaggerated). Yet in the April issue I. R. Spohn (co-author, with S. Clark, of the book World Peace through World Law) ^{already} ~~has~~ ^{stated} that Hudson's ~~proposal~~ ^{suggestion} is insufficient since China and India, voting together (which they would probably ~~only~~ do when the interests of all underdeveloped countries were involved) could block a majority; in his opinion 'it is more important that nations which would have to pay for it should have a stronger voice in the decision'. Pacifists who thought in such terms may reconsider their position after having read the Republican platform for the 1964 Presidential elections, which was adopted a few months after the quoted lines were written. Yet mere correction of detail within the institutional approach is insufficient. Peaceful co-existence of states representing different social structures can emerge, not from generalisations often the process in which some western constitutions came into being or were, ex post facto, ideologically explained-but only from a prolonged effort at mutual understanding.

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Rudolf Schlesinger

Introduction

Un exposé historique ne me semble pas susceptible de bien éclairer la question. En effet, le différend est apparu de manière publique en 1959, et même plus tard. Nous ne disposons donc de renseignements précis, officiels, que pour une période très courte. Tout au plus serons-nous amenés à faire allusion au progrès chronologique de la discorde, mais en remontant alors aux débuts de la révolution chinoise.

Puisqu'il s'agit d'un problème d'actualité brûlante, le mieux m'a semblé être de décrire d'emblée les positions adoptées par l'Union Soviétique et la Chine: ceci nous amènera à n'envisager en ordre principal que les problèmes d'ordre idéologique (1). Après cet examen, je m'efforcerai de préciser quelles questions fondamentales expliquent l'apparition de ces conflits, essayant ainsi d'être fidèle, à mon tour, à la méthode marxiste qui nous demande de tenir compte de l'évolution de l'infrastructure pour comprendre celle des idéologies, des superstructures.

Ce faisant, je ne pourrai évidemment échapper à l'anathème d'une condamnation soit de revisionnisme, soit de dogmatisme. Ceci toutefois a d'autant moins d'importance que je n'appartiens pas à la famille. Ce qui compte pour moi, est de comprendre au-delà de la portée du conflit entre les membres de l'alliance communiste, quels sont les problèmes que ce conflit crée dans le monde et plus précisément pour chacun de nous.

I Divergences idéologiques

Des divergences d'ordre idéologique n'ont pu apparaître entre le guide du camp socialiste: l'Union Soviétique, et le membre chinois qu'au moment où celui-ci a pu se préoccuper vraiment de telles questions. Cela n'a été possible pour la Chine que vers les années 1954-1955, c'est-à-dire après qu'elle ait réussi à assurer sa sécurité, à réunifier son territoire, à enrôler sa population et à restaurer son économie.

On peut, en schématisant, résumer les divergences en les centrant sur trois pôles:

- les problèmes de la paix et de la coexistence
- le rythme de développement économique
- la question des mouvements de libération nationale.

(1) Les Chinois insistent sur ce qu'il ne s'agit de rien d'autre qu'une discussion idéologique. Ils reprochent aux Soviétiques d'avoir déplacé le débat du plan des partis communistes sur le plan gouvernemental.

A) Paix et coexistence

Pour l'Union Soviétique, le développement de la force du camp socialiste depuis la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale ainsi que l'affaiblissement du camp impérialiste permettent d'éviter de nouvelles guerres. Le capitalisme dans sa forme impérialiste est toujours agressif mais il n'ose plus déclencher un nouveau conflit à cause de la puissance de son adversaire et à cause des effets destructeurs des armes modernes. Le moyen le plus efficace d'aider au déclin inévitable du capitalisme est d'éviter l'ouverture d'hostilités destructrices pour les deux camps et de lutter sur le plan de l'efficacité économique, de l'élévation du niveau de vie.

Pour la Chine, tant que survit l'impérialisme, existent des risques de guerre. Le camp socialiste doit bien entendu essayer d'éviter l'ouverture d'hostilités mais il ne peut en aucun cas négliger l'impérieuse obligation qu'il a de continuer la lutte des classes et le développement du mouvement de libération nationale des anciennes colonies et d'émancipation des territoires sous-développés. Céder sur ces points ne peut, au mieux que retarder l'éclatement d'une guerre et la rendre peut-être encore plus meurtrière. Ainsi la version chinoise de la coexistence est celle d'une politique qui tend à limiter les opérations à des guerres locales.

Si pour arriver au but commun qu'est le communisme dans le monde, l'Union Soviétique veut ne s'appuyer que sur la concurrence économique et la lutte pour la conquête de l'opinion publique, la Chine insiste davantage sur la permanence du risque de guerre, sur la fécondité de la violence et l'inutilité des concessions à l'ennemi.

B) Le rythme de l'édification du socialisme

L'expérience faite par la révolution soviétique, pour passer de l'étape démocratique au stade socialiste a démontré qu'il existe des lois objectives que l'on ne peut ignorer sans compromettre les résultats des efforts consentis; vouloir forcer la nature ne peut, en fait, que retarder le passage au communisme.

C'est ce qui explique

Quel est le but ?

calculer 1930 ?
~~C'est ce qui explique,~~ ainsi que le fait que les communes créées peu après la révolution d'octobre en Union Soviétique aient échoué, la circonspection témoignée par l'U.R.S.S. à l'égard des communes populaires et plus généralement à l'égard de l'accélération du rythme de développement adopté par la Chine depuis 1958. C'est aussi ce qui explique la franche hostilité des Soviétiques aux proclamations chinoises qui présentent leur pays comme le modèle idéal à imiter par les pays coloniaux pour transformer leur pays arriéré en un pays développé et pour accéder rapidement au socialisme.

essayer de le faire ?
 En 1958, les théoriciens chinois mettent l'accent sur la théorie de la révolution ininterrompue et l'utilisent pour justifier le grand tournant amorcé avec la ligne générale de l'édification du socialisme, avec les communes et avec les bonds en avant. La sourdine mise à cette campagne à la suite des difficultés rencontrées en 1959, 1960 et 1961 n'empêche que le jaillissement révolutionnaire a existé et qu'il peut reprendre. Cette théorie de la révolution ininterrompue intègre le principe de la révolution par étapes successives: démocratie - socialisme - communisme, au principe de la révolution permanente. Elle prétend que dans un pays arriéré au régime traditionnel affaibli, un parti révolutionnaire peut s'emparer du pouvoir, imposer un programme d'industrialisation et mobiliser les masses rurales en attendant de créer, à partir du haut, un prolétariat. Tout ceci peut se faire, sans observer des barrières entre les diverses étapes d'évolution. La volonté des éléments révolutionnaires ne s'arrête pas, elle pousse toujours plus loin et crée, avant la consolidation de la première étape, les germes du stade supérieur.

Ainsi apparaît la possibilité, au cours de l'édification du socialisme, de voir surgir des germes de communisme alors que subsistent encore des éléments qui datent de l'étape démocratique de la révolution. Les premières sont les communes, les deuxièmes comprennent les sociétés d'économie mixte, le statut économique particulier des investissements anciens et actuels de capitalistes patriotes et de Chinois émigrés outre-mer.

Dans la pratique cette théorie convient particulièrement au climat psychologique de la Chine; il importe de ne pas oublier l'excellence du travailleur chinois, souvent très ingénieux, presque toujours exceptionnellement courageux, endurant et consciencieux.

Enfin, cette théorie de la révolution ininterrompue s'adapte à la réalité sociale de la Chine actuelle et au-delà d'elle, à la situation sociologique des pays en voie de développement dont toutes les structures sont bouleversées. Les masses populaires chinoises avides de changements ont été mobilisées par le parti communiste pour accélérer le développement économique. Le rôle dirigeant du P.C. est ainsi renforcé pendant que l'exigence fondamentale de la population est en voie de satisfaction, et cette mobilisation permet la réforme des anciennes méthodes de pensée.

C'est dans la mesure où la population du Tiers-monde est, elle aussi, désireuse de changements, que l'U.R.S.S. combat cette politique parce qu'elle lui paraît susceptible d'entraîner des complications avec les pays capitalistes et les anciennes métropoles.

C) L'appui à fournir aux mouvements de libération nationale

Pour l'U.R.S.S., la situation internationale actuelle exige que la priorité des préoccupations du camp socialiste soit accordée à la lutte pour la paix. Le progrès du communisme dans le monde dépend du résultat d'une compétition économique et de la lutte menée par le prolétariat des pays capitalistes. Les pays sous-développés ne peuvent progresser qu'en respectant les lois objectives de l'évolution interne des sociétés. La révolution ne peut y être exportée ni accélérée de l'extérieur. Le devoir du camp socialiste est, d'une part, d'empêcher que l'impérialisme puisse freiner l'évolution interne de ces pays, et, d'autre part, d'aider les régimes indigènes.

L'aide doit être accordée sans se demander si le pays bénéficiaire est ou non déjà aidé par les puissances capitalistes. En effet, toute aide au développement favorise l'industrialisation et contribue à la formation d'un prolétariat, conditions nécessaires à l'apparition du socialisme.

Signalons aussi que l'aide du monde capitaliste aux pays sous-développés présente l'avantage de fournir une issue, autre que la course aux armements et à la guerre, aux crises économiques qui attendent infailliblement le capitalisme, aux termes de la théorie marxiste-léniniste.

Cette ligne politique de l'Union Soviétique qui tend à ne pas accélérer artificiellement la révolution, est dictée par l'importance qu'elle accorde aux réactions internationales que provoquerait une intervention du camp socialiste dans les anciens fiefs de l'Occident. Nous revenons ainsi à la ligne de force majeure de l'attitude soviétique, tendant au maintien de la paix.

La Chine, par contre, se montre beaucoup plus soucieuse d'accélérer le déroulement de la révolution mondiale. Pour elle, le Tiers Monde constitue la première préoccupation car c'est lui qui forme le principal ferment révolutionnaire dans le monde actuel. ~~XXXXXX~~ La tâche qui incombe à l'alliance socialiste est d'aider et de précipiter le mouvement d'émancipation des peuples, en acceptant même de créer des risques de conflits avec le monde capitaliste. L'aide à fournir au Tiers Monde est urgente; elle ~~est~~ doit prendre de vitesse les tentatives du néo-colonialisme qui se font jour et qui visent à rétablir un régime d'exploitation économique sous le couvert d'une indépendance politique appelée à rester purement fictive.

Pour garder leur tranchant révolutionnaire, les peuples en lutte pour conquérir une entière indépendance ne peuvent rester sous la conduite de la bourgeoisie nationale. Celle-ci en effet, dès qu'elle arrive au pouvoir, s'oriente nécessairement vers l'exploitation des masses laborieuses. C'est pourquoi les Chinois insistent pour que ce soit le peuple (ouvriers et paysans) représenté par le parti communiste qui dirige tout le processus révolutionnaire, dès ses débuts. Il en découle qu'à tout prix, le camp socialiste doit accorder son aide aux partis frères, tant sur le plan économique que dans les domaines de la politique et de l'armement.

La conclusion tirée de cette confrontation théorique par les deux adversaires⁽²⁾ et admise généralement en dehors d'eux est que l'on assiste ainsi à une division des communistes en deux clans : l'un, celui de l'Union Soviétique, est celui des révisionnistes, l'autre, celui des doctrinaires, des dogmatiques. Ce n'est que récemment, en gros depuis 1963, que d'autres arguments moins formels ont été avancés, étrangers à l'idéologie et que nous examinerons plus loin.

Sans entrer dans le détail, il faut remarquer que ce clivage est fort artificiel. Si la Chine était aussi strictement marxiste-léniniste qu'elle l'affirme, lorsqu'elle reproche à l'Union Soviétique de considérer que dans l'ère nucléaire que nous connaissons, l'essentiel est de rester vivant, ne devrait-elle pas comprendre l'inconséquence qu'il y a à n'accorder qu'une valeur secondaire à l'arme nucléaire dans les rapports de force, alors que la doctrine qu'elle prône et prétend appliquer est toute entière basée sur le déterminisme historique des modes de production et des progrès techniques ? (en fait, la thèse chinoise est basée sur la croyance suivante, exprimée par MAO TSE-tung dès 1946 : l'arme nucléaire ne sera jamais employée parce qu'elle remplit d'horreur le monde entier).

D'autre part, on peut renvoyer la balle et souligner le manque de sens historique, de réalisme, qui se dégage de la croyance - n'est-ce pas simplement un espoir ou un nouvel opium ? - à l'impossibilité des guerres qu'inaugurent ces mêmes armes nucléaires. Il est vrai que ~~par même~~ ^{inévitable} erreur avait déjà été commise au profit du fusil à répétition, et au profit des explosifs comme la dynamite (Lafargue et Nobel). Plutôt qu'une croyance, qu'une affirmation, il s'agit ici, à mon avis, d'un simple espoir offert aux populations; mais qui peut par ailleurs prétendre n'avoir besoin d'aucun bâton pour étayer son optimisme ?

II. Opposition d'intérêts

Il est certain que derrière l'étendard de l'idéologie que brandissent les deux adversaires en présence, se cachent des réalités différentes et des ambitions inavouées. Généralement,.....

(2) Voir les articles de volostine, du Jernina Jekpas et du Korggi se rapportant à la conférence du comité central du P.C de l'URSS et le rapport de M. A. Sverdlov du 14.2.1964
ce texte ont été reproduits dans "la documentation française", notes et études, n° 3092 du 27 mai 1964 et "Chroniques asiatiques", n° 64, URSS, 5 mai 1964.

~~Généralisant~~, on croit expliquer l'apparition de tout le conflit par les trois raisons suivantes :

- pression démographique
- rivalités de prestige
- oppositions d'intérêts nationaux.

Ces motifs de friction existent, leur incidence véritable varie, mais il y en a d'autres plus profonds auxquels je me permettrai de m'attarder davantage, non seulement parce qu'ils me semblent moins connus, mais encore parce que ces raisons me semblent bien plus éclairantes. Ce sont les particularités de la révolution chinoise même, ou les caractéristiques de son héritage culturel et les degrés divers d'évolution sociologique atteints par les deux protagonistes.

Voyons d'abord les conflits matériels.

A. - Pression de population

En arrondissant les chiffres, on prétend qu'en 1980, il y aura quatre Chinois pour un Russe : 1.800 millions face à 265.⁽¹⁾ Mais le déséquilibre est encore bien plus grand sur le plan régional des contacts.

Dans l'Extrême-Orient, les provinces soviétiques comptent un peu moins de 37 millions d'habitants, contre 45 millions en Mandchourie. Or, la colonisation chinoise de cette contrée, qui y est continue depuis le 18^{ème} siècle, connaît actuellement un grand élan à cause de l'industrialisation intense qui y a été effectuée. L'autre point de contact immédiat se situe au Sinkiang, mais ici les problèmes sont très différents. La région est pratiquement non peuplée, les autochtones ne sont pas Chinois mais frères de la population du Kazakhstan, de l'Ouzbékistan, du Tadjikistan : ce sont des populations appartenant à l'aire d'expansion turque ou plutôt ouralo-altaïque. Il faudra encore de très nombreuses années avant que le Turkestan chinois soit peuplé de manière dense comparable à l'implantation connue par les 18 provinces de la Chine proprement dite, car cette densité de peuplement présuppose la mise en valeur industrielle de cette contrée, qui représente 1/6^{ème} du territoire de la République Populaire de Chine.

N'oublions pas que tous les territoires qui bordent le nord de la Chine ne se prêtent pas au mode chinois traditionnel d'exploitation; la frontière nord de la Chine est une des frontières les plus stables du monde; elle correspond à la limite entre une colonisation d'agriculture intensive, spécialisée, coûteuse en main-d'œuvre et une exploitation par des nomades pasteurs. A présent, ces derniers sédentarisés deviennent ouvriers; le climat continue à rendre impossible une agriculture intensive à la chinoise.

De plus, rappelons-nous que la pression chinoise s'exerce d'autre part traditionnellement vers le sud (cela manifestement depuis le début de l'ère chrétienne).

(1) L'étude sur la situation économique de l'Europe en 1960, publiée par les Nations Unies, donne en 1961 pour la Chine un chiffre de 265.4 millions d'habitants pour l'URSS en projection pour 1974. (chap II p 38)

Enfin, attachons-nous au phénomène connu dans nos régions sous le vocable de "Péril jaune", projection en quelque sorte des sentiments qui animent ou ont animé bon nombre d'Occidentaux.

La population de la Chine n'est ni neuve ni absolue: tout l'ouest du pays ne connaît qu'une très faible densité de population. Si la Chine était aussi peuplée que la Belgique, au lieu des 700 millions de Chinois qui l'occupent, il y en aurait 3,5 milliards soit plus que la population actuelle du monde. Ceci aurait pu se réaliser si le pays avait pu échapper à la sélection naturelle des catastrophes, aux épidémies, à l'opium, à la sélection d'un niveau ^{d'efficacité} supérieur qu'opèrent les guerres et si la Chine avait disposé des techniques et de l'aspiration qui animent la mise en exploitation industrielle des ressources naturelles.

L'Europe et la Chine se valent sur le plan de leur territoire. La Chine comptait environ 200 millions d'habitants au moment où l'Europe a commencé les grandes migrations qui ont rempli trois nouveaux continents. Aujourd'hui, les émigrants chinois sont pratiquement exclus de ces terres de peuplement. Dans ces perspectives, il me semble assez ironique d'évoquer avec le Kaiser Guillaume II, le péril jaune, puisque les Chinois ont mis 5.000 ans à remplir, incomplètement, le territoire compris dans leurs frontières actuelles et à déborder sur le seul sud-est asiatique, alors que les Européens en deux siècles se sont emparés de la majeure partie du monde.

Pour l'avenir, n'oublions pas que le taux de croissance de la Chine est loin d'être extraordinaire: 2 à 2,5 pour mille, et qu'une politique de contrôle des naissances y est introduite (au grand dommage de la doctrine orthodoxe du marxisme-léninisme d'ailleurs).

Que ce problème démographique n'ait plus l'importance que l'ignorance lui fait accorder souvent en Occident apparaît à la lumière de l'attitude soviétique elle-même. Entre 1949 et 1957 sont entamés d'énormes travaux de construction de voies ferrées pour relier les deux grands membres de l'alliance: en plus du transsibérien, une voie est construite à travers la Mongolie extérieure et une autre non achevée à travers le Sinkiang. Ces voies peuvent servir à l'expansion de la population chinoise vers le nord, dans des régions qui depuis plus de 30 ans ne sont ouvertes qu'à la seule influence de l'Union Soviétique. Simultanément ont été réalisés des accords pour l'importation de milliers de travailleurs chinois en Mongolie et a été constituée une commission mixte sino-soviétique pour procéder à l'étude de la mise en exploitation du réseau hydrographique de la région de l'Amour: inventaire des ressources, études de localisation des barrages, centrales et réservoirs.

204.279.000 en 1912; 143 millions en 1941; 200 en 1962; 281 millions en 1982 selon les statistiques officielles, représentées dans Ho Ping-ti "Studies on the population of China 1368-1953", Harvard East Asian Studies, 1957.

B. QUESTION DE PRESTIGE

a) Frontières

La délimitation des frontières me semble relever bien plus de considérations de grandeur nationale que de nécessités d'ordre démographique ou d'enrichissement matériel.

Rappelons brièvement sur quoi porte la contestation en matière de définition du territoire national. Dès le triomphe de sa révolution, la jeune Union Soviétique renonce unilatéralement à l'héritage impérial que lui confèrent en Chine les traités inégaux imposés par le régime tsariste. C'est la fameuse déclaration Tchitcherine du 14 juillet 1918.

Cependant la réalisation effective de cette déclaration ne viendra que très longtemps plus tard: en 1952 pour les chemins de fer mandchouriens et les concessions de Port Arthur et de Dairen; en 1955 pour le Sinkiang. De plus, la réalisation n'a jamais été qu'incomplète. A Yalta, en 1945, en contrepartie de son entrée en guerre contre le Japon, l'U.R.S.S. obtient la reconnaissance de l'indépendance de la Mongolie extérieure et elle reprend certains privilèges impérialistes en Mandchourie (ceux-là même qui seront abandonnés définitivement en 1952).

Enfin, les 7 provinces extrême-orientales de l'U.R.S.S., notamment les territoires des Bouriates de Khabarovsk, de Chita et de l'Amour, ont jusqu'au milieu du 19ème siècle au moins subi l'attrait du pôle chinois, et non celui de la Russie plus distante, plus jeune et surtout moins brillante que le céleste empire.

b) Rancœurs dues à l'histoire

La Chine a lutté de 1919 à 1949 pour se dégager de l'exploitation coloniale blanche. Parmi ses exploiters, la Chine compte également la Russie tsariste et l'Union Soviétique. Celle-ci a voulu la vassaliser, non seulement en reprenant des avantages sur le gouvernement nationaliste de *Chiang Kai-shek*, mais aussi en cherchant à imposer - sans succès d'ailleurs - sa ligne de conduite au P.C. chinois. En

1923, c'est l'alliance avec le K.M.T. qui lui est dictée; de 1927 à 1931, l'U.R.S.S. ^{par l'intermédiaire du Comintern} préconise et impose une orientation gauchiste au P.C. : ce sont les tentatives révolutionnaires urbaines qui mènent à la quasi disparition du P.C. chinois; en 1941, c'est la conclusion d'un pacte ^{de non agression} d'alliance avec le Japon par l'U.R.S.S., dont l'effet est comparable pour la Chine à celui du traité de 1939 avec l'alliance nazie pour nos pays; de 1945 à 1949: aucune confiance n'est manifestée par Staline aux communistes chinois; enfin de 1949 à 1952, une politique de subordination aux intérêts du bastion socialiste dans le monde a certainement été proposée, comme aux pays de démocratie populaire d'Europe; mais Mao Tse-tung a sans doute été le dirigeant le plus résistant à cette politique, d'autant plus facilement que la révolution triomphante en Chine y était véritablement autochtone et populaire.

Enfin, s'il est permis de faire une incursion dans le domaine des suppositions il semble possible qu'existe une animosité personnelle entre le chef d'un parti communiste qui a mené la révolution à sa victoire et un personnage qui est arrivé au pouvoir plus de 30 ans après l'installation du premier gouvernement communiste du monde, animosité personnelle entre MAO dont les innovations théoriques et pratiques font une personnalité de la taille des grands du système et entre l'empiriste membre de l'appareil qu'est N. KHRUCHCHEV. Cette animosité peut être d'autant plus vive que MAO Tse-tung est certainement une individualité marquée de volontarisme, de romantisme d'épopée, peu encline à s'enthousiasmer pour des questions de routine administrative et de perfectionnements dans la gestion quotidienne d'un pays.

c) A ces questions de prestige sont liées des caractéristiques de traditions culturelles de la Chine.

Celle-ci en effet ne formait pas une nation lorsque l'Occident s'est mise à établir avec elle ou mieux à lui imposer des contacts suivis. Au contraire, elle se considérait comme une très grande puissance définie par le rayonnement, jamais égalé par d'autres, de sa culture, comme une sorte d'empire universel parce qu'ordonné selon les lois naturelles, capables de faire régner l'harmonie dans le cosmos.

Il en découlait qu'il ne pouvait y avoir de rapports entre la Chine et d'autres Etats sur un pied d'égalité.

Au centre du monde, il y a la Chine. Elle se représente par la graphie : "pays du milieu". En font partie les territoires et les populations qui ont adopté le mode de vie et de pensée des Hans, c'est-à-dire du peuple chinois. Il s'agit d'une aire culturelle à laquelle le concept de nation est étranger. Tout s'ordonne autour de ce céleste empire par cercles concentriques, de plus en plus barbares à mesure qu'ils s'éloignent du centre. Les limites entre Chinois, vassaux tributaires et barbares ne tiennent ni à des questions de race ni à des délimitations de territoire: seuls comptent les modes de vie et de pensée. En principe, chacun peut se siniser, c'est-à-dire peu à peu entrer dans l'orbite du rayonnement chinois et lorsque l'adaptation est complète, l'étranger devient chinois à part entière.

L'extension de la sphère d'influence ne se fait jamais dans les modes d'empires occidentaux: ni colonisation, ni envois de missions ou de propagandistes. Au contraire, c'est par un courant centripète que le leadership culturel s'établit.

La Chine se fermait par contre aux barbares qui voulaient imposer une réforme dans son système politique, économique et philosophique.

Cette conception traditionnelle des relations avec l'étranger était calquée sur l'organisation intérieure de la société de l'Empire: au centre le monde confucéen entouré de franges marginales exogènes tolérées pour autant qu'elles ne troublent pas l'ordre du confucianisme. Ces groupes distillent les éléments étrangers à la culture ^{sinitique} ~~soviétique~~: comme cela a été le cas pour les religions étrangères comme le bouddhisme, comme ce sera le cas également pour les sciences, la technique et les modes de pensée de l'Occident.

Actuellement, le schéma général semble encore rester le même: les éléments capitaux du monde sont les marxistes-léninistes proprement révolutionnaires (les orthodoxes) autour desquels s'agglutinent des pays qui se développent ou se développeront au contact de ce centre. Plus loin se trouvent les populations qui ont encore à se libérer, à se pénétrer de la vérité du marxisme, qui forment une zone ténébreuse sur laquelle il importe d'étendre son rayonnement. Tout aux confins se trouvent les purs barbares, ennemis de la Chine: c'est le camp capitaliste, *contre lequel il importe beaucoup de défendre pour ne pas se laisser attaquer.*

plus Au sein du camp socialiste, la Chine n'a pu se manifester qu'après avoir assis de manière définitive son gouvernement interne et ses bases. Aussi n'est-ce qu'en 1956, à l'occasion des sérieux troubles qui ont éclaté au sein de l'alliance qu'elle a été amenée à y jouer un rôle.

Celui-ci a consisté d'une part à soutenir l'attribution de la direction de l'ensemble de l'alliance socialiste à l'Union Soviétique (ce qui revenait à affermir la position particulière du parti communiste russe et de son secrétaire M. N. KHROUCHTCHEV) ainsi qu'en a témoigné l'attitude chinoise à l'égard de la révolution hongroise.

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D'autre part, cette direction forte du camp socialiste devait n'être qu'un leadership idéologique, chargé d'interpréter la doctrine de l'alliance et d'en répandre les données et les enrichissements. La Chine favorisait une décentralisation matérielle et la création d'un groupe d'alliés bien plus que la consolidation d'un empire. Aussi son rôle a-t-il visé dès 1956 à soutenir les revendications en voies particulières d'accès au socialisme (ce que sa propre révolution avait illustré, comme l'avait fait la Yougoslavie d'ailleurs et comme l'exigeait la Pologne de Gomulka) (5). Ainsi la Chine mettait-elle en valeur sa propre expérience et montrait-elle son droit à participer à la direction de l'alliance.

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(5) Notons qu'à ce moment la Chine fournit un appui à Gomulka qui entérinait la décollectivisation de l'agriculture, qui sollicitait une aide américaine et qui venait d'atteindre un modus vivendi avec l'église catholique.

C. Les intérêts politiques proprement dits

De plus, certains intérêts nationaux de l'Union Soviétique et de la Chine divergent. Bornons-nous à les citer tout en signalant leur importance pour des pays qui pratiquent une "Realpolitik".

La Chine est un pays agricole qui doit encore effectuer sa révolution industrielle. Sa population rurale est disciplinée mais dotée de techniques très spécialisées qui doivent être reconverties.

Une partie de son territoire national, les îles de Taiwan et les Pescadores, n'est pas encore libérée. Elle n'a pas pu récupérer les pertes de territoire subies antérieurement : Viet-Nam sous l'effet de l'invasion française, Corée en 1898, Mongolie extérieure, comme l'a réussi la Russie Soviétique en reprenant les pays baltes, une partie de la Pologne et de la Roumanie et, vers l'Est, les Kouriles et Sakhaline.

De plus, la Chine n'est pas reconnue par les Etats-Unis ni par ses clients, ni en conséquence par aucune des grandes organisations internationales.

Enfin, elle ne possède pas son propre bouclier atomique. L'U.R.S.S. lui reproche ce désir de posséder des armes nucléaires à tout prix et de ne pas se contenter de la protection qu'elle lui assure et ici, l'Union Soviétique fait allusion à des intérêts nationaux particuliers puisqu'elle impute cette envie de la Chine à "des buts et des intérêts spéciaux que la force du camp socialiste ne peut appuyer" (allusions à Taiwan⁽⁶⁾ et au différend frontalier avec l'Inde, de toute évidence).

Sur le plan des relations internationales, les Chinois accusent l'U.R.S.S. de violer les principes socialistes qui doivent régir les rapports entre pays frères et de poursuivre une politique chauvine et d'égoïsme national. L'intégration du bloc socialiste et le développement moderne des pays socialistes industriellement développés sont opposés ici au besoin impérieux de construire la base du socialisme dans les pays arriérés de l'alliance (ces derniers ne sont pas sourds d'ailleurs à cet argument et l'attitude de certains d'entre eux, telle la Roumanie, l'illustre).

La Chine refuse le paternalisme de l'Union Soviétique, qui ^{se} pose à présent en tuteur des autres pays et des autres partis, alors qu'elle ne les a pas toujours soutenus pendant leur lutte souterraine.

Nous nous trouvons en fait, bien plus que devant deux pays socialistes qui s'affrontent, devant deux nations. La nation russe qui a polarisé le développement des peuples de l'Union Soviétique et la nation chinoise d'autant plus virulente que jeune et encore toujours maltraitée. Le nationalisme chinois est en effet une création due à l'action de Sun Yat-sen, au courant radical de l'immédiat après-guerre de 1918 et du parti communiste, sous l'influence prépondérante de l'Occident.

(6) L'Union Soviétique soutient la revendication chinoise mais n'appuyerait pas une opération de force tentée pour récupérer cette portion du territoire national.

Cet affrontement d'intérêts nationaux apparaît à présent comme un des facteurs déterminants de l'action des deux grands protagonistes et il me semble mettre en lumière un élément inavoué : le déclin de la doctrine comme guide d'action véritable. L'attitude de l'Union Soviétique l'atteste déjà clairement; la souplesse chinoise dans la pratique de l'actualité immédiate l'annonce.

III. Passons à présent à des explications qui, à mon avis, sont plus profondes, même si elles sont moins précises.

A. Il y a d'abord celles qui tiennent aux particularités de la révolution et de la culture chinoises

1° La révolution communiste chinoise a mûri dans un pays très peu industrialisé alors que la théorie socialiste prétend que la révolution ne peut triompher que lorsque sont réalisées certaines conditions nécessaires, parmi lesquelles une certaine base industrielle et l'existence d'un prolétariat.

L'affirmation de ce que le développement économique est une condition préalable au triomphe ~~de~~ d'une révolution marxiste est toujours proférée par l'U.R.S.S. qui prétend en effet que le communisme n'est possible qu'après la réalisation de certaines bases qui établissent un état d'abondance - à cette condition, la Chine se trouve encore devant un bon bout de chemin à parcourir.

2° La révolution chinoise, bien qu'animée par un parti communiste, n'a pas été basée principalement sur le prolétariat ni même sur la lutte des classes. En 1948, la Chine comptait 750.000 ouvriers environ contre 280 millions de population rurale active, dans un ensemble de 550 millions d'habitants. Le plan d'action qui a été appliqué par les communistes chinois a visé et a réussi à amener tous les groupes sociaux disponibles à s'unir dans un mouvement qu'ils ont inspiré. Ce sont des intellectuels chinois convertis au marxisme qui ont mené la lutte en cantonnant l'opposition suscitée aux seuls grands bourgeois inféodés au capitalisme impérialiste : disons les 200 familles, en Chine elles forment ce qui est appelé la "bourgeoisie bureaucratique".

Aussi, la Chine populaire est-elle un Etat de dictature du peuple : celui-ci comprend les quatre classes patriotes : ouvriers, paysans, intellectuels, et bourgeoisie nationale, - et n'est-elle pas une dictature du prolétariat.

3° Dans nos pays,...

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~~13e~~ Dans nos pays, et en Union Soviétique également, la population rurale forme la couche la plus stable, la moins politisée, celle qui ne se dresse qu'en dernier lieu contre l'autorité établie.

En Chine, les révoltes de paysans ont été nombreuses, et cela en raison de la misère, de l'usure, de la précoce désacralisation du pouvoir et de la notion de légitimité qu'ont forgée les intellectuels chinois. Toute dynastie qui prétendait s'imposer, alors qu'elle ne faisait plus preuve de sa capacité d'administrer dans l'ordre et dans la prospérité, n'était qu'une autorité de fait que les gouvernés avaient le droit et le devoir de renverser.

C'est ainsi que Mao Tse-tung n'a pas été un innovateur en considérant les paysans chinois comme le principal levier de la révolution sociale. Au contraire, il a incarné, ce faisant, un des idéaux les plus traditionnels de la Chine éternelle. Il a animé un mouvement de révolte paysanne à l'aide d'une interprétation modernisée de l'histoire, à l'instar de rationalisations moralisantes et subversives qu'avaient formulées avant lui quelques grands intellectuels inspirateurs des soulèvements passés. Mais cette politique n'a pas été appréciée par les Russes qui engagèrent le communisme chinois dans des voies occidentales. Ce n'est qu'après les revers subis par cette politique que l'Union Soviétique a dû se rendre à l'évidence; et à partir de ce moment (1931), elle n'a fait que laisser survivre les bases rurales de guérilla dirigées par Mao et Chu Teh au Kiangsi.

Rappelons qu'après l'avènement définitif de Staline au pouvoir, l'U.R.S.S. proclame la nécessité d'édifier le socialisme dans un seul pays. Pendant que cette perspective se réalise, les pays capitalistes continuent leur développement, les crises vont s'y succéder et la révolution y mûrir. Pendant ce temps aussi, les pays coloniaux doivent tendre à réaliser la première étape de leur affranchissement, ^{par ce} sous la conduite de leur bourgeoisie nationale.

L'U.R.S.S. considère qu'il est bien moins urgent d'œuvrer à la révolution mondiale que de rechercher avec son adversaire, le chef de file du camp capitaliste, un *modus vivendi*, de manière à pouvoir prospérer en paix et édifier le communisme, dans un pays qui servira d'exemple.

Pour la Chine au contraire en matière de révolution mondiale, il en va comme pour les révolutions nationales. Il faut tendre dès le départ à la réalisation du maximum. Le but prioritaire des pays socialistes est d'aider les révolutions nationales des autres peuples lorsqu'elles sont dirigées par un parti marxiste. Ceci tient à l'expérience vécue par la Chine, expérience qui l'a persuadée de la nécessité des combats pour faire triompher le socialisme, et qui l'a aussi convaincue que le principal ferment révolutionnaire dans le monde ne réside pas dans le prolétariat des pays développés (donc déjà satisfaits) mais dans les couches misérables des populations du tiers-monde.

4° L'unité égalitaire entre les hommes, imposée aux dépens de la liberté individuelle est dans la logique de la philosophie chinoise. Tous les efforts individuels, les appels aux travaux volontaires, à la limitation des besoins s'intègrent dans un cadre bureaucratique et autoritaire auquel le peuple chinois est habitué de longue date. Une agriculture poussée à améliorer ses rendements et à étendre son champ d'action par des travaux d'irrigation et d'autre part contrainte à se défendre contre les intempéries, la sécheresse et l'irrégularité des fleuves est obligée à défaut de mécanisation et de puissants investissements, d'instaurer des corvées. Cela a été le cas en Chine depuis plus de deux millénaires. Une discipline collective a ainsi été inculquée aux millions de paysans chinois. Le régime actuel s'est efforcé de dépasser le stade de ces corvées féodales afin que le bénéfice des efforts collectifs ne reviennent plus pour la plus grande partie aux seuls propriétaires mais qu'au contraire il permette de sortir de la misère traditionnelle.

Le contraste à ce propos, avec la paysannerie de la Russie est manifeste, paysannerie anarchique et dont la qualité comme travailleur est médiocre, peut être *entra* autre parce que les formes d'organisation (~~telles le mir~~) ne l'avaient jamais intéressée au résultat de ses efforts.

B. Voyons enfin ce qui peut être déduit de l'évolution des deux sociétés en présence.

En Union Soviétique, jusqu'en 1928, 10 % seulement de la population active étaient composés de salariés de l'industrie, des transports, des mines et de la reconstruction. Cette minorité a joué un rôle actif dans la révolution soviétique, et cette participation n'a pas eu son équivalent dans la lutte du communisme chinois, basé sur les villages.

C'est entre 1928 et 1938 que 80 % de la population active soviétique passe du statut de paysan-petit propriétaire à celui de paysan salarié ou d'ouvrier (sovkhozes, M.T.S., coopératives, usines). Mais la prolétarianisation (caractérisée aussi par la soumission à une discipline de travail, la perte de toute indépendance et le déracinement) n'a jamais été complète car :

1. immédiatement s'est créée une strate privilégiée: celle de l'intelligentsia technique et administrative et des ouvriers émérites (les stakhanovistes),
2. l'Union Soviétique a adouci le sort de sa population en consacrant d'énormes efforts à instaurer un système de protection sociale et sanitaire et en développant l'enseignement,
3. enfin, dans les campagnes (plus de 50 % de la population) des éléments d'entreprise privée ont toujours survécu: depuis 1935 en tout cas, l'exploitation de lopins individuels, l'élevage de petit bétail, de volaille notamment ont entre-tenu des éléments de mentalité petit-bourgeoise.

Si actuellement, on peut parler d'embourgeoisement^H de la population soviétique, ce n'est pas tellement par ce que les droits de propriété y ont été développés mais bien parce que les modes de consommation et le style de vie vers lesquels la société s'oriente sont ceux des "bourgeois". Chacun recherche les bénéfices que peut lui procurer le système existant la base étant assurée, on tend vers la satisfaction de besoins secondaires et ~~au dessus de~~ ^{Autant} ~~de~~ ^{l'} on tend vers la stabilité. La politique soviétique est basée sur les stimulants matériels (la définition du socialisme implique la rémunération d'après le principe "de chacun selon ses capacités à chacun selon son travail"). Si cet embourgeoisement n'avait touché que l'élite, depuis quelques années il s'étend de plus en plus à la population entière dont les revenus réels ont crû de manière très sensible. Il n'est pas exagéré de dire que la population soviétique entre dans une période de consommation de masse de ~~biens de consommation~~ ~~durable~~. Il suffit de voir l'étendue de la politique de construction de logements avec un appareillage complètement individualisé par famille.

(H) En s'efforçant de dépasser le vocabulaire de toute charge affective, il faut compter de ce que cette évolution, résultant d'une matière et d'une amélioration de la vie ne signifie pas nécessairement un éloignement du communisme. Ce qui différencie la réalisation de ce dernier sont des buts différents. Si le communisme implique l'élimination de l'embourgeoisement, les hauts revenus, même s'ils restent dans le cadre théorique

L'esprit militant qui subsiste ne peut, dans ces conditions, que rechercher à renforcer la société établie, à la perfectionner: plus question de révolution.

En Chine, par contre, la prolétarianisation a été beaucoup plus loin et elle bat son plein actuellement.

Jusqu'en 1958, la collectivisation des paysans s'est faite par degrés et en douceur, l'expropriation des industriels et des commerçants s'est faite par étapes très progressives et n'est pas encore complètement réalisée.

La vague des communes et des bonds en avant a balayé cette modération. Malgré certains retours en arrière, l'économie paysanne privée semble jouer un rôle beaucoup plus réduit que celui occupé par elle en Russie; les incitants matériels sont employés et certaines catégories bénéficient de privilèges mais l'atmosphère générale de la Chine est hostile à l'accumulation privée et à la recherche du confort individuel et les exemples d'austérité sont donnés par les cadres. Enfin, les services gratuits institués diminuent le rôle de la famille.

Or, la Chine n'est pas capable d'appliquer un service de protection sociale comparable à celui qui a été aménagé par la prolétarianisation soviétique; en Chine, le mouvement crée des pressions explosives qui exigent des contrôles ^{et fut} ~~politiques et militaires~~: ceci explique la constitution de milices, l'enregistrement ~~mentement~~ des paysans, les réunions d'études et de discussions en équipes.

Les conséquences de cette disparité sociologique sont, à mes yeux, très importantes.

1. Il en résulte une irritation mutuelle grandissante et des difficultés croissantes de communication, par des différences de ton et d'atmosphère dans les deux sociétés. Il semble qu'un Russe établisse plus facilement un contact réel avec un Américain qu'avec un Chinois.

Depuis 1958, on essaie de remplacer le foyer, le ménage par des cantines, crèches, services divers en Chine. Pendant ce temps l'Union Soviétique s'efforce d'attribuer des logements avec cuisine privée aux millions de ses citoyens habitués à partager le point d'eau et le fourneau avec les autres occupants de l'immeuble.

La préparation en grand du communisme semble se caractériser par une importance accrue accordée aux facteurs objectifs, à la réalité. C'est ce que trahit notamment l'élaboration des plans.

En Chine, les facteurs objectifs sont considérés comme de l'opportunisme de droite. La politique au contraire doit prendre les commandes, bien plus que les "experts" comme en Union Soviétique.

Ceci tient à ce que les cadres de la Chine actuelle ont été formés pendant la révolution: l'improvisation, l'élan politique, l'appui sur la propagande sont considérés comme les caractéristiques de la lutte pour le communisme bien plus que les conditions objectives.

Les cadres russes sont, non des révolutionnaires mais bien des pionniers de l'embourgeoisement, membres de cette élite technique, administrative et intellectuelle qui ont lutté pour augmenter l'efficacité de leur système et tout autant le niveau de leur propre consommation; ils trouvent naturel et désirable que cette amélioration

s'étende à ^{leurs concitoyens} ~~autres~~ qui y aspirent depuis deux générations. ^{Les énergies sont toutes bandées}
brûlées vers la réussite de l'homme dans le cadre de l'ordre établi par la transformation de celui-ci au moyen de l'action collective.
 2. Pour la Chine, la menace de l'impérialisme représente actuellement le même danger qu'a été l'encerclement capitaliste pour l'Union Soviétique dirigée par Staline (8). Cette menace justifie l'autoritarisme, la dureté de l'idéologie, le renforcement de la lutte. Pour les Russes, la guerre par contre rendrait vains tous les sacrifices consentis et les efforts actuels.

3. L'analyse des mythes qui animent la société communiste de type soviétique et leur comparaison avec ceux de la société chinoise montrent que l'U.R.S.S. est animée par une idéologie produite par une société de plus en plus large, de plus en plus ouverte (la dictature du prolétariat cède le pas à l'Etat du peuple tout entier), alors que la Chine est tout entière galvanisée par l'idéologie d'une couche sociale horizontale, bien distincte, celle du prolétariat (Union des ouvriers et des paysans pauvres), qui dirige la dictature ^{soviétique} exercée par les quatre classes patriotes.

Or l'idéologie est d'autant plus puissante, d'autant plus capable de changer l'ordre établi, qu'elle est propre à un groupe social horizontal: à une classe bien distincte. Si la représentation de la société idéale à atteindre tend à refléter l'ensemble des aspirations d'une communauté, ses concepts deviennent universels, ils favorisent nécessairement la stabilité, l'intégration à un ordre global. C'est le cas lorsque cette représentation est formulée par un groupe vertical qui est au pouvoir et tend à assurer la pérennité de ce dernier.

(8) Cette menace est réelle, seule est envisagée ici son utilisation par le régime.

La différence capitale entre les deux sociétés qui découle de ces considérations est que l'on passe avec la Chine d'un type de société fermée où s'imposent des règles contraignantes définies par une minorité et appliquée à la lettre, à une société ouverte en Union Soviétique, où l'idéologie est complexe, nuancée, plus difficile à résumer, où s'établit un certain pluralisme parce qu'il s'y opèrent de nouveaux clivages.

Une confirmation de ceci a été fournie par un des derniers arguments avancés par la Chine pour condamner le révisionnisme de l'U.R.S.S.. Il date de février 1964 : dans la septième partie de la réponse chinoise à la lettre ouverte du comité central du parti communiste de l'U.R.S.S. (6) il est dit : " les révisionnistes et opportunistes soviétiques cherchent à remplacer la base matérialiste par la mythologie moderne, avec ses déesses de justice, de liberté, d'égalité et de fraternité" ce qui signifie, est-il ajouté "qu'ils avilissent la théorie du marxisme-léninisme et son outil; le parti communiste."

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T. J. Summary
[Summary]

20

Survey of the sino-soviet polemic on the ideological field : problems of peace and coexistence, timing of the economic edification of socialism, national liberation movements.

The Soviet Union gives the absolute priority to peace, proclaims the existence of economic laws, which have inevitably to be respected, ^{and which} governing the evolution towards socialism and communism; ~~she~~ ^{she} does not consider as progress on this road political revolutions without real economic impact toward socialism. China, on the other hand, hopes and tries to initiate political oppositions to the actual situation in ~~the~~ world, still dominated by capitalism, imperialism and neo-colonialism and ~~does~~ not believe that humanity can be preserved from war by long lasting concessions nor socialism conquered without violence.

Some national interests of the two states are also conflicting : more than the questions of demography or territorial frontiers, the problems of different cultural evolution and economic development explain the actual opposition.

Nationalism and unequal sociological situations appear also of great weight.

19700 (4)

[The World Trade Conference and Co-existence,
Yozsef Bogdan]

people are becoming increasingly aware that coexistence means, presupposes and requires much more than the mere warding off of a nuclear war. Only by eliminating the ~~causes and~~ factors responsible for war or, at least, by substantially limiting their influence, can war or wars be avoided. Therefore peace needs vigilance, confidence and security. Confidence and security, in turn, lie with the productive co-operation and joint undertakings of the peoples. Hence, ~~the~~ constructive economic and cultural co-operation and exchange between states constitute ~~constitute~~ a ^{positive} ~~productive~~ contribution to peace. In our days, however, when the international interdependence of peoples and states has assumed unprecedented proportions and when the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution result in the internationalization of ~~increasing~~ ^{widening} spiritual and economic fields, ~~the~~ bilateral ^{or} multilateral co-operation of ~~states~~ ^{nations} is no longer sufficient. The functions, tasks and sphere of competence of the international organizations must be expanded.

The convocation, proceedings and resolutions of the international conference dealing with ~~the~~ problems of Trade and Development demonstrate that the ^{participating} governments of the various countries, ~~and through them the~~ ^{and through them the} overwhelming majority of mankind ~~behind and through them~~ are becoming

increasingly aware of the significance, requirements and purposes of international economic co-operation.

(l.c.) Obviously, the governments of countries of different social systems ~~essentially~~ differ in the interpretation of this recognition, in the ^{ity} ~~sincerity~~ of its assessment and in undertaking the consequences ^{The} ~~of~~ progress ^{made} (is, nevertheless, extremely important!

X The history of the convocation and the proceedings of international conferences can be written in ^{many} ~~any~~ different ways. Since we do not intend to write a history of diplomacy, we shall not examine which countries ^{countries} ~~have~~ suggested and which have ~~opposed~~ the convocation of this Conference for the past ten years. ~~From a historical and economic angle~~ The decisive question is why this Conference ~~had to come into being and~~ take place after many ^s ~~#~~ detour, ^{ies} ~~difficulty~~ and ~~nonsense~~. ^{obstructions} ~~Many may contend~~ that no inevitable necessity can be detected in the circumstances in which the conference has come about and proceeds. ~~For do we~~ ^{do not} ~~believe, naturally,~~ ^{of course} in ~~some~~ ^{any force of} necessity or fatality acting independently of human will, conviction ^{or} ~~endeavour~~ ^{or} ~~and~~ ^{some} of conditions created by ~~us~~ ^{ourselves}. Yet we contend that the requirements deriving from social-economic conditions, from the new phenomena of technical development and from ~~the~~ ^{must inevitably be} new international circumstances ~~are~~ ^{are} recognized - sooner or later, possibly after grave errors - by the large ^{majority} ~~masses~~ of mankind. The depth and

ourselves

majority

degree of the consciousness of this recognition, naturally, ^{are} ^{subject to} vary ^{variation.} ~~within a wide range.~~ Some are only capable of recognizing the immediate consequences, whereas others ~~realize~~ ^{have a deeper insight into} ~~considerable part of all~~ ^{ed} associations and tertiary consequences deriving from ^{the} a new situation.

no, ladies!

The convocation of this Conference can be traced back to ~~such~~ ^{that} a collective recognition ~~which~~ ^{very} ~~briefly~~ ^{can be summed up as follows:} the contradiction between the conditions created by the technical and scientific revolution, ~~On~~ the one hand, and the commercial policy ~~foreign trade conceptions~~ ^{the} evolved in the period of cold war, on the other, in the world economy of our days ~~must~~ be liquidated. We do not mean to say that this basic contradiction has been recognized by the majority of the ~~contractors~~ ^{acting} ~~public personages~~ ^{lives}, civil servants ^{economists} or even scientists /I mean political economists in this case/ as the decisive factor responsible for the difficulties in ^{the} world economy and ⁱⁿ the national economy ^{res} of the various countries. Yet there is a general feeling that something is wrong and there is a trend to try to find the way out.

* * *

The preconditions and the necessity of a wider international division of labour have been created by the technical and scientific revolution but the commercial policy developed in the time of the cold war prevents its implementation.

Let us examine ~~the~~ ^{ies} trade policy ~~conceptions~~ developed during the cold war. ~~The~~ ^{They} ~~criteria~~ can be summed up as follows:

1. The advanced capitalist countries, the United States in particular, decided not to deliver ~~goods~~ ^{any goods} to socialist countries, ^{assist} that would further their "preparations for war", i.e. would ~~foster~~ ^{assist} their economic development. Such an interpretation of trade essentially means trade war; peaceful trade has never been and can never be governed by any other principle but that of mutual benefit.

no slaves!

2. The advanced capitalist countries, ~~the~~ ^{and in particular the} ~~large corporations have~~ ^{large corporations have} ~~supplies in particular~~ ^{ad} endeavoured to maintain their unilateral commercial ~~advantages~~ over the developing countries, advantages acquired during the colonial period.

3. ^A ~~the~~ trend toward ^s autarky developed in the economic management of the socialist countries owing to the import-saving character of their industrialization and to the trade war ^{es} (embargo ^{es} etc.) launched by the United States.

Let us briefly survey the effect of the cold war trade policy ^{ies} ~~conception~~ ^{ies} upon the economic life, growth and development of the three major participants in world economy ~~the~~ ^{ies} the advanced capitalist countries, the socialist countries and the developing countries.

no italics!

The ~~embargo~~^{or} ~~trade war~~ ^{we} use the latter term because only war can simplify human mentality to such an extent as to consider advantageous ~~anything~~^{every} that is disadvantageous to the opponent ⁷ was declared under specific economic conditions. (The explicitly political projection of the problem will not be examined in this paper.) Following World War II, ^{came} the reconstruction of the West-European economies that had sustained great material losses; ~~was undertaken~~, the share of the United States in world trade grew by leaps and bounds, and what is referred to as ~~the U.S. domestic~~^{demand} consumption promised a long-range boom in ~~the U.S. domestic~~^{the} internal economy.

/l.c.)

* "pent-up"

In these days ^{the} world economy was short of goods since ^{for goods arising from} the demand ~~of~~ the reconstruction ~~for goods~~ considerably exceeded the available supply, ~~excesses~~. The essence of the Marshall Plan, disregarding now the political aspects of the ^{matter} ~~problem~~, was the purposeful distribution of the ~~poor~~ resources available. The reconstruction, ~~was~~ ~~carried out~~, for obvious reasons, ~~in an industrial~~ ^{greatly increased the demand for the} ~~structure based on~~ classical raw materials which ~~increased the demand for them~~ and resulted, especially in the days of growing international tension, in the rapid rise of ^{raw material} their prices. This led to a ^{temporary} ~~transitional~~ boom in the countries producing raw materials, although the basic contradictions and inequalities survived. The specific aspect and weakness of this boom was that it

/l.c.
no italics!

transform
failed to start the process of growth and to swing over
the raw-material-producing economies from a static state
into a dynamic one.

a period of
In the socialist countries, too, reconstruc-
tion followed the end of the Second World War.
tion was started first, then, under the given conditions,
Subsequently, an
as industrialization of import-saving character was un-
dertaken which resulted in rapid economic growth.

no balance!
later, however, owing to the technical and
scientific revolution, the industrial production of
the advanced capitalist countries eventually began to
increase and they experienced accelerated expansion and the
transformation of the industrial structure.
started. A surplus of developed and their marketing met
with growing difficulties since the Western countries
did not want to sell them to socialist countries and could
not sell them to the developing countries. This was no
wonder, since the production of finished goods and the
demand for them grew much more rapidly than did the de-
mand for raw materials, especially in that period, when
the chemistry of synthetic materials began to develop
at a rapid rate. On the other hand, the needs of
the underdeveloped economy are unlimited in theory,
in practice, however, they are severely limited by their
purchasing power which grows less rapidly than that of
these of an advanced economy.
an advanced economy.

The advanced capitalist countries reacted in
different ways to the difficulties of realization and to
the economic recessions in their wake. The government of

the United States tried to give a new impetus to economic growth by intensifying ~~the~~ ^{hoping} armament ~~and~~ to reduce unemployment thereby. The West-European countries, ~~in~~ ~~turn~~ endeavoured to enliven the boom by fostering integration and by laying new foundations for the international division of labour.

It was soon discovered, however, that armament today ^{is} ~~was~~ no remedy against unemployment and ~~for~~ ^{cannot} ensuring lasting prosperity. This statement is supported by several investigations and reports resulting from the joint efforts of both western and eastern experts in economics. (The scope of the present paper does not permit me to prove this statement in detail.)

X
(l.c.)
It is incontestable that for the past fifteen (or so) years, since the beginning of the cold war, the share of the United States in world trade has substantially dropped. This fact is usually accounted for by two ~~state~~ ^{explanations} ~~ments~~: according to the one, the material and natural resources of the United States are so large that there is hardly any need for foreign trade; according to the other, specific conditions prevailed ^{arising from} after World War II. ~~The economy of the United States was developed during the war while, on the other hand, the grave damages were inflicted on the West-European economies, and these resulted in the considerable share of the United States in world trade in the immediate post-war period.~~

both
~~either~~

There is some truth in ~~both~~ statements^s, yet both are basically misleading. It is true that the United States is not very ~~much~~ dependent on world trade for its imports, but who would say that the world trade relations of such a highly developed and many-sided economy should and could be examined and approached exclusively from the angle of imports, particularly at a time when the realization of finished goods has a growing importance in world trade and the selling of the raw materials shows a downward tendency?

It is true that the economy of the United States is not import-sensitive but, in spite of the highly developed internal market, it would be erroneous to say that it is not becoming an export-oriented economy.

Nor can it be contested that after World War II specific world trade conditions prevailed, yet it should be realized that the share of export in the national income of USA is small. This was bound to make itself felt in the slowing down of the rate of economic growth compared with that in the west-European countries. Measures limiting imports were first taken as a "time-honoured" method to counterbalance the slow growth of exports. This, however, is not a rational method; obviously, the reaction of a strong and advanced economy, when

/l.c.
no values!

no values!

deterioration

the balance of payments changes for the worse, cannot be the same as ^{that of} ~~in~~ countries at the initial stage of industrialization. ^{The latter are generally} ~~Such an economy is~~ unable to increase ~~its~~ exports and must therefore restrict ~~its~~ imports. The healthy reaction of an advanced economy ^{upon a deterioration of} ~~in case~~ the balance of payments ~~deteriorates~~, is the intensification of export activities.

It follows that in the industrial-technical development of our days, even the strongest economy must increase its exports, and this makes it gradually export-oriented.

2

The new position of the United States in ~~the~~ ^{was recognized} World economy ~~partly~~ by the late president J.F. Kennedy who tried to evolve new principles in trade policy. yet he failed to draw all the inevitable conclusions from his observations. History will reveal whether these inconsistencies reflected ~~rather~~ his own views or the prevailing power relations.

16.0.

On the other hand, the West-European States, as has been mentioned before, tried to expand markets by developing integration. No doubt, they have achieved significant results in this field: their production has grown rapidly, their weight in ~~world~~ trade has substantially increased and their standard of living has materially risen. It is well known, however, that even

the development of trade even within the integration^{ed} region has met certain obstacles. It is probable that the superposition of import on the integrating countries reduces the possibilities of export to territories beyond the area of integration. Hence, if it is true that trade in finished goods plays a growing part in world trade, then the economic difficulties of the export-oriented economies within the integration area will probably increase.

This explains why these export-oriented countries realized the danger of embargo and similar prohibitive lists, before the United States did. And this, again, explains why ^{e.g.} the German Federal Republic - whose government displays an offensive and actively hostile attitude to the socialist countries - is economically more elastic than the United States or many ^{other} West-European countries.

Even more specific was ~~in this field~~ the position of the United Kingdom which was left out of the West-European integration but ^{(partly to the low purchasing power of its partners, partly to the slower rate of its economic development -} was unable to achieve an adequate increase in its export to the Commonwealth countries. Owing to these circumstances, ~~also~~ the British contractors have ^{done} ~~made~~ their best to break through the embargo and other prohibitive commercial measures.

Thus the untenableness of the cold war trade policy ^{has been revealed to be -} ~~conception~~ ^{in different} at different times and (degrees - ~~from which~~ progressively less tenable. ~~weight~~ - proved true in the whole western world.

After the period of reconstruction ~~in~~ 1948 ~~and~~
to 1949, the other large ^{sector} ~~group~~ ^{the} of world economy, and in-
ternational trade, the socialist countries carried out
a programme of intensive industrialization. Since the
achievements are well known, there is no need ^{to} ~~of~~ describe
ing them in detail. Industrialization at its initial
stage invariably has, in a certain sense, an import-sav-
ing character. This is obvious since ^{on the one hand,} the increased import
of the means of production cannot be balanced by export,
on the ^{other} ~~one~~ hand, and the products of the new industry ^{as} need
a certain ^{measure of} ~~protection~~ ~~protectionism~~, on the other.
The increase of export becomes ^{and necessary} possible only in the case
and at the time when ^{further} industrial development is hampered
by the limitations of the internal market. At the time
of the cold war, however, as a logical consequence of
western embargo, all industrialization had an import-
-saving character. In this period the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance concentrated its ^{efforts} ~~forces~~ in the first
place on ^{meeting} ~~counterbalancing~~ the shortage of raw materials
and semifinished goods ^{caused by} ~~due to~~ the prohibitive measures.
Yet, in spite of the difficulties created by the embargo
and of the errors committed in the internal economic
policy, socialist industrialization advanced at a rapid
rate, creating a new situation also in the socialist
economies.

(L.C.)
no talks!

The economies of the minor socialist countries (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland etc.) are import-sensitive, i.e., import ^s grows more rapidly than the national income. In Hungary, for instance, ~~the~~ ^{percentage} ~~per cent of import increase falls to 1 per cent of~~ the growth of the national income. At the same time, by the advancement of industrialization these economies became export-oriented, i.e. the ^{growth} expansion of export markets ^{becomes} is the chief precondition of the quantitative and qualitative ^{expansion of industrial output} development of production. The position of the Soviet Union is, in many respects, reminiscent of that of the United States; from the angle of import the Soviet Union is not ^{very} ~~such~~ dependent on World trade yet it is obvious that even an economy as strong and powerful as ^{the Soviet economy} ~~here~~ cannot dispense with the impulses coming from ^{the} World economy and becoming increasingly intensive on account of the technical development.

A growing responsibility devolves on the Soviet economy in solving the decisive problems of ~~the~~ World economy; among other things, in affording economic assistance to the developing countries by adequately influencing the prices of raw materials etc.

These facts clearly show that the socialist countries, which have entered a new stage of economic development, cannot dispense with some disciplinary and beneficial impulses coming from World trade, and

no helics!

Imports increase by 1.5 per cent for every 1 per cent rise in national income.

no helics!

~~also~~ ^{that} the rate and efficiency of their future development depend, in more than one respect, upon their active participation in ^{the} World economy. Obviously, ^{even} ~~(the)~~ co-operation between the socialist countries has vast and unexploited possibilities in store.

The beneficial advancement of this co-operation, however, ^{does not preclude but} presupposes the rapid and intensive development of the economic relations with the other part of the World.

It has generally been admitted ~~today~~ that the economic growth of the developing countries requires a wide international co-operation, trade and assistance. Obviously, international assistance cannot ^{can encourage} replace, but ~~only promote~~ the total mobilization of the internal spiritual and material resources.

^{It is clear that} ~~no doubt, that~~ the politico-economic problems connected with the problem of growth ⁱⁿ of the developing countries cannot be understood and solved in the spirit of a "business mentality." ~~in the strict sense of the word~~ That is why the advanced capitalist countries have to face new problems. The prices of raw materials and of tropical foodstuffs can be kept low by the influence of the monopolies established in the colonial period. This, however, ^{involves} ~~involves the decreased~~ ^{involves} the purchasing power in the developing countries

no shells!

cannot

thus decreased sales of
and the commodities produced in the western countries
~~by the exporting capitalists~~ cannot be sold on
in these markets. This prevents ^{exactly} ~~exactly~~ the dynamic
branches of industry, most strongly influencing the
rate of technical development, from ^{expanding} ~~evolving~~ their
capacity ^{ies} ~~adequately~~. In other words: the higher profit
of raw-material monopolies concentrated in the tra-
ditional branches of industry forestalls or hampers
the expansion of the markets of the dynamic branches
of industry.

Trade with the developing countries requires
a new, broader and more complex approach on behalf of
the advanced capitalist countries and, let us add,
also from the socialist countries, although it is
easier for ^{these to view relations with developing countries} ~~these to assume a standpoint relying on~~
^{from} ~~this~~ national-economic level and ^{in the light of} ~~on the consideration~~
of the long-range interests of the other party.

It should be remembered, ~~what has been~~
- indeed it was much stressed ~~stressed also~~ at this Conference, that the interests
of trade and of development are closely interlinked.
A ~~country~~ ^{country} (developing slowly) ~~stagnant~~ is always a
worse trade partner than a rapidly developing one.
It follows that the effect of trade upon the internal
economic processes and through them upon the process
of growth should always be taken into account.

Another ^{point} thing to be remembered is that ~~the~~ credits and assistance connected with armament do not promote economic development since the weapons, munition and spare parts are almost invariably imported; ^{furthermore,} ~~what is more,~~ the experts themselves are mostly from abroad.

In the case of the developing countries, it must also be realized that 59 per cent of the population of the world, and 80 per cent of the children under the age of ten live in these countries. (provided the Chinese People's Republic is included among the developing countries.) If the ^{remaining} other part of the world ^{on economic terms} refuses to trade with them ~~under adequate conditions~~ ^{which can} and to help them in their economic growth, these countries lose all perspectives of development.

~~to promote the~~ Rapid economic growth of these countries is ^{required} ~~prescribed~~ not only ^{as a matter of} ~~by our~~ humanistic and internationalist duty but also ⁱⁿ ~~by~~ our own best interest. The contradictions and the deepening gap between the so-called rich and poor peoples may lead to countless conflicts that might jeopardize world peace. Rapid economic growth may prevent such conflicts. This, however, requires a radical revision of earlier concepts of world trade and world economy. Everybody must understand that the world - speaking figuratively - has be-

1/c.
come smaller, the interdependence of the peoples has grown, the World-economic impulses influencing the development of national economies have become more intensive. And this process has by far not come to an end!

1/c.
No ^{by} lasting well-being, prosperity and ^{peaceful} safe development can ^{not} be secured for 40 per cent of the population of the World as long as the other 60 per cent live in misery, poverty and stagnation.

1/c.
By ^{and the} these considerations ^{which} we have ^{earlier} tried to substantiate our statement that the convocation of the ^{World} international Conference ~~dealing with the problems of~~

✓ on Trade and Development ^{was} is not the result of incidental factors, ^{or} of the initiative taken by one or another State or ~~by a~~ group of States. It is the product ~~and~~ outcome of the recognition that the scientific and technical revolution requires a new mentality in World trade. ^{and} The liquidation of the cold war ~~and~~ the victorious spreading of the idea of coexistence, in turn, promoted the ~~self~~-assertion of this new mentality.

1/c.
This new mentality, - which, naturally, has not yet been adopted by every State with all its consequences, since ~~the~~ economic interests developed in the past decades ^{still actively resist its acceptance -} ~~act and mobilize against it,~~ can be summed up in three principles:

1. We live in different social-economic systems and in three groups, each comprising large ^{members} amounts of ~~states~~ the advanced capitalist countries, the socialist states and the developing countries, but in our present world none of these groups ^{is} ~~are~~ capable of developing, prospering and advancing without the intensive growth of trade and economic co-operation with the states belonging to the other two groups. This means in other words that we emulate in the rapid development of our own social-economic system, but ^{that} the economic stagnation, relapse or collapse of our rivals ~~is not~~ ~~is~~ is not in our interest.

2. The various social-economic systems represent different economic methods and mechanisms. Naturally, these economic mechanisms change from time to time and are improved to serve more effectively the given social-economic system.

From the existence of different economic mechanisms it follows that what world economy and trade ^{the adoption of} ~~require~~ today is not universal and general principles. In the first place, certain general principles which rather demonstrate our intentions and goodwill ^{without} than prescribe ^{ing} an order of actions can, naturally, be formulated. ^{incidentally, will be formulated} Most of these can be ~~summed up~~ ^{summed up} in a negative form ^{i.e.,} stating what to refrain from. Universal rules,

determining the order and mode of economic actions,
~~are~~, however, ^{cannot be} ~~impossible to~~ ^{ed} adopt, because the intro-
duction of one and the same impulse into different
economic mechanisms ~~will~~ ^{lead} to different results.
The abolition of customs duty on ^{the importation of} foreign goods may be
advantageous to an industrially advanced country but
might turn out ^{to be} disastrous for a developing country.

It follows that world economy and trade must
not be "left to themselves", but concrete objectives and
tasks must be determined for each group of states, and
the interested parties must be allowed to achieve them
with the means and methods deriving from their own
economic mechanism. Common aims should be attained
by different but co-ordinated methods.

3. Compared with the past millenia, a basic
change has taken place in world economy and trade.
For many centuries, foreign trade was based on the
comparative advantages inherent in climatic and natural
resources. ^Rchiefly raw materials and foodstuffs ~~pre-~~
~~were thus the principal commodities~~
~~and thanks to these advantages were exchanged in~~
world trade. History carries convincing proof that
the comparative advantages inherent in the climatic and
natural resources can be acquired by war, conquest ^{and} ~~or~~
other forms of military force. Hence, the countries
having great natural riches but no adequate military

forces to defend them have ^{been many times} ~~often~~ ^{ed} changed conquerors ^{ed} and re-
for conquerors ^{ed}.

Economists with up-to-date minds, however, agree that today ~~the~~ comparative advantages ^{as depend} do not ~~the~~ ^{so much on} with the climatic and natural conditions of ~~the~~ ^a country ^{as on} but with the technical standard achieved. This statement is borne out by ~~the~~ structural shifts ⁱⁿ ~~foreign trade of~~ ^{over} the postwar years ^{foreign trade in} towards ~~the~~ ^{finished} goods, by the increasing ^{share} ~~weight~~ of the foreign trade ^{in total world} of industrially advanced countries and by the changes in the terms of trade. Besides, ^{within} a similar shift can be detected also ~~in~~ the internal economy of the countries.

The change in the character of the comparative advantages will strongly affect international policy, ~~that~~ Unlike the comparative advantages inherent in climatic and other natural conditions, ^{advantages} these inherent in ~~the~~ technical-scientific standard cannot be conquered, are liable to destruction in war, ^{yet} cannot be transferred to the conqueror.

On the strength of these considerations we venture to hope that ^{economic interests, which are} ~~economy~~ responsible for so many wars in the past, will be a most effective means of co-operation, exchange of experience and knowledge. in the future. This general consideration holds true, although

~~We know, naturally, that~~ in respect of certain raw materials, such as oil, for instance, ~~and of certain States,~~ this is not yet the case. ~~Obviously,~~ ^{and power groups} situations, ~~and~~ attitudes developed for many centuries will not change overnight. *

Some may argue that these questions were not ^{discussed or} raised, ^{the} ~~and~~ accentuated in ~~this~~ ^{of this paper} manner, at the Conference. As we have said above, our purpose ^{is} ~~was~~ not to describe in detail the proceedings of the Conference, ~~the discussion of the agenda, and the claims put in and the~~ ^{positions taken by participating delegations or the} compromises made. Our aim was to discuss the tendencies ^{arising} ~~resulting~~ from the present situation ^{to explore perspectives} ~~and possibilities~~ ^{for the future development of the} of world economy and ~~trade~~ ^{world trade}. l.c.

There is no doubt that the convocation, the ^{recommendations} ~~suggestions~~ proceedings and the ~~suggestions~~ of the Conference should be looked upon as a significant achievement. The Conference itself convincingly proves that the vast majority of mankind ^{is} ~~beginning~~ ^{using} to learn how to coexist. Successful international conferences, however, not only prove but also promote development. They ^{shape the} ~~partly form~~ ^{thinking} the ~~mentality~~ of the exponents of international policy ^{des} ~~which, naturally,~~ ^{and this} is a very important factor, ^{Further, they} ~~partly~~ introduce the concrete actions by which the factors and phenomena recognized can be turned to the benefit of the future of ^{mankind} ~~humanity~~.

In conclusion I should like to ^{quote} stress some ~~of the~~ resolutions and decisions ^{adopted by} ~~proving that~~ the Conference, ^{is able to show how it has done despite} though at the cost of considerable difficulties and some failures, ^{the Conference has} promoted the establishment of the atmosphere and ^{the} practice of coexistence in the economic field.

^{Significant} The resolutions and recommendations adopted declare:

a) "There shall be no discrimination on the basis of differences in socio-economic systems."

b) "Economic development and social progress should be the common concern of the whole international community and should by increasing economic prosperity and well-being help strengthen peaceful relations and co-operation among nations."

c) "All countries should co-operate in creating conditions of international trade conducive to the export earnings of developing countries and in general to the promotion of an expansion and diversification of trade between all countries, whether at similar levels of development, at different levels of development, or having different economic and social systems."

d) "The Conference has also adopted recommendations for ~~active~~ measures to promote market opportunities for primary commodities exports and for increase in consumption and imports in both developed and developing countries."

e) "Each economically advanced country should endeavour to supply financial resources to the developing countries of a minimum amount approaching as nearly as possible to 1 per cent of its national income."

In the subsequent text the recommendations refer to the importance of middle- and long-range bilateral agreements, stressing the significance of the countries having planned economies in the development and expansion of the trade relations of the developing countries.

An important recommendation of the Conference suggests the establishment of a universal and authoritative organization which would permanently deal with the problems of international trade. The on Trade and Development Conference ~~devoted to the problems of Development and Trade~~ elects a permanent Executive Committee the staff of which will truly reflect the present power relations in the world. The Executive Committee appoints permanent Subcommittees for the chief groups of commodities and trade functions. The task of the Executive Committee and of the Subcommittees is to plan concrete actions and take measures effectively promoting the development of international trade.

The principles, resolutions and recommendations ^{adopted by} ~~show that~~ the international conference ^{show that by} dealing

with the problems of Development and Trade ^{has} opened a new chapter in the history of international economic relations. ^{the} achievements of ^{the} conference ^{has} given convincing proof ^{that} ^{notwithstanding} ^{the} many unproductive debates and other difficulties concomitant to such conferences - ^{that} ^{the} states wish to liquidate the heritage ^{in trade policy} of the cold war and that a wide economic co-operation can be achieved in the spirit of coexistence.

The new era of international economic co-operation must ^{be based} ~~rely~~ on new principles evolved from the political and economic potentialities of our age:

a) countries having different social systems develop more rapidly if they establish wide economic relations with countries having another social system;

b) world trade needs few general principles and many concrete common aims which can be attained by means of co-ordinated actions;

c) ^{the contemporary} in ~~an up-to-date~~ world economy the comparative advantages are inherent in the technical-scientific level of the individual countries, whence the advantages cannot be conquered;

d) the stormy growth of industrial productivity and the change in the structure of world trade require that the economically advanced countries should promote the development of the economically weaker countries.

The world By embracing and complying with these principles, can and will economy become the most effective means of co-operation and progress of the peoples.

*The University
Budapest*

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World Trade Conference and Co-existence

People are becoming increasingly aware that coexistence means, presupposes and requires much more than the mere warding off of a nuclear war. Only by eliminating the causes and factors responsible for war or at least by substantially limiting their influence can war or wars be avoided. Therefore peace needs vigilance, confidence and security. Confidence and security, in turn, lie with the productive co-operation and joint undertakings of the peoples. Hence a constructive economic and cultural co-operation and exchange between States constitute a productive contribution to peace. In our days, however, when the international interdependence of peoples and States has assumed unprecedented proportions and when the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution result in the internationalization of ^{widening} increasing spiritual and economic fields, the bilateral or multilateral co-operation of States is no longer sufficient. The functions, tasks and sphere of competence of the international organizations must be expanded.

The convocation, proceedings and resolutions of the international conference dealing with the problems of Trade and Development demonstrate that the governments of the various countries, i.e. the overwhelming majority of mankind behind and through them, are becoming

increasingly aware of the significance, requirements and purposes of international economic co-operation.

Obviously, the governments of countries of different social systems essentially differ in the interpretation of this recognition, in the sincerity of its assessment and in undertaking the consequences. Progress is, nevertheless, extremely important!

The history of the convocation and the proceedings of international conferences can be written in many different ways. Since we do not intend to write a history of diplomacy, we shall not examine which countries have suggested and which have opposed the convocation of this Conference for the past ten years. From a historical and economic angle the decisive question is why this Conference had to come into being and take place after many a detour, difficulty and nonsense. Many may contend that no inevitable necessity can be detected in the circumstances in which the Conference has come about and proceeds. Nor do we believe, naturally, in some necessity or fatality acting independently of human will, conviction, endeavours and of conditions created by us. Yet we contend that the requirements deriving from social-economic conditions, from the new phenomena of technical development and from the new international circumstances are recognized - sooner or later, possibly after grave errors - by the large masses of mankind. The depth and

the consciousness of this recognition, naturally, vary within a wide range. Some are only capable of recognizing the immediate consequences, whereas others realize a considerable part of all associations and tertiary consequences deriving from a new situation.

The convocation of this Conference can be traced back to such a collective recognition which - very briefly - can be summed up as follows: the contradiction between the conditions created by the technical and scientific revolution, on the one hand, and the commercial policy /foreign-trade conception/ evolved in the period of cold^{the} war, on the other, in the World economy of our days must be liquidated. We do not mean to say that this basic contradiction has been recognized by the majority of the contractors, public personages, civil servants or even scientists /I mean political economists in this case/, as the decisive factor responsible for the difficulties in World economy and the national economy of the various countries. Yet there is a general feeling that something is wrong and there is a trend to try to find the way out.

The preconditions and the necessity of a wider international division of labour have been created by the technical and scientific revolution but the commercial policy developed in the time of the cold war prevents its implementation.

Let us examine the trade policy conception developed during the cold war. Its criteria can be summed up as follows:

1. The advanced capitalist countries, the United States in particular, decided not to deliver goods to socialist countries, that would further their "preparations for war", i.e. would foster their economic development. Such an interpretation of trade essentially means trade war; peaceful trade has never been and can never be governed by any other principle but that of mutual benefits.

2. The advanced capitalist countries, the monopolies in particular, endeavoured to maintain their unilateral commercial advantages over the developing countries, advantages acquired during the colonial period.

3. The trend toward autarky developed in the economic management of the socialist countries owing to the import-saving character of their industrialization and to the trade war /embargo etc./ launched by the United States.

Let us briefly survey the effect of the cold war trade policy conception upon the economic life, growth and development of the three major participants in world economy /the advanced capitalist countries, the socialist countries and the developing countries/.

The embargo, i.e. trade war /we use the latter term because only war can simplify human mentality to such an extent as to consider advantageous anything that is disadvantageous to the opponent/ was declared under specific economic conditions. /The explicitly political projection of the problem will not be examined in this paper./ Following World War II, the reconstruction of the West-European economies that had sustained great material losses, was undertaken, the share of the United States in World trade grew by leaps and bounds, and what is referred to as "^{retarded} delayed consumption" promised a long-range boom in American internal economy. In those days World economy was short of goods since the demand of the reconstruction for goods considerably exceeded the available supply ~~attempts~~. The essence of the Marshall Plan, disregarding now the political aspects of the problem, was the purposeful distribution of the poor resources available. The reconstruction was carried out, for obvious reasons, in an industrial structure based on classical raw materials which increased the demand for them and resulted, especially in the days of growing international tension, in the rapid rise of their prices. This led to a transitional boom in the countries producing raw materials, although the basic contradictions and inequalities survived. The specific aspect and weakness of this boom was that it

failed to start the process of growth and to swing over the raw-material-producing economies from a static state into a dynamic one.

In the socialist countries, too, reconstruction was started first, then, under the given conditions, an industrialization of import-saving character was undertaken which resulted in a rapid economic growth.

Later, however, owing to the technical and scientific revolution, the industrial production of the advanced capitalist countries rapidly increased and also the transformation of the industrial structure started. Surplus goods increased, their marketing met with growing difficulties since the ~~exporting~~ ^{west countries} ~~states~~ did not want to sell them to socialist countries and could not sell them to the developing countries. This was no wonder, since the production of finished goods and the demand for them grew much more rapidly than did the demand for raw materials, especially in that period, when the chemistry of synthetic materials began to develop at a rapid rate. On the other hand, the necessities of an underdeveloped economy are infinite only theoretically; in practice, however, they are much more limited than those of an advanced economy.

The advanced capitalist countries reacted in different ways to the difficulties of realization and to the economic recessions in their wake. The government of

the United States tried to give a new impetus to economic growth by intensifying the armament and to reduce unemployment thereby, the West-European countries, in turn, endeavoured to enliven the boom by fostering integration and by laying new foundations for the international division of labour.

It was soon discovered, however, that armament today was no remedy against unemployment and for ensuring lasting prosperity. This statement is supported by several investigations and reports resulting from the joint efforts of both western and eastern experts in economics. /The scope of the present paper does not permit me to prove this statement in detail./

It is incontestable that for the past fifteen or so years since the beginning of the cold war the share of the United States in world trade has substantially dropped. This fact is usually accounted for by two statements; according to the one, the material and natural resources of the United States are so large that there is hardly any need for foreign trade; according to the other, specific conditions prevailed after World War II /the economy of the United States had developed during the war which, on the other hand, inflicted grave damages to the West-European economies/ and these resulted in the considerable share of the United States in world trade.

There is some truth in both statements, yet both are basically misleading. It is true that the United States is not very much dependent on world trade for its import, but who would say that the world trade relations of such a highly developed and many-sided economy should and could be examined and approached exclusively from the angle of import, particularly at a time when the realization of finished goods has a growing importance in world trade and the selling of the raw materials shows a downward tendency?

It is true that the economy of the United States is not import-sensitive but, in spite of the highly developed internal market, it would be erroneous to say that it is not becoming an export-oriented economy.

Nor can it be contested that after World War II specific world trade conditions prevailed, yet it should be realized that the share of export in the national income of USA is small. This was bound to make itself felt in the slowing down of the rate of economic growth compared with that in the West-European countries. Measures limiting import were first taken as a "time-honoured" method to counterbalance the slow growth of export. This, however, is not a rational method; obviously, the reaction of a strong and advanced economy, when

the balance of payments changes for the worse, cannot be the same as in countries at the initial stage of industrialization. Such an economy is unable to increase its export and must therefore restrict its import. The healthy reaction of an advanced economy, in case the balance of payments deteriorates, is the intensification of export activities.

It follows that in the industrial-technical development of our days, even the strongest economy must increase its export, and this makes it gradually export-oriented.

The new position of the United States in the ^{recognized} World economy partly, by the late president J.F. Kennedy who tried to evolve new principles in trade policy. yet he failed to draw all the inevitable conclusions from his observations. History will reveal whether these inconsistencies reflected rather his own views or the prevailing power relations.

On the other hand, the West-European States, as has been mentioned before, tried to expand markets by developing integration. No doubt, they have achieved significant results in this field: their production has grown rapidly, their weight in world trade has substantially increased and their standard of living has materially risen. It is well known, however, that even

the development of trade even within the integration met certain obstacles. It is probable that the superposition of import on the integrating countries reduces the possibilities of export to territories beyond the area of integration. Hence, if it is true that trade in finished goods plays a growing part in world trade, then the economic difficulties of the export-oriented economies within the integration area will probably increase.

This explains why these export-oriented countries realized the danger of embargo and similar prohibitive lists, before the United States did. And this, again, explains why ^{e.g.} the German Federal Republic - whose government displays an offensive and actively hostile attitude to the socialist countries - is economically more elastic than the United States or many West-European countries.

Even more specific was in this field the position of the United Kingdom which was left out of the West-European integration but ^{partly to the low purchasing power of its partners,} ~~owing to its low purchasing power~~ partly to the slower rate of its economic development - was unable to achieve an adequate increase in its export to the Commonwealth countries. Owing to these circumstances, also the British contractors have made their best to break through the embargo and other prohibitive commercial measures.

Thus the untenableness of the cold war trade policy conception - at different times and degrees /weight/ - proved true in the whole western world.

After the period of reconstruction /in 1948--
--1949/, the other large group of World economy and international trade, the socialist countries carried out a programme of intensive industrialization. Since the achievements are well known, there is no need of describing them in detail. Industrialization at its initial stage invariably has, in a certain sense, an import-saving character. This is obvious since the increased import of the means of production cannot be balanced by export, on the one hand, and the products of the new industry need a certain protection /protectionism/, on the other. The increase of export becomes possible only in the case and at the time when industrial development is hampered by the limitations of the internal market. At the time of the cold war, however, as a logical consequence of western embargo, all industrialization had an import-saving character. In this period the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance concentrated its forces in the first place on counterbalancing the shortage of raw materials and semifinished goods due to the prohibitive measures. Yet, in spite of the difficulties created by the embargo and of the errors committed in the internal economic policy, socialist industrialization advanced at a rapid rate, creating a new situation also in the socialist economies.

The economies of the minor socialist countries /Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland etc./ are import-sensitive, i.e. import grows more rapidly than the national income. In Hungary, for instance, 1.5 per cent of import increase falls to 1 per cent of the growth of the national income. At the same time, by the advancement of industrialization these economies became export-oriented, i.e. the expansion of export markets is the chief precondition of the quantitative and qualitative development of production. The position of the Soviet Union is, in many respects, reminiscent of that of the United States; from the angle of import the Soviet Union is not such dependent on World trade yet it is obvious that even an economy as strong and powerful as hers cannot dispense with the impulses coming from World economy and becoming increasingly intensive on account of the technical development.

A growing responsibility devolves on the Soviet economy in solving the decisive problems of World economy; among other things, in affording economic assistance to the developing countries by adequately influencing the prices of raw materials etc.

These facts clearly show that the socialist countries, which have entered a new stage of economic development, cannot dispense with some disciplinary and beneficial impulses coming from World trade, and

also the rate and efficiency of their future development depend, in more than one respect, upon their active participation in world economy. Obviously, ^{even} the co-operation between the socialist countries has vast and unexploited possibilities in store.

The beneficial advancement of this co-operation does not preclude but, however, presupposes the rapid and intensive development of the economic relations with the other part of the world.

It has generally been admitted today that the economic growth of the developing countries requires a wide international co-operation, trade and assistance. Obviously, international assistance cannot replace but only promote the total mobilization of the internal spiritual and material resources.

No doubt, that the politico-economic problems connected with the problem of growth of the developing countries cannot be understood and solved in the spirit of a "business mentality" in the strict sense of the word. That is why the advanced capitalist countries have to face new problems. The prices of raw materials and of tropical foodstuffs can be kept low by the influence of the monopolies established in the colonial period. This, however, involves the decrease of the purchasing power in the developing countries

and the commodities produced in the western countries /by the exporting capitalists/ cannot be sold on these markets. This prevents exactly the dynamic branches of industry, most strongly influencing the rate of technical development, from evolving their capacity adequately. In other words: the higher profit of raw-material monopolies concentrated in the traditional branches of industry forestalls or hampers the expansion of the markets of the dynamic branches of industry.

Trade with the developing countries requires a new, broader and more complex approach on behalf of the advanced capitalist countries and, let us add, also from the socialist countries, although it is easier for these to assume a standpoint relying on this national-economic level and on the consideration of the long-range interests of the other party.

It should be remembered, what has been stressed also at this Conference, that the interests of trade and of development are closely interlinked. A country ¹developing ²slowly ³or ⁴stagnant is always a worse trade partner than a rapidly developing one. It follows that the effect of trade upon the internal economic processes and through them upon the process of growth should always be taken into account.

Another thing to be remembered is that the credits and assistance connected with armament do not promote economic development since the weapons, munition and spare parts are almost invariably imported, what is more, the experts themselves are mostly from abroad.

In the case of the developing countries it must also be realized that 59 per cent of the population of the world, and 80 per cent of the children under the age of ten live in these countries. /provided the Chinese People's Republic is included among the developing countries./ If the other part of the world refuses to trade with them under adequate conditions and to help them in their economic growth, these countries lose all perspectives of development.

To promote the rapid economic growth of these countries is prescribed not only by our humanistic and internationalist duty but also by our own best interest. The contradictions and the deepening gap between the so-called rich and poor peoples may lead to countless conflicts that might jeopardize world peace. A rapid economic growth may prevent such conflicts. This, however, requires a radical revision of earlier concepts of world trade and world economy. Everybody must understand that the world - speaking figuratively - has be-

come smaller, the interdependence of the peoples has grown, the World-economic impulses influencing the development of national economies have become more intensive, and this process has by far not come to an end.

No lasting well-being, prosperity and safe development can be secured for 40 per cent of the population of the World as long as the other 60 per cent live in misery, poverty and stagnation!

By these considerations we have tried to substantiate our statement that the convocation of the international Conference dealing with the problems of Trade and Development is not the result of incidental factors, of the initiative taken by one or another State or by a group of States. It is the product and outcome of the recognition that the scientific and technical revolution requires a new mentality in World trade; the liquidation of the cold war; the victorious spreading of the idea of coexistence, in turn, promotes the self-assertion of this new mentality.

This new mentality, - which, naturally, has not yet been adopted by every State with all its consequences, since the economic interests developed in the past decades ^{still} act and mobilize against it, - can be summed up in three principles:

1. We live in different social-economic systems and in three groups, each comprising large amounts of States /the advanced capitalist countries, the socialist States and the developing countries/, but in our present World none of these groups are capable of developing, prospering and advancing without the intensive growth of trade and economic co-operation with the States belonging to the other two groups. This means in other words that we emulate in the rapid development of our own social-economic system, but the economic stagnation, relapse or collapse of our rivals /opponents/ is not in our interest.

2. The various social-economic systems represent different economic methods and mechanisms. Naturally, these economic mechanisms change from time to time and are improved to serve more effectively the given social-economic system.

From the existence of different economic mechanisms it follows that what World economy and trade require today is not universal and general principles in the first place. Certain general principles which rather demonstrate our intentions and goodwill than prescribe an order of actions can, naturally, be formulated. /Most of these can be summed up in a negative form, stating what to refrain from./ Universal rules,

determining the order and mode of economic actions, are, however, impossible to adopt because the introduction of one and the same impulse into different economic mechanisms will lead to different results. The abolition of customs duty on foreign goods may be advantageous to an industrially advanced country but might turn out disastrous for a developing country.

It follows that world economy and trade must not be "left to themselves", but concrete objectives and tasks must be determined for each group of States, and the interested parties must be allowed to achieve them with the means and methods deriving from their own economic mechanism. Common aims should be attained by different but co-ordinated methods.

3. Compared with the past millennia, a basic change has taken place in world economy and trade. For many centuries, foreign trade was based on the comparative advantages inherent in climatic and natural resources. Chiefly raw materials and foodstuffs produced thanks to these advantages were exchanged in world trade. History carries convincing proof that the comparative advantages inherent in the climatic and natural resources can be acquired by war, conquest or other forms of military force. Hence, the countries having great natural riches but no adequate military

forces to defend them have often changed conqueror for conqueror.

Economists with up-to-date minds, however, agree that today the comparative advantages do not lie with the climatic and natural conditions of the country but with the technical standard achieved. This statement is borne out by the structural shifts in foreign trade of the postwar years towards the finished goods, by the increasing weight of the foreign trade of industrially advanced countries and by the changes in the terms of trade. Besides, a similar shift can be detected also in the internal economy of the countries.

The change in the character of the comparative advantages will strongly affect international policy, too. Unlike the comparative advantages inherent in climatic and other natural conditions, those inherent in the technical-scientific standard cannot be conquered, are liable to destruction in war but can not be transferred to the conqueror.

On the strength of these considerations we venture to hope that economy, responsible for so many wars in the past, will be a most effective means of co-operation, exchange of experience and knowledge in the future.

/We know, naturally, that in respect of certain raw materials, such as oil, for instance, and of certain States, this is not yet the case. Obviously, situations and attitudes developed for many centuries will not change overnight./

Some may argue that these questions were not raised and accentuated in this manner at the Conference. As we have said above, our purpose was not to describe in detail the proceedings of the Conference, the discussion of the agenda, and the claims put in and the compromises made. Our aim was to discuss the tendencies resulting from the present situation and possibilities of world economy and trade.

There is no doubt that the convocation, the proceedings and the ^{Recommendations} ~~suggestions~~ of the Conference should be looked upon as a significant achievement. The Conference itself convincingly proves that the vast majority of mankind begins to learn how to coexist. Successful international conferences, however, not only prove but also promote development. They partly form the mentality of the exponents of international policy, which, naturally, is a very important factor, partly introduce the concrete actions by which the factors and phenomena recognized can be turned to the benefit of the future of humanity.

In conclusion I should like to stress some resolutions and decisions proving that the Conference, though at the cost of considerable difficulties and some failures, promotes the establishment of the atmosphere and practice of coexistence in the economic field.

The resolutions and recommendations adopted declare:

a/ "There shall be no discrimination on the basis of differences in socio-economic systems."

b/ "Economic development and social progress should be the common concern of the whole international community and should by increasing economic prosperity and well-being help strengthen peaceful relations and co-operation among nations."

c/ "All countries should co-operate in creating conditions of international trade conducive to the export earnings of developing countries and in general to the promotion of an expansion and diversification of trade between all countries, whether at similar levels of development, at different levels of development, or having different economic and social systems."

d/ "The Conference has also adopted recommendations for active measures to promote market opportunities for primary commodities exports and for increase in consumption and imports in both developed and developing countries."

e/ "Each economically advanced country should endeavour to supply financial resources to the developing countries of a minimum amount approaching as nearly as possible to 1 per cent of its national income."

In the subsequent text the recommendations refer to the importance of middle- and long-range bilateral agreements, stressing the significance of the countries having planned economies in the development and expansion of the trade relations of the developing countries.

An important recommendation of the Conference suggests the establishment of a universal and authoritative organization which would permanently deal with the problems of international trade. The ~~Conference devoted to the problems of Development and Trade~~ ^{on Trade and Development} elects a permanent Executive Committee the staff of which will truly reflect the present power relations in the world. The Executive Committee appoints permanent Subcommittees for the chief groups of commodities and trade functions. The task of the Executive Committee and of the Subcommittees is to plan concrete actions and take measures effectively promoting the development of international trade.

The principles, resolutions and recommendations show that the international conference dealing

with the problems of Development and Trade has opened a new chapter in the history of international economic relations. The achievements of the Conference has given convincing proof - beside the many unproductive debates and other difficulties concomitant to such conferences - that the States wish to liquidate the heritage in trade policy of the cold war and that a wide economic co-operation can be achieved in the spirit of coexistence.

The new era of international economic co-operation must rely on new principles evolved from the political and economic potentialities of our age:

a/ countries having different social systems develop more rapidly if they establish wide economic relations with countries having another social system;

b/ world trade needs few general principles and many concrete common aims which can be attained by means of co-ordinated actions;

c/ in an up-to-date world economy the comparative advantages are inherent in the technical-scientific level of the individual countries, whence the advantages cannot be conquered;

d/ the stormy growth of industrial productivity and the change in the structure of world trade require that the economically advanced countries should promote the development of the economically weaker countries.

By embracing and complying with these principles can and will economy become the most effective means of co-operation and progress of the peoples.

OCT - 2 1964

Held for
Review only
to come

For Coexistence No. 2.

COMMUNIST CONTROVERSY

Mohit Sen.

The great debate in the International Communist movement has reached its peak now. Certain organisational steps may or may not follow the World Conference which is ^{being prepared} scheduled to meet fairly soon. Some further charges and counter-charges ^{may} be brought forward by the protagonists on both sides. One hopes that there will be more science and sophistication in the inevitable further polemics. Yet one can legitimately doubt whether any new basic themes will emerge, following the ~~eight~~ ^{four} comments by the leadership of the Communist Party of China (C.P.C.) and the report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) by N.A. Suslov.

Rather than take recourse to a footnote, one would like to state at the outset that of the enormous amount of literature that has been generated by the great debate, not much is likely to stand the passage of time and count as a contribution to the ^{corpus} ~~conference~~ of Marxist thought, ~~even where it has gone off the rails~~. We have the 1957 and 1960 Moscow Documents and the CPSU Programme as well as the Suslov Report. Then there is the Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and Kardelj's Problems of War & Socialism, Togliatti's interview to Nuovi Argomenti in 1956 and his reports to the congresses of the Communist Party of Italy after 1956 would also stand. So would Mao's writings and speeches in 1956-57. ~~And~~ On the other side, years hence one might possibly like to refer to Long Live Leninism, Once more on the differences between Comrade Togliatti and ourselves and the Eighth Comment: Proletarian Revolution & Khrushchov's Revisionism. The rest, while signifying something, is too full

of sound and fury.

One has not found it possible to remain neutral in this great debate. With as much objectivity as one could muster one examined the documents, including those published by the protagonists in India, and came to the conclusion that the Communist Party of China is sinning grievously against the scientific method of Marxism while the Communist Party of Soviet Union, despite some aberrations and hesitations, is continuing the work of creatively developing the science of Marxism.

In a large measure this attitude of taking a certain standpoint is inevitable in such a crucial and clearcut debate, especially if one happens also to be a Communist. Nor need it be an unscientific attitude. After all, any advance of any science has almost always been the result of intense controversy and the adoption of partisan attitudes. Neutrality, often enough, has been an euphemism for a failure of intellectual nerve.

^{It is} ~~we~~ propose ^{and then to go} in this article to attempt to explain, ^{we then} the genesis of the present debate. ^{we wish to} ~~go~~ on to examine the nature of the split, proceed to discuss the basis of the tactical issues involved and finally put forward certain rather more fundamental considerations.

I.

The Communist Party of China is quite right when it says that the first stage of the present controversy was ^{inaugurated by} the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of ^{the} Soviet Union. Not only was there the sharp denigration of Stalin at this Congress but certain new ideas were advanced on the possibility of averting a world war. ^{there emerge} the new dimensions of peaceful coexistence, ^{and a} the fresh look at the newly independent countries, ^{at} and the ~~increased~~ possibilities of a peaceful transition to socialism.

1c. All this may have been known earlier to certain of the topflight leaders of the International Communist movement but it certainly came as a great shock to the overwhelming majority of Communists and commentators on Communism, ~~with the possibly sole exception of Leonid Brezhnev~~. It seems also to be a fact that the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union did not fully consult other Communist Parties before coming forward with a startlingly new evaluation of a very important period of the International Communist movement and of its most outstanding personality and leader.

A Following the 20th Congress,
There was a great convulsion in every Communist Party, ~~in varying degrees, and in particular we had the Polish and Hungarian disturbances which both reflected the new tensions and aggravated them.~~ Since then, there has been a steadily mounting conflict in the International Communist movement, ~~with the present form and intensity of the great debate would certainly not have been inevitable. It is difficult not to concede the Communist Party of China this point.~~

Since that memorable Congress the stages of the great debate can be marked as follows:
The struggle against the revisionist offensive till a point of stability ^{was} reached with the November 1957 Moscow meeting; the carrying forward of this offensive with a fair degree of unanimity with the Yugoslav Programme as the main target, till the end of 1959; the start of the big dogmatic push by the Communist Party of China from the beginning of 1960 and the gradual realignment of Communist Parties; the rebuff to dogmatism in the November 1960 Moscow Conference but without an open break on either side; a vigorous offensive by the forces of creative Marxism since the 22nd ^{Congress of the} Communist Party of ^{the} Soviet Union ~~Congress~~ in October 1961 and the dogmatic counter-attack, especially following the October 1962 Caribbean crisis; the present position of

showdown and confrontation, revealing a very clear majority for the creative Marxists but a powerful and determined minority for the dogmatists.

~~Through all these stages -- the details of which are a fascinating study but somewhat irrelevant to the central purpose of this article -- we find the operation of the laws of dialectics. A creative push leads to a revisionist onslaught and the defeat of this onslaught leads to the emergence of a powerful dogmatic trend to combat which there is a fresh return to creativity at a higher level. The spiral-like movement of reality extends also to the realm of the thought of convinced dialectical materialists!~~

An interesting point to note in this connection is that the Communist Party of China in the first stage of the creative push was almost avant-garde. Mao-Tse-tung's two articles on the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat and his famous speech on the contradictions among the people went far beyond the ~~quite~~ cautious, and even pragmatic, formulations of the Communist Party of ^{the} Soviet Union. His only rivals in creative daring were Togliatti and the Yugoslav Communists. ~~The Communist Party of China seems to have got stuck on the second point of the dialectical triad and has not yet been able to get on to the higher level of creativity.~~

~~Here one has to make a very brief digression on the question of the duration of theoretical formulations. ^{It is true that} Reality is constantly changing and is the master of theory. But Marxists believe in the law-governed pattern of objective change and, therefore, in the temporary stability or unity of the opposites rending and driving the development of reality. They, therefore, hold to a certain duration and~~

not to the instantaneity theory of the Buddhists. Hence, after a fair amount of debate and discussion conclusions can be reached which are operative, until a qualitative transformation is effected. ~~(Of course, one has to keep in mind here also the various levels of the development of matter as a whole and of its sub-divisions -- a discussion of all this would, however, take us too far afield.)~~

While one can agree with the Communist Party of China ^{Congress of the CPSU} that the 20th ~~Communist Party of Soviet Union Congress~~ sparked off the present controversy yet it had to come at some time. Fundamentally the inevitability was grounded in the new social reality and the new balance of forces on a world scale after the consolidation of the socialist camp and its possession of atomic armaments. Tactical adjustment and even a new strategic line had to be worked out. And in the process sharp polemics and a certain degree of ~~discrepancy~~ ^{discrepancy} could scarcely be avoided. ~~but there are other reasons for affirming this inevitability.~~

^{After these 20 years} ~~These reasons~~ can be traced back to ^{an earlier} ~~that other~~ great divide in the Socialist movement -- ^{Lenin's} ~~break from~~ social democracy following the First World War ^{which} ~~culminating~~ in the setting up of the Third (Communist) International in 1919. Since that break the first essential task of the Communist movement has been that of establishing its identity. Simultaneously, of course, there was the problem of becoming an effective mass force in the different ^{nations} ~~states~~ in the world.

In the course of carrying out this essential task, while also paying attention to the problem of mass influence, it was, above all, necessary to combat the ideology and outlook of social democratic reformism, ^{or} ~~of~~ right opportunism, to use the Leninist terminology. Only secondary importance could ~~attach~~ ^{attach}.

attach, and was attached to the problem of sectarianism -- the sect, or the movement, had itself to be first established. ^{Fixed in place} ~~If we have~~ the Soviet Union, China, Germany and France ~~(and)~~ ~~we shall find that~~ till the middle 1930's mass Communist Parties did not exist ^{Actually} ~~in other countries~~ ~~of the world~~.

By about 1935, however, following the fascist offensive the problem of ^{transition} ~~going over~~ from establishing of identity to mass actions and influence on a global scale ^{commenced} ~~came to the fore, together with~~ the need for broad unity to contain and finish the fascist menace. ^{required} ~~There was the~~ need for a sharp turn in the policies and outlook of the international Communist movement. ^{At} ~~at this time~~ the seventh World Congress of the Communist International in 1935 ^{signalled the turn} ~~signified that~~ the International leadership ~~was aware~~ of this problem. Dimitroff's report on the United Front Against Fascism and Wang Ming's report on the anti-colonial revolution at that juncture, ^{gave} ~~did give~~ a new orientation and concentrated ^{the} fire against sectarianism and "Leftism". It is significant that time and again these two main reports referred back not to Lenin's great historical service ^{break} ~~of rupture~~ with social--democracy but to his last great theoretical work "Leftwing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder. Time and again these two reports emphasised the dual duty of the Communist ^{of building} ~~parties~~ ^{Communist parties} ~~becoming a mass force~~ and of ^{simultaneously} building unity with other anti-fascist and anti-imperialist mass forces.

This new orientation was implemented in the course of the anti-fascist war and, above all, by the Communist party of China through the theory and leadership of Mao Tse-tung. This led to a swift growth of Communist parties in major regions of the world and to the emergence of the world Communist movement as one of the major shaping influences

of world politics. The further development and sophistication of this new orientation was an essential task of Marxist theoreticians and leaders in the post-war period. ~~Yet not only was this not done but~~ ^{However,} a deeply sectarian analysis and line of action was imposed on the movement by Stalin acting through the Communist Information Bureau established in 1947. His last major theoretical pronouncement -- Economic Problems in the U.S.S.R. and the ^{speech at the Congress of the CPSU in 1952} ~~speech at the 19th Communist Party of Soviet Union Congress~~ clearly bear the impress of dogmatism and sectarianism.

~~What the 20th Communist Party of Soviet Union Congress~~ ^{of the CPSU} and the subsequent efforts signified ~~was~~ above all, the continuation, development and sophistication of the new orientation that was already a reality in 1935. It was a new initiative to carry on the tasks of transition from establishing ^{Communist party} identity to becoming a mass force acting in unity with other mass forces for the accomplishment of radical social changes on a world scale.

The nature of the present scheme should be discussed against this background. II.

~~It is against this background that one would like to discuss the question of the nature of the present scheme.~~

Power considerations certainly do play a part, especially as far as China is concerned. There is an element in the attitude of the Communist Party of China which can only be called chauvinism. Even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that both India and China have an equal share of blame with regard to the border war between the two countries, yet the form and manner in which China presses her claims, and the enormous importance it attaches to considerations of national prestige (one has only to recall her negative

approach to the proposals of the Colombo Powers), are evidence enough of a deviation from the norms of socialist behaviour. To this one has to add the very odd state of affairs along the Sino-Soviet border. Surely as between two socialist countries the principle of maintaining the status quo with regard to borders is the only rational policy. Arguments from feudal maps and "graves of ancestors" are particularly out of place in this connection.

Yet it would not be adequate to depict the conflict as mainly provoked by Chinese chauvinism. Would regional position, perhaps, give us a clue? Some sort of Asian or Afro-Asian feeling might have prompted the Communist Party of China to behave as it does, as a reflection of and accentuation of its separate identity and role in the world Communist movement. But this again is not an adequate explanation because the height of China's impact on the Afro-Asian world was at the time of Bandung in 1955 and later when her economic achievements astounded this vast segment of humanity. The stress on regional exclusiveness came simultaneously with the conflict with India, the aggressive espousal of the cause of the overseas Chinese in Indonesia and the ill-concealed hostility towards Nasser's Arab nationalism. It came also at a time when the economic achievement had turned into its opposite, when, as Edgar Snow has told us in The other side of the river - national income actually fell for three years following the "great leap" policies. *China's impact on Afro-Asia is still considerable but it has not brought the promise of the early 1950s.*

Underdevelopment and isolation were central

~~but~~ factors are again more in the nature of necessary rather than sufficient causes. After all, China was more underdeveloped and no less isolated in 1956-57 --

when she was avant-garde in the matter of creative Marxism -- than in 1960. And by her present policies and attitudes she is scarcely contributing to her development or to the breaking of her isolation, both ~~of which factors~~ the Communist Party of China leadership has shown itself fully aware of in the recent period, as the African tours of Chou Enlai and the overtures to British, French and West German businessmen demonstrate. Nor is the appeal of the policies of the Communist Party of China only to the Communist parties in underdeveloped countries. The Japanese Communist Party is not operating in an underdeveloped country nor the Grippa group in Belgium or the anti-revisionist groups in Britain, France or Italy. Conversely, the Communist parties of India, Ceylon, Iraq, Chile, Mexico and so on are neither the product of nor are they operating in conditions of ~~over-development~~ affluence.

~~Objective factors are undoubtedly the grass-root~~
ones when such significant and large phenomena as the split in the international communist movement ^{have} are ~~sought~~ to be explained. ^{We have to look for objective factors.} The petty-bourgeois environment in China, the newness of the industrial working class there, certainly help to build strong pressures in the direction of the frenzy of 'left' adventurism and sectarianism. The ~~fact of~~ ^{fact} industrialisation of the Soviet Union and the maturity of its working class ^{are} undoubtedly indispensable to the kind of changes in policy and attitude that have been registered there in the recent decade.

Yet in any discussion of this nature one should remember Engels' remarks about the relative independence of ideological factors. After all, the laws of history operate through accidents, and, in the broad perspective of history, ~~The~~ present debate in the Communist movement is

an accident, though not without its causes. It is essential, therefore, to look for the ideological factors in an ideological dispute, to remember certain historical experiences through which the Soviet and the Chinese revolutions passed, and which created the ideological atmosphere for the present experience.

Mao Tse-tung initiated an ideological drive against dogmatism in the late 1930s and early 1940s in the Communist Party of China. The essence of this campaign was to end the method of argument by analogy and ^{by reference} the clinging to the Soviet stereotype, which had bedevilled the leadership of the Communist Party of China from its foundation till the historic Tsunyi Conference of 1935. It was this drive alone which made possible the acceptance by the Communist Party of China, as a whole, of the creative developments of Marxism that Mao was introducing. The very success of the drive and of the Communist Party of China subsequent to the acceptance of Mao's ideas led to the opposite error. ~~On~~ ^{There developed an attitude of} ~~the one hand, the attitude developed of~~ stressing the singularity of China and of the Communist Party of China, ^{and of overlooking of certain regularities in the matter} ~~and of overlooking of certain regularities in the matter~~ ^{of the technique of socialist construction.} ~~of the technique of socialist construction.~~ ^{Instead of} ~~from looking~~ at China's problems with the help of Marxism, ^{the} ~~the~~ transition was made to looking at the problems of the development of Marxism from the Chinese standpoint. On the other hand, a Chinese stereotype was developed which was sought to be universalised. The specific conditions of China and the particular historical moment of the Chinese Revolution were overlooked in the process. It is easy enough to become dogmatic about other ^{people's} ~~for~~ dogmatism, especially when success comes with the first application of what was a new truth. The particular nature of Mao's struggle against dogmatism could lead to the twist of exaggerating ^{the} ~~the~~ significance of the experience of the Chinese revolution. This twist was clearly evident in the long summing-up article that

Liu Shao-chi wrote on the tenth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China; for the World Marxist Review

The second ideological or experiential factor was the nature of the Chinese Revolution. Stalin was not sufficiently accurate and comprehensive when he said that its characteristic feature was that armed revolution was opposing armed counter-revolution -- a formulation enthusiastically quoted by Mao Tse-tung and other leading Chinese theoreticians. The specific form of the Chinese revolution was a peasants' war led by Marxists which transformed itself into liberation of the whole country by an army from the base in the North. It was not the spontaneous upheaval of the people throughout China which culminated in October 9, 1949 but the victory of the liberation Army. It was more chieh-fang (liberation) rather than k'ang-feng (Revolution). This was important in giving a military impress on the thinking of the Chinese Marxists and of inculcating an attitude of War Communism, familiar enough to students of Soviet history prior to the NEP of Lenin. A carry over of this approach when tackling questions of socialist construction, strikingly evident in the Great Leap and the people's communes experiments, was an instance of misplaced concreteness. It also easily enough led to the overlooking of spontaneous, objective and internal factors of a popular revolution in countries where the building up and advance of an indigenous liberation army could not be the main form of revolutionary struggle. Voluntarist excess, over-reliance on the ideological strength of a trained corps and the 'goading on' of revolutions from without, could easily become the hall-mark of the thinking of Chinese Marxists should they allow their own successful revolutionary experience to overwhelm them.

These ideological experiences fitted in with the more elemental pressures of the petty-proprietor and ^{small-scale} producer ~~material~~ environment of China to give us the powerful current of distorted Marxist thinking, which is the root cause and character of the present split. In essence, it is a current against the development of spontaneous, autonomous revolutions in different countries of the world and of replacing certain ~~very few~~ fundamental regularities of social revolution by the specific regularities of ^{the} Chinese revolution at a certain time in history, which is irreversibly over.

III

The actual differences ^{about} ~~take~~ the shape of tactical issues, of matters of policy and, to an extent, ^{of} the evaluation of the past.

^{In the} ~~on the question of evaluating~~ ^{on} Stalin, the communist Party of ^{the} Soviet Union has presented an impressive array of facts which go to show that for ~~quite~~ some seventeen years or so there was arbitrary rule of the most extraordinary ^{in the Soviet Union & elsewhere are often in form of} kind; ^{of} Stalin's erroneous theory that, as socialism advances the class struggle sharpens; ^{of} the intense provocation from the capitalist encirclement and the tensions of rapid socialist industrialisation; together with the personality of the leader. ^{The} ~~this~~ Soviet explanation ^s of ^{this, however,} the phenomenon ^{they} are very far from satisfactory. ~~More all, it neatly evades~~ the question of the role of many of the most prominent present leaders, ~~identifying and attacking~~

^{of last,} The communist party of China, however, does not attempt to explain the phenomenon so much as to deny its existence or to admit that there were some "excesses" and a few theoretical mistakes. Stalin's merits outweigh his faults, ~~as it puts it~~

This is an extraordinarily lighthearted approach to most serious practical and moral issues. ^{The Chinese party does not face} It avoids facing the issue whether or not thousands upon thousands of honest and true Communists were ~~not~~ unjustly killed, defamed or ^{otherwise} ~~in other ways~~ ^{and} ruined, often enough involving their families as well. It further avoids facing the issue of whether this is the inevitable path of "voices raised in anger", to use Brecht's phrase, to ^{push} ~~raise~~ a backward country to the level of modern socialism. ^{Must history justify its} ~~heroes~~ ^{in this way, inevitably?}

It would appear that the Communist Party of Soviet Union overlooks ^{achievement of industrialization} ~~firstly~~ the successes of the policy of Stalin; the ~~reaching of~~ targets and the defeat of fascism. ^{It was, after all, the success of the Soviet Union during the Stalin era which made many Communists within and outside the Soviet Union feel that the} ~~the~~ ^{Stalin's} ~~was~~ right. ^{only to point to his failures cannot explain} the personality cult.

^{Further,} ^{for the crimes of Stalin} ~~Secondly~~, the responsibility ^{the} was that of the Communist party of Soviet Union as a whole, especially of its ~~entire~~ Central Committee. It would not be correct to replace the cult of the personality by the cult of the Party. The party as a whole can make the most serious mistakes -- this is evident enough to those Communists who have the living experience of movements which have not only not succeeded but frequently failed quite utterly. Here, ~~the question of~~ ^{the} outlook, of requirements of a critical, scientific approach, ^{and} of adequate scope for expression of dissent and ways of reaching the entire Party with opinions at variance with the current policies, becomes of paramount importance. It would seem that this method of consultations on major economic and technical issues has become the usual practice now in the Communist Party of Soviet Union, with frequent

central committee meetings and regular party congresses. This has yet to extend to political issues and to themes of Marxist-Leninist theory, ^(passionate debates over) which were so marked a feature of the days of Lenin -- days of far graver difficulty and instability. ^{than with it of today.}

Thirdly, there is the problem of institutional guarantees. One wonders whether there can ever be institutional guarantees when ~~movement is~~ ^{movement is} so terribly swift, unsettled and unsettling. ^(movement is too late) Historical experience has ~~also~~ demonstrated the futility of institutions once wrong approaches and attitudes are adopted. Yet, there is value in institutions as the embodiment and guarantee of a long-term shift and social achievement. In the Soviet Union, ~~however, there seems to have been no lack of adequate~~ ^{many such did in fact exist} ~~and proper institutions~~ -- the Soviet mass organisations and the like, to which the Webbs drew our attention. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that there was a certain degeneration of these institutions, and the task ^{remains to be} ~~has been~~ taken in hand of reviving these specifically socialist and Soviet institutions of democratic expression and control -- we come back again to the question of ideological attitude.

Fourthly, the social roots of the phenomenon of arbitrary rule are to be sought not only in the vast peasant environment of "rural idiosyncrasy", to use a phrase of Marx, but also in the ^{incomplete revolution} ~~semi-finished condition~~ of the working class with its lack of democratic traditions and consciousness. The leap was from Tsarist autocracy to socialist democracy without ^{a period of struggle for} ~~the back ground of the conquest of~~ civil rights within a liberal bourgeois democracy. ~~The leap~~ was a stupendous achievement and without it much of modern history would have been very dark indeed. It is impossible to overestimate the impetus that socialism received from this

great historical initiative. Yet the strain involved and the insufficient elements of a self-generating working class opened the possibility of revolutionary substitution, which is the essence of Stalin's methodology.

Far more important ^{however,} than the assessment of Stalin is the evaluation of the ^{present} epoch. ~~It is~~ the difference in this assessment ~~that is~~ ^{the} the root of the differences over peaceful coexistence, war and peace, peaceful transition to socialism and the new perspectives of development for the newly independent states. It is on the question of the epoch that the world Communist movement is sharply divided into a creative majority and a dogmatic minority.

^{Account} ~~It is necessary here to discuss an important aspect of dialectical materialism, which is accepted by all Communist Parties as the basis of their approach to all phenomena.~~ Lenin emphasised that the self movement of all forms of matter, i.e., objective reality, including social life, was generated by the struggle of opposites. The struggle of opposites was absolute and their unity and equilibrium temporary and conditional. It becomes essential for Marxists to base their policies on discovering the determining opposites in any given aspect of objective reality that they are studying, bearing in mind, in addition, the inter-connections of that aspect of reality with the total reality.

All Communist Parties including the Communist party of China, are agreed that on a world scale the struggle today hinges on the interaction and conflict between the imperialist and anti-imperialist ^{forces} ~~opposites~~. That is why Lenin called ^{the} ~~the~~ epoch, in which he lived, the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution, ^{the} ~~a definition made,~~ perhaps, in 1916. The Communist Party of China insists

that since the two determining opposites remain in existence to-day the world tactical line mapped out by Lenin till his death in 1924 retains its full validity today.

Hence, the opposition by the Communist Party of China to any 'revision' of Lenin in the matter of the inevitability of World War as long as imperialism exists, the depiction of peaceful coexistence as a 'bloodless' war and armed truce, the inevitability of Civil War as a form of transition to socialism, the impossibility of national advance for ex-colonial countries unless the working class is at the head of the nation and of the state. And so on.

Is this approach to the question the correct dialectical materialist one? One thinks not. True, the struggle of opposites is absolute and that the world scene today has the imperialist - anti-imperialist opposites as the determining one. But what about the relative positions of the opposites? Have they remained the same? Which opposite was the more powerful one at the time when Lenin wrote and which now? What is the consequence of the shift in the relative strengths of the determining opposites? Is this of no importance and should attention be only focussed upon the continuing determining opposites and their absolute clash?

The Communist party of China evades answers to these questions and yet without clarity on them no fruitful scientific or discussion of the most fundamental divisive issue is

possible. The creative majority of the world Communist movement agrees on the continuity of the opposites and on anti-imperialist forces. In this sense - but in this sense only - nothing has changed since Lenin wrote, in the years immediately before his death, in 1924. But it further believes that a radical change has taken place in the relative

imperialism and socialism that
positions of ~~the opposites~~ and this necessitates a re-examination of many aspects of the tactical line propounded by Lenin some 40 years ago. The very success of that tactical line has rendered it obsolete in many important particulars.

The inevitability of World War, of the Civil War form of revolution, of the armed truce nature of peaceful co-existence, of the impossibility of independent national development of the ex-colonial countries except under working class leadership -- all this hinged upon the assumption, correct till quite recently, that ~~it was~~ imperialism ^{was its opponent} ~~that~~ was more powerful ~~than the anti-imperialist forces~~. To day, however, the balance of forces has shifted and ~~imperialist opposition~~ ^{now} it is the world socialist system and the other anti-imperialist forces that determine the main trend of world developments. Hence, a new approach can and should be made to all these strategic tactical problems.

Indeed, it is difficult to understand how the Communist Party of China can deny the qualitative transformation in the balance of world class forces since 1916. The socialist camp and the breakdown of the colonial system represent a decisive weakening of imperialism, which retains its predatory character but not its previous preponderant strength. It is not the change in the character of imperialism but in the restrictions of its operations that give our times the character of a new epoch. ^{This new epoch has developments of theory and practice that are new possibilities}

It is ^{has} a fact to be underlined that the ~~new~~ ^{fact} understanding and definition of the new epoch, given pride of place in the Moscow Statement of 1960, is nowhere quoted in the voluminous material put out by the Communist Party of China, which is replete with all manner of quotations from every conceivable document. In Long Live Leninism and in the article directed against Togliatti, however, quite a different definition of the present epoch is given which differs hardly at all from

the one ^{by} ~~of~~ Lenin made some forty years ago.

~~It is here that we come to the heart of the present Communist controversy. The rest is a matter of detail, and even ^{of} technical details, important for the routine work of those active in the world Communist movement but not of fundamental significance. Where to start a revolution or when, whether any particular action of Khrushchev was right or wrong, what is the specific character of the class structure of Ghana, the United Arab Republic or India, are questions of great importance but not, perhaps, for the fundamental analysis ^{regarding it} one is attempting to make. In any event any worthwhile presentation of these details of controversy would require an immense amount of space.~~

~~One~~ ^{Other} fundamental point has to be made before closing this penultimate section. There is a sharp difference between the majority and the minority in the world Communist movement on the necessity of averting a thermo-nuclear war. Certainly, the Communist Party of China desires peace and works for it, albeit in strange and desperate ways, but its leadership is disinclined to give the maintenance of world peace the first priority (here again the relevant formulations of the Moscow documents of 1957 and 1960 are never quoted) and ^{fail to} ~~be~~ correctly grasp the magnitude of catastrophe and disaster should there be a thermo-nuclear war. It is ~~significant~~ that the Communist party of China has never denied that Mao Tse-tung told Jawaharlal Nehru that in a thermo-nuclear war roughly half of humanity would be wiped out but ^{that} this need not particularly depress anybody, since imperialism would also be destroyed and the remaining half of humanity could go on to build a classless and glorious civilisation. He added that he disagreed with Nehru's pessimism on this point. Since these remarks were repeated

by Mao at the 1957 Moscow Conference and have not been repudiated since, then, they evidently represent a considered approach to the vital problem of human survival when confronted by the thermo-nuclear challenge.

The newness of the times in which we live are, therefore, not only a question of the change in the relative positions of the imperialist and the anti-imperialist forces but equally in the new dimensions of destruction that would be the inevitable consequence of a thermo-nuclear war. This only emphasises the necessity of seeing the importance of the pursuit of the international class struggle through the form of peaceful co-existence and peaceful competition simultaneously with the spontaneous, self-generated emergence of indigenous revolutions. Any "pushing on" of revolutions, as also any export of counter-revolution, from without becomes an exercise not only in futility but in cataclysm. One wonders what the fate of humanity would have been if it was not Khrushchev and Kennedy ^{and} who confronted each other at the height of the Caribbean crisis in October 1962 but Mao Tse-tung and Senator Barry Goldwater.

IV

~~some basic points emerge out of~~ the present Communist controversy, which in its scale and vigour is the biggest thing of its kind in history, ~~quite~~ ^{even} dwarfing the schisms in Christianity, Islam, Buddhism or the socialist movement at the time of the rupture with social-democracy. Unlike those previous splits, ^{against the last} ~~one is~~ ^{the} of the opinion that the present one is not so much the reflection of ~~class~~ ^{the} of conflicting material interests but rather more "purely" ideological. It is more akin to the kind of passions generated at the time of any significant breakdown or breakthrough in any coherent systematisation of a series of errors or findings in one of the natural sciences. The passions here are greater and the ^{stakes} ~~states~~ more

immediately important and relevant to the fate of humanity, but its essential character is the same. The conflicting view points, however much buttressed by quotations from the texts of the founders of the system on both sides, make their ultimate court of appeal ⁱⁿ social practice and human reason. This at once qualitatively demarcates it from the purely theological or semantic disputes of many of the great controversies of the past. We have before us a modern controversy, familiar enough to anybody who has reflected ~~at all~~ on the nature and manner of scientific advance in our times.

At the same time one has to note its specific character. It is true that the Communist party of China denounces its ideological opponents as having not only deviated from Marxism but having abandoned it altogether. It goes further and claims that the Communist party of ^{the} Soviet Union and the other ruling Communist Parties from which it differs, have set about destroying their socialist systems and that, in the Soviet Union in particular, there has been a regular "deluge of capitalist restoration." The warning is given that the Soviet Union and the other "revisionist" socialist states would end up in the way Tito's Yugoslavia ^{allegedly} has, i.e., as a "fascist satellite of United States imperialism." [In Comment Number Three, devoted to presenting its analysis of the Yugoslav social system, the Communist Party of China theoreticians have come to the conclusion that while a peaceful transition to socialism is not feasible the peaceful restoration of capitalism has been proved possible. But, as yet, the Communist party of ^{the} Soviet Union and the other Communist parties of the creative majority have not linked up the dogmatic errors of the Communist party of China either with any change in the fundamental socialist nature of the Chinese system, or the basically Marxist character of the Communist Party of China. This is a sharp break from the previous practice and of the utmost consequence.] ~

It will be recalled that in the previous ideological controversy with Trotsky and his followers and the post-war conflict with Tito, the gravamen of the charges on both sides was that the opponent had betrayed the cause of socialism and abandoned Marxism. The opponent was not within the movement but an enemy outside it. ^{it is a} ~~it is a~~ strange quirk of history ~~that~~ that it was Mao Tse-tung who, after Lenin, abandoned this attitude with the reformulation of what Lenin had called non-antagonistic contradictions, i.e., which do not require breakup or explosion even when conflict is involved. For more than two decades this was the approach he adopted ⁱⁿ ~~when dealing with~~ inner-party conflicts in China, ^{an approach which Mao} and which he sharply underlined in his famous speech on contradictions among the people in February 1957. ~~It is~~

~~significant that for the first time~~ in the history of the Communist Party of China since the Tsunyi Conference of 1935, where Mao established his leadership, ~~it was during the anti-right campaign in late 1957-58 that one read of large-scale expulsions and denunciations in the Communist Party of China, including Central Committee and Politbureau members.~~

^{CPSU} At the same time, the Communist Party of Soviet Union leadership while downgrading Stalin -- rather ineptly and unscientifically as we have seen -- insisted that he had been a great Marxist,

^{had} he had defended Lenin's cause and remained a staunch fighter for the proletarian cause till the very end. ~~This was the tragedy of Stalin, Khrushchev pointed out.~~ ^{But, by and large, this is the} approach adopted towards the dogmatic errors and splitting activities of the Communist Party of China, though hegemonistic aspirations and chauvinist motivations are also imputed.

This attitude, one strongly feels, is the correct and appropriate one, not ^{chiefly} because of the undoubted tactical advantages inherent in it, but because it is in keeping with the ideological and scientific nature of the dispute. There are

It is significant that the large-scale expulsions and denunciations in the Communist Party of China, including Central Committee and Politbureau members, during the anti-right campaign in late 1957-58 were the first

numerous instances of confusion and scrimony in the controversies of significance among natural scientists, and the result is not always a compromise and synthesis but the clear victory of one of the disputants. Yet, all are and remain scientists and even the errors go to make up the ^{corpus} ~~corpus~~ of science. Toleration of error is intellectual immorality, yet if the limits of the error are within the limits of the universe of discourse, i.e., reason and experiment, the consequence ^{should be} ~~is~~ not ~~miscommunication~~. It seems likely that this ~~is the~~ approach ~~that~~ will be adhered to by the creative majority of Communist parties, though, it is also likely that the Communist Party of China might well lead itself and the dogmatic majority ^{minority} outside the common movement. ~~We shall have a reversal of the fortunes of Trotsky, although he acted in a manner after his expulsion which the Communist Party of China now imitates.~~

The General
Outline
This brings us to a particularly interesting point of socialist history. ^{The 1920s and 1930s} ~~one~~ would be the last to under estimate the historic necessity and immense benefit of the break that Marx and Engels made from Utopian socialism or the rupture from social-democracy that Lenin accomplished. Both these steps were dictated by the inherent exigencies of socialist advance in thought and action. Yet the great Utopian socialists -- Saint-Simon, Fourier and Owen -- are part of the socialist heritage. So are social-democrats like Plekhanov, Bebel, the Deibtschewts, Rosa Luxemburg and the earlier Kantsky. One recalls in this connection the warm praise of Engels for the utopian socialists and Lenin's advice to the younger generation to read Plekhanov and the early Kantsky. ^{may be recalled} It was part of the sectarian attitude of Stalin that such an approach was abandoned.

10-11-1977

one, at the end of Mount Thoughtful as he

--24--

The present coexistence of Marxism and Communism is an unstable, ^{and} temporary state of equilibrium. It will give way to a higher level of scientific understanding of the world as well as ^{of} the way to change it. The change of science is the only absolute that lasts since it is never still and always transforming itself.

Hyderabad, India.

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~~For Circulation No. 2.~~
~~pp. 224~~

COMMUNIST CONTROVERSY

Mohit Sen.

The great debate in the International Communist movement has reached its peak now. Certain organisational steps may or may not follow the World Conference which is ~~not~~ ^{being prepared} ~~scheduled to meet fairly soon~~. Some further charges and counter-charges ~~might~~ ^{may} be brought forward by the protagonists on both sides. One hopes that there will be more science and sophistication in the inevitable further polemics. Yet one can legitimately doubt whether any new basic themes will emerge, following the ~~right~~ Comments by the leadership of the Communist Party of China (C.P.C.) and the report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) by M.A. Suslov.

Rather than take recourse to a footnote, ~~one~~ ^I would like to state at the outset that, of the enormous amount of literature that has been generated by the great debate, not much is likely to stand the passage of time and count as a contribution to the ~~conference~~ ^{corpus} of Marxist thought, ~~even where it has gone off the rails~~. We have the 1957 and 1960 Moscow Documents and the CPSU Programme as well as the Suslov Report. Then there is the Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and Kardelj's Problems of War & Socialism, Togliatti's interview to Nuovi Argomenti in 1956 and his reports to the congresses of the Communist Party of Italy after 1956. ~~would also stand~~. So would Mao's writings and speeches in 1956-57. And on the other side, years hence one might possibly like to refer to Long Live Leninism, Once more on the differences between Comrade Togliatti and ourselves and the Eight Comment: Proletarian Revolution & Khrushchev's Revisionism. The rest, while signifying something is too full

of sound and fury.

~~One has not found it possible to remain neutral in this great debate. With as much objectivity as one could muster one examined the documents, including those published by the protagonists in India, and came to the conclusion that the Communist Party of China is sinning grievously against the scientific method of Marxism while the Communist Party of Soviet Union, despite some aberrations and hesitations, is continuing the work of creatively developing the science of Marxism.~~

~~In a large measure this attitude of~~ taking a certain standpoint is inevitable in such a crucial and clearcut debate, especially if one happens also to be a Communist. Nor need it be an unscientific attitude. After all, any advance of any science has almost always been the result of intense controversy and the adoption of partisan attitudes. Neutrality, often enough, has been an euphemism for a failure of intellectual nerve.

~~It is~~ ^{it is} proposed ^{and then to} in this article to attempt to explain ~~the~~ the genesis of the present debate, ^{we then} go on to examine the nature of the split, ^{we wish to} proceed to discuss the basis of the tactical issues involved and finally ^{we wish to} put forward certain rather more fundamental considerations.

I.

The Communist Party of China is quite right when it says that the first stage of the present controversy ^{inaugurated by} was ^{the} the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union. Not only was there the sharp denigration of Stalin at this Congress but certain new ideas were advanced on the possibility of averting a world war. ^{there emerged} ~~the~~ the new dimensions of peaceful coexistence, ^{and a} the fresh look at the newly independent countries, ^{at} and the ~~increased~~ possibilities of a peaceful transition to socialism.

All this may have been known earlier to certain of the topflight leaders of the International Communist movement but it certainly came as a great shock to the overwhelming majority of Communists and commentators on Communism, ~~with the possibly sole exception of Isaac Deutscher~~. It seems also to be a fact that the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union did not fully consult other Communist parties before coming forward with a startlingly new evaluation of a very important period of the International Communist movement and of its most outstanding personality and leader.

~~Following the 20th Congress,~~
There was a great convulsion in every Communist Party, ~~in varying degrees, and in particular we had the Polish and Hungarian disturbances which both reflected the new tensions and aggravated them.~~ Since then, there has been a steadily mounting conflict in the International Communist movement, ~~till the present form and intensity of the great debate would certainly not have been inevitable. It is difficult not to concede the Communist Party of China this point.~~

~~Since that memorable Congress the stages of the great debate can be marked as follows:~~
~~1. The struggle against the revisionist offensive till a point of stability was reached with the November 1957 Moscow meeting; the carrying forward of this offensive with a fair degree of unanimity, with the Yugoslav Programme as the main target, till the end of 1959; the start of the big dogmatic push by the Communist Party of China from the beginning of 1960 and the gradual realignment of Communist Parties; the rebuff to dogmatism in the November 1960 Moscow Conference but without an open break on either side; a vigorous offensive by the forces of creative Marxism since the 22nd Communist Party of Soviet Union Congress in October 1961 and the dogmatic counter-attack, especially following the October 1962 Caribbean crisis; the present position of~~

showdown and confrontation, revealing a very clear majority for the creative Marxists but a powerful and determined minority for the dogmatists.

Through all these stages -- the details of which are a fascinating study but somewhat irrelevant to the central purpose of this article -- we find the operation of the laws of dialectics. A creative push leads to a revisionist onslaught and the defeat of this onslaught leads to the emergence of a powerful dogmatic trend to combat which there is a fresh return to creativity at a higher level. The spiral-like movement of reality extends also to the realm of the thought of convinced dialectical materialists!

An interesting point to note in this connection is that the Communist Party of China in the first stage of the creative push was almost avant-garde. Mao Tse-tung's two articles on the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat and his famous speech on the contradictions among the people went far beyond the ~~quite~~ cautious, and even pragmatic, formulations of the Communist Party of ^{the} Soviet Union. His only rivals in creative daring were Fogliatti and the Yugoslav Communists. ~~The Communist Party of China seems to have got stuck on the second point of the dialectical triad and has not yet been able to get on to the higher level of creativity.~~

~~Here one has to make a very brief digression on the question of the duration of theoretical formulations. Reality is constantly changing and is the master of theory. But Marxists believe in the law-governed pattern of objective change and, therefore, in the temporary stability or unity of the opposites rendering and driving the development of reality. They, therefore, hold to a certain duration and~~

not to the instantaneousness theory of the Buddhists. Hence, after a fair amount of debate and discussion conclusions can be reached which are operative, until a qualitative transformation is effected. ~~Of course, one has to keep in mind here also the various levels of the development of matter as a whole and of its sub-divisions -- a discussion of all this would, however, take us too far afield.~~

While one can agree with the Communist Party of China that the ^{Congress of the} 20th Communist Party of ^{the} Soviet Union ~~Congress~~ sparked off the present controversy yet it had to come at some time. Fundamentally the inevitability was grounded in the new social reality and the new balance of forces on a world scale after the consolidation of the socialist camp and its possession of atomic armaments. Tactical adjustment and even a new strategic line had to be worked out. ~~And in~~ the process sharp polemics and a certain degree of ~~disarray~~ ^{disarray} could scarcely be avoided. ~~but there are other reasons for affirming this inevitability.~~

~~It is these~~ ^{one can} ~~reasons~~ ^{traced back to that other} great divide in the Socialist movement -- ~~Lenin's~~ ^{Lenin's} break from social democracy following the First World War ^{culminating} in the setting up of the Third (Communist) International in 1919. Since that break, the first essential task of the Communist movement has been that of establishing its identity. simultaneously, of course, there was the problem of becoming an effective mass force in the different ^{nations} ~~states~~ in the world.

In the course of carrying out this essential task, while also paying attention to the problem of mass influence, it was, above all, necessary to combat the ideology and outlook of social democratic reformism, ~~or~~ ^{Right} opportunism, to use the Leninist terminology. Only secondary importance could ~~attach~~

attach, and was attached, to the problem of sectarianism --
the sect, or the movement, had itself to be first established.
~~If we look for~~ the Soviet Union, China, Germany and France ~~(aside)~~
~~we shall find that~~ till the middle 1930's mass Communist
~~Parties did not exist in other countries of the world~~
~~(aside)~~

By about 1935, however, following the fascist
offensive the problem of ^{transition} ~~going over~~ from ^{an} establishing of
identity to mass actions and influence on a global scale
^{Commenced.} ~~came to the fore~~ together with the need for broad unity
to contain and finish the fascist menace. ~~There was the~~ ^{required} a
need for a sharp turn in the policies and outlook of the
International Communist movement. ~~at this time~~ ^{4th} and the
seventh World Congress of the Communist International in
1935 ~~signified that~~ the International leadership ^{Signified the dawn} ~~was aware~~
of this problem. Dimitroff's report on the United Front
Against Fascism and Wang Ming's report on the anti-colonial
revolution at that juncture. ~~did give~~ ^{gave} a new orientation
and concentrated ^{the} fire against sectarianism and "Leftism".
It is significant that time and again these two main
reports referred back not to Lenin's great historical
~~service of reports~~ ^{to} with socialism ^D democracy but to his last
great theoretical work "Leftwing" Communism, an Infantile
Disorder. Time and again these two reports emphasised the
dual duty of the ~~Communist parties~~ ^{Communist Party} ~~becoming~~ ^{of building} mass forces ~~themselves~~
and of ^{simultaneously} building unity with other anti-fascist and anti-
imperialist mass forces.

this new orientation was implemented in the course
of the anti-fascist war and, above all, by the Communist
Party of China through the theory and leadership of Mao Tse-tung.
This led to a swift growth of Communist Parties in major
regions of the world and to the emergence of the world
Communist movement as one of the major shaping influences

of world politics. The further development and sophistication of this new orientation was an essential task of Marxist theoreticians and leaders in the post-war period. ~~yet not only was this not done but~~ ^{However,} a deeply sectarian analysis and line of action was imposed on the movement by Stalin acting through the Communist Information Bureau established in 1947. His last major theoretical pronouncement -- Economic Problems in the U.S.S.R. and the ^{of Socialism} speech at the ~~19th~~ ^{Congress of the CPSU in 1952} ~~Communist Party of Soviet Union Congress~~ clearly bear the impress of dogmatism and sectarianism.

What the 20th ~~Communist Party of Soviet Union~~ ^{CPSU} Congress and the subsequent efforts signified was, above all, the continuation, development and sophistication of the new orientation that was already a reality in 1935. It was a new initiative to carry on the tasks of transition from establishing ^{Communist Party} identity to becoming a mass force, acting in unity with other mass forces, for the accomplishment of radical social changes on a world scale.

II.

~~It is against this background that one would like to discuss the question of the nature of the present socialist~~
Power considerations certainly do play a part, especially as far as China is concerned. There is an element in the attitude of the Communist Party of China which can only be called chauvinism. Even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that both India and China have an equal share of blame with regard to the border war between the two countries, ~~yet~~ the form and manner in which China presses her claims and the enormous importance ^{it} attaches to considerations of national prestige (one has only to recall her negative

If the nature of the present situation should be discussed against this background

approach to the proposals of the Colombo Powers), are evidence enough of a deviation from the norms of socialist behaviour. To this one has to add the very odd state of affairs along the Sino-Soviet border. Surely as between two socialist countries the principle of maintaining the status quo with regard to borders is the only rational policy. Arguments from feudal maps and "graves of ancestors" are particularly out of place in this connection.

Yet it would not be adequate to depict the conflict as mainly provoked by Chinese chauvinism. Would regional position, perhaps, give us a clue? Some sort of Asian or Afro-Asian feeling might have prompted the Communist Party of China to behave as it does, as a reflection ^{an} ~~of~~ and accentuation of its separate identity and role in the world Communist movement. But this again is not an adequate explanation because the height of China's impact on the Afro-Asian world was at the time of Bandung in 1955 and later when her economic achievements astounded this vast segment of humanity. The stress on regional exclusiveness came simultaneously with the conflict with India, the aggressive espousal of the cause of the overseas Chinese in Indonesia and the ill-concealed hostility towards Nasser's Arab nationalism. It came also at a time when the economic achievement had turned into its opposite, when, as Edgar Snow has told us in The other side of the River - national income actually fell for three years following the "great leap" policies. *China's impact on Afro-Asia is still considerable but it has not fulfilled the promise of the early 1950s.* Underdevelopment and isolation ~~which control~~

~~primary factors~~ are ~~again~~ more in the nature of necessary ~~base~~ ^{of} rather than sufficient causes. After all, China was more underdeveloped and no less isolated in 1956-57 --

~~primary factors~~ are ~~again~~ more in the nature of necessary ~~base~~
~~rather~~ ^{or} than sufficient causes. After all, China was
more underdeveloped and no less isolated in 1956-57 --

when she was avant-garde in the matter of creative Marxism -- than in 1960. And by her present policies and attitudes she is scarcely contributing to her development or to the breaking of her isolation, both ~~of which factors~~ the leadership of the Communist Party of China ~~leadership~~ has shown itself fully aware of in the recent period, as the African tours of Chou Enlai and the overtures to British, French and West German businessmen demonstrate. Nor is the appeal of the policies of the Communist Party of China only to the Communist parties in underdeveloped countries. The Japanese Communist Party is not operating in an underdeveloped country nor the Gripps group in Belgium or the anti-revisionist groups in Britain, France or Italy. Conversely, the Communist parties of India, Ceylon, Iraq, Chile, Mexico and so on are neither the product of, nor are they operating in conditions of ~~overdevelopment~~ affluence, ~~or what have you.~~

Objective factors are undoubtedly the grass-root ones when such significant and large phenomena as the split in the international communist movement are ~~to be~~ explained. ~~At the same time, we have to look for objective factors.~~ The petty-bourgeois environment in China, the newness of the industrial working class there, certainly help to build strong pressures in the direction of the frenzy of 'left' adventurism and sectarianism. The fact of the industrialisation of the Soviet Union and the maturity of its working class ~~are~~ undoubtedly indispensable to the kind of changes in policy and attitude that have been registered there in the recent decade.

Yet in any discussion of this nature one should remember Engels' remarks about the relative independence of ideological factors. After all, the laws of history operate through accidents, ~~and~~ in the broad perspective of history. The present debate in the Communist movement is

an accident, though not without its causes. It is essential, therefore, to look for the ideological factors in an ideological dispute, to remember certain historical experiences through which ~~the Chinese~~ the Chinese revolutions passed and which created the ideological atmosphere for the present approach.

Mao Tse-tung initiated an ideological drive against dogmatism in the late 1930's and early 1940's in the Communist Party of China. The essence of this campaign was to end the method of argument by analogy and ^{by reference} ~~the clinging~~ to the Soviet stereotype, which had bedevilled the leadership of the Communist Party of China from its foundation till the historic Tsunyi Conference of 1935. It was this drive ~~alone~~ which made possible the acceptance by the Communist Party of China, as a whole, of the creative developments of Marxism that Mao was introducing. The very success of the drive and of the communist party of China subsequent to the acceptance of Mao's ideas led to the opposite error. ~~On~~ ^{They developed an attitude of} ~~the one hand, the attitude developed of~~ stressing the singularity of China and of the Communist Party of China, ~~and of overlooking of certain regularities in the matter~~ ^{this} ~~of the technique of socialist construction.~~ ^{communist features} ~~From~~ ^{revolution and} looking at China's problems with the help of Marxism, ^{instead of} ~~the~~ transition was made to looking at the problems of the development of Marxism from the Chinese standpoint. ^{On} On the other hand, a Chinese stereotype was developed which was sought to be universalised. The specific conditions of China and the particular historical moment of the Chinese Revolution were overlooked in the process. It is easy enough to become cognatic about other ~~dogmatism~~ ^{people's}, especially when success comes with the first application of what was a new truth. The particular nature of Mao's struggle against dogmatism ~~could lead to the twist or exaggerating~~ ^{and} the significance of the experience of the Chinese revolution. This twist was clearly evident in the long summing-up article that

Liu Shao-chi wrote on the tenth anniversary of the founding of the people's Republic of China: for the world Marxist Review

The second ideological or experiential factor was the nature of the Chinese Revolution. Stalin was not sufficiently accurate and comprehensive when he said that its characteristic feature was that armed revolution was opposing armed counter-revolution -- a formulation enthusiastically quoted by Mao Tse-tung and other leading Chinese theoreticians. The specific form of the Chinese revolution was a peasants' war led by Marxists which transformed itself into liberation of the whole country by an army from the base in the North. It was not the spontaneous upheaval of the people throughout China which culminated in October 3, 1949 but the victory of the liberation Army. It was more chihfang (liberation) rather than kaming (Revolution). This was important in giving a military impress on the thinking of the Chinese Marxists and of inculcating an attitude of War Communism, familiar enough to students of Soviet history prior to the NEP of Lenin. NEP A carry-over of this approach when tackling questions of socialist construction, strikingly evident in the Great Leap and the people's Communes experiments, was an instance of misplaced concreteness. It also easily enough led to the overlooking of spontaneous, objective and internal factors of a popular revolution in countries where the building up and advance of an indigenous liberation army could not be the main form of revolutionary struggle. Voluntarist excess over-reliance on the ideological strength of a trained corps and the 'goading on' of revolutions from without, could easily become the hall-mark of the thinking of Chinese Marxists should they allow their own successful revolutionary experience to overwhelm them.

chihfang

kaming

NEP

These ideological experiences fitted in with the more elemental pressures of the petty-proprietor and ^{small-hold} producer ~~environment~~ environment of China to give us the powerful current of distorted Marxist thinking, which is the root cause and character of the present split. In essence, it is a current against the development of spontaneous, autonomous revolutions in different countries of the world and of replacing certain ~~very few~~ fundamental regularities of social revolution by the specific regularities of Chinese revolution at a certain time in history, which is irreversibly over.

III

The actual differences ^{assume} ~~take~~ the shape of tactical issues, of matters of policy and, to an extent, ^{of} the evaluation of the past.

^{on the question of evaluating} Stalin, the communist Party of ^{the} Soviet Union has presented an impressive array of facts which go to show that for ~~quite~~ some seventeen years or so there was arbitrary rule of the most extraordinary kind, ^{in the Soviet Union} Stalin's erroneous theory that, as socialism advances the class struggle sharpens, ^{the} intense provocation from the capitalist encirclement and the tensions of rapid socialist industrialisation, together with the personality of the leader -- ~~this~~ Soviet explanation ^{of the phenomenon} are ~~very~~ far from satisfactory. ~~from all it really breeds~~

~~the question of the role of many of the most prominent present leaders, including themselves~~

The communist party of China, however, does not attempt to explain the phenomenon so much as to deny its existence or, at best, to admit that there were some 'excesses' and a few theoretical mistakes. Stalin's merits outweigh his faults, ~~as it puts it.~~

+ Explanations
are offered in
terms of

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This is an extraordinarily lighthearted approach to most serious practical and moral issues. ^{the Chinese party does not} ~~It avoids facing the~~ ^{to} issue whether or not thousands upon thousands of honest and true Communists were ~~not~~ unjustly killed, defamed or ^{otherwise} ~~in other ways~~ ^{and} ruined, often enough involving their families as well. It further avoids facing the issue of whether this is the inevitable path of "voices raised in anger", to use Brecht's phrase, to ^{push} ~~raise~~ a backward country to the level of modern socialism. ^{Must history insult its heroes in this way, inevitably?} (Chatter)

It would appear that the Communist Party of Soviet Union overlooks ~~simply~~ ^{achievement of industrialization} the successes of the policy of Stalin; the reaching of targets and the defeat of fascism. ^{It was not all the success of the Soviet Union during the Stalin era} which ~~made many~~ Communists within and outside the Soviet Union feel that the ~~man~~ ^{whole} ~~was~~ ^{State of the Party were} infallible and all that ~~they~~ ^{to} did ^{Stalin's} must inevitably ~~be~~ ^{right}. ^{Only to point to his failures cannot explain} the personality cult.

^{Further} Secondly, ^{for the crimes of Stalin} the responsibility was that of the Communist Party of Soviet Union as a whole, especially of its ~~entire~~ Central Committee. It would not be correct ~~to~~ replace the cult of the personality by the cult of the Party. The party as a whole can make the most serious mistakes -- this is evident enough to those Communists who have the living experience of movements which have not only not succeeded but frequently failed ~~quite~~ utterly. Here, ~~the question of~~ ^{the} outlook, ~~of~~ requirements of a critical, scientific approach, ^{and} of adequate scope for expression of dissent and ways of reaching the entire Party with opinions at variance with the current policies, becomes of paramount importance. It would seem that this method of consultations on major economic and technical issues has become the usual practice now in the Communist Party of ^{the} Soviet Union, with frequent

Central Committee meetings and regular party Congresses. This has yet to extend to political issues and to themes of Marxist-Leninist theory, ^{the debate over} which were so marked a feature of the days of Lenin -- days of far graver difficulty and instability, ^{than this of present}.

Thirdly, there is the problem of institutional guarantees. One wonders whether there can ever be institutional guarantees when ~~movements~~ ^{movements} are so terribly swift, unsettled and unsettling. ^{movements have been} Historical experience has also demonstrated the futility of institutions once wrong approaches and attitudes are adopted. Yet, there is value in institutions as the embodiment and guarantee of a long-term shift and social achievement. In the Soviet Union, ~~there seems to have been no lack of adequate~~ ^{many such} ~~and proper~~ ^{did not exist} institutions -- the Soviet ^{the} mass organisations and the like, to which the Webbs drew our attention. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that there was a certain degeneration of these institutions, ^{seems to have} and the task ~~has~~ ^{been} been taken in hand of reviving these specifically socialist and Soviet institutions of democratic expression and control -- we come back again to the question of ideological attitude.

Fourthly, the social roots of the phenomenon of arbitrary rule are to be sought not only in the vast peasant environment of "rural idiocy," to use a phrase of Marx, but also in the ~~semi-finished condition~~ ^{incomplete evolution} of the working class with its lack of democratic traditions and consciousness. The leap ~~was~~ from Tsarist autocracy to socialist democracy without ^{a period of struggle for} ~~the best ground of the conquest of~~ civil rights within a liberal bourgeois democracy ~~was~~ ^{was} was a stupendous achievement and without it much of modern history would have been very dark indeed. It is impossible to overestimate the impetus that socialism received from this

great historical initiative. Yet the strain involved and the insufficient elements of a self-generating working class opened the possibility of revolutionary substitution, which is the essence of Stalin's methodology.

Far more important ^{however,} than the assessment of Stalin is the evaluation of the ^{present} epoch. ~~It is~~ ^{The} difference in this assessment ~~that is~~ ^{the} root of the differences over peaceful coexistence, war and peace, peaceful transition to socialism and the new perspectives of development for the newly independent states. It is on the question of the epoch that the world Communist movement is sharply divided into a creative majority and a dogmatic minority.

~~It is necessary here to discuss an important aspect of dialectical materialism, which is accepted by all Communist Parties as the basis of their approach, to all phenomena. Lenin emphasised that the self movement of all forms of matter, i.e., objective reality, including social life, was generated by the struggle of opposites. The struggle of opposites was absolute and their unity and equilibrium temporary and conditional. It becomes essential for Marxists to base their policies on discovering the determining opposites in any given aspect of objective reality that they are studying, bearing in mind, in addition, the inter-connections of that aspect of reality with the total reality.~~

All Communist Parties including the Communist party of China, are agreed that, on a world scale, the struggle today hinges on the interaction and conflict between the imperialist and anti-imperialist ^{forces} ~~opposites~~. That is why Lenin called the epoch in which he lived, the epoch of imperialism and ^{the} proletarian revolution, ~~a last stage~~. ~~perhaps in 1926~~. The Communist Party of China insists

that since the two determining opposites remain in existence to-day the world tactical line mapped out by Lenin ~~till his death in 1924~~ retains its full validity ~~today.~~

Hence, the opposition by the Communist Party of China to any 'revision' of Lenin in the matter of the inevitability of World War as long as imperialism exists, ~~and~~ the depiction of peaceful coexistence as a 'bloodless' war and armed truce, the inevitability of Civil War as a form of transition to socialism, the impossibility of national advance for ex-colonial countries unless the working class is at the head of the nation and of the State. And so on.

Is this approach to the question the correct dialectical materialist one? One thinks not. ~~It is true, the struggle of opposites is absolute and the world scene today has the imperialist - anti-imperialist opposites as the determining one. But what about the relative positions of the opposites? Have they remained the same? Which opposite was the more powerful one at the time when Lenin wrote and which now? What is the consequence of the shift in the relative strengths of the determining opposites? Is this of no importance and should attention be only focussed upon the continuing determining opposites and their absolute clash?~~

The Communist party of China evades answers to these questions ~~and yet without clarity on them no fruitful polemic or discussion of the most fundamental divisive issues is possible.~~ The creative majority of the world Communist movement agrees ~~on the continuity of the opposites and on the absolute nature of their conflict.~~ ^{but it continues to be one basic, essential, unchanging force. In this sense - but in this sense only - with the} ~~But it further~~ believes that a radical change has taken place in the relative

^{imperialism & socialism that}
positions of ~~the opposites~~ end / this necessitates a re-examination of many aspects of the tactical line propounded by Lenin some 40 years ago. The very success of that tactical line has rendered it obsolete in many important particulars.

The inevitability of World War, of the Civil War form of revolution, of the armed truce nature of peaceful co-existence, of the impossibility of independent national development of the ex-colonial countries except under working class leadership -- all this hinged upon the assumption, correct till quite recently, that ~~it was~~ imperialism ^{than it} ~~that~~ was more powerful ^{Opponents} ~~is a viable and anti-~~ imperialist ^{Today, however, the balance of forces has shifted and} ~~opposite.~~ ^{Now} it is the world socialist system and the other anti-imperialist forces that determine the main trend of world developments. Hence, a new approach can and should be made to all these strategic & tactical problems.

Indeed, it is difficult to understand how the Communist Party of China can deny the qualitative transformation in the balance of world class forces since 1916. The socialist camp and the breakdown of the colonial system represent a decisive weakening of imperialism, which retains its predatory character but not its previous preponderant strength. It is not the change in the character of imperialism but in the

restrictions of its operations that give our times the character of a new epoch. ^{In this new epoch new developments of theory are essential to cope with new possibilities}

^{has} It is ~~a fact~~ to be underlined that the ~~new~~ ^{fresh} understanding and definition of the new epoch, given pride of place in the Moscow Statement of 1960, is nowhere quoted in the voluminous material put out by the Communist Party of China, which is replete with all manner of quotations from every conceivable document. In Long Live Leninism and in the article directed against Togliatti, however, quite a different definition of the present epoch is given which differs hardly at all from

the one ^{by} ~~of~~ Lenin ~~made~~ some forty years ago.

~~It is here that we come to the heart of the present Communist controversy. The rest is a matter of detail and even technical details important for the routine work of those active in the world Communist movement but not of fundamental significance. Where to start a revolution or when, whether any particular action of Khrushchov was right or wrong, what is the specific character of the class structure of Ghana, the United Arab Republic or India, are questions of great importance but not, perhaps, for the fundamental analysis ^{required.} ~~one is attempting to make.~~ In any event any worthwhile presentation of these details of controversy would require an immense amount of space.~~

^{One} ~~one~~ other fundamental point has to be made before closing this ~~penultimate~~ section. There is a sharp difference between the majority and the minority in the world Communist movement on the necessity of averting a thermo-nuclear war. Certainly, the Communist Party of China desires peace and works for it, albeit in strange and desperate ways, but its leadership is disinclined to give the maintenance of world peace the first priority (here again the relevant formulations of the Moscow documents of 1957 and 1960 are never quoted) and ^{fails} ~~to~~ correctly ^{to} grasp the magnitude of catastrophe and disaster should there be a thermo-nuclear war. ~~It is significant that~~ the Communist Party of China has never denied that Mao Tse-tung told Jawaharlal Nehru that in a thermo-nuclear war roughly half of humanity would be wiped out but ^{that} this need not particularly depress anybody, since imperialism would also be destroyed and the remaining half of humanity could go on to build a classless and glorious civilisation. He added that he disagreed with Nehru's pessimism on this point! Since these remarks were repeated

by Mao at the 1957 Moscow Conference and have not been repudiated since, ~~then~~, they evidently represent a considered approach to the vital problem of human survival when confronted by the ~~thermo~~-nuclear challenge.

The newness of the times in which we live are, therefore, not only a question of the change in the relative positions of the imperialist and the anti-imperialist forces but equally in the new dimensions of destruction that would be the inevitable consequence of a thermo-nuclear war. This only emphasises the necessity of seeing the importance of the pursuit of the international class struggle through the form of peaceful co-existence and peaceful competition simultaneously with the spontaneous, self-generated emergence of indigenous revolutions. Any "pushing on" of revolutions, as also any export of counter-revolution ~~from without~~ becomes an exercise not only in futility but in cataclysm. One wonders what the fate of humanity would have been if ~~it~~ ^{had} ~~was~~ not Khrushchov and Kennedy ~~who~~ confronted each other at the height of the Caribbean crisis in October 1962 but Mao Tse-tung and Senator Barry Goldwater.

IV

~~some basic points emerge out of~~ the present Communist controversy, ~~which~~ ^{in its scale and vigour} is the biggest ~~thing~~ ^{even} of its kind in history, ~~quite~~ dwarfing the schisms in Christianity, Islam, Buddhism or ^{the} the socialist movement at the time of the rupture with Social Democracy. Unlike those previous splits, ^{except the last} ~~one is of the opinion that the present~~ ^{the} ~~debate~~ is not so much the reflection of ^{the} clash of conflicting material interests but rather more "purely" ideological. It is more akin to the kind of passions generated at the time of any significant breakdown or breakthrough in any coherent systematisation of a series of errors or findings in one of the natural sciences. The passions here are greater and the ^{stakes} ~~stakes~~ more

immediately important and relevant to the fate of humanity, but its essential character is the same. The conflicting view points, however much buttressed by quotations from the texts of the founders of the system on both sides, make their ultimate ~~concrete~~ appeal ^{to} social practice and human reason. This at once qualitatively demarcates it from the purely theological or semantic disputes of many of the great controversies of the past. We have before us a modern controversy, familiar enough to anybody who has reflected ~~at all~~ on the nature and manner of scientific advance in our times.

At the same time one has to note its specific character. It is true that the Communist party of China denounces its ideological opponents as having not only deviated from Marxism but having abandoned it altogether. It goes further and claims that the Communist party of ^{the} Soviet Union, and the other ruling Communist Parties from which it differs, have set about destroying their socialist systems and that, in the Soviet Union in particular, there has been a regular "deluge of capitalist restoration." The warning is given that the Soviet Union and the other "revisionist" socialist states would end up in the way Tito's Yugoslavia ^{allegedly} has, i.e., as a fascist satellite of United States imperialism. ^{is} In Comment Number Three, devoted to presenting its analysis of the Yugoslav social system, ^{theoreticians of the} the Communist Party of China ~~theoreticians~~ have come to the conclusion that while a peaceful transition to socialism is not feasible, the peaceful restoration of capitalism has been proved possible. But, as yet, the Communist party of ^{the} Soviet Union and the other Communist parties of the creative majority have not linked up the dogmatic errors of the Communist Party of China either with any change in the fundamental socialist nature of the Chinese system, or, the basically Marxist character of the Communist Party of China. This is a sharp break from the previous practice ^{is} and of the utmost consequence. ~~is~~

It will be recalled that in the previous ideological controversy with Trotsky and his followers and the post-war conflict with Tito, the ^agravamen of the charges on both sides was that the opponent had betrayed the cause of socialism and abandoned Marxism. The opponent was not within the movement but an enemy outside it. ^{in a}strange quirk of history ~~it is~~ that it was Mao Tse-tung who, after Lenin, abandoned this attitude with the reformulation of what Lenin had called non-antagonistic contradictions, i.e., which do not require breakup or explosion even when conflict is involved. For more than two decades this was the approach ~~he adopted when dealing with inner-party conflicts in China,~~ ^{an approach which Mao} and which he sharply underlined in his famous speech on contradictions among the people in February 1957. ^{It is} significant that ~~for the first time~~ in the history of the Communist Party of China, since the Tsunyi conference of 1935, where Mao established his leadership, ~~it was~~ during the anti-right campaign in late 1957-58 ~~that there was a large-scale expulsions and demotions in the Communist Party of China, including Central Committee and Politbureau members.~~

~~At the same time, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union leadership while downgrading Stalin -- rather ineptly and unscientifically as we have seen -- insisted that he had been a great Marxist, that he had defended Lenin's cause and remained a staunch fighter for the proletarian cause till the very end. This was the tragedy. Evidently the non-antagonistic contradiction concept had convinced of Stalin, Khrushchev pointed out. By and large, this is the approach adopted towards the dogmatic errors and splitting activities of the Communist party of China, though hegemonistic aspirations and showmanist motivations are also imputed.~~

This attitude, one strongly feels, is the correct and appropriate one, not ^{chiefly} because of the undoubted tactical advantages inherent in it, but because it is in keeping with the ideological and scientific nature of the dispute. There are

P.P. is sympathetic toward the Party's policy of expulsions and demotions, including Central Committee and Politbureau members, during the anti-right campaign in late 1957-58 were far fewer...

numerous instances of confusion and acrimony in the controversies of significance among natural scientists and the result is not always a compromise and synthesis but the clear victory of one of the disputants. Yet, all are and remain scientists and even the errors go to make up the ^{corpus} ~~corpus~~ of science. Toleration of error is intellectual immorality, yet if the limits of the error are within the limits of the universe of discourse, i.e., reason and experiment, the consequence ^{should be} ~~is~~ not excommunication. It seems likely that this ~~is the~~ approach ~~that~~ will be adhered to by the creative majority of Communist parties, though, it is also likely that the Communist Party of China might well lead itself and the dogmatic ^{minority} ~~majority~~ outside the common movement. ~~We shall have a reversal of the fortunes of Trotsky, although he acted in a manner after his expulsion which the Communist Party of China now imitates.~~

There are parallels in the history of the socialist movement.
This brings us to a particularly interesting point of socialist history. ^{The ~~great~~ ~~founder~~ ~~of the~~ ~~movement~~ ~~was~~ ~~the~~ ~~last~~ ~~to~~ ~~under~~ ~~estimate~~ ~~the~~ ~~historic~~ ~~necessity~~ ~~and~~ ~~immense~~ ~~benefit~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~break~~ ~~that~~ ~~Marx~~ ~~and~~ ~~Engels~~ ~~made~~ ~~from~~ ~~utopian~~ ~~socialism~~ ~~or~~ ~~the~~ ~~rupture~~ ~~from~~ ~~social-democracy~~ ~~that~~ ~~Lenin~~ ~~accomplished~~. ~~Both these steps were dictated by the inherent exigencies of socialist advance in thought and action. Yet the great Utopian socialists -- Saint-Simon, Fourier and Owen -- are part of the socialist heritage. So are social-democrats like Plekhanov, ^{Labrousse} ~~Rebel~~, the ~~left wing~~, Rosa Luxemburg and the earlier Kautsky. One ~~recalls~~ ^{may be recalled} in this connection, the warm praise of Engels for the utopian socialists and Lenin's advice to the younger generation to read Plekhanov and the early Kautsky. It was part of the sectarian attitude of Stalin that such an approach was abandoned.~~}

At the same time, one has to remember that there is such a thing as ideological and scientific advance. *that one cannot fail to see in judgment,* that there can be no tradition without development. If

at this juncture of history one tries to ~~rehabilitate~~ the
ideas of the Utopian Socialists or claims to be a Marxist without acknowledging the advance of Lenin, then one can be termed a reactionary in the most profound sense of the term. The abandonment of even the formal adherence or reference to Marxism in the programme of the social-democratic Party in West Germany is a clear enough indicator. *Share Marxism without Lenin's leads.* Certainly, there can be various kinds of united front action with even the adherents of utopian socialism to say nothing of the Social-democrats. Yet *neither of these trends can* ~~these cannot~~ be considered the points of growth of socialist theory and ideology, *at least as far as Marxists are concerned.*

One imagines that a similar historical fate will be the destiny of the adherents of the dogmatic line of the ~~Communist Party of China~~. *It would* be stupid and anti-scientific to overlook the contribution to Marxist and socialist thought that the leadership of the Communist Party of China *have* made, especially Mao Tse-tung. Specifically, it was a creative development of Lenin's special contribution -- the working out of the strategy and tactics of the anti-colonial democratic revolution under Marxist leadership. This will always remain a part of the heritage and corpus of Marxist and socialist thought. Yet, if the present erroneous line is persisted in when the evidence against it steadily accumulates and becomes overwhelming, then certainly the followers of the present line *of the leadership* of the Communist Party of China ~~leadership~~ will end up in a blind alley, away from the main road of scientific development. Non-antagonistic contradiction will transform itself into an antagonistic one *at the level of Marxist thought + actions*.

different types of
The present coexistence of ~~Marxism and Communism~~
is ~~an~~ unstable ^{and} temporary. ~~State of equilibrium~~ It will
give way to a higher level of scientific understanding of
the world as well as ~~the~~ way to change it. The change of
science is the only absolute that lasts since it is never
still and always transforming itself.

still
Hyderabad, India.

Comparative Law and Coexistence

by ~~Prof.~~ Gyula Eörsi (~~Budapest~~)

The success of a trend or movement in social science depends not only on the resoluteness, competence and enthusiasm of its adherents. Success or failure basically turns on the development of social-economic relations, whereas this development too is a result of social-human activity. While this fact strips the adherents of these movements off the illusion that they are creating a new world out of nothing, but, at the same time, it recompenses them for this lost illusion ^{the satisfaction that the frequently hidden} by ~~carrying into effect through them the recondite laws of~~ historical development, ~~are carried into effect by~~ through their activities.

The same holds true of comparative law, ~~as well~~. Every textbook deals with a number of the forerunners of comparative law, but these forerunners ~~are~~ ^{new} often unaware of the significance of their action, living the isolated ~~anachronistic~~ life of those who come before their time while they will be discovered and ~~exploited~~ ^{used} only by the grateful posterity hunting egoistically for a family tree.

The first upswing ^{though} of lesser significance fell on the time of the Napoleonic wars when the law of young ^{and} rising capitalism had been opposed to the law of feudalism. It is ~~characteristic of vigour of this tendency that~~ the influence of French law could be discovered even in the Russian Svod Zakonov, though in other respects Tsarist Russia ~~avoided~~ ^{was sealed off from} any reception of ^{the new} bourgeois conceptions. However, in Germany, ^{however,}

^{effect of the} as it was proved by the Thibaut-Savigny polemic ^{demonstrated} the ~~prohibitive~~ efforts aiming at the consolidation of the feudal bases of state-structure and particularism; ~~constituted prohibitory signs in this respect; the isolation of conservative character~~ of the Historical Legal School gained a victory ^{in conservatism} through the

leaving aside the forerunners of comparative law, we may date the first significant period to coincide with the Napoleonic wars. When the law of the newly established bourgeois regimes stood opposed to the law of feudalism.

glorification of old Germanic law ~~by~~ ^{wave following the} taking advantage of the nationalist ~~flaring up as a~~ ^{flaring up as a} consequence of Napoleonic wars. Both the Romanists and the Germanists agreed in looking into the ~~past~~ ^{past} instead of the ~~present~~ ^{present}. The ~~wave of~~ ^{best interest in} comparative law died down, its real time ~~did~~ ^{had} not yet come.

The decisive change occurred ^{when} ~~by~~ capitalism ^{at} attaining its modern stage of development in the last third of the nineteenth century. ^{came into being and the export of goods and of} World economy ~~attained full growth and~~ ^{capital} ~~exports of the Great Powers attained more and more~~ ^{massive proportions.} considerable size. This imparted a new impulse to the ~~science~~ ^{study} of private international law, made the study of foreign laws indispensable and the "export" of internal law ~~desirable~~. Moreover ^{it created} ~~aroused the~~ illusion ^{as to} of the possibility of ~~creating~~ ^{constructing} a "world-law". In Germany this change was ~~shown~~ ^{manifested} in an interesting way by the fact that Jhering's critical remark that ~~by~~ ^{French} the enactment of the "Code Civil" universal European civil law narrowed down to a restricted provincial civil law. ~~it~~ ^{no longer} ~~did not~~ ^{ed} reflect the spirit of Savigny, ~~and~~ ^{nor} ~~did not~~ ^{it} serve the purposes of the retrospective German separatism; ~~but~~ ^{at an} on the contrary, ~~it~~ was aiming at harmonization and ~~approach~~ ^{approach} in view of future development. ~~Here~~ ^{no longer as} The Code Civil ~~was~~ ^{appeared} transferred from a law tending to general validity and endangering the "purity" of the German way of ~~the~~ development of law ^{but as a} to the manifestation of separatism contrasted with universal legal development, ~~where~~ ^{ing} universality meant in the first place that of the Pandectas, that is, of "Usus Modernus", ~~as~~ ^{ed by} being a product of German jurisprudence. Germany ~~after~~ ^{it} having attained National Unity stepped out of economic isolation and used ~~by~~ even the "export" of law as a ~~means of~~ ^{weapon of} its economic power politics. Until, in fascism, brute force and racial myth was made the only means of politics, German law had been ~~considered~~ ^{regarded} by significant tendencies of German jurisprudence

as an important ~~number~~ ^{member} of the family of European laws.

Then ^{after} Germany departed again from the cooperation of international law and was lost in the ^{exclusive} admiration and ^{tendentious} interpretation of German feudal and prefeudal law ^(which, in fact, had long been very similar to feudal and pre-feudal laws of other countries) and ^{breaks} broke into abuses against the legal systems of the "decadent liberalism".

Following the First World War - as a consequence of the development of world trade - even Great Britain found splendid isolation, to be too restrictive: ^{her} its lawyers appeared on the forum of comparative law.

The third great upswing ^{of comparative law} followed ~~after~~ World War II.

Essentially, there were three changes in the traditional

domain of comparative law: a) ~~one of the great victors of the~~

war, the United States appeared on the scene of the Western ^{as a victor of the war and with} world ~~with its~~ overwhelming superiority as the financier of ^{post-war} reconstruction,

b) the second great "victor" of the war, the German Federal Republic ^{achieve its} had buried the hatchet and rejoined the family in order to ^{and} reach its economic power political goals within the Western alliance by ~~modernizing its methods~~

~~used before the fascism~~ and thus, ~~of course~~, it turned ^{again} from the ancient German law towards contemporary Western laws.

c) powerful bourgeois international organizations were created ^{for which} and thus comparative law became absolutely indispensable. ^{Time}

The main point of the changes occurring after World War II is,

however, not to be found here. The decisive change consisted in the transformation of the structure of ^{the} world economy:

while previously comparative law with its solidarity-complex ^{had been} and heated debates ~~was~~ ^{of the West,} an ~~Western~~ internal affair, now the world,

~~as a consequence of social-historic development~~, widened out; ^{while} and, at the same time, ^{it is a consequence} as a result of technical improvement progress.

~~It became narrower too.~~ By the side of the Western World emerged the Socialist World; thereby a new theme and partner appeared

in the field of comparative law: the socialist law and lawyer. At the same time the world of the former colonies became more and more estranged from the Western world. Thereby a number of ~~problems arose in a new way and the number of problems arose~~ was increased to a great extent.

(repetitive) delete
Thus, comparative law after World War II has to reckon - beside the Western world - also with the socialist world and with the world of former colonies - within the framework of a ~~united and dilated~~ world interwoven by the threads of world economy and made closer by technical progress. The effects of the appearance of socialist law will, however, be dealt with later, ~~while~~ ^{at first} I shall treat the causes of the upswing of comparative law in general.

Even this very summary and thus necessarily incomplete outline of development shows fairly clearly that the causes of the upswing in comparative law are of primarily social-economic nature: ⁱⁿ while the development of markets within the ^{nations} ~~isolated~~ countries brought about national laws, ^{the evolution of the} world economy necessarily led to the development of comparative law. Further, ^{an expanding} as the intensity of world economy depends on the application of non-warlike methods, comparative law ~~too~~ can exert a beneficial influence on the consolidation of ~~the~~ conditions of world peace.

In the circumstances it is ^{self evident} easy to understand that comparative law in judicial practice falls primarily on the fields of law involved by ^{centers on the area of} international economic relations, that is, of commercial law, law of exchange, ^{and} certain fields of private law, ^{such as} law of taxation and - as a result of the achievements attained to various extent by the labour movement - also labour law. This is indirectly proved by Limpens who pointed out that the order of sequence both in the development of national laws and in ^{efforts at} ~~the unification of~~ international

laws among nations has been both in Europe and in America as follows: 1) law of exchange, 2) commercial law, 3) law of contracts, 4) other parts of private law¹, ^{Lincoln (pointed out)} further that the proportional number of the frequency of the endeavours of at unification ^{was} is, for instance, in commercial law 150, in private law 84, in labour law 71 ^{and}, ^{whereas} on the other hand, in criminal law ^{a mere} 37, and in administrative law only 10². ~~This is proved also by the fact that~~ As a result of the increase of the number of various international and "super-national" organizations - ^{able to a great extent} attributed ^{as well} mostly to economic factors, in particular to the development of the means of production often outgrowing the possibilities given in certain countries, comparative law ^{made} great headway even in the field of administrative law.

^{largely} Hence ^{important} good intention, enthusiasm and expertness ^{ultimately} have played a very great part, but ^{formidable} it has been the development of productive forces which ~~as its life and soul and source of its success~~ brought ^{the} world economy into life. It was put wisely by Graveson that "en réalité ce n'est pas le droit que l'on unifie mais un certain nombre de fonctions, de buts et de politiques, et que le droit joue en tant que science secondaire et auxiliaire, un rôle essentiel et indispensable en donnant ^m effet, aux politiques dont l'unification a été décidée"³. ^{To this it might be added} ~~This could be completed by saying that it is~~ ^{ultimately} (not only in this sense that ~~it is~~ law is secondary) but also ⁱⁿ to the effect that it is (the product of social-economic relations maintained by social efforts. It is product and, at the same time, also creator: while it has been brought about by the laws of social-economic development it is partly through law that these tendencies of social-economic development are realized.

II.

^{As long as} ~~While~~ comparative law was practised in the Western world

only, the situation was relatively ~~easier~~, ^{simple}.

The possibility ^{of} ~~any~~ comparison arises only if ~~the~~ ^{where} phenomena to be compared are variants which can be subsumed - from a certain point of view - under a common primary category. They have, at the same time, both ~~common~~ and different characteristics. In the Western world this common primary category is the law of private property ^{showing,} ~~which,~~ in the beginning, ~~imbued all the laws in its sphere with its~~ ^{the same basic} principles, that is, ~~with the principle of the~~ ^{essentially in substance} ~~unrestricted~~ ^{represent} ~~nature of~~ private property, freedom of contract and formal equality before the law. These laws ~~constitute~~ the same type of law; thus identity plays an important part in their primary problems.

At the same time ^{developed on the basis of} ~~this~~ extensive identity of primary principles, ~~served as bases for~~ a great variety of legal solutions ~~solutions. These had~~ ^{Legal} ~~their~~ historic causes ~~in the same way~~ as the development of the above mentioned identities. These ~~historic causes~~ are manifold; certain national characteristics, ancestral rights and ^{Legal} traditions have played their part. First of all, however, the role of those class relations ^{which} engendered the modern Western systems of law. This is ~~the basis of the discernment - in the present instance only~~ ^{ex} ~~by way of reference - of~~ the law following ⁱⁿ the wake of the bourgeois revolution ^{yet} ~~preceding~~ ^{full} the accomplishment of the development of ^{the} bourgeois class, ~~which can be characterized by~~ ^{still able to work} ~~the fact that the old feudal class was~~ to a certain extent it ~~was~~ still included in the capitalist forms of production. This led to the development of a legal system conserving certain content elements ^{of content which had} ~~having their origin in the~~ ^{after in free capitalist} ~~(times) preceding~~ capitalism ^{example} /for instance, the system of landed property, the conservation of certain ^{exemptions and} ~~privileges and~~ - as it has often been pointed out - ^{to} ~~giving~~ ^{given} priority ~~to legal~~ status over

contract^{us,} ~~and also conserving~~ ^{Some} in a certain respects, legal methods and techn^{iques} applied before the entry of capitalism on the scene ^{were preserved, such as} judge made law rooted in particularism, the avoidance of any comprehensive legal concept, such as the recognition in general of tort-liability as a consequence of the conservation of the ~~notio~~-system and writ system "governing as from the ^{total} grave" (Maitland). Here I ~~evidently~~ ^{the} refer to common law. On the other hand, the ^{total} victory of ^{the} bourgeois revolution brought about the originally consistent, relatively simple and clear law of the bourgeois class having as ^{its} motto "enrichissez vous" and opposing to such an extent the law of the old regime that it saw even in the recognition of the notion of legal person a danger of restoration; I refer here ~~evidently~~ ^{In some} to the Code Civil. Then ~~the civil laws of these~~ ^{transformation} countries ~~may be mentioned in which the bourgeois revolution~~ was slowed down ~~and made inconsistent by the influence of~~ feudal forces ^{which} ~~hindering~~ ^{ed} the development of productive forces. ^{This is reflected in} Such ~~were the~~ ^{in pre-revolutionary} Austrian and German laws or ~~the~~ ^{political} Russian law ~~preceding the revolution~~. These had been constituted by ~~regimes~~ ^{characterised} ~~completely~~ ^{or} ~~mostly on feudal systems~~ ^{by} the feudal economic bases ~~of which~~ ^{characteristics} became obsolete ~~but had no~~ ^(features) bourgeois class that could have overthrown ~~them~~ ^{on the other hand the fact that not only} ~~and where in addition to the~~ bourgeois class, ^{but} also the working class became a ^{powerful} political factor, ~~which on the other hand~~, made an agreement between the Junkers and capitalists imperative. Within these laws ideas of bourgeois inspiration - ~~mostly~~ ^{such as} having their origin in natural law - are intermingled with rules conserving feudal remnants, ~~landed property, entail or the Einführungsgesetz of the BGB termed by Wieacker as "Privatfürstrecht"~~ ⁱⁿ ~~It seems as if the regulation of land law, on the one hand, and that of the law of contracts on the other, had taken place in different periods, and so on. At last a law is to be mentioned~~ ^{Finally, there is the case of law}

~~which~~ was made in the time of the development of modern capitalism in a country that has never been burdened with considerable feudal remnants: the Swiss private law which by reflecting the common principles of all the bourgeois types of law complies also with the special requirements of the period of modern capitalism, ~~such as~~ the discretion of the Court, clauses of general character, an important part played by ^{modern} equity. ~~etc.~~

~~If we take into account~~
By referring to a number of other variants ^{as well as} the solutions, in many respects original, adopted by Scandinavian laws ~~may be mentioned here~~ ^{it} can be proved that the great intensity of common characteristics is completed by a wide range of variants; ~~that is~~, this domain provides great possibilities for comparative law.

As ~~it~~ has been mentioned, ~~the claim for such a comparative activity was first put by~~ ^{the} world economy in the period of the development of modern capitalism. ^{The development of a} World economy and ^{of} modern productive forces led to some levelling off among Western laws. ^{Great parts of the} feudal remnants surviving in some of these countries have been slowly eliminated. The original great principles of bourgeois development have been more ^{respected} ~~respected~~ ^{as well as} than applied since the development of productive forces, ~~mass production etc.~~ have outgrown the framework of private property. The requirement of state intervention, state-economic activity and some degree of planning, ^{have hindered} ~~have hindered~~ ^{modified} to a ~~great~~ ^{large} ~~extent~~ ^{considerable} (the assertion of the unlimited character of private property and contractual freedom. An interesting process ~~having~~ of levelling off ~~character~~ has taken place in the method ^{of} the development of law, as well. Judge made law has been unable to keep abreast with the requirements of rapid development. ^{There has been pressure} ~~pressing~~, in certain respects, for radical changes: thus statutory law has obtained an ever increasing

importance. At the same time, the great codes have become obsolete ~~and even~~ in the countries of the great codes ~~by~~ - by using the slogan "loyalty to the codes" or propagated by the ~~and similar other theoretical conceptions~~ ~~Freirechtsschule~~ or, on the contrary, in a ~~sky and modest~~ ~~with~~

~~sky and modest~~ way - ~~adjusted~~ ^{more} adjusted to the requirements of our age. This process has only been promoted by the fact that the law of the United States, as a power taking the lead of the Western world, is also to a great extent a judge made law, ~~though there is no~~ ^{fundamentally} question of an adaption of the law of the stronger acting under pressure, ~~but of the fact that~~ partly the pace of development and partly the ~~great~~ ^{ever growing} antagonism between the stage of development of productive forces on the one hand and the traditional system of private property on the other require a judicial watering down of the highly esteemed codes.

In this situation comparative law - in particular after World War II - has promoted the process of levelling off primarily by trying to prove that the laws of various countries - through their different technics and methods - essentially lead to identical practical results. ~~When we are facing~~

~~The matter in question here is~~ a twofold process.

~~Levelling off or "harmonization"~~ ^{takes} taking place in legal practice, delivery conditions and even sometimes in legislative activity, ~~and this~~ is being registered, commented and ~~sometimes even~~ promoted or backed by comparative law. In the field of the impossibility of performance in Germany the theory of "Geschäftsgrundlage" and in England the concept of frustration have simultaneously developed. In the domain of faulty performance in Germany the theory of "Leistungsstörungen" and "positive Vertragsverletzungen" led in its legal consequences to similar results as in France ~~where~~ ^{there} judicial practice was based ~~on~~ ^{an} "inexécution". The law of torts was invaded by the general concept of duty of care ~~and it~~ which lead to was followed by the ~~nearly~~ ^{almost} general responsibility based

10 -

upon negligence, ^{which has} in practice ~~has~~ brought the law of torts near up to the general responsibility caused by injurious acts which has spread on the Continent and ^{which made its way} ~~is in force~~ even in Germany in spite of the exhaustive enumeration in the B.G.B. of all the cases of unlawfully caused damages.

As for the ^{comparativists} adherents of the school of comparative law + as it ~~has been~~ mentioned above, the British and Americans have abandoned the splendid isolation of common law. According to M.A. Millner for instance, English and Continental laws are approaching one another ~~even~~ independently of the developments of common market simply ~~as a~~ consequence of economic interdependence and cultural transfusion: The isolation of English law and lawyers is bound to decline⁴. At the same time Germany has returned into the great family. Instead of the isolation of German law, the common Roman roots have been emphasized (Koschaker) ^{there is talk of} ~~one talks about~~ the possibility of getting rid - by the creation of super-national legal concepts - of the conflicts and ambiguities caused by legal concepts deemed to be necessary if seen solely from national point of view (Zweigert). ^{There is the idea that} ~~and that~~ one must not see in the positive norms of national law the only possible solution (Perid) etc. From the sphere of common law R.B. Schlesinger speaks about the deprovincialization of minds where ^{a Frenchman encourages} ~~as the~~ French David ~~about~~ the possibility created by comparative law to leave the somewhat narrow bounds of ~~national~~ laws. Contantinesco has written a book in French on the breach of contract in the framework of the "Librairie Encycopédique" of Brussels edited by the "Institute of European Law" of the University of the Saarland, detached from France and annexed to the German Federal Republic which has been published in Stuttgart. The purpose of this book is, above all, to point

(Koschaker)

Sket!
add names in parentheses.

out the similarities between the French, English and German solutions. The author comes to the conclusion that modern civil law is losing its historical elements step by step.⁵ Tunc, while reviewing in a very ingenious and interesting way on the pages of the periodical "Revue trimestrielle de Droit civil" the French judicial practice on the ^{civil liability} responsibility for damages systematically draws a parallel between the French and American laws. One of the remarks of Zweigert is particularly characteristic of the above ^{mentioned} treated issue. This points to the necessity of loosening the rigour of Continental codes by means of judge made law, on the one hand, and of providing the judge made law with a new basis, namely that of comparative law, on the other. ~~The author proposes in a concrete case to introduce by judicial practice into the German law, unknowing the "consideration doctrine" the "promissory estoppel" being one of the products of American judicial practice, turning away from the "consideration doctrine".~~ "Des lois aussi vieilles que celles du BGB peuvent être franchement amendées dans leur teneur par une interprétation de droit comparé"^{6, 7}

Perhaps ^{many} it would be unnecessary to continue this enumeration. It can be ^{asserted} ~~laid down~~ that ^{circumstances} within the Western world are now very favourable to comparative law, because

1/ the commensurability of the legal systems serving as the bases of comparison is ensured by their belonging to the same type of law having common fundamental principles,

2/ comparison is made ^{operation} (in particular ^{ways} profitable) by the common effect of two factors, namely:

→ a/ the ^{manner} ~~ways and forms~~ in which the above mentioned common principles are put into practice differ ~~in a~~ greatly extent from each other;

→ b/ the outgrowing ~~hyperproduction~~ ^{the} of the framework of the given national economies by productive forces together with

writes the learned author in connection with a proposition to introduce into the German Law, by judicial practice, "promissory estoppel" which in the practice of U.S. courts serves the purpose of escaping from some consequences of the consideration doctrine, although German Law does not know that doctrine at all and consequently does not need to find a way out of it.

some other phenomena of world economy call for certain levelling off action and ^{for} "harmonization".

III.

What resemblances and differences ^{would appear} in this situation if comparative law ~~exceeded its original province~~ ^{frames} and compared ~~the~~ laws of different types being in force in countries belonging to different social-economic systems?

~~It is~~ conspicuous ^{of} how the demand on comparative law of this kind has increased after World War II. Most of the Western international scientific organizations and educational institutes dealing with comparative law deal ^{also} with socialist laws. ~~too~~. There are a number of such organizations in the boards of which also socialist lawyers are to be found, the raising and working out of the problems of comparative law has begun in the socialist countries as well ² / Systriky, Szabo etc. ³

repetition delete

~~The great intensity of the manifestation of this demand can be traced back to several factors. The Soviet-American-British-French cooperation and within it the part played by the Soviet Union in defeating fascism and further the increase in the number, economic force and prestige of the socialist countries had been the starting point of this development. Socialist countries became powerful factors of world economy through the increase of their economic force which became a factor of a very great importance for example for the countries liberated from colonial oppression. The great part played by the socialist countries in the world economy requires the application of comparative law in the field of the law concerning economic life in the same way - if not to the same degree with the same intensity - as within the Western world, whereas the possibility of comparative law is assured by the fact that the law concerning international relations - in particular in the field of ^{contracts} ~~the treaties connected with this~~ - in some~~

respects necessitates equal or at least similar solutions. This is facilitated by the fact, that ^{the civil laws} before the war ^{made} in some of the socialist countries ^{were} ~~had prevailed~~ civil laws similar to the German, Austrian or French laws the traces of which - in particular in ~~the field of~~ minor details and some types of legal institutions ~~e.g. warrants~~ - can even now be found. Moreover - as Loeber pointed it out - a number of similar problems are raised by modern life in the countries having different social systems.³

Thus there is a demand and common ground for a comparison between the laws of West and East. This common ground is corroborated by the objectives, policy and postulates of peaceful coexistence and peaceful economic competition - the recognition of the fact that an atomic war would be ^{- undershaking the case -} ~~to put~~ it mildly ~~a~~ too radical "solution" of the great problems of the world.

Nevertheless, it would not benefit the purposes of coexistence to leave difficulties ^{unmentioned} ~~unsaid~~. Broadly speaking, these consist in the fact - ^{to be} ~~as it will be~~ dealt with in detail ^{below} in Part IV - that the importance ^{of} differences concerning fundamental issues is greater than that of the similarities. Whereas the comparison of the laws of countries having similar social systems often shows important differences on common grounds, ⁱⁿ ~~while~~ comparing the laws of countries having different social systems, important similarities can be found on grounds of opposite character. The common ground of comparison is in the latter case more general and therefore ^{less} ~~more~~ undistinctive. No direct common ground - such as private property ~~is~~ in the West and social property in the socialist countries - can be found here. Hence, the ~~genus~~ ^{proximum} constituting the ground of an investigation into similarities and differences appears here only on the level of a generalized legal concept

formulated in disregard of the differences of social structures which hardly has any non-formal elements⁹. This leads - among others - to the confusion of identical denominations of essentially different notions. The Colloquium on socialist property organised in Brussels by the Institut Solvay, Centre ~~de~~ d'Études des Pays de l'Est may be mentioned as an instructive example of this¹⁰.

These problems ^{also} engender as well the fact that different social systems, regardless of their own partial internal differences, have ~~neatly~~ ^{very} diverse ideological concepts. It would be wrong to pretend ~~as if~~ ^{that} this fact did not exist. On the other hand, differences in ideological bases ^{should not} ~~cannot~~ lead to a situation where "comparative law" would be ~~no more than~~ ^{merely} some kind of monologues ^{spoken by} ~~between~~ deaf persons, who do not hear one another in spite of shouting aloud. ^{raising their voices}.

no it. ^{no doubt!} ~~However,~~ Difficulties arise from the fact that, as a result of the differences in the social systems and types of law, fundamental legal issues are dominated by differences instead of similarities, while ideological controversies raise further methodological problems. On the other hand, the possibility and necessity of a comparative activity concerning the laws of the two systems is ~~all the same~~ ^{ensured} by the fairly identical level of productive forces, which brings about a situation to a certain extent similar in both systems - it creates special dangers of accidents, it leads to mass-production etc. - and puts to a certain extent similar questions in both systems. ^{the} Such a comparative activity is ensured by world economy created by the development of productive forces, ~~as~~ it is ensured by the great part played in world economy by socialist countries; by the interest aroused in the Western world by the successes of socialism; by similar legal solutions caused partly by historical legal traditions partly by the influence exerted on law by international relations and - last but not least - it is promoted by the postulate of peaceful coexistence. Consequently difficulties only encumber but do not make comparative law impossible. Comparative law may promote:

- a) mutual knowledge and understanding of each other,
and

b) merely the ^{satisfaction of} (practical requirements of international trade.

IV.

One is often inclined ^{to which one is accustomed} to consider ~~usual~~ phenomena as being the natural and only possible ways of the attainment of the purposes of the ^{particular} phenomena in question, that is, to confuse specific and general phenomena. This is the case above all if this interpretation ^{serves one's own interests which present not at all become conscious} ~~can be used - though sometimes subconsciously~~ ^{used} for laying stress on the phenomena of general character. It is well known, for instance, that bourgeois revolution took a stand for "man" whereas ^{was conceived as} the demands of "man" ~~was meant~~ those of the bourgeoisie forging ~~against~~ ahead through fighting against feudalism.

It is of ^{primary} ~~primordial~~ importance from the cognitive point of view of comparative law that for many Western lawyers law ^{equalized with the bourgeois concept of law} ~~is equal to the law of bourgeois type~~ Socialist lawyers, however, are free from this misconception, owing partly to the Marxist historical view ^{recognizing} knowing as many types of law as ~~many~~ social systems ~~there~~ exist, partly to the fact that whereas socialism, for anybody living in ^a bourgeois society, appears as ~~be~~ an abstraction never experienced, social systems preceding socialism are for those living in socialist countries either experienced realities or historical past.

Now, the ^{deceptive identification which raises the special phenomenon to the level of the} generalization ~~considering to be general what~~ ^{general phenomenon, according to which} ~~specific is indeed and thus the law of bourgeois type to be equal to~~ law in general, leads to two conclusions which, though, ^{they} ~~can be also be~~ found simultaneously, ~~as well, (are, by and large)~~ characteristic of two historical eras. These two possible conclusions are

- 1) socialist "law" is not law,
- 2) socialist law is essentially the same kind of law as bourgeois law. ⁴¹¹

The first conclusion is a product of blind anti-Communism,

while the second one - at least as to some of its important varieties - is a ^{well-intentioned} ~~benign~~ ^{promoted} ~~error~~ ^{striving for} ~~involved~~ by the theory of peaceful coexistence.

1) According to Loeber, Western lawyers in general ^{analyse} ~~analyse~~ socialist law in a descriptive ^{and} ~~dogmatic~~ way, while socialist lawyers deal with Western legal systems on an ideological basis¹². In my view, however, this statement is to be rendered more accurate ^{being} ~~there~~ the purpose and ^{the} ~~level~~ of comparison have ^{got mixed up.} ~~been confused~~. The purely descriptive and dogmatical treatment has to satisfy ~~here~~ the practical requirements of world economy and the positivist attitude of Western lawyers has, indeed, led to the fact that comparisons of such kind occur more often in the West than in the socialist countries; moreover, Knapp's criticism concerning this method¹³ has been accepted for the most part by socialist jurists. The other ~~objective~~ ^{purpose} and level of comparison ^{goes to the roots of} ~~probes deeply into~~ the different ^a ~~types~~ of law legal systems by considering law as a product and ^a ~~shaper~~ of social-economic relations and by examining it through its interaction with other social-economic factors. Loeber's statement that this method is more applied by socialist jurists than by the Western ones ^{could} ~~can~~ be interpreted as a praise of the followers of socialist legal theory.

But Loeber did not mean ^{that} ~~so~~. He spoke of "prejudices" and - citing from Braga ^a - of the caricature of comparative law. ^{reality this is not what he called "ideological" comparison, but merely} In his opinion it is not comparative law based on ideology which is the matter in question here but a method of execration and name-calling. ^{As to this "method" his} This reproach is unjustified. Not that in a ^{past} period the method of execration without any analysis had not been a fairly frequent practice in the socialist countries but ^{played at least} (this method - due to anticommunism -) an equal part in the Western countries where its vigour at present - in consequence of cold-war propaganda - has even become more

intensive than in most of the socialist countries.

At first, socialist law ^{was} ~~had been~~ by some lawyers in the West suppressed, belittled or held in contempt while others had even denied that ^{the} phenomenon could ^{be} at all ~~be~~ considered as "law". This was followed by a false generalization which ^{is} ~~can~~ even now ^{current} ~~be found~~; one of the ideological Leitmotiv-s of anti-Communism and cold war is the identification of socialist law with that of ~~the~~ fascism through the introduction of the term "totalitarian". This propaganda disregards the fact that fascism is the ^{most} ~~most~~ ^{important and} ~~ruthless and cruel~~ product of the system of private property whereas socialism is based upon the social property of the means of production; that the political system of fascism has been everywhere organized by the forces of private property in the spirit of blind anti-Communism, that while fascism aimed at the subjugation of the world, socialism ^{serves the cause of} ~~has promoted~~ the progress of humanity. What is the point, for instance, of asserting in ^{a scientific} ~~the~~ publications dealing with comparative law that by rendering the maintenance of ~~natural~~ ^{born out of wedlock} children to be a state-function, ~~that is~~ by releasing mothers from the humiliation of affiliation cases and from financial difficulties, the Soviet Union has weakened the legal status of such children, abolished their equality of rights with those of legitimate children, introduced a policy similar to the demographic policy of fascism ¹⁴? It is well known, that in the Soviet Union no traces can be found of the fascist demographic policy, which took the field of the propagation of one race irrespective of any other aspect, ^{and whose ultimate aim was} ~~the extermination~~ or ^{enslavement} ~~subjugation~~ of all the other races; ^{Neither} ~~any~~ trace of ^{encouraging} ~~propagating~~ the birth of illegitimate children ~~can be found~~ in the Soviet Union. Moreover, it is well known that the legal rule in question concerns not only illegitimate children but also orphans brought up by single women.

Is this the correct English technique form?

Maybe a parenthesis closes (3)

The grammar of this sentence is not clear.

And what is the point of abandoning the style and logical structure applied in the former ^{other} parts of a paper otherwise ~~commonsensical~~ and of high standard and using in respect of the above mentioned issue (such expressions as "satellites", or ¹⁵ ~~the~~ *learned author himself mentions that* "alter Kurs der Gleichstellung"? Moreover, ~~the~~ legal regulation ^{is question} has not been adopted by the other socialist countries. ^{one may ask,} And what, if they had adopted? It is ~~also~~ well known that great differences can be found between certain ^{the different} socialist laws whereas similarities originate in the social property of the means of production and the class-structure in the same way as the similarities between Western laws derive from private property and class relations involved by it. Reference has been made to the ^{harmonization} rapprochement now in progress between the American and other Western laws: ^{prior to the} ~~Before his~~ above criticized paper ^{remarks} Perid himself had used quite another style while dealing with the American observers at the Hague Conference proposing the adoption of the ^{techniques} ~~techniques~~ ^{the American American} of Uniform Laws. What ~~has~~ would be his comment if someone used the term "satellitism" in this connection? No socialist country ^{has} hitherto adopted any Soviet-law, ^{code,} but has Belgium become the ~~stellite~~ ^{satellite} of France by the adoption of the Code Civil?

No doubt, the ^{remnants} ~~remnants~~ of such methods ^{should} ~~must~~ be eliminated from the comparison between the laws of the two systems. Tunc is right in laying down that one has to try to "corriger la caricature que nous nous faisons de l'autre"¹⁶. That ^{also} constitutes a part of the liquidation of the ^{to} ~~remnants~~ of cold war.

2. The other error having ^{philosophical} common roots with the former one, but being seemingly of opposite character, consists essentially in denying the importance of the differences between the laws of the two social systems. The manifestations

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of this view have different ^{political} roots. Some say that socialism has created nothing new in the domain of law, but brought about some sort of cockney-bourgeois law - Zivsz refers for instance, to a statement asserting that the legislation ~~maximalist law~~ of recent years on criminal law in the Soviet Union is no more than the reception of the Dutch criminal law of the XIXth century. Such views are fostered by a scorn of socialism based upon ignorance and prejudices, ~~and which~~ - if they these prejudices have not become inveterated ^{they} can be cleared up by means of information. According to another theory falling under this category, ~~on the other hand~~, two originally different legal systems ^{are converging} ~~have converged here~~. This view is engendered by good-will, ^{by a sort of an} abstract humanism and by a ~~craving~~ ^{desire} for coexistence, that is, by noble motives which, however, may result in illusions involving the danger of disappointment. That is why a discussion in the spirit of honest ^{sincerely} ~~straightforwardness~~ seems to be proper here.

Undoubtedly ^a number of ^{similar} problems arise in every social system. It is also beyond question that the solutions of ^{beyond} these are to a degree similar. I believe, however, that ^{this} degree no convergence is possible, the contradictions are ^{too} deep-rooted.

I cannot agree, for instance, with Loeber's argumentations according to which there are "systembezogen" and "systemneutrak" fields in the domain of comparative law ^{it}. This view - in my opinion - can only be considered correct in the sense that some problems are more directly connected with the social systems serving as their bases than others. The field of civil liability where according to Gutteridge - particularly as a consequence of the steadily increasing motor traffic - problems arise everywhere in an identic way and being a

relatively "systemneutral" field, is a good example of this¹⁸. Here technical progress, traffic conditions and intense mass-cohabitation raise in both social systems the same problems of legal liability. Superficially, also the trend of development is identical: the minimal conditions of the subsistence of the injured person are to be insured by means of general insurance ^{and this} ~~which~~ is to be completed by civil liability for ^{full} damages. The Western solution is, however, characterised by the fact that the most frequent originators of damages, the enterprises, are relieved from any further risk by paying insurance premia, leaving thus all burden of sanctions - through a "tort fine" as proposed by Ehrenzweig or in another way - solely upon the individual if liability is not almost completely eliminated through liability insurance or by other means. According to the socialist solution, ^{on the other hand} ~~however~~ the overwhelming part of damages ~~falls~~ falls on the enterprises: the organs of social insurance and - as regards damages not covered by social insurance - the injured person may claim from the responsible enterprise reimbursement, resp. damages, ^{while} ~~whereas~~ the enterprise can shift only a small part of damages upon the employee, ~~while~~ it has to bear itself the rest; it is not entitled to cover it by insurance. As a result of the state-ownership of ~~the~~ enterprises, damages caused by enterprises burden for the most part the state; the rest diminishes the profitsharing of employees, that is they constitute a loss for the entire collective. This solution stimulates the state, the ^{collectives} ~~collectives~~ of enterprises and the persons causing damages alike, to prevent the development of situations involving the danger of causing damages. Thus, beyond the common tendency of the two systems, in the case of the socialist solution, the enterprise - and through it the state and the collective of the enterprise -

is bears the best part of ^{the} burdens, whereas according to the typical Western solution only the ^{fixed amount} continuous paying of insurance premium burden the enterprises. Can it be denied that this essential difference originates in the fact that socialist enterprises constitute state property while the Western ones - as a rule - are in private ownership, and that thus the legal institution of responsibility for damages together with the distribution of the risk of damages involved thereby is "systembezogen"? ¹⁹

Identities ^{ES} and differences are caused by the fact that productive forces being on fairly equal level are employed within different social ^{relations} systems. The problems raised by the present level of productive forces - such as the problem of atomic war or universal peace raised in a quite new way by the modern technical development - ^{high level} as a result of the differences in social- and property ^{relations}, ~~lead~~ to solutions being sometimes of quite opposite character and sometimes superficially similar but essentially different. As a result of rapid development of productive forces the problem arises in both ^{systems} how extensive planning can be made consistent with ^{individual initiative} spontaneous activity and personal interestness. ^{According to} ~~there is a~~ well known comparative theory according to which the Western world, based upon individual initiative, has introduced more and more elements of extensive planning activity whereas in the socialist countries, based on planning, personal interestness and initiative ~~have~~ played an ever increasing part so that the trend of development has converged; ~~and~~ in this way in the future all differences will disappear, being eliminated by a third new system. ²⁰ It is to be feared however that this ~~the~~ well justified anxiety for the future of humanity may result in a kind of ^{withful} ~~wistful~~ ~~kin~~ thinking which may lead to illusions having in store a danger of disillusionment. The above outlined

arguments show beyond question that the development of productive forces brings about everywhere certain elements of planning which, however, inevitably come into conflict with the system based on private property. The answer to the question put in an identical way will essentially differ in the system of private property from the answer given by the system based on the social ^{ownership} of the means of production even if the universal character of this problem may lead to certain convergence. Though the institution of private property is elastic and has undergone a number of changes, its basis - the non-social character of ownership - has remained unchanged which, despite any possible correction, leads to an unjust distribution of income. This results not only in a hindering effect on the ever increasing demand on an extensive planning and in the fact that the preventive influence of liability for damages cannot duly assert itself ^{on} ~~if~~ the principal ^{originator} ~~cause~~ of damages, the enterprise, but also in far-reaching effects on the moral opinion, scale of values and ^{habits} ~~conventions~~ of the entirety of society, which ^{under} ~~among~~ the conditions of private property has necessarily become dehumanized because ^{business} ~~cut-throat~~ competition and struggle for life involve a daily routine of legally causing damages and at the same time ^{on the scale of values} a number of real values ^{are it} ~~are~~ pushed into ^{the} ~~background~~ background by ^{values of} financial ^{character} ~~interests~~. As to the possibility of a third system - though ways and means may be different ⁻ for the time being no other alternative to private property can be conceived than the social ownership of the means of production.

Thus, convergence has its ^s ~~limitations~~. In my view, Tunc is right in pressing for making the phenomenon of convergence conscious, ²¹⁹ but it would be a mistake to leave it unsaid that this process cannot be applied beyond the ^{limitation} of the real existence of convergence. No doubt, our comparative

law activity would be easier and nothing would prevent an attitude of "keep smiling" if comparison were restricted to phenomena without essential differences. This would be a great convenience but it is doubtful ^{whether} ~~if~~ ^{would be} ~~was~~ a useful solution. Zivsz was right in pointing out at the Paris Round-table Conference on comparative-law activities in the Soviet Union that peaceful coexistence does not mean synthesis but a competition by peaceful means between different social systems, ²² ~~and~~ ^{the} this case cannot be altered at all by leaving it unmentioned as if it were bad manners to speak about it. It is better to go on with this competition ^{also in the field of comparative law} ~~by~~ means of peaceful arguments and analytic research work. The friendly peaceful coexistence mentioned by Tunc will ~~only~~ be possible in the long run ^{only} if the optimism (mentioned also) by him will not originate in wishful thinking ²³. Humanity which might lose ^{much} ~~a lot~~ through war - either cold or ~~warm~~ ^{hot} - can draw only a temporary comfort by leaving peaceful competition out of consideration, while in the long run it can only gain by continuing that competition under peaceful conditions.

In my view, that is what the science ^{of} comparative law has to keep in view. ~~mind~~.

*2. I published
in the field of
Law and the
Hungary of
the 1950s*

[University of Budapest]

Please give correct description

Eötvös Loránt University, Budapest

Notes

1. Limpens: L'étude du droit comparé envisagée comme moyen de rechercher les matières susceptibles d'unification sur le plan international, Rev. de Droit Internat. et de Droit Comparé, Bruxelles, 1958. 2-3. 88-89.
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4. Millner: Contrasts in Contract and Tort, Current Legal Problems, London, 1963.68.
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6. Zweigert: Du sérieux de la promesse, Rev. Int. de Droit Comparé, 1964. p.44.
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8. Loeber: Rechtsvergleichung zwischen Ländern mit verschiedener Wirtschaftsordnung, RabelsZ. 1961.2.224.
9. Cf. Szabó, op.cit. pp. 114-117.
10. ^{See} The report of Yvonne Marx, Rev. Int. de Droit Comparé, 1964, pp.105-108; report of Rudolf Schlesinger, Soviet Studies, Oxford 1964, 4, pp. 474-485; the report of Jacques L. Hirsch, Journal des Tribunaux, Brussels, Dec. 1963, no.1. pp.700-702.
11. Cf. also Imre Szabó, *Riflessioni su alcuni problemi della teoria socialista del diritto*.
12. Loeber, op.cit. p.211.
13. Knapp: Verträge im Tschechoslovakischen Recht, RabelsZ. 1963.3. pp.495-497.

¹⁴
13. Ferid: Methoden, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Privatrechtsvereinheitlichung, Zschr.für Rechtsvergleichung, Wien, 1962.
4. p.263.

14. Ferid, loc.cit.

15. Tunc: La contribution possible des études juridiques comparatives à une meilleure compréhension entre nations,
Rev.Int.de Droit Comparé, 1964. p.54.

¹⁷
16. Loeber, op.cit.226.

17. Gutteridge: Le droit comparé, Paris, 1953. pp.54-55.

19. For some details cf. Eörsi: L'adaptation de la responsabilité civile aux exigences de

20. Tunc arrives at ^{Such a} this conclusion: (La possibilité de comparer

le contrat dans les systèmes juridiques à structures économiques différentes, RabelsZ.1963.3.pp.489-494.)

21. Tunc: La contribution possible des études comparatives à une meilleure compréhension entre nations, Rev.Int.de Droit Comp., 1964.1.p.54.

22. Cf. The report on the Round-table Conference, Rev.Int.de Droit Comparé, 1964, pp. 69-77.

23. Cf. the report on the Round-table conference ibid.p. 75.

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2. pp. 9-23.

Comparative Law and Coexistence

by Prof. Gyula Börsi (Budapest).

The success of a trend of movement in social science depends not only on the resoluteness, competence and enthusiasm of its adherents. Success or failure basically turns on the development of social-economic relations, whereas this development too is a result of social-human activity. While this fact strips the adherents of these movements off the illusion that they are creating a new world out of nothing but, at the same time, it recompenses them for this lost illusion the satisfaction that the frequently hidden by carrying into effect through them the recalcitrant laws of historical development, are carried into effect by through their activities.

The same holds true of comparative law, as well. Every textbook deals with ~~a number of~~ the forerunners of comparative law, but these forerunners are often ^{well} unaware of the significance of their action, living the isolated ~~synchronistic~~ life of those who come before their time while they will be discovered and ^{with} exploited only by the grateful posterity hunting egoistically for a family tree. *Having made the forerunners of comparative*

The first upswing of lesser significance fell on the time of the Napoleonic wars when the law of young rising capitalism had been opposed to the law of foundation. It is characteristic of the ^{the} ~~vigour~~ ^{bourgeois revolution} of this tendency that the influence of French law could be discovered even in the Russian Svod Zakonov, though in other respects Tsarist Russia ~~was~~ ^{had been} ~~was~~ ^{the} ~~not~~ ^{new} ~~was~~ ^{bourgeois} ~~was~~ ^{conceptions}. However, in Germany, ~~was~~ ^{born}

as it was proved by the Thibaut-Savigny polemic ^{confrontation} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~prohibitive~~ efforts aiming at the consolidation of the feudal bases of state-structure and particularism; ~~constituted a prohibitive~~ ^{signs in this respect} the isolation of conservative character ^{of the} Historical Legal School gained a victory ^{in a reorganization} through the

Putting aside the forerunner of comparative law, ^{we} may ~~say~~ take the first important period to ~~be~~ coincide with the Napoleonic wars when the law of the ^{newly} ~~newly~~ established ~~European~~ ~~states~~ republics stood opposed to the law of feudalism.

glorification of old Germanic law by taking advantage of the nationalist ^{wave following the} ~~flaring up of the~~ consequence of Napoleonic wars. Both the Romanists and the Germanists agreed in looking into the ^{past} instead of the ^{present}. The ^{had} ~~wave of~~ comparative law died down, its real time ~~did~~ not yet come.

The decisive change occurred ^{when} ~~by~~ capitalism attaining ^{ed} ~~ing~~ its modern stage of development in the last third of the nineteenth century. ^A ~~World-economy~~ ^{came into being and the export of goods} ~~attained full growth and capital~~ ^{exports} of the great powers attained ~~were and more~~ ^{enormous proportions} considerable size. This imparted a new impulse to the ^{study} ~~science of~~ of private international law, made the study of foreign laws indispensable and the "export" of internal law desirable. ^{it created} ~~Moreover~~ ^{as to} ~~aroused~~ ^{constructing} ~~the~~ ^{world scale} ~~possibility of creating~~ a "world-law". In Germany this change was ~~shown~~ in an interesting way by the fact that Jhering's critical remark that ^{French} ~~by the enactment of the~~ "Code Civil" universal European civil law narrowed down to a restricted provincial civil law ^{no longer} ~~and~~ ^{it} ~~did not~~ reflect the spirit of Savigny, and did not serve the purposes of ~~the~~ retrospective German separatism, but ^{on} ~~the~~ contrary, ^{at an} ~~it~~ it was aiming at harmonization and approach, ^{in view of} ~~in view of~~ future development. Here the Code Civil ~~was~~ ^{appeared} transformed ^{no longer as} ~~from~~ a law tending to general validity and endangering the "purity" of the German way of the development of law ^{but as a} ~~to the~~ manifestation of separatism contrasted with universal legal development, where universality meant in the first place that of the Pandectas, that is, of "Usus Modernus", ^{ed by} ~~being a product of~~ German jurisprudence. Germany after ^{it} ~~having~~ attained National Unity stepped out of economic isolation and used ~~up~~ even the "export" of law as a ^{weapon of} ~~means of its~~ economic power politics. Until, in fascism, brute force and racial myth was made the only means of politics, German law had been ^{regarded} ~~considered~~ by significant tendencies of German jurisprudence

as an important ~~number~~ ^{member} of the Family of European laws.
Then Germany departed again from the cooperation of inter-
national law and was lost in the ^{exclusive} admiration and ^{tendentious} interpretation
of German feudal and prefeudal law being ^{which, in fact, had long been by} so similar to feudal
and pre-feudal laws of other countries ^{they} and broke into abuses
against the legal systems of the "decadent liberalism".
Following the First World War - as a consequence of the
development of world trade - even Great Britain found
splendid isolation, to be too restrictive: ^{her} ~~its~~ lawyers
appeared on the forum of comparative law.

The third great upswing ^{of comparative law studies} followed ~~after~~ World War II.
Essentially, there were three changes in the traditional
domain of comparative law: a) ~~one of the great victors of the~~

^{para} ~~the~~ the United States appeared on the scene of the Western
^{as a victor of the war and with} world ~~with its~~ overwhelming superiority as the financier of
reconstruction, b) the second great "victor" of the war, the

^{para} German Federal Republic ~~had~~ buried the hatchet and rejoined
the family in order to ^{achieve its} ~~reach its~~ economic ^{and} political
goals within the Western alliance ~~by modernizing its methods~~
~~used before the war~~ and thus, ~~as a result~~ it turned from
the ancient German law towards contemporary Western laws. ^{again}

^{para} c) powerful bourgeois international organizations were created
~~and thus~~ ^{for which} comparative law became absolutely indispensable ^{the} ~~the~~ ^{para}

main point of the changes occurring after World War II is,
however, not to be found here. The decisive change consisted
in the transformation of the structure of world-economy:

while previously comparative law with its solidarity-complex
^{had been} and heated debates ~~was a Western~~ ^{internal affair} now the world,
~~as a consequence of social-historic development~~, widened out;

~~and at the same time, as a result of technical development~~
~~became narrower~~. By the side of the Western world emerged ~~the~~
~~the Socialist world~~ ^{new theme and partner} appeared

[↑] ~~from p. 4~~

in the field of comparative law: the socialist law and lawyer. At the same time the world of the former colonies became more and more estranged from the Western world. Thereby a number of ~~problems arose in a new way and the number of problems~~ was increased to a great extent.

MS
delete repetitive
~~This comparative law after World War II has to reckon - beside the Western world - also with the socialist world and with the world of former colonies - within the framework of a united and dilated world interwoven by the treads of world economy and made closer by technical progress. The effects of the appearance of socialist law will, ~~however,~~ be dealt with later, ^{at first} ~~while~~ I shall treat the causes of the upswing of comparative law in general.~~

~~Even~~ this very summary and ~~thus~~ necessarily incomplete outline of development shows fairly clearly that the causes of the upswing in comparative law are ~~of~~ primarily ^{or} socialist economic nature: ^{while the development of markets within the bourgeois nation} ~~isolated countries~~ brought about national law, ^{the development of the world economy evolution} necessarily led to the development of comparative law. Further, as ^{an expanding} ~~the intensity of~~ world economy depends on the application of non-warlike methods, comparative law ~~too~~ can exert a beneficial influence on the consolidation of ~~the conditions~~ ^{of world} peace.

^{independent}
In the circumstances it is ~~easy to understand~~ that comparative law in judicial practice ~~falls primarily on the fields of law involved by~~ ^{center on the area of} international economic relations, that is, of commercial law, law of exchange, ^{and} certain fields of private law, ^{such as} law of taxation and - as a result of the achievements attained to various extent by the labour movement - also labour law. This is indirectly proved by Limpens who pointed out that the order of sequence both in the development of national laws and in ^{efforts at} ~~the unification of~~ ^{international}

laws among nations has been both in Europe and in America as follows: 1/ law of exchange, 2/ commercial law, 3/ law of contracts, 4/ other parts of private law¹. ^{Further} that the ~~proportional~~ number of ~~the frequency of the~~ endeavours ~~of~~ at unification ~~is, for instance,~~ ^{as} in commercial law, 150, in private law 84, ^{and} in labour law 71 ^{and}, ^{whereas} ~~on the other hand,~~ in criminal law ^{a new} 37, and in administrative law only 10². ~~This is proved also by the fact that~~ As a result of the increase of the number of various international and "super-national" organizations - attributed ^{able to a great extent} mostly to economic factors, ^{as well as} in particular to the development of the means of production often outgrowing the possibilities given in certain countries - comparative law ^{made} great headway even in the field of administrative law.

Hence, ^{important} good intention, enthusiasm and expertise ^{ultimately} have played a ^{formidable} very great part, but ~~it has been the development of productive forces which ~~is its life and soul and source of its success~~~~ brought world economy into life. ^{It} was put

wisely by Graveson that "en réalité ce n'est pas le droit que l'on unifie mais un certain nombre de fonctions, de buts et de politiques, et que le droit joue en tant que science secondaire et auxiliaire, un rôle essentiel et indispensable en donnant ^m effet, aux politiques dont l'unification a été décidée"³. ^{To this it might be added} ~~This could be completed by saying that it is~~ ^{adding to it} (not only in this sense ~~that ~~xxxxxx~~ law is secondary~~) but also ~~to the effect~~ ⁱⁿ that it is the product of social-economic relations maintained by social efforts. It is product and, at the same time, also creator: while it has been brought about by the laws of social-economic development it is partly through law that these tendencies of social-economic development are realized.

II.

^{As long as} ~~While~~ comparative law was practised in the Western world

only, the situation was relatively easier. *Simple.*

The possibility ^{of} ~~any~~ comparison arises only if ~~the~~ ^{where} phenomena to be compared are variants which can be subsumed - from a certain point of view - under a common primary category. They have, at the same time, both common and different characteristics. In the Western world this common primary category is the law of private property ^{showing} which, ~~is~~ in the beginning, ~~imbued all the laws in its sphere with its~~ ^{the same basic} principles, that is, ~~with~~ ^{essentially in substance} the principle of ~~the~~ ^{unrestricted} ~~nature of~~ private property, freedom of contract and formal equality before the law. These laws ^{represent} ~~constitute~~ the same type of law; thus identity plays an important part in their primary problems.

At the same time ^{developed on the basis of} this extensive identity of primary principles, served as bases for a great variety of legal solutions ~~solutions. These had their historic causes in the same way as the development of the above mentioned identities. These~~ ~~historic causes~~ are manifold; certain national characteristics, ^{legal} ~~ancestral rights~~ and traditions have played their part. First of all however, the role of those class relations ^{which} engendered the modern Western systems of law, ~~this is the basis of the discernment in the present instance only by way of reference of~~ the law following ^{on} in the wake of the bourgeois revolution ^{yet} preceding ^{the} the accomplishment of the development of ^{full} bourgeois class, which can be characterized by the fact that the old feudal class was ^{still able to work} ~~to a certain extent~~ ⁱⁿ ~~its way~~ ~~still included~~ ^{to} in the capitalist forms of production. This led to the development of a legal system conserving certain ^{of content which had} ~~content elements~~ ^{which in pre-capitalist} ~~having their origin in the times preceding~~ ~~capitalism~~ ^{for instance}, the system of landed property, the conservation of certain ^{exemptions and} ~~privileges~~ and - as it has often been pointed out - ^{the} ~~giving~~ ^{given} priority ~~to~~ legal status over

contracts ^{as} ~~and also conserving~~ ^{some} in a certain respects - legal methods and techniques ^{ones} applied before the entry of capitalism on the scene ^{were preserved, such as} judge made law rooted in particularism, the avoidance of any comprehensive legal concept, such as the recognition in general of tort-liability as a consequence of the conservation of the ~~notio-system~~ and writ system "governing as from the 'grave' (Maitland)". Here I ~~evidently~~ refer to common law. On the other hand, the ^{total} ~~victory~~ ^{the} of bourgeois revolution brought about the originally consistent, relatively simple and clear law of the bourgeois class having as ^{its} motto "enrichissez vous" and opposing to such an extent the law of the old regime, that it saw even in the recognition of the notion of legal person a danger of ~~restoration~~ ^{restoration}; I refer here ~~evidently~~ to the Code Civil. Then ^{in some} ~~the civil laws of those~~ countries ^{transformation} ~~may be mentioned in which the bourgeois revolution~~ was slowed down and made inconsistent by the influence of feudal forces ^{which is} ~~hindering~~ the development of productive forces. This is reflected in ~~Such were the Austrian and German laws or the Russian law~~ ^{in pre-revolutionary} ~~preceding the revolution~~. These had been constituted by ^{political} ~~regimes~~ ^{characterised} ~~completely~~ ^{by} ~~on feudal~~ ^{characteristics a} ~~economic bases~~ ^{features (while the)} ~~which became obsolete but had no bourgeois class that could have~~ ^{was not had not been strong enough to} ~~overthrown them~~ ^{on the other hand the fact that not only} ~~and where in addition to the bourgeois~~ ^{powerful} ~~class, also the working class became a political factor,~~ ^{but} ~~which on the other hand, made an agreement between the~~ ~~Junkers and capitalists imperative. Within these laws, ideas~~ ~~of bourgeois inspiration - mostly having their origin in~~ ~~natural law - are intermingled with rules conserving feudal~~ ~~remnants, ^{such as} landed property, entail or the Einführungsgesetz~~ ~~of the BGB termed by Wieacker as "Privatfürstrecht" 3. It~~ ~~seems as if the regulation of land law, on the one hand, and~~ ~~that of the law of contracts on the other, had taken place in~~ ~~different periods, and so on. At last, a law is to be mentioned~~ ^{Finally, there is the case of}

which was made in the time of the development of modern capitalism in a country that has never been burdened with considerable feudal remnants: the Swiss private law which by reflecting the common principles of all the bourgeois types of law complies also with the special requirements of the period of modern capitalism, such as the discretion of the Court, clauses of general character, an important part played by ^{modern} equity, etc. ^{if we take into account} By referring to a number of other variants ^{such as} the solutions, in many respects original adopted by Scandinavian laws may be ~~mentioned here~~ ^{it} can be proved that the great intensity of common characteristics is completed by a wide range of variants; ~~that is~~, this domain provides great possibilities for comparative law.

As ~~it~~ has been mentioned, ~~the claim for such a comparative activity was first put by~~ ^{the} world economy in the period of the development of modern capitalism. ~~World economy and modern productive forces led to some levelling off among Western laws.~~ ^{Great parts of the} Feudal remnants surviving in some of these countries have been slowly eliminated. The original great principles of bourgeois development have been more ~~respected~~ ^{worshipped} ~~than applied~~ ^{adhered} since the development of productive forces, mass production ~~etc.~~ have outgrown the framework of private property; the requirement of state intervention, state-economic activity and some degree of planning, ~~have hindered to a large extent~~ ^{in fact} the assertion of the unlimited character of private property and contractual freedom. An interesting process ~~having~~ of levelling off character has taken place in the method ^{of} the development of law, as well. Judge made law has been unable to keep abreast with the requirements of rapid development. ^{There has been pressure} ~~pressing, in certain respects~~, for radical changes: thus statutory law has obtained an ever increasing

close
really
means
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Law
the

importance. At the same time, the great codes have become obsolete ~~and even~~ in the countries of the great codes ~~by~~ - by using the slogan "loyalty to the codes" or propagated by the ~~and similar other theoretical conceptions~~ ~~Freirechtsschule~~ or, on the contrary, ~~is a sky and modest~~ ~~way~~ ~~adapted~~ to the requirements of our age. This process has only been promoted by the fact that the law of the United States, as a power taking the lead of the Western world, is also to a great extent a judge made law, ~~though~~ ^{fundamentally} there is no question of an adaption of the law of the stronger acting under pressure, ~~but of the fact that~~ partly the pace of development and partly the ^{ever growing} great antagonism between the stage of development of productive forces on the one hand and the traditional system of private property on the other require a judicial watering down of the highly esteemed codes.

Repetitive!
~~In this situation comparative law - in particular after World War II - has promoted the process of levelling off primarily by trying to prove that the laws of various countries - through their different technics and methods - essentially lead to identical practical results. ^{After we are feeling}~~

~~The matter in question here is a twofold process.~~

Levelling off or "harmonization" ^{takes} place on legal practice, delivery conditions and even sometimes in legislative activity, ^{and this} is being registered, commented and ~~sometimes even~~ promoted or backed by comparative law. In the field of the impossibility of performance in Germany the theory of "Geschäftsgrundlage" and in England the concept of frustration have simultaneously developed. In the domain of faulty performance in Germany the theory of "Leistungsstörungen" and positive "Vertragsverletzungen" led in its legal consequences to similar results as in France ^{where} judicial practice was based on "inexécution". The law of torts was invaded by the general concept of duty of care ~~and~~ ^{which lead to} ~~it~~ was followed by the ^{almost} ~~nearly~~ general responsibility based

10 -

upon negligence, ^{which has} in practice has brought the law of torts near up to the general responsibility caused by injurious acts which has spread on the Continent and is ^{which made its way} in force even in Germany in spite of the exhaustive enumeration in the B.G.B. of all the cases of unlawfully caused damages.

As for the ^{comparatists} adherents of the school of comparative law - as it has been mentioned above - the British and Americans have abandoned the splendid isolation of common law. According to M.A. Millner for instance, English and Continental laws are approaching one another ~~even~~ independently of the developments of common market simply as a consequence of economic interdependence and cultural transfusion; the isolation of English law and lawyers is bound to decline⁴. At the same time Germany has returned into the great family. Instead of the isolation of German law, the common Roman roots have been emphasized (Koschaker) ^{there is talk of} ~~one talks about~~ the possibility of getting rid - by the creation of super-national legal concepts - of the conflicts and ambiguities ~~caused, by legal concepts deemed to be necessary if seen solely from a national point of view~~ ^{Here is the idea that} (Zweigert) ~~and that one must not see in the positive norms of national law the only possible solution~~ (Perid) etc. From the sphere of common law R.B. Schlesinger speaks about the deprovincialization of minds where ^{as} the French (David) about the possibility created by comparative law to leave the somewhat narrow bounds of ~~international~~ laws. Contantinesco has written a book in French on ~~the~~ breach of contract in the framework of the "Librairie Encycopédique" of Brussels edited by the "Institute of European Law" of the University of the Saarland, detached from France and annexed to the German Federal Republic which has been published in Stuttgart. The purpose of this book is, above all, to point

out the similarities between the French, English and German solutions. The author comes to the conclusion that modern civil law is losing its historical elements step by step.⁵ Tunc, while reviewing in a very ingenious and interesting way on the pages of the periodical "Revue trimestrielle de Droit civil" the French judicial practice on ^{civil liability} ~~the responsibility~~ for damages systematically draws a parallel between the French and the American laws. One of the remarks of Zweigert is particularly characteristic of the above ^{mentioned} ~~treated~~ issue. This points to the necessity of loosening the rigour of Continental codes by means of judge made law, on the one hand, and of providing the judge made law with a new basis, namely that of comparative law, on the other. The author proposes in a concrete case to introduce by judicial practice into the German law, [?] ~~unknown~~ the "consideration doctrine" the "promissory estoppel" being one of the products of American judicial practice, turning away from the "consideration doctrine": "Des lois aussi vieilles que celles du BGB peuvent être franchement amendées dans leur teneur par une interprétation de droit comparé"⁶.

Perhaps, ^{many} ~~it would~~ be unnecessary to continue this enumeration: It can be ^{asserted} ~~laid down~~ that within the Western world are now very favourable to comparative law, because

1) the commensurability of the legal systems serving as the bases of comparison is ensured by their belonging to the same type of law having ^{with} common fundamental principles,

2) comparison is made ^{by} ~~(in particular)~~ ^{being} ~~(profitable)~~ by the common ^{operation} ~~effect~~ of two factors, namely:

a) the ^{manner} ~~ways~~ and forms in which the above mentioned common principles are put into practice differ ~~in a great extent~~ from each other;

b) the outgrowing ^{the} ~~by~~ ~~productive~~ of the framework of the given national economies by ^{the} ~~productive~~ forces together with

What does this mean?

advent

advent

some other phenomena of world economy call for certain levelling off action and "harmonization".

III.

What resemblances and differences ^{would appear} in this situation if comparative law ~~exceeded its original province~~ and compared ~~the~~ laws of different types being in force in countries belonging to different social-economic systems?

~~It is~~ conspicuous ^{how} the demand on comparative law of this kind has increased after World War II. Most of the Western international scientific organizations and educational institutes dealing with comparative law deal ^{also} with socialist laws, ~~too~~. There are a number of such organizations in the boards of which also socialist lawyers are to be found, the raising and working out of the problems of comparative law has begun in the socialist countries as well [?] /Bystricky, Szabo etc.?

*delete
repetitive*

The great intensity of the manifestation of this demand can be traced back to several factors. The Soviet-American-British-French cooperation and within it the part played by the Soviet Union in defeating fascism and further the increase in the number, economic force and prestige of the socialist countries had been the starting point of this development. Socialist countries became powerful factors of world economy through the increase of their economic force ^{which} became a factor of a very great importance ^{for example for} ~~from the point of view of~~ the countries liberated from colonial oppression. The great part played by the socialist countries in ^{the} world economy requires the application of comparative law in the field of the law concerning economic life in the same way - if not ^{to the same} ~~with the same intensity~~ - as within the Western world, whereas the possibility of comparative law is assured by the fact that ~~the~~ law concerning international relations - in particular in the field of ^{contracts} ~~the treaties~~ connected with this - in some

respects necessitates equal or at least similar solutions. This is facilitated by the fact, that ^{the civil laws} ~~before the war~~ ^{and} in some of the socialist countries had ^{were} ~~prevailed~~ civil laws similar to the German, Austrian or French laws, the traces of which - in particular in ~~the field of~~ minor details and some types of legal institutions ~~e.g. warranties~~ - can even now be found. Moreover - as Loeber pointed it out - a number of similar problems are raised by modern life in the countries having different social systems.⁸

Thus there is a demand and common ground for a comparison between the laws of West and East. This common ground is corroborated by the objectives, policy and postulates of peaceful coexistence and peaceful economic competition - the recognition of the fact that an atomic war would be ^{(understanding the case -} ~~to put~~ it mildly ~~a~~ ^{(a} too radical "solution" of the great problems of the world.

Nevertheless, it would ~~not~~ benefit the purposes of coexistence to leave difficulties ^{unmentioned} ~~unsaid~~. Broadly speaking, these consist in the fact - as ^{by the} ~~it will be~~ dealt with in detail ^{below} in ~~Part IV~~ - that the importance ^{of} differences concerning fundamental issues is greater than that of the similarities. Whereas the comparison of the laws of countries having similar social system, often shows important differences on common grounds, ⁱⁿ ~~while~~ comparing the laws of countries having different social systems, important similarities can be found on grounds of opposite character. The common ground of comparison is in the latter case more general and therefore ^{less} ~~more~~ undistinctive. No direct common ground - such as private property ~~is~~ in the West and social property in the socialist countries - can be found here. Hence, the ~~genus~~ proximum constituting the ground of an investigation into similarities and differences appears here only on the level of a generalized legal concept

formulated in disregard of the differences of social structures which hardly has any non-formal elements⁹. This leads - among others - to the confusion of identical denominations of essentially different notions. The Colloquium on socialist property organised in Brussels by the Institut Solvay, Centre ~~d'Etudes~~ d'Études des Pays de l'Est, may be mentioned as an instructive example of this¹⁰.

These problems ^{also} engender as well the fact that different social systems, regardless of their own partial internal differences, have neatly diverse ideological concepts. It would be wrong to pretend ~~as if~~ ^{that} this fact did not exist. On the other hand, differences in ideological bases ^{should not} ~~cannot~~ lead to a situation where "comparative law" would be ~~no more than~~ ^{merely} some kind of monologues ^{spoken by} ~~between~~ deaf persons, who do not hear one another in spite of ~~shouting aloud~~ ^{raising their voices}.

see above!
note
~~However,~~ Difficulties arise from the fact that, as a result of the differences in the social systems and types of law, fundamental legal issues are dominated by differences instead of similarities, while ideological controversies raise further methodological problems. On the other hand, the possibility and necessity of a comparative activity concerning the laws of the two systems is ~~all the same~~, ensured by the fairly identical level of productive forces, which brings about a situation to a certain extent similar in both systems - it creates special dangers of accidents, it leads to mass-production etc. - and puts to a certain extent similar questions in both systems. Such a comparative activity is ensured by ^{the} world economy created by the development of productive forces, ~~as~~ it is ensured by the great part played in world economy by socialist countries; by the interest aroused in the Western world by the successes of socialism; by similar legal solutions caused partly by historical legal traditions partly by the influence exerted on law by international relations and - last but not least - it is promoted by the postulate of peaceful coexistence. Consequently, difficulties only encumber but do not make comparative law ~~impossible~~. Comparative law may promote:
a) mutual knowledge and understanding of each other,
and

b) merely the ^{satisfaction of} (practical requirements of international trade.

IV.

One is often inclined ^{to which are in accordance} to consider ~~usual~~ phenomena as being the natural and only possible way^a of the attainment of the purposes of the ^{institutions} phenomena in question, that is, to confuse specific and general phenomena. This is the case above all if this interpretation ^{serves one's own interests which are not at all become conscious} ~~can be used~~ though sometimes subconsciously ~~for laying stress on the phenomena of general character.~~ It is well known, for instance, that bourgeois revolution took a stand for "man" whereas ~~by~~ the demands of "man" ^{were conceived as} ~~was meant~~ those of the bourgeoisie forging ~~against~~ ahead through fighting against feudalism.

It is of ^{primary} ~~principal~~ importance from the cognitive point of view of comparative law that for many Western lawyers law is equal to the law of bourgeois type. ^{is equal to both the bourgeois concept of law.} Socialist lawyers, however, are free from this misconception, owing partly to the Marxist historical view ^{recognizing} ~~knowing~~ as many types of law as ~~many~~ social systems ~~there~~ exist, partly to the fact that whereas socialism, for anybody living in bourgeois society, appears as ~~an~~ an abstraction never experienced, social systems preceding socialism are for those living in socialist countries either experienced realities or historical past. ^{specific}

Now, the ^{deceptive identification which raises the special phenomenon to the level of the general phenomenon, according to which} ~~generalization considering to be general what specific is indeed and thus~~ the law of bourgeois type ~~to be~~ is equal to law in general, leads to two conclusions which, though ^{they} ~~can be also be~~ found simultaneously, ~~as well,~~ ^{are} by and large characteristic of two historical eras. These two possible conclusions are

- 1) socialist "law" is not law,
- 2) socialist law is essentially the same kind of law as bourgeois law. ~~It is~~

The first conclusion is a product of blind anti-Communism,

while the second one - at least as to some of its important varieties - is a ^{well-intentioned} ~~benign~~ ^{provided} ~~error~~ ^{leading for} ~~involvement~~ by the ^{striving} ~~theory~~ of peaceful coexistence.

1) According to Loeber, Western lawyers in general analyze socialist law in a descriptive ^{and} dogmatic way, while socialist lawyers deal with Western legal systems on an ideological basis¹². In my view, however, this statement is to be rendered more accurate ^{being} ~~here~~ ^{the} the purpose and level of comparison have ^{got mixed up} ~~been confused~~. The purely descriptive and dogmatic treatment has to satisfy ~~here~~ the practical requirements of world economy and the positivist attitude of Western lawyers has, indeed, led to the fact that comparisons of such kind occur more often in the West than in the socialist countries; ~~moreover~~, Knapp's criticism concerning this method¹³ has been accepted for the most part by socialist jurists. The other ~~objective~~ purpose and level of comparison ^{goes to the roots of} ~~probes deeply into~~ the different types of law legal systems by considering law as a product and ^a ~~shaper~~ of social-economic relations and by examining it through its interaction with other social-economic factors. Loeber's statement that this method is more applied by socialist jurists than by the Western ones ^{could} ~~can~~ be interpreted as a praise of the followers of socialist legal theory.

But Loeber did not mean ^{that} ~~so~~. He spoke of "prejudices" and - citing from Braga - of the caricature of comparative law. ^{reality this is not what he called "ideological" comparison, but merely} In his opinion it is not comparative law based on ideology which is the matter in question here but a method of execration and name-calling. ^{As to this method, his} ~~This~~ reproach is unjustified. Not that in a ^{past} period the method of execration without any analysis had not been a fairly frequent practice in the socialist countries but ^{played at least} ~~this method~~ due to anti-communism - an equal part in the Western countries, where its vigour at present - in consequence of cold-war propaganda - has even become more

intensive than in most of the socialist countries.

At first, socialist law ^{was} ~~had been~~ by some lawyers in the West suppressed, belittled or held in contempt while others ~~had~~ even denied that ^{the} ~~this~~ phenomenon could ^{be} ~~at all~~ be considered as "law". This was followed by a false generalization which ^{is} ~~can~~ even now ^{current} ~~be found~~: one of the ideological Leitmotives of anti-Communism and cold war is the identification of socialist law with that of ~~the~~ fascism through the introduction of the term "totalitarian". This propaganda disregards the fact that fascism is the most ^{unpleasant and} ~~pitiless and cruel~~ product of the system of private property, whereas socialism is based upon the social property of the means of production; that the political system of fascism has been everywhere organized by the forces of private property in the spirit of blind anti-Communism, that while fascism aimed at the subjugation of the world, socialism ^{serves the cause of} ~~has promoted~~ the progress of humanity. What is the point, for instance, of asserting in ^{a scientific} ~~the~~ publications dealing with comparative law that by rendering the maintenance of ~~natural~~ ^{born out of wedlock} children to be a state-function, ~~that is~~ by releasing ^{them} mothers from the humiliation of affiliation cases and from financial difficulties, the Soviet Union has weakened the legal status of such children, abolished their equality of rights with those of legitimate children, introduced a policy similar to the demographic policy of fascism ¹⁹? It is well known, that in the Soviet Union no traces can be found of the fascist demographic policy, which took the field of the propagation of one race irrespective of any other aspect, the extermination or ^{enslavement} ~~subjugation~~ of all the other races. ^{No trace can} ~~Neither any trace of~~ ^{curious of} ~~propagating~~ the birth of illegitimate children ~~can be found~~ in the Soviet Union. Moreover, it is well known that the legal rule in question concerns not only illegitimate children but also orphans brought up by single women.

2
Is this law
before liberation
from?

framing of
the sentence
not clear.

And what is the point of abandoning the style and logical structure applied in the ~~former~~^{other} parts of a paper otherwise commonsensical and of high standards, and using in respect of the above mentioned issue (such expressions) as "satellites" ^{or the} ~~learned author himself mentions that it is the~~ "alter kurs der Gieichstellung"? Moreover, ~~this~~^{the} legal regulation ^{is a question} has not been adopted by the other socialist countries. ^{one may ask,} And what if they had adopted? It is also well known that great differences can be found between certain ^{the different} socialist laws whereas similarities originate in the social property of the means of production and the class-structure in the same way as the similarities between Western laws derive from private property and class relations involved by it. Reference has been made to the ^{harmonization} rapprochement now in progress between the American and other Western laws: Before ^{prior to the} his above criticized paper ^{remarks} Ferid himself had used quite another style while dealing with the American observers at the Hague Conference proposing the adoption of the ^{the American American} ~~technics of Uniform Laws~~. What ~~that~~ would be his comment if someone used the term "satellitism" in this connection? No socialist country, has hitherto adopted any Soviet law, ^{code,} but has Belgium become the ~~stellite~~^{satellite} of France by the adoption of the Code Civil?

No doubt, the ~~remnants~~^{remnants} of such methods ^{should} must be eliminated from the comparison between the laws of the two systems. Tunc is right in laying down that one has to try to "corriger la caricature que nous nous faisons de l'autre"¹⁶. That, also constitutes a part of the liquidation of the ~~remnants~~^{ts} of cold war.

2. The other error having common ^{philosophical} roots with the former one, but being seemingly of opposite character, consists essentially in denying the importance of the differences between the laws of the two social systems. The manifestations

of this view have different ^{political} roots. Some say that socialism has created nothing new in the domain of law, but brought about some sort of cockney-bourgeois law - Zivsz refers for instance, to a statement asserting that the legislation ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ of recent years on criminal law in the Soviet Union is no more than the reception of the Dutch criminal law of the XIXth century. Such views are fostered by a scorn of socialism based upon ignorance and prejudice ~~and which~~ - if they these prejudices have not become inveterated ^{by} can be cleared up by means of information. According to another theory falling under this category, ~~on the other hand~~ two originally different legal systems ^{are converging} ~~have converged here~~. This view is engendered by good-will, ^{by a sort of an} abstract humanism and by a craving ^{staving} for coexistence, that is, by noble motives which, however, may result in illusions involving the danger of disappointment. That is why a discussion in the spirit of ^{sincerity} ~~honest~~ straightforwardness seems to be proper here.

Undoubtedly ^a number of ^{similar} problems arise in every social system. It is also beyond question that the solutions of these are to a degree similar. I believe, however, that ^{beyond} this degree no convergence is possible, the contradictions are too deep-rooted.

I cannot agree, for instance, with Loeber's argumentations according to which there are "systembezogen" and "systemneutrak" fields in the domain of comparative law ¹⁷. This view - in my opinion - can only be considered correct in the sense that some problems are more directly connected with the social systems serving as their bases than others. The field of civil liability where according to Gutteridge - particularly as a consequence of the steadily increasing motor traffic - problems arise everywhere in an identic way and being a

relatively "systemneutral" field, is a good example of this¹⁸. Here technical progress, traffic conditions and intense mass-cohabitation raise in both social systems the same problems of legal liability. Superficially, also the trend of development is identical: the minimal conditions of the subsistence of the injured person are to be ensured by means of general insurance ^{and this} which is to be completed by civil liability for ^{full} damages. The Western solution is, however, characterised by the fact that the most frequent originators of damages, the enterprises, are relieved from any further risk by paying insurance premia, leaving thus all burden of sanctions - through a "tort fine" as proposed by Ehrenzweig or in another way - solely upon the individual if liability is not almost completely eliminated through liability insurance or by other means. According to the socialist solution, ^{on the other hand} ~~however~~ the overwhelming part of damages ~~falls~~ falls on the enterprises: the organs of social insurance and - as regards damages not covered by social insurance - the injured person may claim from the responsible enterprise reimbursement, ^{or} ~~resp.~~ damages, ^{while} ~~whereas~~ the enterprise can shift only a small part of damages upon the employee, while it has to bear itself the rest; it is not entitled to cover it by insurance. As a result of the state-ownership of ~~the~~ enterprises, damages caused by enterprises burden for the most part the state; the rest diminishes the profitsharing of employees, that is they constitute a loss for the entire collective. This solution stimulates the state, the ~~collectives~~ ^{for} of enterprises and the persons causing damages alike, to prevent the development of situations involving the danger of causing damages. Thus, beyond the common tendency of the two systems, in the case of the socialist solution, the enterprise - and through it the state and the collective of the enterprise -

is bears the best part of ^{the} burdens, whereas according to ~~the~~ typical Western solution only the ^{fixed amount} continuous paying of insurance premium burden~~s~~ the enterprises. Can it be denied that this essential difference originates in the fact that socialist enterprises constitute state property while the Western ones - as a rule - are in private ownership, and that thus the legal institution of responsibility for damages together with the distribution of the risk of damages involved thereby is "systembezogen"? ¹⁹

Identities ^{and} and differences are caused by the fact that productive forces being on fairly equal level are employed within different social ^{relations} systems. The problems raised by the present level of productive forces - such as the problem of atomic war or universal peace raised in a quite new way by the modern technical development - ^{has led} as a result of the differences in social and property relations, ²⁰ lead to solutions being sometimes of quite opposite character and sometimes superficially similar but essentially different. As a result of rapid development of productive forces the problem arises in both ^{systems} ~~systems~~ how extensive planning can be made consistent with ^{individual initiative} ~~spontaneous activity~~ and personal interestedness. ^{According to} ~~There is a~~ well known comparative theory ~~according to which~~ the Western world, based upon individual initiative, has introduced more and more elements of extensive planning activity whereas in the socialist countries, based on planning, personal interestedness and initiative ^{have} played an ever increasing part so that the trend of development has converged; ~~and~~ in this way in the future all differences will disappear, being eliminated by a third new system. ²¹ It is to be feared however that ~~this the~~ well justified ^{anxiety} for the future of humanity may result in a kind of ~~wasteful~~ ^{wishful} thinking which may lead to illusions having in store a danger of disillusionment. The above outlined

arguments show beyond question that the development of productive forces brings about everywhere certain elements of planning which, however, inevitably come into conflict with the system based on private property. The answer to the question put in an identical way will essentially differ in the system of private property from the answer given by the system based on the social ^{ownership} of the means of production even if the universal character of this problem may lead to certain convergence.

Though the institution of private property is elastic and has undergone a number of changes, its basis - the non-social character of ownership - has remained unchanged which - despite any possible correction - leads to an unjust distribution of income. This results not only in a hindering effect on the ever increasing demand on an extensive planning and in the fact that the preventive influence of liability for damages cannot duly assert itself ^{on} if the principal ^{originator} ~~causer~~ of damages, the enterprise, but also in far-reaching effects on the moral opinion, scale of values and ^{habits} ~~conventions~~ of the entirety of society, which ^{under} ~~among~~ the conditions of private property has necessarily become dehumanized because ^{business} ~~cut-throat~~ competition and struggle for life involve a daily routine of legally causing damages and at the same time ^{on the scale of values} a number of real values ^{are} ~~is~~ pushed into ^{the} ~~background~~ background by ^{values of} financial ^{character} ~~interests~~. As to the possibility of a third system - though ways and means may be different for the time being no other alternative to private property can be conceived than the social ownership of the means of production.

Thus, convergence has its ^{limitations} ~~limitations~~. In my view, Tunc is right in pressing for making the phenomenon of convergence conscious, ²¹⁶ but it would be a mistake to leave it unsaid that this process cannot be applied beyond the ^{limitation} ~~limitation~~ of the real existence of convergence. No doubt, our comparative

law activity would be easier and nothing would prevent an attitude of "keep smiling" if comparison were restricted to phenomena without essential differences. This would be a great convenience but it is doubtful ^{whether} ^{would be} if this ~~were~~ a useful solution. Zivsz was right in pointing out at the Paris Round-table Conference on comparative-law activities in the Soviet Union that peaceful coexistence does not mean synthesis but a competition by peaceful means between different social systems, ¹²⁸ ~~and~~ ^{the} ~~this~~ case cannot be altered at all by leaving it unmentioned as if it were bad manners to speak about it. It is better to go on with this competition ^{also in the field of comparative law} by means of peaceful arguments and analytic research work. The friendly peaceful coexistence mentioned by Tunc will ~~only~~ ^{only} be possible in the long run ^{only} if the optimism (mentioned also) by him will not originate in wishful thinking ²¹. Humanity which might lose ^{much} ~~a lot~~ through war - either cold or ^{hot} ~~warm~~ - can draw only ~~a~~ temporary comfort by leaving peaceful competition out of consideration, while in the long run it can only gain by continuing that competition under peaceful conditions.

In my view, that is what the science ^{of} comparative law has to keep in view ^{in mind}.

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Notes

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2. Limpens: Relations entre l'unification au niveau régional et l'unification au niveau universel, Rev. Int. de Droit Comparé, Paris, 1964.1.21.
3. Graveson: L'étendue du domaine de l'unification du droit, Rev. Int. de Droit Comparé, Paris, 1964.1.6.
4. Millner: Contrasts in Contract and Tort, Current Legal Problems, London, 1963.68.
5. Constantinesco: Inexécution et Faute Contractuelle en Droit Comparé, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1960. p.513.
6. Zweigert: Du sérieux de la promesse, Rev. Int. de Droit Comparé, 1964. p.44.
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8. Loeber: Rechtsvergleichung zwischen Ländern mit verschiedener Wirtschaftsordnung, RabelsZ. 1961.2.224.
9. Cf. Szabó, op.cit. pp. 114-117.
10. ^{See} The report of Yvonne Marx, Rev. Int. de Droit Comparé, 1964, pp.105-108; report of Rudolf Schlesinger, Soviet Studies, Oxford 1964, 4, pp. 474-485; the report of Jacques L. Hirsch, Journal des Tribunaux, Brussels, Dec. 1963, no.1. pp.700-702.
11. Cf. also Inre Szabó: Riflessioni su alcuni problemi della teoria socialista del diritto.
12. Loeber, op.cit. p.211.
13. Knapp: Verträge im Tschechoslovakischen Recht, RabelsZ. 1963.3. pp.495-497.

Democrazia
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4. p.4.

¹⁴
13. Ferid: Methoden, Möglichkeit. . and Grenzen der Privatrechts-
vereinheitlichung, Zschr.für Rechtsvergleichung, Wien, 1962.
4. p.263.

14. Ferid, loc.cit.

16. Tunc: La contribution possible des études juridiques
comparatives à une meilleure compréhension entre nations,
Rev.Int.de Droit Comparé, 1964. p.54.

¹⁷

18. Loeber, op.cit.226.

19. Gutteridge: Le droit comparé, Paris, 1953. pp.54-55.

19. For some details cf. Férat: L'adaptation de la responsabilité civile aux exigences de

20. Tunc arrives at ~~this~~ conclusion; (La possibilité de comparer
^{Sucha})

le contrat dans les systèmes juridiques à structures
économiques différentes, RabelsZ.1963.3.pp.489-494.)

21. Tunc: La contribution possible des études comparatives à
une meilleure compréhension entre nations, Rev.Int.de Droit
Comp., 1964.1.p.54.

22. Cf. The report on the Round-table Conference, Rev.Int.de
Droit Comparé, 1964, pp. 69-77.

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La vie
moderne,
Revue de
droit con-
temporain,
Paris, 1963.
2.pp.9-23.

their standard of life, 'embourgeoisement' or not. Until the dispute will have been healed in this most natural of ways we shall have to live with it, just as with the splits within what, on paper, is still the 'Western alliance'-and see to it that conflicts within either of the great 'camps', whatever specific interests of the competing parties are involved, should not degenerate into a competition in 'toughness' against the opposite 'cold war' party.

Rudolf Schlesinger

10pt on 12

The Dispute and the Socialist Tradition

Rudolf Schlesinger

(predominant)

Issues of international policies have hitherto played the ~~predominant~~ part in the Sino-Soviet conflict. At first, they concerned the possibility of peaceful co-existence of states embodying ~~the~~ ^{different} social systems and the prospect ~~not~~ ¹⁾ ~~the~~ certainty of avoiding nuclear war; subsequently, the Chinese ~~have~~ elaborated the concept of the 'intermediate zone' including, apart from the Chinese themselves, countries such as Japan, France and West Germany, ~~have~~ raised territorial claims against the USSR and encouraged others to do so. It is not the purpose of this comment to deal with ~~the~~ issues of foreign policies, ~~for shall~~ ^{journal, the} we deal, ~~in this manner~~, with/organisational implications of the dispute for the world communist movement: ~~this comment is mainly devoted to its~~ ^{we are here concerned with} relevance for the continuity of the socialist tradition. As Palmiro Togliatti has emphasized in his last observations (published in ~~Rinascita~~ ^{in the dispute} September 8th, and in Pravda, September 10th, 1964) the issue is much

broader than that between socialist movements in control of state power. Of course, we are not discussing the dispute from the point of view of Marxist orthodoxy: Marxist ideology, like any other, requires sociological analysis of its origins and formation. We are primarily concerned with the question of whether the roots of the dispute can be explained by differences in development stages or differences in national tradition, or should be regarded as a reformulation of different approaches which are as old as the modern socialist movement.

A serious approach to this problem is a priori excluded if, with G. Lichtheim, Marxism is defined as being, in essence, opposition to 'the

- 1) In his speech at ~~the conference~~ on August 8, 1964, Khrushchev has again made clear that the differences do ~~not~~ ^{not} affect the right and duty of socialist states, if attacked ~~by~~ ^{by} with nuclear arms, and that reconstruction, after such a war, would proceed on such socialist lines as possible after the immense destructions involved in war.
- 2) Marxism: an historical and critical study, London 1961, p. 165, note 4.

F to defend themselves,

read as double-spaced script.
Ordzonikidze

2) economic system of bourgeois society, the latter being the fully ~~developed~~ developed form of western civilization. This statement coincides with the position taken by the Russian right-wing Social Democrats - including the Mensheviks - at the beginning of the twentieth century in their dispute with the Bolsheviks. This position, in fact, denied the possibility of a socialist revolution in a comparatively 'underdeveloped' country, such as Tsarist ~~Russian~~ Russia was. Such an interpretation of Marxism would make it a fortiori inapplicable to the second half of the twentieth century, where the major changes in social structure are taking place outside Europe.

1879) This interpretation, however, contradicts not only the personal views of Marx, as expressed in 1879 in his famous letter to the Editor of the Otechestvennye Zapiski, but also the historical origin of the Marxist movement: Marxism originated, as an intellectual trend, in Germany, which of all the countries of western Europe was the least developed bourgeois society in the mid-nineteenth century, and became dominant in the socialist parties of Germany of the 1880's and Russia of the 1890's, operating underground. The ascendancy of Marxism as the theory of the socialist movement in Russia and throughout Central Europe became general in the first two decades of the twentieth century. By this time bourgeois society ~~bourgeois society~~ had long passed the stage of early nineteenth century England which gave rise to Ricardian economics. Thus the twentieth century vulgarisers of Marxism, including the "economists" not only misrepresented Marxist doctrine, but were indeed several decades behind the course of history. ^{Their} ~~The~~ misrepresentation of Marx' early political writings as some kind of 'infantile disorder' of Young Hegelian origin, and their neglect of Engels' later writings stressing non-economic factors on the shaping ~~and~~ and interaction of history, belongs to the realm of political mythology.

1880's
1890's

...trends included incidents such as the Bechko-vashchina, which belonged to the realm of the pathological. In its day it had acquired

සමස්ත ප්‍රතිඵලයන් සාරාංශයක් ලෙස පහත දැක්වේ.

Much more significant, however, was P.M. Tkachev's attempt to transfer the French Blanquist tradition to the Russian soil and indeed to combine this with a Marxist interpretation of history. It is this trend of the Populist era which is at present experiencing a revival in Maoism and in various revolutionary trends in the developing countries. The combination between Blanquism and Marxism consisted in the assertion that the ideals inspiring voluntarist action or Elites were the product of historical processes. Tkachev was not so

31 I am using the term here in the very broad sense as applied in

Venturi's book is Populism in Russia (Italian ed. 1952, Engl. translation published in 1960 in London, under the title Roots of Revolution) so as to denote that period in the development of the Russian socialist movement in which it was not yet split into what eventually became the Social Revolutionaries (the party which, based upon the peasantry, played ~~the~~ a prominent part during the Kerenky period of 1917, and immediately after the Bolshevik conquest of power, as a main centre of opposition to it) and the Social Democrats (the latter themselves split into the Leninist Bolsheviks, which eventually assumed power, and the Mensheviks, who emphasized a 'western' way of development, both factions, however, operating upon the organisation of the industrial working-class).

naïve as to believe that armed insurrection and conspiracy, in conditions of a crisis within the ruling class could lay the foundations of a new society, which further would develop by its own spontaneity.

It was stated, at their trial after the assassination of Alexander [redacted] by the leaders of the group Verkhvaya Volya, whose own concepts presented a mixture with anarchism. In Ustachev's concept there would have been ample room for a centralized party, of the Chinese rather than the Soviet communist type. Since he was far from recognizing a guiding role of the working class against the soviet forces supporting the revolution, Ustachev might well have supported the following statement of Mao's, made at the height of the Anti-Japanese war but included ~~reprinted~~ in his Selected Works (Engl. ed., vol. II, p. 272):

'Our principle is that the party commands the gun, and the gun will never be allowed to command the party, but it is also true that with guns at our disposal we can easily build up the party organization, and the Eighth Route Army has built up a powerful party organization in North China. We can also rear cadres and create schools, culture and newspapers. Everything in Yenan has been built up by means of the gun. Anything can grow out of the barrel of a gun, according to the Marxist theory of the state, the army is the chief component of the political power of a state... Some people have ridiculed us as advocates of the 'existence of war', yes, we are, we are the advocates of the omnipotence of the revolutionary war, which is not bad at all, but is good and is Marxist.

It is difficult to understand how an author who writes as a Marxist can elevate the army and the process by which it seizes itself into an instrument to create the political elite. Marxists would rather deem that the role of the army is defined by the current class-struggles from which the political elite emerges. The confusion, in China as in the case of many modern revolutions in near Eastern countries, is caused by the absence or weakness of an industrial working class, whose struggles might produce the required guiding force; in its absence, the power structure of the new society becomes ambiguous. In the Marxist case dialectics, which play a central part in Marxist theory, turns from an analysis of the objective, internal contradictions in society into a learned circumscription of the application of force; this is ruthless where 'major contradictions', i.e., relations to the enemy, as described by decision of the Politburo of ~~the Party~~ are concerned, more lenient when the contradictions are judged to be minor ones, i.e., 'within the people'.

^{A8} It is well known, the Russian revolutionary movement did not develop ~~that~~ or lines that might have lead them ^{of far less of} to Machievism, ^{a relatively} to Leninism, in spite of the fact that it operated in ~~a~~ underdeveloped country, and in spite of the Stalinist phase to which the Soviets, naturally enough, cling, as in their guiding star. (Still, Stalin would never have dreamed of an alleged 'omnipotence of war', though he elaborated his system in the course of ~~a~~ a 'revolution from above' and of the preparation for a major war, forced upon the Soviet peoples, against also his nation.) When the voluntarist conceptions of revolution had broken down in the catastrophe of ~~the Russian Revolution~~, the leading minds of a new

~~returned page~~ 5
generation of revolutionaries, with a Marxist conception of social development, adopted an orientation based upon the working class. This was so despite the relatively slow growth⁴⁾ of the working class. Their conception of revolutionary activities centered on the organization of the working ~~class~~ ^{class} around which all the other forces ~~represented~~ repressed by the existing regime, in particular the peasants and the national minorities would rally. This broadness of approach was one of the debts which Leninism owed to its Populist pre-history. The other was the conception of the centralized and organized vanguard. Yet when Lenin, in his Siberian exile in 1898 argued for a broad alliance based on the working class, although paying tribute to ~~them~~ 'the coryphees of Russian revolution', the leaders of Narodnaya Volya, he still took issue with Lavrov who had misinterpreted Lenin's wide appeal to people of all social classes in the struggle against absolutism as a de facto acceptance⁴⁾ of the Populist platform. Lenin's basic orientation upon the working class was elaborated in 1905, when he, now in opposition to the Mensheviks, declared that the workers' party must organize the impending bourgeois-democratic revolution. In 1914 he called upon revolutionary Social Democrats to live up to the decisions of the Second International, in the drafting of which at the Stuttgart Congress of 1907 he himself ^{with Rosa Luxemburg} had played a prominent part.

4) Collected Works, 4th English edition, vol. II, p.325 ff.

8

(as reported by the Biele Congress of 1912)

(The Stuttgart resolutions characterized the impending war as a crime committed in the interest of capitalist profits, dynastic ambitions, and in honouring secret diplomatic conventions' ~~but~~ also as a political and economic crisis which should be used by the socialists in order 'to arouse the people and to remove capitalist class-rule'. Governments were warned of the revolutionary dangers ^{which might result from a war.} threatening them in going to war. We should keep in mind that, at ~~that~~ ^{this} time, the Second International had practically no non-European sections, and that only German Social Democracy had a strength comparable with the present one of the French and Italian ^{Communist parties;} ~~and~~ Bolshevism was a trend struggling for ascendancy within the Russian party though, as one sees, fully recognised as a factor in the International.)

The idea that any socialist could welcome war as the opportunity for socialist revolution never arose; the difference during the First World War between those supporters of the anti-war decisions of the Second International who eventually formed the ^{Communist} ~~Marxist~~ movement and those who remained Social Democrats, concerned merely the question ^{of} what should be done once war had broken out. Ever before the arrival of the Atom Bomb no socialist and no communist ever desired war as the occasion for revolution; when, in 1928, Bukharin made statements which might have been interpreted as expressing an expectation that the next wave of socialist revolution might follow from a war, they were immediately denounced by the CPSU as revealing undue scepticism with regard to the prospects of socialist revolutions arising from conditions of economic depression.

The Comintern's influence upon the revolutionary movement in the colonial and semi-colonial countries operated in a dual, and partly ~~xx~~ contradictory way. On the one hand, it served as the lever through which the Russian-Bolshevik conception of the 'revolutionary dictatorship of the workers and peasants, elaborated in 1905, and that of 'Peasants' Soviets', adopted already in the theses of the Second ^{of the} Comintern Congress ⁱⁿ 1920, were pressed upon the west-European communist parties, with their fully urban outlook, and upon the Eastern communist parties, in particular that of China, which were founded by intellectuals with a purely bookish knowledge of Marxism. On the other

Statements by Marx and Engels, occurring till the end of the 'sixties of the ~~19th~~ century, about the possible promotion of revolutions by war belong to the bourgeois-democratic phase of development, and were quite current amongst their contemporaries. (Cf. by Marx, his time and ~~ours~~ ^{Engels} ed. London 1950, Italy 1961; Chapter XIV Section B.)

unclassified

Wang was in
Japan (below)

On the other hand, the Comintern's centralism soon operated as a limitation upon ^{reports} ~~its~~ to go further in the adaptation of Marxist concepts, for example, to Chinese conditions. Organizational and ideological centralism, as a means of bringing about unity ⁱⁿ the international socialist movement proved disastrous. Pravda, on June 15, 1964 implicitly rejected the 'Twenty-one conditions for Admission to the Comintern' and similar ~~Communist~~ documents, when it published an interview given by an old-standing Japanese Communist. under the heading 'I do not recognize my "exclusion" from the ~~Anti~~ ~~Japan~~ CP Japan's.' Having recently visited the city of Nagasaki and realized the feelings of its population, ^{that} ~~that~~ supported in Parliament the ratification of the Test Ban Treaty, ~~this action on the part of the~~ ~~CP~~ was taken in defiance of a party decision, adopted by the Central Committee of the CPJ against ~~his own and his friends' votes~~. He was ~~thus~~ duly expelled by the Maoist majority of the Japanese Central Committee. In compensation for such a state of things in the Japanese Communist Party, ~~the~~ ~~Communist Party of Japan~~ Mr. Tomomi Narita, the leader of the much stronger Socialist Party of Japan contributed an article to Pravda (July 13, 1964) in which Soviet peace policies, including of course the Test Ban Treaty, are fully supported, and hence, by implication the Maoist standpoint is rejected.

Readers, however, should not forget that the Trotsky-inspired criticism of the Comintern's China policies, current in the west, is ~~not~~ directed, not as with Mao, against the transfer to China of the ~~concept~~ ~~concept~~ of the working-class-guided dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, but against failure to call, in 1937, for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat ~~and the~~ ~~peasantry~~. ~~explicitly~~ ~~China~~ is mentioned only by protest against the failure of the USSR and of the Japanese Government to recognise her lawful government-a point for which there can be no disagreement among sincere supporters of peace.

The timing of Mao's break with the majority trend in communism is open to doubt. Such things happen, as a rule, by an accumulation of comparatively minor disagreements ^{and} ^{particular} ^{where} ^{stare} ^{into} ^{the} ^{eyes} ^{of} ^{the} ^{world} ^{and} ^{perhaps} ^{even} ^{exaggerated}. For example, Miss Engelborgh-Bertels' observations about the non-aggression pact concluded ^{by the USSR with Japan} ^{in 1941} which ~~set~~ ~~the~~ ~~Siberian~~ ~~divisions~~ ~~free~~ ~~to~~ ~~be~~ ~~used~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~war~~ ~~against~~ ~~Germany~~ ~~and~~ ~~perhaps~~ ~~also~~ ~~the~~ ~~Chinese~~ ~~revolutionary~~ ~~retrospective~~ in the December battle, appear to me as reflections of what, mildly, be described as romantic nationalism as opposed to ordinary commonsense in which Mao, as a rule, is not lacking. On the other hand, I think that Maoist Sen is inconsistent when quoting, with approval, both Wan Ming's report to the ^{Council of the} ~~Comintern Congress~~ ^{which was then not received in support} ~~which was then not received in support~~ of the United National Front ~~and~~ ~~for~~ ~~than~~ ~~Mao~~ ~~at~~ ~~that~~ ~~time~~ and the Tseung-tseung, held a few months before or a rest during the 'long march', at which the Politburo installed by Comintern and ^{headed} ^{by}

8-20

Can Zing ~~was~~ ^{has} been ~~deposed~~ ^{deposed} ~~the~~ ^{its} ~~unofficial~~ ^{official} ~~agreement~~ ^{agreement} to these
 changes ~~was~~ ^{is} conditioned by ~~their~~ ^{its} ~~prominent~~ ^{prominent} interest in the anti-Japanese
 United National Front. As regards the interpretation of the driving
 forces of the Chinese revolution, C. J. Kuusinen, the last survivor of
 the Comintern Leaders of those days, has never been convinced of the
 correctness of Mao's standpoint, ~~be it~~ ^{even} for China only: in a speech
 made on the February 1964 plenary meeting of the CPSU (and published,
 after Kuusinen's death, in Pravda, May 19, 1964 as a kind of political
 testament) he asserted that ~~Communism~~ ^{the} ~~however much it may have progressed~~ ^{has}
 in many, including Chinese questions, its criticism of Mao's neglect of
 the urban workers ~~was~~ ^{is} ~~hundred per cent right~~.

These new conditions
diverge from the rest of the world

Kuusinen, and those who repeated his speech have, however, failed
 to make clear what, in their opinion, the Chinese party should have done
 once the possibility of a revolution different from that originally
 intended had become evident. ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~complete~~ ^{complete} failure of all efforts at
 organising the urban workers ~~after the defeats of 1927~~ ^{after the defeats of 1927} ~~the~~ ^{the} peasants' guerilla war ~~was~~ ^{was}
~~and, eventually, on an all-national basis in the defence against~~ ^{and, eventually, on an all-national basis in the defence against}
 Chinese communists could not ~~refuse the possible, only in the sense~~ ^{refuse the possible, only in the sense} of Trotsky
 once said that, in certain circumstances the Russian communists, abandon-
 ed by the western working class, might have to say (paraphrasing Engels)
 'we have come too early'. Such an attitude, even if conceivable after a
 long civil war which had required enormous sacrifices, would ~~also~~ ^{also} have

no doubt!
H.P.

contradicted the self-assertion of a nation with a great history and
 great potential strength as well as the Marxist ^{Leninist} interpretation of
 the present historical period ~~over~~ ⁱⁿ the world as a whole. Similarly
 in our days, the adoption of a conception of world-wide transition to
 socialism by, ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ the ~~whole~~ ^{whole} peaceful competition in the economic and
 cultural fields would imply, for the Chinese, a recognition that their
 country ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~still~~ ^{still} a considerable time ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~long~~ ^{long} run, its potentialities are
 secondary part in that process. ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ the long run, its potentialities are
 nearly unlimited. ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~conception~~ ^{conception} of World Revolution as being, in
 substance, the emancipation of the colonial peoples promises immediate
 gains in prestige precisely in those parts of the world in which China,
 as a great power, is particularly interested, yet which worry little
 about Marxist doctrine. ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~latter~~ ^{latter} ~~had~~ ^{had} to be suitable re-interpreted,
 and this re-interpretation could ~~even~~ ^{even} be combined with a, tactically,
 useful, claim to Marxist orthodoxy since the CPSU, hitherto regarded
 as the guardian of such orthodoxy, ~~had~~ ^{had} ~~not~~ ^{not} ~~yet~~ ^{yet} ~~arrived~~ ^{arrived} at the conclusion, that its own country's further progress
 is promoted by ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~dropping~~ ^{dropping} of obsolete points of doctrine. Since the
 Marxist economic teaching is obviously unsuitable as a basis for a
 the most suitable procedure in the ideological field was
 Chinese of aim to hegemony, ~~a~~ ^a one-sided development ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~Stalin's~~ ^{Stalin's} political doctrine, which ~~had~~ ^{had} in itself had been a shifting
 of the delicate balance established in classical Leninism between
 regard for the mass movements ^{in particular of the industrial workers} and the organising activities of the
 elite, in favour of the ~~latter~~ ^{latter}. We have already noticed that thereby Mao
 arrived very close to one of the ~~pre~~ ^{pre}-Marxist sources of Leninism, ~~namely~~ ^{namely}

As distinct from 'primitive' Blanquism, however, which operated as one of the trends from which the modern socialist movement originated

Private

Its share in the Paris Commune of 1870, though rarely explicitly recognised, forms ~~even~~ part of the generally accepted socialist tradition. ^{has evolved} Maoism, ^{came} originated within the framework of a centralised world

communist movement and aiming at securing for itself its ideological ^{where Engels took the initiative in developing his own, and partly left, estate, consciously opposes and denounces everything else which has}

grown within that ^{the Marxist} framework. The working class of existing socialist countries is said to be exposed to embourgeoisement - evident ^{in the USSR} (already when, at last, it is possible to offer every family a flat of its own).

The labour movement of the industrially developed countries, including the ^{French and Italian} ~~two~~ strongest communist parties - apart from Indonesia which are not ~~inextricably~~ ^{are} state parties - is written off as 'Revisionist'. The

exception ^{is} being formed only by small ~~splitter~~ ^{are} groups which accept the Maoist platform and are prepared to accept even atomic ~~destruction~~ ^{former} of their countries as price for a 'world revolution' of the colonial nations.

'Communists', we read in the seventh editorial comment of 'Yenmin Ribao' and 'Hongqi' to the Open Letter of the ^{Central Committee} of the

CPSU, of February 4, 1964, 'are people who make revolutions. Once they refuse to make revolutions, they cease to be Marxists-Leninists, and become Revisionists of some kind'. ~~Revisionism~~ Revisionism,

evidently, includes the Italian communist concept of 'presenza' - ^{essentially} ~~itself a more continuation of~~ a concept developed by ^{Engels} Engels, in 1891 in

'Socialism in Germany' according to which the working-class, by fighting its struggle for originally limited aims yet putting them into much broader connections, acquires the capacity eventually to take over the estate of capitalist society. Since, at present, no revolut-

Yenmin Ribao
Hongqi

ionary situations exist in the developed capitalist countries, the socialists of such countries, ~~if they were to accept~~ ^{position} the Chinese ~~anathema~~, would have to operate as mere auxiliary forces of the emancipation movement of the underdeveloped countries, about the progress of which we can read every day in the news. ^{Probably} it would be even improper for them to fight for the ~~embourgeoisement~~ ^{of} the workers of their own countries as long as the colonial peoples start. Any party which would take such a position seriously ~~as~~ ^{as} a political line, ~~as~~ ^{as} distinct from a mere desire to document 'radicalism' would commit political suicide. ^{There} is no danger whatever of a world communist movement of Maoist colour coming into being. On the other hand, actions such as the ~~as I write these lines~~ ^{the United States} ~~last one of~~ ^{in North Vietnam} are nearly bound to strengthen the appeal of Maoism in the underdeveloped world countries. Hence we should expect the division to continue for long, even if external aggression should bring about ^{new} military and diplomatic arrangements within what, before, was called the world communist camp and even if, with ^{such} ~~this~~ ^{of increased external threats,} background, the excesses in polemical formulations should be ^a ~~damped~~ down.

Mohit Sen's reference to the schisms within the great world religions has the merit that it warns us against interpreting the Sino-Soviet dispute as a mere episode, to be ended by the patching up of dogmatic differences ^{by international} ~~at a few~~ conferences or, in the extreme case, the ^{disappearance of the} ~~defeated side disappearing~~ from the stage as an uninfluential sect as, for example, the Trotskyists ^{have become} ~~has done~~. It should, however, be kept in mind that the dispute has a well-definable socio-economic background, and that we live in quickly moving times. ^{It is true that} ~~four~~ centuries were required to make Roman Catholics and Protestants ^{Consider the} ~~of~~ possibilities.

of re-union (and this only when faced with a crisis of the religious world outlook as a whole) but it is hardly conceivable that any major country, whatever its local conditions and lines of development, will be without an industrial working-class of its own with a typical working-class attitude by the end of, say, a fifty year period. Nor is it likely that, by then, the Chinese will still be enamoured with 'war communism': much before then their people will have come to regard socialist planning as a means to improve their standard of life, even though, in our days, the Chinese leaders prefer to describe this as 'embourgeoisement'. The Soviet theoreticians, on their part, now clearly emphasize that production drives do not serve production for production's sake, but have to ^{lead to} ~~enable~~ an improvement of the living standards of the people. On the other hand they emphasize, as against the Chinese, that ^{only} by economic progress can socialist countries introduce structural reforms which reduce the differences between town and countryside, between the state-socialist and the co-operative sectors, between manual and intellectual workers: this was heralded by the May, 1964 session of the Supreme Soviet. ¹⁰⁾

Evidently, in the Sino-Soviet dispute we are meeting fundamentally different conceptions of socialism: until it will be healed in the natural way we shall have to live with it just as with the splits within what, on paper, is still the 'Western alliance'. We shall have to see to it that conflicts within either of the great 'camps', whatever specific interests of the competing parties are involved, should not degenerate into a competition in 'toughness' against the opposite 'cold war' party.

University of Glasgow

9) Cf., for example, G. Kozlov, in Voprosy Ekonomiki, 1964, No. 1, p. 48.

10) Cf. B. Ponomarev's ~~report~~ at the June 1964 session of the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the CC of the CPSU; reprinted in Kommunist 1964, No. 11, pp. 45 ff.

report

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R.S. corrections

Comment

The Dispute and the Socialist Tradition

Rudolf Schlesinger

The Sino-Soviet dispute does not deal with forecasts about the likelihood that a party which, in its platform promises 'to take up the cold war offensive on all fronts' and whose leader proclaims that 'they can be no ^{extension} ~~excesses~~ ^{pursuit of} in the cause of freedom' wins the next Presidential election, about the effects which its pressure may have on official U.S. policies, and hence about the prospects ^{of a} further reduction of international ^{tension} ~~tradition~~ by individual agreements. The dispute does not even deal with the question of whether a thermo-nuclear war can be safely avoided: neither of the disputing parties wills it, and neither would be willing to submit to atomic blackmail. Even the Soviet communists do not deny the possibility that mankind may be forced upon the painful way of reconstruction after a nuclear war, and they would, of course, if the aggressor has been defeated, insist on that reconstruction proceeding on such socialist lines as possible after the enormous ~~annihilation~~ destruction of human and productive resources. They emphasise, however, the immensity of the ^{human and material} costs involved in that way towards a new social ^{order} ~~formation~~ and their ⁱⁿ ~~compatibility~~ with those involved even in ~~some~~ a delay of individual revolutionary developments in countries, if such a delay should follow from the ~~maximal~~ pursuance of a cautious foreign policy. And they insist on a definition of socialism from the standpoint of which 'war communism'—their own earlier pattern, from the image of which 'the Chinese way to communism' is modelled—appears not as socialism in the proper sense of the word but as a deviation, unhappily sometimes forced upon the socialist countries by hostile aggression. To the Chinese communists, on the other side, revolutionary war is not, one of

diverse possibilities (not the desirable one) which in the Soviet
communists' opinion, should be approached in the era of thermo-nuclear
armaments in a way very different from that pursued by bourgeois
democrats of the mid-nineteenth century, and shared by Marx up to the
end of the 'sixties' (it changed already fundamentally in the period
of the Interwar ¹⁾ ~~years~~ ^{years}, including the left-wing of the Second International
on the eve of the first World War). To the Chinese, revolutionary
war is the normal way of transforming ^{transition to a} /new society, which is defined in
accordance with that origin (and the Chinese experience). Hence to fol-
low, not different evaluations of, say, US attacks on North Vietnam but
different approaches to the positive construction of socialism. In a
journal devoted to the problems of peaceful co-existence of ^{states embodying} /different
social structures the different ~~conceptions~~ ^{conceptions of the} way to socialism are relev-
ant insofar as, in either ~~case~~ ^{side in the great international cleavage,} lacking belief in the possibility of
striving for its ideals in peaceful competition forms ~~for~~ ^{of} ~~course~~ ^{the} main
argument against peaceful co-existence with the opposite system.

In this comment, ^{however} we are dealing with the dispute not from the
standpoint of its foreign policy implications which, by their very nat-
ure, primarily concern states but from that of the continuity of the
socialist tradition which ~~also, and perhaps mainly,~~ includes its relev-
ance for socialist movements not in control of state power. This does
not mean that we are discussing it from the standpoint of Marxist
orthodoxy: Marxist ideology, like any other, ^{is} its origins and formation
~~is subject to historical sociological analysis~~ ^{religions}. We are primarily con-
cerned with the question of whether the foundations of the dispute (as
distinct from its foreign policy implications) the close association
of which with present issues of international relations is obvious
can be properly explained by ^{new} /differences in development stages ~~for~~
~~(factor)~~ ^{by} /differences in national tradition, or may be regarded
as ^a /reformulation of approaches, the differences of which (though it ^{certainly} ~~surely~~
has its sociological foundations) is as old as the modern socialist
(movement).

A serious approach to this problem is a priori excluded ²⁾ ~~is~~, with
G. Lichtheim Marxism is defined as being, in essence, opposition to 'the

1) I have dealt with this issue in Marx, his time and ours (Engl. ed.
London 1950, Italian 'Marx, ieri e oggi' (Milano, 1961) Chapter XIV, sect. 5
2) Marxism: an historical and critical study, London 1961, p. 165, note 4.

economic system of bourgeois society, the latter being the fully developed form of western civilisation'. This statement, which reproduces the objections of the Russian right-wing Social Democrats (including the Mensheviks) of the beginning twentieth century to Bolshevism- i.e. to the form in which Marxism eventually conquered in a comparatively advanced of the 'underdeveloped' countries such as Tsarist Russia- makes Marxism, a fortiori, inapplicable to the second half of the twentieth century, where the major changes in social structure are taking place outside Europe. It contradicts, however, not only the personal views of Marx, as expressed, 1878, in his famous letter to the Editor of the Otchestvenniye Zapiski, but also the historical record of the Marxist movement which originated, as an intellectual trend, in that country of western Europe which in the late 'forties of the nineteenth century had the least developed bourgeois society and achieved ~~at least formal~~ preponderance in the socialist parties of Germany (in the 'eighties) and of Russia (in the 'nineties) operating in the underground. Its growth, as a theory- not only in Russia, but also in Central Europe- culminated in the first two decades of the twentieth century, i.e. at a time when Ricardian economics (and, a fortiori, their diverse vulgarisations) as well as the stage of bourgeois society with which they had been concerned were stone dead. The misrepresentation of the political aspects of Marx's early ^{political} writings as some kind of 'infantile disorder' conditioned by the Young Hegelian origins, and the neglect of Engels' elaboration, in the concluding years of his life, of the non-economic elements amongst those factors whose interaction shapes history, belongs to the realm of political mythology.

Marxism is, however, a certain conception of the objective conditions of human action and, in particular, of such actions as lead to the replacement of one form of social organisation by another one. In application to the special issue of the replacement of a capitalist by a socialist order of society it asserts the basic importance of the industrial working class; in this sense it has gained ascendancy³⁾ as the conclusion of the 'Populist' period in the development of the socialist movement of that country where eventually it got its first opportunity, not only to exercise influence as a pressure group but to shape social formations. During that preparatory period Russian socialism had been represented by a great variety of trends, all of them based upon the—as a fact indisputable—predominance of the peasantry while the need for a democratic revolution was generally recognised amongst the young intellectuals predominant in the progressive movements. A majority of those trends operated upon the supposed anarchist (or rather spontaneous) inclinations of the peasantry as regards the overthrow of the Tsarist regime as well as the construction of the new society but the minority included, apart from ~~rather pathological~~ incidents such as the Mechayevchina (which, in its days, acquired fame, apart from Dostoyevsky's writings, by its association with the dispute between Marx and Bakunin and, in our days, became a pet-food for anti-communist authors) the attempted transfer, by P. M. Tkachev, of the French Blanquist tradition to the Russian soil, combined with some tribute paid to the Marxist interpretation of history: the bridge was formed by the assertion that the idealist inspiring volunteerist action of elites were produced by the historical process. Tkachev was not so

3) I am using the term here in the very broad sense as applied in Franco

Venturi's book Il Populismo Russo (Italian ed. 1952, engl. translation published, in 1960 in London, under the title Roots of Revolution) so as to denote that period in the development of the Russian socialist movement in which it was not yet split into what eventually became the Social Revolutionaries (the party which, based upon the peasantry, played the prominent part during the Kerensky period of 1917, and immediately after the Bolshevik conquest of power, as a main centre of opposition to it) and the Social Democrats (the latter themselves split into the Leninist Bolsheviks, which eventually assumed power, and the Mensheviks, who emphasized a 'western' way of development; both factions, however, operating upon the organisation of the industrial working-class).

naive to believe that armed insurrection, organised by a conspiratorial group under proper use of a crisis within the ruling class, could solve the problems of the future, the rest to be left to the liberated people's spontaneity (as was stated, at their trial, by the leaders of

of his ideas with anarchy; in his concept there would have been ample room for a centralised party-rather of the Chinese than of the Soviet ~~type~~ communist type, since he was far from recognising a guiding role of the working class in the conglomerate of social forces supporting the revolution. Tkachov would have willingly supported the following statement of Mao's, made at the height of the anti-Japanese war but ^{ed.} ~~unprinted~~ 1954 in his Selected Works (eng. vol. II, p. 272) and ^{surely} ~~has~~ intended as more than a polemic against excessive emphasis on the social and educational aspects of the revolutionary movement, ~~to the detriment of military action:~~

with party
'Our principle is that the party commands the gun, and the gun will never be allowed to command the party. But it is also true that with guns at our disposal we can easily build up the party organisation, and the Eighth Route Army has built up a powerful party organisation in North China. We can also rear cadres and create schools, culture and mass movements. Everything in Yenan has been built up by means of the gun. Anything can grow out of the barrel of a gun. According to the Marxist theory of the state, the army is the chief component of the political power of a state.... Some people have ridiculed us as advocates of the 'omnipotence of war': yes, we are, we are the advocates of the omnipotence of the revolutionary war, which is not bad at all, but is good and is Marxist'.

clarification
(~~clarification~~)
I need not dwell here on the strange ~~explanation~~, by an ~~author~~ who regards himself as a Marxist, of the obvious necessity of a certain institution (the army), and of the process in which it asserts itself (war) into a capacity to create the political elite which is supposed to define the purposes for which it is to be used: in all these cases-including those of many modern revolutions in ^{near-Eastern} countries, with ^{similar confusion, in} ~~non-Marxist national leaders,~~ ~~marking a line~~ has been caused by the absence, or weakness, of an industrial working-class. In the Maoist case, however, the very theory which is supposed to direct the revolutionary process changes its character: Dialectics which plays a central part in Maoist theory-turns from an analysis of the objective, internal contradictions in society into a learned circumscription of policy decisions about the application of force: ruthless where 'major contradictions' (in relation to 'the enemy') are concerned, more lenient, including a larger ~~share~~ share of the educational element, ~~when~~ -presumably according to a decision of the Politburo of the KPC China, the contradictions are merely minor ones, 'within the people'.

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x

It is well known, the Russian revolutionary movement has not developed that on lines that might have lead from Tkachevism to Maoism, in spite of the fact that it operated in an underdeveloped country, and in spite of the Stalinist phase to which the Maoists, naturally enough, cling as to their guiding star (still Stalin would never have dreamed of an ~~omnipotence of war~~ though he elaborated his system in the

of the Stalinist phase to which the Maoists, naturally enough, cling as to their guiding star (still Stalin would never have dreamed of an altered 'omnipotence of war', though he elaborated his system in the course of of a 'revolution from above' and of the preparation for a major war, forced upon the Soviet peoples, against also his volition). When the voluntarist conceptions of revolution had broken down in the catastrophe of 'People's Freedom', the leading minds of a new

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generation of revolutionaries, with a Marxist conception of social development acquired the basic orientation upon the working-class, slow though its growth still was. Their conception of revolutionary activities centred on the organisation of that class and, round it, of all the other forces repressed by the existing regime, in particular the peasants and the minority nationalities. This broadness of approach was one of the debts which Leninism owed to its Populist pre-history; the other was the conception of the centralised and organising vanguard. Yet when Lenin, in his Siberian exile developed this concept as early as 1898, while paying special tribute to 'the coryphees of Russian revolutionary practice' (i.e. the leaders of 'People's Freedom') he argued against Lavrov who had misinterpreted his appeal to people from all social classes for the struggle against absolutism as a de facto acceptance of the Populist platform. ^{x2) 4)} The basic orientation upon the working-class was elaborated, but not modified when in 1905 Lenin—now in opposition to the Mensheviks—declared that the workers' party must organise the impending revolution (about the bourgeois-democratic character of which there were no disagreements) and when, in 1914, he ~~called~~ the revolutionary Social Democrats to live up to the earlier decisions of the Second International (in the drafting of which, at the Stuttgart Congress of 1907, he himself and Rosa Luxemburg herself a Menshevik in Russian organisational matters had played a prominent part). These..

decisions described the threatening war-the political constellation of which was fairly precisely foretold-not only as a crime committed in the interest 'of capitalist profits, dynastic ambitions, and in honouring secret diplomatic conventions' but also as a political and economic crisis which should be used by the socialists in order 'to arouse the people and to remove capitalist class-rule'; governments were warned of the revolutionary dangers threatening them in going to war (we should keep in mind that, at that time, the Second International had practically no non-European sections, and that only German Social Democracy had a strength comparable with the present one of the French and Italian CPs; Bolshevism was a trend struggling for ascendancy within the Russian party though, as one sees, fully recognised as a factor in the International).

[The idea that any Social Democrat could take another than a negative position to the war phenomenon did not even arise: the difference evolved during the ~~xxx~~ First World War between what eventually became the communists and the future Social Democrats, concerned 'only' the question what should be done once war, against the socialists' volition, had broken out. Even before the arrival of the Atom bomb, no orthodox communist had ~~even~~ thought of describing wars as the prominent occasion for revolutions: when, in 1923, Bukharin made statements which might be interpreted in that direction, they were immediately denounced as betraying, not a positive interest in war (no one thought in those days that any communist might have such inclinations) but as ^{allegedly} undue scepticism as regards the prospects of revolutions arising on the basis of economic depressions etc., before imperialism would have had its ~~xxxx~~ opportunity to start a new world war.

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Comintern's influence upon the revolutionary movement in the colonial and semi-colonial countries operated in a dual, and partly contradictory, way: on the one hand, it served as the lever through which the Russian-Bolshevik adaptations of earlier Marxist concepts to the needs of backward peasant countries (the conception of the 'revolutionary dictatorship of the workers and the peasants', elaborated in 1905, and that of 'Peasants' Soviets', adopted already in the theses of the Second Comintern Congress of 1920) were impressed upon the west-European parties, with their fully urban outlook, and ^{upon Eastern} the communist parties ^{of the Eastern countries}, in particular ^{that of} China, which were ~~just being~~ ^{founded} ~~formed~~ by intellectuals with a purely bookish knowledge of Marxism. On the other hand, its ^{Comintern's} centralism ^{soon operated} ~~was~~ as a limitation upon efforts to go ^{further} in the adaptation of Marxist concepts to, ~~for example,~~ Chinese conditions, ~~beyond the limits implied in that framework.~~ (Readers, however, should not forget that the ^{Trotsky-inspired criticism of Comintern's China-policies,} ~~the~~ ^{currently in the West, is directed} ~~to those of the concept~~ not, as with Mao, against the transfer of a working-class guided dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry but against ~~the~~ ^{Comintern's} failure to call ^{in 1928} for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat plus the poorest peasants). As a conception of the organizational and ideological unity of the international socialist movement, this centralism ^{had itself an absurdum.} ~~has surely mistaken~~ ^{implicitly} Pravda (June 16, 1964) itself ~~demonstrated~~ ^{some} how stone-dead the 'Twenty-One conditions for the Admission to Comintern' and other Leninist documents are when, under the heading 'I do not recognise my "Expulsion" from the C.P. of Japan', it ~~published~~ ^{published} an interview given by an old-standing Japanese communist who, after having visited the city of Nagasaki, a victim of the Atom bomb, and ^{having} established the feelings of its population, yet in contravention

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(if published for June 16, 1964)

to a 334-vote decision adopted against his own and his friends' votes, had supported in parliament the ratification of the Test-Ban-Treaty, and been duly expelled by the Maoist majority of the Japanese CC. In compensation for ~~this~~ such a state of things in the Japanese CP ~~however~~ the readers of Pravda (July 13, 1964) got an article by Tomomi Marita, the leader of the (much stronger) Socialist Party of Japan, in which Soviet peace policies (including, of course, the Test Ban treaty) are fully supported and hence, by implication, the Maoist standpoint rejected (explicitly, China is mentioned only by a protest against Mao's failure of the USA and of the Japanese Government to recognise her lawful government—a point, on which there can be no disagreement amongst progressive people and sincere supporters of peace).

The timing of Mao's break with the majority trend in communism is open to doubt: such things happen, as a rule, by an accumulation of comparatively minor disagreements till, eventually—in particular where state interests are involved—all the past disagreements are brought into a system and perhaps even exaggerated. For example, Miss Engelborgh-Bertels' observations about the non-aggression pact concluded ^{by the USSR with Japan} in 1941 which, ~~xxx~~ set the Siberian divisions free to ~~the Japanese~~ ^{retrospective} saved Moscow—and perhaps also the Chinese revolution ^{may} in the December battle, appear to me as reflections of what, mildly, ~~xxx~~ described as romantic nationalism as opposed to ordinary commonsense in which Mao, as a rule, is not lacking. On the other hand, I think that Mohit Sen is inconsistent when quoting, with approval, both Wan Ming's report to the VII Comintern Congress (which went in issue of the United National Front much less far than Mao did at that time) and the Tsuryi-meeting, held a few months before on a rest during the 'long march', at which the Politburo installed by Comintern and ^{led} headed by

Wan Ming had been deposed (the Russians' eventual agreement to these changes was conditioned by their prominent interest in the anti-Japanese United National Front). As regards the interpretation of the driving forces of the Chinese revolution, N.W. Kuusinen, the last survivor of the Comintern leaders of those days, has never been convinced of the correctness of Mao's standpoint, be it even for China only: in a speech made on the February 1964 plenary meeting of the CPSU (and published, after Kuusinen's death, in Pravda, May 19, 1964 as a kind of political testament) he asserted, ~~xxx~~ Comintern, however much it may have erred in many, including ~~xxx~~ its criticism of Mao's neglect of

correctness of Mao's standpoint, be it even for China only: in a speech made at the February 1964 plenary meeting of the CPSU (and published, after Kuusinen's death, in Pravda, May 19, 1964 as a kind of political testament) he asserted that Comintern, however much it may have erred, in many, including Chinese questions, its criticism of Mao's neglect of the urban workers was hundred per cent. right.

Kuusinen, and those who reprinted his speech have, however, failed to make clear what, in their opinion, the Chinese party should have done once the possibility of a revolution different from that originally intended had become evident by the ^{complete} failure of all efforts at organising the urban workers.

After the defeats of 1927, while the peasants' guerilla war made progress and, eventually, got an all-national basis in the defence against Japanese aggression, the ^{Chinese communists could not} refuse the necessity, say in the sense as Trotsky once said that in certain circumstances the Russian communists, abandoned by the western working class, might have to say (paraphrasing Engels): 'we have come too early! such an attitude, even if conceivable after a long civil war which had required enormous sacrifices, would also have contradicted the self-assertion of a nation with a great history and great potential strength as well as the Marxist ^{Leninist} interpretation of the present historical period over the world as a whole. Similarly in our days, the adoption of a conception of world-wide transition to socialism by, in the wholehearted competition in the economic and cultural fields would imply, for the Chinese, a recognition that their country for still a considerable time is bound to play a fairly secondary part in that process: in the long run, its potentialities are nearly unlimited. ^{As opposed to this, the Party} ^{with a conception of world revolution as being, in} ^{hitherto, oppressed} ^{substance, the emancipation of the colonial peoples promises immediate gains in prestige precisely in those parts of the world in which China, as a great power, is particularly interested yet which worry little about Marxist doctrine. The latter had to be suitably re-interpreted; and this re-interpretation could even be combined with a, tactically useful, claim to Marxist orthodoxy since the CPSU, hitherto regarded as the guardian of such orthodoxy had}

arrived at the conclusion that its own country's further progress (as promoted by ~~Marxism-Leninism~~) the dropping of obsolete points of doctrine. Since the

Marxist economic teaching is obviously unsuitable as a basis for a the most suitable procedure in the ideological field was Chinese claim to hegemony, ~~one-sided development of certain points~~

of Stalin's political doctrine, which had in itself had been a shifting of the delicate balance established in classical Leninism between regard for the mass-movement ^{in preference to the individual activity} and the organising activities of the elite, in favour of the latter. ^{Scarcely} We have already noticed that thereby Mao arrived very close to one of the ~~Marxist~~ sources of Leninist ~~thought~~

As distinct from 'primitive' Blanquism, however, which operated as one of the trends from which the modern socialist movement originated (its share in the Paris Commune of 1870, though rarely explicitly recognised, forms ~~even~~ part of the generally accepted socialist tradition) Maoism, originated within the framework of a centralised world communist movement and aiming at securing for itself its ideological estate, consciously opposes and denounces everything else which has grown within that framework. The working-class of existing socialist countries is said to be exposed to embourgeoisement-evident^{in the USSR} (already when, at last, it is possible to offer every family a flat of its own; the labour movement of the industrially developed countries (including the two strongest communist parties apart from Indonesia which are not ~~independent~~ state parties), is written off as 'Revisionist' (the exception being formed only by small splinter groups which accept the Maoist platform and are prepared to accept even atomic destruction of their countries as price for a 'world revolution' of the ^{former} colonial nations). 'Communists', we read in the seventh editorial comment of 'Jenmin Ribao' and 'Hongqui' to the Open Letter of the CC of the CPSU (of February 4, 1964), 'are people who make revolutions. Once they refuse to make revolutions, they cease to be Marxists-Leninists, and become Revisionists of some kind' ~~xxxxxx~~ (Revisionism, evidently, includes the Italian communist concept of 'presenza'-in itself, a mere continuation of a concept developed by Engels, in 1891 in 'Socialism in Germany' according to which the working-class, by fighting its struggle for originally limited aims yet putting them into much broader connections, acquires the capacity eventually to take over the estate of capitalist society). Since, at present, no revolut-

lonary situations exist in the developed capitalist countries, for socialists of such countries, if being afraid of the Chinese, another would have to operate as mere auxiliary forces of the emancipation movement of the underdeveloped countries, about the progress of which we can read every day in the news; probably it would be even improper for ~~them~~ to fight for the embourgeoisement of the workers of their own countries as long as the colonial peoples start. Any party which would take such a position seriously (i.e. as a political line, as distinct from a mere desire to document 'radicalism') would commit political suicide: there is no danger whatever of a world communist movement of Maoist colour coming into being. On the other hand, actions such as the -as I write these lines- last one of TGA in North Vietnam are nearly bound to strengthen the appeal of Maoism in the underdeveloped world countries. Hence we should expect the division to continue for long, even if external aggression should bring about ^{new} military and diplomatic arrangements within what, before, was called the world communist camp and even if, within this background, the excesses in polemical formulations should be damped down.

Mohit Sen's reference to the schisms within the great world religions has the merit that it warns us against interpreting ~~this~~ Sino-Soviet dispute as a mere episode, to be ended by the patching up of dogmatic differences at a few conferences or, in the extreme case, the defeated side disappearing from the stage as an unimportant sect as, for example, the Trotskyist has done. It should, however, be kept in mind that the dispute has a well-definable socio-economic background, and that we live in quickly moving times: if four centuries were required to make Roman Catholics and Protestants to think of possibilities of re-unification (and this only when faced with a crisis of the religious world outlook as a whole) it is hardly conceivable that, say in half a century from now, any major country ~~be it even still backward~~ ^{without its local conditions and specific lines of development} in relation to other, ~~more advanced industrial countries~~ will be without an industrial working-class of its own within a typical working-class attitude. Nor is it likely that, by then, the Chinese will still be enamoured with 'war communism': much earlier their people will have come to regard socialist planning as a means to improve their standard of life, 'embourgeoisement' or not. Until the dispute will have been healed in this most natural of ways we shall have to live with it, just as with the splits ^{which} what, on paper, is still in the 'Western alliance' - and see to it that conflicts within either of the great 'camps', whatever specific interests of the competing parties constitution in 'toughness'.